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To J. C. M.

The long time devoted to the preparation of this book, of right belonged

to you; without your encouragement and aid I should not have been able

to complete it; and while you have always waived your right and lent your

aid in the spirit of most generous helpfulness, I cannot do less than dedicate

to you the final product, coupled with sentiments which I need not name,
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To J.C. M.
The long time devoted to the preparation of this book, of right belonged
to you; without your encouragement and aid I should not have been able
to complete it; and while you have always waived your right and lent your
aid in the spirit of most generous helpfulness, I cannot do less than dedicate
to you the final product, coupled with sentiments which I need not name,
but which your own heart will so readily divine.

PREFACE.

The present work was projected in 1887 and something was

then done upon it. It was, however, temporarily laid aside for

other tasks, until January, 1S92. Since that time it has been

constantly in hand and has been prosecuted as rapidly as health

and the pressure of man)' other duties would permit. Not-

withstanding the utmost effort, however, it has been delayed

long beyond the time originally fixed for its completion.

As it is, the book is very far from being what the writer

hoped to make it, or what he still believes he might have made

PREFACE.

it, had his work been done under more favorable conditions.

To retain it longer, however, for further elaboration seems

neither practicable nor wise.

The general outline and arrangement of Mr. Benjamin have,

in the main, been adopted. This course was decided upon

for two reasons: first, because Mr. Benjamin's classification

has always been regarded as excellent in itself; but secondly

and chiefly, because Mr. Benjamin's analysis (which in its turn

was largely that of Lord Blackburn) has so decidedly controlled
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the development of our law in many important particulars,

that to attempt a new classification or nomenclature would be

confusing if not presumptuous. Mr. Benjamin's text, more-

over, has been freely drawn upon for statements of the Eng-

lish law.

No thought, however, of rivaling Mr. Benjamin's work has

been entertained. Indeed, the writer is convinced, after con-

siderable attention to the subject, that an American book fol-

lowing the method of treatment adopted by Mr. Benjamin is

impracticable. To show the development of the law by an

exhaustive chronological statement of the cases is possible in

England, and would be possible in any single State where

b

The present work was projected in 1887 and something was
then done upon it. It was, however, temporarily laid aside for
other tasks, until January, 1892. Since that time it has been
constantly in hand and has been prosecuted as rapidly as health
and the pressure of many other duties would permit. Notwitbstanding the utmost effort, however, it has been delayed
long beyond the time originally fixed for its completion.
As it is, the book is very far from being what the writer
hoped to make it, or what be still believes be might have made
it, had his work been clone under more favorable conditions.
To retain it longer, however, for further elaboration seems
neither practicable nor wise.
The general outline and arrangement of Mr. Benjamin have,
in the main, been adopted. This course was decided upon
for two reasons: first, because Mr. Benjamin's classification
has always been regarded as excellent in itself; but secondly
and chiefly, because Mr. Benjamin's analysis (which in its turn
was largely that of Lord Blackburn) has so decidedly controlled
the development of our law in many important particulars,
that to attempt a new classification or nomenclature would be
confusing if not presumptuous. Mr. Benjamin's text, moreover, bas been freely drawn upon for statements of the English law.
No thought, however, of rivaling Mr. Benjamin's work bas
been entertained. Indeed, the writer is convinced, after considerable attention to the subject, that an American book following the method of treatment adopted by Mr. Benjamin is
impracticable. To show the development
the law by an
exba ustive chronological statement of the cases is possible in
England, and would be possible in any single State where
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yi PREFACE.

one court of last resort would alone need to be considered;

but to do the same for the whole United States, with over

fifty courts whose more or less conflicting decisions are final

within their respective jurisdictions, seems beyond the reach

of any reasonable endeavor.

Nevertheless an attempt has been made to base this work

upon a careful study of the principal American cases. To this

end, the cases have been carefully digested, and abstracts made

showing concisely the facts and the rule of law announced.

Upon this foundation, the endeavor has been to make a full

and clear statement of the general principles which control

the subject, and to give such a range of illustration and cita-

tion as should show their application. The abstracts and state-

ments of cases have been largely put in the foot-notes rather

than in the text, for the purpose of keeping down the volume

of the work. The result is that the foot-notes are unusually

heavy, possibly unnecessarily so; but if that should be the judg-

ment, the desire to increase the practical usefulness of the book
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must be pleaded in extenuation.

No attempt has been made to deal with every case upon the

subject. Upon many points the cases are now so numerous and

uniform that even to cite them all seemed needless use of space.

Hundreds of cases have been examined and rejected upon this

ground. An effort has been made, however, to include all of

the more recent and important cases down to the date of send-

ing the manuscript to the press.

Parallel references to the " Reporters," to the "American

Decisions," " American Reports," " American State Reports,"

and to the "Lawyers' Reports Annotated," have been made,

and, in many instances, to the volumes of selected cases upon

the law of Sale. Priority of citation has, moreover, been usually

given to these cases, upon the theory that they are likely to be

the most important and most generally accessible. Illustra-

tions of the most important attempts to codify the law of Sale

are given in the Appendix.

When tin's task was undertaken the writer believed that

then- w;is a real mod for an American book upon the law of

one court of last r esort would alone need to be considered;
but to do t he same for th e w bole United States, with over
fifty conrts whose m or e or less conflicting decisions are final
within their respective jurisdictions, seems beyond the reach
of any reasonable endeavor.
K vertheless an atte mpt has been made to base this work
upon a careful study of the principal Am erican cases. To this
enc.1, the cases have been car efully digest ed, aml abstracts made
showing concisely the fac ts and th e rule of law announced.
Upon this founda tion, t he endea vor has been to make a full
and clear statement of the g enera l principl es which control
the subject, a'1d to g ive such a range of illustration and citation as should show their a pplication. The abstracts and statements of cases have been largely put in the foot-notes rather
than in the text, fo r th e purpose of kee ping down the volume
of the work. The r esult is that the foot-notes are unusually
heavy, po sibly un necessaril y so; but if that should be the judgment, the desire to increase the practical usefulness of the book
mu t be pleaded in exten uation.
No attempt bas been made to deal with every case upon the
uhjcct. Upon many poi nts t he cases are now so numerous and
unif rm that even to cite t hem all seemed n eedless use of space.
Ilundre l of ca es have been examined a nu rejected upon this
oT un 1.
n ffort ha been made, ho wever, to incl ucle all of
them re r cent and importa nt cases do wn to the date of senclin<r th manu ript to the pr
I nra.11 l 1' f r nces to tbe "R port ers,'~ to the '' Amedcan
J >' i i n ' " 111 rican R por ts,' "American tate R ports,"
nncl t the' I~awy r '
por ts A nnotat erl," have been maclc,
nncl in many in tnnc; s, t th volu mes of s lect ed cases upon
tliP law of al . ri rity f ·itati n bas moreover, been usually
11
·i\ r n t th
a
up nth th ry t hat th y are likely to b
th ' mo imp rtnnt and m t g ncrally a
s ibl . Illnstrai 111 • 1 f th mot imp rtant a.tt mpts to oclify the law of ale
ill'(' o·i\' ' 11 in th\ ...\pp 'n<li.·.
\\'Ii •n thi. ta . 1- "a. und rt< k n t h writ r believ l that
hr r \\' H". r al n d f ran 111 ri an b k upon the law of
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PREFACE.

Sale. In the long time that he has been at work, various con-

tributions to the subject have been made by others, so that it

is possible that the need, if it ever existed, has long since been

supplied. The writer, however, whether wisely or unwisely,

has persisted in his undertaking, and if his work shall prove to

have a value in some degree commensurate with the labor

spent upon it, he will be content.

Floyd R. Mechem.

University of Michigan,

Ann Arbor, May W, 1901.

Sale. In the long time that he bas been at work, various contributions to the subject have been made by others, so that it
is possible that the need, if it ever existed, has long since been
supplied. The writer, however, whether wisely or unwisely,
has persisted in his undertaking, and if bis work shall prove to
have a value in some degree commensurate with the labor
spent upon it., he will be content.
FLOYD
UNIVER.'SITY OF MICIDGAN,
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Ann Arbor, May 20, 1.90.J..

R.

MECHEM.
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BOOK I.

OF THE CONTRACT OF SALE: ITS FORMATION.

CHAPTER I.

DEFINITIONS.

1. Sale defined.

2. Forms of bargaining.

3. Effect of intention.

4. Essential elements.

5. Further of the definition —

SALE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY.

Executory or executed sales.

§ 6. Bargain and sale.

7. Absolute and conditional sales.

8. Voluntary and forced sales.

9. Judicial sales.

10. Public and private sales.

BOOK I.

§ 1. Sale defined, — A sale of personal property is the trans-

fer, in pursuance of a valid agreement, from one party, called the

seller, to another, called the buyer, of the general or absolute
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title to a specific chattel, for a price, or a consideration esti-

OF THE CONTRACT OF SALE: ITS FORMATION.

mated, in money. 1

x Mr. Benjamin, Sales, § 1, says:

" It may be defined to be a transfer

CHAPTER I.

of the absolute or general property

in a thing for a price in money.''''

Blackstone defines it as "a trans-

DEFINITIONS.

mutation of property from one man

to another in consideration of some

price." 2 BL Com. 446. Kent de-

fines it as " a contract for the trans-

fer of property from one person to

another for a valuable consideration."

2 Kent's Com. 468.

Long's definition is "a transfer-

ring of property from one person to

§ 6. - - Bargain and sale.

§ 1. Sale defined.
2.
3.
4.
5.

7.
8.
9.
10.

- - Forms of bargaining.
- - Effect of intention.
- - Essential elements.
Further of the definition Executory or executed sales.

Absolute and conditional sales.
Voluntary ancl forced sales.
Judicial sales.
Public and private sa:les.

another, in consideration of a sum

of money to be paid by the vendee

to the vendor." Long on Sales, 1.

Story (W. W.) says: "A sale is a

transfer of the absolute title to prop-

erty for a certain agreed price."

Story on Sales, § 1.

Tiedeman defines it as " a contract

or agreement for the transfer of the

§ 1. Sal e defined.- A sale of per on al property is the transfer, in pursuance of a valid agreement, from one party, called the
seller, to another, called the bityer, of the general or absolute
title to a specific chattel, for a price, or a consideration estimated, in money. 1

absolute property in personalty from

one person to another for a price in

money." Tiedeman on Sales, § 1.

English Sale of Goods Act, 1893:

"1. — (1) A contract of sale of

Benjamin, ales, § 1, says:
"It may be defined to be a transfer
of the absolute 01· gene1·al property
in a thing for a price in money."
Black. tone defines it as "a transmutation of property from one man
to another in con ideration of some
price." 2 Bl. Com. 446. Kent defines it as "a contract for the transfer of property from one person to
another for a valuable consideration."
2 Kent's Com. 46 .
Long's definition is "a tran ferring of property from one person to
1 1\fr.

another, in consideration of a sum
of money to be paid by the vendee
to the vendor." Long on Sales, 1.
Story (W. W.) says: "A sale is a
transfer of the absolute title to property for a certain agreed price."
Story on Sales, § 1.
Tiedeman defines it as" a contract
or agreement for the transfer of the
absolute property in personalty from
one person to another for a price in
money." Tiedeman on Sales,§ 1.
Engli h Sale of Goods Act.. 1 93:
"1.- (1) A contract of sale of goods
3

§ 1.J

§ 1.] LAW OF SALE. [BOOK I.

L.A. W OF SALE.

[BOOK I.

The essential elements here involved are that there must be

(1) a transfer, of (2) the general or absolute title, to (3) a spe-

cific chattel, for (4) a price in money or a consideration esti-

mated in money.

Sale is pre-eminently the transfer of the title. This transfer

may ensue at once as the immediate effect of the present agree-

ment of the parties ; or it may be the postponed result to ensue

in future from the present agreement of the parties aided or

completed by some subsequent act or event, such as the lapse

of time or the performance of precedent conditions. In either

case the sale takes place only when the title passes.

Sale means, moreover, the transfer of the absolute or gen-

eral title. There may be other transfers, of limited interests,

such as the right of possession or some special property in or

lien upon the goods ; but these, as will be seen, 1 do not consti-

tute a sale.

There can clearly be no present sale until the specific chattel

has been ascertained and identified. There may be bargain-
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ings concerning the future sale of a chattel not yet in exist-

ence, or not yet ascertained ; but these bargainings, as will also

be seen, 2 cannot ripen into sale until in some way the particular

chattel has been ascertained.

There may be transfers of title for some other consideration

than a price in money ; but no transfer, as will further be seen, 3

is entitled to be denominated a sale unless it be for a price in

money, or at least a consideration estimated in money.

is a contract whereby the seller property in the goods is to take place

transfers or agrees to transfer the at a future time or subject to some

property in goods to the buyer for a condition thereafter to be fulfilled,

money consideration, called the price, the contract is called an agreement

There may be a contract of sale be- to sell. (4) An agreement to sell be-

tween one part-owner and another, comes a sale when the time elapses

(2) A contract of sale may be abso- or the conditions are fulfilled sub-

lute or conditional. (3) Where under ject to which the property in the

a contract of sale the property in the goods is to be transf erred."

goods is transferred from the seller l See post, ch. II.

to the buyer, the contract is called 2 See ptost, Book II, ch. IV.

a sale ; but where the transfer of the 3 See post, ch. V«

The essential elements here involved are that there must be
(1) a transfer, of (2) the general or absolute title, to (3) a specific chattel, for (4) a price in money or a consideration estimated in money.
Sale is pre-eminently the transfer of the title. This transfer
may ensue at once as the immediate effect of the present agreement of the parties; or it may be the postponed result to ensue
in future from the present agreement of the parties aided or
completed by some subsequent act or event, such as the lapse
of time or the performance of precedent conditions. In either
case the sale takes place only when the title passes.
Sale means, moreover, the transfer of the absolute or general title. There may be other transfers, of limited interests,
such as the right of possession or some special property in or
lien upon the goods; but these, as will be seen, 1 do not constitute a sale.
There can clearly be no present sale until the specific chattel
has been ascertained and identified. There may be bargainings concerning the future sale of a chattel not yet in existence, or not yet ascertained; but these bargainings, as will also
be seen, 2 cannot ripen into sale until in some way the particular
chattel has been ascertained.
There may be transfers of title for some other consideration
than a price in money; but no transfer, as will further be seen, 3
is entitled to be denominated a sale unless it be for a price in
money, or at least a consideration estimated in money.

f

is a contract whereby the seller
transfers or agrees to transfer the
property in goods to the buyer for a
money consideration, called the price.
There may be a contract of sale between one part-owner and another.
(2) A contract of sale may be absolute or conditional. (3) Where under
a contract of sale the property in the
goods is transferred from the seller
to the buyer, the contract is called
a sale; but where the transfer of the

property in the goods is to take place
at a. future time or subject to some
condition thereafter to be fulfilled,
the contract is called au agreement
to sell. (4) An agreement to sell becomes a sale when the time elapses
or the conditions are fulfilled subject to which the property in the
goods is to be transferred."
1 See post, ch. II.
2 ee post, Book II, ch. IV.
3 See post, ch. V.
4

CH.

1.J

DEF! !TIO S.

[§§ 2, 3.

CH. I.] DEFINITIONS. [§§ 2, 3.

§2. Forms of bargaining. — The bargainings of par-

ties respecting a transfer of title may take a variety of forms.

Thus, (1) there may be an agreement whose legal effect is the

immediate transfer of the absolute or general title. This is a

sale, called sometimes, for the purpose of further distinction, a

present sale, an executed sale, or a bargain and sale. Or (2)

there may be an agreement whose legal effect is that the title

shall not pass until a future time, either because, in the case

of an ascertained chattel, something remains to happen or be

performed which the parties have treated as precedent, or be-

cause the particular chattel whose title is to be so transferred

has not yet been ascertained. This is an agreement to sell,

called often, for purposes of further distinction, an executory

sale. It does not become a sale until the precedent event has

happened or the condition has been performed. It then be-

comes a sale by force of the present agreement aided or com-

pleted by the happening of that event or the performance of

that condition. Or (3) there may be still another form of agree-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:46 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t6xw4h56n
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

ment, namely, the parties may now agree that at some future

time stated they will come together and enter into another

specified agreement either for a then present sale or for a then

future sale. In this case it is not the intention of the parties

that the title shall now or then pass as the legal result of the

agreement now made, but only that they will then enter into

another specified contract which shall operate to pass the title

either then or at some other time agreed upon. In other

words, adopting the distinction adverted to above, there may

be either (1) a present sale, or (2) a present agreement for a

future sale, or (3) a present agreement for a certain future

agreement to sell.

In all of the forms of bargaining here referred to, however,

it is clear that one result is aimed at, namely, the transfer of

the title, or a sale.

§ 3. Effect of intention. — "Whether in any given case

the bargainings of the parties shall amount to a present sale,

or only to an agreement to sell, depends often and largely

5

§ 2. - - F orms of bargaining.-The bargainings of parties respecting a transfer of title may take a variety of forms.
Thus, (1) there may be an agreement whose legal effect is the
immediate transfer of the absolute or general title. This is a
sale, called sometimes for the purpose of further distinction, a
present sale, an executed sale, or a· bargain and sale. Or (2)
there may be an agreement whose legal effect is that the title
shall not pass until a future time, either because, in the case
of an ascertained chattel, something remains to happen or be
performed which the parties have treated as precedent, or because the particular chattel whose title is to be so transferred
has not yet been ascertained. This is an agreement to sell,
called often, for purposes of further distinction, an executory
sale. I t does not become a sale until the precedent event has
happened or the condition has been performed. It then becomes a sale by force of the present agreement aided or completed by the happening of that event or the performance of
that condition. Or (3) there may be still another form of agreement, namely, the parties may now agree that at some future
time stated they will come together and enter into another
specified agreement either for a then present sale or for a then
future sale. In this case it is not the intention of the parties
that the title shall now or then pass as the legal result of the
agreement now made, but only that they will then enter into
another specified contract which shall operate to pass the title
either then or at some other time agreed upon. In other
words, adopting the distinction adverted to above, there may
be either (1) a present sale, or (2) a present agreement for a
future sale, or (3) a present agreement for a certain future
agreement to sell.
I n all of the forms of bargaining here referred to, however,
it is clear that one result is aimed at, namely, the transfer of
the title, or a sale.

§ 3. - - E ffect of intention.-Whether in any given case
the bargainings of the parties shall amount to a present sale,
or only to an agreement to sell, depends often and largely
5

§ 4.J

J,AW OF SALE.

[BOOK I.

§ 4.] LAW OF SALE. [BOOK I.

upon the intention of the parties. There are, however, cer-

tain conditions or circumstances which conclusively determine

their intention, while others raise a prima facie presumption

concerning it. Thus, where the contract has reference to a

chattel not then designated, it cannot, in the very nature of

the case, fall within the category of present sales, and no title

will pass until the chattel has been ascertained. 1 But where

the contract has reference to a chattel then existing, designated

and ready for delivery, a presumption arises that a present sale

was contemplated and the title will therefore be presumed to

pass at once. 2 This presumption, however, is not conclusive, and

it may be shown that the parties intended that the title should

not pass until some future time or the performance of some

future act, and their intention will be given effect.

§ 4. Essential elements. — The essence of the bargain-

ings concerning sale is, therefore, the agreement or assent

of the parties to the present or future transfer of the title

to a chattel either now designated or afterwards to be ascer-
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tained. Unlike the case of real estate, no deed, conveyance or

other formality is, in general, necessary to give effect to the

intention of the parties ; when the conditions are ripe for the

transfer, the law itself executes their intention by deeming the

upon the intention of the parties. There are, however, certain conditions or circumstances which conclusively determine
their intention, while others raise a primafaoie presumption
concerning it. Thus, where the contract has reference to a
chattel not then designated, it cannot, in the very nature of
the case, fall within the category of present sales, and no title
will pass until the chattel has been ascertained. 1 But where
the contract has reference to a chattel then existing, designated
and ready for deli very, a presumption arises that a present sale
was contemplated and the title will therefore be presumed to
pass at once. 2 This presumption, however, is not conclusive, and
it may be shown that the parties intended that the title should
not pass until some future time or the performance of some
future act, and their intention will be given effect.

transfer as made in conformity to their assent. This assent,

moreover, need not be express, but may be inferred from the

acts and conduct of the parties.

Another element, often appearing in conjunction with this

element of assent, is that of the surrender of the possession of

the chattel by the seller and the assumption of that possession

by the buyer — constituting what is commonly spoken of as the

delivery of the chattel. This element, though very common,

and apparently often regarded as essential, is by no means in-

dispensable; for there may clearly be a completed sale of the

property, though the seller retains the possession ; and there

may also be a complete change of possession without any cor-

responding change of title.

1 See post, Book II, ch. IL ■ 2 See post, Book II, ch. IV.

§ 4:. - - Essential elements.-The essence of the bargainings concerning sale is, therefore, the agreement or assent
of the parties to the present or future transfer of the title
to a chattel either now designated or afterwards to be ascertained. Unlike the case of real estate, no deed, conveyance or
other formality is, in general, necessary to give effect to the
intention of the parties; when the contlitions are ripe for the
transfer, the law itself executes their intention by deeming the
transfer as made in conformity to their assent. This assent,
moreover, need not be express, but may be inferred from the
acts and conduct of the parties.
Another element, often appearing in conjunction with this
element of assent, is that of the surrender of the possession of
the chattel by the seller and the assumption of that possession
by the buyer - constituting what is commonly spoken of as the
delivery of the chattel. This element, though very common,
and apparently often regarded as e sential, is by no means indi pensable; for there may clearly be a completed sale of the
property, thoug h the seller retains the po s ssion; and there
may also be a complete change of possession without any corresponding change of title.
1 See post,

Book II, ch. IL

2 See
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post, Book II, ch. IV.
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A third element, also, often appearing with the others, is that

of payment. But payment is by no means a necessary concom-

itant of the transfer of the title ; for the property may be paid

for before the title passes, or contemporaneously with its trans-

fer, or at any time thereafter.

§ 5. Further of the definition — Executory or executed

sales. — The word sale, remarked the supreme court of the

United States in a leading case, 1 " is a word of precise legal

A third element, also, often appearing with the others, is that
of payment. But payment is by no means a necessary concomitant of the transfer of the title; for the property may be paid
for before the title passes, or contemporaneously with its transfer, or at any time thereafter.

import, both at law and in equity." Unfortunately, however,

this precision of meaning is a condition rather to be desired

than as yet actually attained, for it seems impossible for courts

and text- writers to agree either as to the meaning of the word

or as to the essential elements of the idea it represents. Ac-

cording to some, the sale is the transfer of the title ; according

to others, it is the agreement to transfer. 2 In the case of the

agreement for a present transfer, where the law executes the

agreement by deeming the title as transferred accordingly,

it can be matter of small moment whether the word be applied
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to the agreement or to the transfer, because the making of the

former operates at once to effectuate the latter; but where time,

or the performance of conditions, is to intervene between the

agreement and the transfer, it is necessary to have appropriate

words to indicate these two ideas.

It is, indeed, true here that the effectual thing upon which

the law operates to produce the transfer is still the agreement

of the parties ; but before the law so operates, the agreement of

the parties requires to be aided, supplemented or completed by

the lapse of time or the performance of conditions precedent,

and during this interval the attitude or relation of the parties

needs often to be definitely determined.

That the difference in legal^ffect between a mere agreement

to transfer title hereafter an<ra present transfer of it, is radical

i Williamson v. Berry (1850), 8 How. which the buyer pays or promises to

(49 U. S.) 495, 544. "It means at all pay to the seller for the thing bought

times," continued the court, "a con- and sold."

tract between parties to give and to 2 Compare the definitions collected

pass rights of property for money — in the note to the preceding section.

§ 5. Further of the definition - Executory or executed
sales.-The word sale, remarked the supreme eourt of the
United States in a leading case,1 "is a word of precise legal
import, both at law and in equity." Unfortunately, however,
this precision of meaning is a condition rather to be desired
than as yet actually attained, for it seems impossible for courts
and text-writers to agree either as to the meaning of the word
or as to the essential elements of the idea it represents. According to some, the sale is the tranifer of the title; according
to others, it is the agreement to transfer. 2 In the case of the
agreement for a present transfer, where the law executes the
agreement by deeming the title as transferred accordingly,
it can be matter of small moment whether the word be applied
to the agreement or to the transfer, because the making of the
former operates at once to effectuate the latter; but where time,
or the performance of conditions, is to intervene between the
agreement and the transfer, it is necessary to have appropriate
words to indicate these two ideas.
It is, indeed, true here that the effectual thing upon which
the law operates to produce the transfer is still the agreement
of the parties; but before the law so operates, the agreement of
the parties requires to be aided, supplemented or completed by
the lapse of time or the performance of conditions precedent,
and during this interval the attitude or relation of the parties
needs often to be de.finitely determined.
That the difference in lega~ffect between a mere agreement
to transfer title hereafter an~a present transfer of it, is radical
l Williamson v. Berry (1850), 8 How.
(49 U. S.) 495, 544. "It means at all
times," continued the court, "a contract hetween parties to give and to
pass rights of property for money-

which the buyer pays or promises to
pay to the seller for the t hing bought
and sold."
2 Compare the definitions collected
in the note to the preceding section.
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requires no argument to establish. "By an agreement to

sell," it has been said, "a. jus in personam is created; by a sale

&jus in rem is transferred. If an agreement to sell be broken

the buyer has only a personal remedy against the seller. The

goods are still the property of the seller, and he can dispose of

them as he likes ; they may be taken on execution for his debts,

and if he becomes bankrupt they pass to his trustee. . . .

But if there has been a sale, and the seller breaks his engage-

ment to deliver the goods, the buyer has not only a personal

remedy against him, but also the usual proprietary remedies

against the goods themselves, such as the action for conversion

and detinue. In most cases, too, he can follow the goods into

the hands of third parties. Again, if there be an agreement

for sale and the goods perish, the loss falls on the seller; while,

if there has been a sale, the loss, as a rule, falls on the buyer,

though the goods have not come into his possession." l

§ 6. Bargain and sale. — The common law clearly rec-

ognized these two forms and applied to each a well-known

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:46 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t6xw4h56n
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

name. Thus, " if, by the terms of the agreement, the property

in the thing sold passed immediately to the buyer, the contract

was termed in the common law 'a bargain and sale of goods; '

but if the property in the goods was to remain for the time

being in the seller, and only to pass to the buyer at a future

time, or on the accomplishment of certain conditions, as, for

example, if it were necessary to weigh or measure what was

requires no argument to establish. "By an agreement to
sell," it has been said, " a j us in persona;m is created; by a sale
afus in rem is transferred. If an agreement to sell be broken
the buyer has only a personal remedy against the seller. The
goods are still tho property of the seller, and he can dispose of
them as he likes; they may be taken on execution for his debts,
and if he becomes bankrupt they pass to his trustee.
But if there has been a sale, and the seller breaks his engagement to deliver the goods, the buyer has not only a personal
reme<ly against him, but also the usual proprietary remedies
against the goods themselves, such as the action for conversion
and detinue. In most cases, too, he can follow the goods into
the hands of third parties. Again, if there be an agreement
for sale and the goods perish, the loss falls on the seller; while,
if there bas been a sale, the loss, as a rule, falls on the buyer,
though the goods have not come into his possession." 1

sold out of the bulk belonging to the vendor, then the contract

was called in the common law 'an executory agreement.'" 2

The attempt to distinguish these forms has frequently been

made by applying the term " executed sale " to the former and

" executory sale " to the latter; but this attempt has not proved

entirely satisfactory, not only because the terms have not al-

ways been used in the same sense, but because even the so-

called "executed sale" may be executed in part only; that is,

so far as to pass the title, while it remains executory in part,

as where delivery or payment is postponed.

1 Chalmers on Sale, 3. 2 Benjamin on Sales (6th Am. ed.), § 4.

8

§ 6. - - Bargain and sale.-The common law clearly recognized these two forms and applied to each a well-known
name. Thus, "if, by the terms of the agreement, the property
in the thing sold passed immediately to the buyer, the contract
was termed in the common law' a bargain and sale of goods;'
but if the property in the goods was to remain for the time
being in the seller, and only to pass to the buyer at a future
time, or on the accomplishment of certain conditions, as, for
example, if it were necessary to weigh or measure what was
sold out of the bulk belonging to the vendor, then the contract
was called in the common law 'an executory agreement.'" 2
The attempt to distinguish these forms has frequently been
made by applying the term" executed sale" to the former and
"executory sale" to the latter; but this attempt bas not proved
entirely satisfactory, not only because the terms have not always been used in the same sense, but because even the socalled "executed sale " may be executed in part only; that is,
so far as to pass the title, while it remains executory in part,
as where delivery or payment is postponed.
1 Chalmers

on Sale, 3.

2 Benjamin

8

on Sales (6th Am. ed.),§ 4.
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The English Sale of Goods Act of 1S93 distinguishes thus:

" Where, under a contract of sale, the property in the goods is

transferred from the seller to the buyer, the contract is called

a sale; but where the transfer of the property in the goods is

to take place at a future time or subject to some condition

thereafter to be fulfilled, the contract is called an agreement

to sell. An agreement to sell becomes a sale when the time

elapses or the conditions are fulfilled subject to which the

property in the goods is to be transferred." l This phraseology

is probably as satisfactory as any, and is substantially that

herein adopted.

Assuming the general meaning of the term to be thus agreed

upon, it may be convenient, before going further, to consider

briefly certain special forms or classifications of sale, and to

determine whether they lie within or without the scope of the

present treatise. Thus —

§7. Absolute and conditional sales. — A variety of classi-

fications may be made, based upon the absolute or conditional
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character of the contract of sale. Thus, in accordance with

one basis of distinction — which is really that at the founda-

tion of the distinctions made in the preceding sections between

a sale and a contract to sell, between executed and executory

sales — a sale is said to be absolute " which has been completed

or perfected ; a sale outright ; " while a conditional sale is one

which "takes effect or is to become complete on the perform-

ance of a condition." 2 But this so-called absolute sale may be

The English Sale of Goods Act of 1893 distinguishes thus:
"Where, under a contract of sale, the property in the goods is
transferred from the seller to the buyer, the contract is called
a sale; but where the transfer of the property in the goods is
to take place at a future time or subject to some condition
thereafter to be fulfilled, the contract is called an agreement
to sell. An agreement to sell becomes a sale when the time
elapses or the conditions are fulfilled subject to which the
property in the goods is to be transferred." 1 This phraseology
is probably as satisfactory as any, and is substantially that
herein adopted.
Assuming the general meaning of the term to be thus agreed
upon, it may be convenient, before going further, to consider
briefly certain special forms or classifications of sale, and to
determine whether they lie within or without the scope of the
present treatise. Thus -

subject to a condition subsequent, as where there is a "com-

pleted or perfected " change of title, i. e., " a sale outright,"

subject to be defeated by the non-performance of some annexed

condition. There may clearly, also, be an absolute contract to

sell, as well as a conditional contract to sell.

There is also a form of contract, more fully to be discussed

1 Sec. 1, par. 3 and 4 "The funda- it does not." Blackwood v. Cutting

mental difference between a sale, Packing Co. (1888), 76 Cal. 212, 18

properly so called, and an agreement Pac. R. 248, 9 Am. St. R. 199.

to sell is that in the former case the 2 Anderson's Law Dictionary, 915.

title passes, while in the latter case

§ 7. Absolute and conditional sales.-A variety of classifications may be made, based upon the absolute or conditional
character of the contract of sale. Thus, in accordance with
one basis of distinction - which is really that at the foundation of the distinctions made in the preceding sections between
a sale and a contract to sell, between executed and executory
sales-a sale is said to be absolute" which has been completed
or perfected; a sale outright;" while a conditional sale is one
which " takes e:ffect or is to become complete on the performance of a condition." 2 But this so-called absolute sale may be
ubject to a condition subsequent, as where there is a "completed or perfected" change of title, i. e., ''a sale outright,"
subject to be defeated by the non-performance of some annexed
condition. There may clearly, also, be an absolute contract to
sell, as well as a conditional contract to sell.
There is also a form of contract, more fully to be discussed
1, par. 3 and 4. "The fund~ it does not." Blackwood v. Cutting
mental difference between a sale, Packing Co. (1888), 76 Cal. 212, 18
properly so called, and an agreement Pac. R. 248, 9 Am. St. R. 199.
2 Anderson's Law Dictionary, 915.
to sell is that in the former case the
title passes, while in the latter case
1 Sec.
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hereafter, 1 popularly known as a "conditional sale," which is

really a contract to sell upon the performance of certain con-

ditions by the purchaser, the most usual of the conditions being

the payment of the price.

§ 8. Voluntary and forced sales. — Sales are also often fur-

ther classified as voluntary or forced. A voluntary sale, as its

hereafter,1 popularly known as a "conditional sale," which is
really a contract to sell upon the performance of certain conditions by the purchaser, the most usual of the conditions being
the payment of the price.

name implies, is one which is voluntarily made, as when it is

made by or under the authority of the owner of the goods. A

forced or involuntary sale is one made, not of the volition of

the owner, but by the authority and in pursuance of the law. 2

Of this kind are the great variety of sales made by public offi-

cers, such as sheriffs', guardians' and executors' sales, as well as

the judicial sales which will be hereafter defined.

A sale, though made by a public officer, is not a forced sale

when it finds its authority in the consent of the owner, as where

a sale is made under a power of sale expressly created by a

mortgage ; 3 or where the owner consents to the sale of that

which could not lawfully be sold without his consent, as when
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he consents to the sale of exempt property upon an execution. 4

§ 9. Judicial sales. — Closely allied to the distinctions of

the last section is the subject-matter of this one. A judicial

sale is one made by virtue and in pursuance of an order or de-

cree of a court of competent jurisdiction, and by its duly au-

thorized officer. 5

1 See post, Book II, oh. III. made under the process of the court

2 In Sampson v. Williamson (1851), and in the mode prescribed by law.

6 Tex. 102, 55 Am. Dec. 762, it is said: Civ. Code La., arts. 2580, 2594, 2595."

"A forced sale has been defined to be 3 Patterson v. Taylor (1875), 15 Fla.

a sale made at the time and in the 340. Cf. Sampson v. Williamson,

manner presoi-ibed by law, in virtue supra.

of an execution issued on a judgment i Peterson v. Hornblower (1867), 33

already rendered by a court of com- Cal. 276.

§ 8. Voluntary and forced sales.- Sales are also often further classified as voluntary or forced. A voluntary sale, as its
name implies, is one which is voluntarily made, as when it is
made by or under the authority of the owner of the goods. A
forced or involuntary sale is one made, not of the volition of
the owner, but by the authority and jn pursuance of the law. 2
Of this kind are the great variety of sales made by public officers, such as sheriffs', guardians' and executors' sales, as well as
the judicial sales which will be hereafter defined.
A sale, though made by a public officer, is not a forced sale
when it finds its authority in the consent of the owner, as where
a sale is made under a power of sale expressly created by a
mortgage; 3 or where the owner consents to the sale of that
which could not lawfully be sold without his consent, as when
he consents to the sale of exempt property upon an execution. 4

petent jurisdiction: Dufour v. Cam- 8 Lawson v. De Bolt (1881), 78 Ind.

franc, 11 Mart. (La.) 610, 13 Am. Dec. 564; Terry v. Cole (1885), 80 Va. 701;

360; Donaldson v. Rouzan, 8 Mart. N. Williamson v. Berry (1850), 8 How.

S. 163; Macdonough v. Elam, 1 La. (U. S.) 507; Moore v. Shultz (1850), 13

491, 20 Am. Dec. 284; or, in other Pa. St. 98, 53 Am Dec. 446.

words, a forced sale is one which is

10

§ 9. Judicial sales.- Closely allied to the distinctions of
the last section is the subject-matter of this one. A judicial
sale is one made by virtue and in pursuance of an order or decree of a court of competent jurisdiction, and by its duly authorized officer. 5
1 See

post, Book II, ch. III.

In Sampson v. Williamson (1851),
6 Tex. 102, 55 Am. Dec. 762, it is said:
"A for ced sale has been defined to be
2

a ale made at the time and in the

manner prescribed by law, in virtue
of an execution issued on a judgment
already rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction: Dufour v. Camfranc, 11 Mart. (La.) 610, 13 Am. Dec.
360; Donaldson v. Rouzan, 8 Mart. N.
S. 163; Macdonough v. Elam, 1 La.
491, 20 Am. Dec. 284; or, in other
i.vords, a forced sale is one ·which is

made under the process of the court
and in the mode prescribed by law.
Civ. Code La., arts. 2580, 2594, 2595."
3 Patterson v. Taylor (1875), 15 Fla.
340. Cf. Sampson v. Williamson,
siipra.
4 Peterson v. Hornblower (1867), 33
Cal. 276.
:>Lawson v. De Bolt (1881), 78 Ind.
564; Terry v. Cole (1885), 80 Va. 701;
Williamson v. Berry (1850), 8 How.
(U. S.) 507; Moore v. Shultz (1850), 13
Pa. St. 98, 53 Am. Dec. 446.
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The law governing judicial sales constitutes a separate title

of the law, and most of it lies outside the scope of this treatise,

although some aspects of it will be considered hereafter.

§ 10. Public and private sales. — A public sale is one made

at auction to the highest bidder. A private sale is one not

The law governing judicial sales constitutes a separate title
of the law, and most of it lies outside the scope of this treatise,
although some aspects of it will be considered hereafter.

made by public auction but by private negotiation. Private

sales are always voluntary, but forced sales are always public.

A voluntary sale may also be public at the pleasure of the

§ 10. Public and private sales.-A public sale is one made
at auction to the highest bidder. A private ::;ale is one not
made by public auction but by private negotiation. Private
sales are al ways voluntary, but forced sales are always public.
A voluntary sale may also be public at the pleasure of the
owner.

owner.

11
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CHAPTER II.

TRANSACTIONS TO BE DISTINGUISHED FROM SALES.

§11.

Purpose of this chapter.

§38.

12.

Sale to be distinguished

39.

from gift.

CHAPTER II.

40.

TRANSACTIONS TO BE DISTINGUISHED FROM SALES.

13-15.

Sale to be distinguished

from barter or exchange.

16-18.

Uses of this distinction

— Pleading — Statutes —

41-42.

Waiving tort — Construc-

43-45.

19-20.
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tion of authority.

Sale to be distinguished

from bailment.

46.

21-22.

Change of form or sub-

stance as the test — Illus-

47.

trations.

23.

Further illustrations.

48.

24

Intention of parties as

49.

the test.

50.

25-26.

Same subject — Comming-

ling of goods. — Effect of

51.

custom.

27-30.

Commingling with right of

sale or use in bailee.

52.

31.

Bailment with privilege of

purchase to be distin-

guished from sale.

53.

32.

Option to buy and pay

for chattel or pay for its

use.

54

33.

Delivery of goods on trial to

be purchased if approved.

34. Sale with option to return or

55.

pay.

35.

Bailment or sale, how deter-

mined — Law or fact.

36.

Sale to be distinguished

from mortgage.

56.

37.

§ 11. Purpose of this chapter.
12. Sale to be distinguished
from gift.
13- 15. Sale to be distinguished
from barter or exchange.
16-18. --Uses of this distinction
- Pleading - Statutes Waiving tort - Construction of authority.
19-20. Sale to be distinguished
from bailment.
21-22. - - Change of form or substance as the test - Illustrations.
23. - - Further illustrations.
24. - - Intention of parties as
the test.
25-26. Same subject - Commingling of goods.- Effect of
custom.
27-30. Commingling with right of
sale or use in bailee.
31. Bailment with privilege of
purchase to be distinguished from sale.
32. - - Option to buy and pay
for chattel or pay for its
use.
33. Deli very of goods on trial to
be purchased if approved.
34. Sale with option to return or
pay.
35. Bailment or sale, how determined-Law or fact.
36. Sale to be distinguished
from mortgage.
37. Sale to be distinguished
from pledge.
12

§ 38. - - Sale, not pledge.
39. Pledge, not sale.
40. Parol evidence to show apparent sale to be pledge or
mortgage.
41-42. Sale to be distinguished
from mere agency to buy.
43-45. Sale to be distinguished
from agency to sell or
"consignment."
46. - - Principles of construction.
47. Illustrations of construction.
48. - - Agency, not sale.
49. - - Sale, not agency.
50. - - How question determined - Law or fact.
51. Consignment of goods to
pay debt or cover prior
advances.
52. Sale to be distinguished
from contract for work
and labor.
53. Sale to be distinguished
from com promise respecting liens.
54. Furnishing of food by restaurant or innkeeper as
sale.
55. Supplying goods by several
common owners to one of
them - Social clubs - Intoxicating liquors.
56. Transfer of title by operation of law.

CH. II.] TRANSACTIONS DISTINGUISHED FROM SALES. [§§ 11-13.

§11. Purpose of this chapter. — To be distinguished from

sales are many transactions bearing more or less resemblance

to sales, or partaking partly of the nature of sales and partly of

some other character, but which are not sales in fact. Before

going further, therefore, it seems to be desirable to give some

attention to additional distinctions and differences, and this

chapter will be devoted to that object.

§ 12. Sale to be distinguished from gift. — With this end

in view, it may first be noticed that a sale is to be distinguished

from a gift. A sale, as has been seen, is a transfer of title in

consideration of a price, while a gift has been defined as a vol-

untary transfer of his property by one person to another with-

out any consideration or compensation therefor. To make it

valid as a gift, the transfer must be executed, for the reason

that, there being no consideration for it, no action will lie to

enforce it. To consummate a gift there must be such a deliv-

ery by the donor to the donee as will place the property within

the dominion and control of the latter, with intent to vest the
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title in him. 1

§ 13. Sale to be distinguished from barter or exchange.

So sale is to be distinguished from barter or exchange, though

the transactions are, in many respects, very much alike. As

has been seen, 2 sale is the transfer in consideration of a price

in money or its equivalent. Barter, on the other hand, is the

exchange of one article for another, no price in money being

fixed upon either. 3 If, therefore, as is said in one case, 4 " prop-

erty is taken at a fixed money price, the transfer amounts to a

sale, whether the price is paid in cash or in goods; " but " where

i Gray v. Barton (1873), 55 N. Y. 68, 3 See Bouv. Law Diet. (ed. 1897);

14 Arn. R. 181; Parkinson v. State Commonwealth v. Davis (1876), 12

(1859), 14 Md. 184, 74 Am. Dec. 522; Bush (Ky.), 240; Cooper v. State

Commonwealth v. Packard (1855), 5 (1881), 37 Ark. 412.

Gray (Mass. ), 101 ; Beaver v. Beaver 4 Picard v. McCormick (1862), 11

(1889), 117 N. Y. 421, 15 Am. St. R. Mich. 68; Huff v. Hall (1885), 56 Mich.

531, 22 N. E. R. 940. 456, 23 N. W. R. 88.

2 See ante, § 1.
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§§ 14, 15.J

LAW OF SALE.

(BOOK I.

§§ 14, 15.] LAW OF SALE. [BOOK I.

one chattel is exchanged for another, no price being attached,

it is not a sale." l

§ 14. . In many of the cases the price was to be paid

partly in cash and partly in goods, but this was a mere acci-

one chattel is exchanged for another, no price being attached,
it is not a sale." 1

dent, and is not the criterion. Thus, where a horse was trans-

ferred for the sum of $50, and the owner received in exchange

three notes of third persons amounting to $49.14, and also

eighty-six cents in money, the transaction was held to be a

sale. " In the absence of express evidence that an exchange

only was intended," said the court, 2 "a sale might justly be in-

ferred from the fact that the trade was governed by a fixed

price for the horse, an agreed price being essential to a proper

bargain or sale, but altogether needless in the case of a mere

exchange. There the commodities exchanged, whatever be

their supposed value, are mutually received as equivalents for

each other. It must be taken, then, that the horse was sold to

the defendant at the price of $50." So where the plaintiffs

delivered to the defendant, at various times, dry-goods out of
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their store to a large amount, in consideration of which and in

payment whereof the defendant agreed to deliver to the plaint-

iffs, on or before a day specified, nails at a price per pound

agreed upon, it was held to be a sale of the d^-goods on credit

to be paid for in nails, and neither a purchase of the nails, nor

an exchange of the dry-goods for the nails. 3

§ 15. . But where, on the other hand, plaintiff delivered

wood to the defendant, who agreed to return a like amount to

the plaintiff whenever he should desire it, it was held to be a

mere exchange, and not a sale ; 4 and so where a filly, which

had been bought and was valued at a given price, was ex-

changed for another horse, it was held not to be a sale. 5

i Fuller v. Duren (I860), 36 Ala. 73, SHerrick v. Carter (1865), 56 Barb.

76 Am. Dec. 318. (N. Y.) 41.

2 Loomis v. Wainwright (1818), 21 4 Mitchell *. Gile (1841), 12 N. H. 390.

Vt. 520. 5 Fuller v. Duren (1860), 36 Ala. 73,

76 Am. Dec. 318.

14

§ 14. - - . In many of the cases the price was to be paid
partly in cash and partly in goods, but this was a mere accident, and is not the criterion. Thus, where a horse was transferred for the sum of $50, and the owner received in exchange
three notes of third persons amounting to $49.14, and also
eighty-six cents in money, the transaction was held to be a
sale. "In the absence of express evidence that an exchange
only was intended," said the court, 2 "a sale might justly be inferred from the fact that the trade was governed by a fixed
price for the horse, an agreed price being essential to a proper
bargain or sale, but altogether needless in the case of a mere
exchange. There the commodities exchanged, whatever be
their supposed value, are mutually received as equivalents for
each other. It must be taken, then, that the horse was sold to
the defendant at the price of $50." So where the plaintiffs
delivered to the defendant, at various times, dry-goods out of
their store to a large amount, in consideration of which and in
payment whereof the defendant agreed to deliver to the plaintiffs, .on or before a day specified, nails at a price per pound
agreed upon, it was held to be a sale of the dry-goods on credit
to be paid for in nails, and neither a purchase of the nails, nor
an exchange of the dry-goods for the nails. 3

§ 15. - - . But where, on the other hand, plaintiff delivered
wood to the defendant, who agreed to return a like amount to
the plaintiff whenever he should desire it, it was held to be a
m re exchange, and not a sale; 4 and so where a filly, which
had been bought and was valued at a given pri,ce, was exchanged for another horse, it was held not to be a sale. 5
I Fuller v. Duren (1860), 36 Ala. 73
76 Am. ec. 318.
2 Loomis v. Wainwright (1848), 21
Vt. 5'>0.

a Herrick v. Carter (1 65), 56 Barb.
(N. Y.) 41.
4 l\1itchell . Gile (1 41) 12 N. H. 390.
s Fuller v. Duren (1860), 36 Ala. 73,
76 Am. Dec. 318.
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CH. 'n.
ch/ii.] transactions distinguished ekom sales. [§§16,17.

J

TRANSACTIONS DISTINGUISHED FROM SALES.

[§§ 16, 17.

§16. Uses of distinction — Pleading.— This distinc-

tion between sale and barter usually becomes material rather

as a question of pleading than otherwise, the rule being that in

the case of the mere exchange, where no value has been agreed

upon, an action must be based upon the special contract; 1

while if a price has been fixed and the transaction amounts to

a sale, an action may be maintained upon the basis of goods

sold. 2

It also becomes material occasionally to determine whether

a barter is to be deemed a sale within the purview of statutes

using the latter word. In Indiana a barter has been held not

to be a sale within the meaning of a statute regulating the

sales of intoxicating liquors; 3 and the same ruling was made by

the court in Alabama when construing a penal statute against

the sale of slaves without a license ; 4 but in Massachusetts a

contrary result was reached with reference to a statute against

the sale of liquor, the court saying that "the prohibition of

sales, in the technical sense of that word, would be of little
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effect if the trade was left open to be carried on in other

modes." 5 In the same state also a contract for the exchange

of land for goods and money was held to be equivalent to a

sale within the contemplation of the statute of frauds."

§ 17. Waiving tort — Construction of authority.—

The distinction may be of importance also with reference to the

right of one whose goods have been wrongfully sold to waive

i See Mitchell v. Gile (1841), 12 N. without legal foundation. Travis on

H. 390; Slayton v. McDonald (1881), 73 Sales, p. 7 et seq., and notes.

Me. 50; Vail v. Strong (1838), 10 Vt. 3 Stevenson v. State (1879), 65 Ind.

457; Beirne v. Dunlap (1837), 8 Leigh 409; Massey v. State (1881), 74 Ind.

(Va.), 514. 368.

2 See Forsyth v. Jervis (1816), 1 *Gunte* v. Lecky (1857), 30 Ala.

Stark. 437, 2 Eng. Com. L. 169; Porter 591.

v. Talcott (1823), 1 Cow. (N. Y.) 359; 5 Howard v. Harris (1864), 8 Allen

Hands v. Burton (1808), 9 East, 349; (Mass.), 297; Commonwealth v. Clark

Way v. Wakefield (1835), 7 Vt. 223. (1860), 14 Gray (Mass.), 367.

Mr. Travis, who collates many other 6 Do vvling v. McKenney (1878), 124

16. - - l ses of distinction - Pleading.-Tbjs djstinction between sale and barter usually becom s material rather
as a question of pleading than otherwise, the rule being that in
the case of the mere exchange, where no value bas been agreed
upon, an action must be based upon the special contract; 1
while if a price bas been fixed and the transaction amounts to
a sale, an action may be maintained upon the basis of goods
sold. 2
It also becomes material occasionally to determine whether
a barter is to be deemed a sale within the purview of statutes
u ing the latt r word. In Indiana a barter bas been held not
to be a sale within the meaning of a statute regulating the
sales of in to xi ca ting liquors; 3 and the ame ruling \\ras made by
the court in Alabama when con truing a penal statute against
th sale of slaves without a lie nse; 4 but in :Massachusetts a
contrary r ult was reached with reference to a statute against
the sale of liquor, the court aying that "the prohibition of
ale , in the t hnical sen e of that word, would be of little
e:ffect if the trade TI as left open to be carried on in other
modes.' 5 In the same state also a contract for the exchange
of land for O'OOd and money was held to be equivalent to a
sale within the contemplation of the tatute of frauds. 6

cases, contends that the whole dis- Mass. 478.

tinction between sale and barter is

15

§ 17. - - Waiving tort- Construction of authority.The distinction may be of importance also with reference to the
right of one who e goods have been wrongfully sold to waive
ee Mitchell v. Gile (1 41), 12 N.
H. 390; Slayton v. McDonald (1 1), 73
l\le. 50; Vail v. Strong (1 3 J, 10 Vt.
4 -7; Beirne v. Dunlap (1 37), 8 Leigh
(Va.), 514.
2 ee For yth v. Jervis (1 16), 1
Stark. 437, 2 Eng. Com. L.169; Porter
v. Talcott (1 23), 1 Cow. (N. Y.) 359;
Hands v. Burton (1 0 ), 9 East, 349;
Way v. Wakefield (1 35), 7 Vt. 223.
Mr. Travis, who collates many other
ca e , contend that the whole distinction between sale and barter is
I

without legal foundation. Trads on
Sales, p. 7 et seq., and notes.
3 Stevenson v. State (1879), 65 Ind.
409; l\Ia sey v. State (1881), 74 Ind.
36.
4 GunteP v. Lecky (1 57), 30 Ala.
591.
5 Howard v. Harris (1864), 8 Allen
(Mass.), 297; Commonwealth v. Clark
(1860), 14 Gray (Mass.), 367.
6 Dowling v. McKenney (1878), 124
Mass. 478.
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§ 18.] LAW OF SALE. [BOOK I.

§ 18.]

LAW OF SALE.

[BOOK I.

the tort and sue in assumpsit. " The doctrine of waiving a

tort and bringing assumpsit," it is said in such a case, 1 " is con-

fined to cases where the defendant has disposed of the plaint-

iff's property and received either money or some article or

thing as money. 2 If the property has been sold, it makes no

difference whether the price is received in money or in a chat-

tel at an estimated price for money. 3 But there is a material

distinction between a sale and an exchange or a bargain of

barter; and where one chattel is exchanged for another, no

price being attached, it is not a sale."

Attention must also be paid to this distinction in the con-

struction of authorities, it being clear, for example, that an au-

thority to sell goods would not ordinarily justify an exchange

of them for other goods. 4

§ 18. Otherwise distinction not usually material. —

In most other cases, however, the distinction is of little practi-

cal importance. " The distinction between a sale and exchange

of property," said the court in Massachusetts, 5 " is rather one
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of shadow than of substance. In both cases the title to prop-

erty is absolutely transferred, and the same rules of law are

applicable to the transaction, whether the consideration of the

contract is money or by way of barter. It can make no essen-

tial difference in the rights and obligations of parties that

the tort and sue in assumpsit. "The doctrine of waiving a
tort and Lringing assumpsit," it is said in such a case, 1 "is confined to cases where the defendant has disposed of the plaintiff's property and received either money or some article or
thing as money. 2 If the property has been sold, it makes no
difference whether the price is received in money or in a chattel at an estimated price for money. 3 But there is a material
distinction between a sale and an exchange or a bargain of
barter; and where one chattel is exchanged for another, no
price being attached, it is not a sale."
Attention must also be paid to this distinction in the construction of authorities, it being clear, for example, that an authority to sell goods would not ordinarily justify an exchange
of them for other goods. 4

goods and merchandise are transferred and paid for by other

goods and merchandise instead of by money, which is but the

representative of value or property."

i Fuller v. Duren (1860), 36 Ala. 73, 3 Citing Arms v. Ashley, 4 Pick.

76 Am. Dec. 318. (Mass.) 71; Mason v. Waite, 17 Mass.

2 Citing Pike v. Bright, 29 Ala 336; 560; Stewart v. Conner, 9 Ala. 813;

Crow v. Boyd, 17 Ala. 51; Strother v. Cameron v. Clarke, 11 Ala. 259.

Butler, 17 Ala. 733. See also Watson * See Mechem on Agency, § 352,

v. Stever (1872), 25 Mich. 386; Woods where this subject is fully con-

v. Ay res (1878), 39 Mich. 345; Fiquet sidered.

v. Allison (1864), 12 Mich 330; Coe v. ^ln Com. v. Clark, supra. See also

Wagar (1879), 42 Mich. 52; McLaugh- Hudson Iron Co. v. Alger (1873), 54

lin v. Salley (1881), 46 Mich. 219; Nel- N. Y. 173; First Nat. Bank v. Reno

son v. Kilbride (1897), 113 Mich. 637, (1887), 73 Iowa, 145. 34 N. W. R. 796.

71 N. W. R 1089.

16

§ 18. - - Otherwise distinction not usually materia~.
In most other cases, however, the distinction is of little practical importance. "The distinction between a sale and exchange
of property," said the court in Massachusetts, 5 "is rather one
of shadow than of substance. In both cases the title to property is absolutely transferred, and the same rules of law are
applicable to the transaction, whether the consideration of the
contract is money or by way of barter. It can make no essential difference in the rights and obligations of parties that
goods and merchandise are transferred and paid for by other
goods and merchandise instead of by money, which is but the
representative of value or property."
I

Fuller v. Duren (1860), 36 Ala. 73,

76 Am. Dec. 318.
2 Citing Pike v. Bright, 29 Ala. 336;
Crow v. Boyd, 17 Ala. 51; Strother v.
Butler, 17 Ala. 733. See also Watson
v. Stever (1872), 25 Mich. 386; Woods
v. Ayres (1878), 39 Mich. 345; Fiquet
v. Allison (1864), 12 Mich. 330; Coe v.
Wagar (1879), 42 Mich. 52; McLaughlin v. Salley (1881), 46 Mich. 219; Nelson v. Kilbride (1807), 113 Mich. 637,
71 N. W. R 1089.

3 Citing Arms v. Ashley, 4 Pick.
(Mass.) 71; Mason v. Waite, 17 Mass.
560; Stewart v. Conner, 9 Ala. 813;
Cameron v. Clarke, 11 Ala. 259.
4 See Mechem on Agency, § 352,
where this subject is fully con·
sidered.
5 In Com. v. Clark, supra. See also
Hudson Iron Co. v. Alger (1873), 54
N. Y. 173; First Nat. Bank v. Reno
(1887), 73 Io"..a, 145, 34 N. W. R 796.
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CH. II.] TRANSACTIONS DISTINGUISHED FROM SALES. [§§ 19, 20.

§ 19. Sale to be distinguished from bailment. — The con-

tract of sale, whether executed or executory, is to be distin-

guished from a mere bailment. The contract of sale, as has

been seen, contemplates the transfer to the purchaser of the

absolute title to the property for a price in money or its equiv-

alent. The contract of bailment, on the other hand, contem-

plates the transfer of a special property only, the bailor retain-

ing all of the time the general property in the goods which

are to be returned to him or his order, either in their original

form or in such other form or equivalent as the parties have

agreed upon.

§20.

" It is of the essence of a contract of sale," it is

said in a recent case, 1 " that there should be a buyer and a

seller, a price to be given and taken, an agreement to pay and

1 Union Stock Yards v. Western

Land Co. (1893), 59 Fed. R. 49, 18 U. S.

App. 438, 7 C. C. A. 660. The facts
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here were as follows: Under, con-

tracts between H. and a cattle com-

pany, H. agreed to transport certain

cattle to his farm in Missouri at his

own expense, and there feed them,

that they might be profitably mar-

keted by the cattle company; and he

covenanted that they should not de-

teriorate in flesh or condition, and

bound himself to pay at an agreed

valuation for all losses of the cattle

arising from " death, disease, escape,

theft, or any cause whatsoever." H.

was to employ, at his own expense, a

herdsman selected by the cattle com-

pany. The pasturage was to extend

over a period of some fourteen weeks,

during which time the cattle com-

pany should ship the cattle to mar-

ket or sell them in pasturage. H.

was to receive in full compensation

for his services and expenditures all

moneys realized from the sale of the

cattle by the cattle company in ex-

cess of $36.05 per head after deduct-

ing the expenses of shipment and

sale, and he also waived any lien

upon the cattle for his own services.

H. received the cattle under the con-

tracts, and subsequently gave a chat-

tel mortgage on certain of the cattle

and parted with the possession of the

same. The cattle company thereafter

brought an action in replevin to re-

cover possession of certain of the

cattle which H. had mortgaged.

Held, (1) that the contracts consti-

tuted a bailment of personal prop-

erty, and that H. was a mere agister

with compensation for service con-

tingent upon the price obtained upon

the sale of the cattle; (2) that in the

contracts there was wanting an

agreement to pay a price for the cat-

tle, which is an essential element of

a sale; that there was no conditional

sale of the cattle to H., because in

no event was H. to be invested with

'the title, and in any event he was to

return the cattle to the cattle com-

pany, which, and not H., had the

§ 20.J

LAW OF SALE.

(BOOK I.

§ 20.]

LAW OF SALE.

[BOOK I.

an agreement to receive. Sale is a word of precise legal im-

port. • It means at all times a contract between parties to give

and to pass rights of property for money, which the buyer

pays or promises to pay to the seller for the thing bought and

sold.' l A conditional sale implies the delivery to the purchaser

of the subject-matter, the title passing only upon the perform-

ance of a condition precedent, or becoming reinvested in the

seller upon failure to perform a condition subsequent. It is

not infrequently a matter of difficulty to accurately distinguish

between a conditional sale and a bailment of property. The

border line is somewhat obscure at times. The difficulty must

be solved by the ascertainment of the real intent of the con-

tracting parties as found in their agreement. There are, how-

ever certain discriminating earmarks, so to speak, by which

the two may be distinguished. It is an indelible incident to a

bailment that the bailor may require restoration of the thing
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bailed. 2 If the identical thing, either in its original or in an

altered form, is to be returned, it is a bailment. 3 In a contract

a bailment of property that the

bailee assumes the character of in-

surer of the thing bailed, while it

remains in his possession, the clause

in the contract providing that H.

should be liable for all losses of said

cattle " arising from death, disease,

escape, theft, or any cause whatso-

ever," read in connection with other

an agteement to receive. Sale is a word of precise legal import. 'It means at all times a contract between parties to give
and to pass rights of property for money, which the buyer
pays or promises to pay to the seller for the _thing bought and
sold.' 1 A conditional sale implies the delivery to the purchaser
of the subject-matter, the title passing only upon the performance of a condition precedent, or becoming reinvested in the
seller upon failure to perform a condition subsequent. It is
not infrequently a matter of difficulty to accurately distinguish
between a conditional sale and a bailment of property. The
border line is somewhat obscure at times. The difficulty must
be solved by the ascertainment of the real intent of the contracting parties as found in their agreement. There are, however certain discriminating earmarks, so to speak, by which
the two may be distinguished. It is an indelible incident to a
bailment that the bailor may require restoration of the thing
bailed. 2 If the identical thing, eitber in its original or in an
altered form, is to be returned, it is a bailment. 3 In a contract

provisions of the contract, with

which it was necessary to read it in

order to judge of its meaning, im-

posed upon H., in the care of the cat-

tle while in his custody, the liability

of an insurer, and did not, when so

read in connection with other clauses

of the contract, make the transac-

tion one of conditional sale; (4) that

there was nothing in the contract*

which imposed upon H. accountabil-

ity for depreciation in market value;

(5) that, even if H. had an option

under the contract to pay to the cat-

tle company a stated sum per head

for the cattle, and could so obtain

title to them, there was no obliga-

tion on his part to do so, since an

option is not a sale, and possession of

property under an option to pur-

chase, when possession is delivered

for service to be rendered the thing

bailed, does not transmute into a

conditional sale that which is other-

wise a bailment; and (6) that there

was no design evidenced by the con-

tracts, read in the light of the sur-

rounding circumstances, to avoid

sections 2505, 2507 and 2508 of the

Revised Statutes of Missouri of 1879.

1 Williamson v. Berry, 8 How. 495,

544.

2 South Australian Ins. Co. v. Ran-

dell, L. R. 3 P. C. 101; Jones on Bail-

ment (2d ed.), pp. 64, 102; 2 Kent's

Com., p. 589.

3 Powder Co. v. Burkhardt, 97 U. S.

18

a bailment of property that the tle company a stated sum per head
bailee assumes the character of in- for the cattle, and could so obtain
surer of the thing bailed, while it title to them, there was no obligaremains in hi po . ession, the clause tion on his part to do so, since an
in the contract providing that H. option is not a sale, aud po ses ion of
should be liable for all lo ses of said property under an option to purcattle "arising from death, disea e, chase, when possession is delivered
e cape, theft, or any cause what o- for service to be rendered the thing
ever," read in connection with other bailed, does not transmute into ~
provisions of the contract, with · conditional sale that which is otherwhich it was nece sary to read it in wise a bailment; and (6) that there
order to judge of its meaning, im- was no design evidenced by the conposed upon H., in the care of the cat- tracts, read in the light of the surtle while in his custody, the liability rounding circumstances, to avoid
of an insurer, ancl did not, when so sections 2.'505, 2507 and 2-0 of the
read in connection with other clau es Revised Statute of Missouri of 18i9.
of the contract, make the transacl Williamson v. Berry, 8 How. 49-,
tion one of conditional sale; (4) that 544.
th re was nothing in the contract•
2 South Australian Ins. Co. v. Ranwhich imposed upon H. accountabil- dell, L. R. 3 P. C. 101; Jones on Baility for depreciation in market value; ment (2d ed.), pp. 64, 102; 2 Kent s
(5) that, even if H. had an option Com., p. 5 9.
under the contract to pay to the cat3 Powder Co. v. Burkhardt, 97 U.S.
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CH. II.] TRANSACTIONS DISTINGUISHED FROM SALES. [§ 21.

of sale there is this distinguishing test common to an absolute

and to a conditional sale, that there must be an agreement, ex-

press or implied, to pay the purchase price. In a bailment, if

a bailment for hire, there must be payment for the use of the

thing let or bailed. 1 If service is to be rendered the subject-

matter of the bailment, there must be compensation for the

service unless the bailment be a mandate. In a contract of

condition sale the agreement to pay the purchase price may

be masked so as to give it the appearance of an agreement to

pay for use. In such case the court must ascertain the real

intention of the contracting parties from the whole agreement

read in the light of the surrounding circumstances." Here,

too, as in other cases already considered, the name which the

parties have seen fit to apply to their contract is not at all con-

clusive. Each contract is to be construed according to its true

tenor and legal effect regardless of particular expressions or

peculiar names applied. 2

§ 21. Change of form or substance as the test — Illus-
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trations. — Where the identical article delivered is to be re-

turned in its original form, no difficulty in discrimination arises ;

but where, as is common, the form of the original article is to

be changed, or something else is to be returned as a substitute

for it, difficulties arise. In a late case 3 it is said: "The f mula-

tto, 116; Sturm v. Boker, 150 U. S. elusive that the transaction was a

312, 329. sale and not a bailment, especially

i Hen-ford v. Davis, 102 U. S. 235. in view of the fact that the word

2 Thus, in Weiland v. Sun wall (1895), " Stored " was stamped on the ticket

63 Minn. 320, 65 N. W. R. 628, tick- at the time it was issued. The evi-

ets issued on the receipt of wheat dence was sufficient to justify a

were in the following form: " Ticket finding that these transactions were,

No. . Bought , account of as between the depositors and the

, or bearer, bushels, elevator company, bailments, and

No. wheat, [Signed] , not sales, so that the wheat remained

New Prague Elevator Company." the property of the former." See also

But stamped on the ticket were the Irons v. Kentner (1879), 51 Iowa, 88,

words "Stored. Not transferable." 33 Am. R 119, 50 N. W. R 73.

Said the court: "The fact that these ^Bretz v. Diehl (1888), 117 Pa. St.

tickets commenced with the printed 589, 11 Atl. R 893, 2 Am. St. R 706.

word " Bought " is by no means con- In Mallory v. Willis (1850;, 4 N. Y.
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mental distinction between a bailment and a sale is, that in

the former the subject of the contract, although in an altered

form, is to be restored to the owner, whilst in the latter there

is no obligation to return the specific article; the party receiv-

85, Chief Justice Bronson states the

mental distinction between a bailment and a sale is, that in
the former the subject of the contract, although in an altere<l.
form, is to be restored to the owner, whils.t in the latter there
is no obligation to return the specific article; the party recei v-

distinction thus: "Where the iden-

tical thing delivered, although in an

altered form, is to be restored, the

contract is one of bailment, and the

title to the property is not changed;

but when there is no obligation to

restore the specific article, and the

receiver is at liberty to return an-

other thing of equal value, he be-

comes a debtor to make the return,

and the title to the property is
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changed: it is a sale."

In Powder Co. v. Burkhardt (1877),

97 U. S. 110, the facts were that an

incorporated company entered into

a contract with D., the owner of let-

ters-patent for an explosive com-

pound called " dualin," whereby he

undertook to manufacture it, as re-

quired by the company from time to

time, in quantities sufficient to sup-

ply the demand for the same, and all

sales produced or effected by the

company. The contract provided that

all goods he manufactured should be

consigned to the company for sale,

and all orders he received should be

transferred to it to be filled; that the

parties should equally share the net

profits arising from such sales, and

equally bear all losses by explosion,

or otherwise, so far as the loss of the

dualin was concerned, but the com-

pany assumed no risk on D.'s build-

ing or machinery; that the company

should semi-monthly advance to him,

on his requisition, a stipulated sum,

for paying salaries, for labor, and for

his personal account, and such

further reasonable sums as might be

required for incidental expenses of

manufacture; and should furnish

him all the raw materials needed to

manufacture said explosive in quan-

tities sufficient to supply the demand

created by the company, or should

advance the money necessary to pur-

chase them — the said advances and

the cost of such materials to be

charged to him against the manu-

factured goods to be by him con-

signed to the company. Certain of

the materials which had been fur-

nished him under the contract, and

others which he had purchased with

money advanced by the company,

were seized upon an execution sued

out on a judgment against him in

favor of a third party. The company

then brought this action to recover

for the wrongful conversion of the

materials so seized. Held, that the

85, Chief Justice Bronson states the
distinction thus: "Where the identical thing delivered, although in an
altered form, is to be restored, the
contract is one of bailment, and the
title to the property is not changed;
but when there is no obligation to
restore the specific article, and the
receiver is at liberty to return another thing of equal value, he becomes a debtor to make the return,
and the title to the property is
changed: it is a sale."
In Powder Co. v. Burkhardt (1877),
97 U. S. 110, the facts were that an
incorporated company enterecl into
a contract with D., the owner of letters-patent for an explosive compound called "dualin," whereby he
undertook to manufacture it, as required by the company from time to
time, in quantities sufficient to supply the demand for the same, and all
sales produced or effected by the
company. The contract provided that
all good he manufactured should be
consigned to the company for sale,
and all orders he received should be
transferred to it to be filled; that the
parties should equally share the net
profit arising from such sales, and
equally bear all losses by explosion,
or otherwise, so far as the loss of the
dualin was concerned, but the company assumed no risk on D. 's building or ma hinery; that the company
should semi-monthly advance to him,
on his requisition, a tipulated sum,
for paying salaries, for labor, and for
bis personal account, and such
further reasonable sums as might be
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required for incidental expenses of
manufacture; and should furnish
him all the raw materials needed to
manufacture said explosive in quanti ties sufficient to supply the demand
created by the company, or should
advance the money necessary to purchase them -the aid aclvances and
the cost of such material to be
charged to him against the manufacturecl goods to be by him consigned to the company. Certain of
the materials which had been furnished him under the contract., and
others which he had purchased with
money advanced by the company,
were seized upon an execution sued
out on a judgment against him in
favor of a third party. The company
then brought this action to recover
for the wrongful conversion of the
materials so seized. H eld, that the
delivery of them by the company to
D. did not create a bailment, but
that upon such deli very thev, as
well as those purchased by him with
the money so advanced, became bis
sole property and, as such, were subject to the execution. Said the court:
"The plaintiff in error contends that
the present is the case of a bailmen t
and not of a sale or a loan of the
goods and money to Dittmar. It is
contendeu that the question of bailment or not is determined by the
fact whether the identical article
delivered to the manufacturer is to
be returned to the party making the
advance. Thus, where logs are delivered to be sawed into boards, or
leather to be made into shoes, rags

CII. II. J TRANSACTIONS DISTINGUISHED FROM SALES.

[§ 22.

ing it is at liberty to return some other thing of equal value in

place of it."

Thus, a delivery of wheat " to be manufactured into flour,"

of which flour one barrel is to be returned to the depositor for

every four and one-quarter bushels of wheat, is a bailment for

hire; though the form of the original wheat is to be changed,

it is still the original wheat in its altered form which is to be

returned. 1

§ 22. On the other hand, a delivery of wheat for which

the depositor is to receive one barrel of flour for every four

and one-quarter bushels of wheat, the party receiving being at

liberty to deliver any flour, whether made from that identical

wheat or not, is not a bailment but a sale. 2 In a case 3 of the

latter nature, the court said : " There is here no agreement to

restore to him property of like quality, nor is there any agree-

into paper, olives into oil, grapes into

wine, wheat into flour, if the product
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of the identical articles delivered is

to be returned to the original owner

in a new form, it is said to be a bail-

ment, and the title never vests in the

manufacturer. If, on the other hand,

the manufacturer is not bound to re-

turn the same wheat or flour or

paper, but may deliver any other of

equal value, it is said to be a sale or

a loan, and the title to the thing de-

livered vests in the manufacturer.

We understand this to be a correct

exposition of the law. Pierce v.

Schenck, 3 Hill (N. Y.), 28; Norton v.

Woodruff, 2 N. Y. 153; Mallory v.

Willis, 4 id. 76; Foster v. Pettibone,

7 id. 433."

In Chickering v. Bastress (1889),

130 111. 206, 22 N. E. R. 542, 17 Am.

St. R. 309, the court says: "It is well

settled in this state that when the

identical thing delivered is to be re-

stored in the same or an altered form,

the contract is one of bailment and

the title to the property is not

changed ; but when there is no obli-

gation to restore the specific article,

and the receiver is at liberty to re-

turn another thing of equal value, or

the money value, he becomes a debtor

to make a return, and the title to the

property is changed — it is a sale.

Lonergan v. Stewart, 55 111. 49, and

the authorities there cited; Richard-

son v. Olmstead, 74 id. 213."

i Foster v. Pettibone (1852), 7 N. Y.

433, 57 Am. Dec. 530; Slaughter v.

Green (1821), 1 Rand. (Va.) 3, 10 Am.

Dec. 488; Inglebright v. Hammond

(1850), 19 Ohio, 337, 53 Am. Dec. 430;

Mallory v. Willis (1850), 4 N. Y. 85.

a Woodward v. Semans (1890), 125

Ind. 330, 25 N. E. R. 444, 21 Am. St.

R. 225; Smith v. Clark, 21 Wend.

(N. Y.) 83, 34 Am. Dec. 213. (Sey-

mour v. Brown, 19 John. (N. Y.) 44,

contra, is overruled.) Baker v. Wood-

ruff, 2 Barb. (N. Y.) 523; Norton v.

Woodruff, 2 N. Y. 153.

3 Woodward v. Semans, supra.
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ment to restore to him the product of the property. The agree-

ment is to yield property in exchange for property, and this is

essentially a contract of sale. The appellees were entitled to

a designated quantity of flour and bran for each bushel of

wheat delivered by them, but they were not entitled to the

flour and bran produced from the particular wheat delivered

by them to the appellants. There was therefore no undertaking

to restore the wheat either in its original form or in an altered

form."

In cases of the first class it would be immaterial, as will be

seen, 1 that the miller, by virtue of a custom or agreement, was

to mingle the wheat with other of like kind and quality from

the mass of which the grinding is to be done, so long as the

mass remains and the depositor has the right to demand the

return of a like amount out of the mass. 2

§23. Further illustrations. — Many other cases pre-

sent like considerations. Thus a delivery of logs, to be cut

into boards of which each party is to have half, is a bailment
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and not a sale, 3 as is also an agreement to deliver milk to be

made into cheese, even though the bailee may also be author-

ized to sell the product as the agent of the owner. 4 But where

1 See following sections. an altered form, would be required

2 Slaughter v. Green, 1 Rand. (Va.) to be delivered, and would be the

3, 10 Am. Dec. 488; Inglebright v. property of the owners of the milk.

ment to restore to him the product of the property. The agreement is to yield property in exchange for property, and this is
essentially a contract of sale. The appellees were entitled to
a designated quantity of flour and bran for each bushel of
wheat delivered by them, but they were not entitled to the
flour and bran produced from the particular wheat delivered
by them to the appellants. There was therefore no undertaking
to restore the wheat either in its original form or in an altered
form."
In cases of the first class it would be immaterial, as will be
seen, 1 that the miller, by virtue of a custom or agreement., was
to mingle the wheat with other -0f like kind and quality from
the mass of which the grinding is to be done, so long as the
mass remains and the depositor has the right to demand the
return of a like amount out of the mass. 2

Hammond, 19 Ohio, 337, 53 Am. Dec. As soon as the milk was converted

430. into butter and cheese, Kilbourne's

§ 23. - - Further illustrations.- :Many other cases pre-

3 Pierce v. Schenck (1842), 3 Hill (the bailee's) power to sell as a factor

(N. Y.), 28; Gleason v. Beers (1887), attached, and he took the same as the

59 Vt. 581, 10 AtL R. 80. agent of the milk owners, holding the

4 First National Bank v. Schween title for them until a sale was ef-

(1889), 127 111. 573, 20 N. E. R. 681, 11 fected. This may be more clearly

Am. St. R. 174. After referring to apparent by supposing a revocation

the distinction laid down in Lonergan of his authority to sell. Can there

v. Stewart, 55 111. 48, substantially as be any doubt as to the legal owner-

stated in the text, the court says: " If ship of the butter and cheese in such

sent like considerations. Thus a delivery of logs, to be cut
into boards of which each party is to have half, is a bailment
and not a sale, 3 as is also an agreement to deliver milk to be
made into cheese, even though the bailee may also be authorized to sell the product as the agent of the owner. 4 But where

the power of sale conferred had not case? It is true, the manufacturer

been given, there can be no doubt might have held it until his charges

that the owners of the milk would for its manufacture were paid; but,

have owned its product. In such subject to his lien for his commission,

case, the identical thing, though in it would have belonged to the party

22

See following sections.
2 Slaughter v. Green, 1 Rand. (Va.)
3, 10 Am. Dec. 488; Inglebright v.
Hammond, 19 Ohio, 337, 53 Am. Dec.
I

430.
3 Pierce v. Schenck (1842), 3 Hill
(N. Y.), 28; Gleason v. Beers (1 7),
59 Vt. 581, 10 AtL R. 86.
4 Fir t National Bank v. Sch ween
(1 9), 127 Ill. 573, 20 N. E. R. 681, 11
Am. St. R. 174. After referring to
the distinction laid down in Lonergan
v. tewart, 55 Ill. 4 , substantially as
stated in the text, the court says: "If
the power of sale conferred had not
been given, there can be no doubt
that the owners of the milk would
have owned its product. In such
case, the identical thing, though in

22

an altered form, would be required
to be delivered, and would be the
property of the owners of the milk.
As soon as the milk was converted
into butter and cheese, Kilbourne's
(the bailee's) power to sell as a factor
attached. and he took the same as the
agent of the milk owners, holding the
title for them until a sale was effected. This may be more clearly
apparent by supposing a r evocation
of his authority to sell. Can there
be any doubt as to the legal ownership of the butter and cheese in such
ca e? It is true, the manufactu.rer
might have h eld it until hi charges
for its manufacture were paid; but,
subject to his lieu for his commission,
it would h::i.ve belonged to the party

CH. II.] TRANSACTIONS DISTINGUISHED FROM SALES. [§ 23.

the milk contributed by the various owners was thrown into

a common mass, made into cheese, sold by a committee of the

factory, and then the milk was paid for at the price produced

by the cheese, allowing ten and a half pounds of milk to one

pound of cheese, and deducting the cost of manufacturing, the

court said : " There was evidently no bailment or agency as to

the particular milk delivered. By the very terms of the agree-

ment, it was to be mixed and confused in part or in whole

with other milk indefinitely. It was a sale of the milk to the

factory, for which they were to pay at a certain time and in

a certain manner. It is not to be distinguished from Jenkins

v. Eichelberger} There the contract was to deliver hides to a

tanner at a certain price — the hides when tanned to be re-

turned to the person who had delivered them, to be sold by

him, and out of the proceeds, after deducting the price at which

they had been delivered, the balance to be paid to the tanner.

It was evidently a contrivance by which the hides were to be

protected from the creditors of the tanner, but this court held
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it to be a sale. The same doctrine was maintained in Prich-

ett v. Cook? It is true in both these cases the question was as

to creditors of the manufacturer. But upon the facts . . .

it does not appear that there was anything to qualify the effect

of the absolute delivery of the milk, to be used and mixed in-

discriminately with other milk, and for which the party was

afterwards to receive a credit at a certain rate (and he) had

then, from the delivery of the milk, a mere demand for the

price of its product as agreed upon." 3

Under facts quite similar to those in Jenkins v. Eichelberger,

the court in Massachusetts found a different intention to exist,

who employed him to manufacture proceeds of the sales thereof to be

it." See also Jensen v. Bowles (1896), divided in a certain ratio between

8 S. Dak. 570, 67 N. W. R. 627. the farmers and the manufacturers.

A mere bailment, and not a sale Sattler v. Hallock (1899). 160 N. Y.

which passes title, is made by a con- 291, 54 N. E. R. 667, 46 L. R. A. 679.

tract whereby farmers deliver prod- i 4 Watts (Pa.), 121, 28 Am. Dec. 691.

uce at a factory owned by them to - 12 R F. Smith (62 Pa.), 193.

be manufactured into pickles, sauer- 3 Butterfield v. Lathrop (1872), 71

kraut and other similar articles, the Pa. St. 225.
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and held that a delivery of leather to a manufacturer to be

made into boots which were to be returned to the bailor, who

was to sell them and give to the manufacturer all over the

cost of the leather and five per cent, thereon, constituted a

bailment and not a sale. 1 A fortiori is it so where leather is

delivered to be made into shoes and returned to the owner of

the leather, even though the manufacturer was to supply an-

other kind of leather which was needed in the manufacture. 2

§ 24. Intention of parties as the test. — Where, though

the parties use language on its face indicating a sale, their real

intention is that of bailment, the transaction will be so deter-

mined. Thus, in one case, 3 A. deposited wheat with B., receiving

a memorandum as follows : " Bought of A. for B., to be delivered

and held that a delivery of leather to a manufacturer to be
made into boots which were to be returned to the bailor, who
was to sell them and give to the manufacturer all over the
cost of the leather and five per cent. thereon, constituted a
bailment and not a sale. 1 A fortiori is it so where leather is
delivered to be made in to shoes and returned to the owner of
the leather, even though the manufacturer was to supply another kind of leather which was needed in the manufacture. 2

at his elevator, according to sample, wheat No. 3, at owner's risk

as to fire," and the wheat was placed in a bin by itself, where

it remained until it was destroyed by accidental fire. No de-

mand was made for the wheat until after the fire, but a few

iSchenck v. Saunders (1859), 13 sell, Browne was to pay the highest
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Gray (Mass.), 37. price for the grain or return a like

2 Mansfield v. Converse (1864), 8 quantity and quality. The transac-

Allen (Mass.), 182, See also Brown v. tion was held to be a sale, and not

Hitchcock, 28 Vt. 452; Bulkley v. a mere storage or bailment of the

Andrews, 39 Conn. 70. grain.

3 Irons v. Kentner (1879), 51 Iowa, In Nelson v. Brown, 44 Iowa, 455,

88, 33 Am. R. 119, 50 N. W. R. 73. the ticket, or memorandum, deliv-

In Johnston v. Browne, 37 Iowa, ered to the depositor read: "Received

200, the ticket, or memorandum, of C. C. Cowell, for Thompson, in

given by Browne on receiving the store, for account and risk of C. C.

grain in the elevator was in these Cowell. one hundred and eighty-

§ 24. - - Intention of parties as the test.-Where, though
the parties use language on its face indicating a sale, their real
intention is that of bailment, the transaction will be so determined. Thus, in one case, 3 A. deposited wheat with B., receiYing
a memorandum as follows: "Bought of A. for B., to be delivered
at his elevator, according to sample, wheat No. 3, at O\vner's risk
as to fire," and the wheat was placed in a bin by itself, where
it remained until it was destroyed by accidental fire. No demand was made for the wheat until after the fire, but a few

words: " Bought of H. F. Bickett, for three bushels No. 3 wheat. Loss by

"W. P. Browne, to be delivered at fire, heating and the elements at the

Browne's elevator, if all like sample, owner's risk. Wheat of equal test

of wheat, at % , in store, and value, but not the identical

buyer, bushels, lbs." It wheat, may be returned." It was

was shown in that case, by extrinsic held in that case that so long as the

evidence, that the understanding of wheat remained in the elevator,

the parties was that Browne, the though thrown in a common bin

proprietor of the elevator, was to ship with wheat of like quality, the trans-

and sell the grain on his own account, action was a mere bailment."

and, when the depositor desired to

24

1 Schenck v. Saunders (1859), 13 sell, Browne was to pay the highest
price for the grain or return a like
Gray (Mass.), 37.
2 Mansfield v. Con verse (1864), 8 quantity and quality.
The transacAllen (Mass.), 182, See also Brown v. tion was held to be a sale, and not
Hitchcock, 28 Vt. 452; Bulkley v. a mere storage or bailment of the
Andrews, 39 Conn. 70.
grain.
3 Irons v. Kentner (1879), 51 Iowa,
In Nelson v. Brown, 44 Iowa, 455,
88, 33 Am. R. 119, 50 N. W. R. 73.
the ticket, or memorandum. delivIn John. ton v. Browne, 37 Iowa, ered to the depositor read: "Received
200, the ticket, or memorandum, of C. C. Cowell, for Thomp on, in
given by Browne on receiving the store, for account and risk of C. C.
grain in the elevator was in these Cowell, one hundred and eightywords: ''Bought of H. F. Bickett, for three bushels No. 3 wheat. Loss by
W. P. Browne, to be delivered at fire, heating and the elements at the
Browne's elevator, if all like sample, owner's risk. Wheat of equal test ·
- - of wheat, at$--, in store, - - and value. but not the identical
buyer, - - bushels, - - lbs." It wheat, may be returned." It was
was shown in that case, by extrinsic held in that case that so Jong as the
evidence, that the under tanding of wheat remained in the elevator,
the parties was that Browne, the though thrown in a common bin
proprietor of the elevator, was to hip with wheat of like qualit.y, the tran ·and sell the grain on his own account, action was a mere bailment."
and, when the depositor desired to
24

CH. II.] TEANS ACTIONS DISTINGUISHED FROM SALES. [§ 25.

days before the fire B. offered A. a certain price for it, which

was refused. It appeared that it was the custom at the place

in question for the warehouseman to mix all wheat of the same

grade in one common bin, to keep a sample, and then to ship

the mass away for sale; and, when the parties depositing the

wheat got ready to sell it, to buy it of them, if possible, and if

not, then to return wheat of the same grade and quality as

that deposited. When left on storage for more than a month,

a storage fee was charged.

Said the court. "It was admitted the grain was delivered

in pursuance of the alleged custom or usage, and it was shown

that it was in the elevator in a separate bin when it was

burned, and that the defendant offered to purchase it on the

Saturday before the fire. These facts, when taken in connec-

tion with the ticket, show clearly that the transaction was not

a sale, but a bailment. It is true that the word ' bought ' in

the ticket, unexplained, would import a sale, but when taken

in connection with the expression 'at owner's risk of fire,' and
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in the light of the parol evidence, it clearly appears that a sale

was not contemplated by the parties. ' At owner's risk of

fire ' evidently means that so long as the wheat should remain

in the elevator the plaintiff should bear that risk. If it was

a sale, it is not at all probable that any such words would have

been used. In such case the warehouseman would have as-

sumed the risk without any stipulation to that effect."

§25. Same subject — Commingling of goods — Effect of

custom. — Though a bailment thus ordinarily contemplates the

return of the identical article in its original or changed form,

still the agreement of the parties, as evidenced by express

words or by their acquiescence in an established custom, may

permit the substitution of another article of like kind whose

return will satisfy the contract of bailment. This is illustrated

in the common case of the deposit of grain in a bin or eleva-

tor with other grain of like kind, from the mass of which the

bailor's grain is to be returned to him, but which mass is at all

times to be kept good to provide for such return. Thus in a

25
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late case in Indiana, 1 Nixon was a warehouseman, and it was

his custom to receive wheat on deposit and to place it in a com-

mon bin with wheat bought by him, and it was also his custom

to sell wheat from this bin. Not knowing of this latter custom,

Rice deposited wheat with Nixon, and it was put into this bin

with other wheat deposited by other persons or bought by

Nixon, and from this mingled wheat Nixon sold from time to

time, but there was always wheat enough in the bin to supply

all depositors, until by accidental fire the warehouse and the

wheat were destroyed. No demand was made for the wheat

until after the fire, and there was no agreement that Rice should

have the option to demand the grain or its value in money, nor

had Nixon any option to return the value in money instead of

the wheat. This was held to be a bailment and not a sale.

Said the court: "The rule which we accept as the true one

is required by the commercial interests of the country, and is
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in harmony with the cardinal principle that the intention of

iRice v. Nixon, (1884), 97 Ind. 97, R. 444. 21 Am. St. R. 225, it is said:

49 Am. R. 430. [The court cited Lup-

ton v. White, 15 Vesey Jr. 432; 2

Kent Com. (12th ed.) 365, 590; Story,

Bailm., § 40; Law of Prod. Ex., § 152;

2 Schouler, Pers. Prop., §46; 6 Am.

L. Rev. 457; 2 Bl. Com. (Cooley's Ed.)

404, n.; Ledyard v. Hibbard, 48 Mich.

421, 12 N. W. R. 637, 42 Am. R. 474;

late case in Indiana,1 Nixon was a warehouseman, and it was
his custom to receive wheat on deposit and to place it in a common bin with wheat bought by him, and it was also his custom
to sell wheat from this bin. Not knowing of this latter custom,
Rice deposited wheat with Nixon, and it was put into this bin
with other wheat deposited by other persons or bought by
Nixon, and from this mingled wheat Nixon sold from time to
time, but there was always wheat enough in the bin to supply
all depositors, until by accidental fire the warehouse and the
wheat were destroyed. No demand was made for the wheat
until after the fire, and there was no agreement that Rice should
have the option to demand the grain or its value in money, nor
had Nixon any option to return the value in money instead of
the wheat. This was held to be a bailment an<l not a. sale.
Said the court: "The rule which we accept as the true one
is required by the commercial interests of the country, and is
in harmony with the cardinal principle that the intention of

Nelson v. Brown, 44 Iowa, 455; Sex-

ton v. Graham, 53 Iowa, 181; Nelson

v. Brown, 53 Iowa, 555; Irons v.

Kentner, 51 Iowa, 88, 33 Am. R. 119,

50 N. W. R. 73. Pribble v. Kent, 10

Ind. 325, 71 Am. Dec. 327; Ewing v.

French, 1 Blackf. (Ind.) 353; Carlisle

v. Wallace, 12 Ind. 252, 74 Am. Dec.

207. and Ashby v. West, 3 Ind. 170,

were distinguished or reconciled.]

To the same effect as the principal

case are Bottenberg v. Nixon, 97 Ind.

106; McGrew v. Thayer, 24 Ind. App.

578. 57 N. E. R. 262. ' In Woodward v.

Seinans (1890), 125 Ind. 330, 25 N. E.

"It is the law of this jurisdiction, as

well as of many others, that where a

warehouseman' receives grain on de-

posit for the owner, to be mingled

with other grain in a common re-

ceptacle, from which sales are made,

the warehouseman keeping con-

stantly on hand grain of like kind

and quality for the depositor, and

ready for delivery to him on call, the

contract is one of bailment and not

of sale," citing Rice v. Nixon, supra;

Bottenberg v. Nixon, supra; Schind-

ler v. Westover, 99 Ind. 395; Lyon v.

Lenon, 106 Ind. 567, 7 N. E. R. 311;

Preston v. Withers poon, 109 Ind. 457,

9 N. E. R. 585, 58 Am. R. 417; Morn-

ingstar v. Cunningham, 110 Ind. 328,

59 Am. R. 211, 11 N. E. R. 593. See

also Baker v. Born, 17 Ind. App. 422,

46 N. E. R. 930; McGrew v. Thayer,

24 Ind. App. 578, 57 N. E. R. 262.
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l Rice v. Ni:s:on, (1884), 97 Ind. 97,
49 Am. R. 430. [The court cited Lupton v. White, 15 Vesey Jr. 432; 2
Kent Com. (12th ed.) 365, 590; Story,
Bailm., § 40; Law of Prod. Ex.,§ 152;
2 Schouler, Pers. Prop., § 46; 6 Am.
L. Rev. 457; 2 BL. Com. (Cooley's Ed.)
404, n.; Ledyard v. Hibbard. 48 Mich.
421, 12 N. W. R. 637, 42 Am. R. 474;
Nelson v. Brown, 44 Iowa, 455; Sexton v. Graham, 53 Iowa., 181; Nebon
v. Brown, 53 Iowa, 555; Irons v.
Kentner, 51 Iowa, 8 , 33 Am. R. 119,
50 1 . vV. R. 73. Pribble v. Kent, 10
Incl. 02-, 71 Am. Dec. 327; Ewing v.
French, 1 Blackf. (Ind.) 353; Carli ~ le
v. vVallace, 12 Ind. 252, 74 Am. Dec.
207, ctnd Al!hby v. West, 3 Ind. 170,
w re distinguished or reconciled.]
To the ame effect as the principal
ca e are Bottenberg v.1 ixon, 97 Ind.
106; IcGrewv. Thayer, 24 Incl. App.
57 . 57 N. E. R 26'3. In W ooJ wa.rcl v.
Semans (1890), 125 Ind. 330, 25 N. E.

26

R. 444, 21 Am. St. R. 295, it is said:

"It is the law of this jurisdiction, as
well as of many others, that where a
warehouseman receives grain on deposit for the owner, to be mingled
with other grain in a common receptacle, from which sales are made,
the warehouseman keeping constantly on hand grain of like kind
and quality for the depositor, and
ready for delivery to him on call, the
contract is one of bailment and not
of sale," citing Rice v. Nixon, supra;
Botten berg v. Nixon, supra; Schindler v. W estover, 99 Ind. 395; Lyon v.
Lenon, 106 Ind. 567, 7 N. E. R. 311;
Pr t,on v. Witherspoon, 109 Incl. 457,
9 N. E. R. 585, 58 Am. R. 417; Morning tar v. Cunningham, 110 Ind. 328,
59 Am. R. 211, 11 N. E. R. 593. See
also Baker v. Born, 17 Ind. App. 422,
46 N. E. R. 930; McGrew v. Thayer,
24 Ind. App. 57 , 57 N. E. R. 262.
1

CH. II.] TRANSACTIONS DISTINGUISHED FEOM SALES. [§ 25.

contracting parties is always to be given effect. It is not un-

known to us, nor can it be unknown to any court, for it is a mat-

ter of great public notoriety and concern, that a vast part of the

grain business of the country is conducted through the medium

of elevators and warehouses, and it cannot be presumed that

warehousemen in receiving grain for storage, or depositors in

intrusting it to them for that purpose, intended or expected

that each lot, whether of many thousand bushels or of a few

hundred, should be placed in separate receptacles; on the con-

trary, the course of business in this great branch of commerce,

made known to us as a matter of public knowledge and by the

decisions of the courts of the land, leads to the presumption

that both the warehouseman and the depositor intended that

the grain should be placed in a common receptacle and treated

as common property. This rule secures to the depositor all

that in justice he can ask, namely, that his grain shall be ready

for him in kind and quantity whenever he demands it. Any

other rule would impede the free course of commerce and ren-
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der it practically impossible to handle our immense crops. It

is reasonable to presume that the warehouseman and his de-

positor did not intend that the course of business should- be

interrupted, and that they did not intend that the almost im-

possible thing of keeping each lot, small or great, apart from

the common mass should be done by the warehouseman. If

the warehouseman is not bound to place grain in a separate

place for each depositor, then the fact that he puts it in a com-

mon receptacle with grain of his own and that of other depos-

1 tors does not make him a purchaser, and if he is not a pur-

chaser then he is a bailee. In all matters of contract the

intention of the parties gives character and effect to the trans-

action, and in such a case as this the circumstances declare

that the intention was to make a contract of bailment and not

a contract of sale. The duties, rights and liabilities of ware-

housemen are prescribed by the law as declared by the courts

and the legislature, and as matter of law it is known to us that

a warehouseman, by placing grain received from a depositor

in a common receptacle, and treating it as the usages of trade

27
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warrant, does not become the buyer of the grain, unless, indeed,

there is some stipulation in the contract imposing that charac-

ter upon him."

§ 26. . In another case, 1 where wheat of different depos-

itors had been commingled with the bailee's own, but the latter

warrant, does not become the buyer of the grain, unless, in<leed,
there is some stipulation in the contract imposing that charac- ·
ter upon him."

had no right to draw from the common stock more than his

own share, the court said: "If a party having charge of the

property of others so confounds it with his own that the line

of distinction cannot be traced, all the inconvenience of the

confusion is thrown upon the party who produces it; where,

however, the owners consent to have their wheat mixed in a

common mass, each remains the owner of his share in the com-

mon stock. If the wheat is delivered in pursuance of a con-

tract for bailment, the mere fact that it is mixed with a mass

of like quality, with the knowledge of the depositor or bailor,

does not convert that into a sale which was originally a bail-

ment, and the bailee of the whole can, of course, have no greater

control of the mass than if the share of each were kept sepa-
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rate. If the commingled mass has been delivered on simple

storage, each is entitled on demand to receive his share ; if for

conversion into flour, to his proper proportion of the product. 2

It makes no difference that the bailee had, in like manner, con-

tributed to the mass of his own wheat; for although the abso-

lute owner of his own share, he still stands as bailee to the

others, and he cannot abstract more than that share from the

common stock without a breach of the bailment." The effect

of such a commingling with no right of sale in the bailee is to

make all the depositors tenants in common of the mass, the

interest of each being measured by the amount called for by

his receipt. If the warehouseman also contributes of his own

grain to the mass, he becomes a tenant in common with the

others. 3

1 Bretz v. Diehl (1888), 117 Pa. St. 3 Hall v. Pillsbury (1890), 43 Minn.

589, 2 Am. St. R. 706, 11 Atl. R. 893. 33, 44 N. W. R. 673, 19 Am. St. R. 209;

2 Citing Chase v. Washburn, 1 Ohio O'Uell v. Leyda (1889), 46 Ohio St. 244,

St. 244, 59 Am. Dec. 623; Hutchison 20 N. E. R. 472; Sexton v. Graham

v. Commonwealth, 82 Pa. St. 472. (1880), 53 Iowa, 181, 4 N. W. R. 1090.

28

§ 26. - - . In another case,1 where wheat of different depositors had been commingled with the bailee's own, but the latter
had no right to draw from the common stock more than bis
own share, the court said: "If a party having charge of the
property of others so confounds it with his own that the line
of distinction cannot be traced, all the inconvenience of the
confusion is thrown upon the party who produces it; where,
however, the owners consent to have their wheat mixed in a
common mass, each remains the owner of his share in the common stock. If the wheat is delivered in pursuance of a contract for bailment, the mere fact that it is mixed with a mass
of like quality, with the knowledge of the depositor or bailor,
does not convert that into a sale which was originally a bailment, and the bailee of the whole can, of course, have no greater
control of the mass than if the share of each were kept separate. If the commingled mass has been delivered on simple
storage, each is entitled on demand to receive bis share; if for
conversion into flour, to his proper proportion of the product. 2
It makes no difference that the bailee had, in like manner, contributed to the mass of his own wheat; for although the absolute owner of bis own share, he still stands as bailee to the
others, and be cannot abstract more than that share from the
common stock without a breach of the bailment." The effect
of such a commingling with no right of sale in the bailee is to
make all the depositors tenants in common of the mass, the
interest of each being measured by the amount called for by
hi receipt. If the warehouseman also contributes of his own
grain to the mass, he becomes a tenant in common with the
others. 3
3 Hall v. Pillsbury (1890), 43 Minn.
I Bretz v. Diehl (LS ), 117 Pa. St.
5 9, 2 Am. t. R. 706, 11 At!. R. 93. 33, 44 N. W.R. 673, 19 Am. St. R. 209;
2 Citing Chase v. Wa hburn, 1 Ohio O'Dell v. Leyda (1 89), 46 Ohio St. 244,
St. 244, 59 Am. Dec. 623; Hutchi on 20 N. E. R. 472; Sexton v. Graham
(1 0), 53 Iowa, 181, 4 N. W. R. 1090.
v. Commonwealth, 82 Pa. St. 472.
28

CH. II.] TRANSACTIONS DISTINGUISHED FROM SALES. [§§ 27, 28.

§ 27. . Commingling with right of sale or use in bailee.

In the cases of commingling thus far noticed there was no

right on the part of the bailee, without keeping on hand a

stock sufficient to satisfy the bailor's demand, to sell or other-

wise dispose of the mass and render to the bailor, instead of

his original deposit, either other property or money. "Where

this right exists a new element is introduced. This new ele-

ment may be introduced at different stages in the transaction.

Thus —

§ 28. . T. The grain may have been originally deposited

in a common mass upon which the bailor's claim was to attach,

and from which he would be entitled at any time to demand

and receive his proper share, subject, however, to an express or

implied term that the bailee might draw from the common

stock, and, if he consumed the whole so that the bailor's por-

tion could not be returned, that he should thereupon be deemed

a purchaser. There would here be a contract of bailment

wdiich might ripen into a sale upon a contingency. In one
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case * of this nature it is said that " though the quantity in

store might fluctuate from day to day as grain would be re-

ceived and delivered out, this would not affect the title of the

holder of receipts, who would be at liberty to demand and re-

x Leclyard v. Hibbard (1882), 48 to be a bailment and not a sale.

Mich. 421. 12 N. W. R. 637, 42 Am. R. Speaking of the receipt above re-

474. To like effect, see Nelson v. ferred to, the court said: "All it

Brown (1876), 44 Iowa, 455. See also amounted to, in our judgment, was

Smith v. Smith (1892), 91 Mich. 7, 51 an option on the part of the defend-

N. W. R. 694 ant, when the receipt was presented,

In State v. Rieger (1894), 59 Minn, to pay the market price of the grain

151, 60 N. W. R 1087, wheat was de- instead of returning the grain in

posited and a receipt given stating: specie; and this option he could only

" The conditions on which this wheat exercise when the receipt was pre-

is received at this elevator are that sented, and by paying the money.

Rieger [the warehouseman] has this It never contemplated that he might

option: either to deliver the grade treat the wheat as his own without

of wheat that this ticket calls for, first paying for it. If he elected to

or to pay the bearer the market price buy, it was to be a purchase for cash

for the same, less elevator charges, and not on credit."

on surrender of this ticket." Held

29
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ceive his proper quantity at any time if so much remained in

store. But if the quantity in store is reduced by consumption

instead of by shipment or sale, it is not apparent that the rights

of the holder of the receipts would be any different. It is true,

if the wheat is all consumed and the amount in store is not

kept good so that a demand for wheat can be responded to,

and if the consumption is by consent of the owner, express or

implied, the consumption under such circumstances may be

justly regarded as a meeting of the minds of the parties upon

a sale ; but so long as grain is kept in store from which the re-

ceipts may be met, the fair presumption is that it is intended

they shall be so met, and the presumption would only be over-

come by some act unequivocal in its nature." In cases of this

class the transaction continues a bailment so long as the depos-

itor has the right to demand the return of his share of the

grain and the mass remains to supply the demands of the de-

positors; and it only becomes a sale when subsequently, but

in accordance with an express or implied agreement, the bailee
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is permitted to become a purchaser and to dispose of the whole

mass. The mere fact of such disposition, however, is not the

criterion, but it is the express or implied agreement that such

a disposition may be made. Without such agreement the dis-

posing of the whole would amount to a conversion, but not a

sale ; but with it, it is not a conversion, but is a sale.

§ 29. . II. In other cases, the right of immediate dis-

posal or consumption may be granted to the warehouseman at

the moment of the delivery, the depositor retaining no right to

demand the return of his share of the mass, unless the ware-

houseman elects to so return it, the latter having the option

whether to return the original or like grain or to pay the value

in money. In such cases the transaction is held to constitute

a sale. 1 In one case the distinction is thus stated: "If the

iLyon v. Lenon, 106 Ind. 5G7, 7 N. Ind. 122, 25 N. E. R. 812; Cloke v.

E. R. 311; Barnes v. McCrea (1888), Shafroth, 137 111. 393, 27 N. E. R. 702;

75 Iowa, 267, 39 N. W. R. 392, 9 Am. Reherd v. Clem (1889), 86 Va. 374,

St. R. 473; Johnston v. Browne, 37 10 S. E. R. 504; Fishback v. Van

Iowa, 200; Woodward v. Boone, 126 Dusen, 33 Minn. Ill, 22 N. W. R. 244.
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ceive his proper quantity at any time if so much remained in
store. But if the quantity in store is reduced by consumption
instead of by shipment or sale, it is not apparent that the rights
of the bolder of the receipts would be any different. It is true,
if the wheat is all consumed and the amount in store is not
kept good so that a demand for wheat can be responded to,
and if the consumption is by consent of the O\Yner, express or
implied, the consumption under such circumstances may be
justly regarded as a meeting of the minds of the parties upon
a sale; but so long as grain is kept in store from . which the receipts may be met, the fair presumption is that it is intended
they shall be so met, and the presumption would only be overcome by some act unequivocal in its nature." In cases of this
class the transaction continues a bailment so long as the depositor has the right to demand the return of his share of the
grain and the mass remains to supply the demands of the depositors; and it only becomes a sale when subsequently, but
in accordance with an express or im,plied agreement, the ba,ilee
is permitted to become a purchaser and to dispose of the whole
mass. The mere fact of such disposition, however, is not the
criterion, but it is the express or implied agreement that such
a disposition may be made. Without such agreement the disposing of the whole would amount to a conversion, but not a
sale; but with it, it is not a con version, but is a sale.

§ 29. - - . II. In other cases, the right of immediate disposal or con umption may be granted to the warehouseman at
the moment of the delivery, the depositor retainino- no right to
demand the return of his share of the ma s, unle s the warebou ernan lee.ts to so r turn it, the latter having the option
w b th er to r turn the original or like grain or to pay the value
rn m n y. In uch cases the transaction is held to con titute
a sale. 1 In one case the di tinction is thus stated: "If the
I Lyon v. L non, 106 Ind. 567, 7 N.
E. R. 311; arne v. l\fc
7:3 Iowa, 267, 39 N. W. R.
t. R. 473; J hn ton v.
Iowa, 200; Wood ward v. oone, 19(i

Ind. 122, 25 N. E. R. 812; Cloke v.
hafrotb, 137 Ill. 393, 27 N. E. R. 702;
R herd v. Cl m (1 ' 9), 86 Va. 374,
10 S. E. R. 504; Fi hback . Van
Dusen, 33 Minn. 111, 22 N. ·w. R. 244.
30

CH. I I.J TRANSACTIONS DISTINGUISHED FEOM SALES.

[§30.

dealer has the right, at his pleasure, either to ship and sell the

same on his own account, and pay the market price on demand,

or retain and redeliver the wheat, or other wheat in the place

of it, the transaction is a sale. It is only where the bailor re-

tains the right from the beginning to elect whether he will

demand the redelivery of his property, or other of like quality

and grade, that the contract will be considered one of bail-

ment. If he surrender to the other the right of election, it

will be considered a sale, with an option on the part of the

purchaser to pay either in money or property as stipulated.

The distinction is: Can the depositor, by his contract, compel

a delivery of wheat, whether the dealer is willing or not ? If

he can, the transaction is a bailment. If the dealer has the

option to pay for it in money or other wheat, it is a sale." *

§ 30. . III. Other cases present the features of sale in a

more marked aspect. Thus in one case 2 it appeared that the

owner of wheat deposited it with a miller to be paid for on
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See also Coquard v. Wernse, 100 Mo.

137, 13 S. W. R. 341.

1 Lyon v. Lenon, supra; enforcing

same distinction, James v. Plank, 48

Ohio St. 255, 26 N. E. R. 1107.

2 Jones v. Kemp (1882), 49 Mich. 9,

12 X. W. R. 890. To like effect, where

wheat was deposited to be paid for at

whatever might be the price in

twenty days (Woodward v. Boone

(1890), 126 Ind. 122, 25 N. E. R. 812);

and where wheat was deposited and

tickets given which might be pre-

sented at any time, and which en-

titled the holder to the market price

on the day of presentation. Weiland

v. Sunwall (1895), 63 Minn. 320, 65 N.

W. R. 628; Weiland v. Krejnick

(1895), 63 Minn. 314, 05 N. W. R. 631.

But where the manager of an ele-

vator, when wheat was brought to

it, asked the owner if he wished to

sell, and if he did, paid cash, but if

he did not, gave a deposit ticket, it

was held presumptively a bailment

and not a sale. Weiland v. Krejnick,

supra.

In Rumpf v. Barto (1894), 10 Wash.

382, 38 Pac. R. 1129, goods were de-

livered to a person under an agree-

ment evidenced by a memorandum

as follows: "These goods are sent

for your inspection, the property of

Rumpf & Mayer, and to be returned

to them within demand days. Sale

only takes effect from date of their

approval of your selection, and until

then goods are to be held subject to

their order." The transaction consti-

tutes a bailment and not a condi-

tional sale.

Where a person receives goods

under an agreement by which he

is to keep them during a certain

period, and if within that time he

pays for them he is to become the

owner, but otherwise is to pay for

the use of them, he receives them as

31
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delivery or at any subsequent time when the depositor de-

manded it, at the price current at the time of demand. It was

also understood that the miller might — as he did — mix it

with his own grain and grind from the mass as he desired.

The depositor subsequently demanded payment, but before pay-

ment was made the miller failed. The court below held that

this was a mere bailment, but the supreme court said : "We

think this was erroneous. The plaintiff reserved no right to

recall his wheat or any wheat or flour in its place. Defendant

reserved no right to return it actually or in kind. He was

bound at all events to keep it, and to pay for it on demand,

while the money was payable without any contingency. This

was a sale and delivery at once and without any credit on

which defendant could rely. He was bound to have his money

always ready, and to pay when called on."

§ 31. Bailment with privilege of purchase to he distin-
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guished from sale. — In dealing with the questions arising

out of grain, some illustrations have already been given of

a bailee, and the property in the

goods is not changed until the price

is paid. Brown Bros. v. Billington

(1894), 163 Pa. St. 76, 29 Atl. R.

904.

delivery or at any subsequent time when · the depositor demanded it, at the price current at the time of demand. It was
also understood that the miller might- as he did - mix it
with his own grain and grind from the mass as he desired.
The depositor subsequently demanded payment, but before payment was made the miller failed. The court below held that
this was a mere bailment, but the supreme court said: "We
think this was erroneous. The plaintiff reserved no right to
recall his wheat or any wheat or flour in its place. Defendant
reserved no right to return it actually or in kind. He was
bound at all events to keep it, and to pay for it on demand,
while the money was payable without any contingency. This
was a sale and delivery at once and without any credit on
which defendant could rely. He was bound to have bis money
always ready, and to pay when called on."

In McClelland v. Scroggin (1892), 35

Neb. 536, 53 N. W. R, 469, it appeared

that by a written agreement S. leased

to M. six hundred and forty acres of

§ 31. Bai] ment with privilege of purchase · to be distinguishecl from sale. - In dealing with the questions arising

land and a large amount of personal

property thereon, consisting of live-

out of grain, some illustrations have already been given of

stock and farming implements, of

the agreed value of $23,331. It was

provided in said agreement: ''That

when said M. shall pay to said S. the

sum of $23,331, with interest thereon

at the rate of ten per cent, per an-

num, together with the rents above

specified, and all sums which S. may

advance to or for said M., with inter-

est thereon, then all the above prop-

erty shall be conveyed to him, the

said M., together with all increase

thereof. Until such payment such

property shall be and remain the

property of S.. together with the in-

crease thereof, and should any of

said property be sold bj? - consent of

S., the proceeds thereof shall be ap-

plied upon the above indebtedness."

Held, not a conditional sale, but an

agi-eement to sell at the election of

M., and that the relation of the par-

ties with respect to said property is

that of bailor and bailee only.

But in Barnes v. Morse (1890), 38

I1L App. 274, where the contract was

otherwise clearh r a contract of sale,

it was held that a clause in the con-

tract that "goods not sold this year

will be carried on next year's time "

did not make the contract one of

bailment rather than sala

a bailee, and the property in the

said M., together with all increase
goo<ls is not changed until the price thereof. Until such payment such
is paid. Brown Bro . v. Billington property shall be and remain the
(1 94), 163 Pa. St. 76, 29 Atl. R. property of S., together with the increase thereof, and should any of
904.
In :McClelland v. Scroggin (1892), 35 said property be sold by consent of
Neb. 536, 53 N. W.R. 469, it appeared S., the proceeds thereof shall be apthat by a written agreement S. leased plied upon the above indebtedness."
to l\I. six hundred and forty acres of Held, not a conditional sale, but an
land and a large amount of personal agreement to sell at the election of
property thereon, consi ting of live- M., and that the relation of the parstock and farming implement , of ties with respect. to said property is
the agreed value of $23,331. It was that of bailor and bailee only.
But in Barnes v. Morse (1890), 38
provided in said agreement: ·'That
·when saicl M. shall pay to said S. the Ill. A pp. 27 4, where the con tract was
sum of '23,331, with intere t thereon otherwise clearly a contract of sale,
at the rate of ten per cent. per an- it was held that a clause int.he connum, together with the rent above tract that "goods not sold thi year
specified, and all urns which S. may will be carried ou next year's time :i
advance to or for aid M., with inter- did not make the contract one of
e t thereon, then all the above prop- bailment rather than sale.
erty shall be conveyed to him, the
32
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II.]

TRANSACTIONS DISTINGUISHED FEOil SALES.

[§3i

bailments to which is annexed the privilege of buying the

property at some time in the future. But other cases also

present this feature in almost countless forms. The various

contracts, sometimes called " leases with a right of purchase,"

but more frequently classed under the general term "con-

ditional sales," are illustrations of such transactions, to which

more detailed consideration will be hereafter given. 1 But for

the present purpose —

§ 32. Option to buy and pay for chattel, or pay for

its use. — " Where, by the contract," it is said in one case, 2 " the

bailments to which is annexed the privilege of buying the
property at some time in the future. But other cases also
present this feature in almost countless forms. The various
contracts, sometimes called "leases with a right of purchase,"
but more frequently classed under the general term "conditional sales,'' are illustrations of such transactions, to which
more detailed consideration will be hereafter given. 1 But for
the present purpose -

vendee receives a chattel which he is to keep for a certain

period, and if in that time he pays for it the stipulated price,

§ 32. - - Option to buy and pay for chattel, or pay for

he is to become the owner, but, if he does not pay the price,

he is to pay for its use, the vendee receives it as bailee, and the

right of property is not changed until the price is paid." In
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a later case 3 in the same state the court says that it is a bail-

1 See post, Book II, ch. IIL

2 Eose v. Story (1845), 1 Pa. St. (1

Barr), 190, quoted in Enlow v. Klein

(1875), 79 Pa. St. 488, where are

cited Clark v. Jack, 7 Watts (Pa.),

375; McCul lough v. Porter, 4 W. &

S. 177, 39 Am. Dec. 68; Lehigh Co. v.

Field, 8 W. & S. 232; Rowe v. Sharpe,

its u e. - "Where, by the contract," it is said in one case,2 "the
vendee receives a chattel which be is to keep for a certain
period, and if in that time he pays for it the stipulated price,
he is to become the owner but, if he does not pay the price,
be is to pay for its u e, the vendee receives it as bailee and the
right of propert is not changed until the price is paid." In
a later case 3 in the same state the court says that it is a bail-

51 Pa. St. 26: Becker v. Smith, 59

Pa. St. 469; Henry v. Patterson, 57

Pa. St 346. In Enlow v. Klein the

facts were that Enlow agreed with

Moritz to furnish him with a team

of horses, wagons, etc.. for country

peddling; he to pay Enlow $5 per

week, in two hundred payments; the

team, etc., "to belong to and be

managed by Enlow until the last of

the two hundred payments; " Moritz

to keep up all repairs, and if a horse

should die to replace him at his own

expense; Enlow "to relinquish all

his right, etc., to Moritz when the

last payment is made of the two

hundred." Held to be a bailment

3

See also Mt Leonard Milling Co. v.

Insurance Co (1887), 25 Mo. App. 259.

3 Chamberlain v. Smith (1863), 44

Pa. St 431. In this case A. received

from B. a yoke of oxen " to keep and

work in a reasonable, farmer-like

manner for the term of one year;

said cattle to be returned in one

year." At the same time A. deliv-

ered to B. another animal for the use

of the cattle. The contract also pro-

vided that A " has the privilege, by

paying .$40 and legal interest at the

expiration of the year, to keep the

said cattle."

In Middleton v. Stone (1886), 111

Pa. St. 589, 4 Atl. R. 523, A. deliv-

ered to B. two colts under a contract

that B. should safely keep and sell

them, if possible, for A. at a fixed

price before a certain date, and, if

not sold, to return them in good con-

dition to A. This was held a bail-

ment and not a sale, though B. had

ee post, Book II, ch. UL
2 Rose v. Story (1 4-5 ), 1 Pa. St. (1
Barr), 190, quoted in Enlow v. Klein
(1 75), 9 Pa. St.
, where are
cited Clark v. Jack, 'i Watts (Pa.),
375· McCullough v. Porter, 4 W. &
. 177, 39 Am. Dec. 6 ; Lehigh Co. v.
Field, 8 W. & S. 232; Rowe v. Sharpe,
51 Pa. St. 26: Becker v. Smith, 59
Pa. St. 469; Henry v. Patterson, 57
Pa. t. 346. In Enlow v. Klein the
facts were that Enlow agreed with
l\Ioritz to furni h him with a team
of hor e , wagons, etc., for country
peddling; he to pay Enlow $5 per
week, in two hundred payments; the
team, etc., "to belong to and be
managed. by Enlow until the last of
the two hundred payments;" Moritz
to keep up all repairs, and if a hor e
should die to replace him at his own
expense; Enlow "to relinquish all
hi right, etc., to :Moritz when the
la -t payment is made of the two
hundred. ' Held to be a bailment.
3
1

See al o )It. i,eonard Milling Co. v.
Insurance Co. (1 7), 25 )Jo. A pp. 259.
s Chamberlain v. mith (1 63), 44
Pa. St. 431. In this ca e A. received
from B. a yoke of oxen "to keep and
work in a rea enable, farmer-like
manner for the term of one year;
said cattle to be returned in one
year." At the same time A. delivered to B. another animal for the use
of the cattle. The contract also provided that A. "ha the prh-ilege, b.r
paying $4:0 and legal intere t at the
expiration of the year, to keep the
said cattle."
In Middleton v. Stone (1 6), 111
Pa. St. 589, 4 Atl. R. 523, .A. deli vered to B. two colt under a contract
that B. hould safely keep and sell
them, if possible, for A. at a fixed
price before a certain date, itnd, if
not old, to return them in good condition to A. This was held a ba.ilment and not a sale, though B. had
also the right unrier the contract to

§ 32.J

LAW OF SALE.

[BOOK I.

§ 32.] LAW OF SALE. [BOOK I.

ment and not a sale ; a bailment with a refusal of the chattel

for a specified time.

At the same time, it is easy here, as it has been found to

be in other cases, to attempt to disguise what is really a sale

under the cloak of a mere bailment. Thus where, by the

terms of a written contract, Mary Hicks " leased " to John

Summerson a pair of horses "for the sum of one hundred

and twenty-five dollars, to be paid by the first of April, 18S6;

and in case the said John Summerson shall fail to make

said payment as above agreed," then the said Mary Hicks to

have " full and free possession of said team," it being " further

agreed that the ownership shall remain in hands of Mary

Hicks until payment is made in full," it was held that there

was a sale and not a bailment or leasing. Said the court:

" We are unable to agree entirely with the view taken by

Veither of the parties. Both appear to have been in some de-

gree misled by looking at the name and not at the substance

of the contract. It is called a lease, but is manifestly a sale.
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No term is stipulated for the hiring, nor any rate per month

or per annum. On the contrary, it is merely said that the

horses are leased for a lump sum of one hundred and twenty-

five dollars. But what is conclusive of the character of the

transaction is the stipulation that ' the ownership shall remain

in Mary Hicks until payment is made in full.' If it was merely

keep the colts himself upon paying a ment that he should be paid for her

price fixed for them. Under the cir- keeping by the milk she would yield;

cumstances of the case the latter and if, at any time within four

clause was held immaterial, though months, he should pay the plaintiff

the court said, " But even as to that, $35, the title to the cow should vest

the question at issue being between in him. B. did not pay for the cow,

the original parties only, no credit- but sold and delivered her to the de-

ors being interested, the title could fendant, who bought her in good

not pass without the actual payment faith, supposing her to be the prop-

of the money, and hence this part of erty of B. In an action of trover

the contract cannot convert the against such purchaser it was held

whole into a sale." that the plaintiff was entitled to re-

in Hart v. Carpenter (1856), 24 cover. See also Nichols v. Ashton

Conn. 426, B. took the plaintiffs cow (1892), 155 Mass. 205, 29 N. E. R. 519.

men t and not a sale; a bail men t with a refusal of the chat tel
for a specified time.
At the same time, it is easy here, as it bas been found to
be in other cases, to attempt to disguise what is really a sale
under the cloak of a mere bailment. Thus where, by the
terms of a written contract, JYiary Hicks "leased" to John
Summerson a pair of horses "for the sum of one hundred
and twenty-five dollars, to be paid by the first of April, 1886;
and in case the said John Summerson shall fail to make
said payment as above agreed," then the said Mary Hicks to
have "full and free possession of said team," it being "further
agreed that the ownership shall remain in hands of :M:ary
Hicks until payment is made in full," it was held that there
was a sale and not a bailment or leasing. Said the court:
"We are unable to agree entirely with the view taken by
either of the parties. Both appear to have been in some degree misled by looking at the name and not at the substance
of the contract. It is called a lease, but is manifestly a sale.
No term is stipulated for the hiring, nor any rate per month
or per annum. On the contrary, it is merely said t.hat the
horses are leased for a lump sum of one hundred and twenty:fi ve dollars. But what is conclusive of the character of the
transaction is the stipulation that 'the ownership shall remain
in Mary Hicks until payment is made in full.' If it was merely

into his possession under an agree ,

34

keep the colts himself upon paying a
price fixed for them. Under the circumstances of the ca e the latter
clause was held immaterial, though
the court said, "But even as to that,
the que tion at is ue being between
the original parties only, no creditors being interested, the title could
not pas without the actual payment
of the money, and hence this part of
the contract cannot convert the
whole into a sale."
In Hart v. Carpenter (1 -6), 24
Conn. 426, B. took the plaintiff's cow
into his po se ion under an agree

ment that he should be paid for her
keeping by the milk she would yield;
and if, at any time within four
months, he should pay the plaintiff
$35, the title to the cow should vest
in him. B. did not pay for the cow,
but sold and delivered her to the defendant, who bought her in good
faith, supposing her to be the property of B. In an action of trover
against such purchaser it was held
't hat the plaintiff was entitled to recover. See also Nichols v. Ashton
(1 92), 15- Mass. 205, 29 N. E. R. 519.
34

CH. II.] TRANSACTIONS DISTINGUISHED FROM SALES. [§§ 33-35.

a hiring, the ownership would have remained in Mrs. Hicks

all the time without any such stipulation." 1

§ 33. Delivery of goods on trial to be purchased if approved

is not a present sale. — So the delivery of goods on trial to be

bought and paid for, if the prospective purchaser approves of

them, and, if not, to be returned, does not constitute a present

sale, and the title does not pass until approval express or im-

plied. 2 "Within what time this option is to be exercised, what

is the effect of a failure to disapprove within the time agreed

upon, and what, if any, notice of disapproval may be required,

are questions which will be considered in later sections. 3

§ 34. Sale with option to return or pay. — To be distin-

guished from the cases referred to in the preceding section are

those in which the option is precisely the reverse, that is, that

the article is purchased and shall be paid for, unless it is re-

turned. An option to purchase if one likes is radically dif-

ferent from an option to return a purchase if he does not like.

In the former case the title does not pass until the option is
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exercised ; in the latter case it passes at once, subject to the

right to rescind and return under the conditions agreed upon. 4

"Within what time this option is to be exercised, and what is

the effect of a failure to exercise it as agreed, are subjects

which are reserved for fuller treatment in another place. 5

§ 35. Bailment or sale, how determined — Law or fact. —

The question of bailment or sale, like that hereafter to be con-

1 Summerson v. Hicks (1890), 134 stipulating for the return of the

Pa. St. 566, 19 Atl. R. 808. So in Na- plow, or the payment of any rent,

tional Car & L. Builder v. Cyclone was really a sale.

Steam Snow Plow Co. (1892), 49 Minn. -' See post, §$ 675-685, Book II,

105. 51 X. W. R. 657, where there had chapter III, where many other forms

been a contract by defendant to pay of sale upon condition are consid-

to plaintiff a sum of money when a ered.

certain snow-plow was sold, the 3 See post, %% 681-685.

court held that a " lease " of the plow ' 4 See post, g§ 657-662, Book II,

for ninety-nine years, with the right chapter III, where this and kindred

in the lessee to use, alter, rearrange subjects are more fully discussed.

or improve the machine according 5 See post, §§ 659-662.

to its own judgment, and without

35

§§ 36-38.J

LAW OF SALE.

[BOOK I.

§§ 36-38.] LAW OF SALE. [BOOK I.

sidered of sale or consignment, may be one to be decided by

the court or the jury as the circumstances of each case may

determine. "Where the whole transaction is represented in a

written contract before the court, its legal effect as creating

sale or bailment is a question of law for the court ; * and this

would be true though there were no such writing, if the facts

were agreed upon. The most common case, however, is the

one in which the facts are controverted or the intention in dis-

pute, and in these cases the question, under proper instructions,

is one of fact for the jury to determine. 2

§ 36. Sale to be distinguished from mortgage. — So sale

is to be distinguished from mortgage, which, in most of the

states, is a conditional sale of personal property as security for

the payment of a debt or the performance of some other obli-

gation, though, in some states, it is regarded, like the mortgage

upon land, as a mere lien upon the property rather than a con-

sidered of sale or consignment, may be one to be decided by
the court or the jury as the circumstances of each case may
determine. Where the whole transaction is represented in a
written contract before the court, its legal effect as creating
sale or bailment is a question of law for the court; 1 and this.
would be true though there were no such writing, if the facts
were agreed upon. The most common case, however, is the
one in which the facts are controverted or the intention in dispute, and in these cases the question, under proper instructions,
is one of fact for the jury to determine. 2

ditional sale. The distinction between a sale and a mortgage

or pledge is usually so obvious as not to require extended con-
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sideration. Still —

§ 37. Sale to be distinguished from pledge. — Sale is like-

wise to be distinguished from pledge, which is a deposit of per-

sonal property by way of security for the performance of some

act, usually the payment of a debt. Here though the goods

are delivered to the pledgee, who acquires a special property

in them, the general property remains all of the time in the

pledgor until his title has been divested, after default, by a

foreclosure of his right to redeem.

§ 38. Sale and not a pledge. — The criterion here, as in

other cases, is usually the intention of the parties. The mere

fact that one delivers goods to another to whom he is indebted

' 1 Chickering v. Bastress (1889), 130 Heryford v. Davis, 102 U. S. 235; Fish

I1L 206, 22 N. E. R. 542, 17 Am. St. R. v. Benedict, 74 N. Y. 613).

§ 36. Sale to be distinguished from mortgage.- So sale
is to be distinguished from mortgage, which, in most of the
states, is a conditional sale of personal property as security for
the payment of a debt or the performance of some other obligation, though, in some states, it is regarded, like the mortgage
upon land, as a mere lien upon the property rather than ·a conditional sale. The distinction between a sale and a mortgage
or pledge is usually so obvious as not to require extended consideration. Still-

309 (citing Murch v. Wright, 46 111. 2 Crosby v. Delaware & Hud. Canal

487, 95 Am. Dec. 455; Hervey v. Co. (1890), 119 N. Y. 334, 36 N. E. R

Rhode Island L. Works, 93 U. S. 664; 332.
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§ 37. Sale to be distinguished from pleclge.- Sale is likewise to be distinguished from pledge, which is a deposit of personal property by way of security for the performance of some
act, usually the payment of a debt. Here though the goods
are delivered to the pledgee, who acquires a special property
in them, the general property remains all of the time in the
pledgor until his title has been divested, after default, by a
foreclosure of his right to redeem.

§ 38. - - Sale and not a pledge.-The criterion here, as in
other cases, is usually the intention of the parties. The mere
fact that one delivers goods to another to whom lie is indebted
· 1 Chickering v, Bastress (1889), 130
Ill 206, 22 N. E. R. 542, 17 Am. St. R.
309 (citing Murch v. Wright, 46 Ill.
487, 95 Am. Dec. 455; Hervey v.
Rhode Island L. Works, 93 U.S. 664;

3()

Heryford v. Davis, 102 U.S. 235; Fjsh
v. Benedict, 74 N. Y. 613).
2 Crosby v. Delaware & Rud. Canal
Co. (1890), 119 N. Y. 334, 36 N. E. R.
332.

CH. II.] TRANSACTIONS DISTINGUISHED FROM SALES. [§ 39.

is not enough to stamp the transaction as a pledge. The goods

may have been delivered in payment of the indebtedness and

not as security for it, or, what is in effect the same thing, they

may have been sold to the creditor in consideration of the dis-

charge of the debt. Thus, in one case, 1 a person who had a

judgment against another accepted from the latter goods found

to be worth $600, agreeing to credit him to the amount of

$350, and, if the goods should sell for more than this, to credit

him also with the excess after deducting the expenses of the

sale. This, it was urged, constituted a pledge and not a sale ; but

Dillon, J., held otherwise, saying that there was no objection

to a lona fide transaction of this sort, and that the stipulation

for contingent additional compensation did not ex necessitate

transmute the sale into a pledge or mortgage. So where the

treasurer of a savings bank made an absolute assignment of a

mortgage belonging to the bank to a person who paid full value

for it, agreeing to resell it to the bank if the bank subsequently

wished to buy it, the transaction was held to be a sale and not
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a pledge; and the fact that the treasurer afterward paid inter-

est on the mortgage to the assignee was held not to show an

agreement by the bank to treat the transaction as a loan. 2

§ 39. Pledge and not sale.— But where, on the other

hand, one delivers a chattel to another as security for a debt,

or as indemnity for a suretyship therein, the law regards the

transaction as a pledge and not as a sale ; 3 nor does it alter

the case in equity 4 or, generally, at law, 5 that the property was

transferred by an absolute or unconditional bill of sale or as-

signment, or even if it be expressly stipulated that the pledge

shall be irredeemable. 6 So it is a pledge and not a sale where

a receipted bill of parcels has been given, accompanied by a

i Reeves v. Sebern, 16 Iowa, 234, 85 (1885), 57 Mich. 187, 23 N. W. R. 724;

Am. Dec. 513. O'Neil v. Walker (1893), 45 La. Ann.

2 Commonwealth v. Savings Bank 609, 12 S. R. 872.

(1884), 137 Mass. 431. 4 See following section.

s Morgan v. Dod (1877), 3 Colo. 551 ; 5 See following section.

Upham v. Richey (1896), 163 111. 530, « Morgan v. Dod, si^ra.

45 N. E. R. 228; Berry v. Monroe
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§§ 40, 41.] LAW OF SALE. [BOOK I.

§§ 40, 41.J

LAW OF SALE.

[BOOK I.

formal delivery of the goods, but in reality intended only as

security for a debt. 1

g 40. Parol evidence to show apparent sale to he

pledge or mortgage. — Some conflict of opinion exists as to

formal delivery of the goods, but in reality intended only as
security for a debt. 1

the admissibility of parol evidence to show that a transaction,

on its face a sale, was in reality but a pledge or mortgage.

Where the transfer is not accompanied by written evidence, no

difficulty exists; but where the property has been transferred

§ 4:0. - - Parol evidence to show apparent sale to . be
pledge or mortgage.- Some conflict of opinion exists as to

by a deed or formal bill of sale purporting to convey an absolute

title, the courts are not agreed upon the admissibility of parol

evidence to show that the transfer was, in reality, only as se-

curity, and that the transaction was therefore a pledge or a

mortgage. By many of the courts it is held that such evi-

dence is not admissible at law, 2 though it may be in equity; 3

but other courts hold that as between the original parties or

those not lonafide purchasers, the true nature of the transac-

tion may be shown at law as well as in equity, 4 and such has

been declared to be the weight of authority. 5 But even where
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the former rule prevails, it does not apply to mere informal

instruments, such as a bill of parcels. 6 The evidence, however,

it is said, must be clear and convincing. 7

§ 41. Sale to be distinguished from mere agency to buy.

So a contract for sale is to be distinguished from a mere agency

1 Shaw v. Wilshire, 65 Me. 485, cit- Jones v. Rahilly, 16 Minn. 320 (citing

ing Eastman T.Avery, 23 Me. 248; Belote v. Morrison, 8 Minn. 62; Phenix

Beeman v. Lawton, 37 Me. 543; Whit- v. Gardner, 13 Minn. 432: Russell v.

aker v. Sumner, 20 Pick. (Mass.) 399; Southard, 12 How. (U. S.) 139; Hodges

Hazard v. Loring, 10 Cush. (Mass.) v. Insurance Co., 4 Seld. (N. Y.) 419;

267 ; Walker v. Staples, 5 Allen (Mass.), Chester v. Bank, 16 N. Y. 343 ; Smith

34. v. Beattie, 31 N. Y. 542); Travers v.

2Philbrook v. Eaton, 134 Mass. 398; Leopold, 124 111. 431, 16 N. E. R. 902.

Pennock v. McCormick, 120 Mass. 5 Jones v. Rahilly, supra.

275; Harper v. Ross, 10 Allen (Mass.), 6 Hazard v. Loring, 10 Cush. (Mass.)

332; Hartshorn v. Williams, 31 Ala. 267; Hildreth v. 0"Brien, 10 Allen

149; Bryant v. Crosby, 36 Me. 562, 58 (Mass.), 104.

Am. Dec. 767. 7 Travers v. Leopold, 124 111. 431, 16

the admissibility of parol evidence to show that a transaction,
on its face a sale, was in reality but a pledge or mortgage.
Where the transfer is not accompanied by written evidence, no
difficulty exists; but where the property has been transferred
by a deed or formal bill of sale purporting to convey an absolute
title, the courts are not agreed upon the admissibility of parol
evidence to show that the transfer was, in reality, only as security, and that the transaction was therefore a pledge or a
mortgage. By many of the courts it is held that such evidence is not admissible at law, 2 though it may be in equity; 3
but other courts hold that as between the original parties or
those not bona fide purchasers, the true nature of the transaction may be shown at law as well as in equity, 4 and such has
been declared to be the weight of authority. 5 But even where
the former rule prevails, it does not apply to mere informal
instruments, such as a bill of parcels. 6 The evidence, however,
it is said, must be clear and convincing. 7

3 Jones on Chat. Mortgages, § 22. N. E. R 902.

4 Fuller v. Parrish, 3 Mich. 211;
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§ 4:1. Sale to be distinguished from mere agency to buy.
So a con tract for sale is to be distinguished from a mere agency
1 Shaw v. Wilshire, 65 l\Ie. 4 5, cit- Jones v. Rahilly, 16 .Minn. 320 (citing
ing Ea tman v. A very, 23 Ie. 2-± ; Belote v. l\Iorrison l\finn. 60; Phenix
Beeman v. Lawton, 37 Ie. 543; "Whit- v. Gardner, 13 l\Iinn. 432: Ru ell v.
aker v. Sumner, 20 Pick. (l\Ias . .) 399; Southa.rd, 12How. (U.S.) 139; Hodges
Hazard v. Loring, 10 Cu h. (l\Ia .) v. In urance Co., 4 Seld. (N. Y.) 419;
267; Walker v. Staples, 5 Allen (1\Iass.), Che ter v. Bank, 16 . Y. 343; Smith
34.
v. Beattie, 31 N. Y. 542)· Tra,ers v.
2 Philbrook v. Eaton, 134 Ia . 39 ; Leopold, 124 Ill. 431, 16 N. E. R. 902.
Pennock v. 1\IcCormick. 120 l\Ia .
5 Jone v. Rahilly, supra.
275; Harper v. Ro , 10 llen (1\Ia .),
6 Hazard v. Lorin()', 10 Cush. (l\fas .)
330; Hartshorn v. William , 31 Ala. 267; Hildreth v. O'Brien, 10 Allen
149· Bryant v. Cro by, 36 Me. 569, 58 (l\Ia .), 104.
Am. Dec. 767.
7 Traver v. Leopold, 124 Ill. 431, 16
3 Jone on Chat. fortgage , § 22.
N. E. R. 902.
4 Fuller v. Parrish, 3 1\Iich. 211;
38

CH. II.] TRANSACTIONS DISTINGUISHED FROM SALES. [§ 41.

to buy. Thus in a case ! in Ohio it appeared that the parties

had entered into an agreement evidenced by the following

writing: "Canton, Feb. 7, 1848. Received one hundred and

seventy-five dollars as an advance to buy barley for Wm. Webb,

for which I do agree to deliver one thousand bushels of barley

to Mr. Reynolds' warehouse in Massillon, at thirty-five cents

per bushel, by the middle of April next — the said barley to be

good merchantable barley." Signed "John Black." Black

thereupon proceeded to buy barley, and in February had pur-

chased and stored in Reynolds' warehouse over six hundred

bushels, when the warehouse was washed away by a flood, and

the barley was lost. Black afterwards purchased enough more

to make up a thousand bushels, including that lost, and on

April 15th tendered to "Webb the warehouse receipts for that

washed away and the barley on hand, as a compliance with his

agreement. Webb refused the tender, though he was willing

to accept the barley on hand as so much on account. It ap-

peared also that Webb had often gone to Black's store, where
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he bought the barley, and had examined it, and on one occa-

sion had condemned a load as of poor quality.

Said the court: "There is but a single question growing out

of the facts in this case. Was Black the agent of Webb in pur-

chasing this barley at Massillon ? or was he the vendor of a

thousand bushels of barley to Webb, to be delivered within

a given time, at a certain place, and for a stipulated price ?

If the former, the law will cast the loss upon his principal ;

but if the latter, the misfortune will be his own, unless he had

perfected a delivery of the grain before the accident."

i Black v. Webb (1851). 20 Ohio, 111.467; Shields v. Pettie, 4N. Y. 122;

304, 55 Am. Dec. 456. In the note to Brown v. Brooks, 7 Jones (N. C), 93;

this case the editor says: "A rule Leonard v. Winslow, 2 Grant's Cas.

similar to that laid down in the prin- (Pa.) 139; Shaw v. Nudd, 8 Pick,

cipal case was followed in each of (Mass.) 9; Phillips v. Hunnewell, 4

those cited below: Rodee v. Wade, Greenl. (Me.) 376; Garrett v. Crooks,

47 Barb. (N. Y.) 53; Jennings v. Gage, 15 La. Ann. 483; Roberts v. Beatty,

13 111. 610, 56 Am. Dec. 476; Kelly v. 2 Pen. & Watts, 67, 21 Am. Dec. 410;

Upton, 5 Duer (N. Y.), 336; Lane v. McDonald v. Hewett, 15 Johns. (N. Y)

Neale, 2 Stark. 105; Lovelace v. Stew- 351, 8 Am. Dec. 241; Penniman v.

art, 23 Mo. 384; Low v. Freeman, 12 Hartshorn, 13 Mass. 87."
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[BOOK I.

The court then proceeded to apply various tests, and found

in the language of the agreement, and in the facts that "Webb

was not affected by a rise or fall in the market, and would not

have been responsible to the persons from whom Black might

buy on credit, and could not dictate as to the place or time or

conditions of Black's purchases, and had no control over the

barley in the warehouse until delivered to him, conclusive evi-

dence that Black " purchased this barley, not as the agent or

factor of William "Webb, but on his own private account, and

for the purpose of filling a contract of sale, entered into and

then subsisting between himself as the vendor and William

Webb as the vendee. In this view of the subject, the risk of

the property would remain with Black until he should deliver

the barley or transfer the contract thereof to Webb. The loss

happened before such delivery or transfer, and must be borne

by Black alone."

§ 42. . But in a recent case in Michigan 1 it appeared

that a retail grocer, in ordering goods of a wholesale dealer,
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had on some occasions included in his order, at the request of

a friend, a quantity of goods which the latter had received and

paid for at what they cost. On one of these occasions the friend

refused to receive or pay for the goods, and the grocer sold

them at a loss, and brought action against the friend to recover.

The defendant contended, among other things, that the trans-

action amounted to a sale and was void under the statute of

frauds because not evidenced by writing, but the court held

that it was not a sale, but a case of agency to buy, and the

The court then proceeded to apply various tests, and found
in the language of the agreement, and in the facts that Webb
was not affected by a rise or fall in the market, and would not
have been responsible to the persons from whom Black might
buy on credit, and could not dictate as to the place or time or
conditions of Black's purchases, and had no control over the
barley in the warehouse until delivered to him, conclusive evidence that Black "purchased this barley, not as the agent or
factor of William Webb, but on his own private account, and
for the purpose of filling a contract of sale, entered into and
then subsisting between himself as the vendor and William
Webb as the vendee. In this view of the subject, the risk of
the property would remain with Black until he should deliver
the barley or transfer the contract thereof to Webb. The loss
happened before such delivery or transfer, and must be borne
by Black alone."

plaintiff was permitted to recover.

§ 43. Sale to foe distinguished from agency to sell or con-

§ 4:2. - - . But in a recent case in }.fichigan 1 it appeared

signment. — Sale, further, is to be distinguished from the cre-

ation of an agency to sell. The essence of sale is, as has been

seen, the transfer of the title to the goods for a price paid or

to be paid. Such a transfer puts the transferee, who has pro-

cured the goods to sell again, in the attitude of an owner sell-

1 Hatch v. McBrien (1890), 83 Mich. 159, 47 N. W. R. 214.
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that a retail grocer, in ordering goods of a wholesale dealer,
had on some occasions included in his order, at the request of
a friend, a quantity of goods which the latter had received and
paid for at what they cost. On one of these occasions the friend
refused to receive or pay for the goods, and the grocer sold
them at a loss, and brought action against the friend to recover.
The defendant contended, among other things, that the transaction amounted to a sale and was void under the statute of
frauds because not evidenced by writing, but the court held
that it was not a sale, but a case of agency to buy, and the
plaintiff was permitted to recover.

§ 43. Sale to be distinguished from agency to sell or con·
signment.- Sale, further, is to be distinguished from the creation of an agency to sell. The essence of sale is, as has been
seen, the transfer of the title to the goods for a price paid or
to be paid. Such a transfer puts the transferee, who has procured the goods to sell again, in the attitude of an owner sell1 Hatch

v. McBrien (1890), 83 Mich. 159, 47 N. W. R. 214.
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CH. II.] TRANSACTIONS DISTINGUISHED FROM SALES. [§ 44.

ing his own goods, and makes him liable to the first seller as a

debtor for the price, and not, as an agent, for the proceeds of

the resale. The essence of the agency to sell is the delivery

of the goods to a person who is to sell them, not as his own

property but as the property of the principal, who remains the

owner of the goods and who therefore has the right to control

the sale, to recall the goods and to demand and receive their

proceeds when sold, less the agent's commission, but who has

no right to a price for them before sale or unless sold by the

agent.

Agencies to sell are very common ; the most familiar types

of such agents being the factor or commission merchant, and

the general dealer who receives goods for sale under what is

usually termed a " consignment." In the ordinary cases of

this nature, the title to the goods remains in the consignor or

principal until sale, and the factor or consignee does not be-

come liable as a purchaser except, according to the weight of

authority, when he has sold under a del credere commission. 1

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:47 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t6xw4h56n
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

§ 44. . A qualified form of " agency " which has grown

up in modern times is that which exists when the owner or

manufacturer of patented or other proprietary articles grants

the privilege of sale or of exclusive territory to one who other-

wise might not be at liberty to sell the goods in question. It

is entirely consistent with this arrangement that the so-called

agent is to buy, of the proprietor or manufacturer, the goods

which he is thus authorized to sell, and when this is the fact

there is little more of "agency" in the case than the name

itself. It is also entirely consistent with the arrangement

that the " agent " is to sell the goods at a price or upon terms

or conditions fixed by the proprietor or manufacturer. A per-

son so situated is often, in popular language, said to have ob-

tained the " agency " for the goods, when all that is meant is

that he has obtained a more or less exclusive right to buy and

resell them in a prescribed territory. The transaction is sim-

ple enough, but the reports show many cases in which the par-

iSee Mechem on Agency, § 1014; post, § 49 and notes.
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[BOOK I.

LAW OF SALE.

[book I.

ties have, perhaps, deceived themselves and have certainly at-

tempted to deceive others by calling that an " agency " which

had no resemblance to agency in fact, but was simply a sale

of a proprietary article with a right of resale under terms and

conditions fixed by the proprietor.

§ 45. . It is, moreover, entirely possible that the rela-

tions of the parties may change, or be susceptible of change,

ties have, perhaps, deceived themselves and have certainly attempted to deceive others by calling that an "agency" which
had no resemblance to agency in fact, but was simply a sale
of a proprietary article with a right of resale under terms and
conditions fixed by the proprietor.

during the progress of the transaction. Thus there may be

the creation of a genuine agency to sell, but, coupled with it,

the right of the agent to himself become the purchaser if he

so desires, or a stipulation that in a certain contingency — as

if he sells at a different time or price than that fixed — he shall

or may be treated as a purchaser. In such a case, if the con-'

tingency contemplated occurs, the transaction will cease to be

an agency to sell and will become a sale. 1

i See Ex parte White (1871), L. R. 6
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Ch. App. 397. The question here was

whether one Nevill, to whom Towle

& Co. had delivered goods, was to be

regarded as a purchaser of the goods

or only as agent of Towle & Co. for

their sale. Said Mellish, J.: "It ap-

pears to me that the real question is,

when Nevill sold the goods, did he

§ 45. - - . It is, moreover, entirely possible that the relations of the parties may change, or be susceptible of change,
during the progress of the transaction. Thus there may be
the creation of a genuine agency to sell, but, coupled with it,
the right of the agent to himself become the purchaser if he
so desires, or a stipulation that in a certain contingency- as
if he sells at a different time or price than that fixed- he shall
or may be treated as a purchaser. In such a case, if the con-'
tingency contemplated occurs, the transaction will cease to be
an agency to sell and will become a sale. 1

sell them as the agent of Towle &

Co., so as to make Towle & Co. the

vendors, and the persons to whom

he sold, purchasers from Towle &

Co.? — or did he sell on his own ac-

count, so as to create the relation of

purchaser and vendor between him-

self and Towle & Co., and again the

relation of vendor and purchaser be-

tween himself and the persons to

whom he sold ? Now, it is said that

he was a del credere agent, and no

doubt it requires a very minute ex-

amination of what the course of

business is, to distinguish between a

del credere agent, and a person who

is an agent up to a certain point, that

is to say, until he has sold the goods,

but who, when he has sold the goods,

has purchased them on his own

credit and sold them again on his

own account. And no doubt per-

sons may suppose that their relation-

ship is that of principal and agent,

when in point of law it is not. It

is quite clear that Nevill, if he sold

these goods, was to pay Towle & Co.

for them, at a fixed price — that is

to say, a price fixed beforehand be-

tween him and them — and at a

fixed time. Now, if it had been his

duty to sell to his customers at that

price, and to receive payment from

them at that time, then the course

I See Ex parte White (1871), L. R. 6
Ch. App. 397. The que tion here was
whether one Nevill, to whom Towle
& Co. had delivered goods, was to be
regarded as a purehaser of the goods
or only as agent of Towle & Co. for
their sale. Said Mellish, J.: "It appears to me that the real question is,
when Nevill sold the goods, did he
sell them as the agent of To"vle &
Co., so as to make Towle & Co. the
vendors, and the persons to w horn
he sold, purchasers from Towle &
Co.?-or did he sell on his own account, so as to create the relation of
I urchaser and vendor between himelf and Towle & Co., ancl again the
relation of vendor and purchaser between himself and the persons to
whom he old? Now, it is said that
he wa a del credere agent, and no
doubt it requires a very minute examination of what the course of
lmsin
i , to di tingui h between a
del credere agent, and a per on who
is an agent up to a certain point, that

is to say, until he has sold the goods,
but who, when he has sold the goods,
has purchased them on his own
credit and sold them again on his
own account. And no doubt persons may suppose that their relation.ship is that of principal and agent,
when in point of law it is not. It
is quite clear that Nevill, if he sold
these goods, wa to pay Towle & Co.
for them, at a fixed price- that is
to say, a price fixed beforehand between him and them-and at a
fixed time. Now, if it had been his
duty to sell to his customers at that
price, and to receive payment from
them at that time, then the course
of dealing would be consistent with
his being merely a clel credere agent,
becau elappreh ndthatadelcredere
agent, like any other agent, is to sell
according to the instructions of his
principal, and to make such contracts
as he i. authorized to make for his
principal; and he is distinguished
from other agents simp1y in this,

of dealing would be consistent with

his being merely a del credere agent,

because I apprehend that a del credere

agent, like any other agent, is to sell

according to the instructions of his

principal, and to make such contracts

as he is authorized to make for his

principal; and he is distinguished

from other agents simply in this,

42
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[§46.

§ 46. Principles of construction. — The distinction be-

tween sale and an agency to sell is ordinarily clear and simple,

but, unfortunately, many cases are presented in which the

parties, for the purpose of evading the operation of some local

statute, 1 of defeating the claims of creditors, or otherwise, have

made contracts involving such a confused jumble of the ele-

ments of both sale and agency that it is exceedingly difficult

to determine their true character. Certain of these contracts

have evidently been framed for the purpose of concealing a

that he guarantees that those per-

sons to whom he sells shall perform

the contracts which he makes with

them ; and therefore, if he sells at the

price at which he is authorized by

his principal t© sell, and upon the

credit which he is authorized by his

principal to give, and the customer
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pays him according to his contract,

then, no doubt, he is bound, like any

other agent, as soon as he receives

the money, to hand it over to the

principal. But if the consignee is

at liberty, according to the contract

between him and his consignor, to

sell at any price he likes, and receive

payment at any time he likes, but is

to be bound, if he sells the goods, to

pay the consignor for them at a

fixed price and at a fixed time — in

my opinion, whatever the parties

may think, their relation is not that

of principal and agent. The con-

tract of sale which the alleged agent

makes with his purchasers is not a

contract made on account of his

principal, for he is to pay a price

which may be different, and at a

time which may be different from

those fixed by the contract. He is

not guaranteeing the performance,

by the persons to whom he sells, of

their contract with him, which is

the proper business of a del credere

agent; but he is to undertake to pay

a certain fixed price for those goods,

at a certain fixed time, to his prin-

cipal, wholly independent of what

the contract may be which he makes

with the persons to whom he sells:

and my opinion is that, in point of

law, the alleged agent in such a case

is making, on his own account, a

contract of purchase with his alleged

principal, and is again reselling.

But if, in addition to this, he is

allowed to change the character of

the goods — if he may turn wheat

into flour, or grey goods into dyed or

bleached goods, and to sell those

changed goods on any terms, and at

any price he pleases — that makes it

still clearer that he is not selling on

account of a principal, but that he is

selling on his own account; for, of

course, if he were selling on account

of his principal, and the principal

could sue upon those contracts, the

principal must be liable to be sued

§ 46.J

LAW OF

ALE.

[nooK r.

§*c.]

LAW OF SALE.

[BOOK I.

sale under the guise of an agency, 1 while others have been

drawn with a view to having them construed as contracts of

sale or agency as might best suit the convenience or subserve

the purposes of their framers. 2

In construing these anomalous instruments, courts look

chiefly at the essential nature and preponderating features of

the whole instrument and not at the peculiar form of isolated

parts of it. It matters very little what the parties have chosen

to call their contract. 3 Misfitting or misleading names may be

very easily applied, but they cannot be permitted to conceal

or change the legal nature of the instrument. If the parties

have made a contract which really operates to transfer the

title, it is a sale, notwithstanding they may have labeled it a

" special selling factor appointment," or have expressly stipu-

lated that the alleged factor " shall never purchase such goods

for his own account." 4 So with regard to the use of the term

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:47 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t6xw4h56n
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

"consign:" it may express the true state of the case, and, if so,

1 Thus in Braunn v. Keally, supra,

the court say: "Notwithstanding the

ingenious color of agency thus sought

to be thrown over it, this is a con-

tract of sale."

2 In Arbuckle v. Kirkpatrick (1S97),

98 Tenn. 221, 39 S. W. R. 3, 36 L. R.

A. 285, the court say: "The contract

is certainly a remarkable one, par-

sale und r the guise of an agency,1 while others have been
drawn with a view to having them con trued as ontracts of
sale or agenc as might best suit the convenience or subserve
the purpo es of their framer .2
In con truing the e anomalous instruments, courts look
chiefl at the sential nature and preponderating features of
the w bole in trument and not at the peculiar form of isolated
parts of it. It matters very little what the parties have chosen
to call their contract. 3 .Mi fitting or mi leading names may be
ver ea il applied, but they cannot be permitted to conceal
or change the legal nature of the in trument. If the parties
have made a contract which really operates to tran fer the
title, it is a sale notwith tanding they may have labeled it a
"sp cial selling factor appointment," or have expressly sti pulated that the alleged factor ' hall nev r purchase such goo ls
for his own account." 4 So with regard to the use of the term
"consign: ' it may expre the true state of the case, and, if so,

taking in many of its provisions of a

contract of agency and in many

others of a sale. It is evidently in-

tended as either or both, as might

suit the convenience or subserve the

purposes of the complainants. It pur-

ports to be copyrighted, for what

reason is not stated; but the copy-

right is evidently procured on ac-

count of the unusual and extraordi-

nary provisions of the instrument

(if there be a copyright)."

3 In Heryford v. Davis (1880), 102

U. S. 235, in dealing with an analo-

gous question, the court, by Justice

Strong, said: ""What, then, is the

true construction of the contract?

The answer to this question is not

to be found in any name which the

parties may have given to the in-

strument, and not alone in any par-

ticular provisions it contains, discon-

nected from all others, but in the

ruling intention of the parties, gath-

ered from all the language they have

used. It is the legal effect of the

whole which is to be sought for. The

form of the instrument is of little

account," To the same effect: Her-

vey v. Locomotive Works (1876), 93

U.S. 664; Sturm v. Boker (1893), 150

U. S. 312.

4 As in Arbuckle v. Kirkpatrick,

mpra; Arbuckle v. Gates (1898), 95

Va. 802, 30 S. E. R. 496; Snelling v.

Arbuckle (1898), 104 Ga. 362, 30 S. E.

R. 863; Hutton v. Lippert (1883), 8

App. Cas. 309.
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I Thus in Braunn v. Keally, sitpra, Strong, said: "What, then, is the
the court ay: 'Notwithstanding the true construction of the contract?
ingenious color of agency thus sought. The an wer to this que tion is not
to be thrown over it, this is a con- to be found in any name which the
tract of sale."
partie may have given to the in2 In rbuckle v. Kirkpatrick (1 9i), strument, and not alone in any pa.r9 Tenn. 221, 39 S. W. R. 3, 36 L. R. ticular provi ion it contain , disconA. 2 5, the court ay : "The contract nected from all other but in the
i certainly a remarkable one, par- ruling intention of the partie , gathtaking in many of it provi ion of a ered from all the language they have
contract of agency and in many u ed. It is the legal effect of the
other of a ale. It is evidently in- whole which i to be ought for. The
tended a either or both, as might form of the in trument is of little
uit the con Yenience or ub-en·e the account." To the ame effect: Herpurpo e of the complainant . It pur- vey v. Locomotive \ or ks (1 16), 93
port to be copyrighted, for what U. S. 664; Sturm v. Boker (1893), 150
r ea on i not tated · but the copy- u. s. 312.
right i evidently procured on ac4 As in Arbuckle v. Kirkpatrick,
count of the unu ual and extraordi- silpra · Arbuckle v. Gate (1 9 ), 95
nary provi ion of the in trument Va. 02, 30 . E. R. 496· nelling v.
(if there be a copyright)."
Arbuckle (1 9 ), 10-1 Ga. 369, 30 S. E.
a In Heryford v. Davi (1 0) 102 R. 63· Hutton v. Lippert (1 3), 8
U. . 235, in dealing wi h an analo- App. Cas. 309.
gous question, the court, by Ju tice
44

CH. II.] TRANSACTIONS DISTINGUISHED FEOM SALES. [§§ 47, 48.

it will be given effect; 1 or it maybe a mere subterfuge, and if

it be the latter " there is no magic in that word which can

take from the transaction its real character." 2 The same rules

would, of course, apply were the word "sold" or "bought"

used.

In doubtful cases, moreover, these ambiguous contracts are

construed most strongly against their framers, if such a con-

struction is necessary to protect the rights of others. As re-

marked in one case of such a contract: " In view of its uncer-

tainty and contradictory provisions, the court will see that

third persons are not prejudiced by its construction." 3

§ 47. Illustrations of construction.— The cases in-

volving this question have now become so numerous, and the

variety of forms of contract so great, that it would be imprac-

ticable to attempt a full exposition of them in the text. A few

typical cases only will therefore be selected, leaving to the foot-

notes the fuller exposition of the residue. Thus —

§ 48. Agency and not sale.— In one case, 4 often referred
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to, it appeared that Benson and Sears had entered into a con-

tract, a copy of which is set forth in the margin. While oper-

i As in Sturm v. Boker (1893), 150 care or sale, and did not by any ex-

U S 312 where the contract was press or fair implication mean the

contained in letters stipulating for sale by the one or purchase by the

the consignment of goods for sale, other." Audit was further held that

the proceeds over a certain amount this result was not to be changed be-

to be divided between the parties, cause, in sending the goods under the

and the unsold goods returned. The contract, they were billed as goods

court said that it was "too clear for "bought." Tosame effect: Dittmar

discussion or the citation of authori- v. Norman (1875), 118 Mass. 319

ties that the contract was not a sale * Chickering v. Bastress (1889), 130

of the goods by the defendants to I1L 206, 22 N. E. R 543, 17 Am. St.

Sturm The terms and conditions R. 309.

under which the goods were deliv- > Arbuckle v. Kirkpatrick, supra.

ered to him import only a consign- * Eldridge v. Benson (18ol), 7 Cush.

ment. The words 'consign' and (Mass.) 4S3. The contract read as

'consigned 'employed in the letters follows: "Said Robert Sears . . .

were used in their commercial sense, agrees to furnish such good and re-

which meant that the property was sponsible persons as the said George

committed or intrusted to Sturm for W.Benson . . . may designate

45

§ 4 .]

L.A. W OF SALE •

[BOOK I.

§ 48.] LAW OF SALE. [BOOK I.

ating under this contract, Eldridge, as creditor of Benson, had

attached, as the property of the latter, the books in the hands

of the agents. Sears thereupon intervened, claiming that the

books attached were his property and therefore not subject to

such attachment, thereby making it necessary to determine

whether the contract between himself and Sears amounted to

a sale or only to the creation of an agency to sell. It was held

that the latter was the true construction. Bigelow, J., said:

" The contract is inartificially and obscurely drawn, and it is

somewhat difficult to ascertain the precise purport of all its

stipulations; but upon a careful consideration of its several

provisions we are of the opinion that it created between the

parties the relation of principal, and agent, and not that of

vendor and vendee. The leading feature of the agreement,

which of itself would be quite sufficient to determine its mean-

ino;, is the right reserved to the defendant to return such por-

tion of the books, delivered to him under the contract, as might

not be disposed of by the agents. Such a stipulation is wholly
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inconsistent with an absolute sale of the property to the de-

fendant, and clearly indicates the intent of the parties to have

been that the right of property should remain in the claimant

(Sears). The elementary definition of a sale is the transmuta-

tion of property from one man to another; but no such change

takes place when it is agreed between the parties that the prop-

or elect to act as agents for the sale full payment of the above-named

of Sears' Pictorial School Library, price of $13.50 per set . . . as

with said works at $13.50 per set of may be delivered to all such persons

twelve volumes, to said Benson, sup- as he (Benson) may appoint and to

plying their orders and receiving whom he may direct said books to

their remittances, and placing all be sent. It is further agreed between

money so received, above the amount said parties that settlements shall

of $13.50 as above specified, to the be made quarterly for all bills con-

credit of said Benson, and at the tracted by said Benson on his ac-

close of the labors of the said agents counts." See also the numerous

to receive all the books returned by cases cited in the following note;

them uninjured and credit the same also Brown v. Church Co., 55 111. App.

to said Benson at the cost price above 615; Keystone Watch Case Co. v.

specified; and the said George W. Fourth Street Nat. Bank (1900), 194

• ating under this contract, Eldridge, as creditor of Benson, had
attached, as the property of the latter, the books in the hands
of the agents. Sears thereupon intervened, claiming that the
books attached were his property and therefore not subject to
such attachment, thereby making it necessary to determine
whether the contract between himself and Sears amounted to
a sale or only to the creation of an agency to sell. It was held
that the latter was the true construction. Bigelow, J., said:
"The contract is inartificially and obscurely drawn, and it is
sommvhat difficult to ascertain the precise purport of all its
stipulations; but upon a careful consideration of its several
provisions we are of the opinion that it created between the
parties the relation of principaL and agent, and not that of
vendor and vendee. The leading feature of the agreement,
which of itself would be quite sufficient to determine its meaning, is the right reserved to the defendant to return such portion of the books, delivered to him under the contract, as might
not be disposed of by the agents. Such a stipulation is wholly
inconsistent with an absolute sale of the property to the defendant, and clearly indicates the intent of the parties to have
been that the right of property should remain in the claimant
(Sears). The element.ary definition of a sale is the transmutation of property from one man to another; but no such change
takes place when it is agreed between the parties that the prop-

Benson . . . hereby guarantied Pa. St. 535, 45 Atl. R. 328.

to said Robert Sears the security and
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or elect to act as agents for the sale full payment of the above-named
of Sears' Pictorial School Library, price of $13. -o per set . • . as
with said works at $13.50 per set of may be delivered to all such persons
twelve volumes, to said Benson, sup- as he (Benson) may appoint and to
plying their orders and receiving whom he may direct said books to
their remittances, and placing all be sent. It is further agreed between
money so received, above the amount said parties that settlements shall
of $13.50 a above specified, to the be made quarterly for all bills conredit of sa id Benson, and at the tracted by said Benson on his acclose of the labors of the aid agents counts." See also the numerous
to receive all the books returned by cases cited in the following note;
them uninjured and credit the same also Brown v. Church Co., 55 Ill. App.
to said Ben on at the cost price above 615; Keystone Watch Case Co. v.
specified; an the said George W. Fourth t.reet Nat. Bank (1900), 194:
Ben on . . . hereby guarantied Pa. St. 535, 45 Atl. R. 328.
to said Robert Sears the security and
46

CH. II.] TRANSACTIONS DISTINGUISHED FROM SALES. [§ 49.

erty may be returned to the person from whom it was received.

To test and illustrate the correctness of this principle, as appli-

cable to the case at bar, let us suppose all the agents to have

been unsuccessful in disposing of the books, and, at the close

of their efforts to sell the work, to have had on their hands all

which they originally received from the claimant. By the terms

of the contract the defendant would have the right to return to

the claimant all of the books which had been received. By con-

struing this contract, therefore, as a contract of sale by which

the property became vested in the defendant, we should be led

to the necessary but absurd conclusion that a vendee to whom

the absolute right of property had passed could still retain the

right of returning it to his vendor." Another reason leading

to the same conclusion was found in the fact that the agents

appointed by Benson might order books direct of Sears and

remit the proceeds to him, and the provisions for charging and

crediting were held to be intended to show the extent of Ben-

son's liability under the guaranty for the agents. 1
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§ 49. Sale and not agency. — On the other hand, in a

case typical of the more modern and more complicated form of

contract, a contrary result was reached. Here Arbuckle Bros.,

the manufacturers of a certain brand of coffee, had made with

Kirkpatrick & Co., who were retail dealers, a contract to sup-

ply the latter with the coffee for sale upon the terms set forth

in the margin. 2 Kirkpatrick & Co. having made an assign-

ment for the benefit of their creditors, Arbuckle Bros, sought

1 Many other cases to the same ef- special selling factor for our roasted

feet will be found stated in the fol- coffee, restricting and defining your

lowing note. duties and obligations by the follow-

2 Arbuckle Bros. v. Kirkpatrick ing provisions, to wit:

(1897), 98 Tenn. 221, 39 S. W. R. 3, 36 " I. That all goods consigned on

L. R. A. 285, 60 Am. St. R. 854. your requisitions on us shall, until

The contract here was in the fol- sold in regular course of business,

lowing form: and to bona fide retail customers, re-

"Form C— Special Selling Factor main our property, with the title in

Appointment. us, and shall merely be held by you

" Arbuckle Brothers. as our factor, and shall at all times

" Subject to prompt acceptance we be subject to our order for disposal

take pleasure in appointing you a or removal on payment of all claims
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to recover the coffee unsold and the proceeds of that sold, upon

the ground that Kirkpatrick & Co. were merely agents, and

to recover the coffee unsold and the proceeds of that sol 1, upon
the ground that Kirkpatrick & Co. were merely agents, and
that the title to the coffee unsold, and to the proceeds of that

that the title to the coffee unsold, and to the proceeds of that

against them for advances of money

made to us, and all charges for dray-

age, storage and insurance.

" II. That you shall never purchase

such goods for your own account.

" III. That such goods shall be sold

and billed by you in your own name,

but only as our factor, according to

the laws relating to factors, and only

at such prices and on such terms as

we may give you from time to time.

" IV. That you shall guaranty the

sale of each consignment, and the
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payment therefor, within sixty days

from its date, and shall assume all

risk as to the credit of the parties to

whom you sell, and make all collec-

tions for goods sold, at your own ex-

pense.

"V. That you shall remit us the

full amount of each consignment,

less the commissions as herein pro-

vided, by the end of such sixty days,

at a price designated to you at the

time of the consignment, whether

the whole of said consignment shall

have been sold by you or not, and

whether or not you shall have col-

lected the proceeds thereof.

"VI. That you shall insure us

against any decline in the price of

the unsold goods held by you as our

factor.

"VII. That you shall be entitled

to any advance in the price of such

unsold goods; and

" VIII. That you shall be entitled

to the following allowances and com-

missions, to wit:

"(1) For carting and storing, one-

eighth cent per pound.

" (2) For insuring against fire, wind

and water, one-eighth cent per pound.

"(3) For insuring payment, one-

eighth cent per pound.

" (4) For insuring against decline in

price, one-eighth cent per pound.

" (5) For selling the goods, one cent

per pound.

" IX. That, in addition to the above,

we shall, on all advances made to us

prior to ten days from date of con-

signment, allow a discount of one

per cent., and on advances made

alter ten days, but prior to sixty

days, we shall allow interest at the

rate of six per cent, per annum for

the time between date of said ad-

vance and said sixty clays.

" X. That if you neglect to remit to

us the full amount of any consign-

ment, less the commissions as herein

provided, by the end of sixty days

from its date, we shall make draft

against them for advances of money
made to us, and all charges for drayage, storage and insurance.
"II. 'l'hat you shall never purchase
such goods for your own account.
"III. That such goods shall be sold
and billed by you in your own name,
but only as our factor, according to
the laws relating to factors, and only
at such prices and on such terms as
we may give you from time to time.
"IV. That you shall guaranty the
sale of each consignment, and the
payment therefor, within sixty days
from its date, ::tnd shall assume all
risk as to the credit of the parties to
whom you sell, and make all collections for goods sold, at your own e.xpense.
"V. That you i:;hall remit us the
full amount of each consignment,
less the commissions as herein provided, by the end of such sixty days,
at a price designated to you at the
time of the consignment, whether
the whole of said consignment shall
have been sold by you or not, and
whether or not you shall have collected the proceeds thereof.
" VI. That you shall insure us
against any decline in the price of
the unsold goods held by you as our
factor.
"VII. That you shall be entitled
to any advance in the price of such
unsold goods; and
"VIII. That you shall be entitled
to the follo~ing allowances and commissions, to wit:
"(1) For carting and storing, oneeighth cent per pound.
"(2) For insuring against fire, wind
and water, one-eighth cent per pound.

"(3) For insuring payment, oneeighth cent per pound.
" (4) For insuring against decline in
price, one-eighth cent per pound.
ii (5) For selling the goods, one cent
per pound.
"IX. That, in addition to the above,
we shall, on all advances made to us
prior to ten days from date of consignment, allow a discount of one
per cent., and on advances made
atter ten days, but prior to sixty
days, we shall allow interest at the
rate of six per cent. per annum for
the time between date of said advance and said sixty days.
"X. That if you neglect to remit to
us the full amount of any consignment, less the commissions as herein
provided, by the end of sixty days
from its date, we shall make draft
upon you, and allow you a selling
commission of only one-half of one
cent per pound; and if said draft be
returned unpaid, we shall only allow
you a selling commission of onefourth of one cent per pound; and if
you do not remit us within four
months from date of each consignment, no commissions or discounts
of any nature whatever will be allowed.
"XI. That you will maintain our
established selling price, terms, conditions, and limitations of consignment in such ' states and territories
as may be designated by us; but, in
the event of any violation thereof,
you are to pay us the sum of fifty
dollars ($50) for every such violation.
"XII. That thi factor appointment
may be revoked by us at any time at
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sold, was still in Arbuckle Eros. After reviewing many cases

the court said : " Without attempting to run a parallel between

the present case and those which have been cited and com-

our option. Copyright, 1891, by Ar-

buckle Bros."

This appointment was accepted by

Kirkpatrick & Co. on January 28,

1895, in the following language:

" Dear Sir: We beg to herewith ac-

cept your appointment as 'Special

Selling Factor ' of your roasted cof-

fees, subject to all the provisions,

limitations, and obligations expressed

in your notice of appointment, Form

C, dated at New York, January 28th,

1895."

Under this contract, from February
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5, 1893. to April 3, 1895, twenty-five

different lots of five cases each of this

coffee were received by Kirkpatrick

& Co., the value of which was

$3,041.70. The coffee was sold usually

in one-case lots, and almost daily, and

Kirkpatrick & Co., before making

their assignment, April 6, 1895, had

collected upon such sales $830.55, and

used the proceeds in their business.

Four cases were on hand when the

assignment was made, and these

were delivered up to the plaintiffs

upon their demand, by the assignee,

as before stated. For the remainder

there were accounts on the books of

Kirkpatrick & Co. against their cus-

tomers, and these accounts were

transferred, and went into the hands

of the assignee. The accounts for

coffee sold by Kirkpatrick to their

customers were not kept separate

from other items sold them, but the

amounts and names of customers

can be traced from the books by cull-

ing out the items relating to coffee.

Kirkpatrick & Co. had never paid or

advanced anything on consignments

now in question, and complainants

have received nothing thereon.

The court, in its opinion, said:

"Complainants claim that Kirk-

patrick & Co. were their 'special

selling factors,' so constituted by the

written agreement above set out, and

that coffee was consigned to and sold

by Kirkpatrick & Co. as such. It

is therefore maintained by them:

(1) That the money collected by Kirk-

patrick & Co. upon sales of coffee

consigned to them was complainants'

money; and, as Kirkpatrick & Co.

mingled same with their own, and

finally used it in their business, the

claim, therefore, is a preferred one,

and must be first paid out of assets

in hands of assignees; and (2) com-

plainants are entitled to follow into

assignees' hands all unpaid accounts

created for sales of Arbuckle coffee

on or subsequent to February 5,
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mented upon, we merely state tome of the more prominent

i. .linn i in. -ii we think characterize this contract as one of

gale, and nol of agency, Et will be noted thai undernoeir

[j , ,, ,i i,, i i, i p a { , [| i /. < ',,. would it. did othei fcapli artli lei in 11

i.,, ..nun, \ii,,,-ii. Bros until they stock, to whom 11 pleased, when It

■•.,. old i>y Kirkpatrick S Co., pleased, and Is whatever territory

■■ i ,. I, iold, i "i patrii i- & Co be< i It pleas* d and, so fai ai we can see,

i. 1. 1.. i .,i \t buckle Bros, i a whatever time it pleased, ttren

\,.,\ ., ,i,,, i.,, ii,,. . offi . d< " d no a< count of sale i t<> com-

m rrectdetei mlnal Ion ol I hi plainanl and w as not called upon

i . d( i" ".i upon i he propei to do sc tn 11 di bo its retail

construi I the written ag terchant customers this coffee was

i between thi partii , and then old and billed and shipped with

,,,,,, , ,,i dealing between them othei — d and when Its accounts

, i , < lomplainants claim that wer< i olli oti d from its cui tomers,

, ,. t abov< et out i oni I H ut( d i mbri ■• I be ■ • offees, the pro
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i. ii i pal 1 1( i ■■ i '" 1 1" b factors e< i di w< re depo lited w Ith tl i n

und( i a del credere c< n, and era! fundi of the Bi tn, and paid oul

thai this ii " all thin a< ti d a en II i hei I 1 1 I Ing Its i ol

,,, i, ti,, , ,,,ni ..i i i, .in. . i j ap Habilil les Foi •< w bile the Firm paid

,„ ,i ,, ,,,,1 thai This firm operated foi this i offee bj Its i bei Its upon Its

under a previou < acl withthi i bank In the city of Nashville, just as

, omplalnanl foi i eralyi ai I bl H paid any othei demand upon it.

i ui rai i ■■ i ■ i ii, ni. ii in i rpon obji i I Ion being made to re

H i as to thi one In I bl i a le i eh Ing I b( e i becks In paj ment, Hu-

ll was illghtlj differenl ne <>r Arm openedan aooounl witha

more of iti terms, but tl urseof of New Stork bankers, and forwarded

di aling ol I bi pari Ii bel ween I bera i hei I upon them to c plainanl

i i , o far e we i an 1 1 from I he In el tli meal and these ohei Its ap

i did nol change In anj pai peartohavel a received without

1 1, ui. aterlaltothe Issue In dis question or objecl until the as

puti The complainan! bad a wan l| nmenl ol the firm The complain

Itou i] lll< • 11 b a man In anl nevei Inquired w bethel their

chargi of It, in which thej kept a eoffei i were in ured, oi whether this

U pplj ,,i ii,, i, coffee When the Brm paid for storage, or anything ol

defendanl Brm wanted an) coffee, the kind.' Other facts found by thai

it i ,.. i i i in agent ol iplainants courl have already b i adverted to,

oi the quantity wanted, and it was and still others will be mentioned

i applied, w Ith .i bill oi stati ment, horeaftei ic fai as nei e ai j

on i pi. .i Ibed foi m, ol i he price

and i "i 1 1"- tran fei oi i on

i umenl . formini In al

.mi line w it ii t he proi I Ion i of 1 he

oonl rai t made w it h i heii merchants

dealing In theii coffei i When de

■ Kirs pal i loh & Co are called In

i Ik. oonl rod ipei lal selling fai toi ■■.'

and i he Insl i umenl ;i ' spei lal selling

factoi appoinl ment. 1 Still the propei

, ,,n 1 1 H, i Ion of 1 1"' contracl Is nol

dependent on anj nun.' given to I he

livered, the firm sold the ooffeei ■• Instrument bj the parties, and not
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but the contract clearly contemplates a payment without fur-

ther bargain, when that time arrives, and implies a present

sale, on a credit of sixty days. Kirkpatrick & Co. could sell

but the contract clearly contemplates a payment without further bargain, when that time arrives, and implies a present
sale, on a credit of sixty days. Kirkpatrick & Co. could sell

substance, that complainants cannot

receive tlie price of the goods, and

afterwards claim the goods them-

selves; and when the price is paid

the property could not be longer

claimed. It is insisted that these

provisions in the contract cannot be

considered, because, as a matter of

fact, Kirkpatrick & Co. were not

made liable for any coffees at the

expiration of sixty days, nor were

they called upon to make good any

decline in price, and hence the con-
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ditions allowing these sections to be

looked to have not arisen. It is true,

none ef the funds involved in this

case arise directly from the operation

of these sections, but they are parts

of the same entire contract, and pre-

scribe the rights and liabilities of

the parties under the contingencies

named, and must be looked to, in or-

der to determine the real intent,

force and effect of the instrument.

They are not detachable, nor to be

considered alone, nor is the remainder

of the contract to be considered with-

out them.

" We have been cited by the very

able counsel of complainants to a

large number of cases construing

.contracts more or less like the con-

tract now under consideration, and

it is claimed the principles laid down

in them are conclusive in considera-

tion of this contract. Among the

cases cited for complainants are:

Metropolitan Nat. Bank v. Benedict

Co., 36 U. S. App. 604, 20 C. C. A. 377,

74 Fed. R. 182; Burton v. Goodspeed,

69 111. 237; Norton v. Melick, 97 Iowa,

564, 66 N. W. R. 780; Walker v. But-

terick, 105 Mass. 237; National Cord-

age Co. v. Sims (Neb.), 62 N. W. R.

514; Sturm v. Boker, 150 U. S. 312, 14

Sup. Ct. 99; Lenz v. Harrison (111.),

36 N. E. R. 567; Balderston v. Rubber

Co., 18 R. I. 338, 27 Atl. R. 507, 49 Am.

St. R. 772; Barnes Safe & Lock Co.

v. Bloch Bros. Tobacco Co., 38 W. Va.

158, 18 S. E. R, 482, 22 L. R. A. 850,

45 Am. St. R 846: National Bank v.

Goodyear, 90 Ga. 711, 16 S. E. R. 962;

Milburn Mfg. Co. v. Peak, 89 Tex. 209,

34 S. W. R. 102; Moline Plow Co. v.

Rodgers, 53 Kan. 743, 37 Pac R. Ill,

42 Am. St. R. 317. We examine these

cases with reference to the case now

on trial.

"Metropolitan Nat. Bank v. Bene-

dict Co., 36 U. S. App. 604, 20 C. C.

A. 377, 74 Fed. R 182. Stern Auc-

tion & Commission Company agreed

witli Benedict & Co., manufacturers

substance, that complainants cannot
receive t11e price of the goods, and
afterwards claim the goods them·
selves; and when the price is paid
the property could not be longer
claimed. It i insisted that these
provisions in the contract cannot be
con idered, because, as a matter of
fact, Kirkpatrick & Co. were not
made liable for any coffees at the
expiration of sixty days, nor were
they called upon to make good any
decline in price, and hence the con·
dition allowing these sections to be
looked to have not arisen. It is true,
none ef the funds involved in this
case arise directly from the operation
of these sections, but th ey are parts
of the same entire contract, and prescribe the rights and liabilities of
the parties under the contingencies
named, and must be looked to, in order to determine the real intent,
force and effect of the instrument.
They are not detachable, nor to be
considered alone, nor is the remainder
of the contract to he considered without them.
"vVe have been cited by the very
able counsel of complainants to a
large number of cases construing
contracts more or less like the contract now under consideration, and
it is claimed the principles laid down
in them are conclu ive in con ideration of this contract. Among the
cases cited for complainants a re:
Metropolitan Nat. Bank v. Benedict
Co.. 3G U. S. App. 604, '>O C. C. . 377,
74 Fed. R. 1 2; Burton v.
1 I ee ,
69 Ill. 237; Norton v. :l\leli k, 97 Iowa,
564, 66 N. vV. R. 780; \\ alk r v. Butterick, 105 ~fass. 237; National Cord·

age Co. v. Sims (Neb.), 62 N. W. R.
514; Sturm v. Boker, 150 U.S. 312, 14
Sup. Ct. 99; Lenz v. Harrison (Ill.),
36 N. E. R. 567; Balderston v. Rubber
Co., 18 R. I. 3138, 27 Atl. R. 507, 49 Am.
St. R. 772; Barnes Safe & Lock Co.
v. Bloch Bro" Tobacco Co., 38 W. Va,.
158, 18 S. E. R. 482, 22 L. R. A. 850,
45 Am. St. R. 846: National Bank v.
Goodyear, 90 Ga. 711, 16 S. E. R. 962;
l\lilburn Mfg. Co. v. Peak, 89 Tex. 209~
34 S. W.R. 102; Moline Plow Co. v.
Rodgers, 53 Kan. 743, 37 Pac. R. 111,
42 Am. St. R. 317. We examine these
cases with reference to the case now
on trin.l.
•·Metropolitan Nat. Bank v. Benediet Co. , 36 U.S. App. 604, 20 C. C.
A. 377, 74· Fed. R. 182. Stern Auction & Commission Company agreed
with Benedict & Co., manufacturers
of clothing. as follows: 'We agree
to realize for con. ignment of readyma.de clothing of Benedict & Co., as
per memorandum received of it I resident, net prices as per same, without
any charges of commissions, freight,
or any other uharges. We agree to
keep amount of consignment at all
times until agreement expires fully
insured. and that no part of consignment 'shall remain unsold or unpaid
by February 1, 1 95; and we shall
also be entitled on any ca. h payment
before F bruary 1, 1895, to one and
one-half (11) per cent. a month for
unexpired time.' In a conte t between Ben diet Company and parties claiming con igned clothing
under bill of ale given in payment
of debt due from commi sion company, it wa held: 'The contract between the Benedict Company and

52
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when and on what time they chose; but no matter how sales

were made, the amount to be paid was fixed in advance,

whether sold or not, whether collected or not. Xo account of

the Stern Auction & Commission

Company was not a sale, but a con-

tract of factorage. The stipulations

of the contract are not appropriate

to a contract of sale. If it was a sale,

and the commission company ac-

quired an absolute title, what con-

cern was it of the Benedict Company

when they were sold? When one

merchant sells goods to another, the

seller never requires the buyer to

enter into a covenant that he will

sell the goods within a specified time.

Such a requirement is inconsistent
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with the dominion over the property

which absolute ownership confers.

The money to be paid by the com-

mission company was not upon a sale

of the goods to that company, but

upon a sale of the goods by that com-

pany. . . . The commission com-

pany covenanted that no part of the

consignment should • remain unsold

or unpaid by February 1, 1895.' A

failure to sell the goods and account

for the same at the prices fixed within

the time agreed upon would be a

breach of this covenant on the part

of the commission company, for

which the Benedict Company might

recover damages: but such breach

of the contract would not have the

legal effect to convert the bailment

into a sale. . . . The goods not

sold would still remain the property

of the Benedict Company. There is

no provision in the contract for a

change of title from the consignor

to the consignee in any event. Tested

by the written agreement, the con-

tract was clearly one of bailment."

In this case, while the goods were in

store, the company failed, and sold

to the bank all its stock, expressly

excepting the goods on hand on con-

signment. The president of the bank

was notified that the Benedict goods

would not be included in the sale,

and a special clause in the bill of sale

was inserted for the -purpose of ex-

cluding them. The bank, however,

claimed the goods, and Benedict &

Co. sued for them. The court said

the parties had a right to put their

own construction on the contract,

and when it was done in good faith

the court would sustain the construc-

tion. It is well to note that the com-

.mission company were not to pay for

the goods as on a purchase, but only

to account for the proceeds of sale at

prices fixed by the contract. There

was no stipulation to pay for the goods

at a fixed time, whether they were

sold or not. In the case at bar the

§ 49.J
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sales was to be rendered. Arbuckle & Co. had nothing to do

with Kirkpatrick & Co.'s customers. They were not in privity

with complainants, and no credit was given to them. «If cash

sales was to be rendered. Arbuckle & Co. had nothing to do
with Kirkpatrick & Co.'s cu tomers. They 'vere not in pri' ity
with complainants, and no credit was given to them. •If cash

delivering, including his commis-

sions, $1.50 per ton fox - coal delivered

outside the yard, and $1 for that de-

livered on the yard, and an addi-

tional commission of fifty per cent,

of net profits on sales. Holbrook also

agreed to guaranty payment of sales,

to advance Burton on coal as shipped

$3 per ton, and pay over balance of

proceeds of sales as coal was sold;

not to sell below market price; to

keep correct accounts, and to render

statement each month. The court
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said: 'The relation existing between

appellant, Burton, and Holbrook, by

virtue of their contract, is neither

that of vendor and vendee nor of

partners. . . . There is nothing

said about selling the coal, or any in-

terest in it, to Holbrook, nor have we

been able to find any language from

which we can reasonably presume

that the intention of the parties was

to invest him with the ownership of

the property. The fact that he was

to receive a portion of the net profits

on sales does not prove that he was a

partner, as they were given merely

as part of his compensation. We

think, under the evidence, Holbrook

was, as to the coals shipped him for

sale by appellant, Burton, a factor or

commission merchant.' It is evident

that this is an ordinary consignment

contract. The agent was to render

a correct account each month to his

principal, showing amount of goods

Bold and prices, and did not have to

pay for any goods until sold, and was

only to guaranty such sales as he

made; and the facts do not make it

a contract similar to the one now

under consideration.

"Norton v. Melick, 97 Iowa. 564

(1896), 66 N. W. R. 780. N. & Co.

agreed to furnish M. certain brands

of flour at specified prices, to be sold

by M. for them as their agent at

prices given. M. agreed to receive

flour as agent of N. & Co., to pay

freight and charges, to keep same in

good order, to sell it at not less than

given prices, to render account each

thirty clays, and make remittances

then of the money for all merchan-

dise sold. M. further agreed to buy

any of the flour unsold at the end of

ninety days at prices given, and pay

therefor; and it was also agreed that

title, ownership, and right of posses-

sion of the flour should remain in

N. & Co. until same should be paid

for in full. The court said: 'We

think there ought to be no question

delivering, including his commission , 1.50 per ton for coal delivereu
out ide the yard, and 1 for that delivered on the yard, and an additional commi ion of fifty per cent.
of net profit on sales. Holbrook also
agreed to gua1:antypayment of sales,
to advance Burton on coal as shipped
83 per ton, and pay over balance of
proceed of sale as coal vvas sold;
not to ell below market price; to
keep correct account , and to render
statement each month. The court
said: 'The relationexi ting between
appellant, Burton, and Holbrook, by
virtue of their contract, is neither
that of vendor and vendee nor of
partner . . . . There is nothing
said about elling the coal, or any intere t in it, to Holbrook, nor have we
been able to find any language from
which we can reasonably pre ume
that the intention of the partie was
to inve t him with the ownership of
the property. The fact that he wa
to receive a portion of the net profit
on sale doe not prove that he wa a
partner. as they were given merely
as part of bis com pen ation. V\ e
think under the evidence, Holbrook
wa , a to the coal hipped him for
sale by appellant, Burton, a factor or
om mi ion merchant.' It i evident
that tbi i an ordinary COD ignmPnt
contract. The a O'ent wa to render
a correct account each month to hi
prin ipal, h wing amount of o cl
sold and pri · , an did not have to
pay for any good until olcl, and was
only to guar nty u h ale a· he
made; and the fa t cl n t make it
a COD ract imilar to the one now
under con ·id ration.

" orton v. Ielick 97 Iowa, 564
(1 96), 66 N. W. R. 7 0. N. & Co.
agreed to furnish 1. certain brands
of flour at specified prices, to be sold
by 1\1. for them as their agent at
prices given. M. agreed to receive
flour as agent of N. & Co., to pay
freight and charges, to keep same in
good order, to sell it at not le s than
given price , to render accouD t each
thirty days, and make remittances
then of the money for all merchandi e sold. M. further agreed to buy
any of the flour uD old at the end of
ninety day at price gi ''en, and pay
therefor; and it wa.s also agreed that
title, owner hip, and right of pos e sion of the flour should r emain in
N. & Co. until same should be paid
for in full. The court said: '\ e
think there ought to be no que tion
that the contract was a mere agency
for the ale of the flour. It is expres ly tated in the first paragraph
that the flour wa to be old by the
defendant for the plaintiffs a their
agent. The real inquiry i , What was
the intention of the partie to the
contract? That intention mu t pre'ail; and when it i plainly and unequi,ocally expres ed in writing that
it i an agency and not a ale, and
the title doe not pa , there is no
room for con truction,' etc. Thi contract plainly provided that the agent
hould render an a count each
month, and make remittance for
all mercbandi e old. The title to
the flour wa to remain in the principal until old, and he agent tipulatetl to buy u ha mi 0 ht be un old
at the expiration f nin ty day . The
flour wa de tro; eel by fire before the
;:;4
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was taken, it was not to be kept separate. If notes were taken,

Arbuckle & Co. bad no concern in tbera. Kirkpatrick & Co.

were to bave all advance in prices' and bear all declines. If

ninety days, and the principal sued

the agent for its value. The court

held he was not liable; that the con-

tract was one of agency. There was

no stipulation to guaranty the prin-

cipal against decline in prices, nor to

pay in a fixed time for each lot of

goods, whether sold or not; but sim-

ply to buy at the end of ninety days.

•Walker v. Butterick, 105 Mass.

237. There was a contract between

parties as follows: ' Alexander & Co.

are to take goods from Walker &

Co.. and to return to them every

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:47 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t6xw4h56n
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

thirty days the amount of sales at

prices charged by Walker & Co.,

avIio will furnish Alexander & Co.

all goods in their line. Alexander &

Co. are worth in real estate and

money $5,000.' After receiving goods,

Alexander & Co. made monthly re-

mittances, stating, in substance, that,

according to contract, they remitted

sales for preceding thirty days. The

goods were attached by creditors of

Alexander & Co. Held, the terms

of contract import a consignment,

and not a sale. This is a simple

agency contract, and has none of the

peculiar features of the contract

now under consideration.

"National Cordage Co. v. Sims

(1895), 44 Neb. 148, 62 N. W. R. 514.

"Where a contract provides for con-

signment of goods to be sold on com-

mission for prices fixed by consignor,

and returns at stated periods, con-

signee guarantying payment thereof,

the relation which the law implies

is that of an agency for sale upon a

del credere commission, and not that

of vendor and vendee. In this case

the contract provided that the twine,

as well as the proceeds of its sale,

should remain the property of the

principal, the proceeds to be remit-

ted on the first day of each month.

There was no obligation on the agent

to buy any of the twine, or to sell it

in any fixed time, and it is a case of

simple agency.

"Sturm v. Boker, 150 U. S. 312, 14

Sup. Ct. 99, 37 L. ed. 1093. The goods

were consigned to the agent to be

sold by him to the best advantage,

the profits realized to be divided

equally between the principal and

agent, and all losses to be borne by

the principal. All goods unsold were

to be returned to the principal. The

agent was to insure the goods for the

benefit of the principal, and to pay

the freight. Held, that the contract

was a bailment upon the terms

stated. The contract contained none

§ 49.J

LAW OF SALE.
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the goods were destroyed by fire, wind or water, it was the

loss of Kirkpatrick,& Co., and the insurance was optional, and

only designed to place them in position to account for the

notes taken, to first party. Also, if

required by first party, will take all

wagons unsold at end of year, and

give note for thern ; but this stipula-

tion not to be a positive sale to sec-

ond party unless this requirement is

made by first party. Held to be a

simple consignment.

"Balderston v. Rubber Co. (1893),

18 R. L 338, 27 Atl. R. 507, 49 Am. St.

R. 772. The R. Co. agreed to consign

and deliver free goods to B. & D. for

sale and returns, to pay B. & D. five
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per cent, on net amount of sales as a

commission and guaranty, and also

interest on any sum which they

(R Co.) might owe them. B. & D.

agreed to receive goods on consign-

ment, to use best efforts to sell to

best advantage, to account to R. Co.

for same at price obtained, to charge

as commissions and guaranty five

per cent., and to advise as to goods

needed. B. & D. also agreed to ad-

vance to R. Co. at least §50,000 per

month upon basis of eighty per cent,

market value of goods at rate of

interest specified. The prices for

which B. & D. were to sell were to

be fixed by R. Co. The court held:

' This was an agreement to sell goods

for R. Co. under a del credere com-

mission, the relation between parties

being that of principal and factor.

A factor who has made advances

must first enforce his lien therefor

against goods before looking to con-

signor. And, finally, a factor under a

del credere commission is liable abso-

lutely as a principal, and becomes a

debtor to his consignor if the debt is

not paid by purchaser when due; but

the principal, notwithstanding liabil-

ity of factor to him, may collect of his

purchaser.' In this case it is to be

noted that the rubber company was

to pay all freights to Balderstons

warehouse. Balderston was to use

his best exertion to sell to the best

advantage, and to account at the

price received, less five per cent.

There was no stipulation for a guar-

anty against decline in price, nor loss

by fire, or other causes, nor is there any

guaranty to sell, or to pay until he

did sell. The contract lacks many of

the features of the present one.

" Barnes Safe & Lock Co. v. Bloch

Bros. Tobacco Co., 38 W. Va. 158, 22

L. R. A. 850, 45 Am. St. R. 846, 18 S.

E. R 482. The contract stipulated

that the safe and lock company ap-

pointed the Globe Contract Company

its agent to sell safes in certain terri-

the goods were destroyed by £re, wind or water, it was the
loss of Kirkpatrick. & Co., and the insurance was optional, and
only designed to ·place them in position to account for the
notes takeu, to fir t party. Al o. if
required by first party, will take all
wagons unsold at end of year, and
give note for them; butt.his stipulation not to be a positive sale to second party unless this requirement is
made by fir t party. Held to be a
simple consignment.
"Balder ion v. Rubber Co. (1 93),
18 R. I. 38 , 27 Atl. R. 507, 49 .A.m. St.
R. 772. The R. Co. agreed to consign
and deliver free goods to B. & D. for
sale and returns, to pay B. & D. five
per cent. on net amount of sales as a
commis!::l ion and guaranty, and al o
interest on any sum which they
(R. Co.) might owe them. B. & D.
agreed to receive goods on consignment, to u e be t efforts to sell to
best advantage, to account to R. Co.
for same at price obtained, to charge
as commis ions and guaranty five
per cent., and to advise as to goods
needed. B. & D. also agreed to advance to R. Co. at lea t $50,000 per
month upon basis of eighty per cent.
market value of goods at rate of
intere t specified. The prices for
which B. & D. were to sell were to
l>e fixed by R. Co. The court held:
'Thi wa an agreement to sell goods
for R. Co. under a del crede1·e commi ion, tbe relation between parties
being that of principal and factor.
A factor who has ma.de a.dvanc s
mu t fir t enforce bis lien therefor
against good before looking to consign r. And, finally, a factor under a
del crerlere commi sion i liable absolutely as a principal, anJ. becom a
debtor to hi con ignor if the debt i
not paid by purcha er when due; but
the principal, not with tanding liabil-

ity of factor to him, may collect of his
purcha er.' In this ca e it is to be
noted that the rubber company -was
to pay all freights to Balderston·s
warehouse. Balderston was to use
bis be t exertion to sell to the best
advantage, and to account at the
price recei-ved, less frrn per cent.
There was no stipulation for a guaranty again. t decline in price, nor lo s
by fire, or other causes, nor is there any
guaranty to sell, or to pay until he
did sell. The contract lacks many of
the features of the present one.
''Barnes afe & Lock Co. v. Bloch
Bros. Tobacco Co., 38 W. Va. 158, 22
L. R. A. 850, 45 Am. St. R. 846, 18 S.
E. R. 4 2. The contract stipulated
that the safe and lock company appointed the Globe Contract Company
its agent to sell safes in certain territoryon fixed com mis ions, and agreed
to furnish the agent safes on consignment. The agent was to pay for
safes when it sold them, and to diligently work the territory. The agent
failed, and its creditors levied on
some of the safes in its charge, unsold. The court held that the safe
were not the property of the agent..
The contract contained none of the
peculiar features of the Arbuckle
contract.
"National Bank v. Goodyear, 90
Ga. 711, 16 . E. R. 962. The contract
contained tipulations that the agent
should receive goods on con. ignment,
to be solc'l by him a the agent of the
con ignor. The agent wa to make
monthly report of a le of goods on
band; the title to all un old goods
and all procaeds of sales to remain in
the con ignor; all articles to be set-
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goods. "Whether the goods were carted, or stored or insured,

was optional with Kirkpatrick & Co., but, in any event, they

were to be credited therefor. Thev were allowed a sum for

tied for as soon as sold. The agent

also agreed to insure, store, pay

freight and all charges without ex-

pense to consignor, and have for his

pay whatever the goods sold for

above the invoice prica The con-

signor could terminate "the agency

at his option, and retake all goods on

hand. This was held a bailment, and

not a sale.

"Milburn Manufacturing Co. v.

Peak (1896), 89 Tex. 209, 34 S. W. R.

102. The contract provided that the

Milburn Company appointed Hood &
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Co. its agent to sell vehicles. Hood

& Co. were to make all reasonable

efforts to sell same, and settle for all

vehicles sold, take all notes for goods

sold on credit in the name of the

Milburn Company, and remit to it

all notes and cash received for the

vehicles; the notes taken for the

vehicles to be indorsed and guar-

antied by Hood & Co., and paid if

the makers did not pay at maturity;

the ownership of all vehicles and

their proceeds of sales to remain in

Milburn Company, and under no cir-

cumstances to be used by the agent.

The contract is plainly very different

from the Arbuckle contract.

" Moline Plow Co. v. Rodgers, 53

Kan. 743, 42 Am. St. R. 317, 37 Pac.

R 111. The contract provides that

Underwood was appointed agent of

Moline Plow Company, who agreed

to consign him certain goods. The

agent was to settle for all goods re-

ceived by him with farmers' notes

taken for such goods as he should

sell. The goods remaining unsold

at the end of the season the agent

should either settle for with farmers'

5^

notes, or store for the principal, at

the principal's option. A few months

later the agent absconded. The prin-

cipal, after investigation, attached

the goods on hand as the goods of the

agent. Held, that he thereby elected

to treat the goods as the agent's, and

was bound by his election.

" Defendants cite cases supporting

their contentions, and these we have

examined and comment upon.

"^Etna Powder Co. v. Hildebrand,

137 Ind. 402, 45 Am. St, R. 194, 37

N. E. R 136. The P. Co. agreed to

consign powder, paying freight, to

H. & F., to sell as agents at prices

not below those fixed by P Co., and

to allow H. & F. for selling and guar-

antying sales a given per cent. H.

& F. agreed to act as agents, to guar-

anty sales, to adhere to prices, to
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commissions, whether they sold or not, and discount was to be

allowed for quick payment, as is usual in case of sales. The

course of dealing shows that the proceeds of sale were not to

and was not to pay for them unless

he disposed of them. He was to re-

turn at end of every month an ac-

count of sales actually made, and

then, after lapse of another month,

was to pay in cash for amount of

goods which he so disposed of accord-

ing to values fixed by price list sent

him. It does not appear that he ever

was expected to return any particu-

lar contract, or names of customers.

He pursued his own course in deal-

ing with goods, and frequently be-
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fore sale manipulated them to a very

considerable extent by pressing, dye-

ing, and otherwise altering their

character, changing them as much

as wheat would be changed by being

turned into flour; and he sold them

on what terms he pleased as to price

and credit. T. & Co. undertook to

impose a trust on certain funds al-

leged to have been collected by N.

upon sales of their goods. The court

held: ' The course of dealing between

parties wa,s inconsistent with the

idea that N. was dealing in a fiduci-

ary character in respect to these

goods, or that the relation of vendor

and purchaser existed between T. &

Co. and parties to whom N. sold. The

pi'oceeds of sale were the moneys of

N. Mellish, L. J., said: 'It appears

to me tnat the real question is:

When N. sold the goods, did he sell

them as the agent of T. & Co., so as

to make T. & Co. the vendors, and

the persons to whom he sold purchas-

ers from T. & Co., or did he sell on

his own account, so as to create the

relation of purchaser and vendor be-

tween himself and the persons to

whom he sold ? Now, it is said that

he was a del credere agent; and no

doubt it requires a very minute ex-

amination of the course of business

to distinguish between a del credere

agent and a person who is an agent

up to a certain point, — that is to say,

until he has sold the goods, — but

who, when he has sold the goods, has

purchased them on his own credit,

and sold them again on his own ac-

count. . 4 . Now, if it had been

his (N.'s) duty to sell to his custom-

ers at that price (the price fixed by

T. & Co.), and to receive payment for

them at that time, then the course

of dealing would be consistent with

his being merely a del credere agent.

But if the consignee is at liberty to

sell at any price he likes, but is to be

bound if he sells the goods to pay

the consignor for them at a fixed

commi sions, whether they sold or not, and discount was to be
allowed for quick payment, as is usual in case of sales. The
course of <lea.ling shows that the proceeds of sale were not to
and was not to pay for them unless
he disposed of them. He was to return at encl of every month an account of ales actually made, anu
then. after lapse of another month,
was to pay in cash for amount of
goods which he so disposed of according to values fixed by price list sent
him. It does not appear that he ever
was expected to return any particular contract, or names of customer .
He pursued his own course in dealing with goods, and frequently before sa.le manipulated them to a very
considerable extent by pres ing. dyeing, and otherwise altering their
character, changing them as much
as wheat would be changed by being
turned into flour; and he sold them
on what terms he pleased as to price
and credit. T. & Co. undertook to
impose a trust on certain funds alleged to have been collected by N.
upon sales of their goods. The uourt
held: •The course of dealing between
parties wa_s inconsistent with the
idea that N. was dealing in a fitluciary character in respect to these
goods, or that the relation of vendor
and purcha. er exi ted between T. &
Co. and partie to whom N. sold. The
proceed. of sale were the moneys of
N. :Mellish, L. J., aid: 'It appears
to me tnat the rea.l question is:
'When N. old the good did he sell
them a the agent of T. & Co., so as
to make T. & Co. the vendors, and
the per on to whom h old purcha ers from T. & Co., or clid h ell on
his own account, so as to reate the
relation of pur ha er an l venuor between him, lf and th ]Jer on to
whom he sold? Now, it i s id that

be was a del credere agent; and no
doubt it requires a very minute examination of the course of business
to distinguish between a del credere
agent and a person who is an agent
up to a certain point,- that is to say,
until he has sold the goods,- but
who, when be has sold the goo<l , has
purchased them on his own creel it,
and sold them again on hi own account. • • • Now, if it had been
his (N. 's) duty to sell to his customers at that price (the price fixed by
T. & Co.), and to receive payment for
them at that time. then the course
of dealing would be consistent with
his being merely a del credere agent.
But if the consignee is at liberty to
sell at any price he likei;;, but is to be
bound if he salts the goods to pay
the consignor for them at a fixed
price and time, in my opinion, whatever the pa.rties may think, their r ,.lation is not that of principal anu
agent.' The alleged agent in uch a
case (as thi ) is making on his own
account a contract of purchase with
his alleged principal, and is again
re elling.
"Nutter v. ·wheeler (Dist. Ct. Mas .,
1874), 2 Low. 346, Fed. Ca. No.
10,384. , W. & Co., manufacturers of
tools, were in the habit of sending
their goods to G., at his shop ju B.,
who old them at such prices, to
such per ons, on such term. as be
plea ed. Whenever G. sold tools, he
wa to pa.y W. in thirty days prices
hown by li t, 1 s agreed discount.
vV. had the right at any time to sell
goods remaining in G. 's bop unsold,
a.nd G. was p rmitted to ell goods
at factory of 'lv., who then delivered
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be kept separate, but Kirkpatrick & Co. remitted their check

on general account, and it was accepted without question or

comment. This was a virtual agreement that Kirkpatrick &

them, and charged G. the trade price,

less agreed discount. Instead of

paying in thirty days, G. sometimes

gave his note for balance due, one of

which W. held at time of G.'s bank-

ruptcy. G. ordered three drills to

be sent by W. to a customer. They

were sent, and bill made out to G. as

purchaser for trade price, less dis-

count, and sent him in a letter, in

which W. & Co. said they had taken

off fifteen per cent., and hoped to

get cash in thirty days. G. went

into bankruptcy. The purchasers

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:47 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t6xw4h56n
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

had not paid for drills, and W. & Co.

collected price therefor. G.'s as-

signee brought this suit against them

for money had and received. Lowell,

J., said, among other things: 'It has

been settled for a long time that

upon the bankruptcy of a factor his

principal may recover from the as-

signees any of the goods remaining

unsold, or any proceeds of the sale of

such goods which the assignees

themselves have received, or which

remain specially distinguishable

from the mass of the bankrupt's

property; . . . and it makes no

difference that the factor acted

under a del credere commission or

sold the goods in his own name. As

to those goods sent to Boston, he

(G.) may be described as a bailee,

having power to sell as principal.

But after the goods were sold, the

agreement appears to have been that

G.'s credit alone was looked to.' Re-

lying upon the authority of Ex parte

White, 6 Ch. App. 397, the court

finally said: 'If the relation of the

parties was such as I have consid-

ered it, then, even as to the goods

which had been once consigned to

G., he should be considered as the

purchaser, subject only to the under-

standing that he was neither the

owner of them nor liable to pay for

them until he had succeeded in find-

ing a purchaser; but when he did

sell he immediately became the prin-

cipal, and the defendants ceased to

have the rights of a consignor, and

could not follow the goods or their

proceeds as undisclosed principals."

"Ex parte Flannagans (Dist. Ct.

Va., 1875), 2 Hughes, 264, 12 N. B. R.

230, Fed. Cas. No. 4,855. F. & Son,

manufacturers, and R. & H., com-

mission merchants, in 1873 agreed as

follows: 'We, F. & Son, propose to

give you entire agency for Stone-

wall fertilizer at Norfolk, and for

. . ., on condition you push sale,

and have proper man to look after

§ 49.J
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Co. might use the proceeds as they chose, and account for

them out of their general funds. These features are all evi-

dences of a sale, and cover every risk, obligation and duty that

rests upon a purchaser, and cover every right in handling the

Co. might use the proceeds as they chose, and account for
them out of their general funds. These features are all evidences of a sale, and cover every risk, obligation and duty that
rests upon a purchaser, and cover every right in handling the

397, and section 215, Story, Ag., con-

signments under above contract

were sales, and not shipments under

a del credere guaranty. The judge

held R. & H. were primarily liable

to F. & Son for a fixed price on their

acceptances, and that they might

sell to planters at a different price,

and then stated that ' the now well-

settled law of del credere guaranty is

that the factor is not the primary

debtor; that his engagement is
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merely to pay the debt if it is not

punctually paid by the person to

whom he sells, — citing Story, Ag.,

§ 215, — and held that therefore R. &

H. were not factors, but purchasers.

"In re Linforth (Cir. Ct. CaL, 1877),

4 Sawy. 370, Fed. Cas. No. 8,369. June

1, 1876, F. agreed to furnish L. such

manufactured goods as he should

order, to allow L. certain specified

discounts from price lists, and to give

L. exclusive sale of such goods. L.

agi*eed to pay freight charges, etc.,

on goods shipped, to insure at his

own cost for benefit of F, to render

account of sales every three months,

and to settle for all goods sold or

shipped from his (L.'s) warehouse by

giving his note, payable in sixty days

from date fixed for rendering ac-

count of sales as provided. L. fur-

ther agreed to settle for such goods

as might be on hand June 1, 1877, by

giving notes, payable in six months,

if so required by F. F. agreed to al-

low additional discount for all cash

paid in advance of times specified.

The court held that transactions

under this contract were sales on a

credit; citing Nutter v. Wheeler and

Ex parte White, supra.

"Gindre v. Kean (1894), 31 Abb.

N. C. 100, 7 Misc. R. 582, 28 N. Y.

Supp. 7. The suit arose out of an

effort by principals to recover of

the assignee in insolvency of their

del credere agent the amounts due

for goods furnished him and which

he had sold. The principle is tersely

stated by Bischoff, J., at page 7, as

follows: 'The principles which should

control the decision of the case at

bar, and which are to be deduced

from the adjudged cases, are that

whenever the agreement of the al-

leged principal and factor, whatever

they may style themselves or their

relation, and whether the agreement

be expi'ess or only inferable from the

course of business, clearly manifests

an intention that the alleged factor

397, and section 215, Story, Ag., consignments under above contract
"\Vere · al es, and not shipments under
a del c1·eclere guaranty. The judge
held R & H. were primarily liable
to F. & Son for a fixed price on their
acceptances, and that they might
sell to planters at a different price,
and then stated that 'the now wellsettled law of del crede1·e guar:\nty is
that the factor is not the primary
debtor; that his engagement is
merely to pay the debt if it is not
punctually paid by the person to
whom he sells, - citing Story, Ag.,
§ 215,- and held that therefore R. &
H. were not factors, but purchasers.
"In re Linforth (Cir. Ct. Cal., 1877),
4 Sawy. 370, Fed. Cas. No. 8,369. June
1, 1876, F. agreed to furnish L. such
manufactured goods as he should
order, to allow L. certain specified
discounts from price list , and to give
L. exclusive sale of such goods. L.
a greed to pay freight charges, etc.,
on goods shipped, to insure at his
own co t for benefit of F., to render
a ccount of sales every three months,
a n d to settle for all goods solrl or
shipped from his (L.'s) warehouse by
giving his note, payable in sixty uays
from el ate fix ed for rendering account of sales as provided. L. further agr eel to settle for such goods
as :might be on hand June 1, 1877, by
giving n t , payable in six month ,
if so r quir d by F. F. agreed to allow ad lit i nal di ount for all a h
paid in advance of times spe ified.
The ourt h ld that transaction
under this contract were sale on a

credit; citing Nutter v. Wheeler and
Ex parte White, supra.
"Gindre v. Kean (1894), 31 Abb.
N. C. 100, 7 Misc. R. 582, 28 N. Y.
Supp. 7. The suit arose out of an
effort by principals to recover of
the assignee in insolvency of their
del credere agent the amounts due
for goods furnished him and which
he had sold. The principle is tersely
stated by Bischoff, J., at page 7, as
follows: 'The principles which should
control the decision of the case at
bar, and which are to be deduced
from the adjudged cases, are that
whenever the agreement of the alleged principal and factor, whatever
they may style themselves or their
relation, and whether the agreement
be express or only inferable from the
course of business, clearly manife ts
an intention that the alleged factor
shall become definitely and primarily liable upon a sale for the purchase price of t.he goods consigned,
it is, in legal effect, a sale by the alleged principal to the alleged factor,
out of which arises the ordinary relation of debtor and creditor. The
liability of the alleged factor, under
such an agreement, is repugnant to
that of a mere agent, whose duty to
remit is commensurate only with the
am~unt of the money which he has
actually received upon a sale for
his principal's account.' The court
cites the ca e of Linforth. Nutter v.
Wlleel r, and Ex parte ·white with
approval."
In Arbuckle Bros. v. Gates (1898),
95 Va. 802, 30 S. E. R. 496, the same
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goods that an owner could have, except, simply, the price was

to be sustained. This was evidently provided in order to keep

the price uniform in all markets and stifle competition. Kirk-

patrick & Co. could sell in any territory, in any amount, to

contract came before the court, in

goods that an owner could have, except, simply, the price was
'to be sustained. This was evidently provided in order to keep
the price uniform in all markets and stifle competition. Kirkpatrick & .Co. could sell in any territory, in any amount, to

Virginia, for construction, and the

same conclusion was reached. The

court, referring to certain further

cases, said:

"In Williams v. Tobacco Co. (Tex.

Civ. App.) 44 S. W. R. 185, an agree-

ment, which was very similar in its

essential features and provisions to

that under consideration, was con-

strued by the court of civil appeals

of Texas. The agreement purported
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that the Drummond Tobacco Com-

pany appointed A. H. Schluter &

Co. as agents to sell its tobacco at

such prices as the company should

from time to time prescribe, and that

the title to the tobacco should re-

main in the tobacco company until

sold by the said agents. The latter

were to receive a commission for

selling, and, in consideration thereof,

warranted that every shipment made

to them should be paid in full. The

company, in shipping the tobacco,

invoiced it to A. H. Schluter & Co.

as agents, and used a billhead that

designated the shipment as a ' con-

signment.' It was shown that, after

the shipment of each bill of tobacco,

the company would draw an accept-

ance of the same date as the invoice

of the tobacco for the amount of the

bill, less the commission, payable

sixty days after date, which Schluter

& Co. would accept, and the com-

pany at the maturity thereof would

present for payment, and Schluter &

Co. would pay, whether they had sold

the tobacco or not. The court de-

cided that the transaction was a sale,

and did not create an agency.

" In Mack v. Tobacco Co., 48 Neb.

397, 58 Am. St. R 691, 67 N. W. R.

174, a contract, similar in its terms

to the one construed in the above-

cited case from the Texas court, was

held by the supreme court of Ne-

braska to be a sale, and not an

agency. . . .

" Similar contracts were construed

in the following cases to constitute

a sale, and not an agency: In re Lin-

forth, 4 Sawy. 370, Fed. Cas. No. 8,369;

Chickering v. Bastress, 130 111. 206, 17

Am. St. R. 309, 22 N. E. R 542: ^Etna

Powder Co. v. Hildebrand, 137 Ind.

462, 37 N. E. R 136; Aspinvvall Man-

ufacturing Co. v. Johnson, 97 Mich.

531, 56 N. W. R. 932; Braunn v. Keally,

146 Pa. St. 519, 23 AtL R. 389, 2S Am.

St. R. 811; Kellam v. Brown, 112

N. C. 451, 17 S. E. R. 416. . . .

contract came before the court, in
"In Mack v. Tobacco Co., 48 Neh.
Virginia, for con truction, and the 397, 58 .Am. St. R. 6!H, 67 N. W. R.
same conclu ion was reached. The 174, a contract, similar in its terms
court, referring to certain further to the one con trued in the aboveca es, !';aid:
cited case from the Texa court, was
•·In . .Williams v. Tobacco Co. (Tex. held by the supreme court of NeCiv. App.) 44 S. vV. R. 185, an agree- braska to be a sale, and not an
ment, which was very similar in it agency. . ••
e · ential features and provisions to
' Simila.r con tract were construed
that under con ideration, was can- in the following cases to constitute
st.rued by the court of civil appeals a sale, and not an agency: In re Linof Texa . The agreement purporterl. forth, 4 Sawy. 1370, Fed. Cas. No. 8,36!);
that the Drummond Tobacco Com- Chickering v. Bastres , 130 Ill. 206, 17
c hluter & Am. t. R. 309, 22 N. E. R. 542: lEt.na
pa.ny appointed A. R
Co. as agents to sell its tobacco at Powder Co. v. Hildebrand, 137 Ind.
such price as the company hould 462, 87 N. E. R. 136; Aspinwall fan·
from time to time prescribe, and that ufacturing Co. v. Johnson, 97 Mich.
the title to the tobacco should re- 531, 56 N. W.R. 932; Braunn v. Keally,
main in the tobacco company until 146 Pa. St. 519, 23 AtL R. 3 9, 28 Am.
sold by the aiu agent . The latter St. R. 11; K ellam v. Brown, 112
were to receive a commi ion for N. C. 451, 17 S. E. R. 416. • • •
selling, and, in con ideration thereof,
"In Conable v. Lynch, 45 Iowa, 84,
warranted that every shipment made Berry agreed to sell machines for
to them should be paid in full. The Conable to such persons only as were
company, in shipping the tobacco, perfectly responsible, ~ake notes for
i nvoiced it to A. H. Schluter & Co. the deferred payments, indorse them
as agent , and used a billhead that and guaranty their payment. He was
designated the shipment as a 'con- to send to Conable the notes of pursignment.' It was shown that, after chasers as he sold the machines, and
the shipment of each bill of tobacco, to remit promptly the proceeds of all
the company would draw an accept- cash sales, less the amount of his
All the machines,
ance of the . ame date as the invoice comm1ss10ns.
of the tobacco for the amount of the until paid for, were to remain the
bill, le s the commission, payable property of Conable, and at the exsixty days after date, which Schluter piration of the contract Berry was
& Co. would accept, and the com- to pay for all machines not sold. The
pany at the maturity thereof would court held that the effect of the conprnsent for payment, a.nd Schluter & tract was to make Berry the agent
Co. would pay, whether they had sold of Conable until the termina tion of
t he tobacco or not. The court de- the contract. but after tha t time it.
cided that the transaction was a sale, wa.s a conditional sale.
"It thus appears that, until the exa nd did not create an agency.
61

§ 50.J

L.A. W OF SA.LE.

[BOOK I.

§ so.]

LAW OF SALE.

[BOOK I.

any purchaser, on any terms, for cash or credit, take notes or

make accounts, and dispose of the goods as absolutely and free

of limitation as any owner could, except they could not vary

the price."

§ 50. •- How question determined — Law or fact. — Where

any purchaser, on any terms, for cash or credit, take notes or
make accounts, and dispose of the goods as absolutely and free
of limitation as any owner could, except they could not vary
the price."

the contract is in writing or the facts are not disputed, the

question whether the writing produced or the facts admitted

operate to create a sale or an agency to sell is one of law to be

decided by the court; but when the facts are controverted it

becomes a question for the jury, under proper instructions from

piration of the contract, the relation

of creditor and debtor did not arise.

Until then Berry sold the machines

for and on account of Conable, and

the relation between them was that

§ 50. --·How qnestion determined-Law or fact.-Where
the contract is in writing or the fact are not di puted, the
question whether the writing produced or the facts admitted
operate to create a sale or an agency to _sell is one of law to be
decided by the court; but when the facts are controverted it
becomes a question for the jury, under proper instructions from

of principal and agent, bat when the
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contract expired by limitation, and

Berry came under the obligation to

pay for all unsold machines, the

court held that the contract made

the transaction a conditional sale.

" In Bayliss v. Davis, 47 Iowa, 340,

Bayliss, under the agreement there

construed, appointed one Stinson his

agent to sell harvesters, and agreed

to allow him a commission of $40 on

each harvester. Stinson agreed to

advance one-third of the price, and

give his notes for the residue, and to

sell on the same terms. All notes

taken for machines sold by him were

to be made payable to Bayliss, the

proceeds of sale were to be remitted

by him to Bayliss as fast as received,

after deducting his advances, and his

own notes were to be taken up by ex-

changing for them the notes of farm-

ers to whom he had sold machines. It

was said by the court that, while the

advance of money and giving notes

would ordinarily, without explana-

tion, indicate a sale, yet when consid-

ered iu connection with the fact that

G:

Berry was to be repaid his advances

from the cash payments made by

farmers to whom he sold machines,

and that his own notes were to be

taken up and paid by their notes, it

was not inconsistent with the agency

which was set out in other parts of

the contract."

The same conclusion was also

reached on the same conti - act in

Snelling v. Arbuckle (1898), 104 Ga.

362, 30 S. E. R. 863. See also Howell

v. Boudar (1898), 95 Va. 815, 30 S. E.

R. 1007. The question is also very

fully discussed in Norwegian Plow

Co. v. Clark (1897), 102 Iowa, 31. 70

N. W. R. 808. For still other cases

holding particular contracts to be

contracts of sale rather than of

agency, see Alpha Check-Rower Co. v.

Bradley (1898), 105 Iowa, 537, 75 N. W.

R. 369; Armstrong v. St. Paul, etc.

Co. (1891). 48 Minn. 113, 49 N. W. R.

piration of the contract, the relation
of creditor and debtor did not arise.
Until then Berry sold the machines
for and on account of Conable, and
the r elation between them was that
-0f principal and agent, but when the
contract expired by limitation, and
Berry came under the obligation to
pay for all un old machines, the
court held that the contract made
the tran action a conditional sale.
"In Bayliss v. Davis, 47 Iowa, 340,
Bayliss, under the agreement there
construed, appointed one Stinson his
agent to sell harvesters, and agreed
to allow him a commis ion of -10 on
each harvester. Stinson agreed to
advance one-third of the price, and
give his notes for the residue, and to
sell on the same term..,. All notes
taken for machine old by him were
to be made payable to Bayliss, the
pro eeds of sale were to be remitted
by him to Bayli a fast as received,
after deducting hi advances, and his
own note were to be taken up by exchanging for them the notes of farmers to w horn he had sold machine . It
was said by the court that, while the
advance of mouey and giving note
would ordinarily, without explanation in di ate a ale, yet when con idered in connection with the fact tllat

Berry was to be repaid his advance
from the cash payments made by
farmers to whom he sold machine ,
and that his own notes were to be
takeu up and paid by their note , it
was not inconsistent with the agency
which was set out in other parts of
the contract."
The same conclu ·ion was al o
reached on the same contract in
nelling v. Arbuckle (1 9 ), 10± Ga.
362, 30 S. E. R. 863. See also Howell
v. Boudar (1 9 ), 95 Va. 815, 30 S. E.
R. 1007. The que tion is al o very
fully di cus eel. in orwegiau Plo"·
Co. v. Clark (1897), 102 Iowa, 31. 70
N. W. R. 80 . For still other ca es
holding particular contract to be
contracts of sale rather than of
agency, see Alpha Check-Rower Co. v.
Bradley (1 9 ), 105 Iowa, 537, 75 . \V.
R. 369; Arm trong v. t. Paul. etc.
Co. (1 91). 48 l\finn. 113, 49 N. \V. R.
233 · Granite Roofing Co. v. Ca l er
(1890), 2 Mich. 466, ±6 N. v'i . R. 72 ;
Bradley ffo-. Co. v. Raynor (1 96), 70
IIL App. 639; Peoria _Hg. Co. v. Lyons
(1 94), 15' Ill. 497, 3 N. E. R. 661;
YoJer v. Haworth (1 9 ), 57 1Teb. 150,
77 N. \V. . 377; Hutton v. Lippert
(1 3), 8 App. Ca . 301.l: \ hitman
Agricultural Co. v. Hornbrook (1899),
24: Incl A1 p. 205, 55 N. E. R. 509.
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the court, to determine, in view of all the circumstances, what

the contract was, and what, in accordance with the instructions,

was its legal effect. 1

1 Thus in Rauber v. Sundback

(1890), 1 S. D. 268, 46 N. W. R 927,

the court said: "Upon the whole it

seems to us very plain that the real

intent and understanding of the par-

ties to this agreement must be gath-

ered from a variety of sources: some

affording direct and definite evi-

dence; others indirect, indefinite and

possibly inconsistent and confusing.

It must be determined to some ex-

tent, at least, from statements and

expressions, the meaning of which

seems doubtful and obscure. These
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expressions must be analyzed and

compared, not only with each other,

but with other statements as to the

agreement, if there are any, which

are more definite and certain. By

this means only could the final fact

as to what agreement these parties

made — its scope and meaning — be

intelligently determined. This being

our conclusion as to the condition of

the evidence, it follows that in our

judgment the question should have

been submitted to the jury, with a

plain instruction from the court as

to what agreement would constitute

the transaction a bailment, and what

a sale. Of the cases cited in respond-

ent's brief, Fish v. Benedict, 74 X. Y.

613; Bastress v. Chickering, 18 111.

App. 198 [affirmed 130 111. 206, 17 Am.

St, R, 309]; and Jenkins v. Eichel-

berger, 4 Watts, 121, 28 Am. Dec.

691, — are inapplicable to this case, so

far as the distinct question now pre-

sented is concerned, because in each

of those cases the agreement upon

which the rights of the parties de-

pended was in writing, and there was

and could be no doubt or question as

to its terms, and it was plainly the

duty of the court to construe it, and

declare whether it constituted the

transaction a sale or a bailment. But

here the very matter in doubt and

dispute is, What did the parties agree

to ? and to find and determine what

that agreement really was, its terms

and extent, was a question of fact for

the jury, on all the evidence: its force

and legal effect a matter of law for

the com-t. The other cases cited by

respondent were where grain had

been deposited with a warehouse-

man, and the question there, as here,

was: Was it a sale or a bailment?

But in those cases the undisputed

testimony showed, and it was not

questioned, but conceded, that the

agreement never contemplated that

the specific article which was the

subject of the agreement should be

§ 51.J
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§51.]

LAW OF SALE.

[book

For this purpose a full disclosure of the circumstances is ad-

missible, 1 and in ambiguous cases parol evidence may be re-

sorted to in order to show the intention. 2

For this purpose a full disclosure of the circumstances is admissible,1 and in ambiguous cases parol evidence may be resorted to in order to show the intention. 2

§ 51. Consignment of goods in payment of debt or to cover

prior advances. — Goods may, of course, be delivered in pay-

ment of a debt due from the consignor to the consignee, or to

cover prior advances made by the latter to the former. Where

§ 51. Con ignment of goods in payment of debt or t o cover
prior advances.- Goods may, of course, be delivered in pay-

i Simpson v. Pegram (1891). 108

N. C. 407, 13 S. E. R. 7. (The state-

ments upon the consignee's printed

letter-heads, for example.)

ment of a debt due from the consignor to the consignee, or to
cover prior advances made by the latter to the former. Where

. 2 Head v. Miller (1891), 45 Minn.

446, 48 N. W. R. 192. In this case,

after some oral negotiations, a mem-

orandum or order was signed by one

party in the following form:
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"Order No. , February 11th,

1889.

" Send to J. A. Bixby & Co.

"Place, Minneapolis, Minn.

" How ship, .

"Terms, 4 mos. from July 1st list.

" 13 No. 24 steel furnaces §100.

" 12 No. 034 " " $125.

" 2 No. 55 furnaces with dia.

"2 No. 35 " " "

— at 60 and 10 per cent, from list de-

livered in Minneapolis. It is agreed

that Head's Iron Foundry will carry

over to next season any furnaces not

sold on January 1st, 1890.

[Signed] " J. A. Bixby & Co."

The controversy was between the

foundry company and a receiver of

the property of Bixby & Co., the

former seeking to recover furnaces

in the possession of the latter, not

sold by Bixby & Co. Said the court:

"This memorandum, treated as an

order, is not directed to any one, and

is incomplete in itself; that is to say,

it must be construed in connection

with the proposition or offer of the

plaintiffs. It does not follow that

the terms of the agreement actually

expressed in the memorandum may

be contradicted or disputed by parol;

but the memorandum is consistent

with a consignment of the goods, as

claimed by the plaintiffs, or a sale,

as insisted on by the defendant. The

prices or terms specified in the mem-

orandum may apply to either. Pam

v. Vilmar, 54 How. Pr. 235. We think

the evidence sufficient to support

the finding of the trial court that the

goods were taken on consignment,

and the status of that portion thereof

remaining unsold on January 1, 1890,

is defined in the memorandum ; that

is to say, as against Bixby and the

receiver, the property in question,

when this suit was brought, was,

-by the mutual understanding of the

parties, 'carried' by Head's Iron

Foundry, which is shown to be the

plaintiffs. It was held by Bixby &

I Simpson v. Pegram (1891), 108 plaintiffs. It does not follow that
N. C. 407, 13 S. E. R. 7. (The state- the terms of the agreement actually
ments upon the con~ignee's printed expressed in the memorandum may
be contradicted or disputed by parol;
letter-heads, for example.)
• 2 Head v. Miller (1891), 45 Minn. but the memorandum is consistent
446, 48 N. W. R. 192. In this case, with a consignment of the goods, as
after some oral negotiations, a mem- claimed by the plaintiffs, or a sale,
orandum or order was signed by one as insisted on by the defendant. The
prices or terms specified in the memparty in the following form:
"Order No. - - , February 11th, orandum may apply to either. Pam
v. Vilmar, 54 How. Pr. 235. We think
1889.
"Send to J. A. Bixby & Co.
the evidence sufficient to support
"Place, Minneapolis, Minn.
the finding of the trial court that the
"How ship,--.
goods were taken on consignment,
"Terms, 4 mos. from July 1st list. and the status of that portion thereof
"13 No. 24 steel furnaces $100.
remaining unsold on January 1, 1890,
"12 No. 034 "
''
$125.
is defined in the memorandum; that
'' 2 No. 55 furnaces with dia.
is to say, as against Bixby and the
"2 Jo. 35
"
"
"
receiver, the property in question,
-at 60 and 10 per cent. from list de- when this suit was brought, was,
livered in Minneapolis. It is agreed .by the mutual understanding of the
that Head's Iron Foundry will carry parties, 'carried' by Head's Iron
over to next season any furnaces not Foundry, which is shown to be the
sold on January 1st, 1890.
plaintiffs. It was held by Bixby &
[Signed] "J. A. BIXBY & Co."
Co. as bailees, at the risk of the
The controversy was between the plaintiffs. For this Bixby & Co. had
foundry company and a receiver of taken pains to stipulate, and it is
the property of Bixby & Co., the entirely in harmony with the plaintformer seeking to r ecove1· furnaces iff's alleged claim and the finding
in the posse fon of the latt r, not of the court that the goods were
ltl by Bixby & Co. Said the court: shipped to them to be sold by them
"This memorandum, treated a an for the plaintiffs, and what they
ord r, is not directed to any one, and could not sell by January 1st the
i incomplete in itself; that i to ay, plaintiffs were to hold, an l Bixby &
it mu t be con trued in onnection Co. ·were not responsible for, except
with the proposition or offer of the as bailees."
fH
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the goods have been actually received by the consignee, no

question will ordinarily arise, and the transaction will be

deemed a sale, or, in the case of a factor, the subjecting of the

goods to the operation of his lien. 1 But where the goods have

been sent forward, and while in transit are intercepted by the

creditors of one party or are overtaken by accident, the ques-

tion of the effect of the transaction presents difficulties. Upon

this question the authorities are in conflict, 2 certain of the cases

holding that the goods do not become subject to the claim of

the consignee until they actually come into his possession ; 3

others assert the doctrine that where advances have been pre-

viously made in reliance upon a promise to subsequently con-

sign goods, a delivery to the carrier, consigned to the party, is

sufficient, 4 while others hold that, in addition to such a deliv-

ery, it is necessary that the advances should have been made

in reliance upon this particular consignment. 5 In a recent

case, in which the authorities are reviewed, the court say:

" The rule seems to be that, in order to change the title to the
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property shipped and vest it in the consignee, there must be a

bill of lading, receipt, or letter of information forwarded to

the consignee, or that the advancements were made upon the

faith of the particular consignment." 6

§ 52. Sale to be distinguished from contract for work and

labor.— Sale, still further, is to be distinguished from a con-

tract for the performance of work and labor. This distinction

becomes important most frequently in cases affected by the

statute of frauds, and will be separately considered in that con-

i See Mechem on Agency, § 1035. » Davis v. Bradley, 28 Vt. 118, 65

2 See Mechem on Agency, § 1035. Am. Dec. 226: Holbrook v. Wight, 24

3 Saunders v. Bartlett, 12 Heisk. Wend. (N. Y.) 169, 35 Am. Dec. 607;

(Tenn.) 316; Oliver v. Moore, 12 id. Valle v. Cerre, 36 Mo. 575, 88 Am.

482; Woodruff v. Eailroad Co., 2 Dec. 161; Desha v. Pope, 6 Ala. 690,

Head (Tenn.), 87. See Halliday v. 41 Am. Dec. 76; Hodges v. Kimball,

Hamilton, 11 Wall. (U. S.) 564. 49 Iowa, 577, 31 Am. R. 159; Elliott

4 Elliott v. Cox, 48 Ga. 39; Harde- v. Bradley, 23 Vt. 217.

man v. De Vaughn. 49 Ga. 596; Wade 6 First Nat. Bank v. Mc Andrews, 5

v. Hamilton, 30 Ga. 450; Nelson v. Mont. 325, 51 Am. R 51.

Railroad Co., 2 111. App. 180.

5 65

§ 52.J

LA. W OF SA.LE.

[BOOK I.

§ 52.] LAW OF SALE. [BOOK I.

nection ; but it may and does arise in cases to which that stat-

ute does not apply. The rules of construction must be sub-

stantially the same in both classes of cases, though, perhaps,

rather more technical tests have been applied in those cases

which are affected by the statute.

Where the statute of frauds is not concerned, the question

may become important as a matter of pleading, as a matter of

damages, or as a matter of liability for loss where the loss must

follow the title. The question here, as in the many other cases

already considered, is not a matter of names, but of essence and

intent, involving an investigation into the real situation and

purpose of the parties, as well as an inquiry as to the form of

the contract they have made.

Thus in a recent case in Wisconsin, 1 it appeared that the

plaintiff had agreed to manufacture a large quantity of engrav-

ings and lithographs for theatrical purposes, for the defendant

for his special use, to be taken and paid for during the theat-

rical season of 1885-86, and all of the work to be completed
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ready for delivery by December 15, 1885. A large part of the

goods- was taken and paid for during the season, and the bal-

ance was ready for delivery at the time agreed upon, but not

being called for or paid for was destroyed by fire on May 26,

18S6, while piled up and set apart for the defendant on the

plaintiff's premises. The plaintiff had had these goods insured

and had received a portion of the insurance money. He sued

to recover the price of the goods remaining unpaid for.

Said the court, per Orton, J. : " The learned counsel on both

sides, and the court below, treated this transaction as a sale of

personal property. It was not a sale. When the contracts

were entered into there was nothing in solido to be the subject

of a sale. The mere paper, as the basis of this valuable work

of mechanical art, was not only of insignificant value, but was

not the subject of sale. The defendant did not wish to buy

blank paper, and the plaintiff had none to sell. The plaintiff

1 Central Lithographing & Eng. R 186. See also Patrick v. Colorado

Co. v. Moore (1889), 75 Wis. 170, 43 N. Smelting Co. (1894), 20 Colo. 268, 38

W. R. 1124, 6 L. R A. 788, 17 Am. St. Pac. R. 236.
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nection; but it may ancl does arise in cases to which that statute does not apply. The rules of construction must be substantially the same in both classes of cases, though, perhaps,
rather more technical tests have been applied in those cases
which are affected by the statute.
"\Vhere the statute of frauds is not concerned, the question
may become important as a matter of pleading, as a matter of
damages, or as a matter of liability for loss where the loss must
follow the title. The question here, as in the many other cases
already considered, is not a matter of names, but of essence and
intent, involving an investigation into the real situation and
purpose of the parties, as well as an inquiry as to the form of
the con tract they have made.
Thus in a recent case in Wisconsin,1 it ar peared that the
plaintiff bad agreed to manufacture a large quantity of engr.avings and lithographs for theatrical purposes, for the defendant
for his special use, to be taken and paid for during the theatrical season of 1885-86, and all of the work to be completed
ready for delivery by December 15, 1 85. A large part of the
goods· was taken and paid for during the season, and the balance was ready for delivery at the time agreed upon, but not
being called for or paid for was destroyed by :fire on May 26,
1886, while piled up and set apart for the defendant on the
plain tiff's premises. The plaintiff had had these goods insured
and had received a portion of the insurance money. He sued
to recover the price of the goods remaining unpaid for.
Said the court, per Orton, J.: "The learned counsel on both
sides, and the court below, treated this transaction as a sale of
personal property. It was not a sale. When the contracts
were entered into there was nothing in soli lo to be the subject
of a sale. The mere paper, as the basis of this valuable work
of m chanical art, was not only of insignificant value, but was
not the subject of sale. The def ndant did not wish to buy
blank paper, and the plaintiff had none to sell. The plaintiff
1 Central Lithographing & Eng.
Co. v. Moore (1 9), T Wi . 170, 43
W. R. 1124, 6 L. R. A. 7 , 1 Am. t.

R 1 6.
ee al o Patrick v. Colorado
'melting o. (1 94), 20 Colo. 26 , 38
Pac. R. 236.
66
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was to manufacture these engravings and lithographs for the

especial, peculiar and exclusive use of the defendant in his

business as a theatrical manager. They were advertisements

adapted to the names and characters of his theatrical perform-

ances. It was the plaintiff's work of skill that gave the prop-

erty produced by it any value. It was work and labor per-

formed according to the order and direction of the defendant,

and according to the terms of the contracts. "When the re-

quired works were produced and ready to be taken away by

the defendant and paid for, it was then not a sale. The plaintiff

did not own them, and did not wish to own them, for they

were of no use or value whatever to him, and were only of use

and value to the defendant. When the job was completed ac-

cording to the contracts, then the defendant was under legal

obligation to take them away, and pay the amount agreed

upon. 1 "

Further illustration of this question will not be attempted

here, as it will be dealt with so frequently under various
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aspects hereafter; enough has been given to indicate the point

of differentiation in this place material.

§ 53. Sale to be distinguished from compromise respect-

ing conflicting liens. — Again, a sale is to be distinguished

from a compromise respecting conflicting claims or liens, and

the release thereof by one party to, or for the benefit of, the

other. Thus, in one case it appeared that separate judgment

creditors had caused executions to be levied upon the same

property, each claiming priority, and that they had afterwards

mutually agreed to release their liens, permit one to make a

new levy, and sell for the benefit of both. After such sale, the

creditor making it refused to recognize that the other had any

right to share in the proceeds, and the latter brought an action

to recover. The defense, among other things, was that the re-

lease was a sale, and therefore void under the statute of frauds

because it was not evidenced by writing, but the court held that

it was not a sale, but " a compromise of conflicting claims." l

i Mygatt v. Tarbell (1890), 78 Wis. 351, 47 N. W. R. 618.
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§ 54. Furnishing of food by restaurant or innkeeper as

sale. — Whether the supplying of articles, by restaurant and

innkeepers, to their guests and patrons, to be consumed on the

premises, as food, constitutes a " sale " of those articles within

the meaning of statutes forbidding, for example, the sale of

oleomargarine or intoxicating liquors, is a question which has

been much discussed in recent cases, and perhaps deserves at-

tention in this chapter. While some difference of opinion has

existed, the authorities 1 are, in the main, agreed that, where the

1 In Commonwealth v. Miller (1890),

131 Pa. St. 118, 18 Atl. R. 938, the de-

fendant was owner and proprietor

of a restaurant in Pittsburgh, and

§ 54:. Furnishing of' food by restaurant or innkeeper as
sale.- Whether the supplying of articles, by restaurant and
innkeepers, to their guests and patrons, to be consumed on the
premises, as foocl, constitutes a "sale" of those articles 'vithin
the meaning of statutes forbidding, for example, the sale of
oleomargarine or intoxicating liquors, is a question which bas
been much discussed in recent cases, and perhaps deserves attention in this chapter. \Vhile sonrn difference of opinion has existed, the authorities 1 are, in the main, agreed that, where the

furnished meals to transient and

regular patrons who paid for the

same daily and upon the completion
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of each meal. On a certain day two

men called at the restaurant, asked

for a meal, and were at once fur-

nished with it. Among the articles

of food was a small dish of what ap-

peared to be butter, but which was

in fact oleomargarine. At the com-

pletion of the meal the same was

paid for, and the oleomargarine taken

away by the two men. Suit was

brought against the proprietor of the

restaurant for the recovery of the

statutory penalty imposed upon

" every person . . . who shall

manufacture, sell, or offer, or expose

for sale, or have in his . . . pos-

session with intent to sell " oleomar-

garine. The court held the trans-

action to be a sale, though from that

opinion the chief justice dissented.

In their opinion, delivered by Clark,

J., the court said: "That the food

furnished to McRay and Spence, or

so much of it as they saw fit to ap-

propriate, was sold to them, cannot

be reasonably questioned; when it

was set before them, it was theirs to

all intents and purposes, to eat all, or

a part, as they chose, subject only to

the restaurateur's right to receive

the price, which it is admitted was

promptly paid. They might not eat

all of the article set before them, but

they had an undoubted right to do

so; and even assuming that the meal

is the portion of food taken, in the

sense stated, the transaction must

be regarded as a sale wholly within

the meaning and purport of the stat-

ute. It is certain that the oleomar-

garine composed a part of the meal

the price of which was paid, and was

embraced in the transaction as an

integral part thereof. If an un-

licensed keeper of a restaui - ant may

set before his guests a bottle of wine,

or other intoxicating liquor, charg-

ing a regular price for the same, with

other articles of food furnished, with

liberty to take much or little of the

liquor as the guest may choose, or,

I In Commonwealth v. Miller (1890),
131 Pa. St. 118, 18 Atl. R. 938, the de-

fend.ant was owner and proprietor
of a restaurant in Pittsburgh, and
furnished meals to transient and
regular patrons who paid for the
same daily and upon the completion
of each meal. On a certain day two
men called at the restaurant, asked
for a meal, and were at once furnished with it. Among the articles
of food was a small dish of what appeared to be butter, but which was
in fact oleomargarine. At the completion of the meal the same was
paid for, and the oleomargarine taken
away by the two men. Suit was
brought against the proprietor of the
restaurant for the recovery of the
statutory penalty imposed upon
"every person
who shall
manufa ture, sell, or offer, or expose
for sale, or have in his . . . po:3se ion with intent to sell" oleomargarine. The court held the transaction to be a sale, though from that
opinion the chief ju tice di ented.
In their opinion, delivered by Clark,
J., the court said: ''That the food
furni hed to McRay and Spence, or
so much of it as th y aw fit to appropriate, was sold to th m. annot
be rea. nably que tioned; when it
was et before th m, it wa their to
all intents and purposes, to eat all, or

a part, as they chose, subject only to
the restaurateur's right to receive
the price, which it is admitted was
promptly paid. They might not eat
all of the article set before them, but
they had an undoubted right to do
o; and even assuming that the meal
is the portion of food taken, in the
sense stated, the transaction must
be regarded as a sale wholly within
the meauing and purport of the ·tatute. It is certain th.at the oleomargarine composed a part of the meal
the price of which was paid, and was
embraced in the transaction as an
integral part thereof. If an unlicensed keeper of a restaurant may
8et before his guests a bottle of wine,
or other intoxicating liquor, charging a regular price for the same, with
other articles of food furnished, with
liberty to take much or little of the
liquor as the gue t may choose, or.
failing to drink it with his meal, permit him to take it away with him~
then the liquor laws of the commonwealth are of no avail, a.nd the license
to sell liquor is wholly unnecessary.
\iVhen the liquor is thus furnished
and paid for, it is in legal effect a
sale, for the very act ha· been done
which it is the policy of the law to
prevent, and which it characterizes
a a rime, viz., furnishing intoxicating liquors at a price which is paid.
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proprietor sets before his guest, at the latter's request, a num-

ber of articles as constituting a "meal," for which the guest is

to pay, these articles are then the guest's " to all intents and

purposes, to eat all or part, as he chooses, subject only to the

proprietor sets before his guest, at the latter,s request, a number of articles as constituting a "meal," for which the guest is
to pa.y, these articles are then the guest's "to all intents and
purpo es, to eat all or part, as he chooses, subject only to the

So, in this case, the oleomargarine

was furnished to the person named

as food, and the price was paid. As

the learned judge of the court below

well said, it was not given away, and

the fact that it was not sold sep-

arately, hut with other articles, for

a gross sum, would not make it less

a sale. It therefore comes within

the letter of the law, and it is also

within its spirit. If the use of such
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articles is injurious, it would seem to

be especially within the spirit of the

act to prohibit public caterers from

selling them to their guests as part

of an ordinary meal. Penal statutes

are to be strictly construed, but both

the letter and the spirit of the act of

1885 cover this case, and we think

the judgment was properly entered."

Paxson, C. J., dissenting from the

foregoing, said: "When the legisla-

ture used the word « sale,' it is fair

to assume that it was employed in

the sense in which it is popularly

understood. If it was the intention

not only to prohibit sales of oleo-

margarine, but also its use as an

article of food, or in the preparation

of food, by proprietors of eating-

houses, restaurants, and hotels, it

was easy to have said so in express

terms. As the act stands, there is

nothing to warn this defendant that

he violated it by placing oleomar-

garine on the table as an article of

food.

" I am unable to see how the legal

or popular meaning of the word 'sale '

will support this judgment. A sale

is the transfer of the title to property

at an agreed price. Story on Sales,

§ 1 ; Creveling v. Wood, 95 Pa. St. 152.

I find nothing in the facts, as set

forth in the case stated, to justify

the conclusion that there was a sale

of the oleomargarine. The two indi-

viduals referred to entered the de-

fendant's place of business, and

ordered a meal. It was furnished, but

oleomargarine formed no part of it.

It is true, there was some of that

So, in thi case, the oleomargarine
wa furnished to t.he pen;on named
as food, and the price wa paid. As
the 1 arned judge of the court below
well aid, it was not given away. and
the fact that it was not sold eparately, but with other articles, for
a gro ~ um, would not ma,ke it le s
a ale. It therefore comes within
the letter of the law, and it is al o
within its spirit. If the u e of uch
articles i injuriou , it would eem to
be e pecially within the spirit of the
a.ct to prohibit public caterers from
selling them to their gue ts as part
of an ordinary mea.l. Penal statutes
are to be trictly construed, but both
the letter and the spirit of the act of
1 5 cover this case, and we think
the judgment was properly entered."
Paxson, C. J., di senting from the
foregoing, said: "When the legislature u ed the word 1 sale,' it is fair
to a ume that it was employed in
the sen e in which it is popularly
under tood. If it was the intention
not only to prohibit ales of oleomargarine, but also its use as an
article of food, or in the preparation
<>f food, by proprietors of eatinghouses, i·e taurants. and hotels, it
was ea y to have said so in expre s
terms. As the act stand , there is
nothing to warn this defendant that
he violated it by placing oleomargarine on the table as an article of
food.
"I am unable to see how the legal
or popular meaning of the word' a.le'
will upport tbi judgment. A sale
i the tran fer of the title to property

at an agreed price. Story on Sales,
1; _Creveling v. Wood. 95 Pa. St. 152.
I find nothing in the facts, as set
forth in the case stated, to justify
the conclusion that there was a ale
of the oleomargarine. The two individuals referred to entered the defondant's place of business, and
ordered a meal. It was furnished, but
oleomargarine formed no part of it.
It is true, there was some of that
article on the table. They might
have partaken of it, but they did not.
When they left they carried the oleomargarine away with them. This, in
my opinion, they had no right to do.
A gue t at a hotel may satisfy his
appetite "hen he goe to the table.
He may partake of anything that is
placed before him; but, after filling
his tomach, he may not also fill his
pockets, and carry away the food be
cannot eat. This I understand to be
the rule as applicable to hotels and
eating-houses in this country, and if
there is anything in this case to take
it out of its operation it does not appear in the case stated. The illu trat10n of the bottle of wine, referred to
in the opinion of the court, does not
appear to me a happy one. Surely,
if a proprietor of a hotel places a bottle of wine before his guest, who does
not partake thereof, it cannot be said
that it is a sale of the wine, nor bas
the gue t the right to carry it away.
He might as well carry off the table
furniture."
In Commonwealth v. ·w orcester
(1 79), 126 Ma ·s. 256, the defendant
old meals in his dwelling-house.

article on the table. They might

have partaken of it, but they did not.

When they left they carried the oleo-

margarine away with them. This, in

my opinion, they had no right to do.

A guest at a hotel may satisfy his

appetite when he goes to the table.

He may partake of anything that is

placed before him; but, after filling

his stomach, he may not also fill his

69

~

§ 5±.J

LAW OF

ALE.

[BOOK I.

§5

I-]

LAW OF SALE.

[BOOK I.

restaurateur's right to receive the price;" and that if, among

the articles so furnished, is the forbidden article, there is a

" sale " of that so far as the restaurateur is concerned, even

though it was not specially ordered, or was not separately priced,

or was not eaten by the guest. A fortiori, within this view

would there be a sale ; if the article in question is expressly or-

dered and separately paid for. 1

Whether, under like general circumstances, there would be

a purchase by the guest, was not the subject of investigation in

the cases cited, for in all of them the guest or patron was act-

ively or passively assenting to the act. It would be clear, how-

ever, if the question became material, that the patron could

not become a purchaser without his express or implied assent.

With these meals, and as a part

thereof, were served wine, lager beer
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and other liquors. No bar was in the

room, but upon the tables were

placed bottles containing the liq-

restaurateur's right to receive the price·' and that if, among
the articles so furnished, is the forbidden article, there is a
"sale" of that so far as the restaurateur is concerned, ev n
though it wa not specially ordered, or was not separately priced,
or was not eaten by the guest. A fortiori, within this view
would there be a sale; if the article in question is expressly ordered and separately paid for. 1
\Vhether, under like general circumstances, there would be
a purchase by the guest, was not the subject of investigation in
the cases cited, for in all of them the guest or pat.ron was actively or passively assenting to the act. It would be clear, however, if the question became material, that the patron could
not become a purchaser without his express or implied assent.

uors. When the guests got through

they paid the defendant for the

meal. The court said: "The purchase

of a meal includes all the articles

that go to make up the meal. It is

wholly immaterial that no specific

price is attached to those articles

separately. If the meal included in-

toxicating liquors, the purchase of

the meal would be a purchase of the

liquors." The defendant was there-

fore properly found guilty of keeping

a tenement used for the illegal sale

and illegal keeping of intoxicating

liquors.

i In Commonwealth v. Vieth (1892),

155 Mass. 442, 29 N. E. R. 577, the com-

plaint charged the defendant with

selling milk below the required stand'

ard of quality. He was the keeper of

a hotel, who purchased his milk from

a regular dealer, and furnished it to

his guests in the same condition in

which he received it. The milk com-

plained of was delivered to one Bald-

win, upon his ordering a glass of

milk from the waiter in the cafe, to

be drunk upon the premises. It was

held that the evidence tended to

show a sale in the defendant's cafe

of a glass of milk, apparently a trans-

action in itself, and clearly within

the statute imposing a fine for the

sale of milk not of the required stand-

ard of quality.

In Commonwealth v. Warren (1894),

160 Mass. 583, 36 N. E. R 308, an em-

ployee of a milk inspector called at

the defendant's public house and or-

dered a breakfast in the dining-room.

He asked for a glass of milk with his

breakfast, part of which he carried

away and analyzed. Thirty-five cents

was paid for the breakfast, and noth-

ing for the milk as distinct from the

breakfast. The court held that this

was as much a sale of the milk as

though a specific price had been put

With these meals, and as a part
thereof. were served wine, lager beer
and other liquors. No bar was in the
room, but upon the tables were
placed bottles containing · the liquors. ·when the gue ·ts got through
they paid the d fendant for the
meal. The court said: "The purchase
of a meal includes all the articles
that go to make up the meal. It is
wholly immaterial that no specific
price is attached to tho e articles
separately. If the meal included intoxicating liquors, the purchase of
the meal would be a purchase of the
liquors. " The defen lant was therefore properly found guilty of k eping
a. t nement u eel for the illegal . ale
ancl ill gal keeping of intoxicating
liquor . .
1 In ommonwealth v. Vieth (1 99),
155 Ma s. 442, 29 N. E. R. 577, th omplaint harged th d f ndant with
llingmilk below th requir lL tan 1ard of quality. H wa the k p r f
a hotel, ·w h purcha. d hi milk fr m
a r gular cl al r, an l furni 11 t1 it to
hi gu t· m the ame conui in in

which he received it. The milk complained of \.Yas delivered to one Baldwin, upon his ord ring a gla
of
milk from the waiter in the cafe, to
be drunk upon the premise . It was
held that the evidence tended to
show a sale in the defendant's cafe
of a glas of milk, apparently a transaction in itself, and clearly within
the tatute imposing a fine for the
sale of milk not of the required standard of quality.
In Commonwealth v.Warren(l 94),
160 M:as ·. 533, 36 N. E. R 30 , an employee of a milk in pector called at
the def ndant s public house and ordered a breakfa tin the dining-room.
He asked for a gla of milk with his
breakfa t, part of which he carried
away and analyzed. Thirty-fiye ent
wa. paid for the br akfa t, and nothing for tile milk as di tin t from the
breakfa. t. The court held that this
wa a much a ale of the milk a
th uO'h a pe ifi; I ri e had b en put
up n it, or it had b en b ught and
paid for by it elf.
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§ 55. Supplying goods by several common owners to one

of them — Social clubs — Intoxicating liquors. — The ques-

tion whether the supplying of intoxicating liquors by social

clubs to their members constitutes a sale within the meaning

of the statutes prohibiting sales without a license, the keeping

open of bars on Sunday, and the like, has also frequently arisen

and given much difficulty in its determination. The question

depends so largely upon the character of the club, the language

of the statute, and circumstances of each case, that it cannot

be exhaustively considered here. But in general it has been

'held by the English and several American courts that when

the club is organized in good faith with a limited membership

for other purposes than the mere supplying of liquors, and the

liquors are supplied to members in accordance with the rules

of the club and simply as a part of the general refreshments

furnished by the club, there is no sale within the meaning of

the statutes. It has been contended in these cases that as the

liquors belonged to the club, and the member in obtaining
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them, though at a fixed price, was but exercising his rights as

a member of the club in pursuance of the original contract of

membership, there was no new contract of sale between the

club of which he was thus a member as seller and himself as

purchaser. 1 Many other American cases, however, have re-

1 In Commonwealth v. Smith (1869), liquor was purchased with the club's

102 Mass. 144, the defendant was funds and dispensed to its members,

agent of a club, bought liquors with each paying a stipulated price for

the club's money, and furnished said the liquor consumed, which money

liquor to the club members. The was used solely to keep up the stock

plan was for the members to ad- and cover the expenses of serving,

vance money to the club and receive and was not taken with a view to

in return checks of the denomina- profit, such a transaction did not vio-

tion of five cents, which were pre- late the liquor law providing that no

sented at the club bar and liquor person should sell, dispose of, barter

given in exchange. Held, that these or (if a dealer) give away fermented

facts would not, as a matter of law, liquors on Sunday,

show a sale. Graff v. Evans (1882), 8 Q. B. Div.

In Seim v. State (18S0), 55 Md. 566, 373, is a well known case. A bona

39 Am. R. 419, the court held that fide club, with limitations as to

where a bona fide social club was membership, entrance fees, trustees

formed, in connection with which for the control of its property, and
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pudiated this distinction, and held that, as it was optional with

pudiated this distinction, and held that, as it was optional with
the member whether he would obtain the liquors or not, and

the member whether he would obtain the liquors or not, and

other characteristics common to so

cial clubs, dispensed liquors to its

members without a license, and the

court held that this was not a "sale

by retail " of such liquors within the

meaning of the licensing act.

In Tennessee Club v. Dwyer (1S83),

11 Lea (Tenn.), 452, 47 Am. R 298, it

was held that a club which main-

tained a library, gave musical enter-

tainments, afforded meals to its

members, and kept a small stock of

liquors which were for the use of

members and paid for as used, no
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profit being made, was not liable

to pay a privilege tax as a retail

liquor dealer.

In Commonwealth v. Pomphret

(1884), 137 Mass. 564, 50 Am. R. 340, it

was held that the steward of a club

was not liable for keeping intoxicat-

ing liquors with intent to sell the

same, where the club was limited in

its membership, hired the steward,

who was a member, to deliver liquors

to the other members upon presenta-

tion of checks representing a certain

sum, and the money received was

used by the steward in buying liq-

uors in the name of and for the ben-

efit of the club.

In Commonwealth v. Ewig (1887).

145 Mass. 119, 13 N. E. R. 365, it

was held that, under a state of

facts showing a dispensing of liquors

to members of a bona fide social

club, there was no " sale " of intoxi-

cating liquors. So in Barden v. Mon-

tana Club (1891), 10 Mont. 330, 25 Pac.

R 1042, 24 Am. St. R. 27, 11 L. R A.

593. the court held that, under a state

of facts showing a bona fide literary

and social club, which furnished its

members with liquors with no intent

to evade the liquor laws and without

profit to itself, there was no "deal-

ing in " or " selling " at retail. Pied-

mont Club v. Commonwealth (1891),

87 Va. 541, 12 S. E. R 963, under a

similar state of facts, announced the

same opinion.

In Columbia Club v. McMaster

(1891), 35 S. C. 1, 14 S. E. R 290, the

court held that " the distribution of

liquors by a bona fide club among its

members is not a 'sale' within the

inhibition of a liquor law, even

though the person receiving the liq-

uor gives money for it."

lri State v. St. Louis Club (1894),

125 Mo. 308, 28 S. W. R. 604, 26 L. R

A. 573, the authorities were elab-

orately considered, and the court

held that, where a bona fide social

club, not incorporated for profit, sells

other characteri tics common to so profit to it elf, there wa no "dealcial clubs, di pen ed liquors to its ing in " or ''selling " at retail. Piedmembers without a licen e, and the mont Club v. Commonwealth (1 91),
court held that this was not a • sale 87 Va. 541, 12 S. E. R. 963, under a
by r etail" of such liquors within the similar tate of facts, announced the
ame opinion.
weaning of the licen ing act.
In Tenne -see Club v. Dwyer (1 3),
In Columbia Club v. IcMaster
11 Lea (Tenn.), 452, 47 Am. R. 298, it (1 91), 35 S. C. 1, 14 S. E. R. 290, the
was held that a club which main- court held that "the di tribution of
tained a library, gave musical enter- liquors by a bona fide club among its
tainments, afforded meals to its member i not a' ale' within the
members, and kept a mall stock of inhibition of a liquor law, even
liquors which were for the u e of though the per on receiving the liqmember and pajd for as u ed, no uor gh-e money for it."
profit being made, was not liable
lri State v. St. Louis Club (1 94),
to pay a prh-ilege tax as a retail 125 Io. 30 , 2 S. W. R. 604, 26 L. R.
liquor dealer.
A. 573, the authoritie were elabIn Commonwealth v. Pomphret orately con idered, and the court
(1884), 137 Mas " 564, 50 Am. R. 340, it held that, where a bona fide social
was held that the steward of a club club not incorporated for profit, sells
was not liable for keeping intoxicat- liquor to a m ember. that does not
ing liquor with intent to sell the con ~ titute a sale within the inhibisame, where the club wa limited in tion of the liquor law.
In People v. Adelphi Club (1 96),
its membership, hired the steward,
who was a member, to deliver liquors 149 N. Y. 5, 43 N. E. R. 410, 52 Am.
to the other member' upon presenta- St. R. 700, 31 L. R. A. 510, a bona fide
tion of checks representing a certain club, with a limited member hip,
sum, and the money received was which maintained a library and
u ed by the teward in buying liq- reading rooms, and upplied it · memuor in the name of and for the ben- ber with liquors with no purpo e of
making a profit therefrom, was held
efit of the club.
In Common wealth v. Ewig (1 7). not to be within the contemplation
145 Ma . 119, 13 N. E. R. 365, it of the tatute requiring licen es for
was held that under a tate of the selling of intoxicating liquor .
fact bowing a di pen ing of liquor The court aid: ' ·we think the trarn'to member of a bona fide ocial action did not amount to a sale
club, there wa no " ale' of intoxi· wi hin them aning of he tatute. It
eating liquor .
o in Barden v. Mon- wa but a di ' tribution among the
tana 'lub (1 91), 10 .Mont. 330, 25 Pac. member of the club of the property
R. 1042, 24 m. t. R. 07, 11 L. R. A.. that belonged to them. The fact
593. the court held that. under a state that a payment wa made doe not
of facts bowing a bona fide literary change the baracter of the act...
ee People v. Andrews, 115 N. Y. 4')
and ocial club, which furni herl it
members with liquors with no intent (infra ).
to evade the liquor laws and without
And in Klein v. Livingstone Club,
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as he obtained them from the owner, the club, and paid there-

for a price agreed upon, all of the elements of sale were present. 1

But, on the other hand, all of the cases are practically agreed

that where the " club " is but a mere subterfuge — a device for

(1896), 177 Pa. St. 224, 35 Atl. R 606,

55 Am. St R 717, under a similar

state of facts, the court announced

the same opinion.

iln Marmont v. State (1874), 4S

Ind. 21. there was a club formed for

social and relief purposes, which met

each Sunday. On Saturday of each

week tbe treasurer, by order of the

club, bought a keg of beer, which

was carried to the place of meeting,

and on Sunday the beer was drunk
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by the members, each one, upon re-

ceiving a glass of it, paying five

cents to the treasurer, which money

was put in the club's treasury. Held

to be a violation of the law prohib-

iting sales of intoxicating liquors on

Sunday.

In Martin v. State (1877). 59 Ala.

34. the agent of an incorporated club

sold liquors to the members, no li-

cense having been taken out. It was

held that the ownership of the liq-

uors changed so as to constitute a

sale, passing from the corporation

aggregate to the individual mem-

bers, for a valuable consideration.

In Chesapeake Club v. State (1885),

63 Md. 446, the court was construing

not the general Sunday liquor law,

which was passed upon in Seim v.

State (supra), but the local-option

act, and it held that under this act,

providing "that no person or per-

sons, company, corporation or asso-

ciation shall deposit or have in his,

her, their or its possession , . .

any intoxicating liquors . . . with

intent to sell or give away the same

in violation of law, or with intent

that the same shall be sold or given

away by another person," shall be

liable, the furnishing of liquors on

Sunday by an incorporated club to

its members was an act in violation

of law.

In State v. Lockyear (18S6), 95 X. C.

633, 59 Am. R 287, the court held

that the dispensing of liquors for the

convenience of members by an ordi-

nary social club was " in the strict

legal sense" a sale. In State v.

Horacek (1889), 41 Kan. 87, 21 Pac.

R 204, 3 L. R A 687, it was held

that when an incorporated associa-

tion purchased beer and brought it

into Kansas, and furnished it to its

members in exchange for chips pur-

chased from the association, there

was a violation of the law against

selling intoxicating liquors. And in

People v. Soule (1889), 74 Mich. 250,
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avoiding the operation of the statute — it furnishes no protec-

tion, and that its supplying of liquors to its so-called members

constitutes a sale within the prohibition of the acts. 1

avoiding the operation of the statute - it furnishes no protection, and that its supplying of liquors to its so-called members
constitutes a sale within the prohibition of the ucts. 1

court came to the same decision, con-

struing the same local-option act.

In Kentucky Club v. Louisville

(1891), 92 Ky. 309, 17 S. W. R. 743,

the court held that a city ordinance

laying a tax on every club house

where intoxicating liquors were sold

by retail applied to a club which,

under the ordinary arrangements,

dispensed liquors to its members

only.

In Nogales Club v. State (1891), 69

Miss. 218, 10 S. R. 574, it was held
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that where a social club had a back

room partly disconnected from the

other rooms, in which it disposed of

liquors, at prices regulated by the

club, to members and visitors, em-

ploying a steward for the purpose at

a fixed salary, it was within a stat-

ute prohibiting sales of intoxicating

liquors to minors. t

In State v. Neis (1891), 108 N. C.

787, 13 S. E. R. 225, 12 L. R. A. 412,

a number of persons, members of

a club, were owners in common of

a jug of liquor, which they put in

the hands of a steward, and each

time one of them took a drink from

the jug he gave the steward ten

cents, the money to be used in re-

plenishing the jug. Held, that this

constituted a sale. So in State v.

Boston Club (1893), 45 La. Ann. 585,

12 S. R. 895, the court held that when

a social club distributed liquor to its

members the transaction was a sale,

saying that, " whether incorporated

or not, in both cases the property

passes to the individual member and

the money paid becomes the prop-

erty of the club."

In Krnavek v. State (1897), 38 Tex.

Crim. R. 44. 41 S. W. R. 612, the case

concerned a bona fide club, and the

court said: "The question here is

whether the sale of intoxicants by

the managing steward or barkeeper

of the club to one of the members of

said club is a sale. We are of opin-

ion that it is."

In Mohrman v. State (1898). 105

Ga. 709, 32 S. E. R. 143, 43 L. R. A.

398, the indictment was against the

court came to the same deeision, construin g the same local-option act.
ln Kentucky Club v. Louisville
(1891), 92 Ky. 309, 17 S. vV. R. 743,
the court held that a city ordinance
laying a tax on every club bou e
where intoxicating liquors were sold
by retail applied to a club which,
under the ordinary arrangement ,
dispensed liquors to its members
only.
In Nogales Club v. State (1891), 69
Miss. 21 , 10 S. R. 574, it was held
that where a social club bad a back
room partly disconnected from the
other rooms, in which it disposed of
liquors, at prices r egulated by the
club, to members and visitors, employing a steward for the purpose at
a fixed salary, it was within a statute prohibiting sales of intoxicating
liquors to minors.
In State v. Neis (1891), 108 N. C.
7 7, 13 S. E. R. 225 12 L. R. A. 412,
a number of persons, members of
a club, were owners in common of
a jug of liquor, which they put in
the hands of a steward, and each
time one of them took a drink from
the jug he gave the st eward ten
cents, the money to be use l in replenishing the jug. Helcl, that this
con tituteJ. a sale. So in State v.
Bo ton Club (1893), 45 La. Ann. 5 G,
12 . R. 93, the court held that when
a ocial club di tributed liquor to its
member the transaction was a al ,
aying that, "whether incorporat d
or not, in both ca
the prop rty
passes to th individual m mber an l
th mon y paid becomes the property of the lub. '
In Krna vek v. State (1 97), 38 Tex.

Crim. R. 44. 41 S. W. R. 612, the case
concerned a bona fide club, and the
court said: "The question here is
whether the sale of intoxicants by
the managing steward or barkeeper
of the club to one of the members of
said cl uu is a sale. We are of opinion that it is."
In l\Iohrman v. State (1898\ 105
Ga. 709, 32 S. E. R. 143, 43 L. R. A.
398, the indictment was against the
manager of a social club for "keeping open a tippling-house on the Sabbath day." The deter mination of the
question whether there had been a
sale of liquor was not necessary under
the indictment, but the court discussed the point and approved those
authorities which hold that for a
club to distribute liquors among its
members is a sale.
l In State v. Mer cer (1871), 32 Iowa,
405, a o-called "social club., was
formed whose sole object appeared
to be to supply its m e mbers with
liquors in contravention of the law.
The m embers were given tickets in
exchange for money paid, antl the e
tickets were taken in payment for
liquors. It was held that the sale of
the tickets was in fact the sale of the
liquors, a nd the defendant was guilty
of a violation of the law.
In Rickart v. P eople (1 75), 79 Ill.
85, an asso iation was formed for the
avoweu purpose of promoting temperan e a nd friend ship. One of the
memb r , who was made trea urer,
r an a <'tram-shop, and the oth r members, up n pay1nent of a dollar each,
received ti kets r presenting the
amou nt paid, which were pre ented
at the dram-shop and honored in pay-

manager of a social club for " keep-

ing open a tippling-house on the Sab-

bath day." The determination of the

question whether there had been a

sale of liquor was not necessary under

the indictment, but the court dis-

cussed the point and approved those

authorities which hold that for a

club to distribute liquors among its

members is a sale.
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CH. II.

J

TRANSACTIONS DISTINGUISHED FROM SALES.

[§ 5G.

CH.

II.]

TRANSACTIONS DISTINGUISHED FROM SALES.

[§56.

§ 56. Transfer of title by operation of law.— Finally, to

be distinguished from the transfers to be considered in the

present treatise are those which result from operation of law.

For example, " a recovery for the conversion or for the taking

of a specific chattel, and satisfaction of the judgment, changes

the property in a chattel by operation of law, on the principle

that solutio pretii emptionis loco habetur; where the transfer,

by such means, is considered as a complete and absolute change

of title." l

Such cases, clearly, do not depend upon the mutual negotia-

tion and agreement of the parties, and are foreign to the pres-

ent subject.

ment for liquors or cigars. The treas-

urer received all the money and ren-

dered no account. Held, that such
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dispensing of liquors without a license

was a violation of the law against the

§ 56 . Transfer of titl e by operation of law.- Finally, to
be distinguished from the transfers to be considered in the
present treatise are those which result from operation of law.
For example, "a recovery for the conversion or for the ta.king
of a specific chattel, and satisfaction of the juugment, changes
the property in a chattel by operation of law, on the principle
that olittio pretii emptionis loco liabetur; where the transfer,
by such means, is considered as. a complete and absolute change
of title." 1
Such cases, clearly, do not depend upon the mutual negotiation and agreement of the parties, and are foreign to the present subject.

sale of intoxicating liquors.

People v. Andrews (1889), 115 N. Y.

427, 22 N. E. R. 358, 6 L. R. A. 128,

has been a much misunderstood case.

It was long thought that it held the

distributing of liquors by bona fide

social clubs to their members to be

sales within the meaning of the

liquor laws, and several cases were

decided by the general terms in har-

mony with that view. But in People

v. Adelphi Club, supra, the court of

appeals declared that such was not

the meaning of this case. The facts

showed a fraudulent attempt to

evade the laws under the guise of a

club, any one being admitted to mem-

bership on payment of a nominal fee,

which was returned to him upon

withdrawal. It was this feature

which controlled the decision, and

its application is confined to such

cases of fraud.

i Thayer v. Manley (1878), 73 N. Y.

305, 309. See also Cooper v. Shepherd

(1846), 3 Com. B. 266, 54 Eng. Com. L.

265; Lovejoy v. Murray (1865), 3 Wall.

(U.S.) 1; Fox v. Prickett (1869), 34

N. J. L. 13; Miller v. Hyde (1894), 161

Mass. 472, 37 N. E. R. 760, 42 Am. St.

R. 424, and note at p. 433, where the

mooted question, whether it is the

judgment or its satisfaction which

transfers the title, is discussed.
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ment for liquors or cigars. The treasurer received all the money and rendered no account. H eld, that such
dis pen ingofliquor without a licen,e
was a violation of the law against the
sale of intoxicating liquors.
People v. Andrew (1 9), 115 N. Y.
427, 22 N. E. R. 35 , 6 L. R. A. 12 ,
has been a much misunderstood case.
It wa · long thought that it held the
di tributing of liquor by bona jicle
social clubs to their members to be
sales within the meaning of the
liquor law , and several case were
decided by the general terms in hn.rmony with that view. But in P eople
v. Adelphi Club, supra, the court of
appeal declared that uch was not
the meaning of thi case. The facts
showed a fraudulent attempt to

evade the laws under the guise of a.
club. any one being admitted to membership on payment of a nominal fee,
which was returned to him upon
withdrawal. It was this feature
which controlled the decision, and
its application is confined to such
ca ·es of fraud.
I Thayer v. Manley (1878), 73 N. Y.
305, 309. See also Cooper v. Shepherd
(1 46), 3Com. B. 266, 54 Eng. Com. L.
265; Lovejoy v. Murray (1 6.5), 3 \Vall.
(U. .) 1; Fox v. Prickett (1 69), 34
N. J. L. 13; Iiller v. Hyde (1 94), 161
Mass. 472, 37 N. E. R. 760, 42 Am. St.
R. 424, and note at p. 433, where the
mooted question, whether it is the
ju lgment or its satisfaction which
transfers the title, is discussed.
75

CHAPTER III.

OF THE CAPACITY OF PARTIES — WHO MAY BUY AND SELL.

§ 57. Purpose of this chapter.

I. Of Capacity in General.

58. General rule as to competency.

59. Presumption of competency.

60. Causes and classification of in-

competency.

1. Natural Incompetency.

61. What here included.

a. Persons of Unsound Mind.

62. Scope of present treatment.

63. Insane persons as parties to

contracts generally.

64. Degree of incapacity which

avoids.

65. Weakness of mind and impo-

sition combined.

66. Mere inadequacy of price.
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07. Partial insanity — Monoma-

nia — Sane interval.

68. Presumption as to sane

intervals.

69. Effect of judicial determina-

tion of insanity.

70. Only prima facie evi-

dence as to period covered.

71. Petitioner for proceeding

not estopped by it.

72. Whether contracts of insane

person void or voidable.

73. Avoiding contract — Executed

and executory.

74. 75. Protection of inno-

cent party.

76. Insane person must have

received benefit.

§ 77. Return of consideration

necessary.

78, 79. Right, to recover from

bona fide purchaser.

80. Who may disaffirm.

81. Creditor may not.

82. Sane party may not.

83. Affirmance of contract.

84. Contract of insane person for

necessaries, binding.

85. Liability limited to value

received.

b. Incompetency of Drunkards.

86. Contracts of drunken persons.

87. Voidable, not void.

88. Bona fide holders.

89. Habitual drunkards.

90. Partial intoxication coupled

with fraud.

91. Drunkards under guardian-

ship.

c. Incompetency of Spendthrifts.

92. Contracts of spendthrifts, etc.

2. Legal Incompetency.

93. In general.

a. Incapacity of Infants.

94.

In general.

95.

Infant's contracts voidable,

not void.

96.

What meant by voidable.

CH. III.]

CAPACITY OF P .ARTIES.

CH. III.]

CAPACITY OF PARTIES.

§ 101.

102.

103.

112.

113.

114

115.

116.

117.

118.

119.

120.

121.

125.

126.

127.

128.
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129.

— Effect of ratification.

— Knowledge of non-liabil-

ity.

— Consideration for ratifi-

cation.

104, 105. Ratification, how ef-

fected.

106. Sale or exchange by infant

voidable.

107. When avoided.

108. How avoided.

109. Return of consideration.

110. Bona fide purchasers.

111. Chattel mortgage voidable.

When avoided.

Returning consideration.

How avoided.

Purchases voidable, if not nec-

essaries.

When avoided.

How avoided.

Return of consideration.

Ineffectual defenses — Re-

coupment — Injury to goods.

Effect of disaffirmance —

Revests seller's title.

Ratification of purchases.

122. Liability of infant for neces-

saries.

123, 124. For what amount

bound.

— Interest.

— Goods must have been

furnished on infant's ac-

count.

— Infant not liable if al-

ready supplied.

— Seller supplies goods at

his peril.

— Infant living with par-

ents, etc., presumed to be

supplied.

130. What constitute necessaries.

131. How determined — Bur-

den of proof.

132. Illustrations.

6. Incapacity of Married Women.

g 133. What here considered.

134. Common-law disability.

135. Equitable doctrines as to sep-

~

b. Incapacity of 1Iarried Women.

101. - - Effect of ratification.
102. - - Knowledge of non-liabil-

· 133. What here con idered.
ity.
134. Common-law di abili y.
103. - - Consideration for ratifi135. Equitable doctrines as to sepcation.
arate e tate.
104, 105. - - Ratification, how ef136. Statute removing disability.
fected.
137. --To what extent.
106. Sale or exchange by infant
13 . - - What contract he may
voidable.
make.
107. - - \ hen avoided.
139. - - tatutory liability for
10 . - - H ow avoided.
family nece aries.
109. - - Return of con ideration.
c. Capacity of Corporations.
110. - - Bona fide purcha er .
111. Chattel mortgage voidable.
140. In generaL
112. - - When avoided.
141. Corporations a ellers.
113. - - Returning con ideration.
142. Corporation a buyers.
114. - - How av0ided.
d. Capacity of Partner hips.
115. Purcha es voidable, if not nece sarie .
143. In general.
116. - - When avoided.
144. Partner hips as sellers.
11 . - - How arnided..
145. Partner~hips a buyers.
11 . - - Return of con iderat.ion.
119. - - Ineffectual defen e -Re- IL SALE BY PER OXS HATING ONLY
A DEFE..IBIBLE TITLE.
coupment-Injury to goods.
120. - - Effect of disaffirmance 146. Such a per on in posse sion
Reve t seller' title.
may pa good title to bona
121. - - Ratification of purcha e .
fide purchaser.
122. Liability of infant for neces147. - - One holding subject to
aries.
secret lien.
123, 124. - - For what amount
14 . - - Fraudulent vendee.
bound.
149. - - One who obtained goods
125. - - In tere t.
by trick.
126. - - Goods must have been
150. - - Fraudulent grantee of
furnished on infant's acdebtor.
count.
151. - - Fraudulent debtor.
127. - - Infant not liable if al152. - - Conditional vendee.
ready upplied.
153. - - Purchaser for cash who
128. - - eller supplies goods at
has not paid.
hi periL
129. - - Infant living with par- Ill SALES BY PERSOX HAVING ONLY
AN OSTEN IBLE TITLE.
ents, etc., presumed to be
up plied.
154: 155. In general, one cannot
convey better title than he
130. What con titute necessaries.
131. - - How determined - Burhas.
156. Po e ion alone insufficient
den of proof.
evidence of title.
132. - - Illustrations.
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§

'. J

r >-

,)

LAW OF SALE.

[BOOK I.

57.]

LAW OF SALE.

[BOOK I.

§ 157. Possession coupled with in-

dicia of ownership.

158, 159. What requisite.

160-164. Illustrations.

165. Limitations.

166. Appearance of title from pos-

session of bill of lading or

warehouse receipt.

167. Ostensible title of vendor in

possession.

168. 169. Ostensible title under

Factors Acts.

170. Ostensible title by conduct.

IV. Sales and Purchases by Per-

sons Acting for Others.

171. In general.
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172. Nature of authority.

2. Authority to Sell Personal Prop-

erty.

173. How considered.

a. Authority to Sell Conferred by

Law.

174. Chief illustrations.

b. Authority Conferred by Act of

Party.

175. Express authority to sell.

176. Implied authority to sell.

177. None implied from mere

possession.

178. None implied from mere re-

§ 157. Po ses ion coupled with indicia of ownership.

a. Authority to Buy Conferred by

Law.
1-8, 159. - - What requisite.
§ 181. Chief instances.
160-164. - - Illustrations.
182. Authority of wife to buy nec165. - - Limitations.
essaries on husband's credit.
166. Appearance of title from po 1 3. - - Where parties are living
se sion of bill of lading or
together.
warehouse receipt.
184. - - Where parties are living
167. Ostensible title of vendor in
apart.
possession.
185. - - What constitute neces168, 169. Ostensible title under
saries.
Factors Acts.
186. Authority of infant child to
170. Ostensible title by conduct.
buy necessaries on parent's
credit.
IV. SALES AND PURCHASES BY PERSONS ACTING FOR OTHERS.
b. Authority to Buy Conferred by
171. In general.
Act of Party.
172. .r ature of authority.
187. Express authority to buy.
2. Authority t.o Sell Pe1·sonal Prop188. Implied authority to buy.
e1·ty.
189. - - Not implied from mere
173. How considerad.
relationship of parties.

a. Authority to Sell Conferred by v. SALES BY PERSONS ACTING rn AN
Law.
174. Chief illustrations.

OFFICIAL CAPACITY.
190. In general.
191. ..Authority must be strictly
con trued.
192. Officer must keep within the
term and territory of his
office.
193. Officer cannot deal with him
self.
194. Purchasers at execution, tax,
and imilar sales.
195. Purchases at executors', admini trators' and guardians'
sale.
196. Tru tees' sales.

lationship — Husband and

wife — Parent and child.

179. None implied from authority

to do other kinds of acts.

3. Authority to Buy Personal Prop-

erty.

180. How considered.

a. Authority to Buy Conferred by

Law.

§ 181. Chief instances.

182. Authority of wife to buy nec-

essaries on husband's credit.

183. Where parties are living

together.

184. Where parties are living

apart.

185. What constitute neces-

saries.

186. Authority of infant child to

buy necessaries on parent's

credit.

b. Authority to Buy Conferred by

Act of Party.

187. Express authority to buy.

188. Implied authority to buy.

189. Not implied from mere

relationship of parties.

V. Sales by Persons Acting est an

Official Capacity.

190. In general.

191. Authority must be strictly

construed.

192. Officer must keep within the

term and territory of his

office.

193. Officer cannot deal with him

self.

b. Authority Conferred by Act of
Party.
175. Express authority to sell.
176. Implied authority to sell.
177. - - None implied from mere
possession.
178. None implied from mere relation hip - Husband and
wife - Parent and child.
179. None implied from authority
to do other kinds of acts.

3. Authority to Buy Personal Property.
1 0. How considered.

§ 57. Purpo e of thi chapter.-Having now considered
the qu stion ari ing out of the definition and differentiation
of th contra t of sal , att ntion will n xt b iven to the question of who may sell or buy. This primarily leads to the dis78

CAP A CITY OF P ARTIE •

<JH. III.]

[§§ 58-60.

CH. III.] CAPACITY OF PARTIES. [§§ 58-60.

cussion of the capacity of parties, in general, to enter into the

contract of sale ; but, for convenience sake, a wider range will

be given to the present chapter so as to include certain allied

matters which fall, perhaps, as logicall} 7 under this head as

under any other, and there will be considered here the ques-

tions —

I. Of sales and purchases by parties acting in their own

right; and herein of capacity in general. -

II. Of sales by persons having only a defeasible title.

III. Of sales by persons having only an ostensible title.

IV. Of sales and purchases by persons acting only in a repre-

sentative capacity, or sales and purchases by agents.

V. Of sales by persons acting in an official capacity.

I.

Or Capacity of Parties in General.

§ 58. General rule as to competency. — Sale being a trans-

fer of title in pursuance of a contract, it follows that, as a rule,

the same capacity is requisite for the making of a contract of
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sale as for the making of any other contract; or, stated af-

firmatively, that any person who is capable of making con-

tracts generally is competent to enter into the contract of sale.

cussion of the capacity of parties, in general, to enter into the
contract of sale; but, for convenience sake, a wider range will
be given to the present chapter so as to include certain allied
matters which fall, perhaps, as logically under this head as
under any other, and there will be considered here the questions I. Of sales and purchases by parties acting in their own
right; and herein of capacity in general.
II. Of sales by persons having only a defeasible title.
III. Of sales by persons having only an ostensible title.
IV. Of sales and purchases by persons acting only in a representative capacity, or sales and purchases by agents.
V. Of sales by per ons acting in an official capacity.

§ 59. Presumption of competency. — The law does not pre-

sume that the parties to a contract were incompetent. On the

I.

contrary, the presumption is that they were competent, and

the burden of proving incompetency rests upon him who al-

leges it. At the same time —

§ 60. Causes and classification of incompetency. — There

OF CAP A

ITY OF

p ARTIES

IN GENERAL.

are many persons who are, either generally or in special cases,

incompetent to contract, and this incompetency requires con-

sideration. Incompetency may arise either from infirmity of

the mind or it may be created by law. The former kind is

often termed natural incompetency, while the latter is desig-

nated legal incompetency. Of the first kind are the defects

79

§ 58. General rule a to competency.- ale being a transfer of title in pursuance of a contract, it follows that, as a rule,
the same capacity is requisite for the making of a contract of
sale as for the making of any other contract; or, stated affirmatively, that any person who is capable of making contracts generally is competent to enter into the contract of sale.

§ 59. Presumption of competency .-The law does not presume that the parties to a contract were incompetent. On the
contrary, the presumption is that they were competent, and
the burden of proving incompetency rests upon him who alleges it. .At the same time -

§ 60. Causes and classification of incompetency.- There
are many persons who are, either generally or in special cases,
incompetent to contract, and this incompetency requires consideration. Incompetency may arise either from infirmity of
the mind or it may be created by law. The former kind is
often termed natural incompetency, while the latter is designated tegal incompetency. Of the first kind are the defects
79

§§ 61-64.J

LAW OF SALE.

[BOOK I.

§§ 61-64] LAW OF SALE. [BOOK I.

of idiots, insane persons and drunken persons; and of the lat-

ter kind is the incompetency of aliens, infants and married

women.

1. Natural Incompetency.

§ 61. What here included. — As suggested in the preceding

section, there will be included under this head the question of

the incompetency of the insane person, the drunkard, and the

of idiots, insane persons and drunken persons; and of the latter kind is the incompetency of aliens, infants and married
women.
1. }{atural Incompetency.

spendthrift; and these subjects will be considered in the order

named.

§ 61. What here included.-As suggested in the preceding

a. Incompetency by Reason of Mental Unsoundness or Weak-

ness.

§62. Scope of present treatment. — It is not the purpose

here to enter minutely into the consideration of the question of

the capacity of insane persons to make contracts generally, as

that subject belongs more appropriately to works upon the law

of contracts ; but a brief reference to some of the leading prin-

section, there will be included under this head the question of
the incompetency of the insane person, the drunkard, and the
spendthrift; and these subjects will be considered in the order
named.

ciples and to certain of the more important cases may be of

service. In what will be said, no attempt will be made to dis-
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tinguish between the various forms of mental disease which

are sometimes classified as idiocy, delirium, lunacy, mania, and

a. Incompetency by Reason of Mental Unsoundness or Weakness.

the like.

§ 63. Insane persons as parties to contracts generally. —

Mental incapacity may arise from a great variety of causes and

present almost numberless degrees of completeness. It may

be the result of inheritance, illness, accident or intemperance,

and may be general in its nature, though limited in its degree,

or it may be complete as to some subjects or on some occasions,

while not existing at other times or in reference to other mat-

ters. Hence —

§ 64. Degree of incapacity which avoids contracts. — It is

not every degree of mental weakness which incapacitates one

for entering into contracts, but it must be of such a degree that

the person is unable to intelligently comprehend the act to
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§ 62. Scope of present treatment.-It is not the purpose
here to enter minutely into the consideration of the question of
the capacity of insane persons to make contracts generally, as
that subject belongs more appropriately to works upon the law
of contracts; but a brief reference to some of the leading principles an<l to certain of the more important cases may be of
service. In what will be said, no attempt will be made to distinguish between the various forms of mental disease which
are sometimes classified as idiocy, delirium, lunacy, mania, and
the like.

§ 63. Insane persons as parties to contracts generally.Mental incapacity may arise from a great variety of causes and
present almost numberless degrees of completeness. It may
be the result of inheritance, illness, accident or intemperance,
and may be general in its nature, though limited in its degree,
or it may be complete as to some subjects or on some occasions,
while not existing at other times or in reference to other mat-.
t ers. Hence -

§ 64:. Degree of incapacity which avoids contracts.- It is
not ev ry degree of mental weakness which incapacitates one
for entering into contracts, but it must be of such a degree that
the person is unable to intelligently comprehend the act to
80
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which the contract relates, or to intelligently will to do such

act. 1

In the absence of fraud or imposition, therefore, mere weak-

ness of intellect, 2 old age, 3 " vacillation, shiftlessness, improvi-

dence, occasional despondency or religious hobby," 4 physical

weakness, or want of judgment and discretion, 5 is not enough,

but the disability must be so great that the person is " wholly,

absolutely and completely unable to understand or comprehend

the nature of the transaction." 8

§65. Weakness of mind and imposition combining. — But

though the weakness of mind or partial defect be not sufficient

to incapacitate, yet if there be evidence of co-existing fraud,

undue advantage or imposition operating upon such weakened

or defective intellect, the two combining may be enough to in-

which the contract relate , or to intelligently will t~ do such
act. 1
In the absence of fraud or imposition, therefore, mere weaknes of intellect, 2 old age, 3 "vacillation, shiftlessness, improvidence occa ional de pondency or religious hobby," 4 physical
weakne , or want of ju lgment and di cretion,5 is not enough,
but the Jj ability mu t be so great that the p rson is" wholly,
ab olutely and completely unable to under tand or comprehend
the nature of the tran action." 6

validate the dealing. 7

The rules upon this subject have been well stated in one

case 8 as follows: "Mere weakness of intellect, if the party is

compos mentis, does not deprive him of the capacity to con-
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tract; but imbecility of understanding constitutes a material

ingredient in examining whether a bond or other contract has

been obtained by fraud or imposition or undue influence; for

although a contract made by a man of fair understanding may

i Hovey v. Chase, 52 Me. 304, 83 Am. mania. Connor v. Stanley, 72 CaL

Dec. 514; Jackson v. King, 4 Cow. 556, 1 Am. St. R. 84.

(N. Y.j 218, 15 Am. Dec. 354; Sands v. 5 Hovey v.. Chase, 52 Me. 304, 83

Potter, 165 111. 397, 46 N. E. R. 282. Am. Dec. 514.

2 Jackson v. King, 4 Cow. (N. Y.) 6 Aldrich v. Bailey, 132 N. Y. 85,

207, 15 Am. Dec. 354; Smith v. Be- 30 N. E. R. 264.

atty, 2 Ired. (N. C.) Eq. 456, 40 Am. 7 Garrow v. Brown, Winston's Eq.

Dec. 435; Juzan v. Toulmm, 9 Ala. (N. C.) 46, 86 Am. Dec. 450; Juzan v.

662, 44 Am. Dec. 448; Ellis v. Math- Toulmin, 9 Ala. 662,44 Am. Dec. 448;

ews, 19 Tex. 390, 70 Am. Dec. 353; Jackson v. King, 4 Cow. (N. Y.) 207,

Harrison v. Otley, 101 Iowa, 652, 70 15 Am. Dec. 354: Ellis v. Mathews,

N. W. R. 724; Aldrich v. Bailey, 132 19 Tex. 390, 70 Am. Dec. 353; Seeley

N. Y. 85, 30 N. E. R. 264. v. Price, 14 Mich. 541; Darnell v.

3 Smith v. Beatty, supra; Aldrich Rowland, 30 Ind. 342; Henry v. Rite-

§ 65. 'Veakne

of mincl and impo itiou combining.-But
though the weakne of mind or partial defect be not ufficient
to incapacitate, et if there be
idence of co-exi ting fraud,
undue advantage or impo ition operating upon uch weakened
or defective intellect, the two combining may be enough to inaliclate the dealing. 7
The rule upon thi ubject have been well stated in one
ca e a follow : ' hl re "' akne s of intellect, if the part is
compos menti , doe not d prive him of the capacity to contract· but imbecilit of under tanding con titutes a material
ingredient in examining whether a bond or other contract has
been obtained by fraud or imposition or undue influence; for
although a contract made by a man of fair under tanding may

v. Bailey, supra. nour, 31 Ind. 136; Yount v. Yount,

* West v. Russell, 48 Mich. 74. Be- 144 Ind. 133, 43 N. E. R. 136.

lief in spiritualism does not of itself 8 Juzan v. Toulmin, supra.

show insanity unless it aiaounts to a

6 81

1 Hovey v. Cha~ e, 52 fe. 304 3 Am.
Dec. 514; Jack on v. King, 4 Cow.
(N. Y.) 21 , 1- Am. Dec. 354; and v.
Potter, 165 Ill. 397, 46 N. E. R. 2 2.
2 Jack on v. King, 4 Cow. (N. Y.)
207, 15 Am. Dec. 354; Smith v. Beatty, 2 Ired. ( . C.) Eq. 4:'56 40 Am.
Dec. 435; Juzan v. Toulmin, 9 .Ala.
662, 44 Am. J)ec. 448 · Ellis v. l\Iathew , 19 Tex. 390, 70 Am. Dec. 353;
Harri on v. Otley, 101 Iowa 6-2, 0
N. W. R. 24; Aldrich v. Bailey, 132
N. Y. 5, 1:30 N. E. R. 264.
3 Smith v. Beatty, supm; Aldrich
v. Bailey, supm.
4We t v. Ru ell, 4 Jich. 4. Belief in piritualism does not of itself
show insanity unle s it arnounts to a

6

mania. Connor v.
5-6, 1 Am. t. R. 4.

tanley, 72 Cal

Hovey v. ha e, 52 l\Ie. 304, 83
Am. Dec. 514.
6 Aldrich v. Bailey, 132 N. Y. 85,
30 N. E. R. 264.
7 Garrow v. Brown, Win ton's Eq.
(N. C.) 46, 86 A.m. Dec. 450; Juzan v.
Toulmin, 9 Ala. 662, 44 Am. Dec. 44 ;
Jackson v. King, 4 Cow. (N. Y.) 207,
15 Am. Dec. 354; Elli v. ~Iathew.. ,
19 Tex. 390, 0 Am. Dec. 3-3; eeley
v. Price, 14 Mich. 541; Darnell v.
Rowland, 30 Ind. 342; Henry v. Ritenour, 31 Ind. 136; Yount v. Yount,
144 Ind. 133, 43 N. E. R. 136.
8 J uzan v. Toulmin, supra.
5

81

§§ 66, 67.]

LAW OF SALE.

[BOOK I.

§§ 66, 67.] LAW OF SALE. [BOOK I.

not be set aside, merely because it was a rash, improvident or

bard bargain, yet if made with a person of imbecile mind, the

inference naturally arises that it was obtained by circumven-

tion or undue influence. 1 In Blackford v. Christian? Lord

Wynford said a bargain into which a weak mind is drawn,

under the influence of deceit and falsehood, ought not to be

held valid. And a degree of weakness of intellect far below

that which would justify a jury, under a commission of lunacy,

in finding him incapable of controlling his person and property,

coupled with other circumstances to show that the weakness,

such as it was, had been taken advantage of, will be sufficient

to set aside any important deed."

§ 66. Mere inadequacy of price or other inequality in the

bargain is not, it is said in the same case, "to be understood as

constituting per se a ground to avoid a bargain in equity.

Courts of equity, as well as courts of law, act upon the ground

that every person who is not, from his peculiar condition or

circumstances, under disability, is entitled to dispose of his
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property in such manner and upon such terms as he chooses;

and whether his bargains are wise and discreet or otherwise,

not be set aside, merely because it was a rash, improvident or
hard bargain, yet if made with a person of imbecile mind, the
inference naturally arises that it was obtained by circumvention or undue influence. 1 In Blackford v. Oliri tian, 2 Lord
W y nford said a bargain into which a weak mind is drawn,
under the influence of deceit and fa1sehood, ought not to be
held valid. And a degree of weakness of intellect far below
that which would justify a jury, under a commission of lunacy,
in finding him incapable of controlling bis person and property,
coupled with other circumstances to show that the weakness,
such as it was, had been taken ad vantage of, will be sufficient
to set aside any important deed."

profitable or unprofitable, are considerations not for courts of

justice but for the party himself to deliberate upon. Where,

however, the inadequacy is such as to demonstrate some gross

imposition or undue influence, or, to use an expressive phrase,

shock the conscience, and amount in itself to conclusive and

decisive evidence of fraud, equity ought to interfere. And

gross inadequacy of price, when connected with suspicious cir-

cumstances or peculiar relations between the parties, affords a

vehement presumption of fraud.

§ 67. Partial insanity — Monomania — Sane intervals. —

It is not enough that the person may be partially insane, or

insane only as to certain subjects, or that he may occasionally

be insane, unless it appears also that the contract was in refer-

ence to those subjects to which his insanity applied, or was

1 Citing 1 Story's Eq. Jur. 238-242. 2 1 Knapp, 77.
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§ 66. Mere inMlequaey of pr ice or other inequality in the
bargain is not, it is sa.id in the same case, "to be understood as
constituting per se a ground to avoid a bargain in equity.
Courts of eq uity, as well as courts of law, act upon the ground
that every person who is not, from his peculiar condition or
·c ircumstances, under disability, is entitled to dispose of his
property in such manner and upon such terms as he chooses;
and whether his bargains are wise and discreet or otherwise,
profitable or unprofitable, are con.siderations not for courts of
justice but for the party himself to deliberate upon. Where,
however, the inad equacy is such as to demonstrate some gross
imposition or undue influence, or, to use an expressive phrase,
shock the conscience, and amount in itself to conclusive and
decisive evidence of fraud, equity ought to interfere. And
gross inadequacy of price, when connected with suspicious circumstances or peculiar relations between the parties, affords a
vehement presumption of fraud.

§ 67. Partial insanity-Monomania-Sane intervals.It is not enough that the person may be partially insane, or
insane only as to certain subjects, or that he may occasionally
be in ane, unle s it ppears also th at the contract was in reference to those subj cts to which his in anity applied, or was
1 Citing

21 Knapp, 77.

1 Story's Eq. Jur. 238-242.
82
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made during his insane intervals. If made as to subjects in

reference to which his incapacity did not exist, 1 or, in the other

case, if made during his sane intervals, 2 the, contract will be

valid.

§ 68. Presumption as to sane intervals. — Where gen-

eral or habitual insanity is shown to have existed during a

given period, the presumption will be that it was continuous

made during his insane intervals. If made as to ubjects in
reference to which his incapacity did not exist,1 or, in the other
case, if made during his sane interval ,2 the. contract will be
valid.

during that period, and the person who alleges that a sane in-

terval existed at the time the particular contract was made

must assume the burden of proving it. 3

§69. Effect of judicial determination of insanity.— "All

contracts of a lunatic, habitual drunkard or person of unsound

mind," it is said in a late case, 4 " made after an inquisition and

confirmation thereof, are absolutely void, until, by permission

of the court, he is allowed to assume control of his property. 5

In such cases the lunacy record, as long as it remains in force,

is conclusive evidence of incapacity. Contracts, however, made

68. - - Pre umption as to sane intervals.-Where general or habitual in anity is shown to have existed during a
given period, the presumption will be that it was continuous
during that period, and the person who alleges that a sane interval existed at the time the particular contract was made
mu ta sume the burden of proving it. 3

by this class of persons before office found, but within the pe-
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riod overreached by the finding of the jury, are not utterly

void, although they are presumed to be so until capacity to

contract is shown by satisfactory evidence. 6 Under such cir-

cumstances the proceedings in lunacy are presumptive, but not

-conclusive, evidence of a want of capacity. The presumption,

iGalpin v. Wilson, 40 Iowa, 90; Paige (N. Y.), 422, 22 Am. Dec. 655;

Searle v. Galbraith, 73 111. 269. Wadsworth v. Sharpsteen, 8 N. Y.

2 Lee v. Lee, 4 McCord (S. C), 183, 388, 59 Am. Dec. 499; 2 N. Y. R. S.,

17 Am. Dec. 722; In re Gangwere, 14 p. 1094, sec. 10. To the same effect:

Pa. St. 417, 53 Am. Dec. 554; Staples Pearl v. McDowell, 3 J. J. Marsh.

v. Wellington, 58 Me. 453; Lewis v. (Ky.) 658, 20 Am. Dec. 199; Leonard

Baird, 3 McLean (U. S. C. C), 56; v. Leonard, 14 Pick. (Mass.) 283;

Boyce v. Smith, 9 Gratt, (Va.) 704, 60 Kichol v. Thomas, 53 Ind. 42; Freed

Am. Dec. 313. v. Brown, 55 Ind. 310; Griswold v.

a Rogers v. Walker, 6 Pa. St. 371, Butler, 3 Conn. 227; Elston v. Jasper,

47 Am. Dec. 470; Case of Cochran's 45 Tex. 409; Mohr v. Tulip, 40 Wis.

Will, 1 T. B. Mon. (Ky.) 264, 15 Am. 66; Imhoff v. Whitmer, 7 Casey (Pa.),

Dec. 116, and note citing many cases. 243.

* Hughes v. Jones, 116 N. Y. 67, 15 « Citing 2 R. S., supra; Van Deusen

Am. St. R. 386, 22 N. E. R. 446. v. Sweet, 51 N. Y. 378; Banker v.

6 Citing L'Amoureaux v. Crosby, 2 Banker, 63 N. Y. 409.
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§ 69. Effect of judicial determination of insanity.-" All
-contract of a lunatic, habitual drunkard or person of unsound
mind," it is said in a late case, 4 "made after an inquisition and
-confirmation thereof, are absolutely void, until, by permission
-0f the court, he is allowed to as ume control of his property. 5
In such cases the luna y recor l, as long as it remains in force,
fa conclu ive evidence of incapacity. Contracts, however, made
by this cla s of person before office found, but within the period overreached by the finding of the jury, are not utterly
void, although they are presumed to be so until capacity to
contract is shown by satisfactory evidence. 6 Under such circumstances the proceeding in lunacy are presumptive, but not
-conclusive, evi lence of a want of capacity. The presumption,
I Galpin v. Wil on, 40 Iowa, 90;
Searle v. Galbraith, 73 Ill. 269.
2 Lee v. Lee, 4 1cCord ( . C.), 1 3,
17 Am. Dec. 722; In re Gangwere, 14
-Pa. t. 417, 53 Am. Dec. 554; Staples
-v. Wellington, 5 Me. 453; Lewis v.
l3aird, 3 fcLean (U. S. C. C.), 56;
l3oyce v. Smith, 9 Gratt. (Va.) 70±, 60
Am. Dec. 313.
3Roo-er v. ':Valker, 6 Pa. St. 371,
47 Am. Dec. 470; Ca e of Cochran's
Will, 1 T. B. Mon. (Ky.) 264, 15 Am.
Dec. 116, and note citing many cases.
4 Hughe v. Jones, 116 N. Y. 67, 15
.Am. 't. R. 3 6, 22 N. E. R. 446.
:-i Citing L 'Amoureaux: v. Crosby, 2
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Paige (N. Y.), 422, 22 Am. Dec. 655;
V\ adsworth v. Sharp teen, 8 N. Y.
3 , 59 Am. Dec. 499; 2 N. Y. R. S.,
p. 1094, sec. 10. To the same effect:
Pearl v. McDowell, 3 J. J. Marsh.
(Ky.) 658, 20 Am. Dec. 199; Leonard
v. Leonard, 14 Pick. ( las .) 2 3;
Nichol v. Thomas, 53 Ind. 42; Freed
v. Brown, 55 Ind. 310; Griswold v.
Butler, 3 Conn. 227; El ton v. Ja per,
45 Tex. 409; fohr v. Tulip, 40 Wi .
66; Imhoff v. Whitmer, 7 Casey (Pa.),
243.
Citing 2 R. S., supra; Van Deusen
v. Sweet, 51 N. Y. 378; Banker v.
Banker, 63 N. Y:. 409.
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whether conclusive or only prima facie, extends to all the

world, and includes all persons, whether they have notice of the

inquisition or not.' 1 ' The rule here laid down is approved by

the majority of the courts, though the decisions differ in some

respects owing to peculiarities of the local statutes and the

composition and functions of the tribunal. 2

§ 70. Inquisition only prima facie evidence as to pe-

riod overreached by it, — As stated, however, the inquisition,

while conclusive as to contracts subsequently made, is only

prima fade evidence of incapacity during the period before

the commencement of the proceeding and overreached by it,

wb ther conclusive or on1y p rima fa cie, extends to all the
worlcl and includes all per ons, whether they have notice of the
inquisition or not." 1 The rule here laid down i approved by
the majority of the courts, though the decisions differ in some
respects owing to peculiarities of the local statutes and the
compo ition and functions of the tribunal. 2

and it may be rebutted by evidence of actual capacity at the

particular time at which the act in controversy was done. 3

So, on the other hand, a rinding of insanity at a prior period

is not conclusive, and may be rebutted. 4

§ 71. Petitioner for proceeding not estopped by it. —

The petitioner for the inquisition proceeding is not so far a

party to the proceeding as to be estopped thereby, except as
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all the world is estopped, and he may, therefore, by evidence

rebut the presumption arising out of the very proceeding which

he himself has instituted. 5

§ 72. Whether contract of insane person void or void-

able. — It is laid down by many of the older authorities that

the contract of the insane person, whether before or after

oilice found, is void; but the decided tendency of the mod-

1 Citing Hart v. Deamer, 6 Wend. L'Amoureaux v. Crosby, 2 Paige

§ 70. - - Inquisition only prima facie evidence as to i1eriod overreached by it.- As stated, however, the inquisition,
while conclusive as to contracts subsequently made, is only
p rima f acic evidence of incapacity during the period b fore
the commencement of the proceeding and overreached by it,
and it may be rebutt d by evidence of actual capacity at the
particular time at which the act in controversy "as done.3
o, on the oth er hand, a finding of insanity at a prior period
is not conclusiYe, and may be rebutted. 4

(N. V.i 197; Osterhout v. Shoemaker, (N. Y.), 422, 22 Am. Dec. 655; Field

:; II ill (N. Y.), 513; 1 Greenl. Ev. v. Lucas, 21 Ga. 447, 68 Am. Dec. 4<m;

§ 556. Titlow v. Titlow, 54 Pa. St. 216, 93

2 See Hopson v. Boyd, 6 B. Mon. Am. Dec. G91.

(Ky.) 2'.)ir. Parker v. Davis, 8 Jones * Gibson v. Soper, 6 Gray (Mass.),

(N. C), 4G0; Ilartv. Deamer, 6 Wend 279, 66 Am. Dec 41 L

(N. V.) 497; Little v. Little. 18 Gray •"' Bughea v. Jones, 116 N. Y. 67, 22

(Mass.), 864; Xauger v. Skinner, 1 N E. R. 440, 15 Am. St. R. 386; In re

Mc< Mi-t.-r iN. J.i. 889. Oangwere, 14 Pa.St.417, 58 Am. Dec.

3 Hughes v. Jones, 116 N. Y. 67. 22 554; Hutchinson v. Sandt, 4 Rawle

N. E. R, 446, 10 Am St. B. 386; (Pa.), 234, 26 Am. Deo. 127.
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§ 71. - - Petitioner for proceeding not e top1rnd by it .The petitioner for the inquisition I roceeding is not o far a
par ty to the proc eding as to be estopped thereby, ex ept as
all th world is e topped, and he may, theref re, by vidence
rebut th e pre umption ari ing out of the very proceeding which
be him elf bas in tituted. 5

§ 72. lYh tber contract of in ane p r on void or ''oiclabl . - It i lai l down by many f the old r autboriti s that
t he on t ract of the in ane p rs n wheth r b fore or aft ~r
Hice f und, is void; but the d ci 1 t nd ncy o~ the mo l-
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[ 72.

ern cases is to the effect that the contract made before of-

fice found is voidable and not void, and this may be said to

be the prevailing rule. 1 At the same time there are some very

cogent reasons which have been brought forward in recent

cases in support of the older rule. Thus it is said by Mr. Jus-

tice Strong in the United States supreme court : 2 " The funda-

mental idea of a contract is that it requires the assent of two

minds; but a lunatic or a person non compos mentis has noth-

ing which the law recognizes as a mind, and it would seem,

therefore, upon principle, that he cannot make a contract which

may have any efficiency as such. He is not amenable to the

criminal laws, because he is incapable of discriminating be-

tween that which is right and that which is wrong. The gov-

ernment does not hold him responsible for acts injurious to

itself. Why, then, should one, who has obtained from him

that which purports to be a contract, be permitted to hold him

bound by its provisions, even until he may choose to avoid it?

If this may be, efficacy is given to a form to which there has
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been no mental assent. A contract is made without any agree-

ment of minds, and as it plainly requires the possession and

exercise of reason quite as much to avoid a contract as to make

it, the contract of a person without mind has the same effect

as it would have had he been in full possession of ordinary un-

i Odom v. Riddick, 104 N. C. 515, 10 Creekmore v. Baxter, 121 N. C. 31, 27

S. E. R. 609, 17 Am. St. R. 686; Pear- S. E. R. 994; Louisville, etc. Ry. Co.

son v. Cox, 71 Tex. 246, 9 S. W. R. v. Herr, 135 Ind. 591, 35 N. E. R. 556

124, 10 Am. St. R. 740; Riggan v. (citing Ashmead v. Reynolds, 127

Green, 80 N. C. 236, 30 Am. R. 77; Ind. 441, 26 N. E. R. 80; Boyer v.

Eaton v. Eaton, 37 N. J. L. 108, 18 Berryman, 123 Ind. 451, 24 N. E. R.

Am. R. 716; Hovey v. Hobson, 53 Me. 249; Schuff v. Ransom, 79 Ind. 458;

451, 89 Am. Dec. 705; Hovey v. Chase, Fay v. Burditt, 81 Ind. 433; Harden-

52 Me. 304, 83 Am. Dec. 514; Allis v. brook v. Sherwood, 72 Ind. 403; Wray

Billings, 6 Met. (Mass.) 415, 39 Am. v. Chandler, 64 Ind. 146; Freed

Dec. 744; Carrier v. Sears, 4 Allen v. Brown, 55 Ind. 310; Nichol v.

(Mass.). 336, 81 Am. Dec. 707; Gibson Thomas, 53 Ind. 42; Musselman v.

v. Soper, 6 Gray (Mass.), 279, 66 Am. Cravens, 47 Ind. 1); Gribben v. Max-

Dec. 414; Wait v. Maxwell, 5 Pick, well, 34 Kan. 8, 7 Pac. R. 584, 55 Am.

(Mass.) 217, 16 Am. Dec. 391; Breck- R. 233; Thorpe v. Hanscom, 64 Minn,

ern cases is to the effect that the contract made before office foun l is voidable and not void, and this may be said to
be the prevailing rule. 1 At the same time there are some very
cogent reasons which have been brought forward in recent
cases in support of the older rule. Thus it is said by _fr. J ustice Strong in the United States supreme court: 2 "'J_'he fundamental idea of a contract is that it requir s the assent of two
minds; but a lunatic or a p r on non c01npos mentis has nothing which the law recognizes as a mind, and it would seem,
therefore, upon principle, that he cannot make a contract which
may have any efficiency as such. He i not amenable to the
criminal laws, because he is incapable of discriminating between that which is right and that which is wrong. The government does not hold him responsible for acts injurious to
itself. Why, then, boulcl one, who bas obtained from him
that which purports to be a contract, be permitted to hold him
bound by its provisions, even until he may choose to avoid it?
If this may be, efficacy is given to a form to which there has
been no mental assent. A contract is made without any agreement of minds, and as it plainly requires the possession and
exercise of reason quite as much to avoid a contract as to make
it, the contract of a person without mind has the same effect
as it would have had he been in full pos ession of ordinary un-

enridge v. Ormsby, 1 J. J. Marsh. 201, 66 N. W. R. 1: ^Etna L. Ins. Co.

(Ky.) 289, 19 Am. Dec. 71: Allen v. v. Sellers, 154 Ind. 370, 56 N. E. R. 97.

Berry hill, 27 Iowa, 534, 1 Am. R 300; 2 i n Dexter v. Hall, 15 Wall.(U. S.) 9.
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Odom v. Riddick, 104 N. C. 515, 10
S. E. R. 60!), 17 Am. St. R. 6 6; Pearson v. Cox, 71 Tex. 246, 9 S. W. R.
124, 10 Am. St. R. 7·40; Riggan v.
Green, 0 N. C. 236, 30 Am. R. 77;
Eaton v. Eaton, 37 N. J. L. 108, 1
Am. R. 716: Hovey v. Hob on, 53 Me.
451, 89 Am. Dec. 705; Hovey v. Chae,
52 Me. 304, 3 Am. Dec. 514; Allis v.
Billings, 6 Met. (l\fass.) 415, 39 Am.
Dec. 744; Carrier v. Sears, 4 Allen
(Ma s.). 336, 1 Am. Dec. 707; Gibson
v. Soper, 6 Gray (Mass.), 279, 66 Am.
D ec. 414: Wait v. Maxwell, 5 Pick.
(Mas .) 217, 16 Am. Dec. 391; Breckenridge v. Ormsby, 1 J. J. Marsh.
(Ky.) 2~9, 19 Arn. Dec. 71: AU.en v.
Berryhill, 27 Iowa, 534, 1 Am. R. 300;
I

Creekmore v. Baxter, 121 N. C. 31, 27
S. E. R. 994; Louisville, etc. Ry. Co.
v. Herr, 135 Ind. 591, 35 N. E. R. 556
(citing Ashmead v. Reynolds, 127
Ind. 441, 26 N. E. R. 80; Boyer v.
Berryman, 123 Ind. 451, 24 N. E. R.
249; Schuff v. Ran ·om, 79 Ind. 458;
Fay v. Burditt, 81 Ind. 433; Hardenbrook v. Sherwood, 72 Ind. 403; vV ray
v. Chandler, 64 Ind. 146; Freed
v. Brown, 55 Ind. 310; Nichol v.
Thomas, 53 Ind. 42; l\Iu selman v.
Cravens, 47 Ind. 1); Gribben v. l\Iaxwell, 34 Kan. 8, 7 Pac. R. 584, 55 Am.
R. 238; Thorpe v. Han. com, 64 hnn.
201, 66 N. W. R. 1: JEtna L. Ins. Co.
·v. Sellers, 154 Ind. 370, 56 N. E. R. 97.
2 In Dexter v. Hall, 15 Wall. (U.S.) 9.
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derstanding. While he continues insane he cannot avoid it,

and if, therefore, it is operative until avoided, the law affords

a lunatic no protection against himself ; yet a lunatic, equally

with an infant, is confessedly under the protection of courts of

law as well as courts of equity. The contracts of the latter, it is

true, are generally held to be only voidable (his power of at-

torney being an exception). Unlike a lunatic he is not desti-

tute of reason. He has mind, but it is immature, insufficient

to justify his assuming a binding obligation, and he may deny

or avoid his contract at any time, either during his minority

or after he comes of age. This is for him a sufficient protec-

tion; but as a lunatic cannot avoid a contract for want of men-

tal capacity he has no protection if his contract is only void-

able." Reasoning to the same effect may be found in other

cases, 1 but it has not been deemed sufficient to establish the

rule of absolute invalidity.

After office found, however, and during its continuance, 2

thouo-h not after its termination or abandonment, 3 the con-
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tract of the incompetent is held absolutely void.

§ 73. Avoiding contract — Executed and executory con-

tracts. — Contracts of an insane person made before office found,

1 See opinion of Cole, J., in Allen v. 3 Mohr v. Tulip, 40 Wis. 66; Elston

Berry hill, 27 Iowa, 540; of Gibson, v. Jasper, 45 Tex. 409. In Thorpe v.

C. J., in Desilver's Estate, 5 Rawle Hanscom (1896), 64 Minn. 201, 66 N.

(Pa.), 110; and the case of Van Deu- W. R. 1, the head-note by the court is

sen v. Sweet, 51 N. Y. 378 (but com- as follows: "The deed of an insane

pare Aldrich v. Bailey, 132 N. Y. 85, person not under guardianship is

30 N. E. R. 264); Rogers v. Black well, voidable only; but while he is under

49 Mich. 192, 13 N. W. R. 512; Sulli- actual and subsisting guardianship

van v. .Flynn, 20 D. C. 396; Farley v. he is conclusively presumed incom-

Parker, 6 Oreg. 105. petent to make a valid deed concern-

derstanding. While he continues insane he cannot avoid it,
and if, therefore, it is operative until avoided, the law affords
a lunatic no protection against himself; yet a lunatic, equally
with an infant, is confessedly under the protection of courts of
law as well as courts of equity. The contracts of the latter, it is
true, are generally held to be only voidable (his power of attorney being an exception). Unlike a lunatic he is not destitute of reason. He has mind, but it is immature, insufficient
to justify his assuming a binding obligation, and he may deny
or avoid his contract at any time, either during his minority
or after be· comes of age. This is for him a sufficient protection; but as a lunatic cannot avoid a contract for want of mental capacity he has no protec~ion if his contract is only voidable." Reasoning to the same effect may be found in other
cases,1 but it has not been deemed sufficient to establish the
rule of absolute invalidity.
After office found, however, and during its continuance, 2
though not after its termination or abanclomµ.ent, 3 the contract of the incompetent is held absolutely void.

The rule of absolute invalidity is ing his estate, though he is in fact

strongly established in the federal sane at the time he attempts to do

courts, following Dexter v. Hall, so. If, however, at the time he made

supra. See Parker v. Marco, 76 Fed. the deed, he was in fact of sound

§ 73 . .A. voiding contract - ~xecutecl and executory contracts.- Con tracts of an insane person made before office found,

R. 510; German Sav. & Loan Society mind, and the contract fair, and the

v. De Lashmutt, 67 Fed. R. 399. guardianship had been practically

2 Pearl v. McDowell, 3 J. J. Marsh, abandoned, the deed is valid though

(Ky.) 658, 20 Am. Dec. 199; Leonard the guardian had not been formally

v. Leonard, 14 Pick. (Mass.) 280. discharged by the court."
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I See opinion of Cole, J., in Allen v.
Berryhill, 27 Iowa, 540; of Gib on,
C. J., in Desil ver 's Estate, 5 Raw le
(Pa. ), 110; and the case of Van De usen v. Sweet, 51 N. Y. 378 (but compare Aldrich v. Bailey, 132 N. Y. 85,
30 N. E. R. 264); Rogers v. Blackwell,
49 iich. 192, 13 N. W. R. 512; Sullivan v. Flynn, 20 D. C. 396; Farley v.
Parker, 6 Oreg. 103.
The rule of ab olute invalidity is
strongly establi hed in the federal
court , following Dexter v. Hall,
supra. See Parker v. 1\Iar o, 76 Fed.
R. 510; G rman 'av. & Loan So iety
v. e La ·h11utt, 67 Fed. R. 39!=1.
2 P arl v. 1\1
well, 3 J. J. 1\Iar h.
(Ky.) 65 , 20 Am. Dec. 19!J; Leonard
v. Leonard, 14 Pick. ( fa , .) 280.

3 Mohr v. Tulip, 40 Wis. 66; Elston
v. J a per, 45 Tex. 409. In Thorpe v.
Han. com (1896), 64 Minn. 201, 66 N.
W. R. 1, the head-note by the court is
as follows: •·The deed of an insane
per on not unde r guardianship is
voidable only; but while he is under
actual and subsi ting guardianship
he is conclusively presumed incompetent to make a valid deed concerning his estate, though he is in fact;
sane at the time he attempts to do
so. If, however. at the time he made
the deed, he wa in fact of sound
mind, and the contract fair, and the
guarJianship had been practically
abandoned, the leed i va.lid though
the guardian had not been formally
discbargeJ. by the court."
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which yet remain purely executory, require, ordinarily, no ex-

press act of disaffirmance, and are therefore much more readily

and justly avoided than after they have been partially or fully

executed. 1 This is particularfy so when the mental unsound-

ness was known to the other party or might have been discov-

ered by the exercise of ordinary observation. 2 Contracts for

necessaries, however, though executory, stand upon different

ground, and will be considered later. 3

In the case of executed contracts, on the other hand, differ-

ent elements intervene. Thus it becomes material to inquire

whether the other party knew of the insanity, whether it was

in the ordinary course of business, and whether the parties can

be put in statu quo. Influenced by such considerations it is ob-

vious that many executed contracts ought not to be disturbed

which would not have been enforced so long as they remained

purely executory ; and as the result of these elements the mod-

ern rule has grown up that —

§ 74. Protection of innocent party. — Where the sane
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party has entered into the contract, before office found, in good

faith, without notice of the other's insanity and with nothing

in the surrounding circumstances to reasonably apprise him of

the fact, the contract executed, if fair and equitable, will not

1 Musselman v. Cravens, 47 Inrl. 1; by the party under disability, there

Van Patton v. Beals, 46 Iowa, 62; must be an act of disaffirmance be-

Sentance v. Poole, 3 Car. & P. (Eng.) fore the other party can be put in

1; Dunnage Y.White.l Wils.Ch.(Eng.) the wrong, and a complete right of

67; Hall v. Warren, 9 Ves. (Eng.) 605. action established to recover the con-

which yet remain purely executory, require, ordinarily, no express act of disa:ffirmance, and are therefore much more readily
and justly avoided than after they have been partially or fully
executed. 1 This is particularly so when the mental unsoundness was known to the other party or might have been discovered by the exercise of ordinary observation. 2 Contracts for
necessaries, however, though executory, stand upon different
ground, and will be considered later. 3
In the case of executed contracts, on the other hand, different elements intervene. Thus it becomes material to inquire
whether the other party knew of the in anity, whether it was
in the ordinary course of business, and whether the parties can
be put in statu quo. Influenced by such considerations it is obvious that many executed contracts ought not to be disturbed
which would not have been enforced so long as they remained
purely executory; and as the result of these elements the modern rule has grown up that-

In Fay v. Burditt, 81 Ind. 433, 42 Am. sideration so paid, or the possession

R 142, it is said: "If the contract of property which has been surren-

in respect to the party of unsound dered or taken away under the con-

§ 7!. - - Protection of innocent party.-Where the sane

mind is wholly executory, no act of tract or deed." Citing Musselman v.

disaffirmance is necessary and the Cravens, 47 Ind. 1; Nichol v. Thomas,

incapacity may of course be pleaded 53 Ind. 42; Freed v. Brown, 55 Ind.

in defense to the action by the 310; Wray v. Chandler, 64 Ind. 146;

other party or his assignee. But if Hardenbrook v. Sherwood, 72 Ind.

the contract has been performed, 403 ; Schuff v. Ransom, 79 Ind. 458.

or if the consideration has been 2 Behrens v. McKenzie, 23 Iowa, 333,

party has entered into the contract, before office found, in good
faith, without notice of the other's insanity and with nothing
in the surrounding circum, tances to reasonably apprise him of
the fact, the contract executed, if fair and equitable, will not

paid, or the possession of property 92 Am. Dec. 428.

parted with, under the contract, 3 See post, § 84.
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I 1usselman v. Cravens 47 Inrl. 1;
Van Patton v. Beal. 46 Iowa, 62;
Sentance v. Poole, 3 Car. & P. (Eng.)
1; Dunnagev.White,1 Wils.Ch.(Eng.)
67; Hall v. Warren, 9 Ves. (Eng.) 605.
In Fay v. Burditt, 81 Ind. 433, 42 Am.
R 142, it is aid: "If the contract
in respect to · the party of unsound
mind i:> wholly executory, no ;:i.ct of
disaffirmance is necessary and the
incapacity may of course be pleaded
in defense to the action by the
other party or his assignee. But if
the contract has been performed,
or if the consideration has been
paid, or the po session of property
parted with, under the contract,

by the party under disability, there
must be an act of disaffirmance before the other party can be put in
the wrong, and a complete right of
action established to recover the consideration so paid, or the possession
of property which has been urrendered or taken away under the contract or deed.'' Citing Musselman v.
Cravens, 47 Ind.1; Nichol v. Thomas,
53 Ind. 42; Freed v. Brown, 55 Ind.
310; Wray v. Chandler, 64 Ind. 146;
Hardenbrook v. Sherwood, 72 Ind.
403; Schuff v. Ransom, 79 Ind. 458.
2 Behrens v. l\IcKenzie, 23 Iowa, 333,
92 Am. Dec. 428.
3 See post, § 84.
87

§ 74.J

LAW OF SALE.

[BOOK I.

§?*•]

be set aside unless the parties can be put in statu quo. Not all
of the cases support this rule, but it is su tained by the great
weight of authority. 1 The converse of this rull is, of course,
true, for if the other party had notice of the insanity, or, what

LAW OF SALE.
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be set aside unless the parties can be put in statu quo. Not all

of the cases support this rule, but it is sustained by the great

weight of authority. 1 The converse of this ruk is, of course,

true, for if the other party had notice of the insanity, or, what

1 As by Moulton v. Camroux, 2

Exch. (Eng.) 502, where the rule is

stated as follows: "We are not dis-

1 As

posed to lay down so general a prop-

osition as that all executed con-

tracts bona fide entered into must be

taken as valid, though one of the

parties be of unsound mind; we

think, however, that we may safely

conclude that when a person appar-

ently of sound mind, and not known

to be otherwise, enters into a con-
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tract for the purchase of property

which is fair and bona fide, and

which is executed and completed,

and the property, the subject-matter

of the contract, has been paid for and

fully enjoyed, and cannot be restored

so as to put the parties in statu quo,

such contract cannot afterwards be

set aside by the alleged lunatic or

those who represent him," and by

Flack v. Gottschalk Co. (1898), 88 Md.

368, 41 Atl. R. 908, 42 L. R. A. 745, 71

Am. St. R. 418; McKenzie v. Donnell

(1899), 151 Mo. 461, 52 S. W. R. 214;

Beals v. See, 10 Pa. St. 56, 49 Am.

Dec. 573; Lancaster County Bank v.

Moore, 78 Pa. St. 407, 21 Am. R.

24; Behrens v. McKenzie, 23 Iowa,

333, 92 Am. Dec. 428; Allen v. Berry-

hill, 27 Iowa, 534, 1 Am. R. 309; Fay

v. Burditt, 81 Ind. 43 J, 42 Am. R. 142;

Young v. Stevens, 48 N. H. 133, 97

Am. Dec. 592, 2 Am. R. 202; Eaton v.

Eaton, 37 N. J. L. 108, 18 Am. R. 716;

Corbit v. Smith, 7 Iowa, 60, 71 Am.

Dec. 431; Odom v. Riddick, 104 N. C.

515, 10S.E.R 609, 17 Am. St. R. 686;

Lincoln v. Buckmaster, 32 Vt. 658;

Long v. Long, 9 Md. 348; Matthiessen.

etc. Co. v. McMahon, 38 N. J. L. 536;

Scanlan v. Cobb, 85 111. 296; Wilder

v. Weakley, 34 Ind. 184 (where the

court say: "We think it may be

safely stated, both on principle and

authority, that where a person, ap-

parently of sound mind, and not

known to be otherwise, and who has

not been found to be otherwise by

proper proceedings for that purpose,

fairly and bona fide purchases prop-

erty and receives and uses the same,

whereby the contract of purchase be-

comes so far executed that the par-

ties cannot be placed in statu quo,

such contract cannot afterward be

set aside or payment for the goods

refused, either by the alleged lunatic

or his representatives." But see

Northwestern, etc. Ins. Co. v. Blank-

enship, 94 Ind. 535, 48 Am. R. 185:

Hull v. Louth, 109 Ind. 315, 58 Am.

/

by .Moulton v. Camronx, 2
Exch. (Eng.) 502, where the rule is
stated as follows: "We are not disposeu to lay down so general a proposition as that all executed contracts bona fide entered into must be
taken as valid, though one of the
parties be of unsound mind; we
think, however, that we may safely
conclude that when a per on apparently of sound mind, and not known
to be otherwise, enters into a contract for the purcha e of property
which is fair and bona fide, and
which is executed and completed,
and the property, the subject-matter
of the contract, has been paid for and
fully enjoyed, and cannot be restored
so as to put the parties in statu quo,
such contract cannot afterwards be
set aside by the alleO'ed lunatic or
those who represent him," and by
Flack v. Gottschalk Co. (1 98), 88 Mu.
368, 41 Atl. R. 908, 42 L. R. A. 745, 71
Am. St. R. 418; McKenzie v. Donnell
(1899), 151 Mo. 461, 52 S. W. R. 214;
Beals v. See, 10 Pa. St. 56, 49 Am.
Dec. 513; Lancaster ounty Bank v.
Moore, 7 Pa. St. 407, 21 Am. R.
24; Behren v. McKenzie, 23 Iowa,
3:33, 92 Am. Dec. 42 ; Allen v. Berryhill, 27 Iowa, 534, 1 m. R. 309; Fay
v. Burditt, 1 Ind. 43J, 42 Am. R. 142;
Young v. tPven , 4 N. II. 133, 97
Am. Dec. 592, 2 Am. R. 202; Eaton v.
Eaton, 37 N. J. L. 10 , 1 Am. R. 716;
Corbit v. mi th, 7 Iowa. 60, 71 m.
Dec. 431; 0 lorn v. Ri ldick, 104 N. C.
51.-, 10 . E. R. 609, 17 Am. St. R. 6 6;
Lincoln v. Buckrna ter, 32 Vt. 65 ;
Long v. Long, 9 Md. 348; Matthiessen.

etc. Co. v. Mcl\fabon, 38 N. J. L. fi36;
Scanlan v. Cobb, 85 Ill. 296; Wilder
v. 'Veakley, 34 Ind. 184 ("where the
court say: "We think it may be
safely stated, both on principle and
authority, that where a per. on, apparently of sound mind, and not
known to be otherwise, and who has
not been found to be otberwise by
proper proceedings for that purpose,
fairly and bona fide purchases property and receives and u es the. ame,
whereby the contract of purcha~e becomes so far executed that the pR.rties cannot be placed in statu quo,
such contract cannot afterward be
set aside or payment for the goodi-:;
refused, either by the alleged. lunatic
or his representatives." But see
Northwestern, etc. Ins. Co. v. Blankenship, 94 Ind. 535, 48 Am. R. 11;.5;
Hull v. Louth, 109 Ind. 315, 5 Am.
R. 403, 10 N. E. R. 270).
In Stroduer v. Southern Granite
Co. (1896), 99 Ga. 595, 27 S. E. R. 174,
where the party seeking to di affirm
set up hi poverty as an excuse for
not restoring the con ideration, the
court sai 1: "Unless the plaintiff
plainly allege facts showing that
his inability to make restitution arose
from cau e beyond his control, a
court of equity cannot, merely because of a pre ent inability on his
part from poverty to r tore the
original statu existing betw en himself and his ad vert>ary, grant the reli f hes ek . "
But, contra, in Seaver '·Phelp , 11
Pick. (Ma .) 304:, 22 Am. Dec. 372,
where the que tion was as to the
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is the same thing, such facts as should have put him upon in-

quiry, 1 and, a fortiori, if he took advantage of it, or if the con-

tract is unfair and inequitable, the transaction will not be sus-

tained, even though the parties cannot be placed in statu quo. 2

In a leading case, 3 laying down the rule, it appeared that a

merchant, in the ordinary course of trade, and with nothing

to indicate his incapacity, had purchased goods of a wholesale

dealer, paying partly in other goods previously delivered, and

partly in cash. Afterwards he was declared insane from a

period of only two days later than the sale. The representative

of the insane person tendered back the goods received from the

wholesale dealer, and sued him for the value of the goods de-

livered by the insane person, as for a cash sale. After dis-

posing of other questions, the court, by Gibson, C. J., said:

" Should he have made a wild and unthrifty purchase from a

stranger unapprised of his infirmity, who is to bear the loss

that must be incurred by one of the parties to it? Not the

vendor, who did nothing that any other man would not have
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done. As an insane man is civilly liable for his torts, he is

liable to bear the consequences of his infirmity, as he is liable

to bear his misfortune, on the principle that, where a loss must

right to recover the value of a prom- contract, for if the note was pledged

issory note pledged by the plaintiff, to secure the performance of an ex-

while insane, to the defendant, the ecutory contract, and was part of the

court said: "We are to consider the same transaction, it would rather be

plaintiff as in a state of insanity at considered an executory contract,

the time he pledged his note to the But we do not consider the distinc-

defendant, and this being admitted, tion at all material. It is well set-

we think it cannot avail him as a tied that the conveyances of a non

legal defense, to show that he was compos are voidable, and may be

ignorant of the fact, and practiced avoided by the writ dum fuit non

no imposition. The fairness of the compos mentis, or by entry."

defendant's conduct cannot supply x Lincoln v. Buckmaster, 32 Vt. 632;

the plaintiff's want of capacity. Ehoades v. Fuller, 139 Mo. 179, 40 S.

is the same thjng, such facts as should have put him upon inq uiry,1 and, afortiori, if he took advantage of it, or if the contract is unfair and inequitable, the transaction will not be sustained, even though the parties cannot be placed in statu quo. 2
In a leading case, 3 laying down the rule, it appeared that a
merchant, in the ordinary course of trade, and with nothing
to indicate hjs incapacity, bad purchased goods of a wholesale
dealer, paying partly in other goods previously delivered, and
partly in cash. Afterwards he was declared insane from a
period of only two days later than the sale. The representative
of the in ane per on tendered back the goods received from the
whol sale dealer, and sued him for the value of the goods deli Ye reel by the insane person, as for a cash sale. After disposing of other que tions, the court, by Gibson, 0. J., said:
"Should be l!ave made a wild and unthrifty purchase from a
stranger unapprisecl of his infirmity, who is to bear the loss
that mu t be incurred by one of the parties to it? Not the
vendor, who did nothing that any other man woul l not have
done. As an insane man is civilly liable for his torts, he is
liable to bear the consequences of bis infirmity, as he is liable
to bear his misfortune, on the principle that, where a loss must

The defendant's counsel rely prin- W. R. 760.

cipally on a distinction between con- - Henry v. Fine, 23 Ark. 417; Lin-

tracts executed and those which are coin v. Buckmaster, 32 Vt. 632: Craw-

executory. But if this distinction ford v. Scovell, 94 Pa. St. 48, 39 Am.

were material, we do not perceive R. 766.

how it is made to appear that the 3 Beals v. See, 10 Pa. St. 56, 49 Am.

contract of bailment is an executed Dec. 573.

right to recover the value of a promissory note pledged by the plaintiff,
while in ane, to the defendant, the
court said: "We are to consider the
plaintiff as in a tate of insanity at
the time he pledged his note to the
defendant, and this being admitted,
we think it cannot avail him as a
legal defense, to show that he was
ignorant of the fact, and practiced
no impo ition. The fairnes of the
defendant's conduct cannot supply
the p laintiff's want of capacity.
The defendant's counsel rely principally on a distinction between contract executed and those which are
executory. But if this distinction
were material, we do not perceive
how it is made to appear that the
contract of bailment is an executed

contract, for if the note was pledged
to secure the performance of an executory contract, and was part of the
same transaction, it would rather be
con idered an executory contract.
But we do not con ider the di tinction at all material. It is well ~et
tled that the com-eyances of a non
compos are voidable, and may be
avoided by the writ dwn fuit non
compos mentis, or by entry."
1 Lincoln v. Buckma ter, 32 Vt. 652;
Rhoades v. Fuller, 139 Mo. 179, 40 S.
W. R. 760.
2 Henry v. Fine, 23 Ark. 417; Lincoln v. Buckma ter, 32 Vt. 652: Crawford v. Scovell, 94 Pa. St. 4 , 39 Am.
R. 766.
3 Beal v. See, 10 Pa. St. 56, 49 Am.
Dec. 573.
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be borne by one of two innocent persons, it shall be borne by

him who occasioned it. A merchant, like any other man, may

be mad without showing it; and when such a man goes into

the market, makes strange purchases and anticipates extrava-

gant profits, what are those who deal with him to think? To

treat him as a madman would exclude every speculator from

the transactions of commerce."

§ 75. . In a later case, 1 in the same court, it is said:

" The soundness of this rule is too apparent to need any ex-

tended vindication. Insanity is one of the most mysterious

diseases to which humanity is subject. It assumes such varied

be borne by one of two innocent per ons, it shall be borne by
him who occasioned it. A merchant, like any other man, may
be mad without showing it; and when such a man goes into
the market, makes strange purchases and anticipates extravagant profits, what are those who deal with him to think? To
treat him as a madman would exclude every speculator from
the transa.c tions of commerce."

forms and produces such opposite effects as frequently to baffle

the ripest professional skill and the keenest observation. In

§ 75. - - . In a later case, 1 in the same court, it is said:

some instances it affects the mind only in its relation to or con-

nection with a particular subject, leaving it sound and rational

upon all other subjects. Many insane persons drive as thrifty

a bargain as the shrewdest business man, without betraying in

manner or conversation the faintest trace of mental derange-
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ment. It would be an unreasonable and unjust rule that such

person should be allowed to obtain the property of innocent

parties, and retain both the property and its price."

§ 76. Insane person must have received benefit. —

But this rule of protection cannot apply where the insane per-

son received nothing under the contract and it was therefore

of no benefit to him, even though the other party acted in good

faith and in ignorance of the insanity. Thus, though a mort-

gage for money loaned to an insane person, in good faith and

used by him, may not be avoided, 2 a mortgage made by an

insane woman to secure money loaned to her husband is not

entitled to such protection. 3 For like reasons, a conveyance

made by an insane person without any consideration will not

be sustained as against a subsequent incum 1 trance in good

faith, 4 nor can an accommodation indorser of negotiable paper

1 Lancaster County Bank v. Moore, Blankenship, 94 Ind. 535, 48 Am. R.

"The soundness of this rule is too apparent to need any extended vindication. Insanity is one of the most mysterious
diseases to which humanity is subject. It assumes such varied
forms and produces such opposite effects as frequently to baffle
the ripest professional skill and the keenest observation. In
some instances it affects the mind only in its relation to or connection with a particular subject, leaving it sound and rational
upon all other subjects. :.Many insane persons drive as thrifty
a bargain as the shrewdest business man, without betraying in
manner or conversation the faintest trace of mental derangement. It would be an unreasonable and unjust rule that such
person should be allowed to obtain the property of innocent
parties, and retain both the property and its price."

78 Pa. St. 407, 21 Am. R. 24. 185.

2 Copenrath v. Kienby, 83 Ind. 18. * Hull v. Louth, 109 Ind. 315, 58

3 Northwestern, etc. Ins. Co. v. Am. R. 405, 10 N. E. R. 270.
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§ 76. Insane person must haYe received benefit.But this rule of protection cannot apply where the insane person received nothing under the con tract and it was therefore
of no benefit to him, even though the other party acted in good
faith and in ignorance of the insanity. Thus, though a mortgage for money loaned to an in ane person, in good faith and
used by him, may not be avoided, 2 a mortgage made by an
in ane woman to secure money loaned to her husband is not
entitled to such protection. 3 For like reasons, a conveyance
made by an insane person without any consideration will not
be sustained as against a subsequ nt incum )rance in good
faith, 4 nor can an accommodation indorser of negotiable paper
1

1 Lancaster County Bank v. Moore, Blankenship, 94 Ind. 535, 48 Am. R.
7 Pa. St. 407, 21 Am. R. 24.
1 5.
2 Copenrath v. Kienby, 3 Ind. 18.
4 Hull v. Louth, 109 Ind. 315, 58
3 Northwestern, etc. !us. Co. v.
Arn. R. 405, 10 N. E. R. 270.
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who receives no benefit, and who was insane at the time of in-

dorsing-, be held by a subsequent lonafide holder. 1

§ 77. Return of consideration necessary. — It follows

as a corollary of the rule of the last section, that, in order to

who receives no benefit, and who was insane at the time of indorsing, be held by a subsequeu t bona fide holder.1

disaffirm a fair and equitable contract, executed by one who

has entered into it in good faith without notice of the insanity,

the representatives of the insane person must restore to such

other party the consideration he has parted with in pursuance

of the contract. 2 Such restoration, however, is not necessary

when the other party had notice of the insanity. 3 As is said

in one case: "He who knowingly deals with a madman takes

the risk of losing." So, speaking of the claim that the contract

may be rescinded without restoring the consideration, it is said

by the court in New Jersey: 4 "This is good law where there

is fraud practiced upon one who is known at the time to be in-

sane, but it is not the law where the purchase and conveyance

are made in good faith, for a good consideration, and without

knowledge of the insanity; not only must the consideration be
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1 Wirebach v. First Nat. Bank, 97 husband was not permitted to re-

Pa, St. 548, 39 Am. R 821; McClain scind, as the other party could not

v. Davis. 77 Ind. 419. be placed in statu quo.] Schaps v.

2 Eaton v. Eaton. 37 N. J. L. 108, 18 Lehner (1893), 54 Minn. 208, 55 X. W.

Am. R. 716; Riggan v. Green, 80 R 911. Contra, where nothing has

N. C. 236. 30 Am. R 77; Pearson v. been done to ratify or confirm the

Cox, 71 Tex. 246, 9 S. W. R. 154. 10 act. Gibson v. Soper, 6 Gray (Mass.),

Am. St. R 740; Fay v. Burditt, 81 279, 66 Am. Dec. 414. Limiting Ar-

Ind. 433, 42 Am. R 142; Boyer v. nold v. Richmond Iron Works, 1

Berryman, 123 Ind. 451, 24 N. E. R Gray (Mass.). 434; Hovey v. Hobson,

249; Gribben v. Maxwell. 34 Kan. 8, 53 Me. 451, 89 Am. Dec. 705; Seaver

55 Am. R. 233, 7 Pac. R 584 [dis- v. Phelps, 11 Pick. (Mass.) 304, 22

§ 77. - - Return of con sid eration necessary.- It follows
as a corollary of tbe rule of the last section, that, in order to
di affirm a fair and equitable contract, executed by one wbo
has entered into it in good faith without notice of the in ·anity,
the representatives of the insane person must restore to such
other party tbe consideration he has parted with in pur uance
of the contract. 2 Such restoration, however, is not necessary
when the other party had notice of the insanity. 3 As is said
in one case: "He who knowingly deals with a madman takes
t he ri k of losing." So speaking of the claim that the contract
may be re cinded without re toring the consideration, it is said
by the court in :New J er ey: 4 "This is good law where there
i fraud practiced upon one who i known at the time to be insane, but it is not the law where the purchase and conveyance
are made in good faith for a goou con ideration, and without
knowledge of the in anity; not only mu t the consideration be

approving In re Desilver, 5 Rawle Am. Dec. 372; Rogers v. Walker, 6

(Pa.), 110, 28 Am. Dec. 645; Gibson v. Pa. St. 371, 47 Am. Dec. 470; Wall v.

Soper, 6 Gray (Mass.), 279, 66 Am. Dec. Hdl, 1 B. Mon. (Ky.) 290, 36 Am. Dec.

414; Van Deusen v. Sweet, 51 N. Y. 578.

378; Dexter v. Hall, 82 U. S. (15 Wall.) 3 Crawford v. Scovell, 94 Pa. St. 48,

9J; Allis v.Billings, 6 Met. (Mass.) 415, 39 Am. R 766; Henry v. Fine, 23

39 Am. Dec. 744; Rusk v. Fenton, 14 Ark. 417; Lincoln v. Buckmaster, 32

Bush (Ky.), 490, 29 Am. R 413. [In Vt. 652; Thrash v. Starbuck (1896),

this case the insane man's wife who 145 Ind. 673, 44 X. E. R. 543.

had conveyed property of her own in 4 Eaton v. Eaton, 37 N. J. L 108, 18

payment for that received by her Am. R 716.
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1 Wirebach v. Fir t Nat. Bank, 97 hu band was not permitted to rePa. St. 543, 39 Am. R. 91; McClain cind, as the other party could not
v. Davis. 77 Ind. 419.
be placed in statu quo.]
chaps v.
2 Eaton v. Eaton, 37 N. J. L. 10 , 1
L ehner (1 93), 54 Iinn. 20 , 55 N. W.
Am. R. 716; Riggan v. Green, 0 R. 911. Oonfra, where nothing has
N. C. 236. 30 Am. R. 7 1; Pear on v. been done to ratify or confirm the
Cox, 71 Tex. 246, 9 '. W. R. 124-, 10 act. Gib on Y. o er, 6 Gray (Mas .),
Am. t. R. 740; Fay v. Burditt, 1 279, 66 Am. Dec. 414. Limiting .A.rInd. 4.33, 42
m. R. 142; Boyer v. nold v. Richmond Iron Works, 1
Berryman, 123 Ind. 4.51. 2-! . E. R. Gray (i\Ia .), 43-!; Hovey v. Hob on,
249· Gribben v. Iaxwell, 34 Kan. , 53 l\Ie. 451, 9 Am. Dec. 705; Seaver
55
m. R. 233, 7 Pac. R. 5 4 [dis- v. Phelps, 11 Pick. (Mas .) 304, 22
approving In re Desilver, 5 Rawle Am. Dec. 372; Rogers v. Walker, 6
(Pa.), 110, 2 Am. Dec. 6±5; Gib on v. Pa. St. 371, 47 Am. Dec. 470; Wall v.
Soper, 6 Gray (:.\Ia .), 9""9 66 Am. Dec. Hill, 1 B. Mon. (Ky.) 290, 36 Am. Dec.
414; Van Deu en v. weet, 51 N. Y. 57 .
37 ; Dexter v. Hall, 2 U.S. (15 Wall)
3 Crawford v. Scovell, 94 Pa. St. 4 ,
9]; Alli v. Billing , 6 let. (Ma .) 415, 39 Am. R. 766; Henry v. Fine, 23
39 Am. Dec. 744; Rusk v. Fenton, 14 Ark. 417; Lincoln v. Buckmaster, 32
Bu h (Ky.), 490, 29 Am. R. 413. [In Vt. 659; Tbra h v. Starbuck (1 96),
thi ca e the in ane man wife who 145 Ind. 673, 44 N. E. R. 5-!3.
had conve ed property of her own in
4 Eaton v. Eaton, 37 N. J. L. 108, 18
payment for that received by her Am. R. 716.
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returned in such cases before the conveyance will be avoided,

but courts of equity and courts of law have gone further, and

held that where persons apparently of sound mind, and not

known to be otherwise, enter into a contract which is fair and

bona fide, and which is executed and completed, and the prop-

erty, the subject-matter of the contract, cannot be restored

so as to put the parties in statu quo, such contract cannot be

set aside either by the alleged lunatic or those who represent

him."

78. Right to recover property from third person

who bought it in good faith. — The question has been raised

in a number of cases whether property purchased from an in-

sane person but conveyed, before repudiation, to a third person

who bought in good faith and for a valuable consideration, can

be recovered from the latter, even upon repayment of the con-

return ed in uch ca e bef re be con 1eyance will e a \oid d
ut court of equi y and court, of law ha 1 0 • ne further: an l
held tha where per"OD" apparently of ound min and n t
known to be o herwi e enter into a con ract \\-bich i fair an l
bona fide and which i :s:ecut l an c m pleted an he pr perty the ubject-ma ter of h c n rac cann
be re r d
o a to I ut the partie in utatu quo ·uch contract canno be
t w·icle either by he alleged luna ic or tho e who re pr ent
him.

sideration. In a late case l of the sale of real estate, it was held

that the title of such a bona fide purchaser could not be divested.

" The presumption of the law," said the court, "is in favor of
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sanity, and this presumption is so strong that, when a want of

it is claimed, even in a capital case, the burden is on the defend-

ant to prove it, the presumption of sanity being stronger than

the presumption of innocence. "When, therefore, a purchaser

sees a regular chain of title, formal in all particulars, upon the

registration books, executed by grantors of full age and not

feme coverts, he has a right to rely upon the presumption of

sanity; and if, without any notice or matter to put him upon

inquiry, and for fair value, he takes a deed, he should be pro-

tected. Any other doctrine would place all titles upon the

hazard."

§ 79. But in other cases it has been held that such a

purchaser is not protected and that the property may be re-

covered from him although the consideration is not restored.

iOdom v. Riddick, 104 X. C. 515. 10 bona fide purchaser has acquired title

S. E. R. 609, 17 Am. St. R. 686. The from the vendee of a defrauded

court liken the case to one where a vendor.

92

" i . - - Right to re OT r property from third per on
who b ught it in g od faith . - The que ion ha been rai ed.
in a number of ca es \\he her propert purcha e l from an inane peron u conveyed before r epu lia ion to a third per,on
1rho bouo·h in D'OOd faith and f r a \aluable con i ration can
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i in fa \Or of
T he pre umption of be la n-, ' aid he cour
anity and th·,, pre umption i o r ng ha when a \\-an of
i ·,.,claimed e\en in a capital a e the burden i on the def ndant to pro\e i
be pre umption of ani beinD' ron o·er than
the I re ump ion of innocence. When tber fore a purcha er
ee a reo-ular chain of titl f rmal in all par i ular upon the
r o-i tration boo_, execu ed by 0 Tan or" of full aO'e an not
feme c01;ert be ha a ri o·h to rel r upon the pr ump ion of
sani y· and if without any n tice or ma er o pu him upon
in JUiry an for fair \alue he take a deed, h houl l be protecte l. Any other doctrine 1rould place all title upon the
hazar l.'
u

Bu in other ca e it ha been h 11 ha such a
I urcha er i not pr ectecl an l ba be proper may be r co\ere from him althou b the c n itleration i n t re t r d.
·~

1
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10 om ,.Rid ·ck,lQJ _..,..c. .- 1-.10 bonafide urcha erha acquiredtitle
. E. R 60 , 1i Am. t. R ~ . The from the >endee of a defrauded
court liken t he ca e to one where a >en or.
2
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In one such case 1 the court said: "The grantee whose title is

thus derived must rely on the covenants of his deed. He risks

the capacity to convey of all through whom his title has passed.

The right of infants and of the insane alike to avoid their con-

tracts is an absolute and a paramount right superior to all

equities of other persons, and may be exercised against bona fide

purchasers from the grantee."

The statement of the rule as last quoted was approved in

Indiana in a case in which a bona fide mortgagee sought to

enforce a mortgage upon lands which were obtained by the

mortgagor from an insane grantor whose deed had been dulv

recorded. The mortgagee was held to be not entitled to fore-

close against the insane grantor. 2

§80. Who may disaffirm. — Where the right to disaffirm

exists, it may be exercised by the person himself when he has

recovered from his disability, or it may be exercised by his

guardian or committee, or by his personal representatives or

heirs after his death. 3
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§ SI. Creditor may not. — But a creditor of the insane

person cannot avoid a conveyance made by his debtor solely

1 Hovey v. Hobson. 53 Me. 451, 89 bach v. First National Bank, 97 Pa.

In one uch ca e 1 he court aid : 'The grantee 11.·ho e i Je is
t hu" derived mus rely on the co,enant of his leed. He ri ks
t he capaci ' to convey of all throu D"h whom hi itle has pa eel.
The riD"ht of infant an l of he in ane alike to a\oid their contract i an ab olute an a paramount ri()"bt u1 erior to all
equitie of other per~on . an may be exerci ed aga·n bona .]ide
purcha ~er~ from he grantee.:'
T he atemen of the rule a la iuoted wa apprm-ed in
In liana in a ca"e in which a boiUJ, y,'de mor O'aD"ee OUD"h to
enforce a morto-aO'e upon land~ which were obtained by the
m rtO"acror from an in a ne crran or who e eed had been duly
r ecorded. The mortgaO'ee wa held o be no en ti le to forehe insane O'rantor.2
clo e aO"ain

Am. Dec. 705. The court declare the St. 543. 39 Am. R 821

case unlike that of the defrauded- The Indiana court also liken the

vendor, but like that of the infant, as case to that of the infant, who may

to which it is held that a bona fide recover the land even from an inno-

purchaser from the infant "s vendee cent third person. Miles v. Linger-

has a defeasible title. Harrod v. man, 24 In d. 3S5: Richardson v. Pate,

Myers. 21 Ark. 592, 76 Am Dec. 409. 93 Ind. 423. 47 Am. R 374: Wiley v.

The Maine court, however, approve "Wilson. 77 Ind. 596; Law v. Long. 41

Seaver v. Phelps, 11 Pick. (Mass.) 304, Ind. 58a

. Wh o ma di affirm.-Where he riO'h o di affirm
i may be exerci ed by he per on him elf when e has
recovere from hi cli"abilit.r or it may be exerci ed by hi
cruar lian or commi tee or by hi
eronal repre ntatives or
3
heir af er hi dea h.
0

22 Am. Dec. 373, and Gibson v. Soper. 3 Northwestern, etc. Ins. Co. v.

6 Gray (Mass.). 279, 66 Am Dec. 414, Blankenship, 94 Ind. 535, 4S Am. R.

which, as has been seen, have not 185: Bunn v. Postell (1899), 107 Ga.

been generally followed elsewhere, 490, 33 S. E. R. 707. But the admin-

1. - - r dit r may n t.- Bu a ere i or of he insane
per on canno a\01 a conve ance ma le b. hi"

eb or solely

- Hull v. Louth. 109 Ind. 315, 10 X. istrator of an insane grantee cannot

E. R 270. 5S Am. R. 405. See to like avoid a deed to him and recover

effect: Rogers v. Blackwell. 49 Mich, the consideration paid. Campbell v.

192, 13 N. W. R, 512: Northwestern. Kuhn. 45 Mich. 513, 40 Am. R 43 -

etc. Ins. Co. v. Blankenship. 94 Ind. N. W. R 523.

535, 48 Am. R 185. See also Wire-
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because the latter was of unsound mind when he made it.

"Nor does the fact that the grantee, knowing of the debt and

of the debtor's mental weakness, took advantage of such weak-

ness for the purpose and with the intention of thereby defraud-

ing the creditor, authorize the creditor to appeal to a court of

equity to set aside such deed, unless he is injured thereby." l

§ 82. Sane party may not. — So it is held that, though

the insane party or his representatives may disaffirm the con-

tract on the ground of the insanity, the sane party to the con-

tract may not, on that ground, disaffirm it while the insane

because the latter was of un ound mind when he made it.
"Nor does the fact that the grantee, knowing of the debt and
of the debtor's mental weakness, took advantage of such weakness for the purpose and with the intention of thereby defrauding the creditor, authorize the creditor to appeal to a court of
equity to set aside such deed, unless he is injured thereby." 1

party or his representatives are ready and willing to perform

and seek to maintain the contract as valid. 2

§ 83. Affirmance of the contract. — The former insane per-

son may also, after recovering from his disability either per-

manently or temporarily, 3 ratify and confirm the contract made

during his disability; and, when he acts intelligently, he may

do this expressly or by implication, and either tacitly, as where

he neglects to repudiate within the proper time, or actively, as
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where he insists upon and enforces performance of the con-

tract by the other party. 4 The representatives of the insane

person may also ratify by enforcing the contract against the

sane party, who may not set up the disability as a defense to

himself. 5

§84. Contract for necessaries binding. — "Ever since the

case of Stiles v. West" 6 said Chief Justice Gibson, " it has been

held that the executed contract of a non compos mentis for nec-

1 Brumbaugh v. Richcreek, 127 Ind. acting under the contract and under-

240, 26 N. E. R 664, 22 Am. St. R. 649. standingly availing himself of its

2 Allen v. Berryhill, 27 Iowa, 534, 1 provisions in his favor. Bond v.

Am. R. 309. * Bond (1863), 7 Allen (Mass.), 1. And,

3 As to ratification during lucid generally, the ratification after res-

interval, see Blakeley v. Blakeley toration to sanity must appear to be

(1881), 33 N. J. Eq. 502. the intelligent act of the party.

4 Arnold v. Richmond Iron Works Beasley v. Beasley (1899), 180 111. 163,

(1854), 1 Gray (Mass.), 434. Accept- 54 N. E. R 187.

ance of the benefits, to constitute a 5 Allen v. Berryhill (1869), 27 Iowa,

ratification, must be the intelligent 534, 1 Am. R. 309.

act of the party, knowing that he is 6 Cited in Manly v. Scott, 1 Sid. 109.

94

§ 82. - - Sane party may not.- So it is held that, though
the insane party or his representatives may clisaffirm the contract on the ground of the insanity, the sane party to the contract may not, on that ground, disaffirm it while the insane
party or his representatives are ready and willing to perform
and seek to maintain the contract as valid. 2

§ 83. Affirmance. of the contract.-The former ·insane person may also, after recovering from his disability either permanently or temporarily, 3 ratify and confirm the contract made
during his clisabHity; and, when he acts intelligently, he may
do this expressly or by implication, and either tacitly, as where
he neglects to repudiate within the proper time, or actively, as
where he insists upon and enforces performance of the contract by the other party. 4 The representatives of the insane
person may also ratify by enforcing the contract against the
sane party, who may not set up the disability as a defense to
himself. 6

§ 84:. Contract for necessaries binding.-" Ever since the
case of Stiles v. West," 6 said Chief Justice Gibson, "it bas been
held that the executed contract of a non compos mentis for neeI Brumbaugh v. Richcreek, 127 Ind.
acting under the contract and under240, 26 N. E. R. 664, 22 Am. St. R. 649. standingly availing him elf of its
2 llen v. Berryhill, 27 Iowa, 534, 1 provisions in his favor. Bond v.
Bond (1 63), 7 Allen (Mass.), 1. And,
Am. R. 309.
3 s to ratification during lucid g nerally, the ratification after resinterval, see Blakeley v. Blakeley toration to sanity mu t a1 pear to be
the intelligent act of the part y .
(1 1), 33 N. J. Eq. 502.
B a ley v. Bea ·ley (1 99), 1 0 Ill. 163,
4 mold v. Richmond Iron Work
(1 -4), 1 ray (Ma .), 434. Ace pt- 54 N. E. R. 1 7.
5 Allen v. Berryhill (1 69), 27 Iowa,
ance of the benefit , to con titute a
ratifi ation, mu t be the intellig nt 5· 4, 1 Am. R. 309.
6 Cited in l\Ianly v. Scott, 1 Sid. 109.
act of the party, knowing that he is
94
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essaries, bona fide supplied, stands on the footing of an infant's

contract for necessaries. In Baxter v. The Earl of Portsmouth^

it was said that the word ' necessaries ' is not to be restricted to

articles of the first necessity, but that it includes everything

proper for the person's condition, and it was determined that

to hire carriages to a nobleman who, though actually insane,

voted in parliament and went about as other men do, carried

with it no mark of imposition." The court, therefore, held the

insane person's estate chargeable for board, washing and main-

tenance furnished to him. 2 In many other cases the same rule

has been applied and the estate of the incompetent has been

held chargeable, like an infant's, for the reasonable value of

those things which were suitable and necessary for one in his

condition and which were furnished to him in good faith. 3

Within the class of necessaries in addition to sustenance, shel-

ter and raiment, fall medical services, nursing, and a guard to

protect him against self-injury ; 4 services and expenses for the

preservation of his estate, 5 and, where he was wealthy, the
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court held that pleasures and even luxuries should be allowed. 6

Necessaries furnished to the lunatic's wife are likewise a proper

charge against him. 7

§85. Liability limited to value received. — The lia-

bility of the lunatic, however, is limited to the value of that

only of which he has had the actual use and benefit, and he

cannot therefore be held for other things procured ostensibly

for him by a self-constituted agent, but appropriated by the

latter to his own benefit. 8

i 2 Car. & P. 178, 5 B. & C. 170. 4 Richardson v. Strong, 13 Ired.

2 La Rue v. Gilkyson, 4 Pa. St. 375, (N. C.) L. 106, 55 Am. Dec. 430.

45 Am. Dec. 700. 5 Williams v. Wentworth, 5 Beav.

3 Ex parte North ington, 37 Ala. (Eng.) 325.

496, 79 Am. Dec. 67; Tally v. Tally, 2 6 Kendall v. May, 10 Allen (Mass.),

Dev. & B. Eq. (N. C.) 385, 34 Am. Dec. 62. See also In re Perrse, 3 Molloy,

407; Young v. Stevens, 48 N. H. 133, 94.

essaries, bona fide supplied, stands on the footing of an infant's
contract for necessaries. In BaJ'J ter v. T!ie E arl of Portsmouth, 1
it was said that the word 'necessaries' is not to be restricted to
articles of the first necessity, but that it includes everything
proper for the person's condition., and it was determined that
to hire carriages to a nobleman who, though actually insane,
voted in parliament and went about as other men do, carried
with it no mark of imposition." The court, therefore, held the
insane person's estate chargeable for board, washing and maintenance furnished to him. 2 In many other cases the same rule
has been applied an<l the estate of the incompetent has been
held chargeable, like an infant's, for the reasonable value of
those things which were suitable and necessary for one in his
condition and which were furnished to him in good faith. 3
Within the class of necessaries in addition to sustenance, shelter and raiment, fall medical services, nursing, and a guard to
protect him against self-injury; 4 services and expenses for the
preservation of his estate,5 and, where he was wealthy, the
court held that pleasures and even luxuries should be allowed. 6
Necessaries furnished to the lunatic's wife are likewise a proper
charge against him. 7

97 Am. Dec. 592; Stannard v. Burns 7 Pearl v. McDowell, 3 J. J. Marsh.

(1891), 63 Vt. 244, 22 Atl. R. 460; (Ky.) 658. 20 Am. Dec. 199.

§ 85. - - Liability limited to value received.-The lia-

Sawyer v. Lufkin, 56 Me. 308; Mc- sSurles v. Pipkin, 69 N. C. 5ia

Cormick v. Littler, 85 111. 62; Ken-

dall v. May, 10 Allen (Mass.), 59.
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bility of the lunatic, however, is limited to the value of that
only of which he bas had the actual use and benefit, and he
cannot therefore be held for other things procured ostensibly
for him by a self-constituted agent, but appropriated by tho
latter to his own benefit. 8
4 Richardson v. Strong, 13 Ired.
12 Car. & P. 178, 5 B. & C. 170.
(N.
C.) L. 106, 55 Am. Dec. 430.
2 La Rue v. Gilkyson, 4 Pa. St. 375,
5 Williams v. Wentworth, 5 Beav.
45 Am. Dec. 700.
(Eng.) 325.
3 Ex parte Northington, 37 Ala.
6 Kendall v. May, 10 Allen (Mass.),
496, 79 Am. Dec. 67; TaJly v. Tally, 2
Dev. & B. Eq. (N. C.) 385,34 Am. Dec. 62. See al o In re Perrse, 3 Molloy,
407; Young v. Stevens, 48 N. H. 133, 94.
7 Pearl v. McDowell, 3 J. J. Marsh.
97 Am. Dec. 592; Stannard v. Burns
(1891), 63 Vt. 244, 22 Atl. R. 460; (Ky.) 65 , 20 Am. Dec. 199.
s Surles v. Pipkin, 69 N. C. 513.
Sawyer v. Lufkin, 56 Me. 308; McCormick v. Littler, 85 Ill. 62; Kendall v. May, 10 Allen (Mass.), 59.
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§§ 86-88.J

LAW OF SALE.

[BOOK I.

§§ 86-88.] LAW OF SALE. [BOOK I.

h. Incompetency by Eeason of Drunkenness.

§86. Contracts of drunken persons. — The contracts of

b. Incompetency by Reason of Drunkenrrnss.

drunken persons stand upon much the same ground as the con-

tracts of the insane. Intoxication will avoid a contract when,

§ 86. Contracts of drunken persons. -The contracts of

and, usually, only when, it was so extreme that the party sought

to be charged was incapable of clearly perceiving and assent-

ing to the contract. 1 Where it is of this degree, the other party

need not have participated in causing it; 2 but where he did, a

much less degree will suffice to invalidate the contract. 3

§ 87. Contract voidable and not void.— The contract

of the drunken person is voidable only and not void, 4 and if he

would disaffirm it he must make restitution of what he has

received under it. 5 After he becomes sober he may likewise

affirm it, 6 and affirmance will be presumed where, with knowl-

edge, he retains the consideration. 7

§ 88. Bona fide holders. — Complete incapacity result-

drunken persons stand upon much the same ground as the contracts of the insane. Intoxication will a void a contract when,
and, usually, only when, it was so extreme that the party sought
to be charged was incapable of clearly perceiving and assenting to the contract. 1 Where it is of this degree, the other party
need not have participated in causing it; 2 but where he did, a
much less degree will suffice to invalidate the contract. 3

ing from drunkenness should, it has been said, render his nego-

1 Wade v. Colvert. 2 Mill (S. C), 27, N. J. Eq. 485; French v. French, 8
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12 Am. Dec. 652; French v. French, Ohio, 214, 31 Am. Dec. 441; Noel v.

8 Ohio, 214, 31 Am. Dec. 441; Bush Karper, 53 Pa. St. 97 ; Dulany v. Green,

v. Breinig, 113 Pa. St. 310, 6 Atl. R. 4 Harr. (Del.) 285; Cummings v.

86, 57 Am. R. 469; Wright v. Fisher, Henry, 10 Ind. 109; Cory v. Cory, 1

65 Mich. 279, 32 N. W. R. 605, 8 Am. Ves. Sr. (Eng.) 19; Pitt v. Smith, 3

St. R. 886; Bates v. Ball, 72 111. 108; Camp. 33; Newell v. Fisher, 11 S. &

Caulkins v. Fry, 35 Conn. 170. M. (Miss.) 431, 49 Am. Dec. 66; Reyn-

2 Wigglesworth v. Steers, 1 H. & M. olds v. Waller, 1 Wash. (Va.) 164;

§ 87. - - Contract voidable and not void.-The contract
of the drunken person is voidable only and not void, 4 and if he
would disaffirm it he must make restitution of what he has
received under it. 5 After he becomes sober he may likewise
affirm it, 6 and affirmance will be presumed where, with knowledge, he retains the consideration. 7

(Va.) 70, 3 Am. Dec. 603. Menkins v. Lightner, 18 111. 282; Tay-

3 Willcox v. Jackson, 51 Iowa, 208, lor v. Patrick, 1 Bibb (Ky.), 168;

IN. W. R. 513; Hotchkiss v. Fortson, Broadwater v. Darne, 10 Mo. 277;

§ 88. - - Bona fide holders.- Complete incapacity result-

7 Yerg. (Tenn.) 67; White v. Cox, 3 Hutchinson v. Brown, 1 Clarke

Hay w. (Tenn.) 79; Henry v. Ritenour, (N. Y.), Ch. 408.

ing from drunkenness should, it has been said, render his nego-

31 Ind. 136. 6 Joest v. Williams, 42 Ind. 565, 13

4 Carpenter v. Rodgers, 61 Mich. Am. R. 377; McGuire v. Callahan, 19

384, 28 N. W. R. 156, 1 Am. St. R. 595, Ind. 128.

citing Matthews v. Baxter, L. R. 8 6 Carpenter v. Rodgers, supra, and

Ex. (Eng.) 132; Caulkins v. Fry, 35 cases cited.

Conn. 170; Foss v. Hildreth, 10 Allen 7 Per Alderson, B., in Gore v. Gib-

(Mass.), 76; Van Wyck v. Brasher, 81 son, 13 Mees. & W. 623.

N. Y. 260; Warnock v. Campbell, 25
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1 Wade v. Colvert, 2 Mill (S. C.), 27, N. J. Eq. 485; French v. French, 8
12 Am. Dec. 652; French v. French, Ohio, 214. 31 Am. Dec. 441; Noel v.
8 Ohio, ~14, 31 Am. Dec. 441; Bush Karper, 53 Pa. St. 97; Dulany v. Green,
v. Breinig, 113 Pa. St. 310, 6 Atl. R. 4 Harr. (Del.) 285; Cummings v.
86, 57 Am. R. 469; Wright v. Fisher, Henry, 10 Ind. 109; Cory v. Cory, 1
65 Mich. 279, 32 N. W. R. 605, 8 Am. Ves. Sr. (Eng.) 19; Pitt v. Smith, 3
St. R. 6; Bates v. Ball, 72 Ill. 108; Camp. 33; Newell v. Fisher, 11 S. &
Caulkins v. Fry. 35 Conn. 170.
M. (Miss.) 431, 49 Am. Dec. 66; Reyn:.i Wigglesworth v. Steers, 1 H. & M.
olds v. Waller, 1 Wash. (Va.) 164;
(Va.) 70, 3 Am. Dec. 603.
Menkins v. Lightner, 18 Ill. 282; Tay3 Willcox v. Jackson, 51 Iowa, 208,
lor v. Patrick, 1 Bibb (Ky.), 168;
1 N. W.R. 513; Hotchkiss v. Fortson, Broadwater v. Darne, 10 Mo. 277;
7 Yerg. (Tenn.) 67; White v. Cox, 3 Hutchinson v. Brown, 1 Clarke
Hayw. (Tenn.) 79; Henry v. Ritenour, (N. Y.), Ch. 408.
31 Incl. 136.
a Joest v. Williams, 42 Ind. 565, 13
4 Carpenter v. Rodgers, 61 Mich.
Am. R. 377; McGuire v. Callahan, 19
3 4 2 N. W. R. 156, 1 Am. 't. R. 595, Ind. 12 .
citing Matthews v. Baxter, L. R.
ti Carpenter v. Rodgers, supra, and
Ex. (Eng.) 132; Caulkins v. Fry, 3- ca e cited.
'onn. 170; Fo v. Hildr th, 10 llen
7 P r Alder on, B., in Gore v. Gib(Ma ·.), 76; Van Wyck v. ra h r, 1 son, 13 Mees. & W. 623.
N. Y. 2GO; Warnock v. Campb 11, 25
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CH. III.

J

C.Al' .ACITY OF PARTIES.

[§§ 9-91.

CII . in.] CAPACITY OF PARTIES. [§§ 89-91.

tiable instrument void, 1 even in the hands of a lonafide holder,

though the contrary has been held ; 2 and certainly nothing less

than entire incapacity ought to affect the lonafide holder in the

absence of such fraud on the maker as amounts to illegality. 3

§89. Habitual drunkards.— The contract of even the ha-

bitual drunkard is good if made during a sober interval. 4

tiable instrument void, 1 even in the hands of a bona firle holder,
though the contrary bas been held; 2 and certainly nothing less
than entire incapacity ought to affect the bona fide holder in the
absence of such fraud on the maker as amounts to illegality. 3

But —

§ 90, Partial intoxication or weakness coupled with fraud.

"Where, through long-continued indulgence, the mind has be-

come weakened, or where, though the person is not completely

incapacitated by present drunkenness, he is still to some degree

incompetent, and the other party knew of his condition, the

transaction must appear to have been fair and open, 5 and fraud

§ 89. Habitual drunkards.-The contract of even the habitual drunkard is good if made during a sober interval. 4
But-

or overreaching will, of course, avoid it. 6

§91. Drunkard under guardianship.— If, because of his

incapacity, the habitual drunkard has been placed under legal

guardianship, and the control of his estate has been removed

from him, contracts made by him thereafter will be of no ef-
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fect. 7

1 Daniel on Neg. Inst., § 210. sumption of fraud arises which must

2 State Bank v. McCoy, 69 Pa. St. be countervailed by evidence of a

204, 8 Am. R. 246; McSparran v. fair consideration, and fair and hon-

Neely, 91 Pa. St. 17. est dealing on the part of him who

3 Miller v. Finley, 26 Mich. 249, 12 claims the note as a valid contract.

Am. R. 306. Hale v. Brown, 11 Ala. 87."

§ 90. Partial intoxication or weakness coupled with fraud.
Where, through long-continued indulgence, the mind has become weakened, or where, though the person is not completely
incapacitated by present drunkenness, he is still to ome degree
incompetent, and the other party knew of his condition, the
tran action must appear to have been fair and open;5 and fraud
or overreaching will, of course, avoid it. 6

* Ritter's Appeal, 59 Pa. St. 9. See 6 Hotchkiss v. Fortson, 7 Yerg.

also Van Wyck v. Brasher, 81 N. Y. (Tenn.) 67; White v. Cox, 3 Hayw.

260. (Tenn.) 79; Calloway v. Witherspoon,

5 In Holland v. Barnes, 53 Ala. 83, 5 Ired. (N. C.) Eq. 128; Cruise v.

25 Am. R. 595, Brickell, C. J., says: Christopher, 5 Dana (Ky.), 181; Henry

" When evidence is given that on an v. Ritenour, 31 Ind. 136; Mansfield v.

insufficient consideration a promis- Watson, 2 Iowa, 111; Murray v. Car-

sory note has been obtained from a lin, 67 111. 286.

person enfeebled in body and mind, 7 See ante, § 72; Lynch v. Dodge,

by disease and long-continued drunk- 130 Mass. 458; Manson v. Felton, 13

§ 91. Drunkard under guardianship.- If, because of his
incapacity, the habitual drunkard has been placed under legal
guardianship, and the control of his estate has been removed
from him, contracts made by him thereafter will be of no effect.7

enness, and who at its execution is Pick. (Mass.) 206.

under the influence of liquor, a pre-

7 97

Daniel on Neg. In t., § 210.
sumption of fraud ari es which must
tate Bank v. M Coy, 69 Pa. St. be countervailed by eviuence of a
204,
Am. R. 246; l\IcSparran v. fair consideration, and fair and honNeely, 91 Pa. St. 17.
e t dealing on the part of him who
3 l\Iiller v. Finley, 26 Mich. 24:9, 12 claim the note as a valid con tract.
Hale v. Brown, 11 Ala. 87."
Am. R. 306.
6 Hotchki
v. Fort on, 7 Yerg.
4 Ritter' Appeal, 59 Pa. St. 9. See
al o Van Wyck v. Bra her, 1 N. Y. (Tenn.) 67; White v. Cox, 3 Hayw.
260.
(Tenn.) 79; Calloway v. Witherspoon,
5 In Holland v. Barnes, 53 Ala. 83, 5 Ired. (N. C.) Eq. 128· Cruise v.
25 Am. R. 595, Brickell, C. J., ays: Christopher, 5 Dana (Ky.), 181; Henry
"When evidence is given that on an v. Ritenour, 31 Ind. 136; l\fansfield v.
in ufficient consideration a promis- Watson, 2 Iowa, 111; Murray v. Carsory note has been obtained from a lin, 67 Ill. 286.
7 See ante, § 72; Lynch v. Dodge,
person enfeebled in body and mind,
by disea e and long-continued drunk- 130 Mass. 458; Manson v. Felton, 13
enness, and who at it execution is Pick. (Mass.) 206.
under the influence of liquor, a pre7
97
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§§ 92, 93.J

L.A. W OF SALE.

(HOOK I .

§§ 92, 93.] LAW OF SALE. [BOOK I.

c. Incompetency of Spendthrifts, etc.

§ 92. Spendthrifts and other persons under guardianship.

Provision is usually made by statute for the appointment of

guardians for such persons as by drinking, gaming, debauch-

ery or incompetence are likely to squander their estates and

become charges upon the public. The effect of proceedings

resulting in the appointment of a guardian is usually to take

away from the ward, during guardianship, all general capacity

to enter into contracts, though, as in the case of insane per-

sons and infants, he may bind himself for necessaries. 1

2. Legal Incompetency.

§ 93. In general. — In addition to the various kinds of in-

capacity which have been denominated natural, are certain

others which exist not so much because of any inherent or

natural incompetency, but rather as the result of express rules

of law declared for the purpose not only of guarding against

supposed weakness or exposure to improper influences, but

c. Incompetency e>f Spendthrifts, etc .
.
§ 92. Spendthrifts and other persons under guard ianship.
Provision is usually made by statute for the appointment of
guardians for such persons as by drinking, gaming, debauchery or incompetence are likely to squander their estates and
become charges upon the public. The effect of proceedings
resulting in the appointment of a guardian is usually to take
away from the ward, during guardianship, all general capacity
to enter into contracts, though, as in the case of insane persons and infants, he may bind himself for necessaries. 1

also of subserving certain ends approved by the general pol-

2. Legal Inconipetency.
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icy of the law.

Of these kinds of incapacity, the most important are those

of the infant and the married woman. Corporations and other

more or less similar bodies are also subject to legal incapacity.

Of the incapacity of the infant, it is to be said that his in-

competency may be the result of both classes of causes. Dur-

ing his tender years he is under a natural incapacity, but as

he approaches more and more nearly to the period of his ma-

jority — a period arbitrarily established — he becomes less and

less subject to any natural incapacity and is subject only to

that which the law imposes upon him. He may thus be act-

ually as competent to act in his own behalf on the day before

he attains his majority as on the day after; but the law makes

no such distinction.

The same may be said of the married woman. She may

iManson v. Felton, 13 Pick. (Mass.) 508, 93 Am. Deo. 117; Lynch v.

206; Chandler v. Simmons, 97 Mass. Dodge, 130 Mass. 459.
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§ 93. In general.- In addition to the various kinds of incapacity which have been denominated ncitural, are certain
others which exist not so much because of any inherent or
natural incompetency, but rather as the result of express rules
of law declared for the purpose not only of guarding against
supposed weakness or expo ure to improper influences, but
also of subserving certain ends approved by the general policy of the law.
Of these kinds of incapacity, the most important are those
of the infant and the married woman. Corporations and other
more or less similar bodies are also subject to legal incapacity.
Of the incapacity of the infant, it is to be said that his incompetency may be the result of both classes of causes. During hi t nder years he is under a natural incapacity, but as
he approaches more and more nearly to the period of his m~
jority - a period arbitrarily established - he becomes less and
less subject to any natural incapacity and is subject only to
that which the law imposes upon him. He may thus be actually as competent to act in his own behalf on the day before
he attains his majority as on the day after; but the law makes
no such distinction.
The same may be said of the married woman. She may
Man on v. Felton, 13 Pick. ( fa .) 50 , 93 Am. Dec. 117; Lynch v.
206; Chandler v. immons, 97 l\Ia ·s. Dodge, 130 Ma s. 459.
I
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,CH. III.]

CAP .A.CITY OF PARTIES.

[ § 04- 96.

€H. III.] CAPACITY OF PARTIES. [§§ O-A-Olj.

have as much actual capacity to make contracts the day after

her marriage as she had the day before; but here again the

common law imposes an arbitrary bar.

a. Of the Incapacity of the Infant.

§ 94:. In general. — The question of the general contractual

have as much actual capacity to make contracts the day after
her marriage as she had the day before; but here again the
.common law imposes an arbitrary bar.

incapacity of the infant is one foreign to the present work,

and the matter of his particular incapacity to buy and sell

chattels might also, perhaps, be properly excluded from con-

a. Of the Incapacity of the Infant.

sideration herein; but, in the belief that it may subserve a pur-

pose sufficiently useful to justify the space consumed, a gen-

eral view of this narrower field will be attempted.

§ 95. Infant's contracts are voidable aud not void. — It is

now well settled, as a general rule, that the contracts of an in-

fant are voidable merely and not void; and this rule applies as

well to his deeds and conveyances of his real estate 1 as to his

sales, mortgages and assignments of his personal property. 2

Without attempting to go at large into all the matters which

may be suggested by this discussion, a few points may be
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briefly touched upon. Thus —

§ 96. What meant by voidable. — With respect of void-

§ 94. In general.-The question of the general contractual
incapacity of the infant is one foreign to the present work,
and the matter of his particular incapacity to buy and sell
chattels might also, perhaps, be properly excluded from con-sideration herein; but, in the belief that it may subserve a purpose sufficiently useful to justify the space consumed, a gen-eral view of this narrower field will be attempted.

able contracts generally, it is ordinarily true that they are valid

till avoided, and not void till ratified. With respect of the

i Cole v. Pennoyer, 14 111. 158; Keil Va. 65, 46 Am. R. 709; Birch v. Lin-

v. Healey, 84 111. 104, 25 Am. R. 434; ton, 78 Va. 584, 49 Am. R. 381; Gilles-

Green v. Wilding, 59 Iowa, 679. 13 pie v. Bailey, 12 W. Va. 70, 29 Am.

N. W. R. 761, 44 Am. R. 696; Philips R. 445; Logan v. Gardner, 136 Pa. St.

v. Green, 3 A. K. Marsh. (Ky.) 7, 588, 20 Am. St. R. 939, 20 Atl. R. 625.

13 Am. Deo. 124; Breckenridge v. 2 Holmes v. Rice, 45 Mich. 142, 7

Grmsby, 1 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 236, 19 N. W. R. 772; Williams v. Brown, 34

Am. Dec. 71; Davis v. Dudley, 70 Me. 594; Kingman v. Perkins, 105

Me. 236, 35 Am. R. 318; Youse v. Mass. Ill; Cogley v. Cushman, 16

Norcoms, 12 Mo. 549, 51 Am. Dec. Minn. 397; Corey v. Burton, 32 Mich.

175; Bool v. Mix, 17 Wend. (N. Y.) 30; Osburn v. Farr, 42 Mich. 134,3

119, 31 Am. Dec. 285; Wheaton v. N. W. R. 299; Rice v. Boyer, 108 Ind.

§ 95. Infant's contracts are voidable and not Yoid.- It is
now well settled, as a general rul.e, that the contracts of an infant are voidable merely and not void; and this rule applies as
well to his deeds and conveyances of his real estate 1 as to bis
:sales, mortgages and assignments of his personal property. 2
Without attempting to go at large into all the matters which
may be suggested by this discussion, a few points may be
·briefly touched upon. Thus -

East, 5 Yerg. (Tenn.) 41, 26 Am. Dec. 472, 9 N. E. R. 420, 58 Am. R. 53;

251; Bigelow v. Kinney, 3 Vt. 353, 21 Soper v. Fry, 37 Mich. 236.

Am. Dec. 589; Wilson v. Branch, 77

99

§ 96. - - "What meant by voidable.- With respect of void-able contracts generally, it is ordinarily true that they are valid
till a voided, and not void till ratified. With respect 0£ the
I Cole v. Pennoyer, 14 Ill. 158; Keil Va. 65, 46 Am. R. 709; Birch v. Linv. Healey, 84 Ill. 104, 25 Am. R. 434; ton, 78 Va. 584, 49 Am. R. 381; GillesGreen v. Wilding, 59 Iowa, 679. 13 pie v. Bailey, 12 W. Va. 70, 29 Am.
_N. W.R. 761, 44 Am. R. 696; Philips R. 445; Logan v. Gardner, 136 Pa. St.
-v. Green. 3 A. K. Marsh. (Ky.) 7, 588, 20 Am. St. R. 939, 20 Atl. R. 625.
2 Holmes v. Rice, 45 Mich. 142, 7
13 Am. Dec. 124; Breckenridge v.
•Ormsby, 1 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 236, 19 N. W. R. 772; Williams v. Brown, 34
Am. Dec. 71; Davis v. Dudley, 70 Me. 594; Kingman v. Perkins, 105
Me. 236, 35 Am. R. 318; Youse v. Mass. 111; Cogley v. Cushman, 16
_Norcoms, 12 Mo. 549, 51 Am. Dec. Minn. 397; Corey v. Burton, 32 Mich.
175; Bool v. Mix, 17 Wend. (N. Y.) 30; Osburn v. Farr, 42 Mich. 134, 3
-irn, 31 Am. Dec. 285; Wheaton v. N. W. R. 299; Rice v. Boyer, 108 Ind.
East, 5 Yerg. (Tenn.) 41, 26 Am. Dec. 472, 9 N. E. R. 420, 58 Am. R. 53;
:251; Bigelow v. Kinney, 3 Vt. 353, 21 Soper v. Fry, 37 Mich. 236.
-Am. Dec. 589; Wilson v. Branch, 77
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L A. W OF SALE.

[BOOK I.

§ 97.] LAW OF SALE. [BOOK I.

contracts of infants, the word seems not to have in all cases-

the same meaning. Where the contract made by the infant

has been executed on his part, that is, where he has parted with

something which he was to part with under the contract, it is

said that the contract is binding until it is avoided by the in-

fant, by words or conduct which show that he refuses longer

to be bound by it. " But when it is said that the executory

contract of an infant is voidable, the idea represented is that

the contract is susceptible of confirmation or avoidance by the

promisor, though it is not binding until it is ratified." l This

distinction between the executed and the executory contract

of the infant has been criticised. Thus it is said in one place: -

" This is a senseless and erroneous distinction.- Executory con-

tracts of infauts are no more invalid than executed contracts.

Both are binding until disaffirmed. No one would contend

that infants' executory contracts could be disregarded as nulli-

ties by the adult contracting parties, or by third persons, until

they had been ratified; yet this is precisely what the doctrine
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leads to. It may be that a ratification will result from less

positive acts or conduct in case of executed contracts than in

case of executory; but this does not prove that the one class

has a greater binding effect than the other." It must be con-

ceded, however, that the distinction has found quite a firm

lodgment in our law. 3

§ 97. Who may avoid. — The privilege of infancy is a

personal one, which can be availed of only by the infant him-

self and those who represent him personally. 4 The other party

to the contract cannot insist upon this disabilit} 7 , if the infant

i Minock v. Shortridge (1870), 21 case of Nichols & Shepard Co. v. Sny-

Mich. 304: Edgerly v. Shaw (1852), der (1900), 78 Minn. 502, 81 N. W. R.

25 N. H. 514, 57 Am. Dec. 349; State 516.

v. Plaisted (1862), 43 N. H. 413; Mor- * Oliver v. Houdlet (1816), 13 Mass.

ton v. Steward (1879), 5 111. App. 533; 237, 7 Am. Dec. 134; Cannon v. Als-

Lynch v. Johnson (1896), 109 Mich, bury (1817), 1 A. K. Marsh. (Ky.) 76,

640, 67 N. W. R. 908. 10 Am. Dec. 709; Patterson v. Lip-

2 Note to Craig v. Van Bebber, 18 pincott (1885), 47 N. J. L. 457, 54 Am.

Am. St. R. 579. R. 178.

3 See, for example, the very late
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contracts of infants, the word seems not to have in all cases
the same meaning. \Vbere the contract made by the infant
h as been executed on his part, that is, where he has parted with
something which he was to part with und er the contract, it is.
said that the con tract is binding until it is avoided by the infant, by words or conduct which show that he refuses longer
't o be bound by it. ''But when it is said that the execrntory
contract of an infant is voida,ble, the id ea represented is that
the contract is susceptible of confirmation or avoidance by the
promisor, though it is not binding until it is ratified." 1 This.
distinction between the executed and the executory contract
of the infant has been criticised. Thus it is said in one place: z
"This is a senseless and erroneous distinction.· Executory contracts of infants are no more invalid than executed contracts.
Both are binding until disaffirmed. :No one would con tend
that infants' exec utory contracts could be disregarded as nullities by the adult contracting parties, or by third persons, until
they bad been ratified; yet this is precisely what the doctrine
leads to. It mai be that a ratification will result from less
positive acts or conduct in case of executed contracts than in
case of executory; but this does not prove that the one class
has a greater binding effect than the other." It must be conceded, however, that the distinction has found quite a firm
lodgment in our law. 3

§ 97. - - '\\'ho may avoid.-The privilege of infancy is a
personal one, which can be availed of only by the infant himself and those who represent him personally. 4 The other party
to the contract cannot insist upon this disability, if the infant
I Minock v. Shortridge (1870), 21
Mich. 304; Edgerly v. Shaw (1852),
23 N. H. 514, 57 Am. Dec. 349; State
v. Plaisted (1 62) 43 N. H. 413; Morton v. Steward (1 79), 5 Ill. App. 533;
Lynch v. Johnson (1 96), 109 Mich.
640. 67 N. W. R. 908.
2 Note to Craig v. Van Bebber, 18
Am. St. R. 579.
3 See, for example, the very late

case of Nicholf; & Shepard Co. v. Snyder (1900), 7 Minn. 502, 81 N. W. R.
516.
4 Oliver v. Hou<llet (1816), 13 Mass.
237, 7 Am. Dec. 134; Cannon v. Alsbury (1817), 1 A. K. Marsh. (Ky.) 76,
10 Am. Dec. 709; Patterson v. Lippincott (1885), 47 N. J. L. 457, 54 Am.
R. 178.
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doss not see fit to raise it. 1 Xeither can a stranger to the con-

tract take advantage of it. 2 The infant's creditors, moreover,

are precluded, 3 and so is his assignee in bankruptcy or insolv-

ency. 4 As stated in one case, 5 " Yoidable acts by an infant

can be avoided by none but himself or his privies in blood, and

not by privies in estate; and this right of avoidance is not as-

signable."

The infant's heir, 6 however, or guardian, 7 or personal repre-

sentative, 8 may avoid the contract if the time has not expired.

§ 98. When avoided. — With respect of the time at

which the infant's contracts may be avoided, a distinction is

made between his conveyances of realty and his contracts re-

specting personalty. The former may usually be effectively

avoided only after he becomes of age; but the latter, by the

weight of authority, may be avoided either during his minority

does not see fit to raise it. 1 Neither can a stranger to the contract take ad' antage of it. 2 The infant's creditors, moreover,
are precluded, 3 and so is his a ig-nee in bankruptcy or insol vency.4 As stated in one case,5 "Voidable acts by an infant
can be avoided by none but him elf or his privies in bloo<l, and
not by privies in estate; and thi right of avoidance is not assignable."
The infant's heir, 6 however, or guardian,7 or personal representative,8 may avoid the contract if the time has not expired.

or within a reasonable period thereafter. 9

§ 99. When ratify. — While the infant may thus dis-

affirm during infancy, he cannot, for obvious reasons, effectu-
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ally ratify until he becomes of age; for the ratification is the

1 Holt v. "Ward Clarencieux (1732), however, then his privies in estate

2 Strange, 937; Monaghan v. Insur- may avail themselves of such avoid-

ance Co. (1884), 53 Mich. 238; Hunt ance. Shrock v. Crowl (1882), 83 Ind.

v. Peake (1826), 5 Cow. (N. Y.) 475, 15 243.

Am. Dec. 475; Stiff v. Keith (1887), « Illinois Land Co. v. Bonner (1874),

143 Mass. 224. 75 111. 315; Veal v. Fortson (1882), 57

-'Board of Trustees v. Anderson Tex. 482.

(1878), 63 Ind. 367, 30 Am. R. 224; 1 Compare Oliver v. Houdlet (1816),

§ 9 . - - When avoiclecl.-With respect of the time at
which the infants contracts may be avoided, a distinction is
made between his conveyances of realty and his contracts respecting personalty. The former may u ually be effectively
avoided only after he becomes of age· but the latter, by the
weight of authority, may be avoided either during his minority
or within a rea onable period thereafter. 9

Holmes v. Rice (1881), 45 Mich. 142, 13 Mass. 237, 7 Am. Dec. 134; Chand-

7 N. W. R 772; Soper v. Fry (1877), ler v. Simmons (1867), 97 Mass. 508,

37 Mich. 236. 93 Am. Dec. 117.

3 Kingman v. Perkins (1870), 105 STillinghast v. Holbrook (1862), 7

Mass. Ill; Yates v. Lyon (1874), 61 R. I. 230; Shropshire v. Burns (1871),

N. Y. 344. 46 Ala. 108.

§ 99. -. - When ratify .-While the infant may thus disaffirm durino- infancy, he cannot, for obvious reasons, effectua lly ratify until he becomes of age; for the ratification is the

4 Mansfield v. Gordon (1887), 144 » House v. Alexander (1885), 105

Mass. 168, 10 N. E. R 773. Ind. 109, 55 Am. R 189; Rice v. Boyer

5 Austin v. Charlestown Seminary (1886), 108 Ind. 472, 58 Am. R. 53;

(1844), 8 Met. (Mass.) 196. Miller v. Smith (1879), 26 Minn. 248,

After the contract has been duly 37 Am. R. 407 ; Stafford v. Roof (1827),

avoided by the infant personally, 9 Cow. (N. Y.) 626.
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Holt v. Ward Clarencieux (1732), however, then his privies in e tate
may avail themselves of such avoidance Co. (1 4), 53 Mich. 23 ; Hunt ance. Shrock v. Crowl (1882), 83 Ind.
v. P eake (1 26), 5 Cow. (N. Y.) 475, 15 243.
Am. Dec. 475; Stiff v. Keith (1 7),
ti Illinoi Land Co. v. Bonner (1874),
75 Ill. 315; Veal v. Fortson (18 2), 57
143 Ma s. 224.
2 Board of Trustees v. Ander on
Tex. 482.
{1 7 ), 63 Ind. 367, 30 Am. R. 224;
7 Compare Oliver v. Houdlet (1816),
Holmes v. Rice (l 1), 45 Mich. 142, 13 Mas . 237, 7 Am. Dec. 134; Cband7 N. W.R. 772; Soper v. Fry (1877), ler v. Simmons (1 67), 97 Mass. 508,
.37 Mich. 236.
93 Am. Dec. 117.
s Kingman v. Perkins (1870), 105
B Tillinghast v. Holbrook (1 62), 7
:Mass. 111; Yates v. Lyon (1 74), 61 R. I. 230; Shropshire v. Burns (1871),
N. Y. 344.
46 Ala. 108.
4 Mansfield v. Gordon (1887), 144
a House v. Alexander (1 85), 105
liia s. 16 , 10 N. E. R. 773.
Ind. 109, 55 Am. R. 1 9; Rice v. Boyer
5 Austin v. Charlestown Seminary (1
6), 10 Ind. 472, 5 Am. R. 58;
(1 44), 8 Met. (Mass.) 196.
Miller v. Smith (1879), 26 1\Iinn. 248,
After the contract bas been duly 37 Am. R. 407; tafford v. Roof (1 27),
a'oided by the infant personally, 9 Cow. <N. Y.) 626.
101
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2 Strange, 937; Monaghan v. In ur-
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§§ 100-102.] LAW OF SALE. [BOOK I.

act which is to give the final validity to the act and requires

full capacity. Otherwise he might claim, to disaffirm his ratifi-

cation.

§ 100. How much to be ratified. — If the infant ratifies

or repudiates at all, he must in general deal with the whole

act which is to give the final validity to the act and requires.
full capacity. Otherwise he might claim to disaffirm his ratification.

contract, and not with inseparable parts of it. 1 He clearly may

not, after he becomes of age, so ratify a part as to secure the

benefits of the contract while he repudiates its liabilities.

§ 101. Effect of ratification. — The ordinary effect of

ratification is that the contract then becomes binding from the

beginning, and not merely from the date of ratification. 2 When

once effectually ratified, the contract cannot be subsequently

disaffirmed. 3

§ 102. Knowledge of non-liability. — Whether the acts

§ 100. - - How much to be ratified.- If the infant ratifies
or repudiates at all, he must in general deal with the whole
contract, and not with inseparable parts of it. 1 He clearly may
not, after he becomes of age, so ratify a part as to secure the
benefits of the con.tract while he repudiates its liabilities.

of the former infant relied upon as constituting ratification

must have been clone with knowledge that he was not legally

liable upon the contract, is a question upon which the author-

ities are in conflict; with the weight of reason and modern
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authority to the effect that, in the absence of fraud or unfair

advantage on the part of the other party, such knowledge is

not necessary. 4

i Biederman v. O'Connor (1886), 117 may make his ratification partial or

III. 493: Langdon v. Clayson (1889), conditional; in which event it will

75 Mich. 204; Uecker v. Koehn (1887), be binding only according to its

§ 101. - - Effect of ratification.-The ordinary effect of
ratification is that the contract then becomes binding from the
beginning, and not merely from the date of ratification. 2 When
once effectually ratified, the con.tract cannot be subsequently
disaffi rm ed. 3

21 Neb. 559, 59 Am. R. 849; Lynde v. terms.

Budd (1830), 2 Paige (N. Y.), Ch. 191, 3 See Hastings v. Dollarhide (1864),

§ 102. - - Knowledge of non-liability.-Whether the acts

21 Am. Dec. 84; Bigelow v. Kinney 24 Cal. 195; Voltz v. Voltz (1883), 75

(1830), 3 Vt. 353. 21 Am. Dec. 589; Ala. 555.

American Freehold Mtg. Co. v. 4 Mr. Greenleaf (Evidence, voL II,

Dykes (1895), 111 Ala. 178, 56 Am. St. § 367) lays down the rule that such

R. 38. knowledge is necessary, and his state-

2 Minock v. Shortridge (1870), 21 ment has been often quoted, as, e. g. r

Mich. 304; Hall v. Jones (1863), 21 in Turner v. Gaither (1880), 83 N.

Md. 439; Cheshire v. Barrett (1827), C. 357, 35 Am. R. 574 [see also

4 McCord (S. C), 241, 17 Am. Dec. 735. Hinely v. Margaritz (1846), 3 Pa. St.

But in Minock v. Shortridge, supra, 428J ; but the more modern cases are

in reference to executory contracts, the other way. Anderson v. Soward

the court say that the former infant (1883), 40 Ohio St. 325, 48 Am. R. 687 ^

102

of the former infant relied upon as constituting ratification
must have been done with knowledge that he was not legally
liable upon the con.tract, is a question upon which the authorities are in conflict; with the weight of reason and modern
a uthority to the effect that, in the absence of fraud or unfair
advantage on the part of the other party, such knowledge is
not necessary. 4
1 Biederman v. O'Connor (18 6), 117
Ill 493: Langdon v. Clayson (1 9),
75 Mich. 204; Uecker v. Koehn (1 7),
21 Neb. 559, 59 Am. R. 849: Lynde v.
Budd (1 30), 2 Paige (N. Y.), h. 191,
21 Am. Dec. 84; Bigelow v. Kinney
(1 30), 3 Vt. 353. 21 Am. Dec. 5 9;
American Freehold Mtg.
o. v.
yk (1 9-), 111 Ala. 17 , 56 Am. t.
R. 3 .

may make his ratification partial or
conditional; in which event it will
be binding only according to its
terms.
3 S e Hastings v. Dollar.h ide (1864),.
24 Cal. 195; Voltz v. Voltz (1883), 75
A la. 555.
4 Mr. Greenleaf (Evidence, vol II,.
§ 367) lays down the rule that such
knowledg i ne es. ary, and his statern nt ha b en often quoted, as, e. g.,.
in Turner v. Gaither (1 0), 83 N.
C. 35 , 33 Am. R. 57 4 [see also
Hin ly v. l\fargaritz (1846), 3 Pa. St.
42 ] ; but the mor modern ca es are
the th r way. Anderson v. Soward
(1 3), 40 0 hio St. 325, 48 Am. R. 687;.
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CH. III.] CAPACITY OF PARTIES. [§§ 103-105.

§103. Consideration for the ratification. — No new-

consideration for the ratification is necessary. 1 The contract,

by the hypothesis, was only voidable, not void ; the ratifica-

tion does not amount to the making of a new contract, but is

simply indicative of a final intention to be bound by one al-

ready made upon a sufficient consideration.

§ 104. Ratification, how effected. — Unless required by

statute, as in some cases where written ratification is pre-

scribed, no particular form of ratifying is necessary. It may

be either express or implied. Ordinarily, any words or con-

Consideration for the ratification.- No new
§ 103.
consideration for the ratification is necessary. 1 The contract,
by the hypothesis, was only voidable, not void; the ratification does not amount to the making of a new contract, but is
simply indicative of a final intention to be bound by one already made upon a sufficient consideration.

duct clearly and unequivocally indicating an intention to be

bound by the contract is sufficient. Where the contract has

been so far executed that the infant must be the moving party,

a failure to disaffirm within a reasonable time suffices. Where

the infant has received performance by the other party, and

after majority deals with the thing received as being the owner

of it, or where after majority he demands or accepts perform-

ance by the other party, as on the basis of a subsisting con-
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tract, there is strong evidence of ratification.

§ 105. . On the other hand, where the contract is wholly

executory so far as the infant is concerned — where the pur-

pose is to compel the former infant to do something merely by

reason of his agreement made during infancy, especially an

agreement to pay money, — and ratification since majority is

relied upon to defeat his plea of infancy, very clear evidence

of ratification is required. " To sustain an action against a

person of full age, or a promise made by him when an infant,"

it is said in one case, 2 " there must be a complete ratification,

either by a new promise to pay, or by positive acts of the in-

dividual, after he has been of age a reasonable time, in favor

Clark v. Van Court (1884), 100 Ind. 553; Jefford v. Ringgold (1844), 6 Ala.

113, 50 Am. R. 774; American Mort- 544: American Freehold Mtg. Co. v.

§ 104. - - Ratification, how effected.- Unless required by
statute, as in some cases where written ratification is prescribed, no particular form of ratifying is necessary. It may
be either express or implied. Ordinarily, any words or conduct clearly and unequivocally indicating an intention to be
bound by the contract is sufficient. Where the contract has
been so far executed that the infant must be the moving party,
a failure to disaffirm within a reasonable time suffices. Where
the infant bas received performance by the other party, and
after majority deals with the thing received as being the owner
of it, or where after majority he demands or accepts performance ·by the other party, as on the basis of a subsisting contract, there is strong evidence of ratification.

gage Co. v. Wright (1893), 101 Ala. Dykes (1895), 111 Ala. 178, 20 S. R.

658, 14 S. R. 399; Bestor v. Hickey 136, 56 Am. St. R. 38.

(1898), 71 Conn. 181, 41 Atl. R. 555. 2 Tibbets v. Garrish (1852), 25 N. H.

1 Conklin v. Ogborn (1856), 7 Ind. 41, 57 Am. Dec. 307.
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§ 105. - - . On the other band, where the contract is wholly
executory so far as the infant is concerned-where the purpose is to compel the former infant to do something merely by
reason of his agreement made during infancy, especially an
agreement to pay money,- and ratification since majority is
relied upon to defeat his plea of infancy, very clear evidence
of ratification is required. "To sustain an action against a
person of full age, or a promise made by him when an infant,"
it is said in one case, 2 "there must be a .complete ratification,
either by a new promise to pay, or by positive acts of the individual, after he has been of age a reasonable time, in favor
Clark v. Van Court (1884), 100 Ind. 553; Jefford v. Ringgold (1844), 6 Ala.
113, 50 Am. R 774; American Mort- 544: American Freehold Mtg. Co. v.
gage Co. v. Wright (1893), 101 Ala. Dykes (1895), 111 Ala. 178, 20 S. R.
658, 14 S. R. 399; Bestor v. Hickey 186, 56 Am. St. R. 38.
(1 9 ), 71 Conn. 181, 41 Atl. R. 555.
2 Tibbets v. Garrish (1852), 25 N. H.
1 Conklin v. Ogborn (1856), 7 Ind. 41, 57 Am. Dec. 307.
103

: " lOG, 107.]
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[BOOK J .

§§ 100, 107.]

LAW OF SALE.

[book I.

of his contract, which are of a character to constitute as per-

fect evidence of a ratification as an express and unequivocal

promise." "While this may seem a strong statement of the rule,

it is fairly representative of the authorities. 1

Passing now to the particular questions in hand, and apply-

ing these general principles here touched upon, it may be no-

ticed, first, that — ■

§106. Sale or exchange by infants is voidable.— An in-

fant's sale or exchange of his personal property, though accom-

panied by a delivery of the possession thereof, is voidable at the

of hi contract, wLich are of a cbaract r to con titute as I er£ ct vi ience of a ratifi ation a an XI r
an l un guiv cal
promi .
While tbi may e m a tron tat m nt of tile r ul
it i fairly r pr ntative f the authoriti .1
Pa in now to th particular qu ti n in hand and appl inO' th
n ral I rincipl · h re touched upon, it may be n tic d, fir t, that-

infant's election. 2

§ 107. When may be avoided. — And, though there are

some rulings to the contrary, 3 the executed sale or exchange,

at least when made without fraud on his part, may, according

to the great weight of authority, be avoided by him during his

minority, 4 as well as within a reasonable time after he becomes
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of a^e. 5

ale or exchange by infant i voiclable.-An infant'
le or ex bange of hi p r onal prop rt r th UO'h a compani d by a d livery of the Io s ion ther of, is oidable at the
infant's election. 2

i See also Catlin v. Haddox (1882),

49 Conn. 492, 44 Am. R. 249; Turner

v. Gaither (1880), 83 N. C. 357, 35 Am.

R. 574; Proctor v. Sears (1862), 4

Allen (Mass.), 95; Baker v, Kennett

(1873), 54 Mo. 82; Lynch v. Johnson

(1896), 109 Mich. 640, 67 N. W. R 908;

Nichols & Shepard Co. v. Snyder

(1900), 78 Minn. 502, 81 N. W. R. 516.

2To\vle v. Dresser, 73 Me. 252; Staf-

ford v. Roof, 9 Cow. (N. Y.) 626; Bool

§ 107. - - When maJ be avoidetl.-And thouO'h there are
ome ruling to the contrary 3 the execut d al
r x han ,
at lea t when made without fraud on his part, may, accordin 0
to the gr at w ight of authority, le a' oided by him luring hi
minority, 4 as w 11 as within ~ r asonable time after he becom s
of age. 5

v. Mix, 17 Wend. (N. Y.) 119, 31 Am.

Dec. 285; Carr v. Clough, 26 N. H.

280,59 Am. Dec. 345; State v.Plaisted,

43 N. H. 413; Chapin v. Shafer, 49

N. Y. 407; Cogley v. Cushman, 16

Minn. 397; -Miller v. Smith, 26 Minn.

248, 37 Am. R 407.

» As in Roof v. Stafford, 7 Cow.

49

31 ficb. 1 2 (of which it is sail in
note to 1 Am. t. R. 609, that th
rule "i
ipl nnd
ba b
dam

664, 1

(N. Y.) 179, reversed in Staff or. 1 v.

Roof, 9 Cow. 626; Dunton v. Brown,

31 Mich. 182 (of which it is said in

note to 18 Am. St. R 602, that the

rule "is not correct on principle and

has been decided to the contrary."

Adams v. Beall, 67 Md. 53, 8 Atl. R

664, 1 Am. St. R 379); Boody v. Mo

Kenney, 23 Me. 525. Contra, Towle

v. Dresser, 73 Me. 252.

4 As is said in Towle v. Dresser, 73

Me. 252, "By reason of the transi-

tory nature of personal property, to

withhold this right from the infant,

perhaps for a term of years, until ho

became of age, would, in many cases,

be to make it utterly valueless/' To

like effect: Chapin v. Shafer, 4!) X. V.

407; Rice v. Boyer, 108 Ind. 472, 9 N.

K. R. 420, 58 Am. R 53 (citing Briggs

v. McCabe, 27 Ind. 327; Indianapolis,

etc. Co. v. Wilcox, 59 Ind. 429; Clark

t hid , 96 N. Y.
vV il on, 2 Cold. N. Y. 407.

v. Van Court, 100 Ind. 113,50 Am. R

& Beardsley v. Hotchkiss, 96 N. Y. (Tenn.) 469; Chapin v. Shafer, 49

201; Summers v. Wilson, 2 Cold. N. Y. 407.

104
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[§§ 108, 100.

§108. How disaffirmed. — The disaffirmance maybe

by express notice to that effect, 1 by action to recover the prop-

ert} 7 , 2 or, particularly where the property has not yet been de-

livered, by some act showing unequivocally a determination

not to be bound by it, as by an absolute sale to another person. 3

109.

Necessity of restoring consideration. — Whether,

§ 108.
How di affi rme11.-The Ii affirmanc may be
by expr ss noti ·e to that ff ct,1 by action to r cover th proprty ,2 or, particularly wh r the prop rty has not y t be n deliv r d, by some act showjn 0 un quivocally a <let rmination
not to be bound by it, as by an absolut sale to anoth r pers n. 3

upon a disaffirmance of the contract, a restitution of the con-

109. - - Nece ity of restoring consideration.-Wh th r,

sideration received for the sale is necessary, is a question upon

which the authorities are much in conflict. Certain of the

cases hold that such restitution, either in specie or in value,

is necessary; 4 others that it is necessary in equity, but not at

774; House v. Alexander, 105 Ind.

109, 4 N. E. R 891, 55 Am. R. 189;

Hoyt v. Wilkinson, 57 Vt. 404; Price

v. Furnian, 27 Vt. 268, 65 Am. Dec.
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194; Willis v. Twambly, 13 Mass. 204;

u on a di affirmance of the contract, a restitution of the consideration r cei ve l for the sale is necessary, is a question ur on
which the authoriti s are much in conflict. 0 rtain of the
cases hold that such r stitution, ith r in specie or in valu ,
is necessary; 4 oth rs that it is nece ary in equity, but not at

Stafford v. Roof, 9 Cow. 626; Bool v.

Mix, 17 Wend. 119, 31 Am. Dec. 285);

Hall v. Butterfield, 59 N. H. 354, 47

Am. R. 209.

iScranton v. Stewart, 52 Ind. 68;

Long v. Williams, 74 Ind. 115.

2 St. Louis, etc. Ry. Co. v. Higgins,

44 Ark. 293; Watson v. Billings, 38

Ark. 278; Sims v. Everhardt, 102 U. S.

300.

3Chapin v. Shafer, 49 N. Y. 407;

State v. Plaisted, 43 N. H. 413; State

v. Howard, 88 N. C. 650. Said Peck-

ham, J., in Chapin v. Shafer, of the

disaffirmance of a chattel mortgage:

"Assuming that the mortgage is

voidable only, then the mortgagor

had a right to avoid it at any time

before he arrived at age and within

a reasonable time thereafter, by any

act which evinced that purpose, and

an unconditional sale of the prop-

erty is such an act."

4 In Taft v. Pike, 14 Vt. 405, 39 Am.

Dec. 228, it is said: "It is well settled

that if an infant has executed the

contract on his part by the pay-

ment of money or the delivery of

property, he cannot disaffirm the

contract and recover back what he

has paid, without restoring to the

other party what he has received

from him. Holmes v. Blogg (8 Taunt.

508), 4 Com. L. 252; Corpe v. Over-

ton (10 Bing. 252), 25 id. 121; Farr v.

Sumner, 12 Vt. 32, 36 Am. Dec. :!'37. - '

To like effect: Whitcomb v. Joslyn,

51 Vt. 79, 31 Am. R. 678 (but Price v.

Furman, 27 Vt. 268, 65 Am. Dec. 194,

recognizes the exception spoken of

in the true rule as given in the text).

In Hall v. Butterfield, 59 N. H. 354,

47 Am. R. 209, it is said: "So they

(infants) were formerly allowed to

rescind and recover what they had

paid on their contracts without re-

storing what they had received. But

this lias been changed, and it is now

held that they cannot rescind with-

out restoring or offering to restore

774; House v.
1 xander, 105 Ind.
109, 4 N. E. R. 891, 5- Am. R. 1 9;
H oyt v. Wilkin on, 57 Vt. 404; Price
v. Furman, 27 Vt. 26 , 65 m. Dec.
194; Willis v. Twambly, 13 Ma . 204;
Staff rd v. Roof, 9 Cow. 626; B ol v .
Mi x, 17 W nd. 119, 31 Am.
c. 2 5);
Hall v. Butt di ld, 59 N. H. 354, ·17
Am. R. 209.
1 cranton v. Stewart, 52 Ind. 68;
Long v. Williams, 74 Ind. 115.
2 t. Louis, etc. Ry. Co. v. Higgins,
44 Ark. 293 ; Watson v. Billing , 38
Ark. 27 ; Sims v. Everhardt, 102 U. .

300.
3 Chapin v. Shafer, 49 N. Y. 407;
Stat v. lai ted, 4o N. H. 413; t te
v. Howard, 8 N. C. 650. Said Peckham, J., in Chapin v. Shafer, of the
di affirmance of a chattel mortgage:
"A umin O' that the mortgage is
voidable only. then the mortga or
had a right to avoirl it at any time
befor h arrived at age and within
area. onable time th reafter, by any
act which vin ed that purpo e, and
an unconditional sale of the property i u h an act."
4 In Taft v. Pike, 14 Vt. 405, 39 Am.
Dec. 22 , it is said: "Itis well tt.led
that if an infant has executed the
contract on his part by Lhe pay-

ment of money or the d livery of
prop rty, h cannot di affirm the
contra t and recov r ba,ck what he
ha paid. without re t ring to tl e
oth r part.y what he ha r c ived
from him. H lme v. Blogg ( Taunt.
50 ), 4 om. L. 252; Corpe v. Ov rt n (10 ing. 2-2), 25 id. 121; Farr v.
Sumn r, 12 Vt. 32, 36 Am. D c. 321."
To like ffect : Whitcomb v. Jo lyn,
51 Vt. 79, 31 Am. R. 678 (l>ut Price v.
Furman, 27 Vt. 26 , 65 Am. Dec. 194,
re gnizes the ,'C ]Jtion sp k n of
in the true rule a given in the text).
In Hall v. Butter.field, 59 N. H. 354,
47 Am. R. 209, it i said: " o th y
(infant ) w re formerly all wed to
rescind and re ov r what they had
paid on th ir contract with ut restoring what they had re iv d.
ut
thi has l ,n chang d, an lit is now
h ld that th y cann t re ind without r toring or off ring to r . t re
the consideration, if remaining in
sr eci and in the p s · ion or
ntrol of the infant and ar abl8 of return; and in ome juri diction it is
now held that, where the con ·id ration cannot be r tor d, the infant,
b fore he can be allowed to r cind,
mu t pla e the adult in as good ondition as though he had r turn ri the
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law; 1 and still others that it is not necessary at all. 2 The true

rule, however, seems to be that if, at the time of the disaffirm-

ance, the infant still has in his possession the consideration re-

ceived, he must offer to return it, and that he cannot disaffirm

the contract, if, before disaffirmance, but after attaining major-

consideration, or he must account

for the value of it." [Citing Carr v.

law; 1 and still others that it is not necessary at all. 2 The true
rule, however, seems to be that if, at the time of the disaffirmance, the infant still has in his possession the consideration received, he must offer to return it, and that he cannot disaffirm
the contract, if, before disaffirmance, but after attaining major-

Clough, 26 N. H. 289, 59 Am. Dec.

345; Heath v. West, 28 N. H. 101;

Locke v. Smith, 41 id. 346; Young v.

Stevens, 48 id. 133, 2 Am. R. 202;

Heath v. Stevens, 48 N. H. 251 ; Kim-

ball v. Bruce, 58 id. 327; Price v.

Furman,27 Vt. 268, 65 Am. Dec. 194;

Badger v. Phinney, 15 Mass. 359, 8

Am. Dec. 105; Riley v. Mallory, 33
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Conn. 201.] See also Stack v. Cava-

naugh, 67 N. H. 149, 30 Atl. R. 350.

1 Speaking of the disaffirmance of

executed as distinguished from ex-

ecutory contracts, it is said in Eureka

Co. v. Edwards, 71 Ala. 248, 46 Am.

R. 314, of the former: "Then the

quondam infant, or any one assert-

ing claim in his right, must become

the actor; and coming into court in

quest of equity, he must do or offer

to do equity, as a condition on which

relief will be decreed to him. This

is the difference between asking and

resisting relief. Roof v. Stafford, 7

Cow. (N. Y.) 179; Hillyer v. Bennett,

3 Edw. (N. Y.) Ch. 222; Bartholomew

v. Finnemore, 17 Barb. (N. Y.) 428;

Smith v. Evans, 5 Humph. (Tenn.) 70;

Mustard v. Wohlford. 15 Gratt. (Va.)

329, 76 Am. Dec. 209; Bedinger v.

Wharton, 27 Graft. (Va.) 857. But

it is only in equity this principle ob-

tains. If the suit be at law, the ten-

der need not ordinarily be made as a

condition of recovering the property.

But if the suit be in equity, and if

the money or other valuable thing

be stdl in esse, and in possession of

the party seeking the relief, or in

him from whom the right to sue is

derived, the bill, to be sufficient,

must tender, or offer to produce or

pay, as the case may be. Not so, if

the infant has used or consumed it

during his minority. Badger v. Phin-

ney, LTMass. 359, 8 Am. Dec. 105:

Price v. Furman, 27 Vt. 268, 65 Am.

Dec. 194; Chandler v. Simmons, 97

Mass. 508, 93 Am. Dec. 117; Walsh v.

Young, 110 Mass. 396; Green v. Green,

69 N. Y. 553, 25 Am. R. 233; Dill v.

consideration, or he must account
for the value of it." [Citing Carr v.
Clough, 26 N. H. 2c 9, 59 Am. Dec.
3-!5; Heath v. West, 28 N. H. 101;
Locke v. Smith, 41 i l. 346; Young v.
Steven , 48 id. 133, 2 Am. R. 202;
Heath v. Stevens, 48 N. H. 251; Kimball v. Bruce, 58 id. 327; Price v.
Furman, 27 Vt. 26 , 65 Am. Dec. 194;
Badger v. Phinney, 15 Mass. 359, 8
Am. Dec. 105; Riley v. Mallory, 33
Conn. 201.] See also Stack v. Cavanaugh, 67 N. H. 149, 30 Atl. R. 350.
1 Speaking of the disaffirmance of
executed as distinguished from executory contracts, it is said in Eureka
Co. v. Edwards, 71 Ala. 24 , 46 Am.
R. 314, of the former: "Then the
quondam infant, or any one asserting claim in his right, mu t become
the actor; and coming into court in
que t of equity, he mu t do or offer
to do equity, as a coudition on which
i·elief will be decreed to him. This
i the difference between asking and
re i -ting relief. Roof v. Stafford, 7
Cow. (N. Y.) 179; Hillyer v. Bennett,
3 Edw. (N. Y.) Ch. 299; Bartholomew
v. Finnemore, 17 Barb. (N. Y.) 428;
Smith v. Evans, 5 Humph. (Tenn.) 70;
Mustard v. Wohlford. 15 Gratt. ( a.)
329, 76 Am. Dec. 209; B ding r v.
Whart n, 27 Gratt. (Va.) 57. But
it is only in equity thi principle obtain . If the suit be at law, the t nder need n t ordinarily be made a a
ond.ition of recovering the prop rty.
But if the suit be in quity, and if
the money or other val uaule thing
be still in esse, and in poss s ion of

the party seeking the relief, or in
him from whom the right to sue is
derived, the bill, to be sufficient.
mu t tender, or offer to produce or
pay, as the case may be. Not so, if
the infant bas used or consumed it
during bis minority. Badger v. Phinney, 10- Mass. 359, 8 Am. Dec. 105:
Price v. Furman, 27 Vt. 26 , 65 Am.
Dec. 194; Chandler v. Simmons, 97
Mass. 50 , 93 Am. Dec. 117; Walsh v.
Young, 110 Mass. 396; Green v. Green,
69 N. Y. 553, 25 Am. R. 233; Dill v.°
Bowen, 54 Ind. 204; Phillips v. Green,
5 T. B. Mon. (Ky.) 344; Goodman v.
Winter, 64 Ala. 410, 38 Am. R 13;
Roberts v. Wiggin, 1 N. H. 78, 8 Am.
Dec. 39."
2 Carpenter v. Carpenter, 45 Ind.
142; \Vhite v. Branch, 51 Ind. 210;
Briggs v. McCabe, 27 Iud. 327, 89
Am. Dec. 503. In Clark v. Van Court,
100 Ind. 113, 50 Am. R. 774, the rule
in that state is stated as follows: "A
contract made by an infant, although
executed, is, as to him, voidable (Fetrow v. Wiseman, 40 Ind. 14 ), and it
may be avoided by him at any time
during his minority, or on his arrival at full age (Indianapolis Chair
1fg. Co. v. Wilcox, 59 Ind. 429), without returning or offering to return to
the other party the property which
was obtained from him under the
contra t. arpenter v. Carpenter, 45
Ind. 142; Towell v. Pence, 47 Ind. 304;
'W hite v. Bran h, 51 Ind. 210; Dill v.
Bowen, 5-! Ind. 204." See also St.
Loui , etc. Ry. Co. v. Higgins, 44
Ark. 293.

Bo wen, 54 Ind. 204; Phillips v. Green,

5 T. B. Mon. (Ky.) 344; Goodman v.

Winter, 64 Ala. 410, 38 Am. R. 13;

Roberts v. Wiggin, 1 N. H. 73, 8 Am.

Dec. 38."

2 Carpenter v. Carpenter, 45 Ind.

142; White v. Branch, 51 Ind. 210;

Briggs v. McCabe, 27 Ind. 327, 89

Am. Dec. 503. In Clark v. Van Court,
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ifcy, he has disposed of the property or thing received, or has

fraudulently disposed of the consideration with a view of avoid-

ing the necessity of a return in case of a subsequent disaffirm-

nace. But where during infancy he has, even improvidently

or carelessly, consumed, spent, lost or injured the money or

thing received as the consideration, he may, notwithstanding,

either before or within a reasonable time after majority, dis-

affirm the contract, and recover what he has parted with, al-

though he is unable either to return what he received, 1 or to

return it in as good condition as when he received it. 2

i Price v. Furman, 27 Vt. 268, 65

Am. Dec. 194, is a leading case among

the earlier ones in which this rule

was recognized. It is there said:

" The doctrine is now well settled by

ity, he has disposed of the property or thing received, or has
fraudulently disposed of the consideration with a view of avoiding the necessity of a return in case of a subsequent disaffirmnace. But where during infancy he has, even improvidently
or carelessly, consumed, spent, lost or injured the money or
thing received as the consideration, he may, notwithstanding,
either before or within a reasonable time after majority, disaffirm the contract, and recover what be bas parted with, although he is unable either to return what he received,1 or to
return it in as good condition as when he received it. 2

the authorities that when a contract
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is avoided by an infant he may re-

cover back whatever he has paid or

delivered on it. If services have been

rendered, he may recover in quantum

meruit the value that his services

have been upon the whole state of

the case; if money or property has

been paid or delivered, it can equally

be recovered. Moses v. Stevens, 2

Pick. (Mass.) 382; Vent v. Osgood, 19

id. 572; Voorhees v. Wait, 15 N. J. L.

343; Judkins v. Walker, 17 Me. 38,

35 Am. Dec. 229; Whitmarsh v.

Hall, 3 Denio (N. Y.), 375. But in all

such cases, as a general rule, if the

infant rescinds the contract and

avoids hisliabilityupon it, he must sur-

render the consideration and return

what he has received, for it would be

unjust to permit him to recover back

what he has paid or delivered and at

the same time permit him to retain

the fruits of the contract which he

has received. Taft v. Pike, 14 Vt.

405, 39 Am. Dec. 228; Walker v. Fer-

rin, 4 id. 523; Weed v. Beebe, 21 id.

495; Hillyer v. Bennett, 3 Edw. (N. Y.)

Ch. 222; Kitchen v. Lee, 11 Paige

(N. Y), 107, 42 Am. Dec. 101. This

rule, however, is subject to an im-

portant qualification. A distinction

is to be observed between the case of

an infant in possession of such prop-

erty after age and when he lias lost,

sold or destroyed the property during

1 Price v. Furman, 27 Vt. ~68, 65
Am. Dec. 194, is a leading case among
the earlier ones in which this rule
was recognized. It is there said:
"The doctrine is now well settled by
th,e authorities that when a contract
is avoided by an infant he may recover back whatever he has paid or
delivered on it. If services have been
r endered, he may recover in quantum
meruit the value that his services
have been upon the whole state of
the case; if money or property has
been paid or delivered, it can equally
be recovered. Moses v. Stevens, 2
Pick. (Mas .) 332; Vent v. 0 good, 19
id. 572; Voorhees v. Wait, 15 N. J. L.
343; Judkins v. Walker, 17 Me. 38,
35 Am. Dec. 229; Whitmarsh v.
Hall, 3 Denio (N. Y.), 375. But in all
such cases, as a general rule. if the
infant r e cinds the contract and
a void hisliabilityupon it,hemustsurrender the consideration and return
what he has received, for it would be
unjust to permit him to recover back
·w hat he has paid or delivered and at
the same time permit him to retain

the fruits of the contract which he
bas received. Taft v. Pike, 14 Vt.
405, 39 Am. Dec. 228; Walker v. Ferrin, 4 id. 523; Weed v. Beebe. 21 id.
495; Hillyerv. Bennett, 3 Edw. (N. Y.)
Ch. 222; Kitchen v. Lee, 11 Paige
(N. Y.), 107, 42 Am. Dec. 101. This
rule, however, is subject to an important qualification. A distinction
is to be observed between the case of
an infant in possession of su ch property after age and when he has lost.
sold or de troyed the property during
his minority. In the former case, if
he has put the property out of his
power, he has ratified the contract
and rendered it obligatory upon him;
in the latter case the property is to
be restored if it be in his posse sion
and control. If the property is not
in his hands nor under bis control,
that obligation ceases. To ay that
an infant cannot recover back his
ptoperty, which he has parted w ith
under such circumstances, because
by his indiscretion he has spent, consumed or injured· that which he received, would be making his want of

his minority. In the former case, if

he has put the property out of his

power, he has ratified the contract

and rendered it obligatory upon him;

in the latter case the property is to

be restored if it be in his possession

and control. If the property is not

in his hands nor under his control,

that obligation ceases. To say that

an infant cannot recover back his

property, which he has parted with

under such circumstances, because

by his indiscretion he has spent, con-

sumed or injured that which he re-

ceived, would be making his want of

2 Evidence of depreciation in the

2 Evidence of depreciation in the the damages, in an action by him to
value of the article to be returned recover the consideration upon his
by the infant is inadmissible either disaffirmance of the contract. Price
for the purpose of defeating a recov- v. Furman, 27 Vt. 268, 65 Am. Dec.
ery, or for the purpose of reducing 194.
107
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§ 110. Right to recover from subsequent bona fide

purchaser.— The right of the infant to disaffirm is, it is said,

an absolute and paramount one, superior to the equities of all

other persons, and, when it may be exercised at all, it may be

exercised against the lona fide purchaser from his grantee as

well as from such grantee himself. 1

discretion the means of binding him

to all his improvident contracts and

110. - - R igl1 t to recove r fr om nbseqn ent bona fiile
pnrcba er .-Tbe right of the infant to di affirm i , it is said,
an ab olute and paramount on superior to the equities of all
other persons, and, "·hen it may be exercised at all, it may be
exerci eel again t the "bona fide purchaser from his grantee as
well as from such grantee bimself.l

deprive him of that protection which

the law designed to secure to him.

The authorities, we think, fully sus-

tain this qualification of that rule.

Fitts v. Hall, 9 N. H. 441; Robbins v.

Eaton, 10 id. 562; Boody v. McKen-

ney. 23 Me. 517, 525, 526: Tucker v.

Moreland, 1 Am. Lead. Cas. 260."
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In Craig v. Van Bebber, 100 Mo.

584, 13 S. W. R. 906, 18 Am. St. R. 569,

it is said: " If he has wasted or squan-

dered the consideration or property

during infancy, then he can repudi-

ate the contract without making a

tender. Tyler on Infancy (2d ed.),

§ 37; Green v. Green, 69 N. Y. 553,

25 Am. R. 233; Chandler v. Simmons,

97 Mass. 508, 93 Am. Dec. 117; Reyn-

olds v. McCurry, 100 111. 356; Bran-

don v. Brown, 106 111. 519; Price v.

Furman, 27 Vt. 268, 65 Am. Dec. 194;

Walsh v. Young, 110 Mass. 396. The

privilege of repudiating a contract is

accorded an infant because of the in-

discretion incident to his immatu-

rity ; and if he were required to re-

store an equivalent, where he has

wasted or squandered the property,

or consideration received, the privi-

lege would be of no avail when most

needed."' (Kerr v. Bell, 44 Mo. 120;

Highley v. Barron, 49 Mo. 103; and

Baker v. Kennett, 54 Mo. 82, were

modified.)

In Green v. Green, 69 N. Y 553, 25

Am. R. 233 (involving a sale of land),

Church, C. J., says: "The right to

repudiate is based upon the incapac-

ity of the infant to contract, and

that incapacity applies as well to the

avails as to the property itself, and

when the avails of the property are

improvidently spent or lost by spec-

ulation or otherwise during minor-

ity, the infant should not be held re-

sponsible for an inability to restore

them. To do so would operate as a

serious restriction upon the right of

an infant to avoid his contract, and

in many cases would destroy the

right altogether. . . The right

to rescind is a legal right established

for the protection of the infant, and

to make it dependent upon perform-

ing an impossibility, which impossi-

bility has resulted from acts which

the law presumes him incapable of

performing, would tend to impair the

right and withdraw the protection.''

discretion the mean of binding him repudiate is based upon the incapacto all hi impro>ident contract ancl ity of the infant to contract, and
deprive him of that protection which that incapacity applie a well to the
the law de, igned to secure to him. avails a to the property it elf, and
The authoritie , we think, fully us- when the avails of the property are
tain thi qualification of that rule. improvidently spent or lost by specFitts v. Hall, 9 . H. 441; Robbins v. ulat.ion or other wi e during minorEaton, 10 id. 562; Boody v. 1\lcKen- ity, the infant should not be held reney 23 1\fe. 517, 525, 526; Tucker v. spon ible for an inability to re tore
Moreland, 1 Am. Lead. Ca . 260."
them. To do so would operate a a
In Craig v. Van Bebber, 100 Mo.
eriou re triction upon the right of
584, 13 . W.R. 906, 18 Am. St. R. 569, an infant to avoid his contract, and
it i , aid: "If he has wa ted or q uan- in many cases would de t r oy the
dered the con ideration or property right altogether.
. . The r igh t
during infancy, then he can repudi- to rescind is a legal right e tabli bed
ate the contract without making a for the protection of the infant, and
tender. Tyler on Infancy (2d ed.), to make it dependent upon perform~ 37; Green v. Green, 69 N. Y. 5u3, ing an impo ibility, which irnpo si25 m. R. 233· Chandler v. Simmon , bility has resulted from act which
97 l\Ia . ·o . 93 Am. Dec. 117; R yn- the law pre ume him incapable of
ol<l v. 1\IcCurry, 100 Ill. 356· Bran- performing, would tend to impair the
don v. Brown, 106 Ill. -19; Price v. right and withdraw the protection."
Furman, 27 Vt. 26 , 65 Am. Dec. 194;
Re toration not nece a ry wh e re it
Wal ·h v. Young, 110 l\'Ias . 396. The ha been di. ipated during minority.
privilege of repudiating a contract i
Bullock v. prowls (1 99). 93 Tex. 1 8,
accorde<l an infant becau e of the in- 47 L. R. . 3'>6, -4 S. \ . R. 661; Ridgedi cretion incident to hi immatu- way v. Herb rt (1 99), 150 1\lo. 606, 51
rity; and if he were required to r . \V. R. 1040; American Freehold
tore an equivalent, where he ha l\Itg. Co. v. Dykes (1 93), 111Ala. 178,
wa ·t d or quanJered the property, 20 . R. 136, 56 Am. t. R. 3 . But he
or on ·id ration r ceh'ed, the privi- mu t refund if he ha it.
a,nger v.
lege w ul l be of no avail when mo t Hibbard (1 99), - Ind. Ter. - . -3 .
n d d.' (Kerr v. B 11, 44 Io. 120 · W.R. 3:JO; Englebert v. Troxell (1 04),
Hi O'hley v. Barr n, 49 Io. 10 ; and 40 Neb. 195, 5 r . vV. R. 2, 42 Am.
Baker v. Kennett, 4 :i\fo.
t. R. 663.
mo ifi d.)
I Brant! y v. vVolf, 60
Ii . 420;
In " r n v. Gr n. 69 N. Y. 533 2.- Howar '· impkin , 10 a. 3'>'>· Hi ll
Am. R. ·>:3. (involving a ale of land), v. nde1°'on, 5 Smedes & .l\l ( Ii ·)
Chur h, . J., say : 'The right to 216.
108
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§ 111. Chattel mortgage made by iufant. — The infant's

mortgage of his chattels stands upon ground rather more ad-

vantageous to him than his sales of like property, particularly

-when not accompanied by a change of possession or not given

for necessaries.

§ 112. When avoided. — Like his contracts of sale, his

mortgage of his chattels may be avoided by him either during

his infancy or within a reasonable time thereafter. 1

" 111. Chattel mortgage made by infant.-The infant's
mortgage of his chattels stancls upon ground rather more advantageous to him than his sales of like property, particularly
" hen not accompanied by a change of posse sion or not given
for necessaries.

§ 113. Returning consideration. — And he may do this

without being bound, certainly where he has disposed of it, to

return the consideration received for the mortgage. 2 If it were

otherwise, if an infant " borrows money, and improvidently

disposes of it, as the law from his want of discretion presumes

he may do, this very indiscretion which the law endeavors to

112. - - When av oided.- Like his contracts of sale, bis
mortD'age of his chattels may be avoided by him either during
his infancy or within a reasonable time thereafter. 1

shield and protect becomes the means of fastening the imper-

fect obligation irrevocably upon him, and his inability to refund

what he has borrowed affirms his contract to repay it with in-

terest. It is needless to say that there is no privilege and no
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protection in such a rule." 3 " Under the operation of such a

rule, money lenders would soon become permanently possessed

of the property of infant spendthrifts, for with them the temp-

tation to borrow for immediate gratification is generally too

great to be resisted. Its adoption as a rule would be in vio-

lation of the principle of protection that underlies the whole

doctrine of the law pertaining to the dealings and contracts of

infants." 4

§ 114. How disaffirmed. — The disaffirmance of the

chattel mortgage may be accomplished by the same means

which would suffice in case of a sale. Certainly an absolute

i Miller v. Smith, 26 Minn. 248, 2 W. R. 942, 37 Am. .R. 407; Corey v.

N. W. R. 942, 37 Am. R, 407, citing Burton, 32 Mich. 30.

Stafford v. Roof, 9 Cow. (N. Y.) 626; 3 Cooley, J., in Corey v. Burton,

Chapin v. Shafer, 49 N. Y. 407; Ran- supra.

dall v. Sweet, 1 Den. (N. Y.) 460. * Cornell, J., in Miller v. Smith,

2 Miller v. Smith, 26 Minn. 248, 2 N. supra,

109

§ 11 3. - - Returnin g consideration.-And he may do this
without being bound, certainly where be has disposed of it, to
return the consideration received for the mortgage. 2 If it were
otberwi e, if an infant 'borrows money, and improvidently
dispo es of it, as the law from his want of discretion presumes
he may do, this very in E cretion ·which the law endeavors to
shield an l protect becomes the means of fastening the imperf ct obligation irrevocably upon him, and his inaliility to refund
what he has borrowed affirms his contract to repay it with intere t. It is needless to say that there is no privilege and no
protection in uch a rule.' 3 'Under the operation of such a
r ule, money lenders would oon become permanently possessed
of the property of infant pend thrifts, for with them the temptation to borrow for immediate gratification is generally too
g reat to be resi ted. Its adoption as a rule would be in violation of the principle of protection that underlies the whole
loctrine of the law pertaining to the dealings and contracts of
in fants." 4
' 114:. - - How disaffi rmed.- The disaffirmance of the
chattel mortgage may be accomplished by the same means
which would suffice in case of a sale. Certainly an absolute
I Miller v. Smith, 26 Minn. 248, 2
N. W . R. 942, 37 Am. R. 407, citing
Staffor d v. Roof, 9 Cow. (N. Y.) 626;
Chapin v. Shafer, 49 N. Y. 407; Randa ll v. Sweet, 1 Den. (N. Y.) 460.
2 Miller v. Smith, 26 Minn. 248, 2 N.

W. R. 942, 37 Am. ·R. 407; Corey v.
Burton, 32 Mich. 30.
a Cooley, J., in Corey v. Burton,

supra.
4

Cornell, J., in Miller v. Smith,

supra.
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and unconditional sale of the mortgaged property would be

clear evidence of an intention to disaffirm. 1

§ 115. Purchases by infant, voidable when not necessa-

and unconditional sale of the mortgaged property would be
clear evidence of an intention to disaffirm. 1

ries. — An infant's purchases of goods, not constituting what

are known as necessaries, 2 are, though executed upon his part,

voidable like his executed contracts of sale. 3

§ 116. When may he avoided. — And like the contract

of sale, the contract of purchase may be disaffirmed by the in-

fant either during his minority, 4 or within a reasonable time

after he becomes of age. 5

§ 115. Purchases by infant, voidable when not necessaries.- An infant's purchases of goocls, not constituting what
are known as necessaries, 2 are, though execu te<l upon his part,
voidable like his executed contracts of sale. 3

g 117. How avoided. — The methods which may be

pursued are substantially the same which suffice in the case,

already considered, 6 of the sale or exchange, as by notice, ten-

der, action at law, or plea of infancy. In one case 7 an infant

had purchased a horse, and sixteen days afterward tendered

the horse to the seller and demanded the price paid. The seller

refused to receive the horse or return the money, and the in-

fant therefore kept the horse and brought an action for a rescis-

§ 116. - - When may be avoided.- And like the contract
Qf sale, the contract of purchase may be disaffirmed by the infant either during his minority, 4 or within a reasonable time
:after he becomes of age. 5
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sion and a recovery of the money. Said the court: " We think

it perfectly clear that after an infant has done all in his power

§ 117. - - How avoidcd.-The methods which may be

to secure a rescission, and has brought suit to rescind the con-

tract, he cannot be held to have ratified the contract because

the property is still retained by him. What more he could do

to evince his repudiation of the contract, or what more he could

legally do toward putting it into the possession of the seller,

we are at a loss to conjecture."

§ 118. Necessity for return of consideration. — The

same question as to the necessity of a return of the considera-

iChapin v. Shafer, 49 N. Y. 407; cox, 59 Ind. 429; Rice v. Boyer, 108

State v. Plaisted, 43 N. H. 413; State Ind. 472, 9 N. E. R. 420, 58 Am. R. 53;

v. Howard, 88 N. C. 650. House v. Alexander. 105 Ind. 109, 4

2 See post, § 130. N. E. R. 891, 55 Am. R. 189.

3 See ante, § 106. s See post, § 121 ; ante, % 107.

* Riley v. Mallory, 33 Conn. 201; 6 See ante, § 108.

Cogley v. Cushman, 16 Minn. 397; 7 House v. Alexander, 105 Ind. 109,

Indianapolis Chair Mfg. Co. v. Wil- 55 Am. R. 189, 4 N. E. R. 891.
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pursued are substantia11y the same which suffice in the case,
already considere<l, 6 of the sale or exchange, as by notice, tender, action at law, or plea of infancy. In one case 7 an infant
had purchased a horse, and sixteen days afterward tendered
the horse to the seller and demanded the price paid. The seller
refused to receive the horse or return the money, and the infant therefore kept the horse and brought an action for a rescission and a recovery of the money. Said the court: "We think
it perfectly clear that after an infant has done all in his power
to secure a rescission, and has brought suit to rescind the contract, he cannot be held to have ratified the contract because
the property is still retained by him. What more be could do
to evince his repudiation of the contract, or what more he could
legally do toward putting it into the possession of the seller,
we are at a loss to conjecture."

§ 118. - - Necessity for return of' consideration.-Tbe
same question as to the necessity of a return of the consideraI Chapin v. Shafer, 49 N. Y. 407;
cox, 59 Ind. 429; Rice v. Boyer, 108
State v. Plai ted, 43 N. H. 413; State Ind. 472, 9 N. E. R. 420, 58 Am. R. 53;
v. Howard,
N. C. 650.
Hou e v. Alexancl r, 105 Ind. 109, 4
2 ee 1:>0 t,
130.
N. E. R. 91, 55 Am. R. 1 9.
a See ante, § 106.
5 See po t, § 121; ante, § 107.
4 Riley v. Ma.llory, 33 Conn. 201;
6 ee ante, § 10 .
Cogley v. Cushman, 16 Minn. 397;
7 Hou
v. Al .xander, 105 Ind. 109,
Indianapoli Chair Mfg. Co. v. Wil- 55 Am. R. 1 9, 4 N. E. R. 891.
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.CH. HI.

J

C.AP.ACITY Olf PARTIES.

[§ 11 .

CH. III.]

CAPACITY OF PARTIES.

[§ H8.

tion arises here which arises in the case, already considered,

of the infant's sale of his property. 1 And, notwithstanding

like conflict in the authorities, the true rule seems to be, here

as there, that the infant's failure to tender back the goods

bought will defeat his right to disaffirm, only when at the time

of his disaffirmance he has them in his possession or under his

control, or has disposed of them after coming of age; and

that where, during infancy, he has, improvidently or other-

wise, lost, injured, disposed of, or consumed them, he may re-

cover the price paid without a return of the goods, 2 even in

equity. 3 Thus, where the goods have been wrongfully taken

from him upon an execution against a third person, the infant

is not bound to attempt their recovery in order to return them

upon disaffirmance. It is enough that they have passed out of

his possession and beyond his present control. 4

erty or it is destroyed, then it is im-
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possible to administer this equity.

To hold that in such a case, when

the infant is sued for the price, ho

might defend against his liability on

the contract, but is to be held re-

sponsible as for a tort in converting

tion arises here which arises in the case, already considered,
-0f the infant's sale of bis property. 1 And, notwithstanding
like conflict in the authorities, the true rule seems to be, here
as there, that the infant's failure to tender back the goods
bought will defeat his right to disaffirm, only when at the time
<>f his disaffirmance he has them in bis possession or under bis
-0ontrol, or bas disposed of them after coming of age; and
that where, during infancy, be bas, improvidently or otherwise, lost, injured, disposed of, or consumed them, be may recover the price paid without a return of the goods, 2 even in
-equit.y. 3 Thus, where the goods have been wrongfully taken
from him upon an execution against a third person, the infant
is not bound to attempt their recovery in order to return them
upon disa-ffirmance. It is enough that they have passed out of
his possession and beyond his present control. 4

the property, would be practically

to debar him from the plea of in-

fancy as to his unauthorized con-

tracts, unless he was prepared to

place the vendor in statu quo by a

return of the property. In other

words, the disability of infancy

would only amount to the right to

rescind the contract, and if unable

to comply with a necessary condi-

tion of this, that is, the return of the

property, then he would always be

held liable for its value. He would

be liable for the value, either in con-

tract or tort, but would have the

right to rescind as the extent of his

rights under the disability of in-

fancy. We do not so understand the

law."

4 Lemmon v. Beeman, 45 Ohio St.

505, 15 N. E. R 476.

1 See ante, § 109.

2 Shirk v. Shultz, 113 Ind. 571, 15

N. E. R. 12; Lemmon v. Beeman, 45

Ohio St. 505, 15 N. E. R. 476: Morse

v. Ely (1891), 154 Mass. 458, 28 N. E.

R. 577 [citing Chandler v. Simmons,

97 Mass. 508, 514; Bartlett v. Drake,

100 Mass. 174, 177; Walsh v. Young,

110 Mass. 396, 399; Dube v. Beaudry,

150 Mass. 448, 23 N. E. R. 222; Boody

v. McKenney, 23 Me. 517; Price v.

Furman, 27 Vt. 268].

3 In Nichol v. Steger, 6 Lea (Tenn.),

393, affirming the decree of Cooper,

Oh., 2 Tenn. Ch. 328, it is said: "It is

earnestly urged, however, that the

infant, in a court of equity, must re-

turn the property before he can dis-

affirm the contract. We need but

say, that where the property is in his

possession, or he still has it, so that

the court can compel him so to do,

he will be required to return it, as

one of the terms on which the court

See ante,§ 109.
erty or it is de troyed, then it is imv. Shultz, 113 Ind. 571, 15 po ible to administer this equity.
N. E. R. 12; Lemmon v. Beeman, 45 To bold that in such a ca e, when
'Ohio St. 505, 15 N. E. R. 476; Morse the infant is sued for the price, ho
v. Ely (1891), 154 Mass. 458, 28 N. E. might defend again this liability on
R. 577 [citing Chandler v. Simmons, the contract, but i to be held re'97 Ma s. 508, 514; Bartlett v. Drake, sponsible as for a tort in converting
100 Mas". 174, 177; Walsh v. Young, the property, would be practically
110 Mass. 396, 399; Dube v. Beaudry, to debar him from the plea of in150 Mass. 448, 23 N. E. R. 222; Boody fancy as to his unauthorized conv. McKenney, 23 Me. 517; Price v. tracts, unless he wa prepared to
Furman, 27 Vt. 268].
place the vendor in statu quo by a
3 In Nichol v. Steger, 6 Lea (Tenn.), return of the property. In other
.393, affirming the decree of Cooper, words, the disability of infancy
Ch., 2 Tenn. Ch. 328, it is said: "It is would only amount to the right to
earnestly urged, however, that the rescind the contract, and if unable
infant, in a court of equity, must re- to comply with a hece sary conditurn the property before he can dis- tion of this, that is, the return of the
affirm the contract. We need but property, then he would al ways be
say, that where the property is in his held liable for its value. He would
possession, or he still has it. so that he liable for the value, either in conthe court can compel him so to do, tract or tort, but would have the
he will be required to return it, as right to rescind as the extent of bis
one of the terms on which the court rights under the di ability of ingives relief from an improvident fancy. We do not so understand the
contract, or one made by a party law."
under the disability of infancy. But
4 Lemmon v. Beeman, 45 Ohio St.
where he has parted with the prop- 505, 15 N. E. R. 476.
111
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2 Shirk

§§ 119, 120.J

LAW OF SALE.

[.BOOK I.

§§ 119, 120.] LAW OF SALE. [BOOK I.

§ 119. Ineffectual defenses — Recoupment — Injury

to goods — Stolen money — Representation as to age. — In

an action to recover the price paid the defendant cannot re-

coup damages for the use of the property while in the infant's

possession. In a case l where this defense was attempted the

court said: "The contract, express or implied, to pay for such

use is one he is incapable of making, and his infancy would be

a bar to such suit. We cannot see how the defendants can

avail themselves of and enforce, by way of recoupment, a claim

which they could not enforce by a direct suit."

So, that the goods have deteriorated in value, has been held

to be no defense to an action to recover the price. 2 And

the fact that the infant stole the money with which to buy the

coods is no defense to the seller so long as the owner of the

money makes no claim upon the seller. 3 Neither is it a bar to

disaffirmance that the infant fraudulently represented himself

to be of age, though the seller may, perhaps, have an action

for the fraud. 4
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§ 12o # Effect of disaffirmance — Not only entitles in-

fant to restoration, but reinvests seller's title. — The elfect

of the disaffirmance is not only to entitle the infant to recover

his money, but it also reinvests the seller with the title to the

goods. 5 If, therefore, the infant disaffirms the transaction,

either actively, in the case of the executed contract, as by seek-

ing to recover the price paid ; or passively, in the case of the

executory contract, as by setting up the defense of infancy

1 McCarthy v. Henderson (1885), that an infant, on rescinding the pur-

138 Mass. 310. See also Pyne v. Wood chase of a bicycle, and claiming the

§ 119. - - Ineffectual defenses - Recoupment-Injury
to goods - Stolen money - Representation as to age.- In
an action to recover the price paid the defendant cannot recoup damages for the use of the property while in the infant's
pos s ion. In a case 1 where this defense was attempted the
court said: "The contract, express or implied, to pay for such
use is one he is incapable of making, and his infancy would be
a bar to such suit. \Ve cannot see how the defendants can
avail themselves of anu enforce, by way of recoupment, a claim
which they could not enforce by a direct suit."
So, that the goods have deteriorated in value, has been held
to be no defense to an action to recover the price. 2 And
the fact that the infant stole the money with which to buy the
goo ls is no defense to the seller so long as the owner of the
money makes no claim upon the seller. 3 Neither is it a bar to
disaffirmance that the infant fraudulently represented himself
to be of age, though the seller may, perhaps, have an action
for the fraud. 4

(1888), 145 Mass. 558, 14 N. E. R. 775, return of the instalments paid upon

and Rice v. Butler, cited in the fol- it, must account for the use and de-

lowing note. terioration of the wheel.

2 Price v. Furman (1855), 27 Vt. 268, 3 Riley v. Mallory, 33 Conn. 201.

65 Am. Dec. 1 ( J4; Stack v. Cavanaugh 4 Carpenter v. Carpenter, 45 Ind.

(1891), 67 N. H. 149, 30 Atl. R. 350. 142. See also Slayton v. Barry (1900),

But in Rice v. Butler (1899), 160 175 Mas . 513, 56 N. E. R 574.

N. Y. 578, 55 N. E. R. 275, 47 L. R. A. * Shirk v. Shultz, 113 Ind. 571, 15

303, it is held, denying McCarthy v. N. E. R. 12, and cases in next note.

Henderson and Pyne v. Wood, supra,
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§ 120. - - Effect of disaffirmance-Not only entitles infant to restoration, but rein vests seller's title.- The effect
of the disaffirmance is not only to entitle the infant to recover
his money, but it also rein vests the seller with the title to the
good .5 If, therefore, the infant disaffirms the transaction,
either actively, in the case of the executed contract, as by seeking to recover the price paid; or passively, in the case of the
executory contract, as by setting up the defense of infancy
that an infant, on rescinding the purchase of a bicycle, and claiming the
return of the in t a lments paid upon
it, mu t account for the u e and det rioration of the wheel.
lowing note.
2 Pnce v. Furman (1 5-), 27 Vt. 26 ,
3 RilPy v. Mallory, 33 Conn. 201.
4
Ca rpent r v. Carp nt r, 45 Incl.
6- m.
. 194; ta k v. avan ugh
14 .
al o layton v. Ba rry (1900),
(1 91), 67 N. H. 149 30 tl. R. 3.-0.
ut in Ric v. utl r (1 99), 1 0 1r Ma " 513 56 N. E. R. 574.
5 , i1irk v.
hultz, 113 Ind. 57~, 15
N. Y. 57 , 55 N. E. R. 2T, 47 . R.
303, it i h ld d nying lll ar hy v. N. E. R. 1 , and ca e in next note.
H end rson and Pyne v. v otl, ::w pru,
I McCarthy v. Henderson (1
5),
13 l\Ia 310. S ee also Pyne v. Wood
(1 ), 145 l\fass. 5- , 14 N. E. R. 775,
and Ri e v. Butler, cited in the fol-

11 ...

CH. III.]

CAP A CITY OF l'ARTIES.

[§ 120.

CH. III.]

CAPACITY OF PARTIES.

[§ 120.

when sued for the price, the other party is entitled to have

back from the infant the goods sold, if in the infant's posses-

sion at the time of the disaffirmance; and, if the infant refuses

to surrender them, or after disaffirmance sells, disposes of or

destroys them, the seller may maintain the appropriate action

either to recover the goods or their value. 1

Chattel mortgage. — The same rule applies where the infant

lias given a mortgage upon the goods to secure the purchase

price, or a portion thereof — he cannot avoid the mortgage

and keep the goods; if he repudiates the mortgage, he repu-

diates the whole transaction, and the seller may recover the

goods. 2

Conditional sale. — It applies also where the infant has pur-

chased goods upon the contract ordinarily known as a " condi-

tional sale," i. e., where the title is not to pass until payment.

He cannot, by avoiding his agreement to pay, obtain an absolute
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title to the goods. If he disaffirms, the whole contract is at

i In Fitts v. Hall, 9 N. H. 441, the

court say: "If, after the defendant

in this case had interposed his plea of

infancy and refused to perform the

contract, the plaintiff had demanded

the (goods), and the defendant, hav-

ing them in his possession, had re-

fused to deliver them, that would

when sued for the price, the other party is entitled to have
back from the infant the goods sold, if in the infant's possession at the time of the disa:ffirmance; and, if the infant refuses
to surrender them, or after disaffirmance sells, disposes of or
destroys them, the seller may maintain the appropriate action
either to recover the goods or their value. 1
Chattel mortgage.-The same rule applies where the infant
has given a mortgage upon the goods to secure the purchase
price, or .a portion thereof- he cannot avoid the mortgage
and keep the goods; if he repudiates the mortgage, he repudiates the whole transaction, and the seller may recover the
goods. 2
Conditional sale.- It applies also where the infant has purchaseu goods upon the contract ordinarily known as a "conditional sale," i. e., where the title is not to pa s until payment.
He cannot, by avoiding his agreement to pay, obtain an absolute
title to the goods. If he clisaffirms, the whole contract is at

have been a wilful, positive wrong

of itself, disconnected from the con-

tract, and upon such evidence the

count in trover might have been

maintained. Where goods were sold

to an infant, on a credit, upon his

representation that he was of full

age, and a plea of infancy was inter-

posed, an action of replevin was sus-

tained against his administrator,

after a demand upon him. Badger

v. Phinney, 15 Mass. 359, 8 Am. Dec.

105. In this latter case the defense

of infancy was made by the admin-

istrator of the infant ; the demand of

the goods was made upon him, and

the action sustained against him;

but the court said 'the basis of this

contract has failed, from the fault,

if not the fraud, of the infant; and

on that ground the property may be

considered as never having passed

from, or as having revested in, the

plaintiff.' And upon this ground, if

the infant, having rescinded his con-

tract, withholds the goods purchased,

after a demand which he had power

to comply with, there seems to be no

good reason why he should not an-

swer in trover, the same as for any

other conversion of property law-

fully in his possession." Vasse v.

Smith, 6 Cranch (U. S.), 231; Mills v.

Graham, 4 Bos. & Pul. 140. See also

Walker v. Davis, 1 Gray (Mass.), 506;

Heath v. West, 28 N. H. 101; Skin-

ner v. Maxwell, 66 N. C. 45; Bennett

v. McLaughlin, 13 111. App. 349; Car-

penter v. Carpenter, 45 Ind. 142.

2 Heath v. West, 28 N. H. 101; Skin-

ner v. Maxwell, 66 N. C. 45.
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1 In Fitts v. Hall, 9 N. H. 441, the but the court said 'the basis of this
court say: "If, after the defendant contract bas failed, from the fault,
in this ca e had interposed hi · plea of if not the fraud, of the infant; and
infancy ancl refu ed to perform the on that ground the property may be
contract, the plaint.if! had demanded con idered as never having passed
the (goods), and the defendant, hav- from, or as having revested in, the
ing them in his possession, had re- plaintiff.' And upon this ground, if
fused to deliver them, that would the infant, having re cinded his conhave been a wilful, po itive wrong tract, withholds the goods purnhased,
of itself, disconnected from the con- after a demand which he had power
tract, and upon such eviclence the to comply with, there seems to be no
count in trover might have been good rea on why he should not anmaintained. Where goods were sold swer in trover, the same a for any
to au infant, on a credit, upon his other conversion of property lawr epresentation that he was of fnll fully in his pos~ession." Vas e v.
age, and a plea of infancy was inter- Smith, 6 Cran ch (U. S. ), 231; I ills v.
posed, an action of replevin was sus- Graham, 4 Bos. & Pul. 140. See also
tained against his administrator, Walker v. Davis, 1 Gray ( fass.), 506;
after a demand upon him. Badger Heath v. We t, 28 N. H. 101; Skinv. Phinney, 15 Mass. 359, 8 Am. Dec. ner v. Maxwell, 66 N. C. 45; Bennett
105. In this latter case the defense v. McLaughlin, 13 Ill. App. 349; Carof infancy was made by the admin- penter v. Carpenter, 45 Ind. 142.
istrator of the infant; the demand of
2 Heath v. West, 2 N. H. 101; Skinthe goods was made upon him, and ner v. l\Iaxwell, 66 N. C. 45.
the action sustained against him;
8
113

LA.W OF

ALE.

[BOOK I.

121.]

LAW OF SALE.

[BOOK I.

an end, and the vendor is entitled to a restoration of his goods,

an end an] the vendor is entitled to a r toration of hi good
an l may recover them in r plevin. 1

and may recover them in replevin. 1

§ 121. Ratification of purchases. — After he becomes of age, 2

thouo-h not before, 3 the infant may ratify and affirm the pur-

chase. This he may do, either expressly, by some intentional

act directed to that end, or impliedly, by so dealing with refer-

ence to the subject-matter that his affirmance may be presumed. 4

The express ratification, of course, occasions less legal difficulty

than the implied.

i Robinson v. Berry (1899), 93 Me.

320, 45 Atl. R. 34.

2 See ante, § 99.

* See ante, §99.

121. Ratification of purcha. e .-After he becomes of age 2
though not before 3 th infant ma. ratify and affirm the purcba e. Thi h ma. do, eith r expre l v b) ome intentional
act lirected to that end or implie lly by o dealing 'iYi h reference to the ubje t-ma ter that hi affirma n~e ma\' b pre umed. 4
The ex.pre ratification of cour e occa ions le legal difficulty
than the implied.

4 In Philpot v. Sandwich. Mfg. Co.

(18S5), 18 Neb. 54. Maxwell, J., said:

"After an infant has arrived at the
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age of twenty-one years, he may dis-

avow or ratify any contracts not

made for necessaries. In the absence

of any statute providing how a con-

tract shall be ratified, any one of

three modes ordinarily will be suffi-

cient: 1st. An express ratification.

2d. Acts which imply an affirmance.

3d. The omission to disaffirm in a

reasonable time. The particular acts

which constitute a ratification must

necessarily depend to a great extent

on the nature of the contract. When

it is executed and beneficial to the

infant — as where he has purchased

real estate — it vests in him the free-

hold until he disagrees to it, and the

continuance in possession until he is

of age is an implied confirmation of

the contract. So as to a lease. De-

lano v. Blake, 11 Wend. 85; Jones v.

Phenix Bank, 4 Seld. 228. And an

infant cannot be permitted to re-

tain personal property purchased by

him, and at the same time repudiate

the contract upon which he received

it. Kitchen v. Lee, 11 Paige, 107;

Lynde v. Budd, 2 id. 191; Deason v.

Boyd, 1 Dana. 45; Cheshire v. Bar-

rett. 4 McCord. 241; Ottman v. Monk,

3 Sandf. 431. He who asks equity

must do equity. In the case at bar

the purchase was a joint one. The

plaintiff, after coming of age, so far

as appears, made no effort to return

the property, but still retains posses-

sion. He also made payments on the

notes. This we regard as a sufficient

affirmance of the contract. The law

which enables a party who has pur-

chased property during infancy to

disaffirm on coming of age is to be

used as a shield and not as a sword —

as a means by which he may be dis-

charged from a contract which he

deems prejudicial The object is not

to enable him to rob others of their

property, but upon making restitu-

tion to be discharged from the con-

tract. The fact that when Philpot

made the promise, after coming of

1 Robin on '· Berry (1 99), 93 1\le.
Boyd. 1 Dana. 45 · Che hire v. Bar320 45 Atl. R. 3-i.
rett. 41Ic ord. 2±1; Ottman\. Monk,
2 ee ante, .. 99.
3 andf. 4;jl. He who a k equity
3 ee ante § 99.
must do equity. In the ca e at bar
4 In Philpot v.
andwich Mfg. Co. th purcha e wa a joint one. The
(1 -), 1 reb. 5±, :l\Iaxwell, J. said: plaintiff, after cominO' of age, o far
"After an infan ha arrfred at the a appear . made no effort to re urn
age of twenty-one year he ma di
the proper y but till r etain pos e avow or ratify any contract not sion. He aLo made payment. on the
made for nece arie . In the ab ence note Thi we regard a a ufficient
of any tatute pro,iding how a con- affirmance of the contract. The law
tract hall be ratified. any one of which enable a party who ha purthree mode ordinarily will be uffi- cha ed property during infancy to
cient: 1 t. An expre ratification. di affirm on coming of age i to be
2d. ct which imply an affirmance. u ·ed a a hield and not a a word3cl The omi ion to di affirm in a a a mean by which he may be disrea onable time. The particular act charged from a contract which he
which con titute a ratifica ion must deem prejudicial The object is not
nece arily depend to a great extent to enable him to rob other of heir
on the nature of the contra t. \\ hen property but upon making re ti uit i executed and beneficial to the tion to be discharO'ed from the coninfant - a where he ha purcha ed tract. The fact that when Philpot
r eal e tate - it ve t in him the free- made the promi e after coming of
hold until he di agrees to it. and the aO'e, to pay the note:, be did not know
continuance in po e ion until he i that he was not leO'ally liable to pay
of aO'e i an implied confirmation of aid note , is not material in this ca e
the contract.
o a to a lea e. De- and need not be con idere , there
lanov.Blake,11 \\encl -; Jone v. beinO'a nfficientratificationbyother
Phenix Bank 4 eld. ')2 .
nd an act of the plaintiff. The plaintiff in
infant cannot be permitted to re- error ha the property, the fruit of
tain per onal pro1 erty purcha eu by the contract. There i no claim or
him and at be ·am time repudiate barge that it wa of le \alue than
the contract upon ·w hich he re efr
the price agr ed to be paid. Hont and fair dealing require that be
it. Kitchen v. L e 11 Pai e, l
Lynde v. Budd, 2 icl 191; Dea on v.
hould pay for the same.''
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CH. III.]

CAP.A.CITY

F

P..ARTIE~.

. l;'Jl
- .

'-

CH. III.]

CAPACITY OF PARTIES.

[§ 121-

^Vhat has been said in previous sections l of ratification gen-

erally, and especially of the necessity of a new consideration,

knowledge of legal effect, and like matters, is applicable here.

But. as bearing upon the subject-matter of this section, an ex-

press promise to pay for the goods, or its equivalent, will be a

ratification, 2 but not a mere acknowledgment, 3 or a part pay-

iSeecrnfe. jig 99-105.

2 In Tibbets v. Gerri-h. 25 X. H. 41.

\'\bat ha been aid in pre\iou ec ion 1 of ra ificat'on !Senerally. an e pecially of be nece -i y of a new con iJera ion
knowl d<Ye of leO'al effect and like ma t r , i applicable here.
Bu ; a bearinO' upon the u ject-matter of hi ec ion. an expre promi e to ay for the O'OO
r it equivalent. will be a
ratifica*"ioni but not a mere ackn W"le ]c:rmen 3 or a par pay-

57 Am. Dec. 307, the rule is stated

thus: " Where the defense interposed

is that of infancy, and a new prom-

ise is relied upon, a more stringent

rule prevails than where the defense

is the statute of limitations. To sus-

tain an action against a person of

full age, on a promise made by him
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when an infant, there must be an

express ratification, either by a new

promise to pay or by positive acts of

the individual after he has been of

age a reasonable time, in favor of his

contracts, which are of a character

to constitute as perfect evidence of

a ratification as an express and un-

equivocal promise. Hale v. Gerrish,

8 X. H. 374: Merriam v. Wilkins. 6

id. 433, 25 Am. Dec. 472: Thompson

v. Lay. 4 Pick. (Mats.) 48, 16 Am. Dec.

325: Goodsell v. Myers. 3 Wend.

(X. Y. 47'.'."

In Catlin v. Haddox. 49 Conn. 492,

44 Am. R. 249. the court approve the

rule laid down in Edmunds v. Mis-

ter. 58 Misa 765. as follows: "The

executory contracts of infants for

the payment of money, not for nec-

essaries, impose no legal liability

upon them. . They can be

ee ante. ;:: 99-10.-.
Tibbet '· G rri h. 2.- _-. H. 41.
7 Am. ec. 3 7, the rule i
tated
th : "Where the defen e interf.>0 ed
· that of infancy. and a new romL · r li
upon. a more ~trincrent
rule pre>ail than where the def~ e
i the tatute of limitation
To ustain an action acrainst a per on of
full acre. on a promise ma e by him
when an infant. there mu be an
expre~ ratification. either ya new
romLe to pay or by po iti>e ac of
the in iri ual aft r heh
en of
a ear a ~ nable time, in a'or of hi
contract which ar of a charac er
to con titute a perfect endence of
a ratification a an expre and un~qui>ocal promi ·e. Hale '·
errish
_-. H. 37 4: :llerriam '·
ilkin~. 6
id. 43'?. 2.- A.m. Dec. -172: Thomp- n
'· Lay. 4 Pick. (.Ia . 42. 1 Am. D c.
3'?5:
ood~ 11 '· _Jyer- 3 Wend.
--. Y. 479...
1

2 In

In Catlin '· Haddox. 49 Conn. -192.
4-! Am. R 249. the court appro\e the
rul laid down in Edmund '· _li.
ter. 5 :llL 76.), a follow : •·The
execu or: con ract of in ant for
the ayment of money, not for ece rie . im
e no legal liability
upon them.
. They can be
ratifie a common law only by an
act or a!rree ent which po e e all
the in2Tedient nee : ry to a new
contract. sa>e only a new con ideration. . , • A. mere ackn wledcrmen of th debt i not -u
bu there mu~ e an xpr
romi e ro pay. • olun arily made.
It ~ an no upon the foo in of a.
d bt barr by the tatu e of limitation and afterwar
re'i \ed by a
n w prom Le. because in uch a ca e
there ha been an alway exi incr.
unex mcrui. he ri!rb . ~ ince the limitation affect only the rem Jy and

ratified at common law only by an

act or agreement which possesses all

the ingredients necessary to a new

contract, save only a new considera-

tion. . , , A mere acknowledg-

ment of the debt is not sufficient,

but there must be an express prom-

ise to pay. voluntarily made. . . .

It stands not upon the footing of a

debt barred by the statute of limita-

tions and afterwards revived by a

new promise, because in such a case

there has been an always-existing,

unextinguished right, since the lim-

itation affects only the remedy and

not the right: but it is rather like a

s In Whitney v. Dutch. 14 Has

7 Am. Dec. 229. Parker. C. J., says:

" By the authorities, a mere acknowl-

edgment of the debt, such as would

take a case out of the statute of lim-

itations, is not a ratification of a con-

tract made during minority. The dis-

tinction is undoubtedly well taken.

The reason is that a mere acknowl-

edgment avoids the presumption of

payment which is created by the

statute of limitations: whereas the

contract of an infant may always,

3In \\-hi ney,. Dutch.14 _Ia - 4.57,
, _.\.m. Dec. 22 . Parker. . J..
·By the authoritie . a mere acknowldcrment of the debt. -uch
would
take a ca e out of the a ute of limitation . i not a ratification of a contract made durincr minority. The ·
tinction i undoubtedly well taken.
The rea n i that a mere acknowledcrment a>oi ~ the pre umption of
ayment which i create by the
tatute of limitation~: wherea the
contract of an infant may al wayexcept in certain ca ~ - ~ ufficiently
known. be rn1de by him by lea.

or not: and _om po iti>e ac ordec~
laration. on hi part. i nece: _ ry to
defeat h power of a>oidincr i . ·· ee
at:o m1th '· :llayo. 9 _Ja_ 2: For
>.Phillip~ . 1 Pick. (Ma
2 '?:Thom
~ n '· Lay. 4 Pick. ::\Ia _ 4 _. 1 ~.
Dec. 325: Proct-Or '· ....,ear-. 4 Allen
_fa · 95: Wilcox ~.Roath, 12 Conn.
55 : Edcrerly '· ,...,haw. 'l Fo: . _-. H.
514.. 57 A.m. Dec. 349: Conklin >.. Oarn. 7 Ind. 553: Reed " Bo_Lear: -!
need Tenn. . 11 : Turner'· Gaither,
a_-. C. 3J7. 35 A..m. R. .: i-4: Alexander
'· Hutchison. 2 Hawk
- C., 535.

1 5

§ 121.]

LAW OF SALE.

[BOOK I.

121.]

LAW OF SALE.

[BOOK I.

ment, 1 except pro tanto. So the retention of the property, with

out disaffirmance, for an unreasonable time after becoming of

age, 2 and, a fortiori, such, a retention coupled with clear acts

of ownership, as the mortgaging or selling the property as his-

own, 3 will amount to a ratification.

debt wiped out by a discharge in

ment, 1 except pro tanto. So the retention of the property, with
out disaffirmance, for an unreasonable time after becoming of
age, 2 and, a fortiori, such a ret ntion coupled with clear acts
of ownership, as the mortgaging or selling the property as his
own, 3 will amount to a ratification.

bankruptcy."

In Whitney v. Dutch, 14 Mass. 457,

7 Am. Dec. 229, Parker, C. J., says:

" All that is necessary is that he ex-

pressly agrees to ratify his contract;

not by doubtful acts, such as pay-

ment of part of the money due or

the interest, but by words, oral or in

writing, which import a recognition

and a confirmation of his contract."
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. See also Baker v. Kennett, 54 Mo.

82; Hatch v. Hatch, 60 Vt. 160;

Henry v. Root, 33 N. Y. 526.

A mere offer to submit to arbitra-

tion is not a ratification (Benham v.

Bishop, 9 Conn. 330, 23 Am. Dec. 358);

nor is an offer to compromise (Mar-

tin v. Byrom, Dud. (Ga.) 203; Ben-

nett v. Collins, 52 Conn. 1); nor a

mere declaration, to a stranger, of

an intention to perform. Hoit v.

Underhill, 10 N. H. 220, 32 Am. Dec.

380.

Where the affirmance is condi-

tional it cannot be extended beyond

the limits fixed by the conditions.

Minock v. Shortridge, 21 Mich. 304.

Thus, if the promise is to pay when

able, the plaintiff must show ability

to pay. Thompson v. Lay, 4 Pick.

<Mass.) 48, 16 Am. Dec. 325. See also

debt wiped out by a discharge in
bankruptcy."
In Whitney v. Dutch, 14 Mass. 457,
7 Am. Dec. 229, Parker, C. J .. says:
"All that is nece ary is that he expressly agrees to ratify his contract;
not by doubtful act , such as payment of part of the money due or
the intere 't, but by words, oral or in
writing, which import a recognition
and a confirmation of his contract."
See also Baker v. Kennett, 54 Mo.
82; Hatch v. Hatch, 60 Vt. 160;
Henry v. Root, 33 N. Y. 526.
A mere offer to submit to arbitration is not a ratification (Benham v.
Bishop, 9 Conn. 330, 23 Am. Dec. 358);
nor is an offer to compromise (Martin v. Byrom, Dud. (Ga.) 203; Ben·
nett v. Collins, 52 Conn. l); nor a
mere declaration, to a stranger, of
an intention to perform. Hoit v.
Underhill, 10 N. H. 220, 32 Am. Dec.
380.

Proctor v. Sears, 4 Allen (Mass.), 95;

Everson v. Carpenter, 17 Wend.

(N. Y.) 419; Chandler v. Glover, 32

Pa. St. 509.

i Catlin v. Haddox, 49 Conn. 492, 44

Am. R. 249; Robbins v. Eaton, 10

N. H. 561. In the latter case it is

said: "Payment of part of a note is

1

no ratification of the whole because

the infant may admit only an in-

debtedness to that extent. The ratifi-

cation should be equivalent to a

new contract. Therefore an express

promise as to the whole debt is neces-

sary. There are numerous authori-

ties to this effect, but there are cases

where notes were given for articles

which had been used or consumed

prior to the infant's becoming of age.

Where the matter constituting the

consideration of the note is not in

existence when the infant becomes

of age. or is wholly beyond his con-

trol, there is nothing upon which an

implied promise can arise, and an

express promise to pay the debt can

alone render the infant liable. . . .

But where the consideration of the

notes is still in existence, in as per-

Where the affirmance is conditional it cannot be extended b yond
the limits fixed by the conditions.
Minock v. Shortridge, 21 l\fich. 304.
Thus, if the promise is to pay when
able, the plaintiff must show ability
to pay. Thompson v. Lay, 4 Pink.
c fa:s .) 4 , 16 Am. Dec. 325. See also
Proctor v. Sears, 4 Allen (Mass.), 95;
Ever on v. Carpenter, 17 Wencl.
(N. Y.) 419; Chandler v. Glover, 32
Pa. t. 509.
I Catlin v. Haddox, 49 Conn. 492, 44
Am. R. 249; Robbins v. Eaton, 10
N. H. 561. In the latt r ca it i
said: ''Payment of part of a note i

no ratification <;>f the whole because
the infant may admit only an h1debtedness to that extent. The ratification should be equivalent to a
new contract. Therefore an express
promise as to the whole debt is nece sary. There are numerous authorities to this effect. but there are cases
where notes were given for articles
which had been u ed or consumed
prior to the infant's becoming of age.
Where the matter con tituting the
con id.eration of the note is not in
exi tence when the infant becomes
of age. or is wholly beyond his control, there is nothing u1 on which an
implied promise can arise, and an
express promi e to pay the debt can
alone render the infant liable. . • •
But where the consideration of the
notes is still in existence, in as perfect a tate after the infant becomes
of age as before, and is subject to his
control, he may so deal with the
articles or property forming such
con ideration as to rai. e an implied
promise of payment."
2 Boyden v. Boyden, 9 Mete. (Mass.)
519; l\1cKarny v. Cooper. 81 Ga. 679;
Delano v. Blake, 11 Wend. (N. Y.) 85,
2i5 Am. Dec. 617: Aldri h v. Grime ,
10 N. H. 194; Philpot v. Sandwich
Mfg. Co., 18 Neb. 54, 24 N. W.R. 428.
3 Thus, retaining, using, and finally
s lling. after maturity, a horse purcha ed during infancy affirms the
pur ·ha . Che hire v. Barrett, 4 McCord (8. C.), 241, 17 Am. Dec. 73-,
To am effe t: Lawson v. Lovejoy,
reenl. (Me.) 40-, 23 Am. Dec. 526;
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§ 122. Liability of infant for necessaries. — Notwithstand-

ing the infant's general inability to bind himself by contracts

it is well settled that he is liable for necessaries furnished to

him. "Whether his liability is to be deemed based upon his

express contract, or only upon a contract created or implied by

law, is a question of some importance upon which writers and

judges are not agreed. Mr. Bishop 1 asserts the latter, saying:

" The books often speak of this contract as though it were an

express one, which the law authorizes the infant to make; but

the doctrine is universal that the measure of his liability is the

value of the necessaries, not what he promised to pay for them, 2

so there is no propriety in designating the undertaking as ex-

press, for it is what the law and not the infant has made it." 3

On the other hand, it has been said by the court in Texas: 4

""We apprehend the better doctrine to be that an infant may

make an express written contract for necessaries upon which

he may be sued, but that, by showing the price agreed to be

paid was unreasonable, he can reduce the recovery to a just
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compensation for the necessaries received by him. It is to his

benefit to hold the express contract not void, but voidable;

Boyden v. Boy den, 9 Mete. (Mass.) not only an abandonment of the at-

519; Boody v. McKenney, 23 Me. 517; tempted rescission, but a ratification

Chapin v. Shafer, 49 N. Y. 407; Rob- of the original bargain,

bins v. Eaton, 10 N. H. 561; Curry v. 1 Bishop on Contracts, § 908.

St. John Plow Co., 55 111. App. 82; 2 Citing Hyer v. Hyatt, 3 Cranch

American Freehold Mtg. Co. v. Dykes (U. S. C. C), 276; 12 Fed. Cas. No.

(1895), 111 Ala. 178, 20 S. R. 136, 56 6977; Commonwealth v. Hantz,2 Pa.

Am. St. R. 38. (P. & W.) 333; Morton v. Steward, 5

So in Hilton v. Shepherd (1898), 92 111. App. 533; Bouchell v. Clary, 3

Me. 160, 42 Atl. R. 387, it appeared Brev. 194; Fairmount, etc. Ry. Co.

that an infant bought horses for v. Stutler, 54 Pa. St. 375, 93 Am. Dec.

which he gave his note and other 714.

§ 122. Liability of infant for nece sarie

otwith tanding the infa n t gen ral inability to bind himself by contracts
it is well settled that he is liable for neces aries furnished to
him. \ Vhether hi liabilit is to be deeme l based upon his
ex1 re contract, or only upon a contract created or implied by
law, i a question of some importance upon which writers ancl
judges are not aoT ed.
Ir. Bi "hop 1 a erts the latter, sa ing:
' The book often s1 ak of thi contract as though it were an
expr
one, which the law authorizes the infant to make · but
the loctrine is univ r al that the mea ure of his liability is the
value of the nece ari , not what he promi eel to pay for them, 2
o there i no propriety in de ignating the un lertaking as expr
for it is what the law and not the infant has made it. ' 3
On the other ban l, it has been said by the court in Texa : 4
We apprehend the b ~ tter doctrine to be that an infant may
make an express writt n contract for nee aries upon which
he may be sued but that, by bowing the price agreed to be
paid was unrea onable, be can reduce the r covery to a ju t
compensation for the nece aries received by him. It is to his
b n fit to hold the expre s contract not 'oid, but voidable;
T

considerations. After he became of 3 Citing Stone v. Dennison, 13 Pick,

age, he first used the horses in his (Mass.) 1, 23 Am. Dec. 654; Earle v.

business, and then sold them as his Reed, 10 Mete. (Mass.) 387; Gay v.

own. In a suit brought by him to Ballou, 4 Wend. (N. Y.) 403. 21 Am.

recover the consideration paid, he Dec. 158; Hyman v. Cain, 3 Jones

claimed that he had rescinded the (N. C), 111; Robinson v. Weeks, 56

sale, — but prior to his use and sale of Me. 102.

the hoi^ses. Held, that his conduct 4 Askey v. Williams. 74 Tex. 294.

in the use and sale of the horses was See also Bradley v. Pratt, 23 Vt. 378.

117

not only .an aba,ndonment of the attempted r ci ion, but a ratification
of the original bargain.
1 Bi hop on Contracts, § 90 .
2 Citing Hyer v. Hyatt, 3 Cranch
(U. S. C. C.), 276; 12 Fed. Cas. No.
6977; Commonwealth v. Hantz, 2 Pa.
(P. & W.) 3313; forton v. Steward, 5
o in Hilton v. Shepherd (189 ), 92 Ill. A pp. 533; Bouch ell v. Clary, 3
Me. 160, 42 Atl. R. 3 7, it appeared Brev. 194; Fairmount, etc. Ry. Co.
that an infant bought hor es for v. Stutler, 54 Pa. St. 375, 93 rn. Dec.
which he gave his note and other 714.
con ideration . After he became of
3 Citing Stone v. DennLon, 13 Pick.
age, he fir t u ed t.he hor e in his ( lass.) 1, 23 Am. Dec. 6- 4; Earle v.
bu ine , and then old them as hi Reed, 10 1etc. (Mas .) 387; Gay v.
own. I n a suit brought by him to Ballou, 4 Wend. ( . Y. l 403. 91 Am.
reco-rnr the consideration paid. he Dec. 15 ; Hyman v. Cain, 3 Jones
daimed that he had re cinded the (L . C.), 111; Robin on v. Week , 56
ale,- but prior to hi use and ale of Ie. 102.
4 A. ke
v. Willia-ms, 74: Tex. 294.
the hor e . Held, that hi conduct
in the u e and ale of the hor ·e wa
ee al o Bradley v. Pratt, 23 Vt. 37 •
117
Boyden v. Boyden, 9 Mete. (l\fa .)
519; Boody v. IcK enney, 23 1e. 517;
Chapin v. hafer, 49 N. Y. 407; Robbins v. Eaton, 10 N. H. 561; Curry v.
St. John Plow Co., 5.5 Ill. App. 2;
American Freehold '.ltg. Co. v. Dykes
(1 9-), 111 Ala. 17 , 20 S. R. 136, 56
Am. t. R.3 .
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for if it be voidable merely he can secure the advantage of a

good bargain, and may relieve himself of it if it be a bad one,

while, on the other hand, to hold it void would deprive him of

the benefit of an advantageous contract."

But whatever be the theory upon which the rule is based,

the rule itself is one established, like the general rule of non-

liability, for the infant's benefit and advantage; for if he could

not become bound for necessaries, he might be left to suffer for

the want of those things which were indispensable to his life

or safety, notwithstanding that he had certain future means of

payment.

§ 123. For what amount and how hound — Liability

on notes, bonds, etc. — An infant, in purchasing necessaries,,

may make an express contract to pay for them, but such a

promise is not indispensable. " An infant is liable for neces-

saries in the same manner as an adult is liable; and his con-

tract or promise to pay is to be established in the same manner." l

for if it be voidable merely he can secure the advantage of a
good bargain, and may relieve himself of it if it be a bad one,
while, on the other hand, to hold it void would deprive him of
the benefit of an advantageous contract."
But whatever be the theory upon which the rule is based,
the rule itself is one established, like the general rule of nonliability, for the infant's benefit and advantage; for if he could
not become bound for necessaries, be might be left to suffer foF
the want of those things which were indispensable to his life
or safety, notwithstanding that he had certain future means of
payment.

The promise to pay may therefore be implied. So, the amount
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to be paid may be expressly agreed upon, but, if not, the law

will require the payment of the reasonable value; and, if it be

expressly agreed upon, the law will require the payment of the

§ 123. - - For what amount and bow bound - l .1 iabili ty
on notes, bonds, etc.- An infant, in purchasing necessaries,.

reasonable value only, though the agreed amount was more. 2

Where the promise is express, and particularly where the

amount to be paid is expressly agreed upon, some questions of

difficulty present themselves. These usually have arisen where

the contract of payment was in writing, as where the infant

had given his note or bond for the amount.

§ 124. . It being entirely established that, whatever his

contract, the infant can be held only for the reasonable value of

the goods, the questions at once arise, Is his express promise, per-

1 Gay v. Ballou, 4 Wend. (N. Y.) 403, 111; Locke v. Smith, 41 N. H. 346;

21 Am. Dec. 158. Beeler v. Young, 1 Bibb (Ky.), 519;

2 Stone v. Dennison, 13 Pick. Guthrie v. Morris, 22 Ark. 411; Brad-

(Mass.) 1, 23 Am. Dec. 654; Vent v. ley v. Pratt, 23 Vt. 378; Earle v. Reed,

Osgood, 19 Pick. 572, 575: Gay v. Bal- 10 Mete. (Mass.) 387; Ayers v. Burns

lou, supra; Parsons v. Keys. 43 Tex. (1882), 87 Ind. 245.

557; Hyman v. Cain, 3 Jones (N. G),

113

may make an express contract to pay for them, but such a.
promise is not indispensable. "An infant is liable for necessaries in the same manner as an adult 1s liable; and his contract or promise to pay is to be established in the same manner." 1
The promise to pay may therefore be implied. So, the amount.
to be paid may be expressly agreed upon, but, if not, the law
will require the payment of the reasonable value; and, if it be
expres ly agreed upon, the law will require the payment of the
reasonable value only, though the agree<l amount was more. 2
Where the promise is express, and particularly where the
amount to be paid is expressly agreed upon, some questions of
difficulty present themselves. These usually have arisen where
the contract of payment was in writing, as where the infant
bad given his note or bond for the amount.
124:. - - . It being entirely established that, whatever bis.
contra t, the infant can be held only for the reasonable value of
the goo ls, the questions at once arise, Is his express promise, perGay v. Ballou, 4 Wend. (N. Y.) 403, 111; Locke v. Smith, 41 N. H. 346;.
m. Dec. 15 .
Beeler v. Yonng, 1 Bibb (Ky.), 519;.
2 tone v. D nni ·on, 1u Pick. Guthrie v. Morris, 22 Ark. 411; Brad(Ma .) l, 2 Am. D e. 6-4; Vent v. ley v. Pratt, 23 Vt. 37 ; Earle v. Reed,
gooLl , 19 Pick. 572, 7.~: G::ty v. Bal- 101\1 tc. (fa .) 3 7· Ayers v. Burns
lou, upru; Pars ns v. l y . 43 Tex. (1 2 ), 87 Ind. 245.
5-7; Byman v. Cain, 3 Jone· (N. C.),
113
1
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haps in writing, stipulating for a fixed sura, absolutely void, or

voidable only as to the amount agreed upon ? and, Is the infant

to be held for the reasonable value on the express contract

modified to this extent, or only upon the contract implied or

created by law, the express contract being ignored ? Upon

these questions the courts are not entirely agreed, but the true

rule seems to be that which is well stated by Mr. Parsons 1 as

follows: " He cannot contract to pay even for necessaries, in

such wise as to bar an inquiry into the price and value. The

law permits persons to supply him with necessaries, and have

a valid claim against him therefor, for their fair worth ; but it

does not permit them to make a bargain with him as to the

price which shall bind him absolutely, because it does not per-

mit him to determine this price for himself by reason of his

presumed inability to take proper care of his own interests ; but

the value and the price may be determined by a jury. And a

seal to the instrument would give it no additional force in this

respect, but the infant would still be bound only for a fair
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value. For the same reason an infant cannot be bound for the

amount in an account stated ; 2 nor for the sum mentioned in his

note, although given for necessaries; 3 nor for the amount due

on his bond, for the ancient distinction which held him on a

bond without a penalty, but not a bond with a penalty, would

probably be now disregarded. 4 If, however, an infant gives

i Parsons on Contracts, vol. I, Deal, 3 McCord (S. C), 257. "Some

p. *313. of these cases declare an infant's

2 Citing Ingledew v. Douglas, 2 note, though given for necessaries,

Stark. (Eng.) 36; Trueman v. Hurst, void, but it is conceived they mean

1 T. R. (Eng.) 40; Hedgley v. Holt, voidable only, and not that such note

4 C. & P. (Eng.) 104; Oliver v Wood- is not susceptible of ratification."

roffe, 4 M. & W. (Eng.) 650; Williams 4 "The older cases," says Mr. Par-

v. Moor, 11 id. 256; Beeler v. Young, sons in his note, "hold that an in-

1 Bibb (Ky.), 519. fant's bond, at least if given with a

3 Citing McCrillis v. How, 3 N. H. penalty, is absolutely void, not void-

348; Bouchell v. Clary, 3 Brev. (S. C.) able merely, although given for

194; Swasey v. Vanderheyden, 10 necessaries. Ayliff v, Archdale, Cro.

Johns. (N. Y.) 33; Fenton v. White, Eliz. (Eng.) 920; Fisher v. Mowbray, 8

1 South. (N. J.) 100; McMinn v. Rich- East (Eng), 330; Baylis v. Dinely,

haps in writing, stipulating for a fixed sum, absolutely void, or
Yoidable only as to the amount agreed upon? and, Is the infant
to be he1d for the reasonable value on the express contract
modified to this extent, or only upon the contract implied or
created by law, the express contract being ignored? Upon
these questions the courts are not entirely agreed, but the true
rule seems to be that which is well stated by Mr. Parsons 1 as
follows: "He cannot contract to pay even for necessaries, in
such wise as to bar an inquiry into the price and value. The
law permits person to supply him with necessaries, and have
a vali 1 claim against him therefor, for their fair worth; but it
does not permit them to make a bargain with him as to the
price which shall bind him ab olutely, because it does not permit him to determine this price for himself by reason of his
presumed inability to take proper care of his own interests; but
the value and the price may be determined by a jury. And a
seal to the in trument would give it no additional force in this
re pect, but the infant would still be bound only for a fair
value. For the same reason an infant cannot be bound for the
amount in an account stated; 2 nor for the sum mentioned in his
note, although given for necessaries· 3 nor for the amount due
on his bond, for the ancient di tinction which held him on a
1 ond without a penalty, but not a bond with a penalty, would
probably be now disregarded. 4 If, however, an infant gives

monds, 6 Yerg. (Tenn.) 9; Hanks v. 3 M. & Sel. (Eng.) 447; Hunter v.
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l Parsons on Contract , vol I, Deal, 3 McCord (S. C.), 257.
"Some
p. *313.
of the e cases declare an infant's
2 Citing Ingledew v. Dougla , 2 note, though gh-en for neces aries,
Stark. (Eng.) 36; Trueman v. Hur t, void, but it is concefred they mean
1 T. R. (Eng.) 40; Hedgley v. Holt, voidable only, and not that such note
4 C. & P. Eng.) 104; Oliver v . Wood- is not susceptible of ratification."
roffe, 4 i\f. & W. (Eng. ) 650; Williams
4 "The older cases," ays Mr. Parv. 1\Ioor, 11 id. 256; Beeler v. Young, sons in his note, "hold that an in1 Bibb (Ky.), 519.
fant's bond, at least if given with a
3 Citing McCrillis v. How, 3 N. H. penalty, is absolutely void, not void3.f ; Bouchell v. Clary, 3 Brev. (S. C.) able merely, although g.iven for
194; Swa ey v. Vanderheyden, 10 neoessaries. Ayliff v, Archdale, Cro.
Johns. (N. Y.) 33; Fenton v. White, Eliz. (Eng.) 920; Fisher v. Mowbray, 8
1 South. (N. J.) 100; Ic 1inn v. Rich- East (Eng.), 330; Baylis v. Dinely,
monds, 6 Yerg. (Tenn.) 9; Hanks v. 3 M. & Sel. (Eng.) 447; Hunter v.
119
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[book

his note, his bond, or any other instrument, for necessaries, he

may be sued upon the instrument, but the plaintiff shall recover

only the value of the necessaries." 1

This rale preserves to the infant the benefit of the contract,

if any, as where he has secured favorable terms or a low price, —

as to which the adult seller will be bound,— while protecting

him, if he has made a bad bargain, against the consequences of

his own indiscretion. 3

Agnew. 1 Fox & S. (Ire.) 15; Allen

v. Minor, 2 Call (Va.), 70; Colcock v.

Ferguson, 3 Desaus. (S. C.) 482. It is

his note, his bond, or any other instrument, for necessaries, he
may be sued upon the instrument, but the plaintiff shall recover
only the value of the necessaries." 1
This rule preserves to the infant the benefit of the contract,
if any, as where he has secured. favorable terms or a low price,as to which the adult seller will be bound,-while protecting
him, if he has made a bad bargain, against the consequences of
his own indiscretion.i

conceived, however, that in this

country, bonds, like other contracts,

are only voidable, and may be rati-

fied. Conroe v. Birdsal], 1 Johns. (N.

Y.) Cas. 127 (1 Am. Dec. 105). The
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marginal note to this case errone-

nously uses the word void in relation

to such bond; the court said it w^as

only voidable."

1 Citing Earle v. Reed, 10 Mete.

(Mass.) 387; Dubose v. Wheddon, 4

McCord (S. C), 221.

2 In Stone v. Dennison, 13 Pick.

(Mass.) 1, 23 Am. Dec. 654, Shaw, Ch.

J., says: "Most of the cases where it

has been decided that a minor can-

not be held on his express contract

for necessaries are those where the

action is founded on the express obli-

gation, and where, from the form of

the action, the consideration cannot

be inquired into. As, an action on a

bond with a penalty, which implies

a consideration, and where an in-

quiry into the consideration is pre-

cluded by the forms of pleading and

proof. So on an insimul computas-

sent, where the action is founded

upon the act of accounting and the

admission of the balance, and no

further inquiry into the considera-

tion and terms of the contract can be

gone into. These actions are founded

on the assumption that the party

has full power to bind himself by

any lawful contract, and they only

open the question whether he has so

bound himself. But in the other

forms of obligation and of action,

and where it can always be open to

inquiry what the nature and terms

of the contract were, and whether

the contract was reasonable and ben-

eficial, a minor may as well be bound

by an express as by an implied con-

tract for necessaries. This is often

Agnew, 1 Fox & S. (Ire.) 15; Aller. gone into. The e actions are founded
v. Minor, 2 Call (Va.), 70; Colcock v. on the assumption that the party
Ferguson, 3 Desaus. (S. C.) 482. It is bas full power to bind him. elf by
conceived, however, that in this any lawful contract, and they only
country, bonds, like other contracts, open the question whether he has so
are only voidable, and may be rati- bound himself. But in the other
fled. Conroe v. Birdsall, 1 John . (N. forms of obligation and of action,
Y.) Ca . 127 (1 Am. Dec. 105). The and where it can always be open to
marginal note to thil:i case errone- inquiry what the nature and terms
nously uses the word void in relation of the contract were, and whether
to such bond; the court said it was the contract was reasonable and benonly voidable."
eficial, a minor may as well be bound
I Citing Earle v. Reed, 10 Mete.
by an express as by an implied con(Mass.) 387; Dubose v. Wheeldon, 4 tract for necessaries. This is often
McCord (S. C.), 221.
beneficial to the minor, and enables
2 In Stone v. Dennison, 13 Pick.
him to avail himself of any stipula(Mass.) 1, 23 Am. Dec. 654, Shaw, Ch. tions in his favor. If such an exJ., says: "Most of the cases where it press contract should be held to be
has been decided that a minor can- wholly void. and the party furnisbnot be held on his express contract ing the minor with necessarie ·hould
for necessaries are those where the be remitted to his action on the imaction is founded on the express obli- plied contract, he would recover
gation, and where, from the form of uponaquantumvalebantor quanturn
the action, the consideration cannot m eriiit, though above the stipulated
be inquired into. As, an action on a prices. The rule as above qualified,
bond with a penalty, which implies that the minor shall only be bound
a consid ration, and where an in- by such a p cies of expre ·s contract,
quiry into the consideration is pre- and in uch a form of action, as leaves
eluded by the forms of pleading and the nature, terms and consid ration
proof. So on a.n insimiil computas- of the contract open to inquiry, and
sent, wher the action is found d then only by uch a contract as sh:tll
upon the a t of accounting and the appear at the time to ba e b n fair,
admis ion of the balance, and no rea onable and beneficial to the
furth r inquiry int the con ict ra- minor, aff rds a sufficient security
tion and terms of the contract can be to the rights of minors."
120

beneficial to the minor, and enables

him to avail himself of any stipula-

tions in his favor. If such an ex-

press contract should be held to be

wholly void, and the party furnish-

ing the minor with necessaries should

be remitted to his action on the im-

plied contract, he would recover

upon a quant um valebant or quantum

meruit, though above the stipulated

,
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§ 125. Interest. — Where the infant is held chargeable

§ 125. - - lnterest.-Where the infant is held chargeable

upon his note for necessaries, interest may be allowed on the

amount due. 1

§ 126. Goods must have been furnished on infant's

account and at his request. — While an express contract is

upon his note for necessaries, interest may be allowed on the
amount due. 1

not necessary, and the infant may be charged upon an implied

agreement to pay, it is still essential that the goods should have

been furnished on the infant's account, upon his credit, and at

his request, either express or implied. If, therefore, the goods,

though supplied for the infant, were furnished in reliance upon

the credit of his parent, guardian or other third person, the

infant is not liable, 2 in the absence of a sufficient ratification

or promise by him after he arrives at maturity. 3 The fact that

the parent or other person upon whose credit the goods were

furnished is too poor to be able to pay for them himself, does

not render the infant liable. 4

§ 127. Infant not liable if already supplied. — If the

needs of the infant are already supplied from any source, then
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he is not liable, on the ground of necessaries, for further goods

furnished, notwithstanding that the goods were such as would,

in the absence of such a previous supply, have been properly

regarded as necessaries. 5 It is immaterial from what source

the necessaries have come, if the infant be actually supplied. 6

1 Bradley v. Pratt, 23 Vt. 378. Dec. 612; Guthrie v. Murphy, 4 Watts

2 Duncomb v. Tickridge, Aleyn, 94; (Pa.), 80, 28 Am. Dec. 681 ; Johnson v.

Simms v. Morris, 5 Ala. 42; Hoyt v. Lines, 6 Watts & S. (Pa.) 80, 40 Am.

§ 126. - - Goods must have been furnished on infant's
account and at his request.-While an express contract is
not necessary, and the infant may be charged upon an implied
agreement to pay, it is still essential that the goods should have
been furnished on the infant's account, upon his credit, and at
his request, either express or implied. If, therefore, the goods,
though supplied for the infant, were furnished in reliance upon
the credit of his parent, guardian or other third person, the
infant is not liable, 2 in the absence of a sufficient ratification
or promise by him after he arrives at maturity. 3 The fact that
the parent or other person upon whose credit the goods were
furnished is too poor to be able to pay for them himself, does
not render the infant liable. 4

Casey, 114 Mass. 397, 19 Am. R 371. Dec. 542; Kline v. L'Amoureux, 2

3 See Hoyt v. Casey, supra. Paige (N. Y.), 419, 22 Am. Dec. 652;

4 Hoyt v. Casey, supra. Hoyt v. Casey, 114 Mass. 397, 19

5 Bainbridge v. Pickering, 2 W. Am. R. 371; Decell v Lewenthal, 57

Black. 1325; Ford v. Fothergill, Miss. 331, 34 Am. R 449; Trainer v.

Peake, N. P. 229; Brayshaw v. Eaton, Trumbull, 141 Mass. 527, 6 N. E. R

5 Bing. N. C. 231; Cook v. Deaton, 761; Nichol v. Steger, 2 Tenn. Ch.

3 Car. & P. 114; Barnes v. Toye, L. R. 328; affirmed, 6 Lea (Tenn.), 393.

13 Q. B. Div. 410; Johnstone v. Marks, 6 In Burghart v. Angerstein, 6 Car.

19 id. 509; Angel v. McLellan, 16 & P. 690, Baron Alderson said : "If a

Mass. 28, 8 Am. Dec. 118; Hull v. minor is supplied, no matter from

Connolly, 3 McCord (S. C), 6, 15 Am. what quarter, with necessaries suit-

121

§ 127. - - Infant not liable if already supplied.- If the
needs of the infant are already supplied from any source, th en
he is not liable, on the ground of necessaries, for further goods
furnished, notwithstanding that the goods were such as would;
in the absence of such a previous supply, have been properly
regarded as necessaries. 5 It is immaterial from what source
the necessaries have come, if the infant be actually supplied. 6
1 Bradley

v. Pratt, 23 Vt. 378.
Dec. 612; Guthrie v. Murphy, 4 Watts
v. Tickridge, Aleyn, 94; (Pa.), 80, 28 Am. Dec. 6 1; Johnson v.
Simms v. Norris, 5 Ala. 42; Hoyt v. Lines, 6 Watts & S. (Pa. ) 80, 40 Am.
Casey, 114 fass. 397, 19 Am. R. 371.
Dec. 542; Kline v. L'Amoureux, 2
3See Hoyt v. Casey, supra.
P aige (N. Y.), 419, 22 Am. Dec. 652;
4 Hoyt v. Casey, supra.
H oyt v. Casey, 114 l\faRs. 397, 19
5Bainbridge v. Pickering, 2 W. Am. R. 371; Decell v Lewenthal, 57
Black. 1325; Ford v. Fothergill, Miss. 331, 34 Am. R. 449; Trainer v.
P eake, N. P. 229; Brayshaw v. Eaton, Trumbull, 141 Mass. 527, 6 N. E. R.
5 Bing. N. C. 231; Cook v. Deaton, 761; Nichol v. Steger, 2 Tenn. Ch.
3 Car. & P.114; Barnes v. Toye, L. R. 328; affirmed, 6 Lea (Tenn. ), 393.
13 Q. B. Div. 410; Johnstone v. Marks,
6 In Burghart v. Angerstein, 6 Car.
19 icl. 509; Angel v. McLellan, 16 & P. 690, Baron Alder son said: "If a
lVIa s. 28, 8 Am. Dec. 118; Hull v. minor is supplied, no ma tter from
Connolly, 3 McCord (S. C.), 6, 15 Am. what quarter, with necessaries suit121
2 Duncomb
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If he be partly supplied, then the additional goods can be

deemed necessaries only so far as they supply the need not

provided for. 1 The mere fact, however, that the infant has an

income sufficient to enable him to supply himself with neces-

saries will not defeat a recovery if he was not in fact supplied. 2

Where, however, the infant has been furnished with money for

the purpose of supplying himself with necessaries, the creditor

must, it is said, take the burden of showing that the infant has

not supplied himself. 3

§ 128. Seller supplies goods at Ins peril. — A person

who supplies goods to an infant on his account as necessaries

does so at his peril, taking upon himself the risk of being able

If he be partly supplied, then the additional goods can be
deemed necessaries only so far as they supply the need not
provided for. 1 The mere fact, hovrnver, that the infant has an
in come sufficient to enable him to supply himself with necessaries will not defeat a recovery if he was not in fact supplied. 2
1Vhere, however, the infant has been furnished with money for
the purpose of supplying himself with necessaries, the creditor
must, it is said, take the burden of showing that the infant has
not supplied himself. 3

to prove that they were in fact necessaries. 4 Mere inquiry or

reasonable belief will not protect him; for, notwithstanding

§ 128. - - Seller supplies goods at his peril. - A person

this, it becomes always a question of fact whether the goods

were necessaries or not, and if they were not, the seller must
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fail, however diligent his inquiries may have been. 5

able to his estate and degree, a

tradesman cannot recover for any

other supply made to the minor just

after."

1 So, no recovery can be had for

goods, proper in kind, but excessive

in quantity. Johnson v. Lines, 6

Watts & S. (Pa.) 80, 40 Am. Dec. 542.

2 Burghart v. Hall, Mees. & W.

727.

3 Rivers v. Gregg, 5 Rich. (S. C.) Eq.

274; Nicholson v. Wilborn, 13 Ga. 4G7.

* Barnes v. Toye, L. R. 13 Q. B. Div.

410; Brayshaw v. Eaton, 5 Bing. N.

C. 231; Cook v. Deaton, 3 Car. & R

114; Burghart v. Angerstein, 6 id. 690.

In Trainer v. Trumbull (1886), 141

Mass. 527, 6 N. E. R. 761, the court

said that the question whether the

articles furnished were necessaries

or not " must be determined by the

actual state of the case, and not by

appearances. That is to say, an in-

fant who is already well provided

for in respect to board, clothing, and

other articles suitable for his con-

dition, is not to be held responsible

if any one supplies to him other

board, clothing, etc., although such

person did not know that the infant

was already well supplied. Angel v.

McLellan, 16 Mass. 28; Swift v. Ben-

nett, 10 Cush. 436; Davis v. Caldwell,

12 Cush. 512: Barnes v. Toye, 13 Q. B.

Div. 410."

5 In Johnson v. Lines, 6 Watts &

S. (Pa.) 80, 40 Am. Dec. 542, Gib-

son, C. J., says: "In Ford v. Fother-

gill, 1 Esp. 211; S. c, Peake's N. P.

Cas. 299, Lord Kenyon ruled it to be

incumbent on the tradesman, before

trusting to an appearance of neces-

sity, to inquire whether the minor

is provided by his parents or friends.

That case may be thought to have

been shaken in Dalton v. Gib, 5 Bing.

N. Cas. 198, in which it was held that

inquiry is not a condition precedent

122

who supplies goo ls to an infant on his account as necessaries
does so at his peril, taking upon himself the risk of being able
to prove that they were in fact necessaries. 4 Mere inquiry or
reasonable belief will not protect him; for, notwithstanding
this, it becomes always a question of fact whether the goods
were necessaries or not, and if they were not, the seller must
fail, however diligent his inquiries may have been. 5
able to his estate and degree, a for in respect to board, clothing, and
tradesman cannot recover for any other articles suitable for his conother supply made to the minor just dition, iti not to be held responsible
if any one supplies to him other
after."
1 So, no recovery can be had for
board, clothing, etc., although such
goods, proper in kind, but excessive per on did not know that the infant
in quantity. Johnson v. Lines, 6 was already well supplied. Aqgel v.
Watts & S. (Pa.) 80, 40 Am. Dec. 542. l\foLellan, 16 l\fass. 28; Swift v. Ben2 Burghart v. Hall,
Mees. & W. nett, 10 Cush. 436; Davis v. Caldwell,
727.
12 Cu ·h. 512; Barnes v. Toye, 13 Q. B.
Div. 410."
3 Rivers v. Gregg, 5 Rich. CS. C.) Eq.
274; Nicholson v. "Wilborn, 13 Ga. 4G7.
5 In Johnson v. Lines, 6 Watts &
4 Barne v. Toye, L. R. 13 Q. B. Div.
S. (Pa.) 80, 40 Am. Dec. 542, Gib410; Brayshaw v. Eaton, 5 Bing. N. son, C. J., says: "In Ford v. FotherC. 231; Cook v. Deaton, 3 Car. & P. gill, 1 Esp. 211; s. c., Peake's N. P.
11-±; Buro-hart v. Anger tein, 6 id. 690. Cas. 299, Lord Kenyon ruled it to be
In Trainer v. Trumbull (1 6), 141 incumbent on the tradesman, before
1\Iass. 527, 6 N. E. R. 761, the court trusting to an appearance of necesaid that the que tion whether tbe sity, to inquire whether the minor
arti l s furnished were nece ·ari s i provided by his parents or friends.
or not "mu t be d ter~in d by th That ca e may be thought to have
a tual tate of the a , and not by b en shak n in Dalton v. ib, 5 Bing.
appearan e . That i to ay, an in- N. as. 19 , in whi hit wa b ld that
fant who i already well provid cl inquiry is not a condition precedent
122

CH. III.]

CAPACITY OF PARTIES.

[§ 129.

CH.

III.]

CAPACITY OF PARTIES.

[§ 129.

129.

Infant living with parents or having a guard-

ian presumed to be supplied. — Where the infant lives with

his parents, or is supported by them, or where he has a guard-

ian, the presumption is that his parents or guardian have sup-

plied his needs. Although the goods are to be paid for out of

the infant's estate, yet the parent or the guardian, and the

former particularly, is, within reasonable limits, entitled to

determine what is suitable and desirable for the infant to have ; l

and if it appears that he has supplied the infant with such ar-

ticles as he regards as suitable and sufficient, 2 or has furnished

the infant with money to procure them, 3 the third person who

to recovery where the goods seemed

to be necessary from the outward

§ 129.
Infant Ii Yin g with parents or ha Ying a guardi an pres umed to be supplied .-Where the infant lives with
his parents, or is supported by them, or where he has a guardian, the presumption is that his parents or guardian have supplied his needs. Although the goods are to be paid for out of
the infant's estate, yet the parent or the guardian, and the
former particularly, is, within reasonable limits, entitl d to
determine what is suitable and desirable for the infant to have; 1
and if it appears that he has supplied the infant with such articles as he regards as suitable and ufficient, 2 or has furni heel
the infant with money to procure them, 3 the third person who

appearance of the infant, though
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the mother was at hand and might

have been questioned; but in Bray-

shaw v. Eaton, id. 231, this was ex-

plained to mean that, as such an in-

quiry is the tradesman's affair, being

a prudential measure for his own in-

formation, the omission of it is not

a ground of nonsuit; but that the

question is, on the fact put in issue

by the pleadings, whether the sup-

ply was actually necessary. It is

the tradesman's duty to know, there-

fore, not only that the supplies are

unexceptionable in quantity and

sort, but also that they are actually

needed." See also Trainer v. Trum-

bull. 141 Mass. 527, supra; Nichol v.

Steger, 6 Lea (Tenn.), 393; Kline v.

L'Amoureux, 2 Paige (N. Y.), 419, 22

Am. Dec. 652.

i See Hoyt v. Casey, 114 Mass. 397,

19 Am. R. 371; Hull v. Connolly, 3

McC. (S. C.) 6, 15 Am. Dec. 612; Bain-

bridge v. Pickering, 2 W. Black. 1325.

2 Hull v. Connolly, supra; Freeman

v. Bridger, 4 Jones (N. C), L. 1, 67

Am. Dec. 258; Perrin v. Wilson, 10

Mo. 451.

3 Rivers v. Gregg, 5 Rich. (S. C.)

1

Eq. 274; Nicholson v. Wilborn, 13

Ga. 467.

In Rivers v. Gregg, supra, it is

said: "The general rule certainly is

that an infant is bound by his con-

tract for necessaries. But there are

exceptions equally clear and well

settled. Necessaries, when the term

is applied to an infant, are those

things that are conducive and fairly

proper for his comfortable support

and education, according to his for-

tune and rank. So that what would

be considered necessary in one case

would not be so regarded in another.

The rule is entirely relative in its

operation. But what are necessa-

ries? Meat, lodging, clothing, and

education, if the means admit of it,

certainly fall within the definition.

To which may be added, in case of

to re overy where the goods seemed
t o be neces ary from the outward
appearance of the infant, though
the mother was at hand and might
have been que tioned; but in Brayshaw v. Eaton, id. 231, this was explained to mean that, as such an inquiry is the tradesman's affair, being
a prudential measure for his own information, the omis ion of 1t is not
a ground of non uit; but that the
question is, on the fact put in i ue
by the pleadings, whether the supply was actually nece ary. It is
the tradesman's duty to know, therefore. not only that the supplies are
unexceptionable in quantity and
ort, but also that they are actually
needed." S e also Trainer v. Trumbull, 141 fa . 5'>7, supra; Nichol v.
teger, 6 Lea (Tenn.), 393; Kline v.
L'Amoureux, 2 Paige (N. Y.), 419, 22
Am. Dec. 652.
1 See Hoyt v. Casey, 11-± l\fa s. 397,
19 Am. R. 371; Hull v. Connolly, 3
McC. (S. C.) 6, 15 Am. Dec. 612; Bainbridge v. Pickering, 2 W. Black. 1325.
2 Hull v. Connolly, 1:;up1·a; Freeman
v. Bridger, 4 Jones (N. C.), L. 1, 67
Am. Dec. 258; Perrin v. Wi l on, 10
Mo. 451.
3 Rivers v. Gregg, 5 Rich. (S. C. )

Eq. 274; Nicholson v. Wilborn, 13
Ga. 467.

In Rivers v. Gregg, supra. it is
said: "The general rule certainly is
that an infant is boun<l by his contract for necessarie . But there are
exceptions equally clear an<l well
settled. Nece ·sm·ies, when the term
is applied to an infant, are those
thing tbat are eonducive and fairly
proper for hi comfortable support
and education, according to his fortune and rank. So that what would
be con idered necessary in one ca e
would not be o reCYarded in an ther.
The rule i. entirely relative in its
operation. But what are nece. saries'? Meat, lodging, clothing, and
education. if the means admit of it,
certain ly fall within the definition.
To which may be added, in case of
marriage, the support of wife, children and servants. All is relative
and is regulated by circumstances.
But if an infant is furni hed with
the e things by his parent or guardian, then the same articles, to the
same or a less amount, supplied by
another under contract, are not nece. sary to him. To another, not so
snpplied, they would be necessary.
The same remarks apply, with equal
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would charge the infant for other things as necessaries must

be prepared to prove that they were such.

This rule does not make the fact of the infant's living with

his parents or having a guardian the absolute criterion, or

make the parent or guardian the sole judge, or justify him in

would charge the infant for other things as necessaries must
be prepared to prove that they were such.
This rule does not make the fact of the infant's living with
his parents or having a guaruian the absolute criterion, or
make the parent or guardian the sole judge, or justify him in

propriety and force, where the in-

fant is supplied by parent or guard-

ian, or by this court, with money to

furnish himself with necessaries. In

some cases circumstances make it

proper, and imperatively demand,

that the infant should have the dis-

bursement of his allowance himself.

In the case of marriage and house-

keeping the perpetual .recurring

wants and exigencies of the family
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render it impossible that the guard-

ian should always be called on to

supervise the disbursement of the

fund allowed to the infant. Or if,

being a youth of fortune, he is sent

upon his travels in foreign lands, or

even in his own country, the guard-

ian cannot look to the expenditure

of the money. It is necessarily in-

trusted to his own keeping. The

brother of the deceased is now

abroad on his European travels.

Previous to his departure an appli-

cation was made to this court for a

proper allowance to defray his trav-

eling expenses. The court, upon due

consideration, made an order for

what was supposed to be a proper

allowance, reference being had to

the amount of his fortune. Suppos-

ing this young gentleman should ex-

pend his allowiince, and in addition

should contract debts to the same

amount for articles that, prima

facie, would be regarded as neces-

saries! Could these claims be sup-

ported on its being shown that the

infant had an allowance that was

amply sufficient to defray all his

necessary and proper expenses? I

suppose not.

" He who deals with an infant is

presumed to know of his infancy.

He is bound, at his own peril, to

make the inquiry. It makes no dif-

ference whether the inquiries result

in correct information or the reverse.

It is no excuse if he honestly sup-

posed from his appearance or other

circumstances that the infant was

an adult. The protection of this de-

fenseless class of persons would be

very inadequate if this principle is

not further extended. The only safe

rule for the security of infants and

their estates is that he who credits

the infant for necessaries should be

bound to know whether the infant

has been supplied with a sufficient

amount of those articles by the par-

ent or guardian, or from some other

propriety and force, where the in·
fant is sup[ lied by parent or guardian, or by this court, with money to
furnish himself with necessaries. In
some cases circumstances make it
proper, and imperatively demand,
that the infant should have the di ·
bur ement of his allowance himself.
In the case of marriage and housekeeping the perpetual J.·ecurring
wants and exigencies of the family
render it impossible that the guardian should al ways be called on to
supervise the disbursement of the
fund allowed to the infant. Or if,
being a youth of fortune, he is sent
upon his travels in foreign lands, or
even in his own country, the guardian cannot look to the expenditure
of the mo!Jey. It is necessarily intru ted to his own keeping. The
brother of the deceased is now
abroad on his European travels.
Previous to his departure an application was made to this court for a
proper allowance to defray his traveling expenses. The court, upon due
cohsirleration, made an order for
what was supposed to be a proper
allowance, reference being had to
the amount of his fortune. Supposing this young gentleman should expend hi allowance, and in addition
. hould contract debts to the same
amount for articles that, p1·ima
facie, would be regard d a nece sarie !
ould the e claims be up·
ported on it being shown that the
infant had an all wance that wa
amply sufficient to defray all hi

nece ary and proper expense ? I
suppo e not.
"He who deals with an infant is
presumed to know of his infancy.
He is bound, at his own peril, to
make the inquiry. It makes no difference whether the inquiries rnsult
in correct information or the rever e.
It is no excuse if he honestly supposed from his appearance or other
circum tances that the infant wa.
an adult. The protection of this defenseless class of persons woulrl be
very inadequate if this principle is
not further extended. The only safe
rule for the security of infants and
their estates is that he who credits
the infant for necessaries should be
bound to know whether the infant
has been supplied with a sufficient
amount of those articles by the parent or guardian, or from some other
source. The consequence, if any
other rule than this prevails, would
be, that an infant's estate might be
made liable for double the amount
of necessaries that were necessary for
him.
"I will not say that an infant, after
being upplied with necessarie , or a
proper allowance in ca h to procure
them, may not, under some circumstances, be liable on a contra t for
neces arie . Suppo e, for example,
after being furnish d with all things
neces ary for him, he hould give
them away, or sell them, or wa te
the pr ce d in riot and debauch ry.
Or supp e, that after having placed
in hi hands, in mon y, an allowance
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leaving the infant to suffer, 1 but it affords a presumption, gen-

erally well founded, which the person who supplies more goods

must rebut.

The same presumption arises where the infant lives with his

mother, though the latter be not under the same legal duty to

support the infant that the father would be. 2

The presumption also arises, and the same rule applies, not-

withstanding the mere fact that the father is poor, unless it

also appears that he has refused or neglected to provide for

the infant. 3

sufficient for all his wants, he should

be robbed of it, or should lose it by-

accident or at games of chance.

leaving the infant to suffer, 1 but it affords a presumption, generally well founded, which the person who supplies more goods
must rebut.
The same presumption arises where the infant lives with bis
mother, though the latter be not under the same legal duty to
support the infant that the father would be. 2
The pre umption al o ari e , and the same rule applies, notwith. tanding the mere fact that the father is poor, unless it
al o appears that he has refused or neglected to provide for
the infan t. 3

Then the infant would be reduced to

want for the means of bare subsist-

ence. Must he starve with a plenty

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:47 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t6xw4h56n
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

in his coffers? Would he not be

bound by a contract for necessaries

under these circumstances? This is

stating the strongest imaginable case

against the rule. But its wisdom is

still manifest. In a case like that

supposed, I would say that the in-

fant would be bound. But I would

further say that the party who al-

leged this extraordinary state of facts

must prove them. In other words,

when it is shown that an infant is

supplied with necessaries by his par-

ent or guardian, or with funds amply

sufficient to procure them, the pre-

sumption of law and of reason must

be, that he does not stand in need of

credit to obtain what is necessary

for him. And after this prima facie

showing, he who alleges that, not-

withstanding this, the infant was in

a state of destitution, must take upon

himself the burthen of proving the

allegation. If he does this in a sat-

isfactory manner, his claim should

be allowed. But even then it should

be limited to bare necessaries, and

should not be allowed to embrace

articles of luxury, which would oth-

erwise be suitable to the infant's

fortune and condition in life."

1 In Trainer v. Trumbull (1886), 141

Mass. 527, 6 N. E. R. 761, the defend-

ant was a minor who had an ex-

pectant estate of about $10,000 accru-

ing upon his father's death. His

father was an inmate of a soldiers'

home, his mother had been com-

mitted to a reformatory institution,

and the defendant himself was in an

almshouse and was in a diseased and

sickly condition. Defendant had a

guardian, but the guardian did noth-

ing for his support. The plaintiff, at

the request of defendant's father,

and in reliance upon defendant's ex-

pectancy, took defendant from the

almshouse to his own home, and

cared for and educated him until the

father's death, when she brought an

action to recover for the supplies

sufficient for all bis wants, he should article of luxury which would oth·
be robbed of it, or should lo e it by end e be suitable to the infant's
accident or at games of clrnnce. fortune and condition in life."
1 In Trainer v. Trumbull (1 86), 141
Then the infant would be reduced to
want for the means of bare ubsi t- :Ma s. 527, 6 N. E. R. 761, the defendence. l\lust he starve with a plenty ant was a minor who bad an exin hi coffer ? vVould be not be pectant e tate of about $10,000 accru·
bouncl by a contract for nece aries ing upon his father's death. His
under the e circum tance '? Thi i father was an inmate of a soldiers'
stating the tronge t imaginable ca e home, his mother had been comagain t the rule. But its wi dom is mitted to a reformatory in titution,
still manife t. In a case like that and the defendant himself wa. in an
supposed, I would say that the in- alm hou e and was in a <l.iseas cl and
fant would be bound. But I would
ickly condition. Defendant bad a
further say that. the party who al- guardian, but the guardian did nothleged this extraordinary state of fa ts ing for his support. The plaintiff, at
mu t prove them. In other word , the r que t of defendant's father,
when it is hown that an infant i and in reliance upon defendant's exsupplied with nece arie by his par- pectancy, took defendant from the
ent or guardian, or with fund amply alm hou e to his own home, and
sufficient to procure them, the pre- cared for and educated him until the
sumption of law and of reason must father's death, when she brought an
be, that he does not stand in need of action to recover for the supplies
credit to obtain what is necessary furnished. The defense was that as
for him. And after this p1·ima facie defendant was supplied at the almsbowing, he who alleges that, not- hou e with necessaries accor ling to
with tanding this, the infant was in his then po ition in life, that of a
a tate of de titution, must take upon pauper, the supplies furnished by
him elf the burthen of proving the plaintiff were not nece saries. But
allegation. If he does this ih a sat· the court held otherwise.
2 Hull v. Connolly, 3 1'\lcC. (S. C.) 6,
i factory manner, his claim should
be allowed. But even then it should 15 Am. Dec. 612. See also Atchison
be limited to bare neces ·aries, and v. Bruff, 50 Barb. (N. Y.) 881.
should not be allowed to embrace
3 Hoyt v. Casey, 114 Mass. 397, 19
125

§ 130.J

LA. W OF SA.LE.

[BOOK I.

§ 130.]

LAW OF SALE.

§ 130. 1'7 hat constitute necessaries.-The term "necessaries"

[BOOK I.

§ 130. What constitute necessaries. — The term "necessaries"

is a relative one, and no arbitrary or inflexible rule can be laid

down for determining whether an}' given article falls within

its meaning or not. 1 The most comprehensive statement is that

the term includes those things which are suitable and proper

for the reasonable comfort, subsistence and education of the

particular infant, taking into consideration his circumstances

and condition in life. 2 It therefore clearly is not to be con-

fined in its meaning to those things which are absolutely in-

Am, R. 371. In this case it is said:

" We are of the opinion that the in-

struction to the jury that the pov-

is a relative one, and no arbitrary or inflexible rule can be laid
down for determining whether any given article falls within
its meaning or not. 1 The most comprehensive statement i that
the term includes those things which are suitable and proper
for the reasonable comfort, subsistence and education of the
particular infant, taking into consideration his circumstances
antl condition in life. 2 It therefore clearly is not to be confined in its meaning to those things which are absolutely in-

erty of the father would not be suf-

ficient to render the son liable for

necessaries furnished to him, but

that the plaintiff must go further
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and show a refusal or neglect of the

father to furnish them, was suffi-

ciently favorable to the plaintiff. An

infant when residing at home, and

under the care of his father and sup-

ported by him, is not liable even for

necessaries. If he were, the father

would be deprived of his right to de-

termine what the character of that

support should be. Bainbridge v.

Pickering, 2 W. BL 1325, 1 Esp. N. P.

163; Wailing v. Toll, 9 Johns. 141;

Angel v. McLellan, 16 Mass. 28. Nor

do we think that a case can be ex-

cepted from this well-recognized

principle because the father is found

to be a poor man. When necessary

professional services are rendered to

a minor son residing in the house of

his father, the legal inference is that

the father is the person liable there-

for. In the present case the father

was keeping a family together, and

was receiving the wages of this

minor. While it was proved that

he was unable to pay the debts he had

incurred,he was, so far as it appeared,

doing his best with the means at his

command to provide for his family.

No refusal or neglect to perform his

duty of supporting the son was

shown, although from his impover-

ished condition it may perhaps be

fairly inferred that such duty could

be but imperfectly performed. Or-

dinarily when one renders to another

valuable service, the law will imply

a promise to pay therefor by him for

whom such service is rendered, and

this upon the ground that as such

party cannot infer service of this

character to be gratuitous, it must

be implied that he promised to pay

for it; but no such implication can

arise against a minor residing with

his father, delivering over to him his

wages, and entitled to look to him

for support."

1 Epperson v. Nugent, 57 Miss. 45,

34 Am. R. 434.

2 Burghart v. Angerstein, 6 C. & P.

Am. R 371. In this case it is said:
"We are of the opinion that the instruction to the jury that the poverty of the father would not be sufficient to render the son liable for
necessaries furnished to him, but
that the plaintiff must go further
and show a refusal or neglect of the
father to furnish them, was sufficiently favorable to the plaintiff. An
infant when residing at home, and
under the care of his father and supported by him, is not liable even for
necessaries. If he were, the father
would be deprived of his right to determine what the character of that
support should be. Bainbridge v.
Pickering, 2 W. Bl. 1325, 1 Esp. N. P.
163; Wailing v. Toll, 9 Johns. 141;
Angel v. McLellan, 16 Mass. 28. Nor
do we think that a case can be excepted from this well-recognized
prin ciple because the father is found
to be a poor man. When necessary
profes ional services are rendered to
a minor son residing in the house of
his fath er, the legal inference is that
the father is the p rson liable therefor. In the present case the father
wa ke ping a family tog ther, and
wa re eiving the wages of thi
minor. While it was proved that
he wa unable to pay th debt.· he had
incurred, he wa ·, of r a it appeared,

doing his best with the means at his
command to provide for his family.
No refusal or neglect to perform his
duty of supporting the son was
shown, although from his impoveri::;he l condition it may perhaps be
fairly inferred that such duty could
be but imperfectly performed. Ordinarily when one renders to another
valuable service, the law will imply
a promise to pay therefor by him for
whom such service is rendered, and
this upon the ground that as such
party cannot infer service of this
character to be gratuitous, it must
be implied that he promised to pay
for it; but no such implication can
arise against a minor residing with
his father, delivering over to him his
wages, and entitled to look to him
for support."
1 Epperson v. Nugent, 57 l\fiss. 45,
34 Am. R. 434.
2 Burghart v. Angerstein, 6 C. & P.
690; Dalton v. Gib, 7 Scott, 117;
Peters v. Fleming, 6 M. & W. 42;
Ryder v. Wombwell, L. R. 4 Ex. 32;
Rivers v. Gregg, 5 Rich. (S. C.) Eq.
;274; Epperson v. Nugent, supra;
Davi v. Caldwell, 12 Cush. ( fa .)
512; Nichol on v. pencer, 11 Ga. 607;
Jordan v.
offi ld , 70 N. C. 110;
trong v. Foote, 42 Conn. 203.
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dispensable to the support of life, 1 but it extends to those arti-

cles which are suitable and proper to maintain the infant in

that state, station and degree of life in which he is placed.

Articles of comfort and convenience may therefore, in some

cases, be deemed necessaries, and, in some cases perhaps, things

purely ornamental. 2 " Articles of mere luxury are always ex-

cluded, though luxurious articles of utility are in some cases

allowed." 3

The term, however, it is said, includes those things only which

are personal to the infant, 4 and does not ordinarily include such

things, however desirable or beneficial, as pertain only to his

property or estate. 5 For matters of the latter sort the inter-

vention of a guardian is usually held requisite, though some

cases have extended the rule to include those things also which

are necessary for the preservation of his estate. 6

Fuller illustrations of the application of the rules will be found

in a later section.

§ 131. How question determined — Burden of proof.
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The question whether the goods in controversy in any case

fall under the head of necessaries, is usually one of mixed law

and fact, and, as to the respective provinces of the court and

jury, the rule has been laid down as follows: "The court de-

termines whether the articles furnished fall within the class

1 Peters v. Fleming, supra, per ers, and qualifying the individual to

Parke, B. engage in business when he shall ar-

2 Ryder v. Wombwell, supra, per rive at the age of manhood."

Willes, J. 5 See, as to this, Turner v. Gaither,

dispensable to the support of life,1 but it extends to those articles which are suitable and proper to maintain the infant in
that state, station and degree of life in which he is placed.
Articles of comfort and convenience may therefore, in some
cases, be deemed necessaries, and, in some cases perhaps, things
purely ornamental. 2 "Articles of m ere luxury are al ways excluded, though luxurious articles of utility are in some cases
allowed." 3
The term, however, it is said, includes those things only which
are personal to the infant, 4 and does not ordinarily include such
things, however desirable or beneficial, as pertain only to his
property or estate. 5 For matters of the latter sort the intervention of a. guardian is usually held r equi ite, though some
cases have extended the rule to include those things also which
are nece sary for the preservation of his e tate. 6
Full r illustrations of the application of the rules will be found
in a later section.

3 Chappie v. Cooper, 13 Mees. & W. 83 N. C. 357, 35 Am. R. 574; Tupper

(Eng.) 252, per Alderson, B. v. Cadwell, supra; Middlebury Col-

4 Thus in Tupper v. Cadwell, 12 lege v. Chandler, 16 Vt. 683, 42 Am.

Mete. (Mass.) 559, 46 Am. Dec. 704, Dec. 537; Mathes v. Dobschuetz. 72

Dewey, J., says: "The wants to be 111. 438; Price v. Sanders, 60 Ind. 310.

supplied are, however, personal; 6 See, as to this, Epperson v. Nugent,

either those of the body, as food, 57 Miss. 45, 34 Am. R. 434; Dillon v.

clothing, lodging, and the like; or Bowles, 77 Mo. 603.

those necessary for the proper culti- Mr. Bishop says the other rule is

vation of the mind, as instruction "contrary to reason." Contracts,

suitable and requisite to the useful § 911.

131. - - How question determined - Burden of proof.
The question whether the goods in controver yin any ca e
fall under the head of necessaries, is usually orie of mixed law
and fact, and, as to the respective provinces of the court and
jury, the rule has been laid down as follows: "The court determines whether the articles furnished fall within the class
0
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v. Fleming, sup1·a, per er , and qualifying the individual to
Parke, B.
engage in bu iness when he shall arll Ryder v. Wombwell, supra, per rfre at the age of manhood."
Willes, J.
5 See, a to thi , Turner v. Gaither,
3 Chapple v. Cooper, 13 Mees. & W.
83 N. C. 357, 35 Am. R. 574; Tupper
(Eng.) 2-2, per .Alderson, B.
-.-. Cad well, supm; l\Iiddlebmy ol4 Thus in Tupper v. Cad well, 12 lege v. Chandler, 16 Vt. 6 3, 42 Am.
Mete. (Mass.) 559, 46 Am. Dec. 70-±, Dec. 537; l\Iathes v. Dob chuetz, 72
Dewey, J., says: "The wants to be Ill. 43 ; Price v. Sanders, 60 Ind. 310.
supplied are, however, personal;
6See, as to this, Epperson v.... Tugent,
either those of the body, as food, 57 Miss. 4.5, 34 Am. R. 484; Dillon v.
clothing, lodging, and the like; or Bowle , 77 Mo. 603.
those neces ary for the proper cultil\fr. Bi hop says the other rule is
vation of the mind, as instruction "contrary to reason." Contracts,
suitable and requi -ite to the u eful § 911.
development of the intellectual pow1 Peters
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of necessaries suitable to any one (infant or adult) in the de-

fendant's situation and condition of life; and if the court de-

cides that they do come within the class, the jury are to decide

whether the particular articles furnished were actually neces-

sary under the circumstances of the case." l The court quote,

with approval, the rule as laid down by Bibb, C. J., as follows:

" Whether the articles are of those classes for which an infant

shall be bound to pay is matter of law to be judged of by

the court; if they fall under those general descriptions, then,

whether they were actually necessary and suitable to the con-

dition and estate of the infant, and of reasonable prices, must

regularly be left to the jury as matter of fact." 2

As to the burden of proof something has been already seen, 3

and, in general, the burden of proving that the goods were

such necessaries that the infant might bind himself to pay for

them is upon the plaintiff. 4

§ 132. Illustrations of what are necessaries or not.

Lord Coke laid down the rule that " An infant may bind him-
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self to pay for his necessary meat, drinke, apparell, necessary

physicke, and such other necessaries, and likewise for his good

teaching or instruction, whereby he may profit himselfe after-

wards." 5 Clearly, within the rules already laid down, food is

a necessary, 6 and board, as while attending school. 7 Enter-

tainment at an inn may also be, 8 but not, ordinarily, are din-

ners, confectionery and fruit furnished to a student in college, 9

of necessaries suitable to any one (infant or adult) in the defendants situation and condition of life; and if the court decitles that they do come within the class, the jury are to decide
whether the particular articles furnished were actually necessary under the circumstances of the case." 1 The court quote,
with approval, the rule as laid down by Bibb, 0. J., as follows:
"Whether the articles are of those classes for which an infant
shall be bound to pay is matter of law to he judged of by
the court; if they fall under tho e general descriptions, then,
whether they were actually necessary and suitable to the condition and estate of the infant, and of reasonable prices, must
regularly be left to the jury as matter of fact." 2
As to the burden of proof something has been already seen, 3
and, in general, the burden of proving that the goods were
such necessaries that the infant might bind himself to pay for
them is upon the plainti:ff. 4

iDecell v. LewenthaL 57 Miss. 331, N. W. R. 557; Thrall v. Wright, 38

34 Am. R 449. Vt. 494; Nicholson v. Wilborn, 13 Ga.

* Beeler v. Young, 1 Bibb (Ky.), 519. 4G7.

§ 132. - - Illustrations of what are necessaries or not.

See also Tupper v. Cadwell, 12 Mete. 5 Coke, Lit. 172a.

(Mass.) 559, 46 Am. Dec. 704; Grace 6 Rivers v. Gregg, 5 Rick (S. C.) Eq.

v. Hale, 2 Humph. (Tenn.) 27, 36 Am. 274.

Dec. 296; Jordan v. Coffield, 70 N. C. 7 Kilgore v. Rich, 83 Me. 305, 23 Am.

110; Garr v. Haskett, 86 Ind. 373; St. R 780, 12LE.A. 859, 22 Atl. R.

Ayers v. Burns, 87 Ind. 245; Mo 176.

Kanna v. Merry, 61 111. 177; Bent v. 8 See Watson v. Cross, 2 Duvall

Manning, 10 Vt. 225. (Ky), 147.

3 See ante, § 128. 9 Brooker v. Scott, 11 M. & W. 67.

* Wood v. Losey, 50 Mich. 475, 15
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Lord Coke laid down the rule that "An infant may bind himself to pay for his necessary meat, drinke, apparell, necessary
physicke, and such other necessaries, and likewise for his good
t aching or instruction, whereby he may profit himselfe afterwards." 5 Clearly, within the rules already laid down, food is
a necessary, 6 and board, as while attending school.7 Entertainment at an inn may also be, 8 but not, ordinarily, are dinners, confectionery and fruit furnished to a student in college, 9
I Decell v. Lewenthal, 57 Miss. 331,
34 Am. R. 449.
2 Beeler v. Young, 1 Bibb (Ky.), 519.
See also Tupper v. Cad well, 12 l\Ietc.
(i\Ia .) 5.59, 46 Am. Dec. 704; Grace
v. Hale, 2 Humph. (Tenn.) 27, 36 Am.
D ec. 296; Jordan v. Coffield, 70 N. C.
110; Garr v. Ha kett, 6 Ind. 373;
Ayer v. Burn , 7 Ind. 24-; l\IcKann.a v. Ierry, 61 Ill. 177; Bent v.
:Manning, 10 Vt. <>2-.
3 , ee ante,
12 .
4 Wood v. Losey, 50 Iich. 475, 15

12

N. W. R. 557; Thrall v. Wright, 38
Vt. 494; Nicholson v. Wilborn, 13 Ga.
467.
:>Coke, Lit. 172a.
6 Rivers v. Gregg, 5 Rich. (S. C.) Eq.
274.
7 Kilgore v. Rich, 83 Me. 305, 23 Am.
St. R. 7 0, 12 L. R. A. 859, 22 Atl. R.
176.
s See Watson v. Cross, 2 Duvall
(Ky.), 147.
9 Brooker v. Scott, 11 M. & W. 67.
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though fruit or other like articles might be in case of ill-

ness.

Medical attendance, 2 nursing in sickness, 3 and dental serv-

ices 4 fall within the list of necessaries, and so do proper lodg-

ings, 5 though, ordinarily, repairs upon his dwelling-house, 6 and

labor and material for the erection 7 of a dwelling or insurance

upon it, 8 do not.

A common school education is necessary, 9 but not usually a

college education ; 10 nor, it is held, can a professional education

be regarded as necessary, 11 though this may be questionable.

Suitable clothing, 12 in reasonable quantities," is necessary, but

not when extravagant in kind or excessive in quantity. In

proper circumstances, livery for the infant's servant may be

included, 14 and, in perilous times, regimentals for the infant

himself, 15 but not cockades for the soldiers of the company of

which he is captain. 16 Wedding garments may also be neces-
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sary for the infant's marriage. 17

1 Wharton v. Mackenzie, 5 Q. B.

606.

2 See Hoyt v. Casey, 114 Mass. 397,

19 Am. E. 371; Wailing v. Toll. 9

Johns. (N. Y.) 141; Saunders v. Ott,

1 McCord (S. C), 572; Price v. Saun-

ders, 60 Ind. 310.
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though fruit or other like articles might be in case of illness.1
:Medical attendance, 2 nursing in sickness, 3 and dental services 4 fall within the list of necessaries, and so do proper lodgings,5 though, ordinarily, repairs upon his dwelling-house, 6 and
labor and material for the erection 7 of ad welling or insurance
upon it, do not.
A common school education is necessary, 9 but not usually a
college education; 10 nor, it is held, can a professional education
be regarded as neces ary, 11 though this may be questionable.
uitable clothing, 12 in rea onable quantities,1 3 is nece sary, but
not when extra agant in kind or exces ive in quantity. In
proper circumstances, 11very for the infants servant may be
inclu<led, 14 and, in perilous times, regimentals for the infant
himself, 15 but not cockades for the soldiers of the compa ny of
which he is car tain. 16 Wedding garments may also be necessary for the infant's marriage.17

» Werner's Appeal, 91 Pa. St. 222.

4 Strong v. Foote, 42 Conn. 203.

5 See Rivers v. Gregg, 5 Rich. (S. C.)

Eq. 274. 278; Price v. Sanders, 60 Ind.

310. 314.

6 Tupperv.Cadwell. 12 Mete. (Mass.)

559, 46 Am. Dec. 704; Wallis v. Bard-

well, 126 Mass. 366; Phillips v. Lloyd

(1892), 18 R. I. 99, 25 Atl. R 909.

7 Freeman v. Bridger, 4 Jones (1ST.

C), L. 1, 67 Am. Dec. 258; Price v.

Sanders, 60 Ind. 310; Wornock v.

Loar (Ky.), 11 S. W. R 438: Allen v.

Lardner (1894), 78 Hun (N. Y.), 603.

8 New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Noyes,

32 N. H. 345.

9 See Middlebury College v. Chand-

ler, 16 Vt. 683, 42 Am. Dec. 537.

10 Middlebury College v. Chandler,

supra.

ii Turner v. Gaither, 83 N. C. 357,

35 Am. R. 574. In Walter v. Ever-

ard, [1891] 2 Q. B. 369, instruction

in the business of a farmer, auction-

eer and valuer were held to be nec-

essaries.

i 2 Chappie v. Cooper, 13 M. & W.

252; Maddox v. Miller, 1 M. & S.738;

Barnes v. Toye. 13 Q. B. Div. 410; Gay

v. Ballou, 4 Wend. (N. Y.) 403, 21 Am.

Dec. 158; Anderson v. Smith, 33 Md.

1 Wharton v. Mackenzie, 5 Q. B.
606.
2 See Hoyt v. Casey, 114 Ma . 397,
19 Am. R. 371; Wailing v. Toll, 9
Johns. (N. Y.) 141; Saunders v. Ott,
1 McCord (S. C.), 572; Price v. Saun·
ders, 60 Ind. 310.
a Werner's Appeal, 91 Pa. St. 292.
4 Strong v. Foote, 42 Conn. 203.
5 See River v. Gregg, 5 Rich. (S. C.)
Eq. 274 978; Price v. Sanders, 60 Ind.
310. 314.
s Tupper v. Cad well. 12 Mete. (1\Iass.)
559, 46 Am. Dec. 704.; Wallis v. Bardwell, 126 Ma s. 366; Phillips v. Lloyd
(1892), 1 R. 1 99, 25 Atl. R. 909. .
7 Freeman v. Bridger. 4 Jones (N.
C.), L. 1, 67 Am. Dec. 2-8; Price v.
Sanders, 60 Ind. 310; Wornock v.
Loar (Ky.), 11 S. W.R. 438; Allen v.
Lardner (189±), 7 Hun (N. Y.), 603.
BJ: ew Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Noye,
32 N. H. 345.

465; Lynch v. Johnson (1894), 109

Mich. 640, 67 N. W. R 908.

13 Johnson v. Lines, 6 W. & S. (Pa.)

80, 40 Am. Dec. 542.

i* Hands v. Slaney, 8 T. R. 578.

1 5 Coates v. Wilson, 5 Esp. 152.

16 Hands v. Slaney, supra.

17 Jordan v. Coffield, 70 N. C. 110;

Garr v. Haskett, 86 Ind. 373.
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9 See Middlebury College v. Chand·
ler, 16 Vt. 6 3, 42 Am. Dec. 537.
IO Middlebury College v. Chandler,

supra.

Turner v. Gaither, 83 N. C. 357,
35 Am. R. 574. In Walter v. Everard, (1 91] 2 Q. B. 369, in truction
in the bu ine of a farmer, auction·
eer and valuer were held to be neces aries.
12 Chapple v. Cooper, 13 {. & W.
252; Maddox v. Miller, 1 f. & S. 738;
Barnes v. Toye, 13 Q. B. Div. 410; Gay
v. Ballou, 4 Wend. (N. Y.) 403, 21 Am.
Dec. 15 ; Anderson v. Smith, 33 l\1d.
465; Lynch v. John on (1 94), 109
Mich. 640, 67 N. W. R. 90 .
I3Johnson v. Lines, 6 W. & S. (Pa.)
0, 40 Am. Dec. 542.
u Hands v. Slaney, 8 T. R. 578.
15 Coates v. Wil on, 5 Esp. 152.
16 H ands v. Slaney, supra.
17 Jordan v. Coffield, 70 N. C. 110;
Garr v. Haskett, 86 Ind. 373.
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LAW OF
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[BOOK I.

132.]

LAW OF SALE.

[BOOK I.

Jewelry, ornaments 1 and watches 2 are not ordinarily neces-

saries, though under proper circumstances a watch may be; 3

and jewelry intended as a gift to the betrothed wife of an in-

fant of large fortune has been regarded as necessary. 4 Horses

purchased for business 5 or pleasure, 6 and their keep, 7 are not

necessaries, though it may be otherwise if an infant has med-

ical advice to take exercise on horseback; 8 nor are racing-

jackets (unless the infant be a jockey), 9 or betting-books. 10 In

case the horse was necessary, the horse accoutrements might

be necessary also. 11 Traveling for pleasure is not a necessary, 12

though traveling for health might be. Carriages 13 and bicycles 11

are not ordinarily necessaries, though in special cases either,

like the horse, might be considered so. Tobacco, pipes and

cigars are not necessaries; 15 neither are " liquor, pistols, powder,

saddles, bridles, whips, fiddles, fiddle-strings," etc. 16

Goods for use in business, 17 supplies for farming, 13 a horse to
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i Ryder v. Womb well, L. R 4 Ex. 32.

2 Berolles v. Ramsay, Holt, N. P. 77.

3 See Barnes v. Toye, 13 Q. B. Div.

410. 414; Peters v. Fleming, 6 M. &

w. 4a

*Jenner v. Walker, 19 L. T. X. >.

398.

Jewelry ornament 1 and watche 2 are not or linaril nece arie though un ler proper circum tance a watch may be· 3
and jewelry inten le l a a aif to the betrothed \nfe of an infant of larO'e fortune ha been reo·arded a nece "'ary. 4 H re
purcba e for bu ine 5 or plea ure 6 and h ir keep.; are not
nece arie thouah it may be otherwi e if an infant ha medical adnce to take exerci e on hor"'eback ; nor are ra mgjacket ~ unle the infant b a jockey 9 or betting-book .10 In
ca "e he hor e wa nece -ary the hor"'e accoutrement might
be nece
y al o. 11 Tra \eling for plea ure i ~ no a nece ary 12
hou h tra\eling for heal h might be. arriage 13 and bic cle 14
are not ordinarily nece arie houO'h in pecial ca e either,
like the hor e might be con idered o. Tobacco pipes and
cigar are not nece arie · 15 neither are · liquor pi tols powder
a ldle bridle whip fiddles fiddle- tring
etc. 16
Good,., for use in bu ine 17 upplies for farming 1 a horse to
1'

5 Rainwater v. Durham, 2 N. &

McC. 524. 10 Am. Dec. 637: Grace v.

Hale. 2 Humph. (Tenn.) 27. 36 Am.

Dec. 296; House v, Alexander, 105

Ind. 109, 4 X. K R 891, 55 Am. R. 189;

Beeler v. Young. 1 Bibb (Ky.), 519.

6 See House t. Alexander, and other

cases in preceding note.

" Merriam v. Cunningham, 11 Cush.

(Mass.) 40.

8 Hart v. Prater, 1 Jur. 623.

9 Burghart v. Angerstein, 6 Car. &

P. 690, 698.

io Jenner v. Walker, 19 L. T. X. S.

398.

ii See Hill v. Arbon, 34 L. T. (X. S.)

125.

i 2 McKanna v. Merry, 61 111. 177.

13 Howard v. Simpkins, 70 Ga. 322.

uPyne v. Wood (1888), 145 Mass.

558, 14 N. E. R 775. In this case the

infant lived at home but worked in

a shop a mile away, and used the

bicycle to ride upon in going home

to dinner, which he could not do in

the time allotted without it. (The

court cite Merriam v. Cunningham,

11 Cush. (Mass.) 40; Leonard v. Stott,

108 Mass. 46.) To same effect see

Clyde Cycle Co. v. Hargreaves (1898),

78 L. T. (N. S.) 296. See also Rice v.

1 Ryder

v. W ombwell, L. R 4 Ex. 32.
12 lUcKanna '· 1Ierry, 61 Ill 17 .
v. Ram y Holt, -. P. , i.
13 Howard v. impkins, 0 Ga. 322.
H Pyne v. Wood (1
), 145 Ma
3 'ee Barne v. Toye 13 Q. B. Div.
410, 41±; Peters .-. FleminO', 6 1I. & 55 H _-, E. R 75. In th' ca e the
infant li>ed at home but worked in
W.42.
4 Jenner v. Walker, 19 L. T. V· .) a hop a mile away, and used the
bicycle to ride upon in going home
39.
5 Rainwater v. Durham, 2 X &
to dinner which he could not do in
)lcC. 52-1. 10 Am. Dec. 637: Grace v. the time allotted without it. (The
Hale. 2 Humph. (Tenn.) '>7, 36 Am. court cite }Ierriam v. Cunningham,
Dec. 296; Hou e v, Alexander, 105 11 Cush. (1Ia ) -10; Leonard v. tott
Ind. 109, 4 X. E. R 91, 55 ..:i.rn. R. 1 9 · 10 :.\Ia s. 46.) To same effect ee
Beeler v. YounO'. 1 Bibb (Ky. ), 519.
Clyde Cycle Co. v. Har rea.-e (1 9 )
ll ee Ho
e,. Alexander, and other , L. T. (-T· .) 296.
ee also Rice v.
Butler (1 99), 160 X. Y. 57 , 5- N. E.
ca e in precedin O' note.
'i )lerriam v. Cunningham, 11 Cush.
R. 9 75, -17 L R A. 303.
15 Bryant v. Richard on, 12 Jur.
~la
) -10.
Hart.-. Prater 1 Jur. 623.
(~. .) 300.
9 BurO'hart .-. A.nger~ tein 6 Car. &
16 ' unders .-. 0 t 1 McCord ( . C.),
572; Price v. and er 60 Ind. 310 ·
P . . O 69.
10 Jenner v. \\"" alker 19 L. T. r _"'. .) Hou e .-. Alexander, 10- Ind. 109, 55
Am. R 1 9, 4 .. E. R. 91.
3 .
11 ee Hill v. Arbon, 34: L T. _-. '.)
li Hou e .-. Alexander. 105 Ind. 109,
4 .. T. E. R. 91, 55 Am. R. 1 9; Grace
2 Berolle

T.

Butler (1899), 160 X. Y. 578, 55 X. E.

R. 275, 47 L. R. A. 303.

1 5 Bryant v. Richardson, 12 Jur.

.X. S.)"300.

16 Saunders v. Ott, 1 McCord (S. C),

570; Price v. Sanders, 60 Ind. 310;

House v. Alexander, 105 Ind. 109, 55

Am. R 189, 4 X. E. R 891.

i' House v. Alexander, 105 Ind. 109,

4 X. E. R 891, 55 Am. R 189; Grace

i^Decell v. Lewenthal, 57 Miss. 331, 34 Am. R 449; State v. Howard,

X. C. 650.
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Decell v. Lewentha1, 5
.
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be used in cultivating his land, 1 the keep of work-horses, 2 even

though in either case he thereby earns his living, are not con-

sidered as necessaries.

Money borrowed to be used, and used by the infant in pro-

curing necessaries, is not a necessary. 3 but money directly ap-

plied by the lender to procure necessaries for the infant may

be recovered: 4 and so. it is held, may money advanced by a

third person, at the infant's request, to pay a bill previously in-

curred by the infant for necessaries. 5 On the same ground, a

person who signs, as surety, an infant's note for necessaries and

is compelled to pay it. may recover from the infant as for money

paid for his benefit. 6

Necessaries furnished to the infant's wife and family are nec-

essaries to the infant; 7 and an infant's widow has been held

liable on her contract to pay the funeral expenses of her hus-

band who left no estate. 8

Attorney and counsel fees are usually regarded as necessa-

ries when required to preserve or protect the infant's personal
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rights. 9 When rights of property only are involved, it has been

v. Hale. 2 Humph. (Term.) 27. 36 Am. Price v. Sanders, supra; Marlow v.

Dec. 290: Decell v. Lewenthal. 57 Pitfield. 1 P. Wnis. 558.

Miss. 331. 34 Am. R 449: Rainwater 4 Swift v. Bennett. 10 Cush. (Mass.)

v. Durham. 2 X. & MeG 524. 10 Am. 436: Randall v. Sweet, 1 Demo (N. T. i.

Dec. 637: Rvan v. Smith (1896), 165

Mass. 303. 43 N. R R 109: Paul v. ^Kilgore v. Rich. S3 Me. 305, 22

Smith, 41 Mo. App. 275: Wood v. Atl. R 176, 23 Am St. R 7n">. 12 L.

Losev. 50 Michu 475. 15 N. W. R. 557. R. A. - "

i House v. Alexander. 105 Ind. 109, 6 Conn v Coburn, 7 N. H •:• - -

4 X. E. R. --91. 55 Am. R. 189; Wood Am Dec 746.

v. Losey. 50 Mich, 475, 15 N. W. R : Cantine v. Phillips. 5 Harr. (DeL)
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557: Rainwater v. Durham, supra; 42S: Chapman v. Hughes, 61 Miss.

Grace v. Hale, supra. But see Moh- 339.

ney v. Evans. 51 Pa. St. SO. contra. * Chappie v. Cooper. 13 Mees. d: W.

- Merriam v. Cunningham, 11 Cush. 252.

(Mass.) 40. 9 See Munson v. "VTashband. 31

s Randall v. Sweet. 1 Denio (N. Y-), Conn. 303. S3 Am. Dec. 151: Barker

460: Price v. Sanders. 60 Ind. 310: v. Hibbard, 54 N. H. 539. 20 Am. R

Darbv v. Boucher. 1 Salk. 279: Earle 160: Epperson v. Nugent. 57 Miss. 4-5.

v. Peale. 1 Salk. 38 34 Am R 434: Englebert v. TroxelL

It may be recovered in equity. 40 Neb. 195, 26 L. R A 177, 42 Am.

* 131

'· Hale. 2 Humph. Tenn. 27. 36 Am.
D ec. o n: Decell '· Lewenthal. 57
331, 34 Am. R 4-1 ; R in wa er
' · Durham. o _-.
:JlcC. 52-!. 1 .Am.
D ec. 63, ; Ryan ' · mirh 1"' . . 165
}la
3 3 -!3 _-. E. R 1 9: Paul ' ·
mi th. 41 _Jo. .tl. p. 275: W
' ·
Losey. 5 llich. 47:::. 15 _-. W. R 557.
1 Hou _e ' · .Alexander. 105 Ina. 1 9.
4 X. E. R "'91, 5- .Am. R 10:9; \\oo
' · Lo~ey. - :Jlich. ;-, 15 _-. \\. R.
. 55 ~ : Rainwater ' · Durham. upra;
race '· Hale. upra. But see 1Iohney ' · E\an:. 51 Pa "'t. ~o. contra.
:? 1Ierriam ' · Cunnin(J'ham, 1 Cush.
:Jla~
40.
0: P rice
Darby>.
" Peale. 1
It ma y be reco ere

in e uiry.
13

Price v.
n e . upra ·
ow '·
Pitfield. 1 P. W - 55 .....
w
'" Benn en:. 10 Cush.
4.36: Randall'· wee . 1 Denio
±" .
5 Ki.laore >. Rich.
· }le. 30.'i. 22
.Atl. R 176. 23 .Am. . R ;-o. 2 L
R .A. L''i9.
Conn > Coburn, 7 - -. H.. 36_. 26
..d.m. Dec. 74 .
7 amine '· Phillip- 5 Harr. 'Del
4.2 : Cha man '· Hu he~. 61 _ · 339.
Chapple ' · C-00per. 3 ee &:: W.
r2.
~ee :Jlnn~ n >. "Washban . 31
Conn. 3 3. 3 .Am. Dec. 15': Barker
'· Hibbard. 54: _-. H.. 539. 20 .Am. R.
1 ~ : Eppe :: n '· _-u en . 57 _!i
34 .Am. R 4-3-.:: Englebert " Troxe
_-eh. 1 5, 26 LR A.. ;;. ±~ .A

§§ 133, 134.J

LAW OF SALE.

[Bo K r.

§§ 133, 134.] LAW OF SALE. [BOOK I.

held that such fees were not necessaries ; 1 but the tendency is.

to regard them as necessaries in these cases also, if tlie services

were beneficial in recovering or protecting the infant's estate.' 2

b. Of the Incapacity of Married Women.

held that such fees were not necessaries; 1 but the tendency is.
to regard them as necessaries in these cases also, if the services.
were beneficial in recovering or protecting the infant's estatc.z.

§ 133. What here considered. — It is not within the prov-

ince of such a work as this to enter, with any fullness, into a

consideration of the legal status of the married woman, for

b. Of the Incapacity of Married Women.

that would require a volume. A brief reference to the chief

outlines of the subject is all which space will permit. For

fuller discussion recourse must be had to the various treatises

which make this question the subject of exhaustive treatment.

§ 134. Common-law disability. — At the common law the

unmarried woman, whether maid or widow, was under no con-

tractual disability by reason of her sex; but the married woman,

by reason of her coverture, was, in general, under a complete

disability to contract, or to acquire, hold or dispose of property

in her own right. In contemplation of law, her existence be-

came merged in that of her husband, her bargaining power
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was lost in his, while her personal property of a tangible nat-

§ 133. ·what here considered.- It is not within the province of such a work as this to enter, with any fullness, into a
consideration of the legal status of the married woman, for
that would require a volume. A brief reference to the chief
outlines of the subject is all which space will permit. For
fuller discussion recourse must be bad to the various treatises
which make this question the subject of exhaustive treatment.

ure became his, and her choses in action also, if he reduced

them to his possession. She could not, therefore, buy or sell

personalty, or enter into binding contracts concerning it.

Exception was made for her benefit in certain cases of pur-

chase. " The first is, when the husband is civiliter mortuus,

dead in law, as when he is under sentence of penal servitude,

or transportation or banishment. The disability of the wife

in such cases is said to be suspended, for her own benefit, that

she may be able to procure a subsistence. She may therefore

bind herself as purchaser when her husband, a convict sen-

tenced to transportation, has not yet been sent away, and also

when he remains away after his sentence has expired. But

St. R. 663, 58 N. W. R. 852; Askey v. z Epperson v. Nugent, supra;

Williams, 74 Tex. 294, 5 L. R. A. 176, Searcy v. Hunter, 81 Tex. 644, 17 S.

11 S. W. R. 1101. W. R. 372, 26 Am. St. R. 837. See

i Phelps v. Worcester, 11 N. H. 51. also Thrall v. Wright, 38 Vt. 494 •
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§ 134. Common-law disability .-At the common law the
unmarried woman, whether maid or widow, was under no contractual disability by reason of her sex; but the married woman,
by reason of her coverture, was, in gen ral, under a complete
disability to contract, or to acquire, hold or dispose of property
in her own right. In contemplation of law, her existence became merged in that of her husband, her bargaining power
was lost in his, while her personal property of a tangible nature became his, and her choses in action also, if he reduced
them to his possession. She could not, therefore, buy or sell
personalty, or enter into binding contracts concerning it.
Exception was made for her benefit in certain cases of purchase. "The fir t is, when the husband is civiliter niortuus,
dead in law, as when he is under sentence of penal servitu le,
or transportation or banishment. The disability of the wife
in such cases is said to be suspended, for her own benefit, that
she may be able to procure a subsistence. She may therefore
bind herself as purchaser when her husband. a convict sentenced to transportation, has not yet been sent away, and also
when he remains a way after his sentence has expired. But
St. R. 665, 5 N. W. R 52; A k y v.
2 Epper on v. Nugent, sup1·a;
William , 74 Tex. 294, 5 L. R A. 176, Searcy v. Hunter, 81 Tex. 644, 17 S.
11 S. W. R. 1101.
W. R. 372, 26 Am. St. R. 37. See
l Phelps v. Wor e ter, 11 N. H. 51. also Thrall v. Wright, 38 Vt. 494.
132
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not if he abscond and go abroad in order to avoi& a charge

of felony." 1

A second exception was at one time thought to exist where

the husband was an alien and resided abroad while she lived

in England and purchased there; but this exception has there

been discredited. 2

The third exception was confined to the city of London,

where, by custom, a married woman might be a sole trader

and bind herself as such. 3

§ 135. Equitable doctrine concerning separate estate. —

In order to relieve these disabilities of the married woman, the

court of chancer v in England early 4 laid the foundations of a

system, since much elaborated, by means of which property

could be settled to the separate use of the married woman, with

reference to which she could deal to a large extent as though

not if he ab cond and go abroad in order to avoi& a charge
of felony. 1
A s cond exception was at one time thought to exi t where
the bu band wa an alien an l re ided abroad while he lived
in En()'land and purchase<l th re· but this exception has there
been di credited. 2
The third exception wa confined to the city of London,
where by cu tom, a married woman might be a ole trader
and bind her elf a uch. 3

she were unmarried. Under this system she could not only sell 5

or buy, 6 but could also enter into contractual obligations which

would bind, not herself personally, but her separate estate. 7
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When not restrained by the terms of the settlement, the rule re-

specting her powers was said in one case 8 to be this : " If a mar-

ried woman, having separate property, enters into a pecuniary

engagement, whether by ordering goods or otherwise, which, if

she were a. feme sole, would constitute her a debtor, and in en-

tering into such engagement she purports to contract, not for

her husband, but for herself, and on the credit of her separate

estate, and it was so intended by her, and so understood by the

person with whom she is contracting, that constitutes an obli-

1 Benjamin on Sale (6th Am. ed.), 6 Duncan v. Cashin (1875;, L. R. 10

§ 32. C. P. 554

-'See Benjamin on Sale, £§ 33, 34. 7 That is, such separate estate as

3 See Benjamin on Sale, g 35. she has at the time of the contract

4 See Fettiplace v. Gorges (1789), 1 and which remains at the time of

Yes. Jr. 46, 1 Rev. R 79: Sturgis v. the judgment. Pike v. Fitzgibbon

Corp (1806), 13 Ves. 190, 9 Rev. R. 169. (1881), 17 Ch. Div. 454

5 Fettiplace v. Gorges, supra; Tay- 8 Matthewman's Case (1866), L. R.

lor v. Meads (1865), 4 De Gex, J. & S. 3 Eq. Cas. 781.

597; Cooper v. Macdonald (1877), 7

Ch. Div. 293.
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135. Equitable doctrine concerning eparate e tate.In or ier to reliev th
di abilities of the married woman the
court of chancer in En ()'land early 4 laid the foundation of a
y tern, ince much elaborated by mean of which property
could be ettled to the separate u e of the married woman with
ref r nee to which he could deal to a large extent as though
shew re unmarrie l. n ler thi
tern she could not only ell 5
6
or buy but could al o nter into contractual obligations which
would bind, not herself p r onally, but her separate estate. 7
When not re traine lb the term of the settlement, the rule respecting her powers was aid in one ca e to be this: "If a married woman, bavinO' eparate property enter into a pecuniary
engagement whether b ordering good or otherwi e, which, if
she were afeme sole, would con titute her a debtor, and in entering into such engagement she purports to contract, not for
her hu band, but for herself, and on the credit of h.er eparate
e tate, and it was o intended by her, and so under tood by the
per on with whom she is contracting that con titutes an obliI

Benjamin on Sale (6th Am. ed.),

6

Duncan v. Ca hin (1 75), L. R. 10

§ 32.

C. P. 554.

ee Benjamin on Sale, ~ 33, 34.
ee Benjamin on Sale, ,· 35.
4 ee Fettiplace v. Gorges (17 9), 1
Ve . . Jr. 46 1 Rev. R. 79: Sturgi v.
Corp (1 06), 13 e . 190, 9 Rev. R. 169.
5 Fettiplace v. Gorges, supra; Taylor v. Mead (1 65), 4 De Gex, J. & .
507: ooper '· l\1acdonald (1 77), 7
Cl1. Div. 293.

7 That is, uch eparate estate as
she ha at the time of the contra.ct
and which remaiw at the time of
the judgment. Pike v. Fitzgibbon
(1 1), 17 Ch. Div. 454.
)fatthewman's Case (1 66), L. R.
3 Eq. Cas. 7 1.

:.1

3
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gation for which the person with whom she contracts has the

right to make her separate estate liable; and the question

whether the obligation was contracted in the manner men-

tioned must depend upon the facts and circumstances of each

particular case."

§ 136. American statutes removing disabilities.— The doc-

trines of the English courts of equity were adopted to some

extent in the American states, but, beginning a little prior to

1850. there has been enacted in substantially all of the States

gation for which the person with whom she contracts has the
right to make her separate estate liable; an<l the question
whether the obligation was contracted in the manner mentioned must depend upon the facts and circumstances of each
particular case."

a series of remarkable statutes, in some cases supplementing

or extending the equitable jurisdiction, but usually establishing

a new legal status, by which the rights of the married woman

in her separate estate have been confirmed and her power to

deal with it as a feme sole quite generally established. Space

does not permit, nor does the occasion require, any detailed ex-

amination of these statutes or the decisions under them. While

there is a general similarity, there is yet so much of dissimilar-

ity that the statute of each state must be examined in the light
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of its own history and judicial interpretation. It must suffice

to say that, in most states, the real and personal estate which

the married woman possessed at her marriage and that which

she has since acquired, remains her separate estate, free from

the control of her husband or liability for his debts, and that>

in respect of this separate estate, she may contract as though

she were unmarried. 1

§ 137, Capacity limited even under most statutes. —

Her power to make contracts is, usually, not unlimited even

under these statutes, but is confined to those which relate to

her separate estate. Only to the extent and in the cases that

the statute has removed her disability, can she contract; other-

wise her common-law incapacity still continues. 2

1 These statutes were summarized 2 Nash v. Mitchell (1877), 71 N. Y.

(in 1886) in Stimsons American Stat- 199, 27 Am. R. 38; Russell v. Savings

ute Law, art. 645 et seq. They will Bank (1878), 39 Mich. 671, 33 Am. R.

also be found in the various works 444; Detroit Chamber of Commerce

on the law of husband and wife, and v. Goodman (1896), 110 Mich. 498, 68

the rights of married women. N. W. R 295.
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§ 136. American statutes removing disabilities.- The doctrines of the English courts of equity were adopted to some
extent in the American states, but, beginning a little prior to
1850., there has been enacted in substantiallv
., all of the States
a series of remarkable statutes, in some cases supplementing
or extending the equitable jurisdiction, but usually estabiishing
a new legal status, by which the rights of the married woman
in her separate estate have been confirmed and her power to
deal with it as a feme sole quite generally established. Space
does not permit, nor does the occasion require, any detailed examination of these statutes or the decisions under them. While
there is a general similarity, there is yet so much of dissimilarity that the statute of each state must be examined in the light
of its own history and judicial interpretation. It must suffice
to say that, in most states, the real and personal estate which
the married woman possessed at her marriage and that which
she has since acquired, remains her separate estate, free from
the control of her husband or liability for his debts, and that,.
in respect of this separate estate, she may contract as though
she were unmarried. 1

§ 137. - - Capacity limited even unde1· most statutes.Her power to make contracts is, usually, not unlimited even
under these statutes, but is confined to those which relate to
her separate estate. Only to the extent and in the cases that
the statute has removed her disability, can she contract; otherwise her common-law incapacity still continues. 2
l Th e tatutes were summarized
2 Nash v. Mitchell (1 77), 71 N. Y.
(in 1 6) in 'timson' Am rican tat- 199, 27 Am. R. ; Ru ell v. Savings
ute Law, art. 645 t ·eq. They will Bank (1 7 ), 9 Mich. 671, 33 Am. R.
al o be found in the variou work. 444; Detr it hamber of Commerce
on the law of bu band and wif , and v. Goodman (1896), 110 Mich. 498, 68
the right of married women.
N. vV. R 295.
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138.

What contracts she may make. — She may

under these statutes generally become a sole trader and bivy l

and sell 2 as such. She may enter into partnership with third

persons, 3 and in some States with her husband, 4 and charge

her separate estate as such partner. And she may even, though

living with her husband, bind her separate estate in purchases

which would ordinarily be deemed binding on her husband

only, if it appears that the credit was extended to her and

not to him. 8

i Nispel v. Laparle (1874), 74 111. 306;

Krouskop v. Shontz (1881), 51 Wis.

§ 138.
What contracts slie may make.- She may
under these statutes genera~ly become a sole trader and buy 1
and sell 2 as such. She may enter into partnership with third
persons, 3 and in some States with her husband, 4 and charge
her separate estate as such partner. And she may even, though
living with her husband, bind her separate estate in purchases
which would ordinarily be deemed binding on her husband
only, if it appears that the credit was extended to her and
not to him. 5

204, 37 Am. R. 817; Brickley v. Walker

(1887), 68 Wis. 563; Wallace v. Row-

ley (1883), 91 Ind. 586; Blumer v. Pol-

lak (1882), 18 Fla. 707 [see also Craw-
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ford v. Feder (1894), 34 Fla. 397,

16 S. R. 287]; Sargeant v. French

(1882), 54 Vt. 384; Reed v. Newcomb

(1891), 64 Vt. 49; Haight v. McVeagh

(1873), 69 111. 624; Hickey v. Thomp-

son (1889), 52 Ark. 234; Walter v.

Jones (1892), 148 Pa. St. 589, 24 Atl.

R. 119.

But under the statute a married

woman, in Michigan, is not liable

upon a note given by herself and

husband for the purchase price of

property purchased jointly with her

husband. It is not a contract con-

cerning her separate estate, and she

-would also become a surety for her

husband as to half of the note, which,

for the same reason, is beyond her

power. Caldwell v. Jones (1897), 115

Mich. 129, 73 N. W. R. 129. See also

Speier v. Opfer (1888), 73 Mich. 35,

40 N. W. R 909, 16 Am. St. R. 556.

2 Porter v. Gamba (1872), 43 Cal.

105; Trieber v. Stover (1875). 30 Ark.

727; Netterville v. Barber (1876), 52

Miss. 168.

3 Vail v. Winterstein (1892), 94

Mich. 230, 53 N. W. R. 932, 18 L. R. A.

515. Contra, in South Carolina.

Vannerson v. Cheatham (1894), 41

S. C. 327, 19 S. E. R. 614.

4 That she cannot be a partner with

her husband, see Artman v. Fergu-

son (1888), 73 Mich. 146, 16 Am. St.

R. 572, 2 L. R. A. 343; Gilkerson-

Sloss Com. Co. v. Salinger (1892), 56

Ark. 294, 16 L. R. A. 526, 35 Am. St.

R. 105; Seattle Board of Trade v.

Hayden (1892), 4 Wash. 263, 16 L. R.

A. 530, 31 Am. St. R. 919; Fuller v.

McHenry (1892), 83 Wis. 573, 18 L. R.

A. 512; Bowker v. Bradford (1885).

140 Mass. 521; Payne v. Thompson

(1886), 44 Ohio St. 192; Scarlett v.

Snodgrass (1883), 92 Ind. 262; Carey

v. Burruss (1882), 20 W. Va. 571, 43

Am. R. 790. That she may be a

partner with her husband, see Suau

v. Caffe (1890), 122 N. Y. 308, 25 N. E.

R. 488, 9 L. R A. 593; Louisville

R. Co. v. Alexander (Ky., 1894), 27

I Nispel v. Laparle (1874), 74 Ill. 306;
Vannerson v. Cheatham (1894), 41
Krouskop v. Shontz (1881), 51 Wis. S. C. 327, 19 S. E. R. 614.
204, 37 Am. R. 817; Brickley v. Walker
4That she cannot be a partner with
(1887), 68 Wis. 563; Wa1lace v. Row- her husband, see Artman v. Fergu·
ley (1883), 91 Ind. 586; Blumer v. Pol- son (1888), 73 Mich. 146, 16 Am. St.
lak (1 82), 18 Fla. 707 [see also Craw- R. 572, 2 L. R. A. 343; Gilkersonford v. Feder (1894), 34 Fla. 397, Sloss Com. Co. v. Salinger (1892), 56
16 S. R. 287]; Sargeant v. French Ark. 294, 16 L. R. A. 526, 35 Am. St.
(1882), 54 Vt. 384; Reed v. Newcomb R. 105; Seattle Board of Trade v.
(1891), 64 Vt. 49; Haight v. McVeagh Hayden (1892), 4 Wash. 263, 16 L. R.
(1873), 69 Ill. 624; Hickey v. Thomp- A. 530, 31 Am. St. R. 919; Fuller v.
son (1889). 52 Ark. 234; Walter v. McHenry (1892), 83 Wis. 573, 18 L. R.
Jones (1892), 148 Pa. St. 589, 24 Atl. A. 512; Bowker v. Bradford (1885).
R. 119.
140 Mass. 521; Payne v. Thompson
But under the statute a married (1886), 44 Ohio St. 192; Scarlett v.
woman, in Michigan, is not liable Snodgrass (1883), 92 Ind. 262; Carey
upon a note given by herself and v. Burruss (1882), 20 W. Va. 571. 43
hu band for the purchase price of Am. R. 790. That she may be a
property purchased ;'ointly with her partner with her husband, see Suau
husband. It is not a contract con- v. Caffe (1890), 122 N. Y. 308, 25 N. E.
cerning her separate estate, and she R. 488, 9 L. R. A. 593; Louisville
would also become a surety for her R. Co. v. Alexander (Ky., 1894), 27
hu band as to half of the note, which, S. W. R. 981: Belser v. Tuscumbia
for the same reason, is beyond her Banking Co. (1895), 105 Ala. 514, 17 S.
power. Caldwell v. Jones (1897), 115 R. 40; Dressel v. Lonsdale (1892), 46 Ill.
Mich. 129, 73 N. W. R. 129. See also App. 454; Lane v. Bishop (1893), 65 Vt.
Speier v. Opfer (1888), 73 Mich. 35, 575, 27 AtL R. 499. In Tennessee,
40 N. W. R. 909, 16 Am. St. R. 556.
see Theus v. Dugger (1893), 93 Tenn.
2 Porter v. Gamba (1872), 43 Cal. 41, 23 S. W. R. 135. In Maine, see
105; Trieber v. Stover (1875). 30 Ark. Bird Co. v. Hurley (1895), 87 Me. 579,
727; Netterville v. Barber (1876), 52 33 Atl. R. 164.
Miss. 168.
5 Thus, a married woman is liable
3 Vail v. Winterstein (1892), 94 for the price of a suit of clothes purMich. 230, 53 N. W. R. 932, 18 L. R. A. chased by her for her minor son,
515. Contra, in South Carolina. where the charge was made to her
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| 139. Statutory liability for family necessaries.—

§ 139.

Statutory liabil ity fo r fam ily necessaries.-

Formerly in Alabai;na,1 and still in Iowa, 2 Illinois, 3 :Missouri 4

Formerly in Alabama, 1 and still in Iowa, 2 Illinois, 3 Missouri 4

by her direction and she agreed to

pay it: Hirschfield v. Waldron (1890),

83 Mich. 116, 47 N. W. R. 239; Meads

v. Martin (1890). 84 Mich. 306, 47 N.

W. R. r>83: First Commercial Bank

v. Newton (1898), 117 Mich. 433, 75 N.

W. R. 934; or for medical services to

a minor daughter, under like circum-

stances: Goodman v. Shipley (1895),

105 Mich. 439, 63 N. W. R. 412; or for

wearing apparel for herself: Arnold

v. Engleman (1885), 103 Ind. 512; or

for board for herself and child: Rush-

ing v. Clancy (1893), 92 Ga. 769, 19
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S. E. R. 711.

1 "For all contracts for articles of

comfort and support of the house-

hold, suitable to the degree and con-

dition in life of the family, and for

which the husband would be re-

sponsible at common law, the sepa-

rate estate of the wife is liable; to

be enforced by action at law, against

the husband alone, or against hus-

band and wife jointly." Code, 1876,

§ 2711. Now repealed.

* In Iowa, Code 1897, § 3165, it is

provided that " The expenses of the

family and the education of the chil-

dren are chargeable upon the prop-

erty of both husband and wife, or

either of them, and in relation thereto

they may be sued jointly or sepa-

rately."

" Expenses of the family " are not

limited to necessary expenses; it is

enough that the expense is incurred

on account of the family. Smedley

v. Felt, 41 Iowa, 588; Schrader v.

Hoover, 80 Iowa, 243. Hence, a piano

(Smedley v. Felt, supra); an organ

(Frost v. Parker, 65 Iowa, 178); a

cook stove (Finn v. Rose, 12 Iowa,

565); medical services for the hus-

band or other member of the family

(Murdy v. Skyles. 101 Iowa, 549, 70 N.

W. R. 714); a watch and other jew-

elry, even though the watch was

presented by the husband to his wife

(Marquardt v. Flaughter, 60 Iowa.

148); even a diamond stud worn by

the husband (Neasham v. McNair, 103

Iowa, 695, 64 Am. St. R. 202), are

all family expenses for which the

wife may be held liable under the

statute; but a reaping machine

(McCormick v. Muth, 49 Iowa, 536),

or a plow (Russell v. Long. 52 Iowa,

250), is not such an expense. Many

other illustrations are found in the

Iowa reports.

3 In Illinois, the Iowa statute has

been adopted verbatim. Starr &

Curtis, Ann. Stat. 1896, p. 2133, § 15.

In adopting this statute from Iowa,

by h er direction and she agreed to band or other member of the family
pay it: Hir ·cbfield v. Waldron (1 90), (Murdy v. Skyles. 101 Iowa, 549, 70 N.
83 Mich. 116, 47 N. W.R. 239; leads vV. R. 714); a watch and other jewv. Mart.in (1890). 84 Mich. 306, 47 N. elry. even though the watch was
W. R. fi 3: Fir t Commercia l Bank presented by the hu band to his wife
v. Newton (1 98), 117 Mich. 433, 75 N. (Ma rquardt v. Flaughter, 60 Iowa.
Vv. R. !)34; or for medical s r v ices to 148); even a diamond stnd worn by
a minor daught er, under like cir ·um- the husband (Neasham v. M air, 103
stances : Goodman v. Shipley (1 9.-), Iowa, 695, 64 Am. St. R. 202), are
103 t£icb. 439, 63 N. W.R. 412; or for all family expenses for which the
wearing apparel for h erself: Arnold wife may be h eld liable under the
v. Engleman (1 85), 103 Ind. 512; or statute; but a reaping machine
for board for herself and child: Rush- (McCormick v. Muth, 49 Iowa, 536),
ing v. Clancy (1 93), 92 Ga. 769, 19 or a plow (Ru sell v. Long. 52 Iowa,
S. E. R. 711.
250), is not such an expen e.
fany
l "For all contracts for articles of other illu trations are found in the
comfort and support of the house- Iowa reports.
3 In Illinois, the Iowa statute has
hold. suitable to tlie degree and condition in life of t he family, and for been adopted verbatim. Starr &
which the husband would be re- Curtis, Ann. St.at. 1896, p. 2133, § 15.
sponsible a t common law, the sepa- In adopting this statute from Iowa,
rate estate of the wife is liable; to the interpret a tion put upon it by the
be enforced by action a t law, against Iowa court is adopted al o. Myers
the husban d a lone, or against hus- v. Field, 146 Ill. 50; Glauben klee v.
band and wife jointly." Code, 1 76, Low, 29 Ill. App. 408.
§ 2711. Now repealed.
Under this interpretation it is not
:i In Iowa, Code 1897, § 3165, it i
essential that the expen es shall
provided that "The expenses of the have been "necessary;" the tatute
family and th e education of the chil- applie to family expen ' w ithout
dren a re c hargeable upon the prop- limitation a to amount, and witherty of both husband a nd wife, or out r egard to the wealth, habits or
either of them, and in relation thereto o ial po ition of the parti s. Hudthey may be sued jointly or sepa- son v. King. 23 Ill. App. 11 . The
rately."
wife' consent is not nece ary, and
"Expen
of the family" are not the fa t that the goods w re for the
limite to nere ary xpen 'e · it i bu ·band' p r ona l u e i immaterial.
enough that the expen e i incurr d Rud on v. King, supra.
on a
unt of the family. Smedl y
4 In l\fi ouri, Rev.
tat . 1 99,
v. F lt, 41 Iowa, 5._ · chrad r v.
4340, th r ~al and p r onal propH " r, 0 Iowa, 243. II nc , a piano rty of th wife whi h he had at
(• m dley v. Felt, iipra i ; an organ the tim of b r rnarriag , or whi h
(Fr t . Parker, 65 Iowa, 1 )' a ha om to her ince by <Yift, beque t
ook tove (Finn v. Ro e, 19 Iowa, or inheritan , or by pur hase with
56-); medi al ser ices for he hu - her separate money, or due as wages
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and Oregon, 1 by force of certain unusual and peculiar statutes,

her separate estate is made liable for family expenses even

though she took no part in contracting them.

and Oregon, 1 by force of certain unusual and peculiar statutes,
her separate estate is made liable for family expenses even
though she took no part in contracting them.

c. Of the Capacity of Corporations.

§140. In general.— It is, of course, entirely beyond the

range of such a work as this to go, with any fullness, into the

question of the capacity of corporations to buy and sell. That

c. Of the Capacity of Corporations.

subject belongs to the special treatises upon the law of corpo-

rations. But in attempting to present to the reader's mind a

general view of the capacity of parties to enter into the con-

tract of sale, a statement of the most fundamental principles

which control the private corporation in this regard seems

pertinent. Thus —

§ 141. Corporations as sellers. — Unless restrained by stat-

ute or by the inherent nature or purpose of its existence, a pri-

vate corporation has the same power to dispose of its property
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by sale that a private individual would have in like circum-

stances. 2 As is said in one case : 3 " The very idea of private

for her personal service, or by reason

of a violation of her personal rights,

remains her separate property, and

is not in general liable for the debts

§ 140. In general.-It is, of course, entirely beyond the
range of such a work as this to go, with any fullness, into the
question of the capacity of corporations to buy and sell. That
ubject belongs to the special treatises upon the law of corporations. But in attempting to present to the reader's mind a
general view of the capacity of parties to enter into the contract of sale, a statement of the most fundamental principles
which control the private corporation in this regard seems
pertinent. Thus-

of the husband, but such personal

property " shall be subject to execu-

tion . . . for any debtor liability

of her husband created for necessa-

ries for the wife or family."

The wife must be a party to the

proceeding. Bedsworth v. Bowman,

104 Mo. 44

i In Oregon, Hill's Code, § 2874, it

§ 1!1. Corporations a seller .-Unless restrained by statute or by the inherent nature or purpose of its existence, a priT"ate corporation bas the same pmYer to dispose of its property
by sale that a private individual would have in like circumstances.2 As is said in one ca e: 3 "The very idea of private

is provided that "The expenses of

the family and the education of the

children are chargeable upon the

property of both husband and wife,

or either of them, and in Nation

thereto they may be sued jointly or

separately." The cost of a buggy

bought by the husband for family

use and used by the family is a

family expense within the meaning

of this statute. Dodd v. St. John

(1892), 22 Oreg. 250, 29 Pac. R. 618,

15 L. R. A. 717.

2 White Water Valley Canal Co. v.

Vallette (1858), 21 How. (TJ. S.) 424

Pierce v. Emery (1856), 32 N. H. 486

Hood v. Railroad Co. (1852), 22 Conn. 1

Richards v. Railroad Co. (1S62), 44 N.

H. 136; Commonwealth v. Smith

(1865), 10 Allen (Mass.), 448; Buffett

v. Railroad Co. (1869), 40 N. Y. 176;

Reichwald v. Commercial Hotel Co.

(1883), 106 111. 439; Burton's Appeal

(1868), 57 Pa. St. 213.

3 Miners' Ditch Co. v. Zellerbach

(1869), 37 Cal. 543, 99 Am. Dec. 300.

137

for her per onal ervice, or by reason bought by the husband for family
of a violation of her per onal rights, use and u ed by the family is a
remains her eparate property, and family expense within the meaning
i not in general liable for the debts of this statute. Dodd v. St. John
of the hu band, but such per onal (1892), 22 Oreg. 250 29 Pac. R. 618,
property "shall be suhject to execu- 15 L. R. A. 717.
tion . . . for any debt or liability
2 White Water Valley Canal Co. v.
of her hu band created for necessa- Vallette (1858), 21 How. (U. S.) 424;
rie for the wife or family.''
Pierce v. Emery (1 56), 82 N. H. 4 6;
The wife must be a party to the Hood v. Railroad Co. (1 59.), 22 Conn. l;
proceeding. Bed worth v. Bowman, Richard v. Railroad Co. (1 62), 44 N.
104 1\Io. 44.
H. 136; Commonwealth v. Smith
1 In Oregon, Hill's Code, · 2 74, it (1 65), 10 Allen (1\Ia .), 4-± ; Buffett
is provided that " The expen es of v. Railroad Co. (1 69), 40 . Y. 176;
the family and the education of the Reichwald v. Commercial Hotel Co.
-.hildren are chargeable upon the (1 3), 106 Ill. 439; Burton's Appeal
property of both hu band and wife, (1 6 ), 57 Pa. St. 213.
or either of them, and in relation
31\finers' Ditch Co. v. Zellerbach
thereto they may be sued jointly or (1869), 87 Cal. 543, 99 Am. Dec. 300.
separately." The cost of a buggy
137
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LAW OF SALE.
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§ 142.] LAW OF SALE. [BOOK I.

property, in which the public has no rights, involves the idea

of a right to sell and convey when the exigencies of the corpo-

ration require it." The jus disjxmendi, therefore, necessarily

attaches as an incident to the ownership. The general rule

with its limitations is well stated by Bigelow, J., as follows:

" At common law the right of corporations, acting by a ma-

jority of their stockholders, to sell their property is absolute,

and is not limited as to objects, circumstances or quantity. To

this general rule there are many exceptions, arising from the

nature of particular corporations, the purposes for which they

were created, and the duties and liabilities imposed on them

by their charters. Corporations established for objects quasi-

public, such as railway, canal and turnpike corporations, to

which the right of eminent domain and other large privileges

are granted in order to enable them to accommodate the pub-

lic, may fall within the exception ; as also charitable and re-

liirious bodies, in the administration of whose affairs the com-

munity, or some portion of it, has an interest, to see that their
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corporate duties are properly discharged. Such corporations

may, perhaps, be restrained from alienating their property,

and compelled to appropriate it to specific uses, by mandamus

or other proper process. But it is not so with corporations of a

private character, established solely for trading and manufactur-

ing purposes. Neither the public nor the legislature have any

direct interest in their business or its management." l

§ 142. Corporations as purchasers. — So, also, it is well set-

tled that a private corporation, in the absence of contrary pro-

visions in its charter, has implied power to purchase and hold

such property, whether real or personal, as may reasonably be

required to enable it to carry on the business and accomplish

the purposes for which it was created. 2

i Treadwell v. Salisbury Mfg. Co. 2 Page v. Heineberg (1868), 40 Vt.

(1856), 7 Gray (Mass.), 393, 66 Am. Dec. 81, 94 Am. Dec. 378; Old Colony R.

490. See also Richards v. Railroad R. Co. v. Evans (1856), 6 Gray (Mass.).

Co. (1862), 44 N. H. 136; Pierce v. 38, 66 Am. Dec. 394; Spear v. Craw-

Emery (1856), 32 id. 486. ford (1835), 14 Wend. (N. Y.) 23, 28
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property, in which the public bas no rights, involves the idea
of a right to sell and convey when the exigencies of the corporation require it." The jus disponendi, therefore, necessarily
attaches as an incident to the ownership. The general rule
with its ]imitations is well stated by Bigelow, J., as follows:
"At common law the right of corporations, acting by a majority of their stockholders, to sell their property is absolute,
and is not limited as to objects, circumstances or quantity. To
this general rule there are many exceptions, arising from the
nature of particular corporations, the purposes for which they
were created, and the duties and liabilities imposed on them
by their charters. Corporations established for objects quasipublic, such as railway, canal and turnpike corporations, to
which the right of emrnent domain and other large privileges
are granted in order to enable them to accommodate the public, may fall within the exception; as also charitable and religious bodies, in the administration of whose affairs the community, or some portion of it, has an interest, to see that their
corporate duties are properly discharged. Such corporations
may, perhaps, be restrained from alienating their property,
and compelled to appropriate it to specific uses, by mM/,damus
or other proper process. But it is not so with corporations of a
private character, established solely for trading and manufacturing purposes. Neither the public nor the legislature have any
direct interest in their business or its management." 1

§ 142. Corporations as purchasers.- So, also, it is well settled that a private corporation, in the absence of contrary provi ions in its charter, bas implied power to purchase and hold
such prop rty, whether real or personal, as may reasonably be
required to enable it to carry on the business and accomplish
the purposes for which it was created. 2
1 Treadwell v. Sali bury Mfg. Co.
2 Page v. Heine berg (1868), 40 Vt.
(1 -6) 7 Gray (Ma .) 39 , 66 Am. De . 1, 94 m. Dec. 37 ; Old Colony R.
490.
ee al ·o Richard v. Ra,ilroa<l R. o. v. Evan (1 -6), 6 Gray (Ma .).
'o. (1 62), 44 N. H. 1; 6; Pierce v. ~ , 66 Am. Dec. 394· pear v. Cra~v
Emery (1855), 32 id. 4 f),
f rd (1 35), 14 Wend. (N. Y.) 2 , 2
1
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This power, however, is one which is incidental to its main

powers, and the corporation has, therefore, no authority to pur-

chase and hold such property as does not fall within the limits

above specified. 1

A corporation, therefore, organized for the sole purpose of

manufacturing cannot, it is held, 2 enforce an executory con-

tract to sell and deliver to it goods which are not to be used

in the process of manufacturing, but are to be sold again by

the corporation for profit.

The question of the power of a private corporation to buy

and hold stock, either its own or that issued by some other

corporation, leads so far into questions of general corporation

law that it is left for the special treatises upon that subject. 3

Express limitations may of course be placed, by charter or

other fundamental instruments, upon the power of the corpo-

ration to acquire and hold property, either real or personal; 4

but the question of the effect of such limitations is also be}*ond

the present purpose and must be left to the special treatises
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upon corporation law.

d. Of the Capacity of Partnerships.

§ 143. In general. — For reasons similar to those suggested

in the preceding subdivision in relation to corporations, a word

must be said respecting the power of partnerships to buy and

sell.

Partnerships may be organized for any lawful purpose to

which the buying and selling of personal property may be

more or less germane. In many cases that may be the chief

or characteristic purpose of the partnership, distinguishing it

Am. Dec. 513; Moss v. Averell (1853), cent Oil Co. (1895), 171 Pa. St. 109, 32

10 N. Y. 449; Thompson v. Waters Atl. R. 1120.

(1872), 25 Mich. 222, 12 Am. R. 243. 3 See, for example, Cook on Corpo-

This power, however, is one which is incidental to its main
powers, and the corporation has, therefore, no authority to purchase and hold such property as does not fall within the limits
above specified. 1
A corporation, therefore, organized for the sole purpose of
manufacturing cannot, it is held, 2 enforce an executory contract to sell and deliver to it goods which are not to be used
in the process of manufacturing, but are to be sold again by
the corporation for profit.
The question of the power of a private corporation to buy
and hold stock, either its own or that issued by some other
corporation, leads so far into questions of general corporation
law that it is left for the special treatises upon that subject. 3
Express limitations may of course be placed, by charter or
other fundamental instruments, upon the power of the corporation to acquire and hold property, either real or personal;•
but the question of the effect of such limitations is also be) ond
the present purpose and must be left to the special treatises
upon corporation law.

i Pacific R. R. Co. v. Seely (1870), rations, vol. I, §§ 309 et seq.

45 Mo. 212, 100 Am. Dec. 369; Rens- 4 Compare, for example, Cornell

selaer, etc. R. R. Co. v. Davis (1870), University v. Fiske (1889). 136 U. S.

d. Of the Capacity of Partnerships.

43 N. Y. 137. 152. and Farrington v. Putnam (1897),

2 Bosshardt & Wilson Co. v. Cres- 90 Me. 405, 37 Atl. R. 652, 38 L. R. A.

339.
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§ 143. In general.- For reason similar to those suggested
in the preceding subdivision in r elation to corporations, a word
must be said respecting the power of partnerships to buy and
sell.
Partnerships may be organized for any lawful purpose to
which the buying and selling of personal property may be
more or less germane. In many cases that may be the chief
or characteristic purpose of the partnership, distinguishing it
Am. Dec. 513; Moss v. Averell (1853),
10 N. Y. 449; Thompon v. Waters
(1872), 25 Mich. 292, 12 Am. R. 243.
1 Pacific R. R. Co. v. Seely (1870),
45 Mo. 212, 100 Am. Dec. 369; Rensselaer, etc. R. R. Co. v. Davis (1870),
43 N. Y. 137.
2 Bosshardt & Wilson Co. v. Cres-

cent Oil Co. (1895), 171 Pa. St. 109, 32
A ti. R. 1120.
a See, for example, Cook on Corporations, vol. I, §~ 309 et seq.
4 Compare, for example, Cornell
University v. Fiske (1889), 136 U. S.
152, and Farrington v. Putnam (1897),
90 Me. 405~ 37 Atl. R. 652, 38 L. R. A.
339.
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in many important points from those whose chief purpose is not

thus commercial. Thus it is said in a recent case : " The test of

the character of the partnership is buying and selling. If it buys

and sells, it is commercial or trading. If it does not buy or

sell, it is one of employment or occupation." By this is meant,

of course, buying and selling as a business and not as a mere in-

cident to some other business or occupation. The distinction

is an important one; for, as can readily be seen and as will be

more fully observed hereafter, much greater powers may prop-

erly be regarded as incident to a commercial or trading busi-

ness than to one for the exercise of a profession or occupation

merely. Of this distinction and its legal consequences third

persons are bound to take notice. 1

§ 144. The partnership as seller. — The powers of the part-

nership may be exercised by all of the partners collectively, or

by any one partner alone, it being the general rule that each

partner is agent for the firm in all matters falling within the

scope of the partnership business as it is actually conducted.
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All of the partners collectively, however, might do acts which

a single partner would have no implied power to do, for all

might thus extend or exceed the scope of the business, and

in many important points from those whose chief purpose is not
thus commercial. Thus it is said in a recent case: "The test of
the character of the partnership is buying arn1 selling. If it buys
and sells, it is commercial or trading. If it does not buy or
sell, it is one of employment or occupation." By this is meant,
of course, buying and selling as a business and not as a mere incident to some other business or occupation. The distinction
is an important one; for, as can readily be seen and as will be
more fully observed hereafter, much greater powers may properly be regarded as incident to a commercial or trading business than to one for the exercise of a profession or occupation
merely. Of this distinction and its legal consequences third
persons are bound to take notice. 1

there would be no one left to complain. But, speaking of the

§ 14!. The partnership as seller .-The powers of the part-

implied power of a partner as falling within the scope of the

partnership business, it may be said that each partner has im-

plied authority to sell, assign or dispose of, in the regular course

of business, so much of the partnership property as is designed

for sale, even though it be the whole property of the firm, and

may pass the entire title to it. He may also sell or transfer,

in the course of the business, choses in action and other intan-

gible property of the firm, such as its accounts and bills re-

ceivable, patent-rights, and the like. And upon the sale he

may give such warranties of title or quality, or may make such

1 See Mechem's Elem. of Partner- Pease v. Cole (1885), 53 Conn. 53, 55

ship, § 162; Lee v. First Nat. Bank Am. R. 53; Smith v. Sloan (1875), 37

(1890), 45 Kan. 8, 25 Pac. R 196, 11 L. Wis. 285, 19 Am. R. 757; Woodruff v.

R, A. 238; Winshipv. Bank of United Scaife (1887), 83 Ala. 152.

States (1831), 5 Peters (U. S.), 529;
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nership may be exercised by all of the partners collectively, or
by any one partner alone, it being the general rule that each
partner is agent for the firm in all matters falling within the
scope of the partnership business as it is actually conducted.
All of the partners collectively, however, might do acts which
a single partner would have no implied power to do, for all
might thus extend or exceed the scope of the business, and
there would be no one left to complain. · But, speaking of the
implied power of a partner as falling within the scope of the
partnership business, it may be said that each partner has implied authority to sell, a sign or dispose of, in the regular course
of business, so much of the partnership property as is designed
for sale, ven though it be the whole property of the firm, and
may pass the ntire titl to it. He may also sell or tra.nsfer,
in the course of the business, choses in action and other intangible property of the firm, such as its accounts and bills rec ivable, pat nt-right , and the like. And upon the sale he
may give uch warranti s of title or quality, or may mRik such
1

ee M ch m's Elem. of Partnership,
162; Lee v. First Nat. Bank
(1 0), 4- Kan. , 25 Pac. R. 196, 11 L.
R. . 23 ; Win hip v. Bank of United
States (1831), 5 Peter (U. S.), 529;

s

P ase v. Cole (1 -), 53 Conn. 53, 55
Am. R. 53· mith v. loan (1 75), 37
vVi . <:> , 19 m. R. 7 7; Woodruff v.
Scaife (1 7), 83 Ala. 1 2.
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incidental contracts in relation thereto, as are usually made in

like cases. 1

The implied power of one partner to sell the entire property

of the firm is, by the weight of authority, limited to that kept

for sale and does not include the power to sell that kept for

the purposes of carrying on the business. 2

§ 145. The partnership as buyer. — The same general prin-

ciples apply where the partnership is buying. All of the part-

ners mio-ht so act as to foreclose themselves from asserting that

i ncidental con tracts in relation thereto, as are usually made in
like cases. 1
T he implied power of one partner to sell the entire property
of the firm is, by the weight of authority, limited to that kept
for sale a nd does not include the power to sell that kept for
the purposes of carrying on the business. 2

the purchase was not within the scope of the partnership busi-

ness; but the power of one partner, ordinarily, must be meas-

ured by that scope.

The distinction between trading and non-trading firms is

here material, but not conclusive as to the implied power to

buy. In the case of the trading firm, whose business it is, in

whole or in part, to buy goods for use or sale, the power of each

partner to buy such goods must clearly be implied. It must

also be implied in the case of a non-trading firm if the purchase
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is within the scope of the business as actually conducted. 3

The purchase may be on credit, and may be of either real or

personal property within the limits stated.

If the power exists, the firm is none the less bound because

the partner bu} r ing subsequently misapplies the goods.

II.

Or Sales by Persons Having Only a Defeasible Title.

§ 146. Person in possession under a defeasible title may

transfer good title to bona fide purchaser. — It frequently

happens that a person may be in possession of goods, as owner,

iSee Mechem's Elera. of Partner- Ind. 417, 24 N. E. R 351, 7 L. R A.

ship, § 186; Ellis v. Allen (1886), 80 784; Wilcox v. Jackson (1884), 7 Colo.

Ala. 515, 2 S. R. 676; Crites v. Wil- 521, 4 Pac. R. 966; Cayton v. Hardy

kinson (1884), 65 Cal. 559, 4 Pac. R (1858), 27 Mo. 536.

567; First Nat. Bank v. Freeman 3 See Mechem's Elem. of Partner-

(1882), 47 Mich. 408; Schneider v. ship, § 176; Bond v. Gibson (1808), 1

Sansom (1884), 62 Tex. 201. Camp. 185, Ames' Cas. on Partn. 537,

2 See Lowman v. Sheets (1890), 124 and note; Lynch t. Thompson (1883),
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1!5. Th e par t ner shi p as buyer .- The same general principles apply where the partnership is buying. All of the partner might o act as to foreclo e themselves from a serting that
the purchase wa not within the scope of the partnership busines · but the power of one partner, ordinarily, must be measured by that scope.
The distinction between trading and non-trading firms is here material, but not conclu ive as to the implied power to
buy. I n the case of the trading firm, whose business it is, in
whole or in part, to buy good for u e or sale, the power of each
partner to buy uch <YOOd mu t clearly. be implied. It must
al o be implied in the case of a non-trading firm if the purchase
is within the scope of the bu ine s as actually conducted. 3
T he purchase may be on credit, and may be of either real or
per onal property within the limit stated.
If the power exi ts, the firm is none the less bound because
the partner buying subsequently misapplies the goods.

II.
O F SALES BY P ERSONS HAVING ONLY A DEFEASIBLE T ITLE.

§ 14:6. P er son in posses ion under a defeasible t itle may
transfer good tit l e t o bon a fide pur ch aser. - It frequently
happens that a person may be in possession of goods, as O\\ ner,
1· See l\Iechem 's Elem. of Partner- Ind. 417, 24 N. E. R. 351, 7 L. R. A.
ship, · 1 6; Ellis v. Allen (1 6), 0 7 4; Wilcox v. Jackson (1 4), 7 Colo.
Ala. 515, 2 S. R. 676; Crites v. Wil- 521, 4 Pac. R. 966; Cayton v. Hardy
kin on (1 84), 65 Cal. 559, 4 Pac. R. (1 58), 27 Io. 536.
567 · Fir t Nat. Bank v. Freeman
a See 1\Iechem 's Elem. of P art ner(1 9), 47 1\Iich. 408; Schneider v. ship, § 176 ; Bond v. Gibson (180 ), 1
San om (1 '4), 62 Tex. 20t
Camp. 1 5, Ames' Cas. on P artn. 537,
2 See Lowman v. Sheets (1890), 124 and n ote; Lynch v. Thompson (1883),
141
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having a title thereto not absolute but subject to defeasance

upon the happening of some condition subsequent, or upon the

act of some other person having a paramount right. The per-

son so situated has a title to the goods, which may be defeated

or not, but which until it is defeated confers upon him many

of the rights of an owner. Among these rights is that of trans-

ferring at least such interest as he has, and, in many cases,

where his vendee has acted in good faith, and paid value for the

goods in ignorance of the defeasible character of the title, such

vendee will acquire the title freed from its defeasible nature.

The more important of these cases will be here considered.

§ 147. One holding subject to a secret lien. — A famil-

iar illustration of this rule is found in the case of one who has

a title to goods subject to some secret lien, which while good

between the parties cannot prevail against a purchaser who

buys the goods in good faith without notice of the lien. The

common' instance of the chattel mortgage not filed or recorded

147, 148.J

LA.W OF SA.LE.

[BOOK I.

having a title thereto not absolute but subject to defeasance
upon the happening of some condition subsequent, or upon the
act of some other person having a paramount right. The person so situated has a title to the goods, which may be defeated
or not, but which until it is defeated confers upon him many
of the rights of an owner. Among these rights is that of transferring at least such interest as he has, and, in many cases,
where his vendee has acted in good faith, and paid value for the
goods in ignorance of the defeasible character of the title, such
vendee will acquire the title freed from its defeasible nature.
The more important of these cases will be here considered.

as the law directs and not otherwise brought to the notice of
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the purchaser affords a typical illustration. As said in such a

§ 147. - - One holding subject to a secret lien.- A famil-

case: l " It is too well settled to admit of argument or doubt,

that if the general owner of personal property, having posses-

sion thereof, sell and deliver it to a person who has no notice,

actual or constructive, that the property is incumbered, but who

purchases it in good faith for value, such purchaser will hold

the property discharged of any prior incumbrance."

§ 148. Fraudulent vendee. — Another, and one of the

most common illustrations of this rule, is that of the vendee

who has purchased goods by means of such fraudulent prac-

tices that his vendor may rescind the sale. What these cases

are is more fully considered in later sections, 2 but, as will there

61 Miss. 354; Stillman v. Harvey 14 Nev. 265;' Kenney v. Altvater

(1879), 47 Conn. 27; Johnston v. Trask (1874), 77 Pa. St. 34.

(1889), 116 N. Y. 136, 22 N. E. R. 377, J Andrews v. Jenkins (1876), 39 Wis.

15 Am. St. R. 394, 5 L. R. A. 630; 476.

Porter v. Curry (1869), 50 111. 319, 99 2 See post, §886 et seq.

Am. Dec. 520; Davis v. Cook (1879),
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iar illustration of this rule is found in the case of one who has
a title to goods subject to some secret lien, which while good
between the parties cannot prevail against a purchaser who
buys the goods in good faith without notice of the lien. The
commorr instance of the chattel mortgage not filed or recorded
as the law directs and not otherwise brought to the notice of
the purchaser affords a typical illustration. As said in such a
case: 1 "It is too well settled to admit of argument or doubt,
that if the general owner of personal property, having possession thereof, sell and deliver it to a person who has no notice,
actual or constructive, that the property is incumbered, but who
purchases it in good faith for value, such purchaser will hold
the property discharged of any prior incumbrance."

§ 148. - - Fraudulent vendee.-Another, and one of the
most common illustrations of this rule, is that of the vendee
who has purchased goods by means of such fraudulent practices that his vendor may rescind the sale. What these cases
are is more fully considered in later sections, 2 but, as will there
61 Miss. 354; Stillman v. Harvey 14 Nev. 265; ' Kenney v. Altvater
(1879), 47 Conn. 27; Johnston v. Trask (1874), 77 Pa. St. 34.
l Andrews v. Jenkins (1876), 39 Wis.
(1889), 116 N. Y. 136, 22 N. E. R. 377,
15 Am. St. R. 394, 5 L. R. A. 630; 476.
2 See post, § 886 et seq.
Porter v. Cnrry (1869 ), 50 Ill. 319, 99
Am. Dec. 520; Davis v. Cook (1879),
142
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be seen, it is settled that the sale is not void but merely void-

able. The defrauded vendor may disaffirm the sale, or he may

ratify and confirm it; but, until he has disaffirmed it, his vendee

has such a title that he may transfer a complete and indefeas-

ible title to one who purchases the goods from him for value

in good faith and without notice of the fraud. 1

This rule and the reasons for it were well stated by Chief

Justice Shaw, as follows: "It is a well-established rule that

goods obtained by fraud in the sale, as by false representations,

may be reclaimed by the vendor. This does not proceed on

the ground that the property in the goods does not pass by the

sale, but that the dishonest purchaser shall not hold it against

the deceived vendor. But it is at the option of the vendor to

rescind the contract and reclaim the goods or not. If he elects

to rescind and avoid the sale, he must do it within a reason-

able time after coming to the knowledge of the fraud. If he

does anything to affirm the sale, after a full knowledge of the

facts — especially if he suffer a considerable time to elapse, or if
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others are induced by his affirmance to act, — he will not be en-

titled to disaffirm the sale and reclaim the goods. By the con-

tract, the vendee takes the property in the goods ; but he takes

by title defeasible, because, as against the vendor, he cannot

honestly, and of course not legally, hold them. But this right

of reclaiming can be enforced only whilst the goods are in the

hands, first, of the fraudulent purchaser; or secondly, of some

agent, trustee or other person holding for the use and benefit

of the purchaser; or thirdly, of some one who has taken them

of the purchaser with knowledge of the fraud by which they

they were obtained, or with notice sufficient to put him on rea-

1 Hoffman v. Noble (1843). 6 Mete. 477; Farley v. Lincoln, 51 N. H. 577;

(Mass.) 68; Kingsbury v. Smith (1842), Sleeper v. Davis, 64 N. H. 59, 6 AtL

13 N. H. 109; White v. Garden (1851), R. 201: Rowley v. Bigelow, 12 Pick.

10 C. B. 919, 20 L. J. C. P. 166, 70 Eng. (Mass.) 307]; Holland v. Swain (1879),

Com. L. 918; Kingsford v. Merry, 25 94 111. 154; Doane v. Lockwood (1886),

L. J. Ex. 166; Pease v. Gloahec, L. R. 115 111. 490; Curme v. Rauh (1884), 100

1 Pr. Coun. 219; Porell v. Cavanaugh Ind. 247; Robinson v. Levi (1886), 81

(1898), 69 N. H 364, 41 AtL R. 860 Ala. 134.

[citing Bradley v. Obear, 10 N. H.
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be seen, it is settled that the sale is not void but merely voidable. The defrauded vendor may disa:ffirm the sale, or he may
ratify and confirm it; but, until he has di affirmed it, his vendee
has such a title that he may transfer a complete and indefeasible title to one who purchases the goods from him for value
in good faith and ,-\·ithout notice of the fraud. 1
This rule and the reasons for it were well stated by Chief
Ju tice Shaw, as follows: "It is a well-established rule that
goods obtained by fraud in the sale, as by false representations,
may be reclaimed by the vendor. This does not proceed on
the ground that the property in the goods does not pass by the
sale, but that the dishonest purchaser shall not hold it against
the decei ed vendor. But it is at the option of the vendor to
rescind the contract and reclaim the goods or not. If he elects
to r scind and avoid the sale, he mu t do it within a reasonable time after coming to the know ledge of the fraud. If he
does anything to affirm the sale, after a full knowle<lge of the
facts - e pecially if he suffer a considerable time to elapse, or if
others are induced by his affirmance to act,- he will not be entitled to di affirm the sale and reclaim the goods. By the contract the vendee takes the property in ihe good · but he takes
by title defeasible, because, as again t the vendor, he cannot
honestly and of course not legally, hold them. But this right
of reclaiming can be enforced only whilst the goods are in the
hands, first, of the fraudulent purcha er· or secondly, of some
agent, trustee or other person holding for the use and benefit
of the purchaser; or thirdly, of some one who has taken them
of the purchaser with knowle<lge of the fraud by which they
they were obtained, or with notice sufficient to put him on reaI Hoffman v. Noble (1 43). 6 1etc.
( fas .) 6 ; Kingsbury v. Smith (1 49),
13 N. H.109; White v. Garden (1 51),
10 C. B. 919, 20 L. J.C. P. 166, 70 Eng.
Com. L. 91 ; King ford v. Merry, 95
L. J. Ex. 166; Pease v. Gloahec, L. R.
1 Pr. Coun. 219; Porell v. Cavanaugh
(189 ), 69 N. H. 364, 41 Atl. R. 860
[citing Bradley v. Obear, 10 N. H.

477; Farley v. Lincoln, 51 N. H. 577;
Sleeper v. Davi , 64 N. H. 59, 6 AtL
R. 201; Rowley v. Bigelow, 12 Pick.
(l\Ias .) 307]; Holland v. Swain (1 79),
94 Ill. 154; Doane v. Lockwood (1 86),
115 Ill. 490; Curme v. Rauh (1 4), 100
Ind. 247; Robinson v. Levi (18 6), 81
Ala. 134.
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sonable inquiry, including under this head a mere volunteer

who has obtained the goods without paying any valuable con-

sideration. It follows that a purchaser for a valuable consid-

eration without notice takes a title from the vendee which is

not defeasible, and will therefore hold the goods." l

Who may be deemed to be such a lonaficle purchaser and

what considerations will be deemed sufficient are more fully

considered in the later sections already referred to. 2

§ 149. Person who obtained goods by trick without a

sale.— But this rule, protecting the lonaficle purchaser, does not

LAW OF SALE.

[BOOK I.

sonable inquiry, jncluding under this head a mere volunteer
who has obtained the goods without paying any valuable consideration. It follows that a purchaser for a valuable consideration without notice takes a title from the vendee which is
not defeasible, an l will therefore hold the goods." 1
Who may be deemed to be such a bona fide purchaser and
what considerations will be deemed sufficient are more fully
considered in the later sections already referred to. 2

apply where the person from whom he bought had himself ob-

tained the goods by means of some trick or device and not

§ 149. - - Person wlro obtained goods by trick without a

through the form of a sale to him. Thus where A falsely

represents himself to be B, 3 or the agent 4 or partner 5 of B, or

even the agent of a person not named but represented to be in

i In Hoffman v. Noble(1843), 6 Mete.
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(Mass.) 68.

3 Thus where one A. Blenkarn by-

means of various devices caused him-

self to appear to be W. Blenkiron &

Co., and thereby obtained goods

which the owners supposed they

were selling to the latter firm, it was

sale.- But this rule, protecting the bona fide purchaser, does not
apply n-here the person from whom he bought had himself obtained the goods by means of some trick or device and not
through the form of a sale to him. Thus where A falsely
repre ents himself to be B,3 or the agent 4 or partner 5 of B, or
even the agent of a person not named but represented to be in

held that Blenkarn obtained no title

whatever, as there was never any

contract with him, and even his

bona fide vendee could obtain none.

Cundy v. Lindsay (1878), 3 App. Cas.

459. To like effect: Higgons v. Bur-

ton (1857), 26 L. J. Exch. 342.

4 Thus where S. an impostor, went

to D., and, claiming to be the agent

of B., contracted with D. for the sale

of goods to B., and then went to B.,

and, claiming to be the agent of D.,

contracted to sell the same goods to

B.; and, having obtained possession

of tlifi goods, delivered them to B.

and received the price, it was held

that D.'s title was not divested, and

that B. was liable to D. Barker v.

Dinsmore (1872), 72 Pa. St. 427, 13 Am.

R. 697. Compare with McGoldrick

v. Willits (1873), 52 N. Y. 612, the

facts of which are stated in note to

§165, post. Tosame effect: Edmunds

v. Merchants' Transp. Co. (1883), 135

Mass. 283; Dean v. Yates (1872), 22

Ohio St. 388; Hamet v. Letcher (1881),

37 Ohio St. 356, 41 Am. R 519; Alex-

ander v. Swackhamer (1885), 105 Ind.

81, 55 Am. R 180; Hentz v. Miller

(1883), 94 N. Y. 64; Peters Box Co. v.

Lesh (1888), 119 Ind. 98. See also

Decan v. Shipper (1860), 35 Pa St. 239,

78 Am. Dec. 334; Soltau v. Gerdau

(1890), 119 N. Y. 380, 16 Am. St. R 843,

23 N. E. R. 864. So also, where one

represented to be the agent of a cor-

poration which, in fact, did not exist.

Wyckoff v. Vicary (1894), 75 Hun

(N. Y), 409.

5 Such was the case in Hardman v.

Booth (1863), 32 L. J. Exch. 105, and

Moody v. Blake (1874), 117 Mass. 23,

19 Am. R. 394.
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In Hoffman v. Noble(1843), 6 Mete. Dinsmore (1872), 72 Pa. St. 427, 13 Am.
R. 697. Compare with foGoldrick
(Ma .) 68.
3 Thus where one A. Blenkarn by v. Willits (1873), 52 N. Y. 612, the
mean of various devices caused him- facts of which are stated in note to
self to appear to be W. Blenkiron & § 165, post. To same effect: Edmunds
Co., and thereby obtained goods v. Merchants' Transp. Co. (18 3), 135
which the owners supposed they Mass. 283; Dean v. Yates (1872), 22
were selling to the latter firm, it was Ohio St. 388; Hamet v. Letcher (18 1J,
held that Blenkarn obtained no title 37 Ohio St. 356, 41 Am. R. 519; .Alexwhatever, as there wa never any ander v. Swackhamer (188-), 105 Ind.
contract with him, and even his 81, 55 Am. R. 1 O; Hentz v. Miller
bona fide vendee could obtain none. (1 83), 94 N. Y. 64; Peters Box Co. v.
Cundy v. Lindsay (1 78), 3 App. Cas. Lesh (18 8), 119 Ind. 98. See also
439. To like effect: Higgons v. Bur- Decarr v. Shipper (1860), 35 Pa. St. 239,
ton (1 ~7), 26 L. J. Exch. 342.
78 .Am. Dec. 334; Soltau v. Gerdau
4 Thus where S. an impostor, went (1 90), 119 N. Y. 3 0, 16 Am. St. R. 43,
to D., and, claiming to be the agent 23 N. E. R. 64. So also, where one
of B., contracted with D. for the ale represented to be the agent of a corof good to B., and then went to B., poration which, in fact, did not exist.
and, claiming to be the agent of D., Wyckoff v. Vicary (1894), r Hun
contra ted to sell the ame good to (N. Y.) 409.
B.; and, having obtain d po e sion
5 Such wa the case in Hardman v.
of the ood , delivered them to B. Booth (1 63), 32 L. J. Exch. 105, and
and re iv d the pri , it was held Moody v. Blake (1874), 117 Mas. 23,
that .' title wa not dive ted, anJ 19 Am. R. 394.
that B. was liable to D. Barker v.
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good credit, 1 and by means thereof obtains goods which the

owner did not intend to sell to A but to B, or the other al-

leged principal of A, A obtains no title at all, and a bona fide

purchaser from A can acquire none.

§ 150, Fraudulent grantee of debtor. — Another case

falling within the same general principle is that of the bona

fide purchaser from the fraudulent grantee of a debtor. It is,

good credit,1 and by means thereof obtains goods which the
owner .did not intend to sell to A but to B, or the other alleged principal of A, A obtains no title at all, and a bona fide
purchaser from A can acquire none.

indeed, true, as will be seen hereafter, 2 that if a debtor sells,

§ 150. - - Fraudulent grantee of debtor .-Another case

assigns or otherwise disposes of his goods for the purpose of

defrauding his creditors, his assignee, who is a party to the

fraud, obtains only a defeasible title, which may be impeached

by the debtor's creditors ; but if before the creditors have acted

the debtor's grantee again sells the goods to one who is igno-

rant of the fraud, and in good faith pays value for them, the

latter will obtain a title which cannot be assailed by the cred-

itors of the debtor. 3

§ 151. Fraudulent debtor, — And again, allied to the

last case, it will be seen hereafter, 4 that though sales made by
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a debtor, for the purpose of defrauding his creditors, may in

general be set aside, this is not true where his vendee was igno-

rant of his fraudulent intent and bought the goods in good faith

and for value. 5

§ 152. Conditional vendee. — Unlike the cases here being

considered, and to be distinguished from them, is the case of

the purchaser who has contracted upon the condition that,

though the possession may be delivered to him, no title shall

iSuch was the case in Rodliff v. 63 N. H. 126; Stokes v. Jones (1851),

falling within the same general principle is that of the bona
fide purchaser from the fraudlllent grantee of a debtor. It is,
indeed, true, as will be seen hereafter, 2 that if a debtor sells,
assigns or otherwise disposes of his goods for the purpose of
defrauding his creditors, his assignee, who is a party to the
~rand, obtains only a defeasible title, which may be impeached
by the debtor's creditors; but if before the creditors have acted
the debtor's grantee again sells the goods to one who is ignorant of the fraud, and in good faith pays value for them, the
latter will obtain a title which cannot be assailed by the creditors of the debtor. 3

Dallinger (1886), 141 Mass. 1, 4 N. E. 18 Ala. 734; Waters v. Riggin (1862), 19

§ 151. - - Fraudulent debtor.- And again, allied to the

R. 805, 55 Am. R. 439. Md. 536; Barnes v. Hardeman (1855),

2 See post, §§ 946 et seq. 15 Tex. 366.

3 Anderson v. Roberts (1820), 18 4 See post, § 946.

Johns. (N. Y.) 515, 9 Am. Dec. 235; '° See post, §952; Zoeller v. Riley

Neal v. Williams (1841), 18 Me. 391; (1885), 100 N. Y. 103, 2 N. E. R. 388;

Green v. Tanner (1844), 8 Mete. (Mass.) Neal v. Williams (1841), 18 Me. 391;

411; Sleeper v. Chapman (1876), 121 Sleeper v. Chapman (1876), 121 Mass.

Mass. 404: Gordon v. Ritenour (1885), 404; Comey v. Pickering (1884), 63

87 Mo. 51; Comey v. Pickering (1884), N. H. 126.
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last case, it will be seen hereafter, 4 that though sales made by
a debtor, for the purpose of defrauding his creditors, may in
general be set aside, this is not true where his ventlee was ignorant of his fraudulent intent and bought the goods in good faith
and for value. 5

§ 152. - - Cornlitional vendee.-Unlike the cases here being
considered, and to be distinguished from them, is the case of
the purchaser who has contracted upon the condition that,
though the possession may be delivered to him, no title shall
Such was the case in Rodli:ff v. 63 N. H. 126; Stokes v. Jones (1851),
Dallinger (1886). 141 Mass. 1, 4 N. E. 18 Ala. 734; Waters v. Riggin (1862), 19
R. 05, 55 Am. R. 439.
Md. 536; Barnes v. Hardeman (1855),
2 See post, §§ 946 et seq.
15 Tex. 366.
3 Anderson v. Roberts (1820), 18
4 See post, § 9-!6.
Johns. (N. Y.) 515, 9 Am. Dec. 235;
5 See post, § 952; Zoeller v. Riley
Neal v. Williams (1841), 18 ~e. 391; (1885), 100 N. Y. 103, 2 N. E. R. 388;
Green v. Tanner (1844), 8 Mete. (Mass.) Neal v. Williams (1841), 18 Me. 391;
411; Sleeper v. Chapman (1876), 121 Sleeper v. Chapman (1876), 121 Ma8s.
Mass. 404; Gordon v. Ritenour (1885), 404; Corney v. Pickering (1884), 63
87 M:o. 54; Corney v. Pickering (1884), N. H. 126.
10
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LAW OF SALE.

[BOOK I.

§§ 153, 154.] LAW OF SALE. [BOOK I.

pass to him until the price is paid. Here, until the payment

of the price, the vendee has by the express terms of the agree-

ment no present title at all, not even a defeasible one; and, as

will be seen, it is settled, by the great weight of authority, that

until he acquires title by payment he can transfer none even

to a bona fide purchaser for value. 1

§ 153. Purchaser for cash who has obtained the goods

without paying the price. — In like situation is the purchaser

for cash who has obtained possession of the goods without pay-

ing the price. As will be seen hereafter, 2 payment and trans-

pass to him until the price is paid. Here, until the payment
of the price, the vendee has by the express terms of the agreement no present title at all, not even a defeasible one; and, as
will be seen, it is settled, by the great weight of authority, that
until be acquires title by payment he can transfer none even
to a bona fide purchaser for value. 1

fer are, in such cases, designed to be concurrent acts; and if

the vendee, by trick or otherwise, without paying gets posses-

sion of the goods, the seller, who has done nothing to waive

his right, may recover them from the vendee. While the

vendee is so holding them his interest is only a conditional

one, and he can convey no greater, even to a bona fide pur-

chaser. 3

The same rule applies also where, instead of payment in cash,
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a note or other security for the price is to be given. If the

giving of the note or other security be not waived, but the

vendee obtains possession of the goods, he acquires no present

title and can convey none, even to a bona fide purchaser. 4

III.

Of Sales by Persons Having Only an Ostensible Title.

§ 154. In general, one can convey no better title to a chat-

tel than he has. — It is a fundamental doctrine of the common

law, from which all discussion of the question must proceed,

that, in general, no one can transfer a better title to a chattel

i See post, § 599. neapolis Elevator Co. (1890), 44 Minn.

iSeejwst. §542. 153, 46 N. W. R. 306; Owen v. Long

s National Bank of Commerce v. (1897), 97 Wis. 78, 72 N. W. R. 364.

C, B. & Q. R. Co. (1890), 44 Minn. 4 Wheeler & Wilson Co. v. Irish-

224, 46 N. W. R. 342, 560; Freeman v. American Bank (1898), 105 Ga. 57, 31

Kraemer (1895). 63 Minn. 242, 65 N. S. E. R. 48.

W. R. 455; Globe Milling Co. v. Min-
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§ 153. - - Purchaser for cash who l1a~ obtained the goods
without paJing the price.- In like situation is the purchaser
for cash who bas obtained possession of the goods without paying the price. As will be seen bereafter~ 2 payment and transfer are, in such cases, designed to be concurrent acts; and if
the vendee, by trick or otherwise, without paying gets possession of the goods, the seller, who has done nothing to waive
his right, may recover them from the vcndee. While the
vendee is so holding them his interest is only a conditional
one, and he can convey no greater, even to a bona fide purchaser.3
The same rule applies also where, instead of payment in cash,
a note or other security for the price is to be given. If the
giving of the note or other security be not waived, but the
vendee obtains possession of the goods, be acquires no present
title and can convey none, even to a bona fide purchaser.~
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OF
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HAVING
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TENSIBLE TITLE.

§ 154. In general, one can con yey no better title to a chattel than he has.- It is a fundamental doctrine of the common
law, from which all discussion of the question must proceed,
that, in g eneral, no one can transfer a better title to a chattel
neapolis Elevator Co. (1890), 44 Minn.
ee post, § 599.
153, 46 N. W.R. 306; Owen v. Long
ee post. § 542.
(1 97), 97 Wi . 7 , 72 N. W. R. 364. .
3 L a ti nal Bank of Commerce v.
4 Wheeler & Wilson Co. v. Irish·
C., B. & Q. R. o. (1 0), 44 Minn.
224, 46 N. W. R. 342, 560; Freeman v. American Bank (1898), 105 Ga. 57, 31
Kraemer (l 95). 63 '1inn. 242, 65 N. S. E. R. 48.
W. R. 455; Globe Milling Co. v. Min146
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CAP A CITY OF P ARTI.ES.

[§ 155.

CH. III.] CAPACITY OF PARTIES. [§ 155.

than he himself possesses. Nemo dat quod non hahet is usually

the inflexible maxim. That some or all of the parties acted in

good faith or parted with value is usually entirely immaterial;

however innocent the motives or however valuable the consid-

eration, if the party who assumed to convey had no right or

title to transfer, no title can pass to the other. 1

In the case of negotiable instruments, for obvious reasons,

different principles apply, and it is possible in many cases for

one to invest his transferee with a better title than he himself

possessed ; but these principles have no application to the trans-

fer of the ordinary chattel. In the latter case the strict rules

of the common law have, in general, unabated sway.

§ 155. True owner not to be divested without Lis

consent. — This general principle of the common law has no-

where been better stated than by Senator Verplanck in the

leading- case of Saltus v. Everett:- "The universal and funda-

mental principle of our law of personal property is, that no

man can be divested of his property without his own consent;
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and, consequently, that even the honest purchaser under a de-

fective title cannot hold against the true proprietor. That ' no

than he himself po::;sesses. Nemo dat q wd non liabet is usually
the inflexible maxim. That ome or all of the parties acted in
good faith or parted with value is usually entirely immaterial;
however innocent the motives or however valuable the consideration, if the party who as urned to convey had no right or
title to transfer, no title can pass to the other. 1
In the case of negotiable in truments, for obvious reasons,
different principles apply, and it is possible in many cases for
one to in vest his transferee with a better title than he himself
possessed; but these principles have no application to the transfer of the ordinary chattel. In the latter case the strict rules
of the common law have, in general, unabated sway.

one can transfer to another a better title than he himself has '

is a maxim, says Chancellor Kent, ' alike of the common and

the civil law, and a sale ex vi termini imports nothing more

than that the bona fide purchaser succeed to the rights of the

vendor.' The only exception to this rule in the ancient Eng-

lish jurisprudence was that of sales in markets overt, a custom

i Saltus v. Everett (1838), 20 Wend. 843; Moody v. Blake (1874), 117 Mass.

<N. Y.) 267, 32 Am. Dec. 541; Levi v. 23, 19 Am. R. 394; Smith v. Clews

Booth (1882). 58 Md. 305, 42 Am. R. (1889), 114 N. Y. 190, 21 N. E. R. 160,

332; Barnard v. Campbell (1874), 55 11 Am. St. R. 627, 4 L. R. A. 392;

N. Y. 456. 14 Am. R. 289; McNeil v. Klein v. Seibold (1878), 89 111. 540;

Tenth Nat. Bank (1871), 46 N. Y. 325, McMahon v. Sloan (1849), 12 Pa. St.

7 Am. R. 341; Covill v. Hill (1847), 4 229, 51 Am. Dec. 601; Quinn v. Davis

Denio (N. Y), 323; Cundy v. Lind- (1875), 78 Pa. St. 15; Wilson v. Crocket

say (1878), 3 App. Cas. 459; Jetton v. (1869), 43 Mo. 216, 97 Am. Dec. 389;

Tobey (1896), 62 Ark. 84, 34 S. W. R. Stanley v. Gaylord (1848), 1 Cush.

531: Soltau v. Gerdau (1890), 119 N. (Mass.) 536, 48 Am. Dec. 643.

Y. 380, 23 N. E. R. 864, 16 Am. St. R. - Saltus v. Everett, supra.
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§ 155. - - True owner not to be divested without his
con ent.-This general principle of the common law has nowhere been better stated than by Senator Verplanck in the
leading case of Saltus v. E erett: :i "The universal and fundamental principle of our law of personal property is, that no
man can be divested of his property without his own consent;
and, consequently, that even the honest purchaser under a defective title cannot hold against the true proprietor. That' no
one can transfer to another a better title than he himself has'
is a maxim, says Chancellor Kent, 'alike of the common and
the civil law, and a sale ex vi tennini imports nothing more
than tbat 'the bona fide purchaser succeed to the rights of the
vendor.' The only exception to this rule in the ancient English jurisprudence was that of sales in markets overt, a custom
1 Saltus v. Everett (1838), 20 Wend.
843; Moody v. Blake (1874), 117 MasR.
{N. Y.) 267, 32 Am. Dec. 541; Levi v. 23, 19 Am. R. 394; Smith v. Clews
Booth (1 2), 58 Md. 305, 42 Am. R. (18 9), 114 N. Y. 190, 21 N. E. R. 160,
332; Barnard v. Campbell (1 74), 55 11 Am. St. R. 627, 4 L. R. A. 392;
N. Y. 456. 14 Am. R. 2 9; McNeil v. Klein v. eibolcl (1 78), 9 Ill. 540;
Tenth Nat. Bank (1 71), 46 N. Y. 325, Mc fahon v. Sloan (1 49), 12 Pa. St.
7 Am. R. 341; Covill v. Hill (1847), 4 229, 51 Am. Dec. 601; Quinn v. Davis
Denio (N. Y.), 323; Cundy v. Lind- (1 75), 78 Pa. St. 15; Wilson v. Crocket
say (1878), 3 App. Cas. 459; Jetton v. (1869), 43 l\fo. 216, 97 Am. Dec. 3 9;
Tobey (1 96), 62 Ark. 84, 34 S. W. R. Stanley v. Gaylord (184 ), 1 Cush.
531: Soltau v. Gerdau (1 90), 119 N. (Ma s.) 536, 4 Am. Dec. 643.
Y. iJ80, 23 N. E. R. 64, 1(j ~t\.m. St. R.
2 Saltus v. Everett, supra.
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§ 156.J

LAW OF SA.LE.

[BOOK I.

§ 156.] LAW OF SALE. [BOOK I.

which has not been introduced among us. ' It has been fre-

quently held in this country that the English law of markets

overt had not been adopted, and consequently, as a general

rule, the title of the true owner cannot be lost without his con-

sent.' "

§ 156. Possession alone insufficient evidence of title. — It

is a popular impression which has barely enough apparent

foundation to make it specious, that possession is sufficient evi-

which has not been introduced among us. 'It has been frequently held in this country that the English law of markets
overt had not been adopted, and consequently, as a general
rule, the title of the true owner cannot be lost without his consent.'"

dence of ownership. A moment's consideration, however, will

show the fallacy. It is true that ownership ordinarily carries

with it the right of possession; but the reverse of this idea by

no means follows, for possession is very far from carrying with

it the right of ownership. Whether the possessor is the true

owner, or a bailee, or the finder, or a thief, the evidence of pos-

session may be precisely the same, and to make possession the

test of ownership is obviously impossible. It may be prima

facie evidence, but it is nothing more.

Whoever, therefore, buys from one in possession must see to
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it, at his peril, that the seller has some other title than that

which possession alone confers upon him. For if the seller

were but a bailee for the true owner, his servant or lessee, or if

the seller were a mere finder, or a thief, the purchaser, however

innocent he may have been, or however much he may have

paid for the property, can acquire no claim as against the true

owner of the goods. 1

" Simply intrusting the possession of a chattel to another as

depositary, pledgee, or other bailee, or even under a condi-

tional executory contract of sale, is clearly insufficient to pre-

1 Cundy v. Lindsay (1878), 3 App. Joint Stock Bank v. Simmons, [1892]

Cas. 459; McNeil v. Tenth National App. Cas. 201; Woods v. Nichols

Bank (1871), 46 N. Y. 325, 7 Am. R. (1900), 21 R. I. 537. 45 Atl. R. 548;

341; Saltus v. Everett, 20 Wend. (N. Goodell v. Fairbrother (1878), 12 R. I.

Y.) 267, 32 Am. Dec. 541; Barnard v. 233: Warder v. Rublee, 42 Minn. 23,

Campbell (1874), 55 N. Y. 456. 14 Am. 43 N. W. R. 569; Baker v. Taylor, 54

R 289, 58 N. Y. 73, 17 Am. R. 208; Minn. 71, 55 N. W. R. 823; Velsian v.

Leigh v. Mobile & Ohio R. Co., 58 Lewis, 15 Oreg. 549, 16 Pac. R. 631, 3

Ala. 178; Jetton v. Tobey (1896), 62 Am. St. R. 184

Ark. 84, 34 S. W. R. 531; London
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§ 156. Possession alone insufficient evidence of title.- It
is a popular impression which has barely enough apparent
foundation to make it specious, that possession is sufficient evidence of ownership. A moment's consideration, however, will
show the fallacy. It is true that ownership ordinarily carries
with it the right of possession; but the reverse of this idea by
no means follows, for possession is very far from carrying with
it the right of ownership. Whether the possessor is the true
owner, or a bailee, or the :finder, or a thief, the evidence of possession may be precisely the same, and to make possession the
test of ownership is obviougly impossible. It may be primer,
fa aie evidence, but it is nothing more.
Whoever, therefore, buys from one in possession must see to
it, at his peril, that the seller bas some other title than that
which possession alone confers upon him. For if the seller
were but a bailee for the true owner, bis servant or lessee, or if
the seller were a mere :finder, or a thief, the purchaser, however
innocent he may have been, or however much be may have
paid for the property, can acquire no claim as against the true
owner of the goods. 1
"Simply in trusting the possession of a chattel to another as
depositary, pledgee, or other bailee, or even under a conditional executory contract of sale, is clearly insufficient to preI Cundy v. Lindsay (1878), 3 App.
Cas. 459; McNeil v. Tenth National
Bank (1871), 46 N. Y. 325, 7 Am. R.
341; Saltus v. Everett. 20 Wend. (N.
Y.) 267, 32 Am. Dec. 541; Barnanl v.
Campbell (1 74), 55 N. Y. 456. 14 Am.
R. 2 9, 5 N. Y. 73, 17 Am. R. 20 ;
Leigh v. Mobile & Ohio R o., 58
Ala. 17 ; Jetton v. Tobey (1 96), 62
Ark. 84, 34 S. W. R. 531; London

Joint Stock Bank v. Simmons, [1 92]
App. Cas. 201; Woods v. Nichols
(1900), 21 R. I. 537. 45 Atl. R. 548;
Goodell v. Fairbrother (1878), 12 R. I.
233: Warder v. Rublee, 42 Minn. 23,
43 N. W.R. 569; Baker v. Taylor, 54
Minn. 71, 53 N. W.R. 823; Velsian '·
Lewi , 15 Oreg. 549, 16 Pac. R. 631, 3
Am. 't. R. 184.
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elude the real owner from reclaiming his property, in case of

an unauthorized disposition of it by the person so intrusted.

* The mere possession of chattels, by whatever means acquired,

if there be no other evidence of property or authority to sell

from the true owner, will not enable the possessor to give a

good title.' " l

§ 157. Possession coupled with indicia of ownership. — But

while possession alone is thus not sufficient evidence of owner-

ship, it is possible that the true owner may have clothed the

possessor with such additional evidence of title as to cause the

elude tbe . real owner from reclaiming his property, in case of
an unauthorized disposition of it by the person so intrusted.
'The mere pos ession of chattels, by whatever means acquired,
if there be no other evidence of property or authority to sell
from the true owner, will not enable the possessor to give a
good title.'" 1

possessor to appear to be the owner. " It must be conceded,"

it is said in a leading -cas|,^)" that, as a general rule, applicable

to property other than negotiable securities, the vendor or

pledgor can convey no greater right or title than he has. But

this is a truism, predicable of a simple transfer from one party

to another w r here no other element intervenes. It_does_ not in-

terfere with the well-established principle, that where the true

owner holds out another, or allows him to appear, as the owner

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:47 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t6xw4h56n
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

of, or as having full power of disposition over, the property,

and innocent third parties are thus led into dealing with such

apparent owner, they will be protected. Their rights in such

cases do no t depend upon the actual title or authority of the

party with whom they deal directly, but are derived from the

act of the real owner, which precludes him from disputing, as

against them, the existence of the title or power which, through

neo-lio-ence or mistaken confidence, he caused or allowed to ap-

pear to be vested in the party making the conveyance."

§ 158. What requisite. — In order, however, that this

rule shall operate, it is essential that the acts relied upon as in-

dicating ownership by the possessor shall be acts for which

the true owner is responsible; for it is clear that no acts of

the possessor alone can suffice to cut off the rights of the true

owner.

i Rapallo, J., in McNeil v. Tenth Na- 2 McNeil v. Tenth National Bank

tional Bank, supra, quoting Denio, J., (1871), 46 N. Y. 325, 7 Am. R. 341.

ia Covill v. Hill, 4 Denio (N. Y.), 323.
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§ 157. Po ession coupled with indicia of ownership.-But
while po session alone is thus not ufficient evidence of ownership, it is possible that the true owner may have clothed the
pos essor with such additional evidence of title as to cause the
pos essor to appear to be the owner. "It must be conceded,"
it is_said in a leading cas 0 ''that, as a general rule, applicable
to property other than ne otiable securities, the vendor or
pledgor can convey no greater right or title than he has. But
this is a truism, predicable of a simple transfer from one party
to another where no other element intervenes. It does no,Linterfere with he well-.§stablished principle, that where the true
owner holds out another, or allows him to appear, as the owner
of, or as _having full power of disposition over, the property,
and innocent third parties are thus led into dealing with such
apparent owner, they will be protected. Their ri ·hts in such
cases do not depend u on the actual title or authority of the
pa.r ty with whom they deal directly, but are derived from the
act of the real owner, which precludes him from disputing, as
against them, the existence of the title or power which, through
negligence or mistaken confidence, he caused.or allowed to appear to be vested in the party making the conveyance."

§ 158. - - What requisite.-In order, however, that this
rule shall operate, it is essential that the acts relied upon as indicating ownership by the possessor shall be acts for which
the true owner is responsible; for it is clear that no acts of
the possessor alone can suffice to cut off the rights of the true
owner.
1 Rapallo, J., in foNeil v. Tenth Na2 McNeil v. Tenth National Bank
tional Bank supm, quoting Denio, J., (1871), 46 N. Y. 325, 7 Am. R. 341.
in Covill v. Hill, 4 Denio (N. Y.), 323.
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The acts relied upon must, moreover, be such as to reason-

ably warrant the conclusion that the possessor was authorized

to sell. Thus, for example, while it may be true that sending-

goods to an auction room, or to any other place to which

goods are sent only to be sold, sufficiently indicates that the

owner desires them sold, 1 still the mere fact that one puts his

goods, for some other purpose than sale, into the possession of

one who may happen to be a dealer in similar goods, does not

of itself justify the conclusion that the dealer is to sell these

goods. "Independently of the provisions of the statute in re-

gard to the dealings with agents and factors, it is very clear,"

it is said, 2 "that the hare possession of goods by one, though he

may happen to be a dealer in that class of goods, does not

clothe him with power to dispose of the goods as though he

were owner, or as having authority as agent to sell or pledge

the goods to the preclusion of the right of the real owner. If

he sells as owner there must be some other indicia of property

than mere possession. There must be some act or conduct on
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the part of the real owner whereby the party selling is clothed

with the apparent ownership or authority to sell, and which

the real owner will not be heard to deny or question to the

prejudice of an innocent third party dealing on the faith of

such appearances. If it were otherwise, people would not be

secure in sending their watches or articles of jewelry to a jew-

eler's establishment to be repaired, or cloth to a clothing es-

tablishment to be made into garments." "It is not every

parting with the possession of chattels or the documentary evi-

1 Thus in Pickering v. Busk (1812), pose than that of sale? Or if one

15 East, 38, Lord Ellenborough said: send goods to an auction room, can

*'If the principal send his com mod- it be supposed that he sent them

ity to a place where it is the ordi- thither merely for safe custody?

nary business of the person to whom Where the commodity is sent in such

it is confided to sell, it must be in- a way, and to such a place, as to ex-

tended that the commodity was sent hibit an apparent purpose of sale, the

thither for the purpose of sale. If principal will be bound and the pur-

the owner of a horse send it to a re- chaser safe."'

pository of sale, can it be implied that 2 Levi v. Booth (1882), 58 Md. 305,

he sent it thither for any other pur- 42 Am. R. 332.
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The acts relied upon must, moreov·er, be such as to reasonably warrant the conclusion that the possessor was authorized
to sell. Thus, for example, while it may be true that sending
goods to an auction room, or to any other place to which
goods are sent only to be sold, sufficiently indicates that the
owner desires them sold, 1 still the mere fact that one puts his
goods, for some other purpose than sale, into the possession of
one who may happen to be a dealer in similar goods, does not
of itself justify the conclusion that the dealer is to sell these
goods. "Independently of the provisions of the statute in regard to the dealings with agents and :factors, it is very clear,'"
it is said,2 "that the bare posse sion of goods by one, though he
may happen to be a dealer in that class of goods, does not
clothe him with power to dispose of the goods as though he
were owner, or as having authority as agent to sell or pledge
the goods to the preclusion of the right of the real owner. If
he sells as owner there must be some other indicia of property
than mere possession. There must be some act or conduct on
the part of the real owner whereby the party selling is clothed.
with the apparent ownership or authority to sell, and which
the real owner will not be heard to deny or question to the
prejudice of an innocent third party dealing on the faith of
such appearances. If it were otherwise, people would not be
secure in sending their watches or articles of jewelry to a jeweler's establishment to be repaired, or cloth to a clothing establishment to be made into garments." "It is not every
parting with the possession of_chattels or the documentary eviin Pickering v. Busk (1812), po e than that of sale? Or if one15 East, 38, Lord Ellenboro ugh said: send goods to an auction room, can
•'If the principal send bis com mod- it be suppose l that he sent them
ity to a pla e where it is the ordi- thither merely for safe custody?'
nary bu in . of the p r ou to whom Where the commodity is sent in su h
it i
onficl l to sell, it mu t be in- a way, an l to such a place, as to extend d that the ommodity wa · nt hi bit an apparent purpose of 8ale, the
thither for the purpo of al . If principal will be b und and the purth own r of a hor e nd it to a re- haser af ."
po ·itory of Sc 1 ,ca.nit b implied that
2 Levi v.
ooth (18 2), 58 ·Md. 305>
he sent it thither for any other _pnr- 42 Am. R. 332.
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dence of title," it is said in another case, 1 " that will enable the

possessor to make a good title to one who may purchase from

him. So far as such a parting with the possession is necessary

in the business of life, or authorized by the custom of trade,

the owner of the goods will not be affected by a sale by the

one having the custody and manual possession. But the owner

must go farther, and do some act of a nature to mislead third

persons as to the true position of the title."

§ 159. . Again, the purchaser must actually have parted

with value in reasonable reliance upon the apparent authority

so that he will be prejudiced if the transaction is not upheld.

"Two things must concur," it is saidyU'to create an estoppel

by which an owner may be deprived of his property, by the act

dence of title," it is said in another case,1 "that will enable the
possessor to make a good title to one who may purchase from
him. So far as such a parting with the possession is neces ary
in the business of life, or authorized by the cu tom
trade,
the owner of the goods will not be affected by a sale by the
one having the custody and manual possession. But the owner
must go farther, and <lo some act of a nature to mislead third
persons as to the true position of the title."

of

of a third person, without his assent, under the rule now con-

sidered: 1. The owner must clothe the person assuming to dis-

§ 159. - - . Again, the purchaser must actually have parted

pose of the property with the apparent title to or authority to

dispose of it; and 2. The person alleging the estoppel must

have acted and parted with value upon the faith of such appar-
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ent ownership or authority, so that he will be the loser if the

appearances to which he trusted are not real. In this respect

it does not differ from other estoppels in pais."

And lastly, the purchaser must have acted in ignorance of

the rights of the true owner, for if he has notice of the lat-

ter's interests, or, what is the same thing, knowledge of facts

sufficient to put him upon inquiry, he can acquire no greater

title than the apparent owner can rightfully convey. 3

§ 160. Illustrations.— Many illustrations of these prin-

ciples are to be found in the books. In a case often cited 4 it

appeared that one Miers was, in a small way, a dealer in dia-

monds in New York. His business was to procure diamonds

from the larger dealers and sell them to his customers. On one

•Barnard v. Campbell (1874), 55 Oreg. 69, 49 Pac. R. 861; Sloan v.

N. Y. 456, 14 Am. R. 289. Hudson (1898), 119 Ala. 27, 24 S. R.

2 Barnard v. Campbell, supra. 458.

3 Porter v. Parks (1872), 49 N. Y. 4 Smith v. Clews (1887), 105 N. Y.

564; Perkins v. McCullough (1897), 31 283, 59 Am. R 502.
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with value in reasonable reliance upon the apparent authority
so.that he will be prejudiced if the tran action is not upheld.
"Two things must concur," it i sai 2 "to create an estoppel
by which an owner may be deprived of his property, by the act
of a third person, without his assent, under the rule now considered: 1. The owner must clothe the person assuming to dispo e of the property with the apparent title to or authority to
di po e of it; and 2. The per on alleging the estoppel must
have acted and parted with value upon the faith of such apparent ownership or authority, so that he will be the loser if the
appearances to which he trusted are not real. In this respect
it does not differ from other e toppels in pais."
And lastly, the purchaser must have acted in ignorance of
the rights of the true owner, for if he has notice of the latter's interests, or, what is the same thing, knowledge of facts
sufficient to put him upon inquiry, he can acquire no greater
title than the apparent owner can rightfully convey. 3

§ 160. - - Illustrations.- :Many illustrations of these principles are to be found in the books. In a case often cited 4 it
appeared that one :Miers was, in a small way, a dealer in diamonds in New York. His business was to procure diamonds
from the larger dealers and sell them to his customers. On one
I Barnard v. Campbell (1874), 55
N. Y. 4511, 14 Am. R. 289.
2 arnard v. Campbell, supra.
3 Porter v. Park (1 72), 49 N. Y.
564; Perkins v. McCullough (1 97), 31

Oreg. 69, 49 Pac. R. 861; Sloan v.
Hudson (1 98), 119 Ala. 27, 24 S. R.
458.
4 Smith v. Clews (1887), 105 N. Y.
2 3, 59 Am. R. 502.
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occasion he obtained from the plaintiffs a pair of diamonds for

which he gave them a receipt stating that they were received

by him "on approval to show to my customers, said knobs to

be returned to said A. H. Smith & Co. on demand." Miers

sold these diamonds to the defendant, who bought them in good

faith, supposing Miers to be the owner, and paid him the price.

Miers did not pay the plaintiffs, and they sought to recover the

diamonds from the defendant; but the court held that the

plaintiffs, by intrusting them to Mie a^g pSfown deaAer in such

articles^to be shown to a prospective purchas^^^d clothed

him with apparent authority to sell, and thereftfr^tfat the pur-

chaser obtained a good title. The provision that the diamonds

were to be returned upon demand was held by the court to

mean that they were to be returned if the purchaser in view

did not buy them.

On the other hand, where the owner of a diamond ring put

it into the hands of a traveling trader in jewelry to obtain a

match for it, or, failing in that, to get an offer for it, and the
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jeweler sold it to one who bought in good faith, it was held

that the purchaser acquired no title as against the owner. 1 Au-

thority to find a match for it, or even to get an offer for it,

conferred no apparent authority to sell, for the owner thereby

reserved to himself the right to accept or reject the offer if one

were made.

§ 161. . In a leading English case 2 it appeared that a

broker named Swallow had purchased for the plaintiff, Pick-

ering, a quantity of hemp, which at the plaintiff's request was

transferred upon the books of the wharfinger to the name of

Swallow. Another lot subsequently purchased was transferred

to the names of "Pickering or Swallow," which the court held

to be the same, so far as the question then involved was con-

cerned, as though it stood in Swallow's name alone. The plaint-

iLevi v. Booth (1882), 58 Md. 305, 2 pokering v. Busk (1812), 15 East,

42 Am. R. 332. Compare Rumpf v. 38.

Barto (1894), 10 Wash. 382, 38 Pac. R.

1129.
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occasion he obtainecl from the plaintiffs a pair of diamonds for
which he gave them a receipt stating that they were received
by him "on approval to show to my customers, said knobs to
be returned to said ~. I-I. Smith & Co. on demand." Miers
sold the e diamonds to the defendant, who bought them in good
· faith, supposing Miers to be the OW?-er, and paid him the price.
lifiers did not pay the plaintiffs, and they sought to recover the
diamonds from the defendant; but the court held that the
plaintiffs, by in trusting them to Mie~ow~dr in such
articles to be shown to a prospecti~~urchas
clothed
him with apparent authority to sell, and tberef r
at the purchaser obtained a good title. The provision that the diamonds
were to be returned upon demand was held by the court to
mean that they were to be returned if the purchaser in view
did not buy them.
On the other hancl, where the owner of a diamond ring put
it into the hands of a traveling trader in jewelry to obtain a
match for it, or, failing in that, to get an offer for it, and the
jeweler sold it to one who bought in goocl faith, it was held
that the purchaser acquired no title as against the owner. 1 Authority to find a match for it, or even to get an offer for it,
conferred no apparent authority to sell, for tLe owner th reby
re erved to himself the right to accept or reject the offer if one
were made.

§ 161. - - . In a leading English case 2 it appeared that a
broker named Swallow had purchased for the plaintiff, Pickering, a quantity of hemp, which at the plaintiffs reque twas
tran ferrecl upon the books of the wharfing r to the name of
wallow. Another lot ubs quently purchased was transferred
to the names of "Pick ring or wallow," which the court held
to be the same, so far as the q ue0tron then involved was concerned, as thou0 h it stood in wallows name alone. The plaint1 Levi v. Booth (1882), 5 Md. 305,
42 Am. R. 332.
ompare Rumpf v.
Barto (1 94), 10 Wash. 3 2, 38 Pac. R.

2 Pickering

38.

1129.
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iff paid for the hemp. Swallow afterwards sold it to a third

person, who relied upon the entry in the wharfinger's books

and paid Swallow for it; and Pickering sued the purchaser in

trover for the value. The court, however, held that by per-

mitting the hemp to appear upon the books of the wharfinger

as the property of Swallow, the plaintiff had authorized third

persons, who relied upon Swallow's apparent ownership, to be-

lieve that he had authority to sell the hemp, and that Picker-

ing therefore could not. recover.

§ 162. . In a New York case, 1 often relied upon, it ap-

peared that the plaintiff, who was the owner of certain bank

shares, had delivered to his brokers, to secure a balance of ac-

count, the certificate of the shares, indorsed with an assignment

in blank and an irrevocable power of transfer, signed and sealed

by himself. The brokers, without his knowledge or consent,

iff paid for the hemp. Swallow after"'."ards sold it to a third
person, who relied upon the entry in the wharfinger's books
and paid Swallow for it; and Pickering sued the purchaser in
trover for the value. The court, however, held that by permitting the hemp to appear upon the books of the wharfinger
as the property of Swallow, the plaintiff bad authorized third
persons, who relied upon Swallow's apparent ownership, to believe that be had authority to sell the hemp, and that Pickering th8refore could not~·Tecover.

pledged the shares to the defendant to secure advances made

to them, the defendant having no notice of the plaintiff's in-

§ 162. - - . In a New York case,1 often relied upon, it ap-

terest. The plaintiff brought action against the defendant to
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compel a restoration of the shares, but it was held that the de-

fendant was entitled to hold the stock as against the plaintiff

for the full amount of the advances remaining unpaid. " The

1 McNeil v. Tenth National Bank viously trustworthy agent of a corpo-

(1871), 46 N. Y. 325, 7 Am. R. 341. ration fraudulently abstracted from

For similar or analogous cases, see the company's safe uncanceled cer-

Commercial Bank v. Kortright (1839), tificates of stock, indorsed in blank,

22 Wend. (N. Y.) 348, 34 Am. Dec. and negotiated them, it was held that

317; Holbrook v. Zinc Co. (1874), 57 no title passed. Knox v. Eden Musee

N. Y. 616, 623; Bartlett v. Board of Co. (1896), 148 N. Y. 441, 42 N. E. R.

Education (1871), 59 111. 364, 371; 988.

Wood's Appeal (1880), 92 Pa. St. 379; So where A. and B. had a safety

Cowdrey v. Vandenburgh (1879), 101 deposit box in common, and A. left

17. S. 572; London Joint Stock Bank in the box some certificates of stock

v. Simmons, [1892] App. Cas. 201. indorsed in blank, which B. ab-

But in order that the rule of this stracted and sold to a bona fide pur-

case should apply, it is necessary that chaser, it was held that the latter

peared that the plaintiff, who was the owner of certain bank
shares, had delivered to his brokers, to secure a balance of account, the certificate of the shares indorsed with an assignment
in blank and an irrevocable power of transfer, signed and sealed
by himself. The brokers, without his knowledge or consent,
pledged the shares to the defendant to secure advances made
to them, the defendant having no notice of the plaintiff's interest. The plaintiff brought action against the defendant to
compel a restoration of the shares, but it was held that the defendant was entitled to hold the stock as against the plaintiff
for the full amount of the advances remaining unpaid. "The

there be something more than the acquired no title against A. Bangor

mere intrusting to a servant of a Electric Co. v. Robinson (1892), 52

chattel and the consequent oppor- Fed. R. 520.

tunity for theft. Hence where a pre-
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1 McNeil

v. Tenth National Bank viously trustworthy agent of a corporation fraudulently ab tracted from
For similar or analogous cases, see the company's safe uncanceled cerCommercial Bank v. Kortright (1839), tificates of stock, indor ed in blank,
22 Wend. (N. Y.) 348, 34 Am. Dec. and negotiated them, it was held that
317; Holbrook v. Zinc Co. (1874), 57 no title passed. Knox v. Eden 1u ee
N. Y. 616, 623; Bartlett v. Board of Co. (1896), 148 N. Y. 44:1, 42 N. E. R.
Education (1871), 59 Ill. 364, 371; 9 8.
Wood's Appeal (1880), 92 Pa. St. 379;
So where A. and B. had a ~fety
Cowdrey v. Vandenburgh (1879), 101 deposit box in common. and A. left
U.S. 572; London Joint Stock Bank in the box some certificates of stock
indorsed in blank, which B. ab'"Simmons, [1 92] App. Cas. 201.
But in order that the rule of this stracted and sold to a bona fide purcase should apply, it is necessary that chaser, it was held that the latter
there be something more than the acquired no title again t A. Bangor
mere intrusting to a servant of a Electric Co. v. Robin on (1 92), 52
chattel and the consequent oppor- Fed. R. 520.
tunity for theft. Hence where a pre(1871), 46 N. Y. 325, 7 Am. R. 341.
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holder of such a certificate and power," said the court, " pos-

sesses all the external indicia of title to the stock, and an ap-

parently unlimited power of disposition over it. He does not

appear to have, as is said in some of the authorities cited con-

cerning the assignee of a chose in action, a mere equitable in-

terest, which is said to be notice to all persons dealing with

him that they take subject to all equities, latent or otherwise,

of third parties; but apparently the legal title and the means

of transferring such title in the most effectual manner."

§ 163. . In a case before the supreme court of the United

States, 1 it appeared that the plaintiff, who resided in California,

instructed his agent in New York to cause a steamboat to be

built, giving the agent express directions to hold himself, the

ao-ent, out as owner, and to cause the vessel to be enrolled in

bolder of such a certificate and power," said the court, "posse ses all the external indicia of title to the stock, antl an apparently unlimited power of disposition over it. He tloes not
appear to have, as is said in some of the authorities cited concerning the assignee of a chose in action, a mere equitable interest, which is said to be notice to all persons dealing with
him that they take subject to all equities, latent or otherwise,
of third parties; but apparently the legal title and the means
of transferring such title in the most effectual manner."

his, the agent's, own name, as the principal did not wish to

appear, or be known, as the owner. The agent followed these

instructions, but, upon the completion of the vessel, sold her to

the defendant, who purchased in good faith, relying upon the
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agent's apparent ownership, and paid the agent her full value.

The agent converted the proceeds to his own use, and the plaint-

iff brought the action to establish his title as against the pur-

chaser. But it was held here also that, having held the agent

out to the world as owner, and having intentionally clothed

him with the documentary evidence of ownership, the plaintiff

could not recover from one who, in good faith, has purchased

the property in reliance upon such apparent ownership.

| 164-. . In another case 2 the plaintiff had employed an

agent to purchase a horse. The agent made the purchase, but

i Calais Steamboat Co. v. Van Pelt him to a bona fide purchaser will

(1862), 2 Black (67 U. S.), 372. transfer a good title. O'Connor v.

Where the owner of a wagon, for Clark (1895), 170 Pa. St. 318, 32 Atl.

his own gain, allowed the name and R. 1029.

occupation of another person to be 2 Nixon v. Brown (1876), 57 N. H.

painted on it, and permitted it to re- 34. See also Goldstone v. Merchants'

umiii in the possession of that per- Ice & Cold Storage Co. (1899), 123

son. he so clothes the latter with the Cal. 625, 56 Pac. R. 776.

indicia of ownership that a sale by
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§ 163. - - . In a case before the supreme court of the Un ited
tates, 1 it appeared that the plaintiff, who resided in California,
instructed his agent in New York to cause a steam boat to be
built, giving the agent express directions to hold himself, the
agent, out as owner, and to cause the vessel to be enrolled in
his, the agent's, own name, as the principal did not wish to
appear, or be known, as the owner. The agent followed these
instructions, but, upon the completion of the vessel, sold her to
the defendant, who purchased in good faith, relying upon the
agent's apparent ownership, and paid the agent her full value.
The agent converted the proceeds to his own use, and the plaintiff brought the action to establish his title as against the purchaser. But it was held here also that, having held the agent
out to the world as owner, and having intentionally clothed
him with the documentary evidence of ownership, the plaintiff
could not recover from one who, in good faith, bas purchased
the property in reliance upon such apparent ownership.

§ 164. - - . In another case 2 the plaintiff had employed an
agent to purchase a horse.

The agent ma le the purchase, but

l Calai
teamboat Co. v. Van Pelt him to a bona fide purchaser will
(1 69), 2 lack (67 U. . ), 37 .
tran fer a good title. O'Connor v.
\\There the own r of a wagon, for Clark (1 95), 170 Pa. St. 318, 32 Atl.
hi own gain. allow d th name and R. 1029.
o cupati n of another p r on to be
2 Nixon v.
rown (1876), 57 N. H.
painted on it, and p rn itt d it to re- 34.
ee al o old tone v. l\Ier ·hants'
main in the po . ion f that pPr- Ice &
old torage Co. (1899), 123
al. 62-, 56 Pac. R. 776.
on. he o cloth tb latt r with th
indicia of owner hip th t a al by
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took the bill of sale in his own name. He informed his prin-

cipal of the purchase, showed him the bill of sale, and promised

to execute a similar one to the principal, but did not do so. It

was then agreed that the agent should keep the horse in his

own possession for the purpose of training him, and the agent

went away taking with him the horse and the bill of sale.

Afterwards the agent sold the horse to the defendant, who

bought it in good faith, in reliance upon the bill of sale, and

paid the agent the money, with which the latter decamped.

The plaintiff sued this purchaser in trover, but was not per-

mitted to recover, because he had allowed his agent to appear

to be the owner, and had clothed him with the indicia of title.

§ 1G5. Limitations.— But in order to estop the true

owner it is, as has been seen, indispensable not only that he

has clothed the person assuming to dispose of the property

with the apparent title to it, or with apparent authority to dis-

pose of it, but also that the person asserting the estoppel must

have acted, and parted with value, upon the faith of such ap-
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parent ownership or authority, so that he will be prejudiced if

the appearances to which he trusted are not real. This prin-

took the bill of sale in his own name. He informed his principal of the purchase, showed him the bill of sale, and promised
to execute a similar one to the principal, but did not do so. It
was then agreed that the agent should keep the horse in his
own pos ession for the purpose of training him, and the agent
went awa.y taking with him the horse and the bill of ale.
Afterwards the agent sold the horse to the defendant who
bought it in good faith, in reliance upon the bill of sale, and
paid the agent th~ money, with which the latter decamped.
The plaintiff sued this purcha er in trover, but was not permitted to recover, because he had allowed his agent to appear
to be the owner, and had clothed him with the indicia of title.

ciple is well illustrated by a case which received elaborate con-

sideration in the court of appeals of New York. 1 It there

i Barnard v. Campbell (1874), 55 that he was agent for Willits, and

N. Y. 456, 14 Am. R. 289, 58 N. Y. 73, ordered five barrels of whisky sent

17 Am. R. 208. to the latter. The McGoldricks

In McGoldrick v. Willits (1873), 52 shipped the whisky by rail addressed

N. Y. 612, one Roberts, who was a re- to Willits at his place of business,

tail liquor dealer on Long Island, After the whisky reached the depot,

went to Willits, who was also a re- Roberts went to Willits. showed him

tail liquor dealer in the same vicinity, an invoice of five barrels of whisky

and, saying to Willits that he was purporting to come from - Lewis &

carrying on a distillery, in the name Co.," told him the whisky was at the

of another, at Brooklyn, offered to station, and they both went to the

sell Willits five barrels of whisky, station, where they found the whisky

like a sample which he then pro- shipped by McGoldrick. Willits paid

duced. Willits ordered of Roberts the freight, obtained the whisky, and

the whisky. Roberts then went to paid Roberts for it. When McGoldrick

§ 165. - - Limitation . - But in order to estop the true
o wner it is, as bas been seen, indispen able not only that he
bas clothed the per on a urning to dispose of the property
with the apparent title to it, or with apparent authority to dispose of it, but al o that the per on asserting the e toppel mu t
have acted, and parted with value, upon the faith of such apparent ownership or authority, so that he will be prejudiced if
the appearances to which he trusted are not real. This principle is well illu trated by a case which received elaborate consideration in the court of app als of New York. 1 It th ere

N. P. McGoldrick, who kept a whole- demanded payment, Willits refused

sale liquor store in Brooklyn, said on the ground that he bought the
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I Barnard v. Campbell (1 74), 55
that he was agent for Willits, anu
N. Y. 456, 14 Am. R. 2 9, 5 N. Y. 3, ordered five barrels of whi ky ent
17 Am. R. 208.
to the latter.
The l\foGoldricks
In 1\IcGoldrick v. Willits (1 73), 52
hipped the whisky by rail addressed
N. Y. 612, one Robert , who was a r e- to "W illits at his place of business.
tail liquor dealer on Long I land, After the whisky reached the depot,
went to Willit , who wa also a re- Robert went to "\Villit , showed him
tail liquor dealer in the ame vicinity, an in voice of five barr-els of whi ky
and, saying to Willits that he was purporting to come from ·'Lewi &
carrying on a di tillery, in the name Co.," told him the whisky wa a.t the
of another, at Brooklyn, offered to tation, and they both went to the
ell Willits .five barrels of wbi ky, station. where they found the whisky
like a sample which he then pro- shipped by :M:cGoldrick. Willits paid
duced. Willit ordered of Robert the freight, obtained the whi ky, and
the whi ky. Roberts then went to paiclRobert forit. WhenilicGoldrick
N. P. l\IcGoldrick, who kept a whole- demanded payment, Willits refused
sale liquor store in Brooklyn, said on the ground that he bought the
155
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appeared that the defendants, after some negotiations, had pur-

chased of one Jeffries, on the 21st of August, a quantity of

linseed, and, at his request, had given him their notes in pay-

ment. These notes Jeffries at once pledged to third persons

as collateral to a loan to himself. Jeffries did not have the

linseed at the time, though he had been negotiating with the

plaintiffs for it, and on the 21st of August had made a contract

with them for its purchase. On the 24th of August, by false

and fraudulent representations, he induced them to deliver it to

him without payment. He sent the linseed to the defendants

on the 24th of August, and on the next day mailed them the

bill of lading. On August 27th Jeffries failed, not having paid

for the linseed, and the plaintiffs, on account of the fraudulent

representations, rescinded the sale to Jeffries and demanded

the linseed of the defendants. Upon their refusal to surrender

whisky of Roberts and had paid him
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for it. McGoldrick sued Willits and

was allowed to recover, the court

holding that McGoldrick had done

nothing to clothe Roberts with any

apparent title to or authority over

the goods. See also other cases cited

appeared tba t the defendants, after some negotiations, had purchased of one J effries, on the 21st of August, a quantity of
linseed, and, at his request, had given him their notes in payment. These notes J effries at once pl dged to third persons
as collateral to a loan to himself. J effries did not have the
linseed at the time, though be had been negotiating with the
plaintiffs for it, and on the 21st of August bad made a contract
with them for its purchase. On the 24th of August, by false
and fraudu lent representations: he induced them to deliver it to
him without payment. He sent the linseed to the defendants
on the 2-:l:th of August, and on the next day mailed th em the
bill of la<l.ing. On August 27th Jeffries failed, not having paid
for the linseed, and the plaintiffs, on account of the fraudulent
representations, rescinded the sale to Jeffries and demanded
the linseed of the defendants. Upon their refusal to surrender

in notes to § 149, ante.

In Armstrong v. Freimuth (1899),

78 Minn. 94, 80 N. W. R. 862, it ap-

peared that one Van Baalen executed

a bill of sale of a piano which he

owned to W., but it was in fact a

mortgage to secure a usurious loan.

It was recorded. W. then executed

a bill of sale of the piano to the

plaintiff. Van Baalen at all times

held possession of the piano. Plaint-

iff contended that Van Baalen was

estopped to show that the bill of sale

was a chattel mortgage to secure a

usurious loan. Held, that the owner

is estopped from asserting his claim

as against a purchaser only when he

invests another with the indicia of

an absolute title thereto, and such

person while actually in possession

sells to a bona fide purchaser with-

out notice and for value. But here

the plaintiff's vendor never had pos-

session.

One who deposits wheat for storage,

knowing that it is to be commingled

with wheat owned by the warehouse-

man, and that the latter is selling

and publicly shipping from the com-

mon mass, is estopped to assert title

as against an innocent purchaser

from the warehouseman in the usual

course of business. Preston v. With-

erspoon (1886), 109 Ind. 457, 58 Am.

R. 417.

The plaintiff consigned a piano to

the firm of B. & E., to be sold for

cash. With the assent of E., B. took

the piano to his own house, where he

used it for nine or ten months, when

he sold it, as belonging to himself or

wife, to the defendant, who paid a

fair price and bought in good faith.

Held, that the plaintiff could not re-

cover the piano from such purchaser.

whisky of Roberts and had paid him
for it. McGoldrick sued Willits a nd
was allowed to recover, the court
holding that McGoldrick bad done
nothing to clothe Roberts with any
apparent title to or authority over
the good . See also other case cited
in notes to § 149, ante.
In Armstrong v. Freimuth (1 99),
7 iinn. 94, 80 N. W. R. 862, it appea.red that one Van Baalen executed
a bill of sale of a piano which he
owned to W., but it was in fact a
mortgage to secure a u urious loan.
It wa recorded. W. then executed
a bill of sale of the piano to the
plaintiff. Van Baalen at a ll time
held po e sion of the piano. Plaintiff contended that Van Baalen was
e. topped to show that th bi ll of a.le
was a chattel mortgage to secure a
u uriou loan. H eld, that the owner
i e topp from a rting hi claim
a ag in ta pur cha er only wh n he
inve ts another with the indicia of
an b olute title th reto, and uch
p r on while actually in po e ion

sells to a bona fide purchaser without notice and for value. But here
the plaintiff's vendor never had possession.
Onewhodepositswheatforstorage,
knowing that it is t o be commingled
with wheat owned by the warehouseman, and that the latter is selling
and publicly shipping from the common mas , is estopped to assert title
as against an innocent purchaser
from the warehouseman in the usual
course of bu ·ine s. Prest.on v. With·
er poon (1 6), 109 Ind. 457, 58 Am.
R 417.
The plaintiff coni;;igned a piano to
the firm of B. & E., to be sold for
cash. With the a. sent of E., B. took
the piano to his own hou e, where he
u ed it for nine or t en mont.h , when
be sold it, as belonging to him ~elf or
wife, to the defendant, who paid a.
fair price and bought in good faith.
R ld. that the plaintiff could not recover the piano from such purcha er.
Dia v. hi kering (1 5), 64 Md. 348,
54 Am. R 770.
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it, plaintiffs brought replevin. The defendants assumed the

position of bona fide purchasers for value, and, claiming that

they had purchased upon the faith of the possession conferred

by the plaintiffs upon Jeffries, invoked the principle of estoppel

for their protection. But the court held that every element

of estoppel was wanting. At the time defendants purchased

the linseed and parted with their notes, Jeffries had neither the

possession nor the right of possession of the linseed; nor had

he any documentary evidence of title, or any indicia of owner-

ship or of dominion over the property of any kind. The plaint-

iff had then done nothing to induce the defendants to put their

faith m, or give credit to, the claim of Jeffries of a right to sell

the property. The defendants parted with their notes, not

upon the apparent ownership of Jeffries, but upon his assertion

of a right of which the plaintiffs had no knowledge, and for

which they were in no way responsible.

§ 166. Appearance of title from possession of bill of lad-

ing or warehouse receipt.— An appearance of title may very
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effectually be created, though no title may in fact exist, by the

possession of a bill of lading of the goods. While not strictly

negotiable, in the absence of a statute declaring them so, 1 bills

of lading are regarded, in commercial transactions, as being, in

a very complete sense, the representatives of the goods them-

selves; 2 warehouse receipts also, in many States, by statute or

usage, stand upon the same footing; 3 and if the true owner of

the goods permits another to appear to be the legal holder of

it, plaintiffs brought replevin. The defendants assumed the
position of bona fide purcba ers for value, and, claiming that
they had purchased up<?n the faith of the po:se sion conferred
by the plaintiffs upon Jeffrie , invoked the principle of estoppel
for their protection. But the court held that every element
of estoppel was wanting. At the time defendants purchase<l
the linseed and parted with th ir notes Jeffries had neither the
pos e ion nor the right of po es ion of the lin eell · nor had
he any documentary e idence of title, or any indicia of ownership or of dominion over the property of any kind. The plaintiff had then done nothing to induce the defendants to put their
faith m or give credit to, the claim of Jeffries of a right to sell
the property. The defen lants parted with their notes, not
upon the apparent ownership of Jeffries, but upon his assertion
of a right of which the plaintiffs had no know ledge, and for
which they were in no way re ponsible.

a bill of lading- or warehouse receipt for them, he will so far

clothe him with an ostensible title that a bona fide purchaser,

upon the indorsement and delivery to him of the bill of lad-

iSee, for example, Shaw v. Rail- (1878), 52 Cal. 611, 28 Am. R. 647;

road Co. (1879), 101 U. S. 557. Broadwell v. Howard (1875), 77 111.

2 See Friedlander v. Railway Co. 305; Merchants' Bank v. Hibbard

(1888), 130 U. S. 416. (1882), 48 Mich. 118, 42 Am. R. 465;

3 See Gibson v. Stevens (1850), 49 Allen v. Maury (1880), 66 Ala. 10;

U. S. (8 How.) 384; Adams v. Foley Bank of Newport v. Hirsch (1894),

(1856), 4 Iowa, 44; Davis v. Russell 59 Ark. 225, 27 S. W. R 74.
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§ 166. Appearance of title from pos ession of bill of lading or warehou ·e receipt.- An appearance of title may very
ffectually be created, though no title may in fact exist, by the
posse ion of a bill of lading of the good . While not strictly
negotiable, in the ab ence of a statute declaring them so,1 bills
of lading are regarded, in commercial transactions, as being, in
a very complete sense, the representatives of the goods themselves; 2 warehouse receipts al o, in many States, by statute or
usage, stand upon the same footing; 3 and if the true owner of
the goods permits another to appear to be the legal holder of
a bill of lading- or warehouse receipt for them, be will so far
clothe him with an ostensible title that a bona fide purchaser,
upon the indorsernent and delivery to him of the bill of lad1 See, for example, Shaw v. Rail(1 78), 52 Cal. 611, 28 .Am. R. 6±7;
road Co. (1879), 101 U. S. 557.
Broadwell v. Howard (1 75), 77 Ill.
2 See Friedlander v. Railway Co.
305; Merchants' Bank v. Hibbard
(1 '), 130 U. S. 416.
(1 2), 48 Mich. 118, 42 .Am. R. 465;
3 See Gibson v. Stevens (1850), 49 .Allen v. Maury (1880), 66 Ala. 10;
U. ". (8 How.) 384; Adams v. Foley Bank of Newport v. Hirsch (1894),
(1 56), 4 Iowa, 44; Davis v. Rus ell 59 Ark. 225, 27 S. W.R. 74.
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ing or warehouse receipt, will obtain an indefeasible title to

the goods. 1

This will be true, as in the case of a sale of the goods them-

selves, if the true owner voluntarily permitted the bill of lad-

ing or receipt to be so possessed, even though his consent was

induced by fraud or mistake; 2 but it will not be true where

the true owner had not consented, but the bill of lading or re-

ceipt was obtained against his will, as by finding, theft, or sim-

ilar act. 3

§ 167. Ostensible title of vendor permitted o retain pos-

session. — Somewhat akin to the questions here being consid-

ered is that of the effect of leaving the seller in possession

after a sale of the goods. It is, in general, true, as will be

seen, that delivery of possession is not essential to the transfer

ing or warehouse receipt, will obtain an indefeasible title to
the goocls. 1
This will be true, as in the case of a sale of 4-he goods themselves, if the true owner voluntarily permitted the bill of lading or receipt to be o po s s eel, even though bi con ent was
induced by fraud or mistake; 2 but it will not be true where
the true owner had not con nted, but the bill of lading or receipt was obtained against his will, as by finding, theft, or similar act. 3

of the title, at least as between the parties; but where one pur-

chaser of the goods voluntarily leaves them in the possession of

the seller, and the latter then sells them again to another who

buys in good faith, paying value in ignorance of the rights of
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the first purchaser, and obtains possession of the goods, the

question of the respective rights of the two purchasers presents

obvious difficulties. The rule is often declared to be, as will

be seen hereafter, that, of two equally innocent purchasers

from the same vendor, he who first obtains possession of the

goods shall hold them; though it must be conceded that the

condition of the law upon this question is far from satisfactory.

The matter is usually dealt with under the head of fraud, and

it is so discussed in this book in later sections; 4 but the sugges-

tion has sometimes been made that, by leaving the vendor in

possession, the first vendee so clothes the vendor with the

ostensible title that he should not be permitted to recover as

1 Conard v. Atlantic Ins. Co. (1828), - Dows v. Greene (1862), 24 N. Y. 638.

1 Pet. (U. S.) 386; Winslow v. Norton ^See, per Lord Campbell, in Gur-

(1849), 29 Me. 419; Newhall v. Central ney v. Behrend (1854), 3 El. & Bl. 633,

Pac. R Co. (1876), 51 Cal. 345, 21 Am. 77 Eng. Com. L. 622; Brower v. Pea-

R 713; Barber v. Meyerstein (1870), body (1855), 13 N. Y. 121; Shaw v.

L. R. 4 H. L. 317; Cahn v. Packet Railroad Co. (1879), 101 U. S. 557.

Co., [1899] 1 Q. B. 643. 4 See jjost, §§ 979-992.
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§ 167. Ostensible title of vendor permitted · 'l retain possession.- Somewhat akin to the questions her being considered is tba t of the effect of leaving the seller in possession
after a sale of the goods. It is, in general, true, as will be
seen, that delivery of possession is not essential to the transfer
of the title, at least as between the parties; but where one purchaser of the goods voluntarily leaves them in the possession of
the seller, and the latter then sell& them again to another who
buys in good faith, paying value in ignorance of the rights of
the first purchaser, and obtains poss ssion of the goods, the
question of the respective rights of the two purchasers presents
obvious difficulties. The rule is often declare Lto be, as will
be seen hereafter, that, of two equally innocent purchasers
from the same vendor, he who first obtains po session of the
goods shall bold them; though it must be conceded that the
condition of the law upon this question is far from satisfactory.
The matter is usually dealt with under the head of fraud, and
it is so discussed in this book in 1ater sections; 4 but the sugge tion has sometimes been made that, by leaving the vendor in
po e sion, the fir t vendee so clothes the vendor with the
o ten ible title that he should not be permitted to recover a
I Conard v. Atlantic Ins. Co. (1 9 ),
2 Dows v. Greene (1 62), 24 N. Y. 63 .
1 Pet. (U. '.) 3 6· Win low v. Norton
:-i see, per Lorcl ampbell, in Gur(1 49), 9 Me. 419; Newhall v. C ntral n y v. B hr nd (1 54), 3 El. & Bl. 633,
n ·. om. L. 6'),.,. Brow r v. PeaPac. R. o. (1 76 > 51 Cal. 34-, 91 m.
R. 713; arber v . 1ey r tein (1 70), b dy (1 J.-), 13 N. Y. 191; haw v.
L. R. 4 H. L. 317; Cahn v. Pa ket Railroad o. (1 79), 101 U. S. 557.
o., [1 99] 1 Q. B. 643.
4 ee post, § 979-992.
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against a later bona fide purchaser who obtains possession.

" Under such appearances of ownership," it is said, " every man

is justified in regarding him as being still the owner." l

As has been stated, however, leaving the vendor in posses-

sion has usually been deemed evidence, more or less conclusive

in various jurisdictions, of either actual or constructive fraud ;

and however plausible may be the suggestion which makes its

notice in this place permissible, it is deemed wiser to defer its

fuller treatment until the subject of fraud upon creditors and

subsequent purchasers is reached. 2

§ 168. Ostensible title under Factors Acts.— An ostensible

title may also be acquired under the operation of the statutes

generally known as Factors Acts. By the ordinary rules of the

common law, a factor or other agent, having the goods of his

principal in his possession, could convey no title, even to a bona

fide holder, by any transfer or pledge of his principal's goods

in payment or security for his own debts. 3 But inasmuch as

against a later bona fide purchaser who obtains possession.
"Un ler such appearances of ownership," it is said," every man
is justified in regarding him as being still the owner." 1
.As bas been stated, however, leaving the vendor in possession has usually been deemed evidence, more or less conclusive
in various jurisdictions, of either actual or constructive fraud;
and however plausible may be the suggestion which make its
notice in this place permissible, it is deemed wiser to defer its
fuller treatment until the subject of fraud upon creditors and
subsequent purchasers is reacbed. 2

the factor often deals in his own goods as well, and it is im-
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practicable, if not impossible, in many cases for third persons

dealing with him to know whether the goods are his own, or

whether he has authority to pledge them, statutes have been

passed in England and in several of the States 4 designed to pro-

tect those who have dealt with the factor in good faith in re-

liance upon his apparent title.

Thus, for example, the statute in Kew York provides that

" every factor or other agent intrusted with the possession of

any bill of lading, custom-house permit, or warehouse-keeper's

receipt for the delivery of any such merchandise, and every

such factor or agent not having the documentary evidence of

title who shall be intrusted with the possession of any mer-

chandise for the purpose of sale, or as a security for any ad-

vances to be made or obtained thereon, shall be deemed to be

i Streeper v. Eckart (1837), 2 Whart. 4 Such statutes exist in New York.

(Pa.) 302; Daniels v. Nelson (1868), 41 Maine, Massachusetts, Maryland,

Vt 161. Ohio, Kentucky, Pennsylvania, Wis-

2 Post. £§ 930, 979. consin, and Rhode Island.

3 See Mechem on Agency, § 994.
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§ 168. Ostensible title under Factors Acts.- An ostensible
title may also be acquired under the operation of the statutes
generally known as Factors Acts. By the ordinary rules of the
common law, a factor or other agent, having the goods of his
principal in his possession, could convey no title, even to a bona
fide holder, by any transfer or pledge of his principal's goods
in payment or security for his own debts. 3 But inasmuch as
the factor often deals in his own goods as well, and it is impracticable, if not impossible, in many cases for third persons
dealing with him to know whether the goods are his own, or
whether be bas authority to pledge them, statutes have been
passed in England and in several of the tates 4 designed to protect those who have dealt with the factor in good faith in reliance upon his apparent title.
Thus, for example, the statute in New York provides that
"every factor or other agent intrusted with the possession of
any bill of lading, custom-house permit, or warehouse-keepers
receipt for the delivery of any such merchandise, and every
such factor or agent not having the documentary evidence of
title who shall be intrusted with the possession of any merchandise for the purpose of sale, or as a security for any advances to be made or obtained thereon, shall be deemed to be
1 Streeper v. Eckart (1837), 2 Wbart.
(Pa.) 302; Daniels v. Nelson (1868), 41

Vt. 161.
2 Post. .~§
:i See

930, 979.
Mechem on Agency,

~

4 Such statutes exist in New York,
Maine, Ma achusetts, Ma ryla nd,
Ohio, Kentucky, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Rhode Island.

994.
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the true owner thereof, so far as to give validity to any con-

tract made by such agent with any other person, for the sale

or disposition of the whole or any part of such merchandise,

for any money advanced or negotiable instrument or other

obligation in writing given by such other person upon the faith

thereof." *

§169.

the true owner thereof, so far as to give validity to any contract made by such agent with any other person, for the sale
or disposition of the whole or any part of such merchandise,
for any money advanced or negotiable instrument or other
obligation in writing given by such other person upon the faith
thereof." 1

How such statutes construed. — Statutes of this

sort, being in contravention of the common law, are subject to

a strict construction, and no one can obtain the benefit of them

who does not bring himself within their terms. 2 Thus, for ex-

ample, the acts do not apply to every agent, but only to a factor

or other agent employed in like mercantile transactions; 3 he

must actually have been employed as such;*, the goods must

have been intrusted to him for sale; 5 his possession must have

been with the consent of the owner, and not obtained by theft
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or trick; 6 the person who claims the protection of the statute

must have acted in good faith, 7 without notice of the true own-

er's rights, 8 and he must have parted with value in the ordinary

i Rev. Stats, of New York, vol. Ill,

p. 2006.

2 Victor Sewing Maeh. Co. v. Hel-

ler (1878). 44 Wis. 265; Stevens v.

Cunningham (1862), 3 Allen (Mass.),

491.

3 Thus in Heyman v. Flewker (1863),

13 Com. B. N. S. 519, 106 Eng. Com.

§ 169. - - How such statutes construed.- Statutes of this
sort, being in contravention of the common law, are subject to
a strict construction, and no one can obtain the benefit of them
who does not bring himself within their terms. 2 Thus, for example, the acts do not applJ. to every agent, but only to a factor
or other agent employed in like mercantile transactions; 3 he
must actually have been employed as such;'· the goods must
have been in trusted to him for sale; 5 his possession must have
been with the con ent of the owner, and not obtained by theft
or trick; 6 the person who claims the protection of the statute
must have acted in good faith, 7 without notice of the true owners rights, 8 and he must have parted with value in the ordinary

L. 518, it is said that "the term

' agent ' does not include a mere serv-

ant or care taker, or one who has

possession of goods for carriage, safe

custody, or otherwise as an inde-

pendent contracting party; but only

persons whose employment corre-

sponds to that of some known kind

of commercial agent, like that class

(factors) from which the act has

taken its name." To like effect: Bush

v: Fry (1888), 15 Ont. 122; City Bank

v. Barrow (1880), 5 App. Cas. 664;

Johnson v. Credit Lyonnais (1878),

2 C. P. Div. 224, 3 id. 32; Cole v.

Northwestern Bank (1874), L, R. 9 C.

P. 470, 10 id. 369.

4 See First Nat. Bank v. Shaw (1874),

61 N. Y. 283; Mechanics' Bank v.

Farmers' Bank (1875), 60 N. Y. 40;

Farmers' Nat. Bank v. Atkinson

(1878), 74 N. Y. 587;' Davis v. Bigler

(1869), 62 Pa. St. 242.

5 Nickerson v. Darrow (1862), 5

Allen (Mass.), 419; Thacher v. Moors

(1880), 134 Mass. 156.

e Soltau v. Gerdau (1890), 119 N. Y.

380, 23 N. E. R. 864; Prentice Co. v.

Page (1895), 164 Mass. 276, 41 N. E.

R. 280; Cahn v. Packet Co., [1899] 1

Q. B. 643.

' Cleveland v. Shoeman (1883), 40

Ohio St. 176; Price v. Wisconsin M.

& F. Ins. Co. (1877), 43 Wis. 267.

8 Macky v. Dillinger (1873), 73 Pa. St.

85; Dorrance v. Dean (1887), 106 N. Y.

203. See Price v. Insurance Co.,

supra.
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1 Rev.

Stats. of New York, vol. III,

p. 2006.
:? Victor Sewing Mach. Co. v. Reller (1 78), 44 Wis. 265; Stevens v.
Cunningham (1862), 3 Allen (Mass.),

491.

3Thus in Heyman v. Flewker (1863),
13 Com. B. N. S. 519, 106 Eng. Com.
L. 51 , it is said that "the term
'agent' does not include a mere servant or care taker, or one who has
pos e sion of goods for carriage, safe
cu to ly, or otherwise as an in lep endent contracting party; but only
}Jer ons whose employment correponds to that of some known kind
of commercial agent, like that class
(factor ) from which the act has
tak nits name." Tolikeeff t: Bu ·h
v. Fry (1 ), 15 nt. 1· 2; City ank
v. Barrow (1 0), 5 App. as. 664;
John on v. Cr dit. Lyonnai (1 1 ),
2 C. P. Div. 224, 3 id, 3""; Cole v.

North·western Bank (1874), L. R. 9 C.
P. 470, 10 id. 369.
4 See First Nat. Bank v. Shaw (1874),
61 N. Y. 2 3; Mechanics' Bank v.
Farmers' Bank (1875), 60 N. Y. 40;
Farmers' Nat. Ba__nk v. Atkin on
(1878), 74 N. Y. 587; Davis v. Bigler
(1869), 62 Pa. St. 242.
5 Nickerson v. Darrow (1862), 5
Allen (Mass.), 419; Thacher v. Moors
(1880), 134 Mass. 156.
6 Soltau v. Gerdau (1890), 119 N. Y.
3 0, 23 N. E. R. 864; Prentice Co. v.
Page (1895), 164 Mass. 276, 41 N. E.
R. 2 O; Cahn v. Packet Co., [1 99] 1
Q. B. 643.
7 Cleveland v. Shoeman (18 3), 40
Ohio St. 176; Price v. Wiscon in M.
& F. Ins. Co. (1 77), 43 Vlis. 267.
8 Macky v. Dillinger (1873), 73 Pa. St.
-; Dorrance v. Dean (1 7), 106 N. Y.
203.
e Price v. Insurance Co.,
supm.

lGO

CH. II I. ]

CAPACITY OF PARTIES.

[§§ 170, 171.

CH. III.]

CAPACITY OF PARTIES.

[§§ 170, 171.

course of business in reliance upon the factor's apparent au-

course of business in reliance upon the factor's apparent authority.1

thority. 1

§ 170. Appearance of title by conduct — General estoppel.

And finally, without going further into details, it may be said

that whenever and however the true owner of goods by his

conduct — his words, his acts, his failure to act — has reason-

ably led another person to appear to be the owner of his goods,

_ot authorized to dispose of them, he will not be permitted to

deny such ownership or authority to the prejudice of a third

person who in good faith and with reasonable prudence has

parted with value upon the strength of such appearances. 2

IV.

Of Sales and Purchases by Persons Acting in a Repre-

sentative Capacity.

§ 171. In general.— Again, it may be that the person who

undertakes to buy or sell is acting, not on his own account,
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but as the representative of another; and something therefore

§ 170. Appearance of title by conduct- General e toppel.
And finally, without going further into details, it may be sai~
that when ever and however the true owner of goods by his
conduct-his word_s, his acts, his failure to act-has reasonably led another person to appear to be the owner of his goods,
_gr authorized to dispose -of them, lie :will no be permitt cl to
deny such ownership o_r authority to the prejudice of a third
person who ·n good faith and with reasonable prudence has
P,arted 1\ ith value upon the strength of such appearanc~s. 2

should, perhaps, be said concerning the origin, nature and ex-

IV.

his long delay estopped him to set

up title as against the bona fide pur-

chaser for value.

OF

SALES AND

PURCHASES

BY P ER ONS A CTING IN A REPRE-

In Grace v. McKissack (1873), 49

ENTATIVE OAP.A.CITY.

Ala. 163, a person sold and delivered

property on condition that the title

should remain in him until the price

was paid or secured by a mortgage.

A third person, proposing to buy the

property from the vendee, informed

the vendor of that fact, and asked

him if he had any mortgage upon it.

§ 171. I n general.-Again, it may be that the per on who
undertakes to buy or sell is acting, not on his own account,
but as the representative of another; and something therefore
should, perhaps, be sai concerning the origin, nature and ex-

The vendor replied that he had none,

and did not expect to have any ; and

said nothing as to his claim of title.

The third person thereupon bought

the property. Held, that the vendor

■was estopped to set up title against

him. See also Stewart v. Munford

(1878), 91 111. 58; Powers v. Harris

(1880), 68 Ala. 409.

1 Cleveland v. Shoeman, supra.

2 See Freeman v. Cooke, 2 Exch.

654; Pickard v. Sears, 6 Adol. & EL

469, 33 Eng. Com. L. 257; Gregg v.

Wells, 10 AdoL & El. 90, 37 Eng. Com.

L. 71; Knights v. Wiffin, L R. 5 Q.

B. 660. In Leavitt v. Fairbanks (1899),

92 Me. 521, 43 AtL R. 115, it appeared

that Leavitt delivered a mare to one

Sawyer to be kept through the win-

ter and returned in good condition

the next spring. Sawyer sold the

mare to the defendant, who had no

knowledge of plaintiff's title and no

reason to suspect it. Plaintiff gave

defendant no notice of his title for

seventeen months after he knew of

the sale, meanwhile endeavoring to

obtain the price from Sawyer. Held,

that his action was a ratification of

Sawyer's sale, and furthermore that

^

11

161

v. Shoeman, sitpra.
his long delay e topped him to set
Freeman v. Cooke, 2 Exch. up title as again t. the bona fide pur654; Pickard v. Sears, 6 Adol. & EL cha er for value.
469, 33 Eng. Com. L. 257; Gregg v.
In Grace v. McKi ack (1 73), 49
Wells, 10 Adol & EL 90, 37 Eng. Com. Ala. 163, a per on sold and delivered
L. 71; Knights v. Wiffin, L. R. 5 Q. property on condition that the title
B. 660. In Leavitt v. Fairbanks (1 99), hould remain in him until the price
92 1\fe. 521, 43 Atl R 115, it appeared was paid or ecured by a mortgage.
that Leavitt delivered a mare to one A third per on, propo. ing to buy the
Sawyer to be kept through the win- property from the vendee, informed
ter and returned in good condition the -vendor of that fact, and asked
t he next pring. Sawyer sold the him if he bad any mortgage upon it.
mare to the defendant, who had no The vendor replied that he had none,
knowledge of plaintiff' title and no and did not expect to have any; and
r ea on to suspect it. Plaintiff gave said nothing as to his claim of title.
defendant no notice of his title for The third per on thereupon bought
seventeen months after he knew of the property. H eld, that the vendor
t he sale, meanwhile endeavoring to was estopped to set up title against
obtain the price from Sawyer. H eld, him. See also Stewart v. Lunford
that his action was a ratification of (1 7 ), 91 Ill. 58; Powers v. Harris
Sawyers sale, and furthermore that (1 0), 6 Ala. 409.
11 .
161
1 Cleveland

2 See

§~

172-174.J

LAW OF SALE.

[BOOK I.

§§ 172-174.] LAW OF SALE. [BOOK I.

tent of the power of him who so undertakes to represent another,

although the subject may not be strictly one involving the ca

pacity of parties.

This general question of authority to buy and sell as agent

has been fully discussed by the present writer in another place; l

but a brief review of the subject seems germane to the present

endeavor, and will be given.

§ 172, Nature of the authority. — It will be obvious upon

a slight consideration of the matter that the authority of one

person to act for another in buying and selling personalty may

be either (1) such as the law alone creates and confers, even

tent of the power of him who so undertakes to represent another,
although the subject may not be strictly one involving the ca
pacity of parties.
This general question of authority to buy and sell as agent
has been fully discussed by the present writer in another place; 1
but a brief review of the subject seems germane to the present
endeavor, and will be given.

without the consent of the person to be bound; or (2) such cre-

ated and conferred by the act of the party to be represented.

§ 172. Nature of the anthoritJ .-It will be obvious upon

In the latter case, of authority conferred by act of party, the

authority may have been conferred either (a) expressly, or it

may have arisen (b) by implication from some other act, cir-

cumstance or condition.

It will be found, moreover, that somewhat different consid-
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erations are presented where the question is one of power to

buy than where the power to sell is involved; and it will be

convenient, therefore, to consider each question separately.

1. Authority to Sell Personal Property.

§ 173. How considered. — Applying the distinction referred

to in the preceding section, it will be convenient to consider,

first, the question of the power to sell when conferred by law;

and second, the power to sell when it arises either expressly

or impliedly from the acts of the parties.

a. Authority to Sell Conferred by Law.

§ 174. Chief illustrations. — With a single exception, per-

haps, the question of the power to sell conferred by law does

not greatly concern us. It will be found in later sections that

a vendor of goods has, in many cases, a power conferred by

1 See Mecliem on Agency, §£ 335-362; §§ 3G3-370; and elsewhere in same

work.

1G2

a slight consideration of the matter that the authority of one
person to act for another in buying and selling personalty may
be either (1) such as the law alone creates and confers, even
without the consent of the person to be bound; or (2) such created and conferred by the act of the party to be represented.
In the latter case, of authority conferred by act of party, the
authority may have been conferred either (a) expressly, or it
may have arisen (b) by implication from some other act, circumstance or condition.
.
It will be found, moreover, that somewhat different considerations are presented where the question is one of power to
buy than where the power to sell is involved; and it will be
convenient, therefore, to consider each question separately.
1. ..AiithorUy to Sell P ersonal Property.

§ 173. How considered.-Applying the distinction referred
to in the preceding section, it will be convenient to consider,
first, the question of tbe power to sell when conferred by law;
and second, the power to sell when it arises either expressly
or impliedly from the acts of the parties.

a. Authority to S ll Conferred by Law.
174:. Chief illu trations.-With a single exception, perhap , tlie qu tion of the power to sell conferred by law does
not gr atly ·oncern u . It will b found in later sections that
a ven lor of o d has, in many ca e , a power conferred by
e :1e h m on

g n y, § · 33-_ 62;

work.
162

363-370; and elsewhere in same

CH. III.

J

CAPACITY OF PARTIES.

[§ 175.

€H. III.] CAPACITY OF PARTIES. [§ 175.

law to sell the goods, as the goods of his vendee, to enforce the

payment of the price, and this question will there be fully dis-

cussed. 1 Aside from this, the chief instances of the kind of

power now under consideration are: the power of the master

of a ship, in case of absolute necessity, to sell the ship or cargo;

the power of the pledgee to sell the goods pawned; the power

of a landlord to distrain and sell for the payment of rent; the

power of the sheriff or other similar officers to sell goods upon

execution; the power of the tax collector to seize and sell

goods for the payment of taxes; and other like cases of stat-

utory authority, none of which falls within the field now being

considered.

b. Authority to Sell Conferred by Act of Party.

§ 175. Express authority to sell. — The authority to sell

may of course be conferred expressly and under a great va-

riety of circumstances to which it is not necessary here to

refer. 2 It may have been previously given or result from a sub-

sequent ratification by the principal with full knowledge of the
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material facts — such a ratification being, in general, the equiv-

alent of a prior authorization. 3 Such an authority is to be ex-

law to sell the goods, as the goods of his vendee, to enforce the
payment of the price, and tbis qnestion will there be fully dis<:mssed.1 Aside from this, the chief instances of the kind of
power now und er consideration are: the power of the master
of a ship, in case of absolute necessity, to sell the ship or cargo;
the power of the pledgee to sell the goods pawned; the power
of a landlord to distrain and sell for the pay ment of rent; the
power of the sheriff 01· other similar officers to sell goods upon
execution; the power of the tax collector to seize and sell
goods for the payment of taxes; and other like cases of statutory authority, none of which falls within the field now being
<:!onsidered.

ercised for the benefit of the principal, and not, under any

b. Authority to Sell Conferred by Act of Party.

circumstances, for the personal benefit of the agent. 4 He will

not be permitted, without the full knowledge and consent of

his principal, to sell to himself, either directly or indirectly, or

otherwise deal with himself on his principal's account. 5

1 See post, §§ 1621 et seq. § 354; Gould v. Blodgett (1881), 61

2 See Mechem on Agency, § 335 N. H. 115; Wilson v. Wilson (1897),

et seq. 181 Pa. St. 80, 37 Atl. R. 117; Read v.

3 Mechem on Agency, §§ 109-189. Cumberland, etc. Co. (1894), 93 Tenn.

4 Mechem on Agency, §§344,354. 482, 27 S. W. R. 660; or take pay-

Thus, for example, he cannot set off ment to himself for his principal's

against the price due his principal goods, McGrath v. Vanaman (1895),

debts owing by himself, Mechem on 53 N. J. Eq. 459, 32 Atl. R. 686; or ac-

Agency, § 344; Talboys v. Boston cept a cancellation of his own debt

(1891), 46 Minn. 144, 48 N. W. R 688; in payment. Smith v. James (1890),

or sell or deliver the goods in pay- 53 Ark. 135, 13 S. W. R. 701.

ment of his own debt, or pledge them 5 Mechem on Agency, § 461.

for his own debt, Mechem on Agency,

163

§ 175. Express authority to sell.-The authority to sell
may of course be conferred expressly and under a great variety of circumstances to which it is not necessary here to
refer. 2 It may have been previously given or result from a subsequent ratification by the principal with full knowledge of the
material facts - such a ratification being, in general, the equivalent of a prior authorization. 3 Such an authority is to be exercised for the benefit of the principal, and not, under any
circumstances, for the personal benefit of the agent. 4 He will
·n?t be permitted, without the full knowledge and consent of
.his principal, to sell to himself, either directly or indirectly, or
-0therwise deal with himself on his principal's account. 5
§ 354; Gould v. Blodgett (1 , 1), 61
post, §§ 1621 et seq.
Mechem on Agency, § 335 N. H. 115; Wilson v. Wilson (1 97),
-et seq.
1 1 Pa. St. 80, 37 Atl. R. 117; Read v.
3 Mechem on Agency,§§ 109-182.
Cumberland, etc. Co. (1894), 93 Tenn.
4 Mechem on Agency, §§ 344, 854.
4 2, 27 S. W. R. 660 ; or take payThus, for example, he cannot set off ment to himself for his principal's
.again t tbe price due his principal goods, McGrath v. Vanaman (1 '95),
debts owing by himself, Mechem on 53 N. J. Eq. 459, 32 Atl. R. 686; or acAgency, § 344; Talboys v. Boston cept a cancellation of his own debt
(1891), 46 Minn. 144, 48 N. W.R. 688; in payment. Smith v. James (1890),
or sell or deliver the goods in pay- 53 Ark. 135, 13 S. W. R. 701.
ment of his own debt, or pledge them
a Iechem on Agency, § 461.
for his own debt, Mechem on Agency,
163
1 See

2 See

§ 175.J

LAW OF SALE.

(BOOK I.

175.]

LAW OF SALE.

[BOOK I.

Authority to sell can only justify such dispositions as are, in

legal effect, sales, and it therefore does not warrant a pledge,

a mortgage, or an exchange or barter. 1 If the authority be to

sell, without stipulating as to the manner, it is to be construed

as referring to a private and not to a public or auction sale. 2

If, on the other hand, a sale by auction is directed, a private

sale would not be authorized. 3

General power to sell, without restrictions, would carry with

it implied power to fix the price and agree upon the terms,

within the usual or reasonable limits. 4 The principal himself,

however, may prescribe the price and terms, and his restric-

tions will be binding upon the agent and also upon third per-

sons who are charged with notice. Mere private instructions,

however, could not affect third persons actually ignorant of

them, who have dealt with the agent in good faith and in the

exercise of reasonable prudence; 5 though even here the terms
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or price fixed by the agent may be so unusual or unreasonable

as to fairly put a prudent man upon his guard. 6

1 Mechem on Agency, §§ 356, 361,

352.

2 Mechem on Agency, § 358.

a Mechem on Agency, § 358.

4 Mechem on Agency. § 362; Day-

light Burner Co. v. Odlin (1871), 51

N. H. 56, 12 Am. R 45; Putnam v.

French (1881), 53 Vt. 402, 38 Am. R.

6S2; Bigelow v. Walker (1852), 24 Vt.

Authority to sell can only justify such dispositions as are, in
legal effect, sales, and it therefore does not warrant a pledge,
a mortgage, or an exchange or barter. 1 If the authority be to
sell, without stipulating as to the manner, it is to be construe(l
as referring to a private and not to a public or auction sale. 2
If, on the other hand, a sale by auct10n is directed, a private
sale would not be authorized. 3
General power to s3ll, without restrictions, would carry with
it implied power to fix the price and agree upon the terms,
within the usual or reasonable limits. 4 The principal himself,
however, may prescribe the price and terms, and his restrictions will be binding upon the agent and also upon third persons who are charged with notice. Mere p1·ivate instructions,
however, could not affect third persons actually ignorant of
them, who have dealt with the agent in good faith and in the
exercise of reasonaLle prudence; 5 though even here the terms
or price fixed by the agent may be so unusual or unreasonable
as to fairly put a prudent man upon his guard. 6

149, 58 Am. Dec. 156; Watts v. How-

ard (1897), 70 Minn. 122, 72 N. W. R.

840; Smith v. Droubay (1899), 20

Utah, 443, 58 Pac. R. 1112; Taylor v.

Bailey (1897), 169 111. 181, 48 N. E. R.

200. Where the only apparent lim-

itation upon the agent's authority

was to sell at "proper prices," the

sale cannot be defeated because the

principal claims that the price fixed

by the agent was too low, unless it

was so low as to plainly show fraud

on his part. U. S. School Furniture

Co. v. Board of Education (1897), —

Ky. — , 38 S. W. R. 864.

5 Mechem on Agency, § 362.

6 Mechem on Agency, § 362. Thus

where a traveling salesman offered

to sell to a customer goods worth

$860 for $382.50, it was held that the

customer must have known that the

salesman was joking or perpetrating

a fraud upon his principal, and there-

fore the principal was not bound.

Brown Grocery Co. v. Beckett (1900),

— Ky. — , 57 S. W. R. 458.

In Brown v. West (1897), 69 Vt. 440,

38 Atl. R. 87, defendants were whole-

sale grocers, under contract with the

manufacturers of certain goods not

to sell below list prices. They em-

ployed a traveling salesman to sell

these goods, and he was authorized

to sell only at list prices, to make col-

lections and receipt bills. A retailer,

who knew of the contract, bought

goods from the salesman, who al-

lowed him discounts, though the

goods were sold and bills rendered

164

on Agency, §§ 356, 361,

Mechem on Agency, § 362.
Mechem on Agency, § 362. Thus
2 Mechem on Agency, § 358.
where a traveling salesman offereu
3 l\Iechem on Agency, § 358.
to sell to a customer goods worth
41\Iechem on Agency.§ 362; Day- S 60 for 8382.50, it was held that the
lig ht Burner Co. v. Odlin (1871), 51 customer must have known that the
N. H. 56, 12 Am. R. 45; Putnam v. salesman was joking or perpeLrating
Frenc h (18 1), 58 Vt. 402, 38 Am. R. a frauu upon his principal, and there6 2 ; Bigelow v. Walker (1852), 24 Vt. fore the principal was not bound.
H9, 5 Am. Dec. 156; Watts v. How- Brown Grocery Co. v. Beckett (1900 ),
ard (1 97), 70 Miun. 122. 72 N. W. R. - Ky. --, 57 S. vV. R. 45 .
40; Smith v. Droubay (1 99), 20
In Brown v. We t (1897), 69 Vt. 440,
Utah, 443. 5 Pac. R. 1112; Taylor v. 38 Atl. R. 87, defendants were wholeBa iley (1 97), 169 Ill. 181, 48 N. E. R. sale grocers, under contra t with the
200. Where the only apparent lim- manufacturers of certain goods not
itation u pon the agent's authority to ell below list prices. They em·
wa to ell at "proper prices." the ployed a traveling sale man to sell
sale cannot be defeated be ·au e the the e good , and he wa authorized
prin cipal claim tha t th price fixed to ell only at li t prices, to make coly the agent was too low, unle it lections and receipt bill . A retailer,
wa so low a to plainly show fraud who knew of the contract. bought
on his part. U. S. S hool Furniture good from the ale ·man, who allowe i him di ~ count , though the
o. v. Boa nl of Edu ti on (1 97 J, Ky. - , 38 . W. R. 64.
goods were sold and bills rendered
164
1 Mechem

352.

b

6

CH. III.] CAPACITY OF PARTIES. [§ 1T6.

()H. III.]

CAP A.CITY OF PARTIES.

[§ 176.

Authority to sell upon a day named does not justify a sale

at a later day; 1 and authority to sell upon a particular occa-

sion does not warrant the inference of like authority several

years later. 2

Authority to sell raises no implication of authority to subse-

quently alter or modify the contract, rescind the sale, or dis-

charge the purchaser from his liability; 3 or to release or com-

promise debts due the principal, or to turn out the property in

payment of his debts. 4

Like other authorities, the authority to sell is usually not one

which the agent may delegate to another without his principal's

consent. 5

Where the authority is simply to solicit orders for goods, or

negotiate for their sale, the agent would have no implied power

to make an absolute contract of sale; 6 but even though, in fact,

his authority is so limited, if the principal holds him out as

having general authority to sell, the principal will be liable to

innocent third persons who have made an absolute contract
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with the agent in reliance upon his apparent authority. 7

§ 176. Implied authority to sell. — Although not expressly

conferred, authority to sell may be implied from words or con-

at list prices. Held, that the retailer adopting and enforcing the contract

was bound to inquire as to the ratifies that agreement, which thus

agent's authority to make discounts, formed a part of it. Babcock v.

i Bliss v. Clark (1860), 16 Gray Deford (1875), 14 Kan. 408.

(Mass.), 60. 4 Mechem on Agency, § 355; Smith

2 Reed v. Baggott (1879), 5 111. App. v. Perry (1860), 29 N. J. L. 74; Powell

257. v. Henry (1855), 27 .Ala. 612; Nash v.

3 Mechem on Agency, § 360 ; Diversy Drew (1850), 5 Cush. (Mass.) 422.

v. Kellogg (1867), 44 111. 114, 92 Am. 5 Mechem on Agency, § 185 et seq.;

Dec. 154; Stilwell v. Mutual Life Ins. Bancroft v. Scribner (1896), 44 U. S.

Co. (1878), 72 N. Y. 385; Adrian v. App. 480,21 C. C. A. 352; Burke v.

Authority to sell upon a day named does not justify a sale
at a later day; 1 an l authority to sell upon a particular occasion does not warrant the inference of like authority several
years later. 2
Authority to sell raises no impUcation of authority to subsequently alter or modify the contract, rescind the sale, or dis~harge the purchaser from his liability; 3 or to release or compromise debts due the principal, or to turn out the property in
payment of his debts. 4
Like other authorities, the authority to sell is usually not one
which the agent may delegate to another without his principal's
consent. 5
Where the authority is simply to solicit orders for goods, or
negotiate for their sale, the agent would have no implied power
to make an absolute contract of sale; 6 but even though, in fact,
his authority is so limited, if the principal holds him out as
having general authority to sell, the principal will be liable to
innocent third persons who have made an absolute contract
with the agent in reliance upon his apparent authority. 7

Lane (1879), 13 S. C. 183; Adams v. Fry (1895), 44 Neb. 223, 62 N. W. R.

Fraser (1897), 49 U. S. App. 481, 27 476; National Cash Register Co. v.

C. C. A. 108. Ison (1894), 94 Ga. 463, 21 S. E. R. 228.

Such authority may, of course, be 6 Johnson Railroad Signal Co. v.

§ 176. Implied

~uthority

to sell.-Although not expressly

conferred, authority to sell may be implied from words or con-

conferred, expressly or by implica- Union Signal Co. (1892), 51 Fed. R. 85.

tion; and where the agent in selling 7 Banks v. Everest (1886), 35 Kan.

has agreed that the buyer may re- 687; Potter v. Springfield Milling Co.

turn the goods, the principal by (1898), 75 Miss. 532, 23 S. R. 259.
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at list prices. Held, that the retailer
was bound to inquire as to the
agent's authority to make discounts.
1 Bliss v. Clark (1860), 16 Gray
\1\'Iass.), 60.
2 Reed v. Baggott (1879), 5 111. App.

adopting and enforcing the contract
ratifies that agreement, which thus
formed a part of it. Babcock v.
Deford (1 75), 14 Kan. 40 .
4Mechem on Ageney, § 355; Smith
v. Perry (1860), 99 N. J. L. 74; Powell
257.
v. Henry (1855), 27 Ala. 612; Na h v.
3 Mechem on Agency,§ 360; Diver y Drew (1850), 5 Cush. (Mass.) 422.
v. Kellogg (1867), 44 Ill. 114, 92 Am.
5 Mechem on Agency,§ 1 5 et seq.;
Dec. 154; Stilwell v. Mutual Life Ins. Bancroft v. Scribner (1896), 44 U. S.
Co. (1878), 72 N. Y. 3 5; Adrian v. App. 4 0, 21 C. C. A. 3-2; Burke v.
Lane (1 79), 13 S. C. 183; Adams v. Fry (189-), 44 Neb. 223, 62 N. W. R.
Fra er (1897), 49 U. S. App. 481, 27 476; National Cash Regi ter Co. v.
C. C. A. 108.
Ison (1 94), 94 Ga. 4613, 21 S. E. R. 228.
Such authority may, of course, be
6 Johnson Railroad Signal Co. v.
conferred, expressly or by implica- Union Signal Co. (1892), 51 Fed. R. 85.
tion; and where the agent in selling
7 Banks v. Evere t (1 6), 35 Kan.
ha agreed that the buyer may re- 6 7 · "Potter v. Springfield Milling Co.
turn the goods, the principal by (1 9 ), 75 Mis 532, 23 S. R. 259.
16;)

§§ 177, 178.J

J,.A.W OF SALE.

[BOOK I.

§§ 177, 178.] LAW OF SALE. [BOOK I.

duct which would reasonably lead to the inference that such

authority existed.

§ 177. None implied from mere possession.— Author-

ity to sell, however, is not to be implied from the mere posses-

duct which would reasonably lead to the inference that such
authority existed.

sion of the goods. As has been already seen, there must be

§ 177. - - None impliecl from mere possession.- Author-

something more — some additional fact or circumstance which

has clothed the possessor with the indicia of ownership or

with apparent authority to sell. 1

§ 178. None from mere relationship — Husband and

w if e — Parent and child.— So no authority to sell is ordina-

rily to be implied from the mere relationship of the parties.

Thus the wife, merely because she is the wife, has no implied

power to sell or dispose of her husband's property. 2 The mere

fact that the husband is ill, 3 or temporarily absent, 4 does not en-

ity to sell, how·ever, is not to be implied from the mere possession of the goods. As has been already seen, there must be
something more - some additional fac t or circumstance which
has clothed the possessor with the indicia of ow:11ersbip or
with apparent authority to sell. 1

large her powers, though long-continued absence, and a fortiori

an entire abandonment, would, of necessity, in respect of many

articles of personalty, warrant the wife to sell. 5 Authority

to sell may, of course, be inferred from conduct, prior recog-
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nition, subsequent ratification, and the like, as in the case of

other agents.

So the husband, merely because he is the husband, has no

implied authority to sell or dispose of the wife's property. She

may make him her agent, as in the case of other agents, but

he is not her agent simply because he is her husband. 6

The same rules apply also to the relation of parent and child.

1 See this subject discussed, ante, 3 x\lexander v. Miller, supra.

§% 156, 157. 4 Benjamin v. Benjamin (1843), 15

2Mechem on Agency, § 62; Alex- Conn. 347, 39 Am. Dec. 384; Krebs v.

ander v. Miller (1851). 16 Pa. St. 215; O'Grady (1853), 23 Ala. 726, 58 Am.

Brown v. Railroad Co. (1863), 33 Mo. Dec. 312; Butts v. Newton (1872), 29

309; Dunnahoe v. Williams (18G6), Wis. 632.

24 Ark. 264; Wheeler & Wilson Mfg. 5 See Felker v. Emerson (1844), 16

Co. v. Morgan (1883), 29 Kan. 519; Vt. 653, 42 Am. Dec. 532; Church v.

Ness v. Singer Mfg. Co. (1897), 68 Landers (1833), 10 Wend. (N. Y.) 79.

Minn. 237, 70 N. W. R. 1126. Wife has 6 See Mechem on Agency, § 63, and

no implied power to lend the hus- cases cited,

band's property. Green v. Sperry

(1844), 16 Vt. 390, 42 Am. Dec. 519.
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§ 178. - - None from mere relation hip-Husband and
wife- Parent and child.- So no a uthority to sell is ordinarily to be implietl from the mere relationship of the parties.
Thus the wife, merely because she is the wife, has no implied
power to sell or dispose of her husband's property. 2 The mere
fact that the husband is ill, 3 or temporarily absent 4 does not enlarge her powers, though long-continued absence, and aforti01·i
an entire abandonment, would, of necessity, in respect of many
articles of personalty, warrant the wife to sell.5 Authority
to sell may, of course, be inferred from conduct, prior recognition, subsequent ratification, and the like, as in the case of
other agents.
So the husband, merely because he is the husband, has no
implied authority to sell or dispose of the wife's property. She
may make him her agent, as in the case of other ag nts, but
he is not her ag nt simply because be is her husband. 6
The same rules apply also to the relation of parent and child.
ee this subject discu sed, ante,

1 xan der v. Miller, supra.
4 Benjamin v. Benjami~ (1 43), 15
2 l\Iechem on Agen cy, § 6'>;
lex- Conn. 347, 39 m. Dec. 3 4; Krebs v.
ander v. Iiller (1 -1 ), 16 Pa. t. 21-; O'Grauy (1 - 3), 23 A la. 726, 58 Am.
ro,vn v. Ra ilroad Co. (1 68), 33 Io. Dec. 31 '>; Butt v. Newton (1 7'>), 29'
30U; Dunna ho '· Willi a m (1 66), Wi . 632.
5
e F lker v. Erner. on (1 .J.4), 1()
2± rk. 264 ; "Wh eel r & v il n lfg.
o. v. l r o· n (1 !J), 29 Kan. 519; Vt. 633, 42 Am. Dec. 532; lmrch '·
N
v. ' incr r l\Ifg. ' . (1 97) 6 Land r (1 33), 10 \ Ull. (N. Y.) 79.
e l\I l em on Agency,§ 63, and
Minn. 2· 7 10 N. vV. . 11· 6. Wif h
ca~ e cited.
1

§ . 156, 1:-1.

.
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3

CH. III.] CAPACITY OF PARTIES. [§§ 179-181.

CH. III.]

CA.PA.CITY OF PARTIES.

[~§

179- 1 1.

The child, simply because he is such, has no implied power to

sell the parent's property; and the parent, by virtue of his re-

lationship alone, would have no implied power to sell the prop-

erty of the child.

A fortiori, the mere fact that one is nephew of another and

works upon his farm gives him no right to sell that other's

property. 1

§ 179. None from authority to do different kind of

acts. — Authority to sell, moreover, cannot be inferred from

the mere fact that the person selling has even express author-

ity to do acts of some other nature. Thus, an agent authorized

to manage a business has therefrom no implied power to sell

The child, simply because he is such, has no implied power to
sell the parent's property; and the parent, by virtue of bis relationship alone, would have no implied power to sell the property of the child.
A fortiori, the mere fact that one is nephew of another and
works upon his farm gives him no right to sell that other's
property. 1

it; 2 and an agent authorized to solicit orders for goods by ref-

erence to samples which he carries with him has no implied

power to sell the samples. 3

2. Authority to Buy Personal Property.

§ 180. How considered. — In this case, also, it will be con-

venient to apply the distinction mentioned in a preceding sec-
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tion, and consider, first, the authority conferred by law ; and

second, the authority conferred, expressly or impliedly, by act

of parties.

a. Authority to Buy Conferred by Law.

§ 181. Chief instances. — There are a few cases in which the

law, by reason of the necessity of the case, confers upon one

party the power to bind another, with whom he is in some way

legally related, for the purchase of goods, even without the ex-

~

179. - - None from authority to do different kincl of
acts.-Autbority to sell, moreover, cannot be inferred from
the mere fact that the person selling has even express authority to do acts of some other nature. Thus, an agent authorized
to manage a business has therefrom no implied power to sell
it; 2 and an agent authorized to solicit orders for goods by reference to samples which he carries with him has no implied
power to sell the samples. 3

press consent and often notwithstanding the express dissent of

the person to be bound. The most striking illustration of this

2. Authority to Buy Personal Property.

authority is the power of the wife, under certain circumstances,

i Moffet v. Moffet (1894), 90 Iowa, Carey Lumber Co. v. Cain (1893), 70

442, 57 N. W. R. 954. Miss. 628, 13 S. R. 239.

2 Holbrook v. Oberne (1881), 56 3 Kohn v. Washer (1885), 64 Tex.

Iowa, 324; Vescelius v. Martin (1888), 131, 53 Am. R. 745.

11 Colo. 391, 18 Pac. R. 338. But see
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§ 180. How considerecl.- In this case, also, it will be convenient to apply the distinction mentioned in a preceding section, and consider, forst, the authority conferred by law; and
second, the authority conferred, expressly or impliedly, by act
of parties.
,,.

a. Authority to Buy Conferred by Law.
§ 181. Chief instances.-Tbere are a few cases in which the
law, by reason of the necessity of the case, confers upon one
party the power to bind another, with whom be is in some way
legally related, for the purchase of goods, even without the express consent and often notwithstanding the express dissent of
the person to be bound. The most striking illustration of this
authority is the power of the wife, under certain circumstances,
1 Moffet

v. Moffet (1894), 90 Iowa, Carey Lumber Co. v. Cain (1893), 70
442, 57 N. W. R. 954.
Mi s. 628, 13 S. R. 239.
3 Kohn v. Washer (1885), 64 Tex.
2 Holbrook v. Oberne (1881), 56
Iowa, 324; Vescelius v. Martin (1 88), 131, o3 Am. R. 745.
11 Colo. 391, 18 Pac. R. 338. But see
167

§§ 1 2, 183.J

LAW OF SALE.

[BOOK I.

§§182, 183.] LAW OF SALE. [BOOK I.

to pledge her husband's credit for necessaries. Allied to this,

there has often been said to be, though probably erroneously,

a similar power on the part of an infant child to pledge his

father's credit. And compared to it, too, but probably also erro-

neously, is the power of the master of a ship to buy supplies

upon the owner's credit.

§ 182. Authority of wife to buy necessaries on husband's

credit. — A wife, merely because she is such, has no general

authority as her husband's agent; though he may make her his

agent as in other cases. But while she has no general power

to pledge her husband's credit for necessaries. Allied to this,
there has often been said to be, though probably erroneously,
a similar power on the part of an infant child to pledge his
father's credit. And compared to it, too, but probably also erroneously, is the power of the master of a ship to buy supplies
upon the owner's credit. ·

to bind him, the law, in one class of cases, gives her a special

and unusual power, fitly designated as an " authority by neces-

sity," to pledge her husband's credit, under certain circum-

stances, for those articles which the law has denominated

§ 182 . Aut110rity of wife to buy neces~aries on husband's
creel it.- A wife, merely because she is such, has no general

" necessaries." His liability for necessaries has grown to be an

important and extensive chapter of the law, and many pages

would be required to adequately discuss it. The purpose here

is simply to show its place in the general subject under discus-
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sion, and to notice only its most important features.

§ 183. Where the parties are living together.— While

the husband and wife are living together, the wife has usually

a sort of agency in fact to manage the domestic affairs, and to

pledge her husband's credit for the purchase of such articles as

are reasonably necessary and proper for family use, even though

they might not all be strictly of the class known as necessaries. 1

This presumptive agency, however, is not an absolute one. The

husband may, in general, supply his family as he pleases and

keep the control of the purchases within his own hands. He

may show, therefore, that he has never given the wife this ap-

parent authority, or that, if she ever had it, it has been revoked

upon proper notice. As stated in one case, 2 " the agency of the

i Vusler v. Cox (1891), 53 N. J. L. 21 Atl. R. 834, 23 Am. St. R. 764 See

authority as her husband's agent; though he may make her his
agent as in other cases. But while she has no general power
to bind him, the law, in one class of cases, gives her a special
and unusual power, fitly designated as an "authority by necessity," to pledge her husband's credit, under certain circumstances, for those articles which the law has denominated
"necessaries." His liability for necessaries l}as grmvn to be an
important and extensive chapter of the law, and many pages
would be required to adequately discuss it. The purpose here
is simply to show its place in the general subject unJ er discussion, and to notice only its most important features.

516; Baker v. Carter, jyost; Phillips also Flynn v. Messenger (1881), 28

v. Sanchez (1895), 35 Fla. 187; Wagner Minn. 208, 41 Am. R. 279; Bergh v.

v. Nagel (1885), 33 Minn. 348. Warner (1891), 47 Minn. 250, 50 N. W.

2 Baker v. Carter (1890), 83 Me. 132, R. 77, 28 Am. St. R 362.
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§ 183. - - Where tlrn parties are living together.-While
the husband and wife are living together, the wife has usually
a sort of agency in fact to manage the domestic affairs, and to
pledge her husband's credit for the purchase of such articles as
are reasonably necessary and proper for family use, even though
they might not all be strictly of the class ln1own a.s nece aries. 1
This presurnpti ve agency, however, is not an absolute one. The
husband may, in gener al, supply his family as he pleases and
keep the control of the purchases within bis own bands. He
may show, therefore, that he has never g iven the wife this apparent authority, or that, if she ever had it, it has b en r voked
upon prop r notice. As stated in one case, 2 "the agency of the
l Vu ler v. Cox (1891), 53 N. J. L. 21 Atl. R. 834, 23 Am. St. R. 764. See
516; Baker v. Carter, po. t; Phillips al o Flynn v. 1essenger (1 81), 28
v. Sanchez (1 9-), 35 Fla.1 7; Wagner Minn. 20 , 41 Am. R. 279 ; Bergh v.
v. Nagel (1 5), u3 Minn. 34 .
Warner (1 91) 47 Minn. 250, 50 N. \V.
2 Baker v. Carter (1890), 83 Me. 132, R. 77, 28 Am. St. R. 362.
168

CH. III.] CAPACITY OF PARTIES. [§ 184.

CH. III.]

CAPACITY OF PARTIES.

[§ 1

±.

wife to purchase necessaries is only presumptive, and may be

disproved by the husband by showing that he had abundantly

supplied the house with all things necessary and suitable, or

that he had furnished the wife with ample ready money for the

purpose, and requested her not to purchase on credit, or had

provided suitable places where all things necessary could be

had and forbidden her to purchase elsewhere; though the mere

fact that he privately forbade her to act for him will not relieve

him from liability, where it appears that he has recognized her

agency, or has in some way allowed her to appear to have

charge of his house. The husband, in the view of the law, is

the head of the house, and has a right to control the affairs of

his own household."

If, however, he made no provision for her in any way, then

the wife would have the power to buy necessaries upon his

credit, and he could not by any notice or countermand deprive

her of the power. 1

§ 184, Where the parties are living apart, — Where
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the husband and wife are living apart, somewhat different con-

siderations apply.

If they are living apart because of the wife's misconduct or

default, the husband is ordinarily freed from the liability to

support her. 2

If they are living apart because of the husband's fault, as

where he has deserted her, driven her away, or rendered her

home an unfit place for her to live, he is usually said to send

his credit with her, and, if she is not otherwise supplied, 3 she

may buy necessaries upon her husband's credit, and of this

right no notice not to supply her can deprive her. 4

wife to purchase necessaries is only presumptive, and may be
disproved by the husband by showing that he had abundantly
supplied the house with all things necessary and suitable, or
that he had furnished the wife with ample ready money for the
purpose, and requested her not to purchase on credit, or had
provided suitable places where all things necessary could be
had and forbidden her to purchase elsewhere; though tbe mere
fact that he privately forbade her to act for him will not relieve
him from liability, where it appears that he has recognized her
agency, or has in some way allowed her to appear to have
charge of his house. The husband, in the view of the law, is
the head of the house, and has a right to control the <tffairs of
. his own household."
If, however, he made no provision for her in any way, then
the wife would have the power to buy necessaries upon his
credit, and he could not by any notice or countermand deprive
her of the power. 1

i Keller v. Phillips (1868), 39 N. Y. 3 If the wife has other adequate

351 ; "Woodward v. Barnes (1871), 43 means, the rule is said not to apply.

§ 184-. - - Where the parties are living apart.- Where

Vt. 330; McGrath v. Donnelly (1889), Hunt v. Hayes (1891), 64 Vt, 89, 23

131 Pa. St. 549. Atl. R. 920, 33 Am. St. R. 917.

2 Oinson v. Heritage (1873), 45 Ind. 4 Carstens v. Hanselman (1886), 61

73, 15 Am. R. 258; Brown v. Mudgett Mich. 426, 28 N. W. R. 159. 1 Am. St.

(1868). 40 Vt.68: Sturtevant v.Starin R. 606'; Billing v. Pilcher (1847), 7

(1865), 19 Wis. 285. B. Mon. (Ky.) 458, 46 Am. Dec. 523;
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the husband and wife are living apart, somewhat different considerations apply.
If they are living apart because of the wife's misconduct or
default, the husband is ordinarily freed from the liability to
support her. 2
If they are living apart because of the husband 's fault, as
where he has deserted her, driven her away, or rendered her
home an unfit place for her to live, he is usually said to send
his credit with her, and, if she is not otherwise supplied, 3 she
may buy necessaries upon her husband's credit, and of this
right no notice not to supply her can deprive her. 4
s If the wife has other adequate
mean , the rule is said not to apply.
Hunt v. Hayes (1891), 64 Vt. 89, 23
Atl. R. 920, 33 Am. St. R. 917.
4 Car~tens v. Hanselman (1 6), 61
Mich. 126, 28 N. W. R. 159. 1 Arn. St.
R. 606; Billing v. Pilcher (1847), 7
B. Mon. (Ky.) 458, 46 Am. Dec. 523;
169

I Keller v. Phillips (1868), 39 N. Y.
351; Woodward v. Barnes (1871), 43
Vt. 300; McGrath v. Donnelly (1889),
131 Pa. St. 549.
2 Oinson v. Heritage (1873), 45 Ind.
73, 15 Am. R. 258; Brown v. Mudgett
(1868), 40 Vt. 68; Sturtevant v. Starin

(1865), 19 "Wis. 285.

§ 1 5.J

LAW OF SALE.

[BOOK I.

§ 185.] LAW OF SALE. [BOOK I.

If they are living apart by consent, the husband is still under

obligation to support his wife, and if in fact he does sufficiently

supply her, he cannot be further bound; if he does not so sup-

ply her, she may pledge his credit, except where he has made

an allowance agreed upon, which, though insufficient, was still

the consideration upon which he gave his consent to the sep-

arate maintenance. 1

Whoever supplies goods to the wife as necessaries, however,

in the cases herein being considered, must be prepared to show

that the husband had not supplied the wife and that the other

circumstances exist which impose upon him the liability. 2

§ 185. What constitute necessaries. — The term "nec-

essaries " is not one having a precise legal import. It includes

the various articles and' services which are reasonably essen-

tial to the health and comfort of the wife, having regard to

the means of the husband, the station in life, and the style of

living to which the parties are accustomed. Food, drink, cloth-

ing lodo-incr, fuel, washing, medical, surgical and dental serv-

If they are living apart by consent, the husband is still under
obligation to support his wife, and if in fact he does sufficiently
supply her, he cannot be further bound; if he does not so supply her, she may pledge his credit, except where he has made
an allowance agreed upon, which, though insufficient, was still
the consideration upon which he gave his consent to the separate maintenance. 1
Whoever supplies goods to the wife as necessaries, however,
in the cases herein being considered, must be prepared to show
that the husband had not supplied the wife and that the other
circumstances exist which impose upon him the liability. 2
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ice or attendance 3 would probably everywhere be deemed

necessaries ; and so might domestic service under many circum-

stances, 4 and counsel fees where the services of counsel become

necessary for the support or protection of the wife. 5

But money borrowed to procure necessaries would not, at

Mitchell v. Treanor (1852), 11 Ga. 324, 111. 414; Blowers v. Sturtevant, 4

56 Am. Dec. 421; Reynolds v. Sweet- Denio, 46; Breinig v. Meitzler, 23 Pa.

zer (1860), 15 Gray (Mass.), 78; Hultz St. 156; Gill v. Read, 5 R. I. 343; Ben-

v. Gibbs (1870), 66 Pa. St. 360. nett v. OTallon, 2 Mo. 69].

iSee Alley v. Winn (1883), 134 3 Medical services: Mayhew v.

Mass. 77, 45 Am. R. 297; Crittenden Thayer (1857), 8 Gray (Mass.), 172.

v. Schermerhorn (1878), 39 Mich. 661, Dental services would seem to stand

33 Am. R. 440. upon the same reasons. See Gil man

2 The party supplying the wife v. Andrus (1856), 28 Vt. 241; Free-

living apart does so at his peril, and man v. Holmes (1879), 62 Ga. 556.

he must be prepared to show the 4 See Phillips v. Sanchez (1895), 35

facts that make the husband liable. Fla. 187, 17 S. R. 363; Wagner v.

Hare v. Gibson (1876), 32 Ohio St. Nagel (1885), 33 Minn. 348.

33, 30 Am. R. 568 [citing Cartwright 5 See Wilson v. Ford (1868), L. R. 3

v. Bate, 1 Allen, 514 ; Rea v. Durkee, 25 Ex. 63.
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§ 185. - - What constitute necessari es.-The term" necessaries" is not one having a precise legal import. It includes
the various articles ancl' services which are reasonably essential to the health and comfort of the wife, having regard to
the means of the husband, the station in life, and the style of
liYing to which the parties are accustomed. Food, drink, clothing, lodging, fuel, washing, medic~l, surgical and dental service or attendance 3 would probably everywhere be deel.Iled
necessaries; and so might domestic service under many circumstances,4 and counsel fees where the services of counsel become
necessary for the support or protection of the wife. 5
But money borrowed to procure necessaries would not, at
Mitchell v. Treanor (1852), 11 Ga. 324, Ill. 414; Blowers v. St.urtevant. 4
56 Am. Dec. 421; Reynold v. Sweet- Denio, 46; Breinig v. Meitzler, 23 Pa.
zer (1860), 15 Gray (Mass.), 7 ; Hultz St. 156; Gill v. Read, 5 R. I. 343; Benv. Gibbs (1 70), 66 Pa. St. 360.
nett v. O'Fallon, 2 Mo. 69).
I See Alley v. Winn (1883), 134
3 Medical services:
Mayhew v.
fa . . 77, 45 Am. R. 297; Crittenden Thayer (1857), 8 Gray (Mass.), 172.
v. Schermerhorn (1 7 ), 39 Mich. 661, Dental services would seem to stand
33 m. . 440.
upon the same reasons. See Gilman
2 Th
party supplying the wife v. Andrus (1 56), 2 Vt. 241; Freeliving apart does . o at bi peril, and man v. Holme (1 79), 62 Ga. 556.
be mu t be prepar
to how the
4 ee Phillips v. Sanch z (1 95), 35
fa t · t.hat make the hu ·band liable. Fla. 1 7, 17 . R. 363; Wagner v.
Hare v. Gib on (1 76), 32 Ohio t. Nag l (1 5), 33 Minn. 348.
33 30 ru. R. 56 [ ,iting artw ri ht
5 ee "il ·on v. Ford (,1 68), L. R. 3
v. Bate, 1Allen,514; Rea v. Durk e, 25 Ex. 63.
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CH. III.] CAPACITY OF PARTIES. [§ 1S6.

CH. III.]

C.AP .A.CITY OF P .ARTIES.

[" 1 6.

common law, be regarded as a necessary, even though actually

used to buy necessaries. 1

§ 186. Authority of infant child to buy necessaries on par-

ent's credit. — The power of an infant child to buy necessa-

common law, be regarded as a necessary, even though actually
used to buy necessaries. 1

ries upon his parent's credit presents somewhat different con-

siderations. The parent is doubtless under something of a

moral obligation to support his minor children ; and statutes

in many States impose a legal liability under many circum-

stances. But whether, in the absence of a statute, there is

such a legal obligation that it may be made the basis of an ac-

tion by one who has supplied the minor child with necessaries,

is in dispute. Mr. Schouler, for example, concludes that there

is no such legal liability, and that " either an express promise,

or circumstances from which a promise by the father can be

inferred, is essential." 2 In a late case in Iowa, 3 on the other

hand, the legal obligation was recognized and enforced.

If the child resides at home, it is to be presumed that the

father furnishes whatever is necessary and proper for his main-
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tenance; 4 but where the child is absolutely not supplied, though

at home, or is driven from home, or is temporarily away by

his parent's authority and is unsupplied, the liability arises, if

at all. If, on the other hand, the child has voluntarily aban-

doned his home where the parent is ready to supply him, 5 or

is emancipated, 6 the liability does not exist.

i Skinner v. Tirrell (1893), 159 Mass. v. Barrett (1871), 4 Oreg. 171: Mo

471. 34 N. E. R. 692, 38 Am. St. R. 447, Millen v. Lee (1875), 78 III 443; Owen

21 L. R. A. 673. v. White (1837), 5 Port. (Ala.) 435, 30

2 Schouler on Domestic Relations Am. Dec. 572; Bazeley v. Forder

(5th ed.), § 241. (1868), L. R. 3 Q. B. 559, per Cock-

s Porter v. Powell (1890), 79 Iowa, burn, C. J.

151, 44 N. W. R. 295, 18 Am. St. R. Whether the moral obligation will

353, 7 L. R. A. 176. See also Cooper supply consideration for a promise

v. McNamara (1894), 92 Iowa, 243, 60 to pay: Pro, Jordan v. Wright (1885),

N. W. R. 522; Dawson v. Dawson, 12 45 Ark. 237: con, Freeman v. Robin-

Iowa, 513. Contra, Kelley v. Davis son, supra.

(1870), 49 N. H. 187, 6 Am. R. 499; * See Schouler, Dom. Rel., § 241.

Farmington v. Jones (1858), 36 N. H. 5 See Schouler, Dom. Rel., § 241;

271; Gordon v. Potter (1845), 17 Vt. Owen v. White (1837), 5 Port. (Ala.)

348; Freeman v. Robinson (1876), 38 435, 30 Am. Dec. 572.

N. J. L. 383, 20 Am. R. 399; Carney "Schouler, Dom. Rel., § 268, citing
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§ I 6. A nthority of infant child to buy necessaries on parent's credit.- The P°'' er of an infant child to buy nece ari es upon bis parent's credit presents somewhat different considerations. The parent is doubtless under something of a
moral obligation to support his minor children; and statutes
in many tates impose a legal liability under many circumstances. But whether, in the absence of a statute, there is
such a legal obligation that it may be made the basis of an action by one who bas applied the minor child witn necessaries,
is in dispute. }iJr. chouler, for example, concludes that there
is no such legal liability, and that "either an express promise,
or circumstances from which a promise by the father can be
inferred, is essential." 2 In a late case in Iowa, 3 on the other
hand , the legal obligation was recognized and enforced.
If the child resides at home, it is to be presumed that the
father furnishes whatever is neces ary and proper for his maint enance; 4 but where the child is absolutely not supplied, though
at home, or is driven from home or is temporarily away by
bis parent's authority and is un applied, the liability ari es, if
at all. If, on the other hand, the child has voluntarily abandoned his home where the parent is ready to supply him/> or
is emancipated,6 the liability does not exist.
1 kinner v. Tirrell (1 93), 159 Ma . v. Barrett (1 71), 4 Oreg. 171: 1\Ic474 34 N. E. R. 69'), 3 Am. St. R. 447, 1\Iillen v. Lee (1 /.-), 7 Ill. 448; Owen
v. White (1 81 ), 5 Port. (Ala.) 435, 30
21 L. R. A. 673.
2 chou ler on Dome tic Relations Am. Dee. 572; Bazeley v. Ford er
(1 6 ), L. R. 3 Q. B. 559, per Cock(5th ed.), § 241.
burn, C. J.
3 Porter v . Powell (1 90), 79 Iowa,
Whether the moral obligation will
151 44 N. \V. R. 29-, 1 Am. St. R.
353, 7 L. R. A. l 16.
ee _also Cooper supply con ideration for a promise
v. l\'Ic amara (1 94), 92 Iowa, 2-!3, 60 to pay: Pro, Jordan v. Wright (1 3),
N. vV. R. 522; Daw on v. Dawson, 12 45 Ark. 237: con, Freeman v. RobinIowa, 513. Contra, Kelley v. Davi son, S'Upra.
4 See Schouler, Dom. Rel., § 241.
(1 10), 49 N. H. 1 7, 6 Am. R. 499;
5 See Schouler, Dom. Rel.,
241;
Farmington v. J one (1 5 ), 36 N. H.
271; Gorrlon v. Potter (1 4 - ), 17 Vt. Owen v. White (1 37), 5 Port. (Ala.)
43;-, 30 Am. Dec. 572.
34 ; Freeman v. Robin on (1 76), 3
G Schouler, Dom. Rel., § 26 , citing
N. J. L. 3 3, 20 Am. R. 399; Carney
171

§ 1 7.]

LAW 01!' SALE.

[BOOK I .

§ 1ST.] LAW OF SALE. [BOOK I.

Even though there be no legal liability, except upon an ex-

press promise or circumstances from which a promise can be

inferred, the law is very liberal in construing the acts, the ac-

quiescence, the failure to dissent, of the parent into an implied

promise to respond. 1

h. Authority to Buy Conferred by Act of Party.

§ 187. Express authority to buy.— The authority to buy,

like the authority to sell already considered, may be conferred

Even though there be no legal liability, except upon an express promise or circumstances from which a promise can be
inferred, the law is very liberal in construing the acts, the acquiescence, the failure to dissent, of the parent into an implied
promise to respond. 1

expressly and previously, or result from subsequent ratification ;

and the same general principles will apply to its construction.

If the agent has a general power to buy, without restrictions,

he may do all of those incidental things which usually accom-

b. Authority to Buy Conferred by Act of Party.

pany a purchase; as, for example, to agree upon the price and

terms of sale, the time and method of delivery, and the like. 2

He may, however, be lawfully limited by his principal with

respect to quantity, 3 quality, kind or price, 4 or even as to the

persons with whom he shall deal. 5 And, unless these limita-

tions are intended to be secret, third persons, in their dealings
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with him, must observe them. He may, ordinarily, not buy

on credit, 6 unless his principal has failed to supply with him

the necessary funds. 7

Nightingale v. Withington, 15 Mass. quantity of cotton at certain places

272; Corey v. Corey, 19 Pick. 29; and from named parties at a stated

Hollingsworth v. Swedenborg, 49 price. The agent could not fill the

Ind. 378; Varney v. Young, 11 Vt. order at the places named and bought

258; Johnson v. Gibson, 4 E. D. Smith, elsewhere, from the plaintiffs. The

231. defendants repudiated the purchase,

i Schouler, Dom. Rel., § 241. Held, that authority given to a com-

2 See Mechem on Agency, § 365. mission merchant to buy goods at a

3 Mechem on Agency, § 366. certain place and from certain parties

* Mechem on Agency, § 367. did not authorize the purchase at

5 Mechem on Agency, § 368. other places and from other parties.

In Robinson Mercantile Co. v. e Mechem on Agency, § 363.

Thompson (1897), 74 Miss. 847, 21 S. R. In Liddell v. Sahline (1891), 55 Ark.

794, it appeared that defendants tele- 627, 17 S. W. R. 705, appellants were

graphed a cotton buyer, who was not stockholders in a co-operative com-

their regular agent, to buy a certain pany which employed a general

§ 187. Express authority to buy .-The authority to buy,
like the authority to sell already considered, may be conferred
expressly and previously, or result from subsequent ratification~
and the same general principles will apply to its construction.
If the agent has a general power to buy, without restrictions,
he may do all of those incidental things which usually accompany a purchase; as, for example, to agree upon the price and
t erms of sale, the time and method of delivery, and the like. 2
He may, however, be lawfully limited by his principal with
respect to quantity, 3 quality, kind or price,4 or even a.s to the
persons with whom he shall deal. 5 And, unless these limitations are intended to be secret, third persons, in their dealings
with him, must observe them. He may, ordinarily, not buy
on credit, 6 unless his principal has failed to supply with him
the necessary funds. 7

' Mechem on Agency, § 304.
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Nightingale v. Withington, 15 Mass.
272; Corey v. Corey, 19 Pick. 29;
Holling worth v. Swedenborg, 49
Ind. 378; Varney v. Young, 11 Vt.
258; Johnson v. Gibson, 4E. D. Smith,
231.
1 Scbouler, Dom. Rel., § 241.
2 S e Mechem on Agency,. 365.
3 Mechem on Agency, § 366.
4 Meehem on Agency, § 367.
5 lVIechem on Agency, § 368.
In Robinson M rcantile Co. v.
Thompson (1897), 74 Miss. 847, 21 . R.
794, it appeared that d fendant tele·
grapheu a cotton 1 uyer, who wa. not
their regular agent, to buy a certain
7 Mechem

quantity of cotton at certain places
and from named parties at a stated
price. The agent could not fill the
order at the places named and bought
elsewhere, from the plaintiffs. The
defendants repudiated the purchase.
H eld, that authority given to a commission merchant to buy goods at a
certain place and from certain parties
did not authorize the purchase at
other place and from other parties.
6 .Mechem on Agency, § 3613.
In Liddell v. Sahlin (1 91). 55 Ark.
627, 17 . W. R. 705, appellants were
stockh lclers in a co-operative company which employed a general

on Agency, § 304.
172

CH. III.]

CAP.A.CITY OF PARTIES.

[§ 188.

CH. III.]

CAPACITY OF PARTIES.

[§ 188.

Like the agent authorized to sell, the agent authorized to buy

will not be permitted, without the full knowledge and consent

of his principal, to buy of himself, either directly or indirectly ;

or otherwise exercise his authority on his own account. Any

such transaction is voidable at the option of the principal. 1

Such an agent also is, in general, not permitted to delegate

his authority. 2

§ 188. Implied authority to buy. — But authority to buy

may, in many cases, be implied, though it has not been expressly

Like the agent authorized to sell, the agent authorized to buy
will not be permitted, without the full knowledge and consent
of his principal, to buy of himself, either directly or indirectly;
or otherwise exercise bis authority on his own account. Any
such transaction is voidable at the option of the principal.1
Such an agent also is, in general, not permitted. to delegate
his authority. 2

conferred. It may, for example, be found to be a suitable and

necessary incident to some other power which was expressly

given ; as, for example, where one who has been given general

authority to manage a business in which the use of teams was

necessary, was held authorized to buy a team for that purpose. 3

manager with power to buy and sell

goods in accordance with certain
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provisions, which included a limita-

tion upon purchases on credit. The

manager bought on credit beyond

the limit imposed. Held, that though

a general agent has no power to buy

§ 188. Implied authority to buy.-But authority to buy
may, in many cases, be implied, though it has not been expressly
conferred . It may, for example, be found to be a suitable and
necessary incident to some other power which was expressly
given; as, for example, where one who has been given general
authority to manage a business in which the use of teams was
necessary, was held authorized to buy a team for that purpose. 3

on credit, yet if goods are delivered

by plaintiffs without knowledge of

the limitations, they are not bound

by them.

In Welch v. Clifton Mfg. Co. (1899),

55 S. C. 568, 33 S. E. R 739, an agent

for the purchase of cotton bought on

credit. It was claimed he had no

authority. Held, that the manner in

which he had conducted his princi-

pal's business for a long time could

be shown to determine the scope of

his authority; and that the retention

of the goods by the principal after

notice that they were bought on

credit was a ratification.

In Littleton v. Loan, etc. Ass'n

(1895), 97 Ga. 172, 25 S. E. R 826, the

defendants had an agent in another

town whose business it was to buy

and ship cotton to them. His au-

thority to bind his principals was

limited to drawing drafts upon them

in favor of a specified bank, with

bills of lading attached to the drafts,

which the bank, by arrangement

with the principals, cashed so as to

supply the agent with money to pay

for his purchases. The manager of

the plaintiff corporation, knowing

the extent of the authority possessed

by defendant's agent, sold him cotton

and took in payment the agent's in-

dividual check on the bank, which

was dishonored. Held, that the

plaintiff cannot recover from the

manager with power to huy and ell
goods in accordance with certain
provi ions, which included a limitation upon purcha e · on credit. The
manager bought on cr edit beyond
the limit impo ed. H eld, that though
a general agent has no power to buy
on credit, yet if good. are delivered
by plaintiff. without knowledge of
the limitation • they are not bound
by them.
In Welch v. Clifton Mfg. Co. (1899),
55 S. C. 568, 33 S. E. R. 739, an agent
for the purchase of cotton bought on
credit. It was claimed he had no
authority. H eld, that the manner in
which he had conducted his principal busine s for a long time could
be hown to determiue the scope of
his authority; and that the retention
of the goods by the principal a.f ter
notice that they were bought on
credit was a ratification.
In Littleton v. Loan, etc. A. s'n
(1..: 95), 97 Ga. 172, 25 S. E. R. 826, the
defenuants had an agent in another
town whose business it was to buy
and ship cotton to them. His au-

thority to bind his principals was
limited to drawing drafts upon them
in favor of a pecified bank, with
bills of lading attached to the drafts,
which the bank, by arrangement
with the principals, ca hed so a to
supply the agent with money to pay
for hi purcha es. The manager of
the plaintiff corporation, knowing
the extent of the authority po ses ed
by defendant's agent, sold him cotton
and took in payment the agent's individual check on the bank, which
was di honored. H eld, that the
plaintiff cannot recover from the
principal wit.bout showing that he
actually received the goo<ls, and not
even then if the principal had paid
the agent by honoring the agent's
draft.
I Mechem on Agency, § 462; Disbrow v. Secor (1889), 58 Conn. 35, 18
AtL R. 9 1.
2 Mechem on Agency, § 185 et seq.
3See Montgomery Furniture Co. v.
Hardaway (1 93), 104 Ala. 100, 16 S.
R. 29.
In Heald v. Hendy (1891), 89 Cal.

principal without showing that he

actually received the goods, and not

even then if the principal had paid

the agent by honoring the agent's

draft.

1 Mechem on Agency, § 462; Dis-

brow v. Secor (1889), 58 Conn. 35, 18

AtL R. 981.

2 Mechem on Agency, § 185 et seq.

3 See Montgomery Furniture Co. v.
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§ 1 D.J

LAW OF SALE.

[BOOK I.

§ 189.] LAW OF SALE. [BOOK I.

It may be inferred also where it has been openly and notori-

ously exercised without the objection or with the acquiescence

of the principal. 1 Liability for purchases may also be incurred

by one who has either actively or passively caused or permitted

himself to be held out as the principal, 2 and if he were really

principal, he may be liable, though he was not known as such. 3

Authority to buy in these cases is, of course, not an unlim-

ited one; the goods must be suitable to the business as appar-

ently conducted, 4 and there must be nothing so unreasonable in

quantity or terms as to properly put a prudent man upon his

guard.

g 189. Not implied from mere relationship of parties.

But authority to buy is not ordinarily to be inferred from the

mere relationship of the parties. Thus, not speaking now of

the law's authority to buy necessaries, 5 a wife has no implied

power to buy goods generally upon her husband's credit, 6 nor

has the husband power, simply because he is husband, to buy

It may be inferred also where it has b en openly and notoriously exercised without the objection or with the acquiescence
of the principal.1 Liability for purchases may also be incurred
by one who has either actively or pas ively caused or permitted
himself to be held out as the principal,2 and if be were really
princi1 al, he may be liable, though he was not known as such. 3
Authority to buy in these cases is, of course, not an unlimited one; the goods must be suitable to the busi ness as apparently conducted, 4 and there must be nothing so unreasonable in
quantity or terms as to properly put a prudent man upon his
guard.

goods for the wife, or make improvements to her property upon
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her credit. 7 Either may make the other an agent, and it may

§ 189. - - Not implied fro m mere rel ationship of' parties .

be done by implication from acts, as in other cases, but no gen-

eral authority arises merely from the relationship.

The same rules apply also in the case of parent and child. 8

632, 27 Pac. R. 67, the superintendent 124 Pa. St. 291, 10 Am. St. R. 585, 2

of a mine agreed with third persons L. R. A. 823; Watteau v. Fen wick,

that the defendants, the owners of [1893] 1 Q. B. Div. 346; Simpson v.

the mine, would pay for provisions Patapsco Guano Co. (1896), 99 Ga. 168,

furnished to the boarding-house 25 S. E. R. 94; Steele-Smith Grocery

where the miners boarded. Held, Co. v. Potthast (1899), — Iowa, — ,

that where it is necessary to the op- 80 N. W. R. 517. But see Becherer v.

eration of a mine that provisions be Asher (1896), 23 Ont. App. 202.

furnished to a boarding-house where 4 See Wallis Tobacco Co. v. Jackson

the miners live, the superintendent (1892), 99 Ala. 460, 13 S. R. 120.

has power to bind the mine operators 5 Already considered, ante, §§ 182-

for such necessary supplies. 185.

i See Hirschmann v. Iron Range 6 See Mechem on Agency, § 62, and

R. R Co. (1893), 97 Mich. 384, 56 N. W. cases cited.

r # 842. 7 See Mechem on Agency, § 63, and

2 See Feldman v. Shea (1899), — cases cited.

Idaho, — , 59 Pac. R. 537. 8 See Johnson v. Stone, 40 N. H.

» See Hubburd v. Tenbrook (1889), 197, 77 Am. Dec. 706; Bennett v. Gil-
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But authority to buy is not ordinarily to be inferred from the
mere relationship of the parties. Thus, not speaking now of
the law's authority to buy necessaries, 5 a wife has no implied
power to buy goods generally upon her husband's credit, 6 nor
has the husband power, simply because he is husban l, to buy
goods for the ·wife, or make improvements to her property upon
her credit. 7 Either may make the other an agent, arnl it may
be done by implication from acts, as in other cases, but no general authority arises merely from t.he relationship.
The same rules apply also in the case of parent and child. 8
632, 27 Pac. R. 67, the superintimdent
of a mine agreed with third persons
that the defendant , the owners of
the mine, would pay for provisions
furnish cl to the boarding-house
where the miner boarded. R ld,
that wh re it is nece ary to the operation of a mine that provisions be
furnish d to a boa.rding-house where
the miners live, the ·up rintendent
ha p w r to bin i th mine operator
for uch n e ary UI plies.
e ir chmann v. Iron Rang
R. R. o. (1 93), 97 ii h. 3 4, 56 N. vV.

124 Pa. St. 291, 10 Am. t. R. 5 5 2
L. R. A. 823; Watteau v. Fenwick,
[1893] 1 Q. B. Div. 346; Simp on v.
Patapsco Guano Co. (1 96), 99 Ga. 168,
25 S. E. R. 94; teele-Smith Grocery
Co. v. Pottha t (1 99), Iowa, --,

0 N. W.R. 517. But ·ee B cherer v.
Asher (1 96), 23 Ont. App. 202.
4 See Wallis Tobacco Co. v. Jack on
(1 92), 99 la. 460, 13 . R. 190.
5 lr ady con idered, ante, < 1821 5.

g n y,

. 4. .

63, an l

l lman v. h a (1 99), Iuaho, - - 9 Pac. R. 37.
e John on v. ton , 40 N. H.
a See Hubbard v. Ten bro k (1 9), 197, 77 Am. De . 706; Bennet.t v. Gil174
j

CH. III.]

CAP .A.CITY OF PARTIES.

[§§ 190, 191.

CH. III.] CAPACITY OF PAKTIES. [§§ 190, 191.

V.

Sales by Persons Acting- in an Official Capacity.

V.

§ 190. In general.— Something ought also to be said, per-

haps, concerning sales and purchases by persons acting in an

SALES BY PERSONS ACTING IN AN OFFICIAL CAPACITY.

official or ^wa^'-official capacity and by authority of law, rather

than in a private representative capacity and by authority of the

person represented. The full treatment of such cases belongs, of

course, to other treatises, but a few points may not be without

significance here.

§ 191. Authority must be strictly construed. — It may, in

the first place, appropriately be noticed that these official per-

sons derive their authority from the law, which is supposed

always to be open for investigation, and with the terms of

which every person who deals with the officer is presumed to

be familiar. 1 Express grants of power, moreover, are usually

subjected to a strict construction and will be deemed to confer

§ 190. In general.- Something ought also to be said, perhaps, concerning sales and purchases by persons acting in an
official o~ quasi-official capacity and by authority of law, rather
than in a private representative capacity and by authority of the
person represented. The full treatment of such cases belongs, of
course, to other treatises, but a few points may not be without
significance here.

those powers only which are either expressly given or neces-

sarily implied. 2 -The fact that the same act, if done by a pri-
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vate agent, would have been binding upon his principal, is not

conclusive of its validity against the public;, for in the case of

the private agent the full extent of the authority and limita-

tions upon it may be known to the principal and agent alone,

while in the case of the public agent his authority and its lim-

itations are matters of public record with which every one may

make himself acquainted. 3

lette, 3 Minn. 423, 74 Am. Dec. 774; Moines, 19 Iowa. 199, 87 Am. Dec.

Sequin v. Peterson, 45 Vt, 255, 12 Am. 423; Wallace v. Mayor, 29 Cal. 181;

R 194; Hall v. Harper, 17 111. 82; Sutro v. Pettit, 74 Cal. 332, 5 Am. St.

Swartwout v. Evans, 37 111. 442; R. 442; Day Land & Cattle Co. v.

Burnham v. Holt, 14 N. H. 367. State, 68 Tex. 526; Tamm v. Lavalle,

i Mechem on Public Officers, § 506, 92 111. 263.

citing Mayor of Baltimore v. Esch- -Mechem on Public Officers, §§ 511,

bach, 18 Md. 282; Mayor of Baltimore 830; Green v. Beeson, 31 Ind. 7; Vose

v. Reynolds, 20 Md. 1, 83 Am. Dec. v. Deane, 7 Mass. 280; The Floyd Ac-

535; State v. Hays, 52 Mo. 578; State ceptances, 74 U. S. (7 Wall.) 666.

v. Bank, 45 Mo. 528: Lee v. Munroe, 3 Mechem on Public Officers, § 512;

11 U. S. (7 Cranch), 366; Clark v. Des Mechem on Agency, § 292; Mayor of

175

§ 191. Authority must be trictly construed.-It may, in
the first place, appropriately be noticed that these official persons derive their authority from the law, which is supposed
al ways to be open for investigation, and with the terms of
which every person who deals with the officer is presumed to
be familiar. 1 Express grants of power, mor over, are usually
subjected to a strict construction and will be deemed to confer
those powers only which are either expressly gi \Ten or necessarily implied. 2 The fact that the same act, if done by a private agent, would have been binding upon his principal, is not
conclusive of its validity against the public;... for in the case of
the private agent the full extent of the authority and limitations upon it may be known to the principal and agent alone,
while in the case of the public agent his authority and its limitations are matters of public record with which every one ma.y
make himself acquainted. 3
lette, 3 . Minn. 423, 74 Am. Dec. 774; Moines, 19 Iowa, 199, 87 Am. Dec.
Sequin v. Peterson, 45 Vt. 255, 12 Am. 423; Wallace v. Mayor, 29 Cal. 181;
R. 194; Hall v. Harper, 17 Ill. 2; Sutro v. Pettit, 74 Cal. -332, 5 Am. St.
Swartwout v. Evan , 37 Ill. 4±2; R. 442; Day Land & Cattle Co. v.
Burnham v. Holt, 14 N. H. 367.
State, 68 Tex. 526; Tamm v. Lavalle,
1 Mechem on Public Officers, . 506, 99 Ill. 263.
citing Mayor of Baltimore v. Eschi fochem on Public Offi cers, §~ 511,
bach, 18 Md. 282; Mayor of Baltimore
30; Green v. Bee on, 31 Incl. 7; Vo e
v. Reynolds, 20 Md. 1, 83 Am. Dec. v. Deane, 7 Mass. 2 0; The Floyd Ac535; State v. Hays, 52 Mo. 578; State ce1 tances, 74 U. S. (7 Wall.) 666.
v. Bank, 45 Mo. 528; Lee v. Munroe,
3 fechem on Public Officer , § 512;
11 U. S. (7 Cranch), 366; Clark v. De l\fec hem on Agency,§ 292; Mayor of
175

§§ 192- 194.J

[_BOOK I.

LAW OF SALE.

§§ 192-194.] LAW OF SALE. [BOOK I.

If the law requires particular formalities, the officer, in his

acts, must observe them ; l if precedent conditions are prescribed

they must be complied with; 2 and generally the officer can

bind the public only while acting strictly within the scope of

his authority as created, conferred and deQned by law. 3

§ 192. Officer must keep within the term and territory of

his office. — It is evident also that the officer must keep within

If the law requires particular formalities, the officer, in his
acts, must observe them; 1 if precedent conditions are prescribed
they must be complied with; 2 and generally the officer can
bind the public only while acting strictly within the scope of
his authority as created, conferred and de.Qncd by law. 3

the territorial limits to which by law his authority extends,

and that when he goes beyond such limits his official character

and his official authority must be left behind. 4 It will likewise

be evident that his authority must be limited in its exercise to

that term or period during which he is by law invested with

official character. 5

§ 193. Officer cannot deal with himself. — It is a rule of

inflexible application that the public like the private agent shall

not, without the full and intelligent consent of his principal,

deal with himself on his principal's account, or exercise his

authority for his own profit or advantage. Without such knowl-
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edge and consent, therefore, an agent authorized to sell prop-

erty for his principal cannot sell to himself; an agent author-

ized to buy for his principal cannot buy of himself; and an

§ 192. Officer must keep within the term and territory of
his office.- It is evident also that the officer must keep within
the territorial limits to which by law his authority extends,,
and that when he goes beyond such limits his official character
and his official authority must be left behind. 4 It will likewise
be eviden t that his authority must be limited in its exercise to
that term or period during which he is by law invested with
official character. 5

agent authorized to buy or sell for his principal cannot buy or

sell for himself. 6

This rule applies in all its force to such public or quasi-public

officers as administrators, executors, guardians, sheriffs, trustees,

judges of probate, county treasurers, and the like. 7

§ 194. Purchases at execution, tax and other similar

sales. — The principles above referred to find constant illus-

Baltimore v. Eschbach, 18 Md. 282; <See Mechem on Public Officers,

Mayor of Baltimore v. Reynolds. 20 § 508.

Md. 1,83 Am. Dec. 535; State v.Hays, 5 See Mechem on Public Officers,

52 Mo. 578. §§ 509, 510.

i Mechem on Public Officers, § 831. 6 See Mechem on Agency, §§ 454-

2 Mechem on Public Officers, §833. 472; Mechem on Public Officers,

3 Mechem on Public Officers, § 834. §§ 839, 840.

7 Mechem on Public Officers, § 810.
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§ 193. Officer cannot deal with bimself.-It is a rule of
inflexible application that the public like the private agent shall
not, without the full and intelligent consent of his principal,
<leal with bimself on his principal's account, or exercise his
authority for his own profit or ad vantage. Without such knowledge and consent, therefore, an agent authorized to sell property for his principal cannot sell to himself; an agent authorized to buy for his principal cannot buy of himself; and an
agent authorized to buy or sell for his principal cannot buy or
sell for himself. 6
This rule applies in all its force to such public or quasi-public
officers as administrators, executors, guardians, sheriffs, trustees,
judges of probate, county treasurers, and the like.7

§ 194:. Purchases at execution, tax and other similar
sal es.-The principles above referred to find constant illusBaltimore v. Eschbach, 18 Md. 282;
Mayor of Baltimore v. Reynold , 20
l\fd. 1, 3 Am. Dec. 535; State v. Hays,
50 Mo. 57 .
I 1echem on Public Officers, § 31.
2 Mechem on Public Officers, § 33.
a Mechem on Public Officer , § 834.

4 See

Mechem on Public Officers,

§ 508.
5 See

l\fechem on Public Officer ,

§§ 509, 510.
6 See Mechem on Agency, §§ 454472; Mechem on Public Officers,
§ 39 40.
7 Mechem on Public Officers,§ 840.
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CH. III.]
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[§ 195.

CH. III.] CAPACITY OF PARTIES. [§ 195.

tration in the case of sales made upon execution and other sim-

ilar writs. A sale made under such a lien, it is said, 1 " can ordi-

narily transfer no interest beyond that in fact held by the

defendant when the lien attached, or acquired by him subse-

quently thereto, and before the sale. It is the duty of the

purchaser to satisfy himself, prior to the purchase, respecting

the title of the defendant and the sufficiency of the proceedings

to transfer it, for the maxim of caveat emptor is unquestionably

applicable both to judicial and to execution sales. The title

acquired by a purchaser, even when the proceedings are valid,

is that only to which he would succeed by a conveyance from

the defendant in the writ made either at the time of the sale

where it is nut supported by any antecedent lien, otherwise at

the date of the attaching of such lien. If one not a party to

the suit has an interest in the property, an execution sale will

not defeat it, though such property was levied upon while in

his possession."

The same rule applies to tax sales. " The rule caveat emptor
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applies to the purchaser. He takes all the risks of his pur-

chase, and if he finds in any case that he has secured neither

the title he bid for, nor any equitable claim against the owner,

the State may, if it see fit, make reparation itself ; but it has no

more authority to compel the owner of the land to do so than

to exercise the like compulsion against any other person." 2

No guaranty, moreover, is ordinarily available by the pur-

chaser; for neither the officer, 3 nor the public which he repre-

sents, 4 impliedly warrants the validity of the title which he

assumes to convey.

§ 195. Purchases at executors', administrators' .and

guardians' sales. — Like general principles apply to sales by

executors and administrators in many States. For while, at

common law, the representative took such title to the personal

estate of the decedent that he might, in many cases, transfer

1 Freeman on Executions (3d ed.), 3 Cooley on Taxation (2d ed.), p. 476,

§ 335. nota

2 Cooley on Taxation (2d ed.), p. 553. * Cooley on Taxation (2d ed.), p. 818.
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tration in the case of sales made upon execution and other similar writs. A sale made under such a lien, it is said, 1 "can ordinarily transfer no interest beyond that in fact held by tbe
defendant when the lien attached, or acquired by him subsequently thereto, and before the sale. It is the duty of the
purchaser to sati fy hi1pself, prior to the purchase, respecting
the title of the defendant and the sufficiency of the proceedings
to transfer it, for the maxim of caveat emptor is unquestionably
applicable both to judicial and to execution sales. The title
acquired by a purchaser, even when the proceedings are valid,
is that only to which be would succeed by a conveyance from
the defendant in the 'vrit made either at the time of the sale
where it is nut supported by any antecedent lien, otherwise at
the date of the attaching of such lien. If one not a party to
the suit has an interest in the property, an execution sale will
not defeat it, though such property was levied upon while in
his po session."
The same rule applies to tax sales. "The rule caveat emptor
applies to the purchaser. He takes all the ri ks of his purchase, and if he finds in any case that he has secured neither
the title he bid for, nor any equitable claim against the owner,
the State may, if it see fit, make reparation it elf; but it has no
more authority to compel the owner of the land to do so than
to exercise the like compulsion against any ot~er person." 2
No guaranty, moreover, is ordinarily available by the purchaser; for neither the officer, 3 nor the public which he represents,4 impliedly warrants the validity of the title which he
assumes to convey.

§ 195. Purchases at executors', administrators' and
guardians' sales.- Like general principles apply to sales by
executors and administrators in many States. For while, at
common law, the representative took such title to the personal
estate of the decedent that he might, in many cases, transfer
3 Cooley on Taxation (2d ed.), p. 476,
note.
·
2 Cooley on Taxation (2d ed.), p. 553.
4 Cooley on Taxation (2d ed.), p. 818.
12
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Freeman on Executions (3d ed.),

§ 335.

§ 196.J

LA. W OF SALE.

[BOOK I.

§ 196.] LAW OF SALE. [BOOK I.

an unimpeachable title to a "bona fide purchaser, even though

he made himself liable to the persons interested in the estate,

as for a devastavit, the power of the representative in many

States is now so limited by statute that the purchaser must be-

ware, and an unauthorized sale will transfer no title. 1

And so in the case of the guardian. "No doubt is enter-

tained," it is said, 2 " of the competency of a guardian's power

over the disposition of the personal estate, as between him and

a bona fide purchaser, unless restrained by statute. Although

the guardian is liable on his bond for any abuse of this power,

yet the vendee takes a good title if he has no notice of the

guardian's fraud. » . But many States have enacted stat-

utes avoiding all sales of a ward's property by the guardian

if made without order of court, whether the purchaser have

knowledge or not that such property belongs to a ward. In

such case, if a guardian sell without authority, the sale is void-

able at the option of the ward on reaching majority."

§ 196. Sales by trustees.— Doctrines of like general char-
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acter apply to sales by trustees. " It is a universal rule," it is

said, 3 u that if a man purchases property of a trustee, with no-

tice of the trust, he shall be charged with the same trust, in

respect to the property, as the trustee from whom he pur-

chased. And even if he pays a valuable consideration, with

notice of the equitable rights of a third person, he shall hold

the property subject to the equitable interests of such person.

Of course, a mere volunteer, or person who takes the property

without paying a valuable consideration, will hold it charged

an unimpeachable title to a bona fide purchaser, even though
be made himself liable to the persons interested in the estate,
as for a devastavit, the power of the representative in many
States is now so limited by statute that the purchaser must beware, and an unauthorized sale will transfer no title. 1
And so in the case of the guardian. "No doubt is entertained," it is said,2 "of the competency of a guardian's power
over the disposition of the personal estate, as between him and
a bona fide purchaser, unless restrained by statute. Although
the guardian is liable on bis bond for any abuse of this power,
yet the vendee takes a good title if he has no notice of the
guardian's fraud.
But many States have enacted statutes avoiding all sales of a ward's property by the guardian
if made without order of court, whether the purchaser have
knowledge or not that such property belongs to a ward. In
such case, if a guardian sell without authority, the sale is voidable at the option of the ward on reaching majority."

with all the trusts to which it is subject, whether he have notice

or not; for in such case no wrong or pecuniary loss can fall

upon him in compelling him to execute the trust to which the

property that came to him without consideration was subject."

" Of course," it is further said, 4 "the opposite proposition is

also true, that a purchaser for a valuable consideration, with-

1 See the subject fully discussed in 2 Woerner on Guardianship, p. 179.

Woerner on Administration (2d eel.), 3 Perry on Trusts (5th ed.), § 217.

§ 331. 4 Perry on Trusts, § 218.
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§ 196. Sales by trustees.- Doctrines of like general character apply to sales by trustees. "It is a universal rule," it is
said, 3 •'that if a man parchas s property of a trustee, with notice of the trust, he shall be charged with the same trust, in
respect to the property, as the trustee from whom he purchased. And even if he pays a valuable consideration, with
notice of the equitable rights of a third person, he shall hold
the property subject to the equitable interests of such person .
Of course, a mere volu nteer, or person who takes the property
without paying a valuable consideration, wiJl hold it charged
with all the trusts to which it is subject, whether lie /i,ave notice
or not; for in such case no wrong or pecuniary loss can fall
upon him in compelling him to execute the trust to which the
property that came to him without consiueration was subject.'
"Of course," it is further said, 4 "the opposite proposition is
also true, that a purchaser for a valuable consideration, with1 See the subject fully di cu ed in
Woerner on Admiui tration (2d ed.),
§ 331.
178

2 W oern

r on Guardianship, p. 179.
Perry on Trusts (5th ed.), B217.
4 Perry on Trusts, §' 218.
3
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CAP .A.CITY OF PARTIES.

[§ 196.

CH. III.] CAPACITY OF PARTIES. [§ 196.

out actual or constructive notice of the trust, holds the prop-

erty discharged of the interest of the cestui que trust." But

to constitute one such a purchaser, " he must show an actual

eonveyance, and not merely an agreement for a conveyance;

and it must be shown that the consideration named in the

deed was paid in good faith;" while "notice must be posi-

tively and affirmatively denied, and not evasively or inferen-

tiaily."*

1 Perry on Trusts, § 219.
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-out actual or constru0tive notice of the trust, holds the prop-erty discharged of the interest of the cestui qite trust." But
to constitute one such a purchaser "he must show an actual
conveyance, and not m rely an agreement for a conveyance;
R.nd it must be shown that the consideration named in the
.deed was paid in good faith;" while "notice must be positively and affirmatively denied, and not evasively or inferentially." l
l

Perry on Trusts, § 219.
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CHAPTEK IV.

OF THE THING SOLD — WHAT MAY BE BOUGHT AND SOLD.

§ 197. What may be sold.

# 198. No present sale until chattel

ascertained.

199. Thing sold must be in exist-

ence.

CHAPTER IV.

§ 200, 201. Things potentially in ex-

istence.

202. Things not yet acquired by

vendor.

OF THE THING SOLD- WHAT MAY BE BOUGHT AND SOLD.

203. Sales for future delivery.

§ 197. What may be sold. — Sale has been seen to be, in

substance, the transfer of the absolute title to a chattel for a

price. Who may sell, has already been considered. Attention

will now be given to the consideration of what, in general,

may be the subject-matter of a sale. The question at present

will not be what sales are valid under particular circumstances,

§ 197. What may be sold.
1 198.

No present sale until chattel
a scertained.
199. Thing sold must be in existence.

§ 200, 201. Things potentially in existence.
202. Things not yet acquired by
vendor.
203. Sales for future deli very.

but, what things in general may be sold. And for this chap-
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ter, the subject will be considered without reference to the re-

§ 197. What may be sold.- Sale has been seen to be, in

quirements of the statute of frauds — a matter reserved for a

later chapter. 1

Starting, then, with the simplest form, the general rule may

be said to be that anything of value then belonging to the seller

and actually or potentially in existence may be made the sub-

ject-matter of a sale. It is not necessary, it has been said, 2

" that the subject of sale should have a physical and corporeal

existence and be susceptible of manual delivery; for, provided

it have an actual value, however intangible it may be, it may

nevertheless be sold. 3 Thus, a license to manufacture patented

machines, 4 or a copyright to print and sell a manuscript, even

of as incorporeal a substance as poetry or metaphysics, may be

sold." 5

So, also, the good-will of a business, whether conducted by a

1 See post, § 329 et seq. 4 Citing Brooks v. Byam (1843), 2

2 Story on Sale (4th ed.), § 187. Story, C. C. 525, 4 Fed. Cas., p. 261.

3 Citing Pothier, Contrat de Vente, 5 Citing 2 Blackstone, Com. 405-408-

No. 6. and notes.
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substance, t1e transfer of the absolute title to a chattel for a
price. Who may sell, has already been considered. Attention
will now be given to the consideration of what, in general,
may be the subject-matter of a sale. The question at present
will not be what sales are valid under particular circumstances,
but, what things in general may be sold. And for this chapter, the subject will be considered without reference to the requirements of the statute of frauds - a matter reserved for a
later chapter. 1
Starting, then, with the simplest form, the general rule may
be said to be that anything of value th en belonging to the seller
and actually or potentially in existence may be made the subject-matter of a sale. It is not necessary, it bas been said, 2
"that the subject of sale should
haveI a physical and corporeal
.
existence and be susceptible of manual delivery; for, provided
it have an actual value, however intangible it may be, it may
nevertheless be sold. 3 Thus, a license to manufacture patented
machines,t or a copyright to print and sell a manuscript, even
of as incorporeal a substance as poetry or metaphysics, may be
sold." 5
So, also, the good-will of a business, whether conducted by a.
post, § 329 et seq.
4 Citing Brooks v. Byam (1 43), 2
on Sa.le (4th ed.), § 187.
Story, C. C. 525, 4 Fed. Cas., p. 261.
3 Citing Pothier, Contrat de Vente,
a Citing 2 Blackstone, Com. 405-408.
No. 6.
aml notes.
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2 Story
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[§§ 19 ' 109.

€H. IV.] OF THE THING SOLD. [§§ 198, 199.

single individual ! or a partnership; 2 the good- will of a news-

paper route ; 3 a trade-mark ; 4 or, in some cases, a seat in a stock

exchange or board of trade, 5 may be made the subject of a sale.

As stated in one case, 6 "a mere privilege may be the subject

of sale, if the purchaser is willing to run the risk of failing to

enjoy it."

Passing next more fully into details, it may be noticed that —

§ 198. No present sale until thing to be sold is ascer-

tained. — In order that there may be a present sale, it is the

first requisite, so far as the subject-matter of the sale is con-

cerned, that the thing sold shall be ascertained and agreed upon

by the parties. This rule, " that the parties must be agreed as

single individual 1 or a partnership; 2 the good-will of a newspaper route; 3 a trade-mark; 4 or, in some ca es, a seat in a stock
exchange or board of trade,5 may be made the subject of a sale.
As stated in one case, 6 "a mere privilege may be the subject
of sale, if the purchaser is willing to run the risk of failing to
enjoy it."
Passing next more fully into details, it may be noticed that-

to the specific goods on which the contract is to attach before

there can be a bargain and sale, is one that is founded on the

§ 198. No present sale until thing to be sold is ascer·

very nature of things." 7

There may, of course, be contracts for the sale of goods not

yet ascertained, as where the kind of goods is described, or

manifested by sample, while the " individuality of the thing to
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be delivered" is left for subsequent determination; and many

important rules are hereafter to be dealt with in connection

with such " subsequent appropriation," as it is called. 8 The

point here to be emphasized is, that the title to a chattel cannot

pass until the identity of that chattel has been determined.

§ 199. Must be a thing in existence to be sold. — It is

equally obvious that there can be no present sale where there

is nothing existing to be sold. Parties may undoubtedly, as

will be seen in a later section, contract for the future sale of

an article not yet acquired or not yet in existence, but a pres-

ent transfer of the title to that which is not, is clearly an im-

i Tweed v. Mills (1865), L. R. 1 Com. Cal. 254; Hyde v. Woods (1876), 94

PI. 39. U. S. 523, 24 L. ed. 264; In re Werder

2 See Mechem's Elem. of Partner- (1883), 15 Fed. R. 789; Barclay v.

ship, £§ 87-89, and cases cited. Smith (1883), 107 111. 349, 47 Am. R.

3 Hathaway v. Bennett (1854), 10 437; Thompson v. Adams (1880), 93

N. Y. 108, 61 Am. Dec. 739. Pa. St. 55; Pancoast v. Gowen, id. 66.

4 Warren v. Thread Co. (1883), 134 b Hathaway v. Bennett, supra.

Mass. 247. 7 Blackburn on Sale, p. 124.

5 See Clute v. Loveland (1885), 68 8 See post, %% 721-752.
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tained.-In order that there may be a present sale, it is the
first requisite, so far as the subject-matter of the sale is con-0erne I, that the thing solcl shall be ascertained and agreed upon
by the parties. This rule, "that the parties must be agreed as
to the specific goods on which the contract is to attach before
there can be a bargain and sale, is one that is founded on the
very nature of things." 7
There may, of course, be contracts/or the sale of goods not
yet ascertained, as where the kind of goods is described, or
manifested by sample, while the "individuality of the thing to
be delivered" is left for subsequent determination; and many
important rules are hereafter to be dealt with in connection
with such "subsequent appropriation," as it is called. 8 The
point here to be emphasized is, that the title to a chattel cannot
pass until the identity of that chattel has been determined.

§ 199. Must be a thing in existence to be sold.- It is
equally obvious that there can be no present sale where there
is nothing existing to be sold. Parties may undoubtedly, as
will be seen in a later section, contract for the future sale of
an article not yet acquired or not yet in existence, but a present transfer of the title to that which is not, is clearly an im1 Tweed v. Mills (1865), L. R. 1 Com. Cal. 254; Hyde v. Woods (1 16), 94
Pl. 39.
U. S. 523, 24 L. ed. 264; In re Werder
2 See Mechem's Elem. of Partner- (1 3), 15 Fed. R. 789; Barclay v.
Smith (1888), 107 Ill 349, 47 Am. R.
ship, !:S§ 87-89, and cases cited.
3 Hatha"vay v. Bennett (1854), 10 437; Thompson v. Adams (18 0), 93
N. Y. 10, 61 Am. Dec. 739.
Pa. St. 55; Pancoast v. Gowen, id. 66.
0 Hathaway v. Bennett, supra.
4 Warren v. Threarl. Co. (1 3), 134
7 Black burn on Sale, p. 124.
Ia . 247.
B See post, §§ 721-752.
ii See Clute v. Loveland (1885), 6
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§ 109.J

LAW OF SALE.

[BOOK I.

199.]

LAW OF SALE.

[book r.

possibility. Hence, if at the time of the negotiation the thing

contemplated had, contrary to the belief of the parties, never

had any existence, or if it had, contrary to their belief, already

ceased to exist, there is clearly no sale. 1 This rule, as is said

by Mr. Benjamin, 2 is " sometimes treated in the decisions as

dependent on an implied warranty by the vendor of the exist-

ence of the thing sold; sometimes on the want of considera-

tion for the purchaser's agreement to pay the price. Another,

and perhaps the true ground, is rather that there has been no

contract at all, for the assent of the parties, being founded on

a mutual mistake of fact, was really no assent; there was no

subject-matter for a contract, and the contract was therefore

never completed." Mr. Benjamin cites also Pothier, 3 who says :

" There must be a thing sold, which forms the subject of the

i Strickland v. Turner, 7 Ex.208;

Hastie v. Couturier, 9 Ex. 102; Em-
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erson v. European, etc. Ry. Co., 67

Me. 387, 24 Am. R. 39; Dexter v. Nor-

ton, 47 N. Y. 62, 7 Am. R. 415.

In Gibson v. Pelkie, 37 Mich. 380,

where the parties were dealing in

possibility. Hence, if at the time of the negotiation the thing
contemplated bad, contrary to the belief of the parties, never
had any existence, or if it had, contrary to their belief, already
ceased to exist, there is clearly no sale. 1 This rule, as is said
by Mr. Benjamin,2 is "sometimes treated in the decisions as
dependent on an implied warranty by the· vendor of the existence of the thing sold; sometimes on the want of consideration foe the purch~ser's agreement to pay the price. Another,
an<l perhaps the true ground, is rather that there has been no
contract at all, for the assent of the parties, being founded on
a mutual mistake of fact, was really no assent; there was no
subject-matter for a· contract, and the contract was therefore
never completed." Mr. Benjamin cites also Pothier, 3 who says:
"There must be a thing sold, which forms the subject of the

reference to a judgment which in

fact did not exist, Graves, J., said:

"There was no subject-matter. The

parties supposed there was a judg-

ment, and negotiated and agreed

on that basis, but there was none.

Where they assumed there was

substance there was no substance.

They made no contract, because the

thing they supposed to exist, and the

existence of which was indispensa-

ble to the institution of the contract,

had no existence." Citing Allen v.

Hammond, 11 Pet. (U. S.) 63; Suydam

v. Clark, 2 Sandf. (N. Y.) 133; Gove

v. Wooster, Lalor's SuppL (N. Y.) 30;

Smidt v. Tiden, L. R. 9 Q. B. 446;

Couturier v. Hastie, 5 H. L. 673;

Hazard v. New England Ins. Co., 1

Sumn. (U. S. C. C.) 218; Silvernail v.

Cole, 12 Barb. (N. Y.) 685; Sherman

•?. Barnard, 19 Barb. (N. Y.) 291.

2 Benjamin on Sales, § 77.

3 Contrat de Vente, No. 4.

In Bates v. Smith, 83 Mich. 347, 47

N. W. R. 249, Long. J., says: "It is

essential to the validity of every ex-

ecuted contract of sale that there

should be a thing or subject-matter

to be contracted for. And if it ap-

pears that the subject-matter of a

contract was not and could not have

been in existence at the time of such

contract, the contract itself is of no

effect, and may be disregarded by

either party. Strickland v. Turner,

7 Exch. 208; Hastie v. Couturier, 9

id. 102, 5 H. L. Cas. 673; Franklin v.

Long. 7 Gill & J. (Md.) 407. A

mere possibility or contingency, not

founded upon a right or coupled with

an interest, cannot be a subject of a

present sale, though it may be of an

executory agreement to selL Purcell

v. Mather, 35 Ala. 570; Low v. Pew,

108 Mass. 347, 11 Am. R. 357. Though

I Strickland v. Turner, 7 Ex. 208;
Hastie v. Couturier, 9 Ex. 102; Emerson v. European, etc. Ry. Co., 67
Me. 387, 24 Am. R. 39; Dexter v. N Orton, 47 N. Y. 62, 7 Am. R. 415.
In Gibson v. Pelkie, 37 Mich. 380,
where the parties were dealing in
reference to a judgment which in
fact did not exist, Graves, J., said:
"There was no subject-matter. The
parties supposed there was a judgment, and negotiated and agreed
on that basis, but there was none.
Where they assumed there was
substance there was no substance.
They maJ.e no contract, beca.use the
thing they supposed to exi:;t, and the
existence of which was indispensable to the institution of the contract,
had no exi tence." Citing Allen v.
Hammond, 11 Pet. (U.S.) 63; Suydam
v. Clark, 2 Sandf. (N. Y.) 133; Gove
v. Woo t r, Lalor's Suppl. (_ . Y.) 30;
Smidt v. Tiden, L. R. 9 Q. B. 446;
Couturi r v. Ha ti , 5 H. L. 673;
Hazard v. N w ngland In . ., 1
Sumo. (U. . . C.) 21 ; 'ilvernail v.
Cole, 12 Barb. (N. Y.) 6
h rman
"Y· Barnard, 19 Barb. (N. Y.) 291.
2 Benjamin on Sales, § 77.

3 Contrat de Vente, No. 4.
In Bates v. Smith, 83 Mich. 347, 47
N. W. R. 249, Long. J., says: "It is
essential to the validity of every executed contract of sale that there
should be a thing or subject-matter
to be contracted for. And if it appears that the subject-matter of a
contract was not and could not have
been in existence at the time of such
contract, the contract itself is of no
effect, and may be disregarded by
either party. Strickland v. Turner,
7 Exch. 208; Hastie v. Couturier, 9
id. 102, 5 H. L. Ca . 673; Franklin v.
Long, 7 Gill & J. (Md.) 407. A
mere possibility or contingency, not
founded upon a right or coupled with
an interest, cannot be a ubject of a.
present sale, though it may be of an
executory agreement to sell. Purcell
v. Mather, 35 Ala. 570; Low v. Pew,.
108 lVfa . 347, 11Am.R.357. Though
the ubje t-matt r of the agreement.
has neither an n. tual nor potential
exi t nee, su ·h an agreement is usually denomin:Lted an executory contract, and for its violation the remedy
of the party injured is by an action
to recover the damages. Hutchinson
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contract. If, then, ignorant of the death of my horse, I sell it,

there is no sale, for want of a thing sold. For the same reason,

if, when we are together in Paris, I sell you my house at Or-

leans, both being ignorant that it has been wholly or in great

part burnt down, the contract is null, because the house, which

was the subject of it, did not exist; the site and what is left of

the house are not the subject of our bargain, but only the

remainder of it."

§ 200. Things potentially in existence.— A valid sale, how-

ever, may be made of a thing which, though not yet actually

in existence, is reasonably certain to come into existence as the

natural increment, probable result or usual incident of some-

thing already in existence, and then belonging to the vendor,

contract. If, then, ignorant of the death of my horse, I sell it,
there is no saie, for want of a thing sold. For the same reason,
if, when we are together in Paris, I sell you my house at Orieans, both being ignorant that it has been wholly or in great
part burnt down, the contract is null, because the house, which
was the subject of it, did not exist; the site and what is left of
the house are not the subject of our bargain, but only the
remainder of it."

and the title will vest in the buyer the moment the thing comes

into existence. 1 Things of this nature are said to have a potential

existence. 2 " It is frequently held," says Peters, J., 3 " that a man

may sell property of which he is potentially but not actually

possessed. He may make a valid sale of the wine that a vine-
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yard is expected to produce; or the grain a field may grow in

a given time; or the milk a cow may yield during a coming

year; or the wool that shall thereafter grow upon sheep; or

what may be taken at the next cast of a fisherman's net; 4 or

fruits to grow ; or young animals not yet in existence ; 5 or the

v. Ford, 9 Bush (Ky.). 318, 15 Am. R 4 This illustration of the next cast

711; Pierce v. Emery, 32 N. H. 484." of a fisherman's net, though a com-

But see Dickey v. Waldo, 97 Mich, mon one (see Benjamin on Sales,

255, 23 L. R. A. 449. § 84), is not accurate. Low v. Pew,

1 Low v. Pew, supra; Emerson v. -supra.

European, etc. Ry. Co., 67 Me. 387, 24 * A contract that all the colts to be

Am. R. 39; Cutting Packing Co. v. foaled by certain mares sold by A to

Packers' Exchange, 86 Cal. 574. 21 B, and kept in A's stables under Bs

Am. St, R. 63, 25 Pac. R 52; Arques care, were to belong to B, is a valid

v. Wasson, 51 Cal. 620, 21 Am. R 718; contract of sale, and not void as

Dickey v. Waldo, supra. against creditors for want of deliv-

2 " Things have a potential exist- ery. Hull v. Hull, 48 Conn. 250, 40

ence which are the natural product Am. R 165. Plaintiff's mare having

or expected increase of something been served by defendant's stallion,

already belonging to the vendor." plaintiff executed a written agree-

§ 200. Things potentially in existence.- A valid sale, however, may be made of a thing which, though not yet actually
in existence, is reasonably certain to come into existence as tbe
natural increment, probable result or usual incident of something already in existence, and then belonging to the vendor,
and the title will vest in the buyer the moment the thing comes
into existence. 1 Things of this nature are said to have a potential
existence. 2 "It is frequently held," says Peters, J., 3 "that a man
may sell property of which he is potentially but not actually
possessed. He may make_a valid sale of the wine that a vineyard is expected to produce; or the grain a field may grow in
a given time; or the milk a cow may yield during a coming
year; or the wool that shall thereafter grow upon sheep; or
what may be taken at the next cast of a fisherman's net; 4 or
fruits to grow; or young animals not yet in existence; 5 or the

Hutchinson v. Ford, supra. ment to pay defendant $20 in twelve

8 In Emerson v. Railway Co., supra, months if the mare proved with foal,
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v. Ford, 9 Bush (Ky.). 318, 15 Am. R.
711; Pierce v. Emery, 32 N. H. 484."
But see Dickey v. Waldo, 97 1\licb.
255, 23 L. R. A. 449.
1 Low v. Pew, supra; Emerson v.
European, etc. Ry. Co., 67 Me. 387, 24
Am. R. 39; Cutting Packing Co. v.
Packers' Exchange, 86 Cal. 574, 21
Am. St. R. 63, 25 Pac. R. 52; Arques
v. Wasson, 51 Cal. 620, 21 Am. R. 71 ;
Dickey v. Waldo, supra.
2 "Things have a potential existence which are the natural product
or expected increase of something:.
already belonging to the vendor."
Hutchinson v. Ford, supra.
a In Emerson v. Rail way Co., supra.

This illustration of the nex t cast
of a :fisherman's net, though a common one (see Benjamin on Sales,
§ 4), is not accurate. Low v. Pew,
4

·supra.
;; A contract that all the colts to be
foaled by certain mares sold by A to
B, and kept in A's stables under B"s
care, were to belong to B, is a valid
contract of sale, and not void as
against creditors for want of delivery. Hull v. Hull, 48 Conn. 250, 40
Am. R. 165. Plaintiff's mare having
been served hy defendant's sta.llion,
plaintiff executed a written agreement to pay defendant $20 in twelve
months if the mare proved with foal,
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good-will of a trade, and the like. 1 The thing sold, however,

must be specific and identified; it must be, for instance, the

product of a particular vineyard or field, or the wool from a

particular sheep. These must also be owned at the time by

the vendor. A person cannot sell the products of a field which

"colt holden for payment." Held,

good-will of a trade, and the like. 1 The thing sold, however,
must be specific and identified; it must be, for instance, the
product of a particular vineyard or field, or the wool from a
particular sheep. These must also be owned at the time by
the vendor. A person cannot s-ell the products of a field which

that the agreement was a mortgage

of the colt. Sawyer v. Gerrish, 70

Me. 254, 33 Am. R. 323. Owner of a

mare may, during gestation, make a

valid contract for sale of the colt.

McCarty v. Blevins, 5 Yerg. (Tenn.)

195, 26 Am. Dec. 262. A valid sale

may be made of the first female

colt which a mare, then owned by

grantor, may thereafter produce.
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Fonville v. Casey, 1 Murph. (N. C.)

389, 4 Am. Dec. 559.

But in Bates v. Smith, 83 Mich. 347,

47 N. W. R. 249, it was held that a

contract by which A was to have a

half interest in the colt to be pro-

duced by subsequently breeding B's

mare to A's stallion, conveyed no

such title to the colt that it could

operate as against C, who bought

the mare, while in foal, with notice

that she had been bred to A's stal-

lion but without notice of this con-

tract. Such notice was not sufficient

to put C upon inquiry as to A's rights.

1 Wages to be earned and money to

become due under an existing con-

tract or employment may be assigned,

though employment is for no definite

time, but not if there be no present

contract of service. Low v. Pew, 108

Mass. 347, 11 Am. R. 357; Hartley v.

Tapley, 2 Gray (Mass.), 565; Mulhall

v. Quinn, 1 Gray (Mass.). 105, 61 Am.

Dec. 414; Kane v. Clough, 36 Mich.

436, 24 Am. R. 599; Weed v. Jewett,

2 Mete. (Mass.) 608, 37 Am. Dec. 115;

Thayer v. Kelley, 28 Vt, 19. 65 Am.

Dec. 220; Stott v. Franey, 20 Oreg.

410, 23 Am. St. R. 132, 26 Pac. R. 271;

Adler v. Railroad Co., 92 Mo. 242, 4

S. W. R. 917; Provencher v. Brooks,

64 N. H. 479, 13 Atl. R. 641; Field v.

Mayor. 6 N. Y. 179, 57 Am. Dec. 435.

See Gragg v. Martin, 12 Allen (Mass.),

498, 90 Am. Dec. 164. But accounts

to be made in future years by a phy-

sician in his practice (Skipper v.

Stokes, 42 Ala. 255. 94 Am. Dec. 646),

or of a blacksmith (Pureed v. Mather,

35 Ala. 570, 76 Am. Dec. 307), are not

assignable. A merchant may exe-

cute a valid mortgage on " all future

book accounts." Dunn v. Swan, 115

Mich. 409, 73 N. W. R. 386. The un-

earned salary of a public office may

not be assigned, such assignments

being contrary to public policy. Bliss

v. Lawrence, 58 N. Y. 442, 17 Am. R.

273; Mechem on Pub. Off., § 874;

Bowery Nat. Bank v. Wilson, 122 N.

"colt holden for payment." Held,
that the agreement was a mortgage
of the colt. S~wyer v. Gerrish, 70
Me. 254, 33 Am. R. 323. Owner of a
mare may, during gestation, make a
valid contract for sale of the colt.
McCarty v. Blevins, 5 Yerg. (Tenn.)
195, 26 Am. Dec. 262. A valid sale
may be made of the first female
colt which a mare, then owned by
grantor, may thereafter produce.
Fonville v. Casey, 1 Murph. (N. C.)
389, 4 Am. Dec. 559.
But in Bates v. Smith, 83 Mich. 347,
47 N. W. R. 240, it was held that a
contract by which A was to have a
half interest in the colt to be produced by subsequently breeding B's
mare to A's stallion, conveyed no
such title to the colt that it could
operate as against C, who bought
the mare, while in foal, with notice
that she had been bred to A's stallion but without notice of this contract. Such notice was not sufficient
to put C upon inquiry as to A's rights.
1 Wages to be earned and money to
become due under an existing contractor employment may be assigned,
thoug h employment is for no definite
time, but not if there be no pre ent
contra t of service. Low v. Pew, 108
J\fa . 347, 11 Arn. R. 357; Hartley v.
Tapl y, 2 Gray (l\1a . .), 565 ; Mulhall
v. Quinn, 1 ray (Ma »), 105, 61 Am.
D c. 414; Kane v. 'l ugh, 36 Mich.
436, 24 m. R. 599; W ed v. Jewett,
2 Mete. ( fas .) 60 , 37 m. Dec. 115;
Thayer v. Kelley, 2 ' Vt. 19. 6.- Am.
Dec. 220; Stott v. Fran y, 20 Or g.
410, 23 Am. St. R. 132, 26 Pac. R. 271;

Adler v. Railroad Co., 92 Mo. 242, 4
S. W. R. 917; Provencher v. Brooks,
64 N. H. 479, 13 Atl.
641; FielJ v.
Mayor. 6 N. Y. 179, 57 Arn. Dec. 435.
See Gragg v. Martin, 12 Allen (Mass.),
498, 90 Am. Dec. 164. But account
to be made in future years by a physician in his practice (Skipper v.
Stokes, 42 Ala. 255. 94 Am. Dec. 646 ),
or of a black mi th (Purcell v. ]\father,
35 Ala. 570, 76 Am. Dec. 307), are not
assignable. A merchant may execute a valid mortgage on "all future
book accounts." Dunn v. Swan, 115
Mich. 409, 73 N. W. R. 386. The unearned salary of a public office may
not be assigned, such assignments
being contrary to public policy. Bliss
v. Lawrence, 58 N. Y. 442, 17 Am. R.
273; Mechem on Pub. Off., § 874;
Bowery Nat.. Bank v. ·wilson, 122 N.
Y. 478, 19 Arn. St. R. 507, 25 N. E. R
855, citing many cases; Schwenk v.
Wyckoff, 46 N. J. Eq. 560, 19 Am. St.
R. 438, 20 Atl. R. 259.
Goods purchased to replace those
sold from a mortgaged st.ock are covered by the mortgage a of its date.
McLoud v. Wakefield, 70 Vt. 558, 43
Atl. R. 179.
Fruit to be grown on trees now
owned by vendor may be sold. Cutting Packing o. v. Packers' Exchange. 6 Cal. 574, 21 Am. t.. R. 63,
25 Pac. H. 52; Arques v. Wasson, 51
Cal. 620, 21 Am. R. 718; Di key v.
Waldo, 07 'lich. 255, 23 L. R. A. 449.
Chee. e to be ma.de from the milk
of cow now owned by grantor may
be sol l. Van Hoozer v. Cory, 34
Barb. (N. Y.) 12.
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he does not own at the time of sale, but which he expects to

own." 1

g 201. . " But," on the other hand, as is said by Morton, J.,

" a mere possibility or expectancy of acquiring property, not

he does not own at the time of sale, but which he expects to
own." 1

coupled with any interest, does not constitute a potential inter-

est in it, within the meaning of this rule. The seller must have

201. - - . "But,'' on the other band, as is said by :Thforton, J.,
"a mere possibility or expectancy of acquiring property, not
coupled with any interest, does not constitute a potential interest in it, within the meaning of this rule. The seller must have
a present interest in the property, of which the thing sold is
the product, growth or increase. Having such interest, the
right to the thing sold, when it shall come into existence, is a
present vested right, and the sale of it is valid. Thus, a man
may sell the wool to grow upon bis own sheep, but not upon
the sheep of another; or the crops to grow upon his own land,
but not upon lan l in which he has no intere t." 2
v

a present interest in the property, of which the thing sold is

the product, growth or increase. Having such interest, the

right to the thing sold, when it shall come into existence, is a

present vested right, and the sale of it is valid. Thus, a man

may sell the wool to grow upon his own sheep, but not upon

the sheep of another; or the crops to grow upon his own land,

but not upon land in which he has no interest." 2

§ 202. Things not yet acquired by vendor. — As a general

rule, at law, there can be no present sale of things not yet

owned by the veudor, and not potentially in existence, as ex-

plained in the last section. " The common-law maxim is con-

clusive upon the point. Nemo dat quod non habet" 3 "A mere
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possibility or expectancy, not coupled with any interest in or

growing out of property, cannot be made the subject of a valid

sale." 4 " At law, although a power is given in the deed of

assignment to take possession of after-acquired property, no in-

terest is transferred, even as between the parties themselves,

unless possession is actually taken." 5 These statements suffi-

ciently indicate the rigor of the rule at law. " But though the

actual sale is void," says Mr. Benjamin, 6 " the agreement will

i Child cannot make valid sale of v. Marshall, 10 H. L. Cas. 191 ; Willis-

his expectant interest in his parent's ton's Cases on Sales, 10. See, as to the

estate during the latter's life-time, general rule at law, Jones on Chat-

Wheeler v. Wheeler, 2 Mete. (Ky.) tel Mortgages (4th ed.), § 13S et seq. ;

474, 74 Am. Dec. 421 : Read v. Mosby, Hutchinson v. Ford, 9 Bush (Ky.), 318,

87 Tenn. 759, 11 S. W. R. 940. 15 Am. R. 711: Gittings v. Nelson,

2 Low v. Pew, 103 Mass. 347, supra. 86 111. 591 ; Borden v. Croak, 131 111. 68,

3 Per Peters, J., in Emerson v. 22 N. E. R. 793, 19 Am. St. R. 23: Fer-

European & N. A. Ry. Co., 67 Me. 387, guson v. Wilson, 122 Mich. 97, 80 N.

24 Am. R. 39. W. R. 1006.

4 Per Judge, J., in Skipper v. Stokes, 6 Benjamin on Sale (6th Am. ed.),

43 Ala. 255, 94 Am. Dec. 646. § 80.

6 Per Lord Chelmsford in Holroyd

185

§ 202. Things not yet acquired by Yendor.-As a general
rule, at law, there can be no present sale of things not yet
owned by the vendor, and not potentially in existence, as explained in the last section. "The common-law maxim is conclusive upon the point. N emo dat quod non liabet." 3 ''A mere
possibility or expectancy, not coupled with any interest in or
growing out of property, cannot be made the subject of a valid
sale." 4 "At law, although a power is given in the deed of
assignment to take pos e sion of after-acquired property, no interest is trapsferre l, even as between the parties themselves,
unless possession is actually taken." 5 These state men ts sufficiently indicate the rigor of the rule at law. "But though the
actual sale is void," says .Mr. Benjamin 6 'the agreement will
I Child cannot make valid sale of
his expectant intere t in his parent's
estate during the latter's life-time.
Wheeler v. Wheeler, 2 fetc. (Ky.)
474, 74 Am. Dec. 421: Read v. Iosby,
7 Tenn. 759, 11 S. W. R. 940.
2 Low v. Pew, 10 Mass. 347, supra.
3 Per Peters, J.J in Emerson v.
European & N. A. Ry. Co., 67 Me. 387,
24: Am. R. 39.
4 Per Judge, J., in Skipper v. Stokes,
42 Ala. 255, 94 Am. Dec. 646.
li Per Lord Chelmsford in Holroyd

v. farshall, 10 H. L. Cas. 191; Williston's Cases on ale , 10. See, as to the
general rule at law, Jone on Chattel i\Iortgage (4th ed.), 13 et seq.;
Hutchin on v. Ford, 9 Bu h (Ky. ), 31 ,
15 Am. R. 711: Gitting v. Nel on,
6Ill. 591; Borden v. Croa k, 131Ill.68,
22 N. E. R. 793, 19 Am. St. R. 213 : F ergu on v. \Vil on, 1'>2 lich. 97, 0 N.

w.

R. 1006.

6 Benjamin

§

185
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take effect if the vendor, by some act clone after his acquisition

of the goods, clearly shows his intention of giving effect to the

original agreement, or if the vendee obtains possession under

authority to seize them." l This question arises most frequently

at the present time in controversies between the creditors of

the vendor and his mortgagee or vendee of the goods; and in

respect, particularly, to mortgages upon such after-acquired

goods, and crops growing or to be grown, has often been con-

sidered. 2

JSee Jones on Chattel Mortgages

(4th e<L), § 158 et seq.; Cook v. Corthell,

11 R. I. 482, 23 Am. R. 518; Moore v.

ta.ke effect jf the vendor, by some act done after bis acquisition
of the goocls, clearly shows hjs intention of giving effect to the
original agreement, or if the vendee obtains possession under
authority to seize them." 1 This question arises most frequently
at the present time in controversies between the creditors of
the vendor and his mortgagee or vendee of the goods; and in
respect, particularly, to mortgages upon such after-acquired
goods, and crops growing or to be grown, bas often been considered. 2

Byrurn, 10 S. C. 452, 30 Am. R. 58;

Williams v. Briggs, 11 R. I. 476; Con-

greve v. Evetts, 10 Exch. 298; Carr v.

Allatt, 3 H. & N. 964; Chidell v. Gals-
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worthy, 6 C. B. (N. S.) 470; Baker v.

Gray, 17 C. B. 462; Moody v. Wright,

13 Mete. (Mass.) 29, 46 Am. Dec. 706;

Chapman v. Weimer, 4 Ohio St. 481.

As to the nature of the new act re-

quired, see Head v. Goodwin, 37 Me.

181; Griffith v. Douglass, 73 Me. 532,

40 Am. R. 395.

2 Much uncertainty and conflict ex-

ists in the authorities upon the ques-

tion of mortgages and sales of goods

not yet acquired. See the question

fully discussed in Jones on Chat.

Mortg. (4th ed.), £§ 138-175.

A crop planted on one's own land,

or on land let to him, as well as a

crop planted and in process of culti-

vation, is the subject of a valid mort-

gage. Rawlings v. Hunt, 90 N. C.

270.

A chattel mortgage can only op-

erate upon property in actual exist-

ence at the time of its execution. A

chattel mortgage can have no valid

operation upon a crop of grain given

at or about the time of planting the

same, and before it is up and has

any appearance of a growing crop.

The property attempted to be mort-

gaged in such case cannot be said

to be in existence; the subject-mat-

ter not being in esse, there is nothing

for it to operate upon. Comstock

v. Scales, 7 Wis. 159. See also Mer-

chants' Bank v. Lovejoy, 84 Wis. 601,

55 N. W. R. 108; McMaster v. Emer-

son, — Iowa, — , 80 N. W. R 389.

A mortgage executed by a tenant

on the crops to be raised by him on

a tract of ground leased by him is

valid against his execution creditors;

but they may sell the equity of re-

See Jones on Chattel Mortgages
(4th ed.),§ 158 et seq.; Cook v. Cort hell,
11 R. I. 482, 23 Am. R. 518; Moore v.
Byrum, 10 S. C. 452 30 Am. R. 5 ;
Williams v. Briggs, 11 R. I. 476; Congre\e v. Evetts, 10 Exch. 298; Carr v.
Allatt, 3 H. & N. 964; Chidell '· Galsworthy, 6 C. B. (N. S.) 470; Baker v.
Gray, 17 C. B. 462; Moody v. Wright,
13 Mete. (Mass.) 29, 46 Am. Dec. 706;
Chapman v. Weimer, 4 Ohio St. 481.
As to the nature of the new act required, see Head v. Good win, 37 Ie.
1 1; Griffith v. Douglass, 73 Me. 532,
40 Am. R. 395.
2 foch uncertainty and conflict exi t in the authorities upon the que tion of mortgage and sales of goods
not yet acquired. See the question
fully di cu sed in Jones on Chat.
Mortg. (4th ed.), ~'S 138-175.
A crop planted on one's own land,
or on land let to him, as well a a
crop planted and in process of cultivation, i the subject of a Yalid mortgage. Rn.wling v. Hunt, 90 N. C.
270.
A hattel mortgage can only operate up n pro1 erty in a tual exi tence at the time of it execution. A
chatt 1 m rtgage an hav no valid
operation upon a rop of grain iv n
at or about th tim of planting th
am , and befor it i up and ha
any app aran e f a growing r l.
The prop rty attempted to be m rtl

gaged in such case cannot be said
to be in existence; the subject-matter not being in esse, there is nothing
for it to operate upon. Comstock
v. Scales, 7 Wis. 159. See also Merchants' Bank v. Lovejoy, 84 Wis. 601,
55 N. W. R. 108; McMa ter v. Emerson, - Iowa,-, 80 N. W.R. 389.
A mortgage executed by a tenant
on the crops to be raised by him on
a tract of ground leased by him is
valid against his execution creditors;
but they may sell the equity of redemption. Headrick v. Brattain, 63
Ind. 438.
A mortgage of future crops cannot operate at the time of its execution, because the crops are not then
in existence; but, as soon as the crops
grow, the lien of the mortgage attaches. Butt v. Ellett, 19 Wall. (86
U.S.) 544.
A contract between a farmer, engaged in raising corn, and a grain
dealer, made whilst corn was growing in the field, whereby the farmer
old to the dealer a certain quantity
of corn, at an agreed price, to be delivered when called for, the purcha er to give ten day 'notice of the
time he would call for it, and a part
of th purcha ·e-money wa paid at
the tim of making the contract, i
an ab olute sale of corn, to be deliver d in the future, and not a contract for a future sale. And in such

demption. Headrick v. Brattain, 63

Ind. 438.

A mortgage of future crops can-

not operate at the time of its execu-

tion, because the crops are not then

in existence; but, as soon as the crops

grow, the lien of the mortgage at-

taches. Butt v. Ellett, 19 Wall. (86

U. S.) 544.

1 6

CH. IV.j

OF THE THING SOLD.

[§ 202.

CH. IV.J

OF THE THING SOLD.

[§ 202.

In equity, however, conveyances of future-acquired goods are

often enforced, even though the goods have not yet been de-

In eg·uity, however, conveyances of future-acquired. goods are
often enforced, even though the goods have not yet been de-

a case the purchaser is bound to give title to the obligee. Redd v. Burrus,

notice of his readiness to receive the

corn within a reasonable time; and

if he fails to do so, the seller may

offer to deliver the corn without such

notice, and the purchaser is bound

to accept and pay the contract price

for it. A contract made when corn

is growing in the field, for the sale of

a certain amount of corn at a stip-

ulated price to be delivered in the

future, is not illegal, although the

judgment of the parties as to the

prospect of a corn crop may have
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controlled them, more or less, in

making the contract. Sanborn v.

Benedict, 78 111. 309.

An agreement in the spring, be-

fore the existence of a crop, to give

another a lien upon the crop to be

raised that year, for property pur-

chased and for advances, or that the

crop shall belong to the creditor

until he is paid, cannot operate upon

the crop after being raised, as a trans-

fer by way of pledge or mortgage or

otherwise, until at least after posses-

sion taken by the creditor, and be-

fore possession so taken the crop will

be liable to an execution against

the debtor. Gittings v. Nelson, 86

111. 591.

A mortgage may be made of a part

of a growing crop, if the part mort-

gaged be so described as to be iden-

tified by parol evidence; and whether

so identified or not is a question for

the jury under the proof. Stephens

v. Tucker, 55 Ga. 543.

Thore can be no valid sale or mort-

gage of a portion of a crop not

planted; therefore, an obligation

dated 25th of December, 1874. to de-

liver certain cotton of the next year's

crop — the crop of 1875 — passes no

58 Ga. 574.

A mortgage on a crop to be after-

wards planted, unlike a mortgage on

a growing crop, does not pass to the

mortgagee the legal title, but creates

only an equitable lien, which will

not support an action of detinue for

the recovery of the crop after it has

matured and been gathered, until, at

least, there has been a delivery under

the mortgage. A crop must be con-

sidered and treated as a growing

crop from the time the seed are de-

posited in the ground, as at that time

the seed lose the qualities of a chat-

tel, and become a part of the free-

hold, and pass with a sale of it. Wilk-

inson v. Ketler, 69 Ala. 435.

At common law, unplanted crops,

or other things not having an exist-

a case the purchaser is bound to give title to the obligee. Redd v. Burrus,
notice of his readiness to receive the 58 Ga. 574.
corn within a reasonable time; and
A mortgage on a crop to he afterif he fails to do so, the seller may wards planted, unlike a mortgage on
offer to deliver the corn without such a growing crop, does not pass to the
notice, and the purchaser is bound mortgagee the legal title, but creates
to accept and pay the contract price only an equitable lien, which will
for it. A contract made when corn not support an action of detinue for
is growing in the field, for the sale of the recovery of the crnp after it has
a certain amount of corn at a stip- matured and been gathered, until, at
ulated price to be delivered in the least, there has been a delivery under
future, is not illegal, although the the mortgage. A crop must be conjudgment of the parties as to the sidered and treated as a growing
prospect of a corn crop may have crop from the time the seed are decontrolled them, more or less, in posited in the ground, as at th<tt time
making the contract. Sanborn v. the seed lose the qualitie of a chatBenedict, 78 Ill. 309.
tel, and become a part of the freeAn agreement in the spring, be- hold, and pass with a sale of it. Wilkfore the existence of a crop, to give inson v. Ketler, 69 Ala. 435.
another a lien upon the crop to be
At common law, unplantecl crop.,
raised that year, for property pur- or other things not having an existchased and for advances, or that the once, actual or potential, were not
crop shall belong to the creditor the subject of sale, assignment or
until he is paid, cannot operate upon mortgage; but in a court of equity
the crop after being rai ed, as a trans- such sale, assignment or mortgage
fer by way of pledge or mortgage or creates an equitable interest which
otherwise, until at least after pos'es- attaches to the property when it
sion taken by the creditor, and be- comes into existence or is·acquired,
fore possession so taken the crop will and which the court will enforce
be liable to an execution against and protect again.tall other persons
the debtor. Gittings v. Nelson, 6 than bona fide purchasers without.
notice; and for the conversion or
Ill. 591.
A mortgage may be made of a part illegal di position of the property,
of a growing crop, if the part mort- with notice of the lien. an action on
gaged be o described as to be iden- the case may be maintained. Hnrst
ti:fied by parol evidence; and whether v. Bell, 72 Ala. 336. See also Mayer
so identified or not is a question for v. Taylor, 69 Ala. 403; Collier v.
the jury under the proof. Stephens Faulk, 69 Ala. 58; Electric Lightin g
v. Tucker, 55 Ga. 543.
Co. v. Rust, 117 Ala. 680, 23 S. R.
Th3re can be no valid sale or mort- 751.
gage of a portion of a crop not
.A. con tract of sale of a crop to
planted; therefore, an obligation be thereafter raised, harvested and
dated 25th of December, 1874. to de- thresheu, made before the seed was
liver certain cotton of the next year's sown, is inoperative as a sale against
crop- the crop of 1875- passes no a levy upon t.he growing crop at the
187
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202.]

LAW OF SALE.

[BOOK I,

livered to or obtained by the vendee, after their acquisition, in

livered to or obtained by the vendee, after their acquisition, in
pur uance of tLe contract. 1

pursuance of the contract. 1

suit of the seller's creditor. Welter

v. Hill, 63 Minn. 273, 68 N. W. R. 26.

The lessees of a farni who agreed

in the lease that they would fodder

the stock on the farm with the hay

which should grow thereon, and that

they would not sell, dispose of or

carry away, or suffer to be carried

away, from the farm any of the hay

without the consent of the lessors,

gave a bill of sale to a third person

of hay grown on the farm after the

making of the lease, and he took pos-

session. Held, that no title passed
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to him, and he had no insurable in-

terest, although he intended to carry

on the farm and not to carry off the

hay. Heald v. Builders' Ins. Co., Ill

Mass. 38.

A mortgage on a crop to be

planted, and to secure payment for

supplies necessary to enable the mort-

gagor to "make the crop," is valid

even as against creditors. Watkins

v. Wyatt, 9 Baxt. 250, 30 Am. R. 63,

note; Hall v. Glass, 123 Cal. 500, 56

Pac. R. 336.

A mortgage of a growing crop is

valid. Cotten v. Willoughby, 83 N. C.

75, 35 Am. R. 564.

The lessee of land in possession ex-

ecuted a mortgage of the crops to

be raised by him the coming season,

and which were not yet planted.

Held, that the mortgage was valid.

Arques v. Wasson, 51 Cal. 620, 21

Am. R. 718.

A contract in writing, dated in

December, by which a debtor, in

consideration of indulgence, gave to

his creditor "a mortgage on all my

(his) cotton, corn and wheat that I

may raise during the then next year,

to secure the payment of the debt;

and in default of payment by the 1st

of November next, then I authorize

the said " creditor or his agent to

"take all the crops raised by me,''

was held a good and enforceable lien

upon the crops mentioned therein,

although they had not been planted

when the contract was made, the

mortgagee having taken the prop-

erty into his possession after it is

acquired and before the rights of

others as creditors or purchasers

have attached thereon. Moore v.

Byrum, 10 S. C. 452,-30 Am. R. 58.

A mortgage of a crop to be raised

on a farm during a certain term, but

which is not yet sown, passes no title,

and the mortgagee has no claim

against a purchaser of the crop, for

it or its value. Hutchinson v. Ford,

9 Bush, 318, 15 Am. R. 711.

Welter of November next, then I authorize
the said" creJ.itor or his agent to
The lessees of a farm who agreed "take all t he crops raised by me,.,
in the lea e that they would fodder was held a good and enforceable lien
the stock on the farm with the hay upon the crops mentioned therein.
which should grow thereon, and that although they had not been p lanted
they would not sell, dispose of or when the contract was made, the
carry a way, or suffer to be carried mortgngee having taken the propaway, from the farm any of the hay erty into his pos ession after it is
without the consent of the le sors, acquired and before tbe r ights of
gave a bill of sale to a third person others as creditors or purcha ·ers
of hay grown on the farm after the have attached thereon. Moore v.
making of the lease, and he took pos- Byrum, 10 S. C. 452,-30 Am. R. 58.
session. Held, that no title pa secl
A mortgage of a crop to be raised
to him, and he had no insurable in· on a farm during a certain term, but
terest, although he intended to carry which is not yet sown, pa es no title,
on the farm and not to carry off the and the mortgagee has no claim
hay. Heald v. Builders' Ins. Co., 111 against a purchaser of the crop, fo r
it or its value. Hutchinson Y. Ford,
Mass. 38.
A mortgage on a crop to be 9 Bush, 31 , 15 Am. R. 711.
l Jones, Chat. Mortg. (4th
eel .),
planted, and to secure payment for
supplies neces ai·y to enable the mort- §§ 170-175; Mitchell v. Winslow, 2
gagor to "'make the crop," is valid Story (U. S. C. C.), 644, 17 Fed. Cas.,
even as against creditors. Watkins p. 527; Butt v. E llett, 19 Wall. (U.S.)
v. Wyatt, 9 Baxt. 250, 30 Am. R. 63, 544; Apperson v. Moore, 30 Ark. 56.
note; Hall v. Glass, 123 Cal. 500, 56 2! Am. R. 170; Pennock v. Coe, 23
Pac. R. 336.
How. (U. S.) 117; Brett v. Carter, 2
A mortgage of a growing crop is Low. ( U. S. C. C.) 45 , 4 Fed. Cas., p. 67;
valid. Cotten v. Willoughby, 83 N. C. Mc Caffrey v. Woodin, 65 N. Y. 459,
75, 3.5 Am. R. 564.
22 Am. R. 644; Siller v. Lester 4
The lessee of land in po ses ion ex- I iss. 513; Booker v. Jone , 55 A la. 266.
ecuted a mortgage of the crops to
In Roche ter Di tilling o. v. Rasey
be raised by him the coming season, (1894), 142 N. Y. 570, 37 N. E. R. 632,
and whiuh were not yet planted. 40 Arn. St. R. 635, the subject was
H eld, that the mortgage was valid. fully di cu. d. The yllab u gives
Arque v. Wa · on, 51 Cal. 620, 21 the conclu ion reached and is as folAm. R. 71.
low:
A ontract in writing, dated in
"A chattel mortgage cannot, as a
D
mu r, by whi h a debtor, in matter of law, be giv n future effect
con id ration of indulgence, gave to as a lien upon per onal property
hi r rl.itor "am rtgage on all my whi h at. the time of the delivery of
(hi.)
t. n, corn and wheat that I the mortga"'e wa not. in exi. tence~
may rai during th th n next) ar, actually or potentially, wh n the
to cure the p yment of the d bt; rights of reditor of tlie mortgagor
and in default of payment by the 1 t have intervened; the mortgage can
l 8
suit of the seller's creditor.

v. Hill, 65 l\1inn. 273, 68 N. W. R. 26.

<JH. IV.]

OF THE THING SOLD.

[§ 203.

OH. IV.]

OF THE THING SOLD.

[§ 203.

§ 203. Contracts of sale for future delivery.— It was at

one time thought, in England, 1 that contracts for the sale and

future delivery of goods which the vendor did not then have,

or which he had no reasonable expectation of receiving by con-

signment or otherwise, but which he intended to go into the

market and buy, were not valid contracts, but mere wagers on

the price of the goods. But while this form of contract may

afford easy opportunity for wagering, it is now well settled,

both in England and the United States, as will be more fully

seen hereafter, 2 that such contracts are not necessarily invalid,

but are valid or not according to the actual intention of the

parties. 3 The rule has been stated by the court in Indiana as

only operate on property in actual

existence at the time of its execu-

tion.

" While such a mortgage may, as
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between the parties, be regarded in

§ 203. Contracts of sale for future delivery.-lt was.·at
one time thought, in Englancl,1 that contracts for the sale and
future delivery of goods which the vendor did not then have,
or which be had no reasonable expectation of receiving by consignment or otherwise, but which he intended to go into the
market ancl buy, were not valid contracts, but mere wagers on
the price of the goods. But while this form of contract may
afford easy opportunity for wagering, it is now well settled,
both in England and the United States, as will be more fully
seen hereafter/ that such contracts are not necessarily invalid,
but are valid or not according to the actual intentio.n of the
parties. 3 The rule has been stated by the cour~ in Indiana as

equity as an executory agreement to

give a lien when the property comes

into existence, some further act

thereafter is requisite to make it an

actual and effectual lien as against

creditors.

" Crops which are the annual prod-

uct of labor, and of the cultivation

of the earth, have no actual or po-

tential existence before a planting.

"The lessee of certain farm lands

executed a chattel mortgage, by its

terms covering, among other things,

all the potatoes and beans ' which

are now . . . planted or which

are hereafter . . . planted dur-

ing the next year.' The greater part

of the planting of potatoes and all

that of the beans was done after the

delivery of the mortgage. After the

planting the growing crops were

levied upon and sold under an exe-

cution against the lessee, and plaint-

iff became the purchaser. The mort-

gagor subsequently foreclosed his

mortgage and sold said crops to de-

fendant, who took possession. In an

action to recover possession, held,

that the levy by the sheriff operated

to transfer to him possession of the

crops; that in the absence of proof

of any act by the parties to the mort-

gage to create an actual lien as

against such possession, the equities

of the mortgagee were ineffectual

for any purpose; and that plaintiff

was entitled to the potatoes and

beans obtained from the planting

done after the execution and deliv-

eiy of the mortgage."

i Bryan v. Lewis, Ry. & Moo. 386,

overruled in Hibblewhite v. McMor-

ine, 5 M. & W. 462.

2 See post, §§1030-1038.

3 Irwin v. Williar, 110 U. S. 499;

Hatch v. Douglas, 48 Conn. 116, 40

Am. R. 154; Whitesides v. Hunt, 97

Ind. 191, 49 Am. R. 441; Gregory v.

Wendell, 39 Mich. 337, 33 Am. R. 390;

Conner v. Robertson, 37 La. Ann. 814,

only operate on property in actual fendant, who took possession. In an
existence at the time of its execu- action to recover po ession, held,
tion.
that the levy by the sheriff opc~ratecl
"While uch a mortgage may, as to transfer to him possession of the
between the parties, be regarded in crops; that in the absence of proof
equit.y as an executory agreement to of any act by the partie to the mortgi ve a lien when the property comes gage to create an actual lien as
into exi tence, some further act against such po::;session, the equities
thereafter is requisite to make it an of the mortgagee were ineffectual
actual and effectual lien as against for any purpose; and that plaintiff
creditors.
was entitled to the potatoes and
"Crops which are the annual prod· bPans obtained from the planting
uct of labor, and of the cultivation done after the execution and delivof the earth, have no actual or po- er5" of the mortgage."
tential existence before a planting.
1 Bryan v. Lewis, Ry. & Moo. 386,
"The lessee of certain farm lands overruled in Hibblewhite v. McMorexecuted a chattel mortgage, by its ine, 5 M. & W. 462.
terms covering, among other things,
2 See post, §§ 1030-1038.
all the potatoes and beans 'which
3frwin v. Williar, 110 U. S. 499;
are now • • • planted or which Hatch v. Douglas, 48 Conn. 116, 40
are hereafter . . . planted dur- Am. R. 154; Whitesides v. Hunt, 97
ing the next year.' The greater part Ind. 191, 49 Am. R. 441; Gregory v.
of the planting of potatoes and all Wendell, 39 Mich. 337, 33 Arn. R. 390;
that of the beans was done after the Conner v. Robertson, 37 La. Ann. 814,
d elivery of the mortgage. .After the 55 Am. R. 521; Crawford v. Spencer,
planting the growing crops were 92 Mo. 498, 1 Am. St. R. 745; Bigelevied upon and old under an exe- low v. Benedict, 70 N. Y. 202, 26
cution against the lessee, and plaint- Am. R. 573; Seeligson v. Lewis, 6.5
iff became the purchaser. The mort- Tex. 215, 57 .Am. R. 593; Wall v.
gagor subsequently foreclosed his Schneider, 59 Wis. 352, 48 Am. R. 520;
mortgage and sold said crops to de- Sondheim v. Gilbert, 117 Ind. 71, 10
189
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§ 203.] LAW OF SALE. [BOOK I.

follows: ""Where a commodity is bought for future delivery,

no matter what the form of the contract is, the law regards

the substance and not the shadow, and if the parties mutually

understood and intended that the purchaser should pay for and

the seller should deliver the commodity at the maturity of the

contract, it is a legal and valid transaction ; and the fact that

the purchaser is required to deposit a margin and increase the

same at any time the market requires it, in order to secure the

payment at maturity, or that the seller shall deposit a margin

and increase the same, like the purchaser, in order to secure

the delivery at maturity, does not vitiate the contract. But if,

at the time of the contract, it is mutually understood and in-

tended by all the parties, whether expressed or not, that the

commodity said to be sold was not to be paid for nor to be de-

livered, but that the contract was to be settled and adjusted

by the payment of difference in price — if the price should de-

cline the purchaser paying the difference, if it should rise the

seller paying the advance, the contract price being the basis
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upon which to calculate differences, — in such a case it would

be a gambling contract and void and the deposits of margins

are only to be considered as attempting to secure the terms of

the bet on prices at some future time." ! It is not enough, as

will be more fully seen hereafter, to render the contract void

that one party only intended by it a speculation in prices; it

must be shown that both parties did not intend a delivery of

the goods, but contemplated and intended a settlement only

of differences. The burden of showing the invalidity of the

contract rests upon the party asserting it. 2

Am. St. R. 23; McGrew v. Produce ences is contrary to the gaming act,

Exchange, 84 Tenn. 572, 4 Am. St. R. notwithstanding that the contract

771 ; In re Taylor, 192 Pa. St. 304, 309, gives the buyer or seller an option to

43 Atl. R. 973, 975. demand delivery or acceptance of

As to the general rule and the ef- the stocks. In re Gieve, [1899] 1 Q. B.

feet of the Illinois statute, see Clews 794.

v. Jamieson (1899), 38 C. C. A. 473, 96 1 In Whitesides v. Hunt, supra.

Fed. R. 648; Wolf v. Nat. Bank, 178 2 See post, § 1032; Irwin v. Williar,

111. 85, 52 N. E. R. 896. A contract supra; Crawford v. Spencer, supra.

between two stock dealers for differ-

190

follows: "Where a commodity is bought for future delivery,
no matter whRt the form of the contract is, the law regarJs
the substance and not the slrn(1ow, and if the parties mutually
understood and in tended that the purchaser shou ld pay for an cl
the seller sbould deliver the commodity at the maturity of the
contra.ct, it is a legal and valid transaction; and the fact that
the purchaser is required to deposit a margin antl increase the
same at any time the market requires it, in order to secure tlie
payment at maturity, or that the seller shall deposit a margin
and increase the same, like the purchaser, in order to secure
the delivery at maturity, does not vitiate the contract. But if,
at the time of the contract, it is mut~ally understood and intended by all the parties, whether expres ed or not, that the
commodity said to be sold was not to be paid for nor to be delivered, but that the contract was to be settled and adjusted
by the payment of difference in price -if the price should decline the purchaser paying the differ nee, if it should rise the
seller paying the atl vance, the contract price being the basis
upon which to calculate differences,- in such a case it would
be a gambling contract and void antl the deposits of margins
are only to be considered as attempting to secure the terms of
the bet on prices at some future time." 1 It is not enough, as
will be more fully seen hereafter, to rentler the contract void
that one party only intended by it a speculation in prices; it
must be shown that both parties did not intencl a delivery of
the goods, but contemplated and intended a settlem nt only
of differences. The burden of showing the in validity of the
contract rests upon the party asserting it. 2
Am. St. R. 23· McGrew v. Produce ence i contrary to the gaming act,
Exchange, 84 Tenn. 572, 4 Am. t. R. notwith tanding that the contract
771; In re Taylor, 192 Pa. St. 304, 309, give the buyer or eller an option to
43 Atl. R. 973, 975.
demand d livery or a ce1 tance of
As to the general rule and the ef- the stocks. In re ieve, [1899J 1 Q. B.
fect of the Illinoi tatute, see lew 794.
1 In Whit i le v. Hunt, supm.
v. Jamie on (1 99), 3 C. C. A. 473, 96
F d. R. 64 ; Wolf v. Nat. Bank, 11
2
e post · 1032; Irwin v. Williar,
Ill. 5, 52 N. E. R. 06.
contra t supra; rawforJ v. Spencer, supra.
between two to k dealer for cliffer190

CHAPTEK v.

...

OF THE PRICE.

§ 204 Necessity of a price.

205. Executory contracts.

206. Executed contracts.

CHAPTER V.

207. Where price not agreed upon,

reasonable value will deter-

OF THE PRICE.

mine.

208. Market price — Market con-

trolled by monopolistic com-

bination.

209. Other methods of fixing price.

210, 211. Price must be fixed with

certainty.

212,213. Price to be fixed by valuers.

214. Payment of the price.

§ 204. Necessity of a price.— A distinguishing feature of a

sale, as has been seen, is that it is a transfer of the absolute title

to a thing for a price in money or its equivalent. 1 There can

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:48 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t6xw4h56n
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

therefore be no valid sale unless this price has been determined

upon by the parties themselves, either expressly or impliedly,

or unless some means or method be agreed upon by the parties

or established by law by which the price may be determined. 2

§ 205. Executory contracts. — Hence in the case of

executory contracts, where parties are negotiating in respect

of a sale and of the price to be paid thereon, the contract of

sale cannot be deemed to be completed so long as the price re-

mains undetermined. 3 There will, therefore, be no sale if the

parties, though apparently agreed, are really mutually mis-

§ 204. Neces ity of a price.

trolled by monopolistic combination.
Executory contracts.
Executed contract .
§ 209. Other methods of fixing price.
207. Where price not agreed upon,
210, 211. Price must be fixed with
rea onable value will detercertainty.
mine.
212 213. Price to be fixed by valuers.
208. Market price - farket con214. Payment of the price.
205. 206. -

§ 204:. Necessity of a price.- A di tinguishing feature of a
sale, as bas been seen, is that it is a transfer of the absolute title
to a thing for a price in money or it equivalent. 1 There can
therefore be no valid sale unle s this price bas been determined
upon by the parties themselves, either expre ly or impliedly,
or unles some means or method be agree l upon by the parties
or established by law by which the price may be determined. 2

taken as to the price to be paid. 4 There will also be no sale if

the price is left to be afterwards agreed upon, and the parties

fail afterwards to agree; 5 though if the sale be for a reason-

able price to be afterwards agreed upon, and the parties can-

not agree, the law will supply the method. 6

1 See ante, § 1.

2 A transfer of property cannot be

regarded as a sale thereof when no

purchase price has been agreed upon,

nor the price in any manner made

definite, nor any means agreed upon

by which the price can be ascertained.

Borland v. Nevada Bank, 99 Cal. 89,

33 Pac. R. 737, 37 Am. St. R. 32.

3 Foster v. Lumbermen's Mining

Co., 68 Mich. 188, 36 N. W. R. 171

[citing Williamson v. Berry, 8 How.

(U. S.) 544]; Bigley v. Risher. 63 Pa.

St, 152; Devaue v. Fennell, 2 Ired.

§ 205. - - Executory contracts.- Hence in the case of
executory contracts, where parties are negotiating in respect
of a sale and of the price to be paid thereon, the contract of
sale cannot be deemed to be completed so long as the price remains undetermined. 3 There will, therefore, be no sale if the
parties, though apparently agreed, are really mutually mi taken as to the price to be paid. 4 There will also be no sale if
the price is left to be afterwards agreed upon, and the parties
fail afterwards to agree; 5 though if the sale be for a reasonable price to be afterwards agreed upon, and the parties cannot agree, the law will supply the method. 6

(N. C.) 36.

* See post, § 278.

3 Wittkowsky v. Wasson, 71 N. C.

451; Albemarle Lumber Co. v. Wil-

cox, 105 N. C. 34.

6 Greene v. Lewis, 85 Ala. 221, 4 S.

191

1 See
2A

ante, § 1.

tran fer of property cannot be
regarded as a ale thereof when no
purcha e price ha been agreed upon,
nor the price in any manner made
definite, nor any means agreed upon
by which the price can be a certained.
Borland v. Nevada Bank, 99 Cal. 9,
33 Pac. R. 737, 37 Am. St. R. 32.
3 Fo ter v. Lumbermen's Mining

Co., 6 Mich. 1 8, 36 N. W. R. 171
[citing William on v. Berry, 8 How.
( . S. ) 544]; Bigley v. Ri her. 63 Pa.
St. 15'>; Devane v. F ennell, 2 Ired.
(N. C.) 36.
4 ee post,
2 .
o Wittkow ky v. \Va on, 71 N. C.
451; Albemarle Lumber Co. v. Wilcox, 105 N. C. 34.
0 Greene v. Lewis, 85 Ala. 221, 4 S.

191

§§ 206, 207.]

LAW OF SALE.

[BOOK I.

§§ 206, 207.] LAW OF SALE. [book I.

§ 206, Executed contracts. — In the case of executed

contracts, however, " the rule is settled that the title to per-

sonal property may pass to a vendee without fixing an abso-

lute price, if the circumstances attending the transaction satis-

factorily show such to be the clear intention' of the contracting

parties." 1 " In the latter class of contracts," *. e., the executed

contracts, " where the seller, whether by actual delivery or

other like unequivocal act, intentionally passes the property in

specific goods to the purchaser without fixing the price, the

law leaves the price to be adjusted by the agreement of the

parties, or, if they fail to agree, by the verdict of a jury. If

such price is left open for future adjustment by consent, the

property being delivered with the expressed intention to com-

plete the sale, the price to be agreed on is implied to be one

that is fair and reasonable, and this is always the rule of

recovery on a quantum meruit or quantum valebat. If there

should or can be no mutual consent, the implication follows as

part of the original contract of sale, that a jury will adjust it,
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just as manifestly as in every-day sales and delivery of goods

by merchants on open account, where the price is very often

not adjusted for months afterward." 2

§ 207. Where price not agreed upon, reasonable worth is

the price. — Where the parties have agreed upon the other ele-

ments of the sale, but have made no reference to the price, and

therefore have not disagreed upon it or left it open for further

negotiation, and where it is agreed that the title shall pass, and

the price shall be adjusted afterwards, and no other adjustment

is made, the law implies that the goods are to be paid for at

what they are reasonably worth. 3

R. 740, 7 Am. St. R 42. See also Valpy v. Gibson, 4 C. B. 837; Ma-

Hassard v. Hardison, 117 N. C. 60, 23 comber v. Parker, 13 Pick. (Mass.)

S. E. R. 96. 175; Bos well v. Green, 1 Dutch. (N. J.)

"See 2x>st, §§ 493-498; Greene v. 390.

Lewis, 85 Ala. 221, 4 S. R. 740, 7 Am. 3 Acebal v. Levy, 10 Bing. 376;

§ 206. - - Executed contracts.- In the case of executed
contracts, however, "the rule is settled that the title to personal property may pass to a vendee without fixing an absolute price, if the circumstances attending the transaction satisfactorily show such to be the clear intention· of the contracting
parties." 1 ''In the latter class of contracts," i.e., the executed
contracts, "where the seller, whether by actual delivery or
other like unequivocal act, intentionally passes the property in
specific goods to the purchaser without fixing the price, the
law leaves the price to be adjusted by the agreement of the
parties, or, if they fail to agree, by the verdict of a jury. If
such price is left open for future adjustment by consent, the
property being delivered with the expressed intention to complete the sale, the price to be agreed on is implied to be one
that is fair and reasonable, and this is al ways the rule of
recovery on a quantitm rneruit or quanturn valebat. If there
should or can be no mutual consent, the implication follows as
part of the original contract of sale, that a jury will adjust it,
just as manifestly as in every-day sales and delivery of goods
by merchants on open account, where the price is very often
not adjusted for months afterward." 2

St. R. 42; Shealy v. Edwards, 73 Ala. Hoadly v. McLaine, 10 Bing. 482;

175, 49 Am. R. 43, 75 Ala, 411; Wilk- Shealy v. Edwards, 73 Ala. 175, 49

inson v. Williamson, 76 Ala. 163. Am. R. 43; Greene v. Lewis, 85 Ala.

2 Shealy v. Edwards, 73 Ala. 175, 49 221, 7 Am. St. R. 42, 4 S. R. 740; Lore-

Am. R 43, citing Benj. Sales, § 87; joy v. Michels, 88 Mich. 15, 49 N. W.
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§ 207. Where price not agreed upon, reasonable worth is
the price.-Where the parties have agreed upon the other elements of the sale, but have made no reference to the price, and
therefore. have not disagreed upon_it or left it open for further
negotiation, and where it is agreed that the title shall pass, and
the price shall be adjusted afterwards, and no other adjustment
is made, the law implies that the goods are to be paid for at
what they are reasonably worth. 3
R. 740, 7 Am. St. R. 42. See al o Valpy v. Gibson, 4 C. B. 837; Malia . ard v. Hardison, 117 N. C. 60, 23 comber v. Parker, 13 Pick. (Mass.)
S. E. R. 96.
175; Boswell v. Green, 1 Dutch. (N. J.}
1 See po t, §. 493-49 ; Gr en e v.
390.
Lewi. , 5 Ala. 221, 4 . R. 74.0 7 Am.
3 Acebal v. Levy, 10 Bing. 376;
St. R. 42; healy v. Edward 73 la. H dly v. McLaine, 10 Bing. 4 2;
17 , 49 Am. R 43, 75 A la. 411; Wilkhealy v. Edwards, 73 Ala. 175, 49
in on v. William on, 76 Ala. 163.
Am. R. 43; reene v. Lewis, ;- Ala.
2 b aly v. Edw· rel , 73 Ala. 175, 49
221, 7 Am. St. R. 42, 4 S. R. 740; LoveAm. R. 43, citing Benj. Sale , § 7; j y v. Michels, 88 Mich. 15, 49 N. W.
192
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For like reasons, where the parties have fixed the price, but

their agreement in that respect is invalid because the price was

fixed on Sunday, the law, if the sale is otherwise complete and

valid, will imply a promise to pay what the goods are reason-

ably worth. 1

So, also, " under an allegation of an agreed price, if there is

a failure to prove the agreement as to price, evidence of value

is competent for the purpose of a recovery of what the article

was fairly worth, but not to sustain a recovery beyond the

amount alleged." 2 Where, however, the price is fixed by the

contract, that price must govern, and the mere fact that there

is conflict in the evidence as to what the price was, will not

justify the jury in declining to ascertain that price and award-

ing the reasonable value in its place. 3

§ 208. Market price — Market controlled by monopolistic

" combination." — This reasonable worth or price is usually
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R. 901, 13 L. R. A. 7T0; James v.

Muir, 33 Mich. 223; Comstock v.

Sanger, 51 Mich. 497, 16 N. W. R. 872:

Livingston v. Wagner, 23 Nev. 53, 42

For like reasons, where the parties have fixed the price, but
their agreement in that respect is invalid because the price was
fixed on Sun lay, the law, if the sale is otherwise complete and
valid, will imply a promise to pay what the goods are reasonably worth. 1
So, al o, "under an allegation of an agreed price, if there is
a failure to prove the a<rreement as to price, evidence of value
is competent for the purpo e of a recovery of what the article
was fairly worth, but not to sustain a recovery beyond the
amount alleged.'' 2 Where, however, the price is fixed by the
contract that pric mu t govern, and the mere fact that there
is conflict in the evi Jenee as to what the price wa , "ill not
justify the jury in declinin<r to ascertain that price and awarding the reasonable value in its place. 3

Pac. R. 290; Snodgrass v. Broadwell,

2 Litt. (Ky.) 353; Jenkins v. Ricttard-

son, 6 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 442; Tucker

v. Cady, 25 I1L App. 578. The mar-

§ 20 . Market price - Market controlled by monopolistic
"combination."-This rea onable worth or price is u ually

ket price at the time of the sale is to

govern, unaffected by subsequent

changes. Hill v. Hill, 1 N. J. L. 261.

And where goods are ordered to be

shipped the market value at the time

and place of shipment controls. Fen-

ton v. Braden, 2 Cranch, C. C. 550, 8

Fed. Cas., p. 1140.

Where parties have had a contract

for a specific quantity of goods at a

certain price, and more are ordered,

there is no implied understanding

that these shall be at the same price,

especially where it is known that the

market price has advanced. Rice v.

Western Fuse Co., 64 111. App. 603.

Where A says to B: "When you

are ready to sell your corn, deliver

it at my warehouse and I will make

it satisfactory as to the price," and

B delivers it, the law will imply

a promise to pay the market price.

McEwen v. Morey, 60 I1L 32. The

owner of a chattel requested A to

sell it but named no price. A con-

tracted to sell it to B at a certain

prica Before B accepted it, he met

the owner, who notified B to pay no

one but himself, to which B assented

but no price was named. Held, an

assent to the sale, and, as no price

was named, the reasonable value

could be recovered. Taft v. Travis,

136 Mass. 95.

i Bradley v. Rea, 14 Allen (Mass.),

20; s. C, 103 Mass. 188, 4 Am. R 524.

2 Livingston v. Wagner. 23 Nev. 53,

42 Pac. R. 290, quoting Abbott's Trial

Evidence, 306, and citing Sussdorf

v. Schmidt, 55 N. Y. 319; Trimble v.

Stillwell, 4 E. D. Smith, 512.

3 Illinois Linen Co. v. Hough, 91

111. 63.

R. 901, 13 L. R. A. 770; Jame v.
Muir, 33 1ich. 223; Com tock v.
Sanger, 51 iicb. 497, 16 N. vV. R. 7 :
Living, ton v. Wagner, 23 Nev. 53, 42
Pac. R. 290; Snodgrass v. Broadwell,
2 Litt. (Ky.) 353· J enkin v. Riclfardson, 6 J. J. Mar h. (Ky.) 442; Tucker
v. Cady, 25 Ill. App. 578. The mar-

it at my warehouse and I will make
it sati factory as to the price," and
B delivers it, t.he law will imply
a promi e to pay the market price.
IcEwen v. Morey, 60 Ill. 32. The
owner of a chattel reque ted A to
sell it but named no price. A contracted to sell it to B at a certain
price. Before B accepted it, he rp.et
the owner, who notified B to pay no
one but him elf, to which Ba ented
but no price was named. Held, an
a ent to the sale, and, a no price
was named, the rea, onable value
could be recovered. Taft v. Travis,
136 Mas. 95.
1 Bradley v. Rea, 14 Allen ( la s.),
20; s. c., 103 1\Ias . 1 , 4 Am. R. 524.
2Living ton v. ·wagner, 23 Nev. 53,
42 Pac. R. 290, quoting Abbott's Trial
Evidence, 306, and citing Su ' dorf
v. Schmidt, 55 N. Y. 319; Trimble v.
Stillwell, 4 E. D. Smith, 512.
3 Illinois Linen Co. v. Hough, 91
Ill. 63.

ket price at the time of the ale is to
govern, unaffected by ub equent
changes. Hill v. Hill, 1 N. J. L. 261.
And where good are ordered to be
hipped the market value at the time
and place of shipment controls. Fenton v. Braden, 2 Crancb, C. C. 550, 8
Fed. Cas., p. 1140.
Where partie have had a eon tract
for a specific quantity of goods at a
certain price, and more are ordered,
there i no implied under tanding
that the e shall be at the ame price,
especially where it jg known that the
market price has advanced. Rice v.
We tern Fuse Co., 64 Ill. .A pp. 603.
Where A says to B: "When you
are ready to sell your corn, deliver
13
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the market or current price, but it is not necessarily so. 1 As is

said in a leading case: 2 "The current price of the day may be

highly unreasonable from accidental circumstances, as on ac-

count of the commodity having been purposely kept back by the

vendor himself, or with reference to the price at other ports

in the immediate vicinity, or from various other causes."

Where, therefore, the present market price is one fixed arbi-

trarily by a combination of all the manufacturers or dealers in

a given article, that price cannot control where one has pur-

chased such goods not knowing of this price and not agreeing

to pay it. 3

iKountz v. Kirkpatrick. 72 Pa. St.

378. 13 Am. R. 687; Smith v. Griffith,

3 Hill (N. Y.), 337, 38 Am. Dec. 639;

Blydenburgh v. Welsh, Bald. (U.S. D.)

the market or current price, but it is not necessarily so. 1 As is
said in a leading case: 2 ''The current price of the day may be
highly unreasonable from accidental circumstances, as on account of the commodity having been purposely kept back by the
ven lor himself, or with reference to the price at other ports
in the immediate vicinity, or from various other causes."
vVhere, therefore, the ·present market I rice is one fixed arbitrarily by a combina tion of all the manufacturers or dealers in
a given article, that price cannot control where one has purchased such goods not knowing of this price and not agreeing
to pay it. 3

331.
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2 Acebal v. Levy, supra.

3Lovejoy v. Michels, 88 Mich. 15, 13

L. R. A. 770, 49 N. W. R. 901.

Champlin, C. J., said: "I do not

think a price so fixed by a combina-

tion of manufacturers or dealers is

competent evidence to show a reason-

able price of goods sold by the mem-

bers of such combination. Such

combinations to control prices are

intended to stifle competition, which

is a stimulus of commercial transac-

tions, and to substitute therefor the

stimulus of unconscionable 'gain,

whereby the participants in such

combinations become enriched at the

expense of the consumer, beyond

what he ought legitimately to pay,

under a healthy spirit of competition

in the business community. The ef-

fect of such combinations to control

prices is the same as that other class

of contracts which has always been

denounced as vicious, namely, con-

tracts in restraint of trade. Public

policy places its reprobation upon one

equally with the other. These com-

binations to control prices are be-

coming very numerous, and affect

not only the staples of human sus-

tenance, but nearly all the neces-

saries of life and the necessaries of

business. Such combinations to con-

trol prices are against public policy,

and void, on the ground that they

have a mischievous tendency, so as

to be injurious to the best interests

of the State. The best interests of

the State require that all legitimate

business should be open to competi-

tion; that the current price of com-

modities should be controlled by the

law of demand and supply; that the

laws of commerce should flow in their

accustomed channels, and should not

be diverted by combinations to con-

trol prices fixed by the arbitrary de-

cision of interested parties. Of course,

what is said above does not apply to

monopolies authorized by law; as,

for instance, to patented articles.

l Kountz v. Kirkpatrick. 72 P a. St.
378. 13 Am. R. 6 7; Smith v. Griffith,
3 Hill (N. Y.), 337, 3 Am. Dec. 639;
Blyden burgh v. ·w elsh, Bald. (U.S.D.)
331.
2 Acebal v. Levy, S'l.ip1·a.
3 Lovejoy v. Iichels,
Mich. 15, 13
L. R. A. 770, 49 N. W. R. 901.
Champlin, C. J., aid: " I do not
think a price so fixed by a combination of manufacturers or dealers is
competent evidence to show a reasonable price of good old by the members of such combination. Such
combinations to control prices are
intended to stifle competition, which
is a stimulus of commercial tntnsactions. and to ubstitute therefor the
sti mulus of unconscionable •gain,
whereby the participant· in . uch
combinations become enriched at the
ex pen e of the con um er, beyond
what he ought legitimately to pay,
under a healthy spirit of competition
in the bu. ine. community. The effeet of uch combinations to control
pric
of ontra t.s which ha always b n
denounced a vici u , namely, ontract in r e traint of trade. Publi
policy pla e it r pr bation upon on
qually ·w ith tb
ther. The e combinations to control prices are be-

coming very numerous, and affect
not only the staples of human sustenance, but nearly all the necessaries of life and the necessaries of
busine . Such combinations to control prices a re against public policy.
and void, on the ground that they
have a mischievous t endency, so as
to be injurious to the be ·t intere ts
of the State. The best interests of
the State require that all legitimate
business should be open to competition; that the current price of commodities should be controlled by the
law of demand and su pply; that the
lawsofcommerceshouldflowintheir
accustomed channels, a nd should not
be diverted by combinations to control prices fixed by the arbitrary deci. ion of intere ted partie . Of cour e
what is said above doe not apply to
monopolies · authorize l by law; a ,
for instance, to patented articles.
The odiou features of illegal monor olie are plainly apparent. Th e e can
ab olutely control the price. which
the public shall pay, ancl it is this
monopoli tic feature of such combination to contr 1 price which
tamps them as odiou , b cau e t.hey
xerci e the franc hi e of the monopoly without the legal right. The e
view are supported in the following
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§ 209. Other methods of fixing price. — There may also be

many other methods adopted for fixing the price. The mate-

rial point is not a particular method, but whether the method

chosen will result in fixing the price with requisite certainty,

cases: Anderson v. Jett, 89 Ky. '675, reasonably worth. As pointed out

6 L. R. A. 390. 12 S. W. R. 670; Rail-

road Co. v. Closser, 126 Ind. 348, 9 L.

R. A. 754, 26 N. E. R. 159; People v.

Refining Co., 54 Hun (N. Y.), 354, 5

L. R. A. 386; Richardson v. Buhl, 77

Mich. 632, 6 L. R. A. 457, 43 N. W. R,

1102; Carbon Co. v. McMillin, 119

N. Y. 46, 7 L. R. A. 46, 23 N. E. R. 530;

Stanton v. Allen, 5 Denio, 434, 49 Am.

Dec. 282; Morris Run Coal Co. v.

Barclay Coal Co., 68 Pa. St. 173, 8
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Am. R. 159; Arnot v. Coal Co., 68

N. Y. 558, 23 Am. R. 190; Salt Co. v.

Guthrie, 35 Ohio St. 666; Association

v. Koch, 14 La. Ann. 168; Denver,

etc. R. Co. v. Atchison, etc. R. Co., 15

Fed. R. 650; Hilton v. Eckersley, 6

El. & Bl. 47; West Va. Trans. Co. v.

Ohio River Pipe-Line Co., 22 W. Va.

600, 617; W. U. Teh Co. v. American

Union Tel. Co., 65 Ga. 160, 38 Am. R.

781; Craft v McConoughy. 79 111. 346,

22 Am. R. 171; Raymond v. Leavitt,

46 Mich. 447, 41 Am. R. 170, 9 N. W.

H. 525: Faulds v. Yates, 57 111. 416, 11

Am. R. 24; Wright v. Ryder, 36 Cal.

342, 95 Am. Dec. 186.

" I have no doubt that in executory

contracts of sale, where the goods

have not been accepted, such price

so fixed cannot be recovered; and I

am also of opinion that such price so

fixed is no criterion of the market

value or current price in an action

brought for goods sold and delivered,

where no price has been agreed upon.

In this case the goods have been

ordered and accepted without any

reference to the price to be paid, and

the law presumes that defendant in-

tended to pay what the knives were

in James v. Muir, 33 Mich. 223, the

market value and reasonable worth

of a commodity are not always the

same. Ordinarily the market value

is evidence of what goods are reason-

ably worth. Kountz v. Kirkpatrick,

72 Pa. St. 376, 386, 13 Am. R. 687;

Benj. Sales, p. 103, § 86. If there be

no market value of manufactured

goods, the evidence to establish the

reasonable worth must necessarily

be the cost of production, which

would include the cost of labor and

material, and a reasonable profit on

the cost of production."

And McGrath, J., said : " A price so

fixed is not entitled to rank as the

market price. It is not a market

price, within the contemplation of

the law. The market price of an

article manufactured by a number

§ 209. Other met11ods of fixing price.- There may also be
many other methods adopted for fixing the price. The material point is not a particular method, but "hether the method
chosen will result in fixing the price with requisite certainty.
case : Anderson v. Jett, 89 Ky. 375, reasonably worth. As pointed o~t
6 L. R. A. 390. 12 S. W. R. 670; Rail- in James v. Muir, 33 Mich. 223, the
road Co. v. Closser, 126 Ind. 34 , 9 L. market value and reasonable worth
R. A. r4, 26 N. E. R. 15!.l; People v. of a commodity are not always the
Refining Co., 54 Hun (N. Y.), 354, 5 same. Ordinarily the market value
L. R. A. 3 6; Richard on v. Buhl, 77 is evidence of what goods are rea onMich. 632, 6 L. R. A. 457, 43 N. W. R. ably worth. Kountz v. Kirkpatrick,
1102; Carbon Co. v. Mcl\1illin, 119 n Pa. St. 376, 3 6, 13 Am. R. 687;
N. Y. 46, 7 L. R. A. 46, 23 N. E. R. 530; Benj. Sales, p. 103, § 86. If there be
Stanton . Allen 5 Denio, 434, 49 Am. no market value of manufactured
Dec. 2 9; Morris Run Coal Co. v. goods, the evidence to establi h the
Barclay Coal Co., 6 Pa. St. 173, 8 reasonable worth must neces arily
Am. R. 159; Arnot v. Coal Co., 68 be the cost of production, which
N. Y. 53 , 23 Am. R. 190; alt Co. v. would include the cost of labor and
Guthrie, 3.J Ohio St. 666; A 'Ociation material, and a rea onable profit on
v. Koch, 14 La. Ann. 16 ; Denver, the co t of production."
etc. R. Co. v. Atchi on, etc. R. Co., 15
And l\1cGra.th, J., said: "A price o
Fed. R. 650; Hilton v. Eckersley, 6 fixed i not entitled to rank as the
El. & Bl. 47: We t Va. Trans. Co. v. market price. It is not a market
Ohio River Pipe-Line Co., 22 W. Va. price, within the contemplation of
600, 617; W. U. TeL Co. v. American the law. The market price of an
Union Tel. Co., 65 Ga. 160, 3 Am. R. article manufactured by a number
7 l; Craft v IcConoughy, 9 Ill. 346, of <lifferent person is a price fixed
22 Am. R. 171; Raymond v. Leavitt, by buyer and seller in an open mar46 l\Iicb. 447, 41 Am. R. 170, 9 N. W. k t, in the u sual and ordinary cour e
R. 525: Faulds v. Yate , 57 lll. 4.16, 11 of lawful trade and competition. It
Am. R. 24; Wright v. Ryd er, 36 Cal. cannot be dive ted of these incident ,
.342, 95 Am. Dec. 1 6.
and retain its character. As ociation
"I have no doubt that in executory of this character give the buyer no
contract of sale, where the good voice, and clo e the market again ·t
have not been accepted. uch price competition. In Acebal v. Levy, 10
so fixe<l cannot be recovered; and I Bing. 376, cited in Benjamin on Sale ,
.am al ' O of opinion that such price so § 86, the court declared that. 'vvhen
fixed is no criterion of the market there was no expres contract a · to
-value or current price in an action price, the price is to be a rea, onable
brought for good sold and delivered, price,-' uch a price as the jury upon
where no price has been agreed upon. the trial of the cau e shall, under all
In thi ca e the goods have been the circumstances, decide to be rea-0rdered and accepted without any son able. This price may or may not
reference to the price to be paid, and agree with the current price of the
the law pr _, umes that defendant in- commodity at the port of hipment
tended to pay what the knives were at the precise time when such, hip19.J
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As is said in one case, "the price to be paid must be certain,

or some guide must be agreed on by which it can be found

with certainty. There may be a sale for a reasonable price, in

which case, if the parties afterwards differ, the price must be

made certain by the verdict of a jury. Or there may be a sale

at a price to be afterwards fixed by valuers. In such case if

the valuers refuse to fix the price, the sale is considered incom-

plete, or else as rescinded by the refusal. If, indeed, the thing

sold has been delivered to the vendee, and consumed, so that

merit is made. The current price of

the day may be highly unreasonable

from accidental circumstances, as on

As is said in one case, "the price to be paid must be certain,
or some guide must be agreed on by which it can be found
with certainty. There may be a sale for a reasonable price, in
which case, if the parties afterwards differ, the price must be
made certain by the verdict of a jury. Or there may be a sale
at a price to be afterwards fixed by valuers. Jn such case if
the valuers refuse to fix the price, the sale is considered incomplete, or else as rescinded by the refusal. If, indeed, the thing
sold has been delivered to the vendee, and consumed, so that

account of the commodity having

been purposely kept back by the

vendor himself, or with refei'ence to

the price at other ports in the imme-
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diate vicinity, or from various other

causes.' In James v. Muir, 33 Mich.

223-227, Mr. Justice Campbell, speak-

ing for the court, says: "According

to Acebal v. Levy, there is at least

no implication of a promise to pay at

what may happen to be the market

rate, which may not be always, as

there held, a reasonable rate." In

Kountz v. Kirk patrick, 72 Pa. St. 376,

13 Am. R. 687, the court say: "Ordi-

narily, when an article of sale is in

the market, and has a market value,

there is no difference between its

market value andlhe market price,

and the law adopts the latter as the

proper evidence of the value. This

is not, however, because ' value ' and

' price ' are really convertible terms,

but only because they are ordinarily

so in a fair market. The market

price of an article is only a means of

arriving at compensation; it is not

itself the value of the article, but is

the evidence of value. The law

adopts it as a natural inference of

fact, but not as a conclusive legal

presumption. Without adding more,

I think it is conclusively shown that

what is called the ' market price ' or

the quotations of the articles for a

given day is not always the only evi-

dence of actual value, but that the

true value may be drawn from other

sources, when it is shown that the

price for the particular day has been

unnaturally inflated."

"It has frequently been held that

the value of a commodity is not to

be determined by the necessities of a

particular buyer or the demands of

a particular seller. If the 'current

price ' is not conclusive upon the pur-

chaser, because the vendor may have

by some act of his own made that

price unreasonable, or if it may be

shown that the market price had

been unnaturally inflated, how can

it be said that a price fixed by a com-

bination of the manufacturers of a

given article, with sole reference to

ment is made. The current price of I think it is conclusively shown that
the <lay may be highly unreasonable what is called the 'market price' 0r
from accidental circumstances, as on the quotations of the artides for a
account of the commodity having given day is not always the only evibeen purposely kept back by the dence of actual value, but that the
vendor himself, or with reference to true value may be drawn from other
the price at other ports in the imme- sources, when it is shown that the
diate vicinity, or from various other price for the particular day has bee.n
causes.' In James v. Muir, 33 Mich. unnaturally iufiated."
223-227, l\Ir. Justice Campbell, speak"It has frequently been held that
ing for the court, says: "According the value of a commodity is not to
to Acebal v. Levy, there is at least be determined by the necessities of a
no implication of a promise to pay at particular buyer or the demands of
what may happen to be the market a particular seller. If the' current
rate, which may not be always, as price' is not conclu ive upon the purthere helct, a reasonable rate." In chaser. because the vendor may have
Kountz v. Kirkpatrick, 72 Pa. St. 376, by some act of his own made that
13 Am. R. 687, the court say: '' Ordi- price unreasonable, or if it may be
narily, when an article of sale is in shown that the market. price had
the market, and has a market value, been unnaturally inflated, how can
there is no difference between its it be said that a price fixed by a commarket value and "the market price, bmation of the manufacturers of a
and the law adopts the latter as the given article, with sole reference to
proper evidence of the value. This their interests, is to govern, to the
is not, however, becau e 'value' and exclusion of all other consideration ?
'price' are really convertible term , In such case there is no market price.
but only because they are ordinarily and evidence of a fair m a rket pri e
so in a fair market. The market or a fair market value is clearly adprice of an article is only a means of mi si ble. In the ab ·ence of an agreearriving at compensation; it i not rnent, a price fixed by a combination
itself the value of the article, but is of deal rs does not bind tbe purthe eviden e of value. The law chaser, nor will the law so far counadopt it as a natural inference of tonance such comt:inations as to
fact, but not as a conclu ive legal regard prices fixed by them as even
presumption. Without adding more, ev idence of value."
19()

CH.
CH. V.] OF THE PRICE. [§ 210.

v.J

OF THE PRICE.

[§ 210.

the parties cannot be put in statu quo, the vendee is liable for

a reasonable price. 1 But there cannot be an executed sale so

as to pass the property, where the price is to be fixed by agree-

ment between the parties afterwards, and the parties do not

afterwards agree. One element of a sale is wanting, just as a

different element would be if the thing were not ascertained.

If, in such case, the thing was actually delivered and consumed,

the vendee would be liable, not upon the special imperfect con-

tract, but on an implied contract to pay a reasonable price." 2

§ 210. Method must fix price with certainty. — It is not,

therefore, necessary that the price should be fixed by the con-

tract itself, or at the very time the contract is made, provided

that the parties have settled upon some method hy which the

price may be determined with certainty. "If the parties set-

tle between themselves some method by which it may be as-

the parties cannot be put in statu qiw, the venclee is liable for
a reasonable price. 1 But there cannot be an executed sale so
as to pass the property, where the price is to be fixed by agreement between the parties afterwards, and the parties do not
afterwards agree. One element of a sale is wanting, just as a
different element would be if the thing were not ascertained.
If, in such case, the thing was actually delivered and consumed,
the vendee would be liable, not upon the special imperfect contract, but on an implied contract to pay area. onable price.' 2

certained at a future period, the maxim id certum est quod cer-

tain reddi potest applies, and the price when sb settled shall

relate to the original contract." 3 Thus where the contract for
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the sale of a village lot provided that the price should be that

at which the first lots in the vicinity should be sold, and lots

adjoining the one in question were sold before the action was

brought, it was held that the contract was thus rendered cer-

tain. 4 So where the contract provided that the price of wheat

sold should be ten cents per bushel less than the Milwaukee

market price on a day which the vendor should thereafter

name, it was held sufficient though the wheat was destroyed

before the day was fixed. 5 And a contract for the sale of

wheat which provided for payment at the market price on the

day when the vendor should demand payment was held suffi-

1 Citing Benjamin on Sales, 69; value of gold. Ames v. Quimby, 96

Clarke v. Westrope, 18 C. B. 765. U. S. 324

2 Wittkowsky v. Wasson, 71 N. C. 4 Cunningham v. Brown, siqjra.

451. 5 McConnell v. Hughes, supra. So

s McBride v. Silverthorne, 11 Up. in Shaw v. Smith, 45 Kan. 334. 25 Pac.

Can. Q. B. 545 (citing Ross on Vendors, R. 886, 11 L. R. A. 681, Mechem's Cas.

51); McConnell v.Hughes, 29 Wis. 537; on Damages, 260, the price of flax-

Cunningham v. Brown, 44 Wis. 72. seed was to be " thirty-five cents less

The price may be made to corre- than St. Louis market price on day

.spond with the fluctuations in the of delivery."
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§ 210. Method mu t fix price with certainty.- It is not,
therefore, necessary that the pri e should be fixed by the contract itself, or at the very time the contract is made, provided
that the parties have settled upon some method by which the
price may be determined with certainty. "If the parties settle between themselves some method by which it may be ascertained at a future period, the maxim id certum est quod ce1·tum nddi potest applies, and the price when so settl~d shall
relate to the original contract." 3 Thus where the. contract for
the sale of a village lot provided that the price should be that
at which the first lots in the vicinity should be sold, and lots
adjoining the one in question were sold before the action wa
brought, it was held that the contract was thus rendered certain.4 So where the contract provided that the price of wheat
-sold should be ten cents per bushel less than the :Milwaukee
market price on a day which the vendor should thereafter
name, it was held sufficient though the wheat was destroyed
before the day was fixed. 5 Arnl a contract for the sale of
wheat which provided for payment at the market price on the
day when the vendor should demand payment was held suffiCiting Benjamin on Sales, 69;
Clarke v. Westrope, 1 C. B. 765.
2 Wittkowsky v. Wasson, 71 N. C.
1

451.
3 McBride v. Silverthorne, 11 Up.
Can. Q. B. 545 (citing Ross on Vend or ,
51); McConnell v. Hughe ,29Wi .53i;
.Cunningham v. Brown, 44 Wis. 72.
The price may be made to corre.spond with the fluctuations in the

value of gold. Ames v. Quimby, 96
U. S. 39 4.
4 Cunningham v. Brown, sup1·a.
5 foConnell v. Hughe , supra. So
in Shaw v. Smith, 45 Kan. 334, 25 Pac.
R. 86, 11 L. R. A. 6 1, Mechem 's Cas.
on Damage , 260, the price of flaxseed was to be "thirty-five cent less
than t. Louis market price on day
of delivery."
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§ 211.J

LAW OF SALE.

[BOOK I.

§ 211.]

LAW OF SALE.

[BOOK I.

cient. 1 So a contract for the sale of goods at the price for which

the manufacturers should sell similar articles at a given time

in the following year, affords a specific means by which the

price may be ascertained. 2 And so of a contract to sell at the

same rate which the seller gives to the buyer's neighbors. 3

§ 211. Dependent on subsequent acts or events.— The

cient. 1 So a contract for the sale of goods at the price for which
the manufacturers should sell similar articles at a given time
in the following year, affords a specific means by which the
price may be ascertained. 2 And so of a cor;i tract to sell at the
same rate which the seller gives to the buyer's neighbors.a

amount may also be made to depend upon subsequent events

§ 211. - - Dependent on subsequent acts or events.- Tbe

or conditions, being fixed at one price if a certain event hap-

pens, and at a different price if that event does not happen. 4

But an executory contract to sell ore at a price to be deter-

mined by that which the vendee might subsequently receive

upon a resale of it has been held insufficient to pass the title. 5

So an agreement to pay " as much as any one else would pay "

has been held too uncertain to sustain an action for specific

performance. 6 And an agreement for the sale of ice at a price

which would" yield the seller a net profit not to exceed one
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dollar per ton has been held void for uncertainty. 7

iMcBride v. Silverthorne, supra;

Phifer v. Erwin, 100 N. C. 59, 6 S. E. R.

672. To same effect: Daniel v. Han-

nah (1898), 106 Ga. 91, 31 S. E. R 734.

A contract to pay the seller of logs

"the most that he could get offered

in money for them delivered at Jack-

son, when measured," is sufficient.

Hagins v. Combs (1897), 102 Ky. 165,

amount may also be made to depend upon subsequent events
or conditions, being fixed at one price if a certain event happens, an l at a different price if that event does not happen.4
But an executory contract to sell ore at a price to be determined by that which the venclee might subsequently receive
upon a resale of it has been held insufficient to pass th_e tit l e.~
So an agreement to pay "as much as any one else would pay"
has been hel<l too uncertain to sustain an action for specific
performance. 6 And an agreement for the sale of ice at a price
which woula yield the seller a net profit not to exceed one
dollar per ton has been held void for uncertainty. 7

43 S. W. R 222. And so is a contract

to sell at the " lowest jobbing prices."

Beardsley v. Smith, 61 111. App.. 340.

2 Lund v. McCutchen, 83 Iowa, 755,

49 X. W. R 998.

3 Ashcroft v.Butterworth,136 Mass.

511.

4 As in Newell v. Smith, 53 Conn.

72, where the price of a cow was

fixed at $100 if she proved then to be

with calf, but only §40 otherwise.

See also Brogden v. Marriott, 2 Bing.

N. C. 473, 29 Eng. Com. 397.

A provision in a contract for the

sale of goods to be delivered at dif-

ferent times, that " if, during the de-

liveries on this contract, the price

should be below the price herein

named, we agree to rebate such dif-

ference on deliveries so affected," the

words " the price " mean the market

l McBride v. Silverthorne, sup1'a;
Phifer v. Erwin, 100 N. C. 59, 6 S. E. R.
672. To same effect: Daniel v. Hannah (1 9 ), 106 Ga. 91, 31 S. E. R. 734.
A contract to pay the eller of logs
"the most that he could get offered
in money for them delivered at Jackon, when measured,'' is sufficient.
Hagins '· Combs (1 97), 102 Ky. 165.
43 S. W.R. 22'>. And o i a. contract
to ell at the "lowe t jobbing price .':
Beard ley v. Smith, 61 Ill. App. 340.
2 Luncl v. 1'1cCutchen, 3 Iowa, 755,

4G

T.

3A

w.

R. 99 .

h roft v. Butterworth, 136 fass.

511.

price. Wing v. Wadhams Oil Co.

(1898), 99 Wis. 248, 74 N. W. R 819.

5 Foster v. Lumbermen's Mining

Co., 68 Mich. 188.

6 Gelston v. Sigmund, 27 Md. 334.

But see Hagins v. Combs, supra.

7 Buck master v. Consumers' Ice

Co. (1874), 5 Daly (N. Y.), 313.

In Daniel v. Hannah (1898), 106 Ga.

91, 31 S. E. R 734, a sale of cotton

was made, stipulating that the price

should be "the highest market price

in Thomaston for the cotton on No-

vember 10, 1896." Held, that "the

fact that the pi-ice of the cotton was

to be ascertained subsequently, by

the condition of the market at a par-

ticular place does not affect the va-

lidity or completeness of the sale."

In Deyo v. Hammond (1894), 102.

s in Newell v. mith, 53 Conn.
the price of a cow wa
fixed at . 1 0 if ·he pr ,. d th n to
with calf, but only 40 otherwi .
ee aL o Brogd n v. lllarri tt 2 Bing.
N. . 47 , 9 EnO'. om.· 91.
A provi ion in a
ntract for the
ale of good to e deliver l at lifferent time , that "if, during the de4

72, wher

liveries on this contract, the price
should be below the price herein
named, we agree to rebate such difference on deliveries so affected," the
words "the price" mean the market
price. Wing v. Wadhams Oil Co.
(1 98) 99 Wis. 248, 74 N. W. R. 819.
5 Fo ter v. Lum bermen's Mining
Co., 6 Mich. 1 .
6 Gel ton v. Sigmund, 27 fd. 334:.
But see Hagins v. Combs, sup1'a.
7 Buckma ter v. Con umers' Ice
Co. (1 t4), ·5 Daly (N. Y.), 313.
In Daniel v. Hannah (1 9 ), 106 Ga.
91, 31 . E. R. 734, a sale of cotton
wa made, tipnlating that the price
·hould b "the hig h st market price
in Thoma ton for the cotton on Novemb r 10 1 96.. , Hi ld, that 'the
fact ti at the pri e f the cotton was.
to b a certain <l subsequently. by
the c n<lition of the market at a particular place doe not affect the validity r ornpl ten
of the ale."
In Deyo v. Hammond (1 94), 102.
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Cff.

v.J

OF THE PRICE.

[§ 212.

Cfl, v.]

OF THE PKICE.

[§ 212.

g 212. Price to be fixed by valuers. — It is also compe-

tent for the parties to provide that the price shall be such as

may thereafter be fixed by valuers, 1 and in case it is so fixed

they are as much bound by it as if they had fixed it themselves. 2

The values may properly, and perhaps under the statute of

frauds, in some cases, should, be named in the agreement ; but if

the valuers are appointed and act, this ordinarily is sufficient. 3

Mich. 122, 60 N. W. R. 455. plaintiff price so fixed, even though the party

sold a mare to the defendant under

§ 212. - - Price to be fixed by valuers.- It is also competent for the parties to provide that the price shall be uch as
may thereafter be fixed by valuer ,1 and in case it is so fixed
they :ire as much bound by it as if they had fixed it them el ves. 2
The values may properly, and perhaps under the statute of
frauds, in some ca es, should, be named in the agreement; but if
the valuers are appointed and act, this ordinarily is sufficient. 3

an agreement that if, in a test to be

made within ninety days, the mare

could trot as fast as one owned by the

defendant, an additional price was

to be paid. The test was not made,

owing to the sickness of one mare

and the lameness of the other, both
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having been in the defendant's pos-

session during the ninety days. Held,

that the defendant was nevertheless

liable to pay the extra price, it being

shown from other sources that plaint-

iff's mare was several seconds faster

than defendant's mare.

In Lilienthal v. Suffolk Brewing Co.

(1891), 154 Mass. 185,28 N. K R. 151, a

sale of hops was made for a certain

price, with the condition that if the

purchaser subsequently found it was

not the market price the sale should

be void. Held, that there was a pres-

ent sale upon condition subsequent.

1 That such an appraisement is not

an arbitration, and that the parties

are not entitled to notice of hearing,

and that the appraisal, unless fraudu-

lent, is conclusive, see Norton v. Gale,

95 111. 533, 35 Am. R. 173, citing many

cases. See also Stose v. Heissler, 120

111. 433, 11 N. E R. 161, 60 Am. R.

563. In New England Trust Co. v.

Abbott, 162 Mass. 148, 38 N. E R. 432,

the court say: " It is settled that one

may agree to sell his property at a

price to be determined by another,

and that he will be bound by the

establishing it was interested, pro-

vided the interest was known, and no

objection was made by the parties,

and no fraud or bad faith is shown

Brown v. Bellows. 4 Pick. 179, 189

Palmer v. Clark, 106 Mass. 373, 389

Haley v. Bellamy, 137 Mass. 357

359; Fox v. Hazel ton, 10 Pick. 275

Strong v. Strong, 9 Cush. 560, 569

Benjamin on Sales, § 88, note 3."

2 Wilcox v. Young, 66 Mich. 687.

3 In Brown v. Bellows, 4 Pick.

(Mass.) 179, it is said: "The first ob-

jection is that the writing declared

upon is void by the statute of frauds,

inasmuch as it purports to be a con-

tract concerning the sale of real es-

tate, and is to be partly made out by

parol evidence, for that the referees

are not named in the instrument,

but it depends wholly upon parol evi-

dence to prove who were chosen to

l\fich. 122, 60 N. W. R. 455, plaintiff price so fixed, even though the party
old a mare to the defendant under establi bing it was interested, proan agreement that if, in a te t to be vided the intere twas known, and no
made within ninety day , the mare ohjection was made by the partie.,
could trot as fast as one owned by the and no fraud or bad faith i hown.
defendant, an additional price was Brown v. Bellows. 4 Pick. 179, 1 9;
to be paid. The te ·t wa not made, Palmer v. Clark, 106 fa . 373, 389;
owing to the sickne s of one mare Haley v. Bellamy, 137 l\Ia . 357,
and the lamenes of the other, both 359; Fox v. Hazelton, 10 Pick. 275;
having been in the defendant' pos- Strong v. Strong, 9 Cush. 560, 569;
se ion during the ninety days. H eld, Benjamin on Sales, · , note 3."
that the defendant wa neverthele s
2Wilcox v. Young, 66 1ich. 6 7.
lial>le t o pay the extra price, it being
a In Brown v. Bellows, 4 Pick.
hown from other ources that plaint- (Ma s.) 179, it is said: "The first obiff' mare wa, "everal econd fa ter jection is that the writing declared
than defendants mare.
upon is void by the statute of frauds,
In Lilienthal v. Suffolk Brewing Co. ina much as it purport to be a con(1 91), 154 Mass. 1 5, 2 N. E. R. 151, a tract concerning the sale of real essale of hops wa made for a certain tate, and is to be partly made out by
price, with the condition that if the parol evidence, for that the referee
purchaser subsequently found it was are not named in the in trument,
not the market price the sale should but it depends wholly upon parol evibe void. H eld, that there wa a pre - dence to prove who were chosen to
ent ale u pon condition ub equent. be the referee . What weight might
l That such an apprai ement is not originally have attached to this sugan arbitration, and that the parties gestion it is not nece sary to decide,
are not entitled to notice of hearing, because the contract ha been perand that the appraisal, unles fraudu- formed in this re pect. The partie
lent., is conclusive, ee :rorton v. Gale, were sati. fied with the apprai ·er ,
9- Ill. 533, 35 Am. R. 173, citing many and at.tended upon them during their
ca e. . See also Stose v. Hei sler, 120 apprai al. It i too late for either now
Ill. 433, 11 N. E. R. 161, 60 Am. R. to object that it cannot be legally
563. In New England Tru t Co. v. known who were cho en for that purAbbott, 162 Ma s. 14 , 38 N. E. R. 432, po e. The parties could not have conthe·court say : "It is ettled that one ducted them elves as they did, in thi
may agree to sell his property at a re pect, unle s on account of the
price to be determined by another, agreement, and o far in performand that he will be bound by the ance of the same."
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§§ 213, 214.J

LAW OF SALE.

[BOOK I.

§§ 213, 214.]

§ 213. - - . But in order that the contract shall take effect

213.

LAW OF SALE.

[BOOK I.

-. But in order that the contract shall take effect

it is essential that the price shall be fixed as provided in the

agreement; for if the parties fail to appoint valuers, or the

latter fail or refuse to act, the contract, if executory, must fail,

and unless the contrary intention appears the title will not

pass, 1 even though the failure in the valuation should be caused

by one of the parties. 2 Where, however, the goods have been

delivered, and the vendee has prevented the valuation by con-

suming or disposing of the goods before the valuation has taken

place, he will be liable for their reasonable worth. 3

§ 214. Payment of the price. — The question of the payment

of the price; when it is due; where, how and to whom it is to

be paid; in what medium, and the like; and the question of

it is es ential that the price shall be fixed as provided in the
agreement; for if the parties fail to appoint valuers, or the
latter fail or refuse to act, the contract, if executory, must fail,
and unless the contrary intention appears the title will not
pass,1 even though the failure in the valuation should be caused
by one of the parties. 2 vVhere, however, the goods have been
delivered, and the vendee has prevented the valuation by consuming or disposing of the goods before the valuation bas taken
place, he will be liable for their reasonable worth. 3

payment in specific articles, are matters reserved for treatment

in a later chapter upon the generaL subject of " Payment." 4
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1 In Fuller v. Bean, 30 N. H. 290. the

question was whether certain goods

had been sold, so that the title passed,

in an interview between Fuller and

one Felton at Concord. When the

parties separated at Concord the price

§ 214:. Payment of' the price.-The question of the payment
of the price; when it is due; where, bow and to w horn it is to
be paid; in what medium, and the like; and the question of
payment in specific articles, are matters reserved for treatment
in a later chapter upon the general subject of "Payment." 4

had not been fixed, but they agreed

that it should be fixed by one Neal,

who did fix it the next day. Said

the court: "The bargain was that

noluerit vel non potuerit pretium

definire tunc pro nihil o esse venditio-

nem. Inst. 3, 23; Poth. de Vente,

pt. 1, art. 2, sec. 2. That appraisal re-

mained to be made. It was an act

to be done before the property could

pass to Fuller, unless it could be

fairly inferred from the evidence

relative to the agreement that it was

the understanding of the parties that

Neal should appraise the goods, and the property should nevertheless pass

that Fuller should pay for them at at once."

the rate of seventy-five per cent, of

the appraisal, one half by his own

note and the other half by J. G. Ful-

ler's note and cash. Now a price is

essential to a contract of sale. Nulla

emptiosine pretio essepotest; though

if the price can be made certain it is

sufficient. Just. Inst. 3, 23: 4 Kent's

Com. 463, 477: Poth. de Vente, p. 1,

sec. 1, p. 3. When the parties then

separated and Fulton returned to

Boston the sale was incomplete. It

was at that time contingent whether

Neal would make an appraisal, with-

out which there would be no sale.

Sin autem ille qui nominatus est vel

2 Thurnell v. Balbirnie,2 Mees.& W.

786; Vickers v. Vickers, L. R. 4 Eq.

529; Milnes v. Gery, 14 Ves. 400.

3 Clarke v. Westrope, 18 Com. B.

765, 86 Eng. Com. L. 764; Humaston

v. Telegraph Co., 20 Wall. (U. S.) 20

[citing Inchbald v. Western Planta-

tion Co., 17 Com. B. (N. S.) 733; Hall

v. Conder, 2 id. 53: United States v.

W T ilkins, 6 Wheat. (U. S.) 135; Ken-

niston v. Ham, 9 Fost. (N. H.) 506;

Holliday v. Marshall, 7 Johns. (N. Y.)

211; Cowper v. Andrews, Hobart, 40,

l In Fuller v. Bean, 30 N. H. 290. the
question was whether certain goods
had been sold, so that the title passed,
in an interview between Fuller and
one Felton at Concord. When the
parties eparated at Concord the price
bad not been fixed, but they agreed
that it should be fixed by one Neal,
who did fix it the next day. Said
the court: ·'The bargain was that
Neal should appraise the goods, and
that Fuller should pay for them at
the rate of eventy-fi-ve per cent. of
the apprai al, one half by his own
note and the other half by J. G. Fuller's note and ca h. Now a price is
essential to a contract of sale. Nulla
emptio sine pretio e ·se potest; though
iE the pri e can be made certain it i
suffi ient. Ju t. Inst. 3, 23: 4 Kent.'
Com. 46 , 477; Poth. de Vente, p. 1,
sec. 1, p. 3. When the partie then
separated and Fulton returned to
Boston the ale wa incomplete. It
wa at that time contingent wb h r
Neal would make an apprai al, without which there would be no ale.

noluerit vel non pot'lle1·it p1·etiitm
definire tune pro nihilo esse venditioneni. Inst. 3, 23; P oth. de Vente,

pt. 1, art. 2, sec. 2. That appraisal remained to be made. It was an act
to be done before the property could
pass to Fuller, unless it could be
fairly inferred from the evidence
relative to the agreement that it was
the understanding of the parties that
the property should nevertheless pass
at once."
2Thurnell v. Balbirnie,21\fee .& W.
786; Vickers v. Vickers, L. R. 4 Eq.
529; tfilne v. Gery, H Ves. 400.
3 Clarke v. Westrope, 18 Com. B.
765, 86 Eng. Com. L. 764; Ruma ton
v. Telegraph Co., 20 Wall. (U. S.) 20
[citing ln chbald v. We ·tern Plantation Co., 17 Com. B. (N. .) 733; Hall
v. Conder, 2 id. 53: nited States v.
"W ilkins, 6 Wheat. (U. .) 135; Kenni, ton v. Ham, 9 Fo t. (N. H.) 506;
Holliday v. Iarshall, 7 Johns. (N. Y.)
211; Cowper v. Andrew , Hobart, 40,
43]; Albemarle Lumber Co. v. Wilcox, 10- N. C. 34.
Sin autem ille qui nominatus est vel
4 See post, § 1404 et seq.
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CHAPTER YI.

OF THE CONTRACT OF SALE — IN GENERAL.

§ 215. Purpose of this chapter.

216. Of the contract in general.

I. Of Mutual Assent.

217. Necessity of mutual assent.

218. Assent need not be express.

219. Assent must be mutual, un-

CHAPTER VI.

conditional and co-existent.

220-223. Mere negotiations not

amounting to proposition

OF THE CONTRA.CT OF SALE-IN GENERAL.

and acceptance.
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§ 215. Purpose of this chapter. — Sale being a transfer of
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the title to goods in pursuance of a valid agreement to that

effect, it is obvious that a question which demands early atten-

tion is, What bargainings between parties will suffice to indi-

cate their assent to a transfer of the title ?

Ordinarily this must be a question depending upon the gen-

eral principles of contract, and it might be safe and proper,

perhaps, to leave the consideration of this aspect of contracts

to the writers upon that general subject. A review, however,

of the leading principles applicable to this particular phase of

that greater subject may not be thought to be inappropriate,

and will be attempted here.

So much of the subject as is unaffected by the statute of

frauds will be dealt with in this chapter, and the application of

that statute will be the subject-matter of the following chapter.

§ 216. Of the contract in general. — Except as it is affected

by the statute of frauds, there is nothing in the rules governing

the formation of the contract of sale which, requires that that

contract shall be made in any particular manner or in any

particular form. Competent parties are required — and the ques-

§ 215. Purpose of this chapter.- ale being a transfer of
the title to goo<ls in pursuance of a valid agr ment to that
effect, it is obvious that a question which demands early attention is, What bargainings between parties will suffice to indicate their assent to a transfer of the title?
Ordinarily this must be a question depending upon the general principles of contract, and it might be safe and proper,
perhaps, to leave the consideration of this a pect of contract
to the writers upon that general subjeut. A review, however,
of the leading principles applicable to this particular phase of
that greater subject may not be thought to be inappropriate,
and will be attempted here.
So much of the subject as is unaffected by the statute of
frauds will be dealt with in this chapter, and the application of
that statute will be the subject-matter of the following chapter.

tion of their competency has already been considered ; and there

is required the assent of the parties that the title to a specific

chattel shall pass from one party and vest in the other. This

matter of assent or agreement, therefore, seems to be the one

§ 216. Of the contract in general.- Except as it is affected
by the statute of frauds, there is nothing in the rules governing

which logically falls next in order for consideration ; and the

formal rule may be stated, as an introduction to the general

subject, thus —

J ' 203

the formation of the contract of sale which requires that that
contract shall be rna<le in any particular manner or in any
particular form. Competent parties are required-and the question of their competency has already been con iclered; and there
is r quired the assent of the parties that the title to a specific
chattel shall pass from one party and vest in the other. This
matter of assent or agreement, therefore, seems to be the one
which loO'ically falls next in order for consideration; and the
formal rule may be stated, as an introduction to the general
subject, thus202

CH. VI.J CONTRACT OF SALE — IN GENEKAL. [§§ 217-219.

CH. YI.]

CONTRACT OF SALE- IN GENERAL.

[§§ 217-219.

I.

I.

Of Mutual Assent.

§ 217. The necessity of mutual assent. — To the making of

the perfect contract of sale, as to the making of every other

contract, it is indispensable that there should be the mutual

OF

MUTUAL

A

E T.

assent of the parties to the subject-matter of the contract. And

in this, as in other cases, it is essential that the minds of the

parties shall meet, — that they shall both assent to the same

thing and in the same sense.

Hence until there is a clearly-defined offer on the one side to

sell, and a definite acceptance of that offer on the other, there

can be no sale, and the title will not pass even though the

property be delivered. 1

But, to quote the language of Mr. Benjamin: 2 —

§218. The assent need not be express. — "The assent of

the parties to a sale need not be express. It may be implied

from their language 3 or from their conduct; 4 may be signified

by a nod or a gesture, 5 or may be inferred from silence in cer-
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tain cases; as if a customer takes up wares off a tradesman's

counter and carries them away, and nothing is said on either

side, the law presumes an agreement of sale for the reasonable

worth of the goods." 6

§ 219. Assent must be mutual, unconditional and co-exist-

ent. — "But," continues Mr. Benjamin, "the assent must, in

order to constitute a valid contract, be mutual and intended to

1 Utley v. Donaldson, 94 U. S. 29, 47 ; a draft of a proposed agreement,

§ 217. The nece ity of mutual a ent.-To the making of
the perfect contract of sale, as to tbe making of eYery other
contract, it ·is indi pen able that there should be the mutual
a ent of the parties to the subject-matter of the contract. And
in this, as in other ca es, it is essential that the minds of the
parties shall meet,- that they shall both as ent to the same
thing and in the same sense.
Hence until there is a clearly-defined offer on the one side to
sell, and a definite acceptance of that offer on the other, there
can be no sale and the title will not pass even though the
prop rt. be deliver d. 1
But, to quote the lan uage of :Mr. Benjamin: 2-

Gardner v. Lane, 12 Allen (Mass.), 89; which was intended to form the

Summers v. Mills, 21 Tex. 77. basis of a formal contract, to be after-

2 Benjamin on Sale, £ 38. wards executed by them both."

3 Citing Joyce v. Swann, 17 C. B. 5 The fall of the hammer at an auc-

(N. S.) 84, " a curious case of what tion sale, the nod of the bidder, and

one of the judges termed a ' grum- the like, are familiar instances of

bling ' assent." this.

4 Citing Brogden v. Metropolitan 6 Citing Black. Com., Bk. II, ch. 30,

Ry. Co., 2 App. Cas. 666, " where the p. 443; Hoadley v. McLaine, 10 Bing.

parties had acted upon the terms of 482, per Tindal, C. J.
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§ 21 . '!'he a . ent ne d not be exp re .- "The a s nt of
the parties to a sale n d not be expr
It may be implied
3
from their lan uage or from their conduct; 4 may be signifi d
by a nod or a g tur ,5 or may be inferred from ilence in certain cases· a if a cu tomer tak s up wares off a trade man's
counter an l carri s them away, and nothing is aid on either
side, the law presumes an agreement of sale for the reasonable
worth of the goods." 6

§ 219. As, ent must be mntnal, unconditional and co-exi. tent.-" But," continue Mr. Benjamin, "the assent must, in
order to con titute a valid contract, be mutual ancl intended to
I Utley v. Donald on, 94 U. '. 29, 47;
Gardner v. Lane, 19 Allen (l\Ia .), 39;
ummers v. Mills, 21 Tex. 77.
2 Benjamin on Sale, .' 3 .
3 Citing J oyce v. Swann, 17 C. B.
(N. .) 4, "a curious ca e of what
one of the judges termed a' grum·
bling ' a ent."
4 Citing Brogden v. Metropolitan
Ry. Co., 2 pp. Ca . 666, "where the
partie had acted u1Jon the terms of

a draft of a proposed agreement,
which was in tended to form the
ba i. of a formal contract, to be afterward executed by them both. '
5 The fall of the hammer at an auction ale, the nod of the bidder, and
the like, are familiar instances of
this.
6 Citing Black. Com., Bk. II, ch. 30,
p. 443; Hoadley v. 1\IcLaine, 10 Bing.
4 2, per Tindal, C. J.
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§ 220.J

LAW OF

ALE.

(B

K I.

§ 220.] LAW OF SALE. [BOOK I.

bind loth sides. It must also co-exist at the same moment of

time. A mere proposal by one man obviously constitutes no

bargain of itself. It must be accepted by another, and this

acceptance must be unconditional. If a condition be affixed

by the party to whom the offer is made, or any modification

or change in the offer be requested, this constitutes in law a re-

jection of the offer, and a new proposal, equally ineffectual to

complete the contract until assented to by the first proposer.

Thus, if the offer by the intended vendor be answered by a

proposal to give a less sum, this amounts to a rejection of the

offer, which is at an end, and the party to whom it was made

cannot afterwards bind the intended vendor by a simple ac-

ceptance of the first offer."

§ 220. Mere negotiations not amounting to proposition

and acceptance. — Mere negotiations which do not ripen into

an offer, on one side, and an acceptance of that offer as made,

on the other side, do not amount to a contract of sale. This

is very clearly put, in a leading case, 1 by Sergeant, J., as fol-
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lows: "It is incumbent on a party suing to recover damages

for breach of contract to make out a clear case of some mat-

ter or thing mutually assented to and agreed upon by the par-

b1°nd both sides. It mu t al o co-e:ri. t at tlie , ame mom nt nf
time. A mere propo al by one m, n b i u I r n ti ut n
bargain of itself. It mu. t be a 1 t d by an th r an 1 thi
acceptan
must be 'ltn('onrlitional. If a c mliti n 1 a 1.' l
by the party to ·whom th off r i mad
r any m lifi , ti n
or chan e in the off r b r qu ste l thi c n ti tu
in law a r jection of the offer and a n w pr I
1, qu 11; in IT tu, 1 t
complete tbe con~ract until as nt l to by th fir t Ir p r.
Thus, if the offer by th int ml 1 v n lor b an \Y r 1 by
proposal to give a 1 ~ um tbi am unt to a r j ti n of th
offer which is at an n 1 an l th I c r t "h m it w m l
cannot aft rnrarcls bind tb int n l 1 v n l r y a impl , a ceptance of the first off r."

ties to the alleged contract. When the agreement is in writ-

ing, signed and executed by the parties, their assent to all that

is contained in it is no longer a matter of dispute; the ques-

tions which arise in such a case are of a different character.

But when it is epistolary, consisting of a series of letters con-

taining inquiries, propositions and answers, it is necessary that

some point should be attained at which the distinct proposi-

tion of the one party is unqualifiedly acceded to by the other,

so that nothing further is wanting on either side to manifest

that aggregatio mentium which constitutes an agreement, and

that junction of wills in the same identical matter, offered on

one side and concurred in by the other, bringing everything to

a conclusion, which in contemplation of law amounts to a con-

tract. If a proposition be made by one man to another to

1 Slaymaker v. Irwin, 4 Whart. (Pa.) 369.

20 i

§ 220. Mere negotiation not amountin()I' to propo. iti n
and acceptance.-ltI r n otiati n ' hich do n trip n int
an offer, on one sid , an l an ace ptance of that off r as ma l
on the other side, do not amount to a contract E a.le. Thi
is very clearly put, in a 1 adino· ca 1 by
rg ant J., as follows: "It is incumb nt on a party suing to recov r dama0
for breach of contract to make out a clear case of ome matter or thing mutually a entecl to and agreed upon by the parties to the alleged contract. When the agreem nt is in writing, signed and executed by the parti , their as ent to all that
is contained in it is no longer a matter of di pute; the qu stions which arise in such a ca e are of a different cbaract r.
But when it is epistolary, consisting of a serie of letters containing inquiries, proposition and an wers, it is nece ary that
some point should be attained at which the di tinct propo ition of the one party is unqualifiedly acceded to by the oth r,
so that nothing further is wanting on either side to manife t
that aggregatio mentiuni which constitutes an agreement, and
that junction of wills in the same identical matter, offered on
one side and concurred in by the other, bringing everything to
a conclusion, which in contemplation of law amounts to a contract. If a proposition be made by one man to another to
1

Slaymaker v. Irwin, 4 Whart. (Pa.) 369.
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OH. VI.] CONTRACT OF SALE IN GENERAL. [§ 2lU.

purchase an article from him at a certain price and on certain

terms, which is accepted as offered, there is then an agreement

or contract. But if, instead of accepting it, the party declines

so doing, and then new terms of purchase are offered, the as-

sent is vet to be given by the other to the terms thus varied.

It is not a contract — it is the suggestion or proposal of a new

subject of contract, on which the first party has again a right

to pause, to consider, to accept, to reject, to suggest new terms;

and all is in the meantime merely negotiation. 1 '

§ 221. . In a case 1 often cited it appeared that A wrote

to B as follows: "Say how many white, colored and woolen

purcha an articl fr m 1 im at a certain price an 1 on certain
re l th r i th n an a0 r em n t
which i ace I t l a
ut if in t a 1 f ace I tin it th par y l lin
or c ntra t .
1 in
n l th n n w t rm f I ur ha ar o r d h a sent i y t to b giv n b th oth r to h t rm thu Yari l.
I i not a contra ·t-it i th uo- · tin r pr p al of an w
u j ct of ontra t, on whi ·h th e 'r I ar h,
t pc u
t c n id r t a c pt tor j ct to u0 er
an l 11 i in tho m antim mer lj n 0 tiati n. '
T

rags you have on hand, and your prices for them.''' B replied :

"I have about a ton each, white and colored rags, and my

prices are three and one-half cents for colored and seven cents

for white." A replied: - I will take the rags at the price you

name." B made no written reply, but there was evidence

tending to show a subsequent oral agreement by him to de-

liver the rags, which he afterwards refused to do. Said ftfet-
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calf, .J.: "The evidence introduced l.y the plaintiffs at the trial

to

;.121. - - . In
a f 11 w "' :

rot

failed to prove that the defendants made the contract with

them for the breach of which their action was brought. That

evidence consisted of three letters. The first was from the

plaintiffs to the defendants, merely inquiring what were the

quantity and price of rags which they had on hand. The sec-

ond was the defendants' reply to the first, merely stating the

quantity of rags which they had, and the price thereof. Thus

far there was no offer of one party to buy, nor of the other

party to sell. The third letter was from the plaintiffs, saying

to the defendants that they would take the rags at the price

which the defendants had named. This was the first offer in

the case, and this offer the defendants never accepted in writ-

ing. And an oral acceptance, if they had made it, would not

have bound them; the case being within the statute of frauds,

no part of the rags having been accepted and received by the

plaintiffs, and nothing having been given by them in earnest

1 Smith v. Gowdy, 8 Allen (Mass.), 5G6.

203

vi l n
r t wa from the
l la.intiff to the l f n lant m r 1y in iuirinO' what w re the
uantit n l price f ra · which th J
tl on ban 1. Th s nd w th defen lant r ly t th fir t m rely tatin the
uantit} of rag which they ha l and the price thereof. Thus
fi- r th re ' as no off r of n party to buy nor f the other
party to 11. The third 1 tter wa from the 1 Iaintiff
in
to the lef ndant that th y woul 1 t ke th rag at the price
which the defen lant had name . This wa the first offer in
the ca e an l thi offer the ef ndant nev r ac epted in writin0.
nd an oral acce1 tanc if th ha ma l it w ul l n t
hav b und them· the ca e b in0 wit in the tatute of fraud ,
no 1 rt f th ra ba-ving be n ace pt d an receive l by the
pl, in tiffs, and nothing having be n i en by them in earnest
l

Smith v. Gowdy, Allen ()Ia s.), 566.
20-

§§ 222- 224. J

LAW OF

ALE.

(B

OK I.

§§ 222-224.] law of sale. [book i.

to bind the bargain, or in part payment. It is clear, therefore,

that no contract was completed, there having been no assent

to a sale by the union of both parties' minds."

§ 222. . So, in a recent case, 1 it appeared that the plaint-

iff, Ahearn, asked one member of defendants' firm how much

to bind the bargajn, or in part payment. It is cl ar, ther fore,
that no contract was complete l, there having been no a. sent
to a sale by the union of both parti s' minds."

they were paying for stave-bolts, and was told that defendants

would take all he could make and deliver at $2 per cord.

Plaintiff made a lot of bolts, which he proposed to furnish to

defendants, but they denied any bargain. Ahearn sued them

for not accepting the bolts. Said the court: "There was no

contract made out. Ahearn did not inform defendants that he

would accept or act on their order, or deliver any bolts, or, if

any, how many. The transaction went no further than what

occurs when any one asks another what he will either give or

take for commodities. Such inquiries may lead to bargains,

but do not make them."

§ 223. . So, again, 2 plaintiff inquired of defendant the

price of certain steers belonging to the latter. Defendant
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wrote in reply : " I could not give you a close price on the

steers, on account of not seeing them for a while, but they

ought to be worth $4.25. ... Go see them." Plaintiff

went to see them, and wrote that he would take them at the

price named, but defendant sold them elsewhere. In an action

by plaintiff for breach of an alleged contract of sale, it was

held that defendant's letter did not constitute an offer, and

that there was therefore no contract between the parties.

§ 224. Mere announcement to traders or price-list is not

§ 222. - - . So, in a recent ca ,1 it appear cl that tbe plaintiff, Ahearn, asked one member of defendants' firm bow much
they were paying for stave-bolt , and was told that defendants
would take all he could make and deliver at $2 per cord .
Plaintiff made a lot of bolts, which he propo ed to furnish to
defendants, but they denied any bargain. Ahearn sued them
for not accepting the bolts. Said the court: ' There was no
contract made out. Ahearn did not inform cl f ndant that be
would accept or act on their ord r, or deliver any bolts, or, if
any, how many. The tran action went no further than what
occurs when any one asks another what he will either give or
take for commodities. Such inquiries may lead to bargains,
but do not make them."

an otter to sell such goods as may be ordered. — So a mere

advertisement or announcement of goods for sale, or a price-

list or circular calling the attention of prospective purchasers

to goods or prices, or a mere offer to sell goods generally, does

not constitute an offer to sell such goods as may be ordered at

i Ahearn v. Ayres, 38 Mich. 692. 2 Patton v. Arney (1895), 95 Iowa,

6G4, 64 N. W. R. 635.

206

§ 223. - - . So, again, 2 plaintiff inquired of defendant the
price of certain steers belonging to the latter. Defendant
wrote in reply: "I could not give you a close price on the
steers, on account of not seeing them for a while, but they
ought to be worth $4.25.
Go see them." Plaintiff
went to see them, and wrote that he would take them at the
price named, but defendant sold them elsewhere. In an action
by plaintiff for breach of an alleged contract of sale, it was
held that defendant's letter did not constitute an offer, and
that there was therefore no contract between the parties.

§ 224:. Mere announcement to traders or price-list is not
an ott'er to sell such goods as may be orde r ed. - So a mere
advertisement or announcement of goods for sale, or a pricelist or circular calling the at ten ti0n of prospective purchasers
to goods or prices, or a mere offer to sell goods generally, does
not constitute an offer to sell such goocls as may be ordered a t
l

Ahearn v. Ayres, 138 Mich. 692.

2 Patton v. Arney (1895), 95 Iowa?
664, 6fN. W . R. fi35.
206

CH. V I.]

00:.NTRACT OF SALE -

IN GE ERAL.

[§ 224.

CH. VI.]

CONTRACT OF SALE IN GENERAL.

[§ 224.

the prices named. 1 Thus, in a leading case, 2 it appeared that

the defendants wrote to the plaintiff saying: "We are author-

ized to offer Michigan fine salt in full car-load lots of eighty

to ninety-five bbls., delivered in your city at eighty-five cents

i Moulton v. Kershaw, 59 Wis. 816,

the prices named. 1 Thus, in a leading case,2 it appeared that
the d fenclants wrote to the plaintiff aying: ""'\Ve are authorized to offer Michi;:,an fine salt in full car-load lots of eighty
to ninety-five bbls., delivered in your city at eighty-five cents

18 N. W. R. 172, 48 Am. R. 516;

Beaupre v. Telegraph Co., 21 Minn.

155; Kinghorne v. Telegraph Co., 18

U. C. Q. B. 60; Schenectady Stove

Co. v. Holbrook, 101 N. Y. 45, 4 N. E.

R. 4.

2 Moulton v. Kershaw, supra, dis-

tinguishing Keller v. Ybarru, 3 Cal.

147.

In Beaupre v. Telegraph Co., 21

Minn. 155, supra, it appeared that
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the plaintiffs, merchants in St. Paul,

wrote to R., a wholesale dealer in

pork at Dubuque, " Have you any

more Northwestern mess pork, or

prime mess? Also extra mess; tele-

graph price on receipt of this." R.

telegraphed in reply: "Letter re-

ceived. No light mess here. Extra

mess twenty-eight seventy-five

($28.75)." On July 15, the plaintiffs,

having received R. ! s dispatch, deli v.

ered to the defendant at St. Paul, at

about 6 o'clock P. M., the following

message addressed to R., with a re-

quest to forward it without delay:

" Dispatch received. Will take two

hundred extra mess, price named."

Held, that the letter and telegrams

did not constitute a contract. Tiie

court said: "The plaintiffs, in their

complaint, treat Ryan's dispatch as

an offer to sell such quantity of pork

as they might order, at the price

therein named, and their own mes-

sage as an acceptance of such offer,

and an agreement on their part to

take two hundred barrels at that

price. If such were the character of

these dispatches, then the plaintiffs'

message, if seasonably delivered,

would have effected a valid execu-

tory contract of sale, by which Ryan

would be bound to furnish the pork

contracted for, at the contract price.

. . . But neither Ryan's dispatch

nor the plaintiffs' message will bear

the construction put upon it in the

complaint. The plaintiffs had writ-

ten to Ryan, inquiring if he had any

more pork of certain kinds, and re-

questing him to "telegraph price on

receipt of this." Ryan accordingly

telegraphed as follows: "Letter re-

ceived. No light mess here. Extra

mess twenty-eight seventy-five

($28.75> M Upon receipt of this dis-

patch, the plaintiffs sent this mes-

sage, which the defendant neglected

to deliver in due season: "Dispatch

received. Will take two hundred

extra mess, price named." Ryan's

I Ioulton v. K er haw 59 'Vi . 316, me age, if
ea onably delivered,
1 N. W. R. 172, 4
rn. R. 516; would have effected a vltlid execuBeaupre v. Telegraph Co., 21 finn. tory contract of ale, by which Ryan
15-; Kinghorne v. Teleg raph Co., 18 would be bound to furnish the pork
U. 0. . B. 60; chenectady to'e contracted for, at the contract price.
Co. v. Holbrook, 101 N. Y. 4 -, 4 N. E. • • . But neither Ryan's Ji. patch
R. 4.
nor the plaintiff ' message will bear
2 foulton v. Ker haw, supra, dis- the con. truction put upon it in the
tingui hmg Keller v. Ybarru, 3 Cal. ·omplaint. The plaintiff had writ147.
ten to ran, inquiring if he had any
In Beaupre v. Telegraph Co., 21 more pork of c rtain kind , and reIinn. 15 -, sitpra, it appeared that que ting him to ' telegraph price on
the plaintiff , merchant in t. Paul, receipt of thi . " Ryan a corclingly
wrote to R., a whole ale dealer in telegraph d a follow : "Letter repork at Dubuque "Have you any ceived. No light me, h re. Extra
more I orthwe t rn m
pork, or me
twenty-eight sev nty-:five
prime me ? Al ·o extra me ; t le- (. '> •75). ' Upon r cei pt of thi di graph price on receipt of thi ." R. patch, the plaintiff ent thi me~
telegraphed in r eply: "Letter re- age, which the clefondant neglected
ceived. Ko light me here. Extra to d liver in clue .ea on: "Di patch
me
twenty-eight tffenty-five receiv cl ' ill take two hunur d
("'..., . 5)." On July 1-, the plaintiff, extra me , price named." Ryan'
having received R.:s di -·pa.tch, deliv_ di patch did not purport to be an
ered to the defendant at t. Paul, at off r to sell any quantity of pork
about 6 o'clock P. 1., the following whatever, nor wa the plaintiff, · me me age addre. sed to R., with a re- age an acceptan e of any offer. The
que t to forward it without delay: ea on able delivery of plaintiffs' me "Di patch r eceivecl Will take two .. age to Ryan would not have efhundred extra me s, price named. ' fected any contract binding him to
Held, that the letter and telegram deliv r to the plaintiffs t"·o hundred
did not constitute a contract. The barrel . at tbe price named. Ryan·s
court said: "The plaintiff , in their di patch wa rather (as seems to be
com1 laint, treat Ryan' di patch a admitted by the plaintiff in their
an offer to sell uch quantity of pork printed argument) a quotation of
a they might order, at the price the market price of pork, or perhaps
therein named, and their own mes- a tatement of the price at which he
age a an acceptance of uch off r, held his own pork· ancl the plaintand an agreement on their part to iff ' m . age wa an offer to take two
take two hundred barrels at that hundred. barrel at the price namedprice. If uch were the character of a mere order for good ~ , which Ryan
these di patche , then the plaintiff
might accept or reject at his pleas207
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[BOOK I.

§ 225.] LAW OF SALE. [BOOK I.

per bbl." The plaintiff telegraphed: "Your letter of yester-

day received and noted. You may ship me 2,000 bbls. of

Michigan fine salt as offered in your letter." The court held

that the letter did not constitute an offer of sale. Said the

court : " We place our opinion upon the language of the letter

of the appellants, and hold that it cannot be fairly construed

into an offer to sell to the respondent any quantity of salt he

might order, nor any reasonable amount he might see fit to

order. The language is not such as a business man would use

in making an offer to sell to an individual a definite amount

of property. The word ' sell ' is not used. They say, ' We aro

authorized to offer Michigan fine salt,' etc., and volunteer an

opinion that at the terms stated it is a bargain. They do not

say we offer to sell to you. They use the general language

proper to be addressed generally to those who were interested

in the salt trade. It is clearly in the nature of an advertise-

ment or business circular to attract the attention of those in-

terested in that business to the fact that good bargains in salt
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could be had by applying to them, and not as an offer by which

they were to be bound, if accepted, for any amount the per-

sons to whom it was addressed might see fit to order. We

think the complaint fails to show any contract between the

parties."

§ 225. . So in a recent case in Massachusetts 1 it is said:

" A contract is an agreement which creates an obligation. If

a person writes to a merchant, ' At what price will you fill my

ure, and until his acceptance no con- ten car-loads as per your quotation."

tract would exist between the par- This was held to constitute a corn-

ties." plete contract from which the seller

But this rule as to quotations was could not withdraw by telegraphing,

held not to apply where one party "Impossible to book your order,

wrote to the other, " Please advise Output all sold." Fairmount Glass

us the lowest price you can make us Works v. Grun den-Martin Wooden-

on our order for ten car-loads of ware Co. (1899), Ky. — , 51 S. W.

Mason green jars," and the other re- R. 196.

plied, "We quote you Mason fruit lAshcroft v. Butterworth, 136

jars" at certain prices "for immedi- Mass. 511. See also Lincoln v. Erie

per bbl." The plain tiff telegraphed: "Your letter of yest 'relay received and noted. You may ship me 2, 00 bbls. of
Michigan fine salt as offered in your l tter." The court h kl
that the letter did not constitute an off r of sale.
aid the
court: "We place our opinion upon the language of the letter
of the appellants, and hold that it cannot be fairly con tru<:.d
into an offer to sell to the respon l nt any quantity of salt he
might order, nor any rea onable amount h mi ·ht see fit to
order. The language is not such as a busin ss man would use
in making an offer to sell to an individual a definite amount
of property. The word' sell' is not used. They say,' \Ve aro
authorized to offer .Michigan fine salt,' etc., and volunteer an
opini9n that at the terms stated it is a bargain. They do not
say we offer to sell to you. They use the general language
proper to be addressed g nerally to those who were interested
in the salt trade. It is clearly in the nature of an advertisement or business circular to attract the attention of those interested in that business to the fact that good bargains in salt
coukl be had by applying to them, and not as an offer by which
they were to be bound, if accepted, for any amount the persons to w horn it was addressed might see fit to order. We
think the complaint fails to show any contract between the
parties."

ate acceptance;" to which the first Preserving Co., 132 Mass. 129.

replied by telegraph, "Enter order
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§ 225. - - . So in a recent case in Massachusetts 1 it is said:
"A contract is an agreement which creates an obligation. If
a person writes to a merchant, 'At what price will you fill my
ure, and until his acceptance no con- ten car-loads as per your quotation."
tract would exist between the par- This was held to constitute a comties."
plete contract from which the seller
But this rule as to quotations was could not withdraw by telegraphing,
held not to apply where one party "Impossible to book your order.
wrote to the other, "Please ad vise Output all sold." Fairmount Glass
us the lowe t price you can make us Works v. Grunden-Martin Woodenon our or ler for ten car-loads of ware Co. (1899), - - Ky. - , 51 S. W.
Mason green jar ," and the other re- R. 196.
I Ashcroft v. Butterworth, 136
plied, "We quote you Mason fruit
jars" at certain prices "for immedi- Mass. 511. See also Lincoln v. Erie
ate acceptance;" to which the first Preserving Co., 132 Mass. 129.
replied by telegraph, "Enter order
208

CH. VI.] CONTRACT OF SALE — IN GENERAL. [§§ 220, 227.

orders for goods?' and receives in writing the answer, 'I will

sell you at die same rate I sell your neighbors,' is the merchant

bound to fill any order or any reasonable order he may receive

before the offer is revoked? The offer is not certain, or capable

of beino- made certain, in regard to the quantity or particular

qualiuCsize and kind of goods which the merchant agrees to

sell It is not intended to bind him absolutely to sell his whole

stock or any specific part of it which the customer may order.

It does not contain the means of identifying the proper y he

offers to sell. It expresses a general willingness to sell this

customer, out of his stock, at the same price at which he sells

another, and leaves the merchant the right to accept or reject

any particular order."

S o» 6 Offer must he accepted — Mere unaccepted offer not

enough!- So clearly a mere offer on the one side, not accepted

on the other, is not sufficient. Thus, B., C. & Co., the defend-

ants in an action/ wrote: "We agree to sell It one million

feet of Norway (pine); . . • said Norway to be suitable
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for making square timber, and will make a contract with him

givino- him the right to go on said lands and cut and remove

said Umber on payment for the same. The price of said Nor-

way to be," etc. Said the court: " This instrument was not a

contract. It was simply an offer to make one, with a state-

ment of the terms. There was no mutuality It was the act

alone of the defendants, and it was not supported by any duty

or obligation of the plaintiff, or of any other person, or by any

form of consideration whatever, and there was no averment of

acceptance by the plaintiff. There is no appearance of a cause

of action." 2

s 227 Offer must be accepted as made.— And not only

must the offer be accepted, but it must be accepted as made.

Thus, in a case frequently cited, 3 it appeared that the defendant

. McDonald v. Bewick, 51 Mich. 79, EL 693; James v. W1^5R&

1fi v w R oin Ad. 1109; Tucker v. Woods, 12 Johns.

2CitIg Governor, etc. v. Fetch, 28 (N. Y.) 190 7 Am. Dec. 305; Quick v.

Eng. L. & Eq. 470; Lees v. Whitcomb, Wheeler, 78 N. Y. 300.

5 Bin- 34; Sykes v. Dixon, 9 Ad. & 3 Hutchison v. Bowker, 5 M. & W.

° u 209

§ 227. ]

LAW OF SALE.

[no

K

r.

227.]

LAW OF SALE.

[book

had written an offer to sell good barley. The plaintiff replied,

accepting the offer, but adding, "expecting you will give lis fine

barley and good weight." To this defendant replied. " You say

you expect we shall give you ' line barley.' Upon reference to

our offer, you will find no such expression. As such, we must

decline shipping the same." Good barley and fine barley were

shown to be distinct grades, and the latter was the heavier. It

was therefore held that there had been no acceptance of the

offer and hence no contract.

So where defendant offered to buy a horse if warranted

" sound and quiet in harness," and the plaintiff sent the horse

with a warranty that it was "sound and quiet in double har-

ness," it was held that there was no contract. 1 Many other

cases will be found in the notes.

535. See the very similar case of

Myers v. Trescott, 59 Hun (N. Y.),
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395, to the same effect.

i Jordan v. Norton, 4 M. & W. 155.

S. wrote to J. offering to sell two

hundred boxes of cheese, at a given

price, and to deliver them at a place

had written an o[er to sell goocZ barl y. The p!nintif'f r p1i ccl,
accepting the off r, but acl ling, "exp ting you will ive u fine
barley and good w i bt." To thi' cl f n lan tr I li cl ''You ay
you expect we shall gi\•e you' fi n barl y.' Ur n r f r nee t
our off r, you will find no u h ex1 re ion. A n h, we mu t
o l barl y an 1 fin b rl y w r
decline shipping the ame.
shown to be distinct ()'rad , an l th latt"r "-as the heavi r. It
wa therefore held that th re bad b n no acceptance of the
offer and h nee no ontra t.
o where defen lant offer d to uy a bor e if warrant d
''sound and qui tin barn
ancl th 1 lai nti:ff sent the horse
with a warranty that it wa ' ouncl < nd qui t in <l ubl harness," it was b lcl that th r wa no ontract. 1 Many other
·cases will be found in the not s.

designated, '"one hundred now and

one hundred about the middle of

October next."' J. wrote, accepting

the offer as to amount, price and

place of delivery, but specifying

other times of delivery. Held, that

the two letters did not constitute a

contract. Johnson v. Stephenson, 26

Mich. 63.

A offered to sell to B two thou-

sand to five thousand tons of iron

rails at terms specified. B wrote

back directing the entry of an order

for one thousand two hundred tons

" as per your favor." A declined to

fill this order. Held, that B's order

was only a qualified acceptance, and

hence equivalent to a rejection. Min-

neapolis, etc. Ry. Co. v. Columbus

Rolling Mills, 119 U. S. 149.

An acceptance of an offer to sell

land, but fixing a different place for

the delivery of the deed and the pay-

ment of the money than the resi-

dence of the parties or the place

named in the offer, is not such an un-

conditional acceptance as will bind

the seller. Northwestern Iron Co. v.

Meade, 21 Wis. 480, 94 Am. Dec. 557;

Baker v. Holt, 56 Wis. 100, 14 N. W.

R. 8. In the latter case, A in Con-

necticut wrote to B in Wisconsin

offering to sell land on certain terms,

nothing being said about place of

payment or delivery of deed. B

wrote saying that he would take the

land on the terms stated, the deed

to be forwarded to a certain other

place in Wisconsin for delivery and

payment. B also telegraphed A

that he had written that he would

take the land at A's figures. Before

either the letter or the telegram

reached A, but after they had both

been sent, A wrote withdrawing his

offer. The acceptance by the tele-

53.5. See the very sim il ar ca e of
iyer v. Tr , ott, 59 Hun (N. Y.),
095, to the same effect.
1 JorcJan v. rorton, 4 1\I. & \V. 15-.
. wrote to J. offeri ng to 11 two
hundred boxe of cheese. at a given
price, and to deliver them at a place
<le ignated, '·one hundred now and
one hundred about the mid lle of
October next." J. wrote, accepting
the offer as to amount, price and
place of delivery, but specifyin g
other times of delivery. H eld, that
tbe two letter did not constitute a
contract. Johnson v. Stephenson, 26
l\Iich. 63.
A offereJ. to sell to B two thousand to fl.ye thou and tons of iron
rails at t erm s specifie L B wrote
back directini the entry of an order
for one thou and two hundred tons
"as per your favor." A declined to
fill this orcler. H eld, that B's order
was only a qualified acceptance, a nd
hence eq_ ui valent to a rejection. l\finneapoli., etc. Ry. o. v. Col nm bus
Rolling Mill·, 119 U. S. 14V.
An acceptance of an offer to sell

land, but fixing a lifferent place for
the deliYer of the leed and the payment of the money than the re idence of the parties or the place
name l in the offer, is not uch an unconditional acceptance as will bincl
the seller. Nort hwestern Iron Co. v.
l\feade, 21 vVi . 4 0 94 Am. Dec. 557;
Baker v. Holt, 56 Wis. 100, 14 N. W.
R. . In the latter ca e, A in Connecticut wrote to B in Wiscon in
offering to sell land on certain term ,
nothing being said about place of
payment or delh-ery of deecl.
B
wrote saying that he ·w ould take the
land on the term stated, the deed
to be forwarded to a certain other
place in Wisconsin for clBlivery ancl
payment. B also tel gra1 hed A
that he had written that he would
take the land at A's figures. Before
either the letter or the t elegram
reached A, but after they bad both
been sent, A wrote withdrawing hi ·
offer. The acceptance by the telegra m was held to be limited by conditiorn; fixecl in the letter of acceptance, and as the letter of acceptance
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« 228. . The rule of these cases was well illustrated and

stated by Graves, J., 1 as follows: "If in answer to a proposal

to grant Black Acre, a person replies that he is ready to close

the matter and will take White Acre, there is no acceptance.

was not an unconditional accept-

ance of the offer, it was held there

22 . - - . Tb rul of th se ca
wa well ill u trat d an l
stately ra.v J.,1a fllw: "Ifinanwrto rropoal
to grant lack
r a per n r r li that be i rea 1y to lo e
the matt r and will take v hit
re, tb r i no a c ptanc .

was no sale.

The same rule was also enforced in

Weaver v. Burr, 31 W. Va. 736, 3 L

R. A. 94, 8 S. E. R. 743.

A wrote B asking, " What will you

sell me 450 kegs of nails for, deliv-

ered at Bangor, in the course of a

wa not an
ance of th
wa n ·al.
The am rule wa al o nfor d in
urr, 31 W. Va. 736, 3 L .

Il·

an.

. E . . 743.

month, cash down?" B replied, "We

will sell 450 casks common assorted

nails, delivered on the dock at Ban-
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gor, at §3.02 per keg of 100 lhs. each,

cash." A replied. "Nails have ad-

vanced so much I am almost afraid

to buy; but you will send me as soon

as possible 303 kegs (naming the

kinds), and I will send you a check

on Exchange Bank, Boston." Held,

no contract. Jenness v. Iron Co.

(1864). 53 Mr. 20.

A offered to sell goods to B with a

credit of six months after December

15. B offered to pay them on a credit

of six months after December 31. A

said he could not do that: B said he

could do better. Held, do sale, though

A afterwards sent the goods which

n

were not accepted, (lowing v.

Knowles, lis Mass. 232.

A ordered article x sent to him by

B. saying also, "if you please send

me "-article y "at the same time."

Held, that B might send both arti-

cles x and y or x alone, but not y

alone. Virtue v. Beacham, 17 N. Y.

SuppL 450.

A made offer for " 15 to 20 bales

good, new hops at 20 cents, cash."

B accepted for " 15 bales new hops, Cor

delivery when picked." Held, no con-

tract. ( 'alter v. Bingham. 32 Up. Can.

Q. B. 61").

In Griffin v. Gratwick Lumber Co.

(1893), 97 Mich. 557, 56 N. W. R. 1034,

it appeared thatthe plaintiff offered

to sell to the defendant a quantity of

logs. Defendant's agent promised to

go the next day and examine it, but

did not do so. Soon after part of the

logs were destroyed by fire. Later

another agent of the defendant wrote

to plaintiff saying defendant would

take the logs at the price named, and

would send a man to scale them, but

calling attention to the fact that

fires had been raging in the vicinity

and might have damaged the logs.

In an action for the price of the logs

as at the date of the offer, it was held

that there was no contract. The

promise to go and examine the logs

was not an .acceptance of the offer to

Immaterial variation.- But tb
'ariation which shall amount to a
ariation.
r j tion m1 t be reall
Thu . ·w h r there wa an off r f r
the . al of a large q mm ti ty oflard to
be d liver d in daily in talrn nt,
aver ing t n thou and I ound each.
and th offer declared the 'term of

§ 22 .]

LAW OF SALE.

[B OK I.

§ 228.]

LAW OF SALE.

[book

Neither is there an acceptance where executory proceedings on

each side are involved in the proposal, and the party profess-

ing to accept introduces a variance, and formulates his adoption

of the offer with conditions and qualifications which essentially

alter some of the constituents or materially vary the effect. In

such cases no contract is brought into existence. 1

bills daily." was really materially dif-

ferent. The Court, moreover, held

Neither is there an acceptance wb re xecut r3 proc lino· on
each side are inYol v d in the pror o al, and the party profe ·~
ing to accept introduce a varianc , an<l formulat hi ad ption
of the offer with concliti n and qualification which
entiall
alter some of the con titu nt or materially vary the effect. In
such ca es no con tract is brought in to xi tenc .1

that the two instruments — the offer

and the acceptance — must be read

together as constituting the agree-

ment,and that when so read, the latter

expression explained the former and

left no inconsistency. Anglo-Amer-

ican Prov. Co. v. Prentiss (1895), 157

111. 506, 42 N. E. R. 157.
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1 Citing Kyle v. Kavanagh, 103

Mass. 356, 4 Am. R. 560; Suydam v.

Clark, 2 Sandf. (N. Y.) 133; National

Bank v. Hall, 101 U. S. 43; Jordan v.

Norton, 4 M. & W. 155; Hussey v.

Horne-Payne, 8 Ch. Div. 670, 25 Eng.

R. 561; Tilley v. Cook County, 103 U.

S. 155.

In Potts v. Whitehead, 23 N. J. Eq.

514, it is said: "An acceptance, to be

good, must of course be such as to

conclude an agreement or contract

between the parties. And to do this,

it must in every respect meet and

correspond with the offer, neither

falling within nor going beyond the

terms proposed, but exactly meeting

them at all points and closing with

them just as they stand ; " citing

Huddleston v. Briscoe, 11 Ves. (Eng.)

583; Carr v. Duval, 14 Pet. (U. S.) 77;

McKibbin v. Brown, 1 McCarter

(N. J.), 13; s. c, 2 id. 498; Honeyman

v. Marryatt, 6 H. L. C. 112: Routledge

v. Grant, 4 Bing. 653; Kennedy v.

Lee, 3 Meriv. 441; Hutchison v.

Bowker, 5 M. & W. 535; Eliason v.

Henshaw, 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 225.

In the case of Fulton Bros. v. Upper

Canada Furniture Co., 9 Ontario Ap-

peal Reports, 1883-1884, p. 211, it ap-

peared that, the plaintiffs having

agreed to supply the defendant with

one hundred thousand feet of lum-

ber subject to inspection, the defend-

ants in a subsequent letter assumed

that this was to be "American in-

spection," and the plaintiffs an-

swered: " We do not know anything

about American inspection, but will

submit to any reasonable inspec-

tion." No formal waiver of the in-

spection claimed by the defendants

was made by them, neither was there

any agreement by the plaintiff to

submit to such inspection. It was

held that there had not been shown

"a clear accession on both sides to

one and the same set of terms," and

that a concluded agreement had not

been made out between the parties.

anada Furniture Co., 9 Ontario Apbills daily." was really materially different. The court, moreov r, held p al R port , 1 3-1 4, p. 11 it a1 that the two in trument - the off r p ared that, the plaintiff. ba\inoand the acce1 tan e - mu t be read <gr ed to supply the cl fen ]ant with
together as con titutinO' the agree- one hundred thou anrl f et of lumment,and that when o read, the latter b r . ubj ct to in . l ction, the d fondexpres ion explained the former and ant in a ub ·equ ut 1 tt r a urned
left no inconsi tency. Anglo-Amer- that thi wa to be " merican inican Prov. Co. v. Prentiss (1 95), 157 sp ction," and the plaintiff anIll. 50 , 42 N. E. R. 157.
"" red: "~Te do not know anything
1 Citing Kyle v. Kavanagh, 103 about American in pection, but will
l\Iass. 3.J6. 4 Am. R. 560; Suy lam v. submit to any r a onable in pe Clark, 2 andf. (N. Y.) 133; National tion." ro formal wafrer of the inpection claimed by the defendant
Bank v. Hall, 101 U.S. 43; Jordan v.
Norton, 4 M. & vV. 155: Hu sey v. was made by them, neither wa there
Horne-Payne, 8 Ch. Div. 670, 25 Eng. any agreement by the plaintiff to
R. 561; Tilley v. Cook County, 103 U. submit to such inspe tion. It wa
s. 155.
held that there had not been shown
In Potts v. ·whitehead, 23 N. J. E<J.. "a clear acces ion on both ides to
514, it is said: "An acceptance, to be oue and the same set of term ,"and
good, mu t of course be such as to that a concluded agreement had not
conclude an agreement or contract been made out between the parties.
between the parties. And to do this,
pragge, 0. C. J., said: " The ru le
it must in every respect meet and a to making out a contract from
correspond with the offer, neither corre pondence ha been stayed by
falling within nor going beyond the many of the judge · in England, and
terms propo ed, but exactly meeting by the text-writers on the Law of
them at all points and closing with Contraets, including fr. Beujamin'
them just as they stand; " citing able treati e on the· Sale of Personal
Huddleston v. Briscoe, 11 Ve" (Eng.) Property. Osler, J., in his jmlgment
583; Carr v. Duval, 14 Pet. (U. S.) 77; in the court below, adopts the lanMcKibliin v. Brown, 1 M:cCarter guage of Mr. Pollock (on Contracts,
(N. J.), 13; s. c., 2 id. 498; Honeyman 3d ed. 37): 'In order to convert a
v. l'lfarryatt, 6 H. L. C. 112: Routledge propo al into a promise the acceptv. Grant, 4 Bing. 653; Kennedy v. ance must be absolute and unqualiLee, 3 Meriv. 441; Hutchison v. tied. For unless and until there is
Bowker, 5 M. & W. 53!5; Elin.son v. such an acceptance on the one part,
Henshaw, 4 Whea,t. (U.S.) 225.
of terms proposed on the other part,
In the case of Fulton Bros. v. Upper there is no expression of one and the
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"In order to convert a proposal into a promise, the constitu-

ents of the acceptance tendered must comply with and conform

to the conditions and exigencies of the proposal The accept-

ance must be of that which is proposed and nothing else, and

must be absolute and unconditional. Whatever the proposal

requires to fulfill and effectuate acceptance must be- accom-

plished, and the acceptance must include and carry, with it

whatever undertaking, right or interest the proposal calls for

and there must be an entire agreement between the proposal

and acceptance in regard to the subject-matter and extent of

the interest to be contracted."

same common intention of the par- ticular case upon the language em-

tieTbnt at the most expressions of ployed; and a deepen upo«

he more or less different intentions of corresponde nee my taof httfe

of each partv separately: in other assistance where the effect of an

words, proposals and counter-pro- other set comes jn question/^ See

"In or l r to convert a propo al into a promise, the con tit.uents of th acceptance t ml red mu t comply with an conform
to the condition and xi 0 ncie of the propo al. The ac pta nce mu t be f that which i propo eel and nothing el e an l
mu .. t be ab olute and unc n litional. \\ hatev r th pr 1 o al
r quir to fulfi ll ancl eff tuate acceptance mu t b accom1 li h 1 and the acceptance mu t in lu le and can . with it
whatever un lertakino- ri bt r intere t the propo al call for,
an 1 there mu t be an ntir aO'r ment b twe n th pro1o al
and ace ptance in r ·ar<l to the ubj ct-matter and extent of
theinter ttobecontr ·tel."
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posals.' There must be, to use the

language of Sir J. Knight Bruce, in

Thomas v. Blackman, 1 Coll. 312, 'a

clear accession on both sides to one

and the same set of terms.' In The

Oriental Inland Steam Co. v. Briggs,

4 D., F. & J. 191. Lord Campbell

spoke emphatically of its being ex-

tremely desirable -to adhere strictly

to the rule of the court that whoever

brings forward a contract, as consti-

tuted of a proposal on one side and

an acceptance on the other, should

show that the acceptance is prompt,

immediately given, unqualified, sim-

ple and unconditional.'

"We find the same language in

other cases. The language employed

by the parties to correspondence

also Mayer v. McCreery, 119 N. Y.

434, 23 N. E. R. 1045; Corcoran v.

White, 117 111. 118, 7 N. E. II. 525, 57

Am. R. 858; Sawyer v. Brossart, 67

Iowa, 678, 25 N. W. R. 876, 56 Am. R.

371; Carter v. Bingham, -32 U. Can.

"(Q. B.)615: Cangas v. Rumsey Mfg.

Co., 37 Mo. App. 297; Washington

Ice Co. v. Webster, 62 Me. 341, 16

Am. R. 462; Wilkin Mfg. Co. v. Loud

Lumber Co. (1892), 94 Mich. 158, 53

N. W. R. 1045 citing Johnson v. Ste-

phenson. 26 Mich. 63; Warded v.

Williams. 62 Mich. 50. 28 N. W. R.

796; Whiteford v. Hitchcock, 74 Mich.

208, 41 N. W. R. 898; Bowen v. Mc-

Carthy. 85 Mich. 26, 48 N. W. R 155);

Ames" v. Smith, 65 Minn. 304, 67 N.

W R. 999; Wemple v. North Dak.

sr. 69 N.

bv the parties w cuurapu^'^ ... — , -

varies as much, perhaps, as the Ian- Elev. Ca (1896,, 01 Mmn

... , ., • :n„. W T? A7S- Harris V. AniOS I

guage used by testators in their wills ;

so that, as was observed by the late

learned chief justice of this court,

in Bruce v. Tolton, 4 App. R. 144:

'Whether there had been an agree-

ment, the result of mutual assent,

must obviously depend in each par-

W. R. 478; Harris v. Amoskeag Lum-

ber Co. (1895), 97 Ga. 465, 25 S. E. R.

same common intention of the par- ti ular ca e upon the language emties, but at the mo t expr i n of ployed; and a deci ion upon one et
the more or le different intention of corre poncl n e ma be of little
f each party separatel · in other a , i tance where the effect of anvor<l , propo al and counter-pro- other et come in que. tion.' :•
ee
po al .' There m t be, to u ·e th
al o fayer v. 1\Ic re ry, 119 N. Y.
langua
of ir J. Knight ru , in 4. 4:, 23
. R. 10.ir;
orcoran v.
Thoma v. Blackman 1 'oll. 31.,,, ·a 'Wbite, 11 Ill. 11 , N. E. R. 5'>-, 57
lear acce ion on both id to one Am. R. - ; awyer . Bro art, 67
nd th ame et of term ' In The Iowa, 6 , . N. \ . R. 76, 56 Am. R.
Ori ntal Inlan
team Co. v. Brigg
371; art r v. Bina-ham, ·32 U. an.
4 D., F. & J. 191, Lord arupb 11 { . B. ) 61.-: anga v. Rum y :i\lfo-.
o., 37 iro. App. 297; v asbington
. poke emphati ally of it beino- extremely d irable ·to adhere trictly Ice Co. v. Web ter, 6 le. 341, 16
to the rule of the court that whoever Am. R. 462 · Wilkin ~Hg. Co. v. Loud
ring forward a contract, a con ti- Lumber o. (1 9'>), 9± Iicb. 1- , 53
tuted of a propo al on one id an<l N. \V. R. 10±5 (citing J0hn on v., 'tean acceptance on the other, hould phen on. 26 l\Iich. 63; Wardell v .
.·how that the acceptance i prompt, "\Villiam 6'> l\fich. 50, 2 N. W . R.
immediately given, unqualified, sim- 796; Whiteford v. itchcock, 4:l\Iicb.
ple anci unconditional.'
20 , 41 N. W. R. 9 ; Bowen v. :.Uc" We find the ame language in Cartby, 5 ~1ich. 26, 48 . W. R.1.-.- ):
-0ther ca e . The language employed Ames v. mith, 65 Minn. 304, 67
by the partie to corre pondence W. R. 999; \ emple v. ~orth Dak.
varie a much, perhap., a the lan- Elev. o. (1 96), 67 Minn.
, 69 N .
.guage u e<l byte tator in heir will ; \V. R. 4 ; Harri v. Amo keag Lumo that. a wa ob ervecl by the late ber Co. (1 93), 97 Ga. 46.5 2- S. E. R.
learned chief ju tice of tbi court, 519· Phenix In. . o. v. chultz (1 97),
in Bruce v. Tolton 4 pp. R. 144: 42 U. . App. 3, 0 Fed. R. 337, 2' Whether the re had been an agree. C. A. 4,-3; :Yic ormick Harv. Mach.
ment. th re ult of mutual a ent,
o. v. Richardson l1 93), 9 Iowa, 525,
m t obviou ly depend in each par- 56 N. \i . R. 682.
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§§ 220, 230.] LAW OF SALE. [book I.

§ 229. Counter-proposition operates as rejection of oiler.

If, instead of accepting the offer as made, the person addressed

responds with a counter-proposition, or an offer to accept if

iE

the original offer be modified or altered, he will thereby be

deemed to have rejected the first offer. 1 After such a rejec-

tion, it is not competent for the party addressed to accept the

original offer unless it is again renewed. 2

This rule is very carefully stated by Mr. Justice Gray of the

United States Supreme Court 3 as follows: "As no contract is

complete without the mutual assent of the parties, an offer to

sell imposes no obligation until it is accepted according to its

terms. So long as the offer has been neither accepted nor re-

jected, the negotiation remains open, and imposes no obligation

upon either party ; the one may decline to accept or the other

may withdraw his offer; and either rejection or withdrawal

r

leaves the matter as if no offer had ever been made. A pro-

t

posal to accept, or an acceptance, upon terms varying from

those offered, is a rejection of the offer, and puts an end to the
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negotiation, unless the party who made the original offer re-

news it, or assents to the modification suggested. The other

party, having once rejected the offer, cannot afterwards revive

it by tendering an acceptance of it." 4

j< 230. What constitutes such counter-proposition. —

But in order to operate as a rejection the alleged counter-prop-

osition must actually amount to such. A mere inquiry of the

proposer whether he will alter his proposal is not, therefore,

1 Minneapolis, etc. By. Co. v. Colum- party to whom the offer is made,

bus Rolling Mill, 119 U. S. 149: Hyde this, in law. constitutes a rejection

v. Wrench, 3 Beav. 334; Solomon v. of the offer."

AVebster. 4 Col. 353: Baker v. Holt, 56 2See post, % 233.

Wis. 100. 14 X. W. R. 8: Jenness v. 3 In Minneapolis, etc. Ey. Co. v. Co-

Iron Co.. 53 Me. 0:'.: Beckwith v. lumbus Eolling Mill, 119 U. S. 149.

Cheever, 21 X. H. 41: Weaver v. Burr, 4 Citing Eliason v. Henshaw, 4

31 W. Va. 736, 8 S. E. R 743, 3 L. R Wheat. (U. S.) 225: Carr v. Duval,

A. 94. In the last case it is said: "If 14 Pet. (U. S.) 77: Xational Bank v.

term .
j ct d the n ·otiati n r m, in p n an limp
up n ith r part · th n m, d lin t a
wi thd raw hi off r · ncl i th r r j
the matt r a if n
ff ' r had v r
pr po al to a l t or an ace ptan
up n t rm var IIlO' fr m
tb
off r cl i a r j ti n of th off r an l l ut an nd to the
n ·otiation unl
h party who made b ori inal off r ren 'iYS it or a ent to the modifi ·ation uo· · ted. The other
party ha ino· once r jec't d the offer cannot aft rwards revive
it by ten l ering an ac eptance of it. !
1

to the acceptance a condition be Hall. 101 U. S. 43: Hyde v. Wrench, 3

affixed, or any modification or change Beav. (Eng.) 334; Fox v. Turner, 1

in the offer be requested by the 111. App. 153.

214

§ 230. - - lfhat constitute such counter-propo ition.But in ord r to op rate as a rejection the all o·ed counter-propo ition mu t actuall3 amount to uch. Arn re inquiry of the
propo er whether h will alter hi pro1 o al i not therefore
i ·M iuneapolis, etc. Ry. Co. v. Colum- party to "horn the offer is made,.
bu Rolling l\Iill, 119 . . 14:9: Hyde thi , in law. con titnte a rejection
v. \\r nch. 3 Beav. 33±; olomon Y. of the offer."
v\ eb ter 4: 'ol. 353: Baker v. Holt, -6
2 ee po t,
938.
' ' L 100. 14 N. W. R. ; Jenne~ v.
s In hlinneapoli , etc. Ry. Co. v. CoIron Co.. 53 l\Ie. 93 · Beckwith v. lumbus Rolling l\Iill, 119 . S. 149.
hee,er, 21 r. H. ±1: \\ea Yer v. Burr,
4 Citin o- Elia on "
Hen haw, 431 \\. \ a. 136,
. E. R. 1±3, 3 L. R
Wheat. (
.) 225: arr v. DuYal,
11;
a ional Bank '·
A. 94:. In the lat ca e iti a id: '·If 1± P et. ( .
to the ace ptanee a condition be Hall, 101 . . 43 : Hy le v. Wrench, 3
affix d.or anymodificationor hange Bea,. (Eng. ) 33±; Fox v. Turner, 1
in the off r be reque tecl b th
Ill App. 153.
914
1

. )
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such a counter-proposition as will justify the proposer in treat-

ing his proposal as rejected, and a subsequent acceptance of

the original offer before it has been withdrawn will bind the

proposer.

Thus, in a leading English case, 1 defendant wrote, offering

uch a coun r-pr I ition a
ill ju ify the 1 o er in tr atin hi pr
~, l a rejec
1. an a ~ub equ nt acce t nee f
the oriainal o er bef re it a een with ra n will bin t e

to sell iron for 40*. per ton, net cash. The offer to remain

"open till Monday," the meaning of which expression was ad-

ca e 1 1 fen lan

mitted to be that the offer was open during all of Monday. ( >n

Monday morning plaintiffs telegraphed to defendant: " Pleas

wire whether you would accept forty for delivery over two

T

t

e

months, or if Dot, longest limit you would give."' 1 defendant did

not answer this message, but in an hour or two sold the iron to

a third person at 40*. and then advised plaintiffs of the sale by

telegram. Before the last message arrived plaintiffs had tele-

graphed to defendant an acceptance of his offer, and this was

held to be a sufficient acceptance. Said the court : " The form

of the telegram is one of inquiry. It is not ' I offer forty for

mitte to
~Ion la\
het

delivery over two months,' which would have likened the case
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to Eydi v. Wrench? where one party offered his estate for

£1, and the other answered by offering £960. Lord Lang-

dale, in that case, held that after the £950 had been refusal,

the party offering it could not, by then agreeing to the original

proposal, claim the estate, for the negotiation was at an end by

the refusal of his counter-proposal. Here there is no counter-

proposal. The words are, 'Please wire whether you would

accept forty for delivery over two months, or if not, the lon_

limit vou will give.' There is nothing specific- by way of offer

or rejection, but a mere inquiry, which should have been an-

swered and not treated as a rejection of the off<:-r."

1

B -231, . So where there has been an absolute and uncon-

ditional acceptance, the mere expression of a hope by the party

t

accepting that the other will do more than he has agreed will

not defeat the acceptance: 5 nor. where a party has by one

letter distinctly accepted an offer to sell goods, will the mere

i Stevenson v. McLean, 5 Q. B. Div. * 3 Bear. 334.

34k 3 Phillips v. Moor, 71 M-

215

·ir

w

m n h . r i ~no : be l n...,e
limit v u ill ai e.
1 nothing l ecific y w y of o
r
r reJ ti n, u a mere in un '\T hie b ul l ha v l1e n an·
w r l an n t treated a
rejec ion of the offer.;'

. :.: 1. - - . o where t
en an al> olut
unc nIi tional acce1 tance the ere ex r ~ion f a b l e .
e part.
ccer tin()' tha the ther will
re than be ha aO'ree l ill
3
n
lef
the acce tance: n r, here a arty ha by one
lett r i tinctl acce tel an
r o ~eu O'O l , will e mere
I

te•en n '"· J.IcLean, 5 . B. Dfr.

34: .

3

a>. 33-!.

3 Philli
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§§ 232, 233.] law or sale. [cook i.

fact that by a subsequent letter he orders more affect the ac-

ceptance. 1

§ 232. If counter-proposal is accepted a contract ex-

fact that by a subsequent letter be orders more affect the acceptance.1

ists.— So though a counter-proposal, or an offer of conditional

acceptance, is to be regarded as a rejection of the original pro-

posal, it is, of course, competent for the party making the first

proposal to accept the counter-proposition and thus effect a

contract. In this respect the counter-proposition stands upon

the same footing as an original proposition, and if accepted a

contract will ensue. 2

This acceptance, moreover, need not ordinarily be in writing;

it may be made orally or be inferred from the conduct of the

other party. 3

§ 233. Original proposal not open to acceptance after

its rejection by counter-proposition.— A further effect of the

rejection of the original proposal by the making of a counter-

proposition is, as has been already seen, 4 that the original pro-

posal, being rejected, is not afterwards open to acceptance
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unless its proposer in form or substance renews it. Speaking

of this effect of the rejection it was said in one case: 5 "The

original offer thereby loses its vitality, being, so to speak, passed

by in the course of the negotiation, so as to be no longer pend-

§ 232. - - If counter-proposal is accepted a contract exists.- So though a counter-proposal, or an offer of conditional
acceptance, is to be regarded as a rejection of the original proposal, it is, of course, competent for the party makinO' the fir t
propo al to accept the counter-proposition and thu effect a
contract. In thjs re'pect the counter-propo ition stands upon
the same footing as an original proposition, and if ace ptecl a
contract will ensue. 2
This acceptance, moreover, need not ordinarily be in writing;
it may be made orally or be inferred from the conduct of the
other party.a

ing between the parties, and it becomes an open proposition

again only when renewed by the party who first made it.

Hence, a party who has submitted a counter-proposition can-

not, without the assent of the other party, withdraw or aban-

§ 233. - - Original proposal not open to acceptance after
its rejection by counter-proposition.- A further effect of the

1 Gartner v. Hand, 86 Ga. 558, 12 4 See two preceding sections.

S. E. R. 878. 5 Fox v. Turner (1878), 1 111. App.

2 In Borland v. GufTey, 1 Grant's 153, citing 1 Pars, on Contr. 477;

Cas. (Pa.) 394, A made a proposi- Baker v. Johnson, 37 Iowa, 186; Elia-

tion to B; B declined to accept it, son v. Henshaw, 4 Wheat. 225; Carr

but made a different one to A by v. Duval, 14 Peters, 77; Jenness v.

messenger. A was satisfied with this Mt. Hope Iron Co., 53 Me. 20; Bel-

last proposition of B's, but did not fast, etc. Ry. Co. v. Unity, 62 Me. 148;

notify B of his assent. Held, that B Sheffield Canal Co. v. Radway Co., 3

was not bound. Rail. & Can. Cas. 121; Tinn v. Hoff-

3 Anglo-American Pro v. Co. v. Pren- man, 29 Law Times R. (N. S.) 273.

tiss (1893), 157 I1L 506, 42 N. E. R. 157.
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rejection of the original proposal by the making of a counterproposition is, as has been already seen; that the original proposal, being rejected, is not afterwards open to acceptance
unless its proposer in form or sub tance renews it. Speaking
of this effect of the rejection it was said in one case:~ "The
original offer thereby loses its vitality, being, so to speak, passed
by in the course of the negotiation, so as to be no longer pen ling between the parties, and it becomes an open proposition
again only when renewed by the party who first made it.
l{ence, a party who bas submitted a counter-proposition cannot, without the assent of the other party, withdraw or aban1 Gartner v. Hand, 86 Ga. 558, 12
S. E. R. 78.
2 ln Borland v. Guffey, 1 Grant"s
Cas. (Pa.) 394, A made a propo ition to B; B declined to accept it,
but ma le a different one to A by
me enger. A was satisfied with this
la t proposition of B's, but did not
notify B of his assent. Held, that B
was not bound.
3 An lo-American Prov. Co. v. Prentiss (1893), 157 Ill 506, 42 N. E. R. 157.

two preceding sections.
v. Turner (1878), 1 lll. App.
153, citing 1 Pars. on Contr. 477;
Baker v. Johnson, 37 Iowa, 186; Eliason v. Henshaw, 4 Wheat. 225; Carr
v. Duval, 14 Peters, 77; Jennesg v.
Mt. Hope Iron Co., 53 Me. 20; Belfa t, etc. Ry. Co. v. Unity, 62 Me. 148;
Sheffield Canal Co. v. Railway Co., 3
Rail. & Can. Cas. 121; Tinn v. Hoffman, 29 Law Times R (N. S.) 273.
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4 See

5 Fox
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[§ 234.

don the same .and then accept the original offer which he has

once virtually rejected."

don the ame an 1 the n ac e1 t the original offer which he has
once virtually rej ct cl ."

§234. Terms of sale must be fully agreed upon. — There

can obviously be no sale until the terras upon which it is to be

made have been fully determined and mutually agreed upon.

Mere negotiation is not enough: the negotiation must have

ripened into a completed agreement. 1 And the agreement, to

• See Utley v. Donaldson, 94 U. S.

29; Oakman v. Rogers, 120 Mass. 214;

Gowing v. Knowles, 118 Mass. 232.

In Whiteford v. Hitchcock, 74

234:. T rm of al e mn t be full y ag r eed upon.- There
can ob i u 1 be no ale until the terms upon which it is to be
ma 1 ha e been fully determin
an l mutually agreed u1 on.
11 r n gotiation i not nouo· : the n gotiation mu t hav
ripen d into a cor::iplet d a 0 reement. 1
nd the agr ement, to

Midi. 208, 41 N. W. R. 898, the par-

ties had been negotiating for the

sale of a boat. Whiteford wrote

Hitchcock that he would sell the

boat for a given price, but that the
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price must be paid or secured before

shipment Hitchcock wrote back

submitting a different offer, pay-

ment to be secured on delivery of

boat in Muskegon, and asked a re-

ply by telegraph. Whiteford tele-

graphed that he would ship the boat

and would also come himself. Said

the court: "It will be noticed that

in his telegram the plaintiff does

not accept their offer in so many

ti
ale
Hit h ock that be w ul l
boat for a given pri e, bu that the
pri ·e mu t be paid or ecur cl b f r
hipment. Hit h ock wrot back
ubmittino- a differ nt off r.

words. He wires them that he will

send boat that week, and he will be

in Muskegon first of the next week.

Suppose that he had shipped the

boat to Muskegon, and had required,

after he got there, the money for his

boat, or security, before he delivered

it, or that the security offered by

them had not been satisfactory to

him, could the defendants, upon this

correspondence, have maintained an

action against him for breach of

contract if he had refused to deliver

it because they would not pay or

secure the pay for it before deliv-

ery, or because the security offered

by them did not suit him? "We think

not. The minds of the parties had

not met upon the terms of payment,

and the contract was not completed

in this respect."

In Gates v. Nelles, 62 Mich. 444. 29

N. W. R. 73, complainant and de-

fendant were copartners, and prior

to June 22, lss."), had been negotiat-

ing for the purchase by one or the

other of his copartner's interest in

the firm assets and business, with

the understanding that a valuation

should be placed upon the property.

over and above the firm debts and

in his telegram the p1aintiff doe
not accept their offer in o many
word . He wires them that he will
nd boat that .week, and he will be
in l\Iu kegon fir t of the next week.
uppo e that he had shipped the
boat to l\fu kegon, and had required,
aft r he got there, the money for hi
boat, or ecurity, before he <lelivered
it, or that the ecurity offered by
them had not been . atisfactory to
h im, could the defendant , upon thi
·orr p ndence, have maintained an
action against him for breach of
contract if he had refu ·ed to deliver
it b cau ·e they would not pay or
·e ure the pay for it before deliv·
e ry, or becau e the ecurity offered
by t hem did not suit him ? We think

not. The mind of the partie had
not met upon the terms of payment,
and the contra t wa not comp1eted
in thi re pect."
In Gates v. N 11 , 62 1Uich. 4-M, 29
N. W. R.
complainant a,nd d op i· ner. , and prior
to June '\ 1 -, had been n go fating f r the pur ha by one or tb
other of hi copar n r' int re t in
the firm a et and bu in · . with
th e un 1 r tan ding that a aluation
shoul b phic
upon the property,
o er and abo e the firm d bt and
liabili i , to erve a a ba i for an
o er on eitb r side to buy or 11.
uring th e n go iation , whi h
were verb 1, and on June 99., 1 -.
compfainant made a written offer
to d fendc nt to buy or ell on the
ba i of 16,500 the purcha er to a ume all ompany liabilitie , and
give ufficient ecurity for their payment and of the purchase price. Defondant on the next day accepted
complainant' offer in writing, on
the term mentioned therein, and
afterwards claimed that the Jett rs
con tituted a complete ale, and refu el to have anything more to do
with the joint bu ine . H eld, that
the letters did n t con ·titute a completed sale; that. complainant'., offer
look d toward further agreements
a to security for the purchase price
and indemnity for the payment of
the firm debts, and was only one of

liabilities, to serve as a basis for an

offer on either side to buy or sell.

During these negotiations, which

were verbal, and on June 22, 1885,

complainant made a written offer

to defendant to buy or sell on the

basis of $16,500, the purchaser to as-

sume all company liabilities, and

give sufficient security for their pay-
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be finally settled, must comprise all the terms which the par-

ties intend to introduce into it. " An agreement to enter into

an agreement upon terms to be afterwards settled between the

parties is a contradiction in terms. It is absurd to say that a

be finally settled, must comprise all the terms which the parties intencl to introduce into it. "An agreement to enter into
an agr ement upon terms to be afterwards settled between the
parties is a contradiction in terms. It is ab urd to say that a

the steps leading to a sale, and con-

templated a meeting of the parties,

if accepted, and a completion of the

transaction.

In Topliff v. McKendree, 88 Mich.

148, 50 N. W. R. 109, the defendant,

a stock-broker in D., wrote plaintiffs,

stock-brokers in B., offering to sell

them one hundred shares of mining

stock at $41, adding: " Can ship it to

you, I guess, with draft attached.''

Plaintiffs answered by asking
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whether defendant would sell part

of such shares, and for how long the

offer held good. Two days later,

plaintiffs telegraphed that they

would take the stock, asking defend-

ant to forward it, with draft at-

tached, an d also wrote him to the same

effect. Held, (1 j that this correspond-

ence did not make a completed con-

tract, as plaintiffs did not bind them-

selves to accept the stock and pay

for it in D., nor did defendant, by the

phrase in his first letter, '• Can ship

it to you, I guess, with draft at-

tached," absolutely bind himself to

send the stock to B. ; and hence the

manner and place of delivery were

left Open to future negotiations be-

tween the parties. (2) Defendant's

reply to plaintiffs' offer to take the

one hundred shares, stating that he

was unable as yet to furnish the

stock, but that he had no doubt

about his ability to get it, giving his

reasons therefor, does not constitute

a binding agreement by defendant

to procure the stock. McDonald v.

Bewick, 51 Mich. 79, 16 N. W. R. 240;

Eggleston v. Wagner, 46 Mich. 610,

10 N. W. R. 37; Bowen v. McCarthy,

85 Mich. 26, 48 N. W. R. 155, were

cited.

In Felthouse v. Bindley, 11 C. B.

(N. S.) 869,a nephew wrote to his uncle

that he could not take less than

thirty guineas for a horse, for which

the uncle had offered '301. The uncle

wrote back saying: "Your price, I

admit, was thirty guineas; 1 offered

307., never offered more, and you said

the horse was mine; however, as

there may be a mistake about him,

I will split the difference, 30/. 15s., I

paying all expenses from Tarn worth.

You can send him at your conven-

ience between now and the 25th of

March. If I hear no more about h im,

I consider the horse is mine at 301.

15s." This letter was dated the 2d

of January; on the 21st of February

the nephew sold all his stock at auc-

the st p leading to a sale, and con- 10 . . T_ W. R. 37; Bowen v. McCarthy,
templated a meeting of the partie , 85 Mich. 2'3, 48 N. W. R. 155, were
if accepted, and a completion of the cited.
transaction.
In Felthou ·e v. Bindl y, 11 C. B.
In Topliff v. l\IcKoodree, 8 Mich. (N. .) 69,a n ph w wrote to hi uncle
148, 50 N. W. R. 109, the cl fendant, that he could n t take l
than
a stock-broker in D., wrote plaintiff . thil-ty guineas for a hor ·e, for which
stock-brokers in B., offering to sell the uncle had offered 30l. The uncle
them one hundred share of mining wrote back aying: "Your price, I
stock at $41, adding: "Can hip it to admit. was thi1ty guinea ; I offered
you. I gue s, with draft attached .. , 30l., never offered more, and you said
Plaintiffs answered by a king the horse ·wa mine; how v r, as
whether defendant woul l ell part there may be a mi take about him,
of uch shares. and for how long the I will split the difference, 30l. 15s., I
offer held good. Two days later, paying all expen es from Tam worth.
plaintiffs telegraphed tha.t they You can send him at your convenwould take the stock, asking defend- ien e between now and the 25th of
ant to forward it, with draft at- March. If I hear no more about him,
ta.ched,andal owrotehimtothe ame I consider the horse is mine at 30l.
effect. Held, (1 ) that this corre pond- 151:1." This letter was dated the 2d
ence did not make a complete<l con- of January; on the 21st of February
tract, as plaintiffs did not bind them- the nephew sold all his stock at aucselves to accept the stock and pay tion. the defendant being the aucfor it in D., nor did defendant, by the tioneer, but gave pecial orders not
phrase in his first letter, '·Can hip to oll the hor e in question, saying
it to you, I guess, with draft at- it was his uncle's. The defendant by
tached,'' absolutely bind himself to mi take sold the horse, and the acsehd the tock to B.: and hence the ti on was trover by the uncle. H eld,
manner and plaue of delivery ·w ere that there ha lb en no complete conleft open to future negotiation· be- tract between the uncle and the
t\Yeen the parties. (2) Defendant's nephew, because the latter had never
r eply to plaintiffs' offer to take the communicated to the former any
one hundred shares, stating that he a sent of the sale at 30l. 15s.; that the
wa unable as yet to furnish the uncle had no right to put upon his
stor.k, but that he had no doubt nephew the burden of being bound
about his ability to get it, giving his by the offer unless rejected, and that
reasons therefor, does not con ·titute there was nothing up to the date of
a binding agreement by defendant the auction ale to prevent the
to procure the stock. McDonald v. nephew from dealing with the horse
Bewick, 51 !fich. 79, 16 N. vV. R. 240; as his own. The plaintiff, therefore,
Eggle ton v. Vfagner, 46 .Mich. 610, was nonsuit~d on the ground that be
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man enters into an agreement until the terms of that agree-

merit are settled. 1 '

Where, therefore, the negotiations have not vet been crys-

tallized into a complete offer and acceptance, or where a di»

had no property in the horse at the

man nters into an a 0 reement until the terms of that agreement ar ettl d.
\Vh re th r for the neO'otiati n have not yet been cr:stallize l into a c mpl te offer and ace I tance, or where a lis-

date of the alleged conversion.

In Appleby v. Johnson, L. R. 9 C. P.

158, the plaintiff wrote to the defend-

ant proposing to enter his services as

ments, such agreed valuations to be

placed on the plat of said farm.

The time for accepting this "/ro-

of sale was limited to twenty days,

prior to the expiration of whicl

antproposmgjo^r^v^. „ ^'^ the offer

salesman upon ceitain terms nciu 1 defendant to prepare
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ing, among others, a commission

upon all sales to be effected by In in.

for which purpose a list of merchants

with whom he should deal was to be

prepared The defendant replied as

follows: "Yours of yesterday em-

bodies the substance of our conver-

sation and terms. If we can define

some of the terms a little clearer, n

might prevent mistakes: but I think

„.,. are quite agreed on all We shall

therefore, expect you on Monday;"

and the postscript added: "I have

made a list of customers which we

can consider together." Held, not to

be an absolute and unconditional ac-

ceptance of the defendant's proposal.

In Wardell v. Williams, 62 Mich.

50, 28 N. W. R. 796, defendant agreed

in writing to sell to plaintiff his farm

for $39,000, payable as follows: $12,000

in cash, and the balance on or before

four years from the date of a mort-

gage to be given as security for such

del erred payment, plaintiff to have

the privilege of paying $1,000 or

more at any time during the four

years on account of the unpaid prin-

cipal. The agreement further stated

that the farm had been subdivided

into lots; that the parties were to

agree to the valuation of each lot,

and defendant agreed, on the mak-

ing of such optional payments, to re-

lease lots of equal value to such pay

and requested defendant to prepare

his deed. Defendant answered that

the agent of an insurance company

which held a mortgage on the land

was then absent and would not re-

turn until the following Tuesday,

which would prevent his obtaining

a discharge of the mortgage until

that date: and it being suggested by

plaintiff that the twenty days' op-

tion would expire before the date

named, defendant said that would

make no difference— that he would

carry out the contract even after

sixty 'lays.

Plaintiff made no tender of the

int
parti
were to
aO'ree to the 'aluation of each lot,
aml lef nclant agre d, on the ma.king of u h optional payment , t r
lea e lot of equal value to ucb pa·-

ment , uch agreed valuation to be
plac d on the plat of aitl farm.
The tim for accepting thi off r
of al wa limited to tw nty day ,
I rior to the expiration of which
plaintiff v rbally ac ept l th offer.
and reque t cl d f ntlant to pr pare
hi de d. D fendant an w r cl that
th ag nt of n in . uran e ompc ny
whi h b ltl a mortgag on the land
wa th n ab~ nt antl woul l not return until the f 11 wino- Tu day,
whi h "·ould pr
nt hi obtaining
a di harge of th m r gao- until
that dat ; and it being ugg t cl by
pl intiff that the tw n y da r • pion would. xpir b for the lat
n, med, d f ndant aid bat w uhl
mak no cliff renc ,-that he would
c, rry out he con ra ·t ev n after
ixty lay . .
Plaintiff ma.d no t nd r of the
a ·h paym nt, or of any d ed or
m rt gag , x u ted or to be xeu te<l, antl b for th Tne tla arri" d, and aft r th expiration of the
tw n y day , defendant old the land
to an th r I arty.
H eld, in a uit brought to recover
<lamag for the br ach of the alleged
ontra t for ale, that the offer did
not con.titute a completed contract.
but upon it face looked to futur
action and negotiation · between the
partie to determine and aO'ree upon
the valuation to be I lac d u1 on ih
lot , and that thi part of the offer
wa an e ntial part of the terms
and n<li ion of ale and I ayment.
In onl r to pa title to per onal
property under a contract of sale,
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pute is yet going on between the parties as to terms, or where

the essential elements, such as number, price, term of credit,

and the like, have not yet been settled, there can be no sale.

As is said in one case, 1 "the agreement must be entire — as to

the thing sold, its price, the time of delivery, and the terms of

payment."

§ 235. Negotiations in contemplation of more formal con-

tract. — Where it is evident from the words or conduct of the

parties that they do not intend to be bound by their informal

preliminary negotiations, but only by an express and formal

contract to be afterwards entered into, they will not be bound

until such formal contract has been made, unless its necessity

be waived. Thus in one case 2 it appeared that the plaintiffs

pute is yet going on between the parties a to t rm or where
the essential elements, such as number, price t rm of er dit,
and the like, have not yet been s ttl cl, there can be no s I .
As is said in one case, 1 "the agreem nt mu t be ntire - as t
the thing sold, its price, the time of delivery, and the terms f
payment."

§ 235. Negotiations in contemplation of more formal contract.- Where it is evident from th word or conduct of the

had advertised for tenders for goods, but saying expressly: "All

contractors will have to sign a written contract after accept-

ance of tender." Defendant submitted a tender and received

notice of its acceptance, but later in the same day wrote to the

plaintiff that he declined to supply the goods. In an action to
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recover damages for his refusal, it was held that there was no

contract between the parties. Parke, B., said : " It was clearly

the intention of the parties that there should be no binding

ensrao-ement until a written contract had been executed. The

tender, though accepted, was not a contract."

" But on the other hand," as is said by Lord Cairns in a recent

case, 3 " there is no principle of law better established than this:

that even although parties may intend to have their agreement

the purchase price must be fixed, and, 1 Washington Ice Co. v. Webster,

if credit is to be given, the time and 62 Me. 341, 16 Am. R. 462, citing Sieve-

terms of payment must be agreed wright v. Archibald, 17 Q. B. 103;

upon. Hence an agreement for the Gether v. Capper, 18 C. B. 865; Hamil-

sale of a quantity of ore for a price ton v. Terry, 11 C. B. 954.

per ton dependent upon that to be 2 Guardians of the Poor v. Petch, 10

subsequently received by the vendee Exch. 610.

on its sale by him lacks an essential 3 Brogden v. Metropolitan Ry. Co.,

ingredient of a contract of sale, and L. R. 2 App. Cas. 666.

cannot be enforced. Foster v. Lum- To the same effect see Lewis v.

bermen's Mining Co., 68 Mich. 188, Brass, 3 Q. B. D. 667; Rossiter v. Mil-

36 N. W. R. 171, citing Williamson v. ler, 3 App. Cas. 1124; Bonnewell v.

Berry, 8 How. (U. S.) 544. Jenkins, 8 Ch. D. 70.

220

parties that they do not intend to b bound by th ir inf rmal
preliminary negotiation , but onlv by an expr s an l formal
contract to be afterward ntere l into, th y will not be boun 1
until such formal contract ha b en made, unl
it nee ity
2
be waived. Thus in one case it appeared that the plaintiff
had advertised for ten l rs for goo 1 , lrnt aying xpre sly: "All
contractors will have to ign a written contract aft r acceptance of tender." Defen lant submitted a tender and receiv l
notice of its acceptance, but later in the same day wrote to the
plaintiff that he declined to supply the goods. In an action to
recover damages for his rp,fusal, it was held that there was no
contract between the parties. Parke, B., said: "It was clearly
the intention of the parties that there should be no binding
engagement until a written contract had been executed. The
tender, though accepted, was not a contract."
"But on the other hand," as is said by Lord Cairns in a recent
case, 3 "there is no principle of law better established than this:
that even although parties may inten<.l to have their agreement
the purcha e price must be fixed, and,
1 Wa hin gton Ice Co. v. Webster,
if credit is to be given, the time aml 62 Me. 341, 16 Am. R. 462, citing Sieveterms of payment must be agreed wright v. Archibald, 17 Q. B. 103;
upon. Hence an agreement for the Gether v. Capper, 18 C. B. 865; Hamilsale of a quantity of ore for a price ton v. Terry, 11 C. B. 954.
per ton depenuent upon that to be
2 Guardians of the Poor v. Petch, 10
subsequently received by the vendee Exch. 610.
on its sale by him lacks an es ential
3 Brogden v. Metropolitan Ry. Co.,
ingredient of a contract of sale, and L. R. 2 App. Cas. 666.
cannot be enforced. Foster v. LumTo the same effect see Lewis v.
berm.en's Mining Co., 68 Mich. 188, Brass, 3 Q. B. D. 667; Ro siter v. Mil36 N. W. R. 171, citing Williamson v. ler, 3 App. Cas. 1124; Bonnewell v.
Berry, 8 How. (U. S.) 544.
Jenkins, 8 Ch. D. 70.
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expressed in the most solemn and complete form that convey-

ancers and solictors are able to prepare, still there may b, a

sensus between the parties tar short of the complete mode

of expressing it, and that mimoi may be discovered from

letters or from other documents of an imperfect and incomplete

description; I mean imperfect and incomplete as regards lorm.

At the same time, as Lord Cairns further remarks, • 1 hue are

no cases npon which difference of opinion may be more readilj

entertain,,!, or which are always more embarrassing to dispose

of than eases where the court has to decide whether or not,

havine regard to letters and documents which have not as-

sumed the complete and formal shape of executed and solemn

agl ments, a contract has really been constituted between the

parties. 1 '

, 236 In a late case, 1 the principle which governs in

these cases is said to be this: -If there is a simple acceptance

of an offer to purchase, accompanied by a statement that the

iCrossley v. Mavcock, L. R 13 Eq. to be reduced to writing; that tins

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:48 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t6xw4h56n
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

180 % — the vendorsof Land, was not done, and that there was no

in a letter acknowledging the receipt meeting of minds. _

. n offer of purchase, wrote as fol- b Ridgway v. Yn barton 6 II L.

; ■ which offer we accept, and Cases, 238, the Lord Chancellor said.

Z\,Z vou two copies of condi- "I again protest against its being

xpre ed in the mo t ol mn and compl te form that conveyancer an l olicitor are able to pr pare till there may b 3 a
on en u betw en the par i far bort of the com11 te mode
f expr ing it, and tb t con· n. u ma - be di covere l from.
I tt r or from oth r locum nt" of an imperfect and incomplete
l cri1 ti n · I mean imp rf ct an l in om11 tea rco·ar 1 f rm.'
t th ame time as L rd. airn furth r r mark
There are
no ca
upon which liff r 'nc f pinion may b mor r a lil.
ntertain d or which are alway n.or embarra in t ch 1 o e
f, th" n ca e where th court ha to l ide ·w h th r or not,
ha' in r ar l t Jett r and d um nt which haY not a um d th co pl t an formal h< pe f . ut l an l olemn
"oT m nt , a contract ha , really b en con titut l b tween the
l aeti

UonsofsaW' and therewith inclosed supposed, because persons wish to

. - - . In a lat
a e 1 th principle which ov rn in
ail to b tbi : ' f ther i a impl accept, nc
pur ha
ace mp·~ ni cl by a tatem nt th t the

, ,1 a . reement with conditions have a formal agreement drawn up

:fa^ialch ; inu,c,i,/,, that the that therefore they cannot be bound

acceptance was only conditional, and by a previous agreement if t is clear

C-'was no final agreement of that such an agreement has ben

whtah specific performance could be made; but the circumstance that the

^ot TaTa^inst the purchaser, parties do intend a subsequent agree-

Methu.lv v. Ross, 10 Mo. App. ment to be made is strong evidence

10 1 it 1 ^he mere fact that a to show that they did not intend the

Sen contract was to be subse- previous negotiations , ^amount .to

1

quently prepared does not show that an agreement And in the same

a W agreement between the par- case, Lord Wensleydale sad: An

ties was°not made, but it tends to agreement to be finally sett ed must

I", and. m this case, we think comprise all the terms which the

i • , that there was no contract to parties intend to introduce into the

- h he parties had agreed in all agreement. An agreement to enter

en that there was to be a into an agreement upon terms to be

nTore expli it agreement which was afterwards settled between the par-

low : "whi h offer we ac pt, and
now han you t' o copie of ondition of 1 , and therewith inclo eJ.
a formal agreement "ith condition
of a l ecial character. H eld, that the
ac e1 tance a only conditional, anu
that ther "a no fin· l agreement of
which p cifi~ performance ould be
enforced a aO'ain t the purcha er
In i\lethudy v. Ro
10 Io. App.
101, it i aid: ;'The mere fa t thata
written contract a to be ub
qu ntl prepared doe not bow that
a fin::tl agreement betwe n the partie wa not made but it tend to
·h wit: and, in thi ca e we think
it cl ar hat there wa no contract to
which the partie had agreed in all
it term · that here wa to be a
more explicit agreement which wa

to be r duced to writing· that thi
wa not 1on , and that there wa no
m tin o- of mind . '
In Ri 1"'"
v. Wharton, 6 H. L.
a e , 23 , tbe Lord Chancellor sail:
"1 a ain prote t again t its being
uppo eJ., becau~ e per on wLh to
ha"e a formal a r ement dra"-n up,
that therefore they cannot b bound
by a previous agr ement, if it is clear
hat ... uch an agreement ha been
made; but the circum tan~e that the
partie do intend a ub equentagreement to be made i trong e"idence
to how hat they did not intend the
previou. negotiation to amount to
an a reement." And in the same
ca e, Lord Wen leydale aid: "An
a reeruent to be finally ettled mu t
compri e all the term which the
partie intend to introduce into the
ao-reement. An agreement to enter
into an agreement upon term to be
afterward ettled between the par-
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acceptor desires that the arrangement should be put into some

more formal terms, the mere reference to such a proposal will

not prevent the court from enforcing the final agreement so

arrived at. But if the agreement is made subject to certain

conditions then specified or to be specified by the party making-

it or by his solicitor, then until these conditions are accepted

there is no final agreement such as the court will enforce."

§ 237. . Where the parties have intended to have their

agreement reduced to writing, and a writing has been prepared

which both agree contains the terms of their agreement, but

both neglect to sign it, such writing, while it cannot take effect

as a written contract, is the best evidence of what the actual

acceptor desires that the arrangement 110ulcl be put into ome
more formal terms, the mere reference to such a proposal will
not prevent the court from enforcing the :final agreem nt so
arrived at. But if the agreem nt is macle subj ·t to c rtain
conditions then specifi d or to be specified by the party making
it or by his olicitor, then until the e con lition are accept cl
there is no final agreement such a the court will enforce.'

agreement of the parties was. 1

§ 238. Acceptance must be com nnuiicatetl.— There must,

moreover, not only be acceptance of or assent to the offer, but

that acceptance or assent must be communicated to the other

party. A mere determination to accept, or a mental conclu-

sion not evidenced by any outward act, is not enough. As stated

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:48 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t6xw4h56n
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

by Mr. Benjamin, "the assent must either be communicated

to the other party, or some act must have been done which the

other party has expressly or impliedly offered to treat as a

communication, as, e. g., in contracts by correspondence, the

posting of the letter of acceptance; or the assent may be in-

237. - - . \Vhere the parti s have intended to have thefr
agreement recluced to writing, an la writing ha be n prepare l
which both agree contains the terms of their agreement, but
both neglect to ign it, uch writin while it cannot take effect
as a written contract, i the be t evidence of what the actual
agr ement of the parties \vas. 1

ferred from subsequent conduct; but an assent which is neither

ties is a contradiction in terms. It intended only as a preliminary nego-

is absurd to say that a man enters tiation. The question in such cases

into an agreement till the terms of always is. Did they mean to contract

that agreement are settled. Until by their correspondence, or were they

those terms are settled, lie is per- only settling the terms of an agree-

fectly at liberty to retire from the ment into which they proposed to

bargain. enter a f ter all itg par ti cu i ars were

In Lyman v. Robinson, 14 Allen adjusted, which was then to be form-

(Mass.), 252, 2.54, it is said: "A valid ally drawn up, and by which alone

contract may doubtless be made by they designed to be bound ? "

correspondence, but care should al- 1 Bryant v. Smith, 87 Mich. 525, 49

ways be taken not to construe as an N. W. R. 889.

agreement letters which the parties
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§ 23 . Acceptance must be com municatecl .-There must,
moreover, not only be acceptance of or assent to the offer, but
that acceptance or assent must be comm unica.ted to the other
party. A mere determination to accept, or a m n tal conclusion not evicl need by any outward act, is not enough. As stat cl
by Mr. Benjamin, "the as ent must either be communicated
to the other party, or some act mu t have been done which the
other party has expres ly or impliedly offered to treat as a
communication, as, e. g., in con tracts by correspondence, the
po ting of the letter of acceptance· or the assent may be inferred from subsequent conduct; but an a sent which is neither
tie i a contradiction in term . It
is ab urd to ay that a man enter.
into an agreement till thA terms of
that agreement are settled. Until
tho ·e terms are settled, he is perfe tly at liberty to retire from the
bargain."
In Lyman v. Robinson, 14 Allen
(Jia .), 052, 2-4, it is said: "A valiJ
contra t may doubtle s be made by
corre pondence, but care hould alway he taken not to con true as an
agreement letters which the partie ·

fotencled only as a preliminary negotiation. The que tion in such ca es
always is, Did they mean to contract
by their corre pondence, or were they
only settling the term of an agreement into which they propo ed to
enter after all its particulars were
adjusted, which was then to be formally drawn u1, and by which alone
tl1ey de igned to be bound? "
1 Bryant "·
mith, 87 Mich. 525, 49
N. W. R 889.
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communicated to the other party nor followed up by action,

a mere -mental assent.' as it is termed, is insufficient." 1

to h
com.mum a
a m r · mental a "en

th r party nor f llow l up y action
a it i t rm 1 i in uffici nt. .. 1

| 239. Manner of acceptance.— The offer, further, must not

only he accepted, but it must be accepted in accordance with

the terms expressly or impliedly prescribed for its acceptance.

,,. 3 '

,_

~

.

er. further; mu~ not
accept 1 in a · r lane "\\ith
liedly Ir "cribe 1 for it~ ccer ance .

1 Benjamin on Sale.

In Felthouse v. Bindley. 11 Com. B.

(N. S.' 868. 103 Eng. Com. Law, 868,

the term

L

it appeared that A and B verbally

come to the general proposition

le.

3.

which Mr. Justice Brett seems to

have laid down, that a simple ac-

ceptance in your own niind. without

treated for the purchase of ahorse any intimation to the other party,

by the former of the latter. A few

days afterwards B wrote to A sav-
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in- that he had been informed that

there was a misunderstanding as to

the price. A having imagined that

om.B.
om. Law. .... .
that A and B 'erb Uy
the pur ha e of a ho -e
y the former of the latt r. A. ew
a:- a terwar
t A. - :in O' hat he ha b en informe that

com to the aen n l
ro -ition
which _Jr, Justice Brett e ms t
ha'e lai 1 own. that a imple acceptance in :our o n min . without
any inrirn tion to the other
rty-,
by a mer

he had bought the horse for £30, B

that he had sold it for thirty guineas.

A thereupon wrote to B proposing

to split the difference, adding: "If I

hear no more about him. I consider

the horse is mine at 30/. 15&." To

this no reply was sent. No money

- rid, and the horse remained in

session. Six weeks afterwards

the defendant, an auctioneer who

was employed by B to sell his farm-

ing stock, and who had been directed

by B to reserve the horse in qm -

as it had already been sold, by mis-

take put it up with the rest and sold

it. After the sale B wrote to A a

letter which substantially amounted

to an acknowledgment that the

- had been sold to him. Held,

that A could not maintain an action

against the auctioneer for the con-

version of the horse, he having no

property in it at the time the defend-

ant sold it. B's subsequent letter not

having ias between A and a stranger

any relation back to A's proposal.

In Brogden v. Metropolitan Ry.

Co.. L. R. i App. Cas.. at p. 698, Lord

Blackburn savs: "But when you

an 1 expresse 1 by a mere private

act. such as putting a letter into a

drawer, completes a contract. I must

it.
let er which su
to
h
th
again
' .:i n of the hor•. he ha' ng n
rr: in it at the timt the de c?n -

say I differ from that. It appears

from the Year Books that as long

a the time of Edward I'

Edw. IV.. T. Pasch case, 2) Chief Jus-

tice Brian decided this very |

The plea of the defendant in that

case justified the seizing of some

growing crops becau-e he said the

plaintiff had offered him to go and

look at them, and if he liked them,

and would - for them,

he might take them: that was the

justification, That case is rel

to in a book which I publis

a good many years - Black-

burn on Contract of Sale. p. 190 et

you

~i

§ 239.J

LAW OF SALE.

[BOOK I.

§ 239.]

LAW OF SALE.

[book. I.

It is entirely competent for the party who makes the offer to

stipulate that it shall not be binding upon him unless its ac-

ceptance be communicated to him in a certain manner, 1 at a

prescribed place, 2 or within a designated time; 3 and the per-

son who seeks, by acceptance of such an offer, to bring a bind-

ing contract into existence, must show either that he has com-

plied with the terms so fixed or that the other party has waived

the necessity for such compliance.

Where, however, no express terms have been prescribed, the

manner of acceptance is a matter to be deduced from the ap-

parent intention of the parties as evidenced by their acts, sur-

plaintiff, and your having it in your

own mind is nothing, for it is trite

law that the thought of man is not

triable, for even the devil does not

know what the thought of man is;

It is entirely competent for the party who mak s the offer to
stipulate that it slrnll not be binding upon him unless its acceptance be communicated to him in a certain manner,1 at a
prescribed place, 2 or within a designated time; 3 and the person who seeks, by acceptance of such an offer, to bring a binding contract into existence, must show either that be bas complied with the terms so fixed or that the other party bas waived
the necessity for such compliance.
Where, however, no express terms have been prescribed, the
manner of acceptance is a matter to be deduced from the apparent intention of the parties as evidenced by their acts, sur-
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but I grant you this, that if in his

offer to you he had said, Go and look

at them, and if you are pleased with

them signify it to such and such a

man, and if you had signified it to

such and such a man, your plea

would have been good, because that

was a matter of fact.' I take it, my

lords, that that, which was said three

hundred years ago and more, is the

law to this day, and it is quite what

Lord Justice Mellish, in Ex parte

Harris. Law R. 7 Ch. App. 593, accu-

rately says, that where it is expressly

or impliedly stated in the offer that

you may accept the offer by posting

a letter, the moment you post the

letter the offer is accepted. You are

bound from the moment you post

the letter; not, as it is put here,

from the moment you make up your

mind on the subject."

To the same effect: Mactier v.

Frith, 6 Wend. (N. Y.) 103, 21 Am.

Dec. 262; Jenness v. Iron Co., 53

Me. 20.

1 Thus in Bosshardt & Wilson Co.

v. Crescent Oil Co., 171 Pa. St. 109, 32

Atl. R. 1120, the parties had stipu-

lated for an acceptance in writing,

and the court said that no other

method would suffice.

2 Thus in Eliason v. Henshaw (1819),

4 Wheat. (17 U. S.) 225, an offer of

purchase was made, stipulating for

an acceptance " by return of wagon "

to the place at which the offerer then

was, namely, at Harper's Ferry. In-

stead of so replying, the other party

sent his acceptance by mail to a differ-

ent place, namely, toGeorgetown. This

letter was afterwards received, but

the proposed buyer then declined to

consummate the purchase. The court

said that "an acceptance communi-

cated at a place different from that

pointed out by the plaintiffs in error

[the proposers], and forming a part

of their proposal, imposed no obliga-

tion binding upon them, unless they

had acquiesced in it, which they de-

plaintiff, and your having it in your v. Cre cent Oil Co., 171 Pa. St. 109, 32
own mind is nothing, for it is trite Atl. R. 1120, the parties had stipulaw that the thought of man is not lated. for an acceptance in w1·iting,
triable, for even the devil doe not and the court said that no other
know what the thought of man is; method would suffice.
2 Thus in Eliason v. Henshaw (1819),
but I grant you this, that if in his
offer to you he had said, Go and look 4 Wbeat. (17 U. S.) 225, an offer of
at them, and if you are pleased with purchase was made, stipulating for
them siguify it to such and such a an aceeptance "by return of wagon"
man, and if you had signified it to to the place at which the offerer then
such and such a man, your plea was, namely, at Harper's Ferry. Inwould have been good, because that stead of so replying, the other party
was a matter of fact.' I take it, my sent his acceptance by mail to a differlords, that that, which was said three ent place, namely, to Georgetown. This
hundred years ago and more, is the letter was afterwards received, but
law to this day, and it is quite what the proposed buyer then <leclined to
Lord Justice Melli$h, in Ex parte consummate the purchase. The court
Harris. Law R. 7 Ch. App. 593, accu- said that "an acceptance comm uni·
rately says, that where it is expressly cated at a place different from that
or impliedly stated in the offer that pointed out by the plaintiffs in error
you may accept the offer by posting [the proposers], and forming a part
a letter, the moment you post the of their proposal, imposed no obligaletter the offer is accepted. You are tion binding upon them, unless they
bouud from the moment you post had acquiesced in it, whieh they dethe letter; not, as it is I ut here, clined doing. It is no argument that
from the moment you make up your an answer was received at Georgemind on the subject."
town; the plaintiffs in error had a
To the same effect: Mactier v. right to dictate the terms upon
Frith, 6 Wend. (N. Y.) 103, 21 Am. which they would purchase the flour,
Dec. 262; Jenness v. Iron Co., 53 and unless they were complied with
Me. 20.
they were not bound by them."
l Thus in Bosshardt & Wilson Co.
3 See post, § 244.
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roun dings or location, and by the consideration of what is

convenient or usual in like cases.

§ 240, What constitutes. — ""What shall constitute an

acceptance," said Mr. Justice Marcy in the leading case of

r oun lino· or location, an l by the consideration of what is
con cnient. or u ual in like cases.

Mactier v. Frith, 1 " will depend in a great measure upon cir-

cumstances. The mere determination of the mind, unacted on,

can never be an acceptance. Where the offer is by letter, the

usual mode of acceptance is by the sending of a letter announc-

ing a consent to accept; where it is made by messenger, a de-

termination to accept returned through him, or sent by another,

would seem to be all the law requires, if the contract may be

consummated without writing. There are other modes which

are equally conclusive upon the parties; keeping silence under

certain circumstances is an assent to a proposition; anything

that shall amount to a manifestation of a formal determination

to accept, communicated, or put in the proper way to be com-

municated, to the party making the offer, would doubtless

complete the contract."
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§241. Notice of acceptance by conduct. — It is evi-

dent from the foregoing principles that, unless the parties have

stipulated otherwise, the acceptance of the offer need not be in

any particular form and need not be evidenced by express

words. The fact of the acceptance, and the communication of

that fact to the proposer in any manner reasonably warranted

by the situation, are the material things. Thus in one case, 2 it

appeared that the plaintiff had sent to the defendant a number

of orders for goods to be supplied as specified. The latter

1 6 Wend. (N. Y.) 103, 21 Am. Dec. have prompt attention." Held, not

262. Followed in Trevor v. Wood, an acceptance. Said the court:

36 N. Y. 307, 93 Am. Dec. 511. "Promise to give the proposal atten-

Promise to give prompt atten- tion was not a promise of accept-

§ ..AO. - - 1' h at con t it utes .-" What shall con titute an
acceptan e," said Mr. Ju tice Marcy in the leading case of
Ia ti r v. 1 rith, 1 "will lep nd in a great mea ure upon circum tanc . The m r cl termination of the mind, unacte l on,
h re the off r is by letter, the
can n v r be an ace ptan e.
u ual mo 1 of acceptan e i by the ending of a letter announcin a n nt to ace pt· wh r it i male b. m ena r, a det rmin, ti n to ac pt r turn cl throuc-h him, or nt by another,
would e m to b all the law requires, if the contra t may be
c n um mat cl without \ ritin . Th r ar oth r mode which
are quall
n l u iv ur n th, I arti ; k pin il nee under
rtain circum tanc i an a nt to a r p ition · anythin 0
that ball amount to a manif ta ti n of a f rm, l d t rmination
t ac pt c mmunicat 1, or put in the r p r way to be communic, te 1, to th part makinD' the offer, would doubtl ss
c m pl te th con tract. '

tion, not an acceptance. — InManier ance. It was not an assent to it.

v. Appling. 112 Ala. 663, 20 S. K. 978, It was no more than a courteous

the proposer made an offer (an order) promise to give it consideration."

to buy goods. The party addressed 2 Jordan v. Patterson (1896), 67

replied acknowledging the receipt of Conn. 473, 35 Atl. R. 521.

the offer and said, " The same shall

15 225

§ 24:1. - -

oti e of ac eptance by con duct.- It is evi-

th parties have
l nt from the f r · in · principl s that unl
tipulat doth rwi the cce1 tance of th otf r n ed not be in
any particular form and n d not be vicl nee l by express
word . The fact of th ac ptance, an 1 the communication of
that fact to the propo r in any manner rea onably warranted
l>y the ituation, are the material things. Thu in one case, 2 it
app ared that the 1 laintiff batl sent to the d fendant a number
f order for good to be upplied as pecified. The latter
16 Wend. (N. Y.) 103, 21
m. Dec.
269. Followed in Trevor v. Wood,
36 N. Y. 30 , 93 m. Dec. 511.

Promi e t o gi ve prompt at ten·

have prompt attention." H elcl, not
an acceptance. Said the court:
"Promi e to give the propo al attention was not a promi e of acceptance. It wa not an a ent to it.
It wa no more than a courteous
promi e to give it con ideration."
2 Jordan v. Patter on (1 96), 67
Conn. 473, 35 Atl. R. 591.

ti on, not an a c ptan ce.- In Manier
v. Appling. 119 Ala. 663, 20 . R. 97 ,
the propo er made an offer (an order)
to bu good. . The party addre ed
r eplied acknowledging the receipt of
the offer and aid, ' The ame shall
15
225

§ 2±2.J

LAW OF

ALE.
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8 242.] LAW OF SALE. [BOOK I.

replied, saying, "We are in receipt of the following contracts,

for which we thank you," and appended to this a detailed de-

scription of the orders. Part of the goods only having been

supplied, the defendants insisted that their letter was not

an acceptance; and, if it was an acceptance at all, it was an

acceptance of some one of the orders only and not of all. But

it was held that the letter constituted a sufficient acceptance of

the orders and of all of them.

§ 242. . So, that the party addressed acted upon the offer

to the knowledge of the person offering may be a sufficient

notice of acceptance. Thus, an offer to buy goods or an order

for goods may be accepted by the shipment and delivery of

the goods without a formal letter of acceptance, 1 providing such

replied, saying, "We are in receipt of the foll WinO' m fl'a t
for "'bich we thank you " and ap1 nde l to ibi a tl tail l cl scri ption of the or<lers. Part of tbe ·ood onl haYing b en
supplied, the def n lants in i ted that their letter wa not
an acceptance; and if it wa an acceptance at all it wa an
acceptance of som one of the ord r only and not of all. But
it was held that the 1 tter con tituted a ufficient ac e1 tance of
the orcl r and of all of them.

acceptance be in due season. 2 But this form of acceptance,

like all others, unless this condition be waived, must correspond

with the offer made. Hence an order for a given quantity of

goods cannot be deemed to have been accepted, so as to bind

the person ordering, merely by the shipment of a less quantity; 3
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though, as against the shipper, the sending of part may be evi-

dence of an acceptance of the whole order; 4 nor would the

person ordering the goods be required to accept a less quantity,

1 Taylor v. Jones, L. R. 1 Com. P. firmed this order by letter. Defend-

Div 87; Crook v. Cowan, 64 N. C. ant replied on the same day: "I send

743; McCormick Harvesting Mach. you sample of wheat. I will send

Co. v. Richardson (1893), 89 Iowa, 525, one car soon, and if satisfactory will

56 N. W. R. 6S2. ship more. ' I ship this at price

2 As to which, see §§ 244, 245. named." Plaintiff replied thatsample

3 Bruce v. Pearson (1808), 3 Johns, was satisfactory, and urged haste in

<_N. Y.) 534. sending the five cars. After several

4 Thus in Eckert v. Schoch (1893), days and more urging, defendant

155 Pa. St. 530, 26 Atl. R. 654, it wrote: "1 ship one car to Stemton

appeared that defendant wrote to on this day, contents 444 bus. Will

plaintiff as follows: "If you can pay ship one more on Monday." No more

83£ c. on track here for prime Pa. was shipped, and defendant denied

wheat, will send you sample." On the existence of any agreement for

2±2. - - . o that th party adclre ed acte l upon the off r
to the knowledge of the per on offerin()' may be a sufficient
notice of acce1 tance. Thu , an off r t buy ood or an ord r
for goods may be a c pt d by the hipm nt and deliv r of
the O'OOcl without a formal lett r of acceptance, 1 provi ling uch
acceptance be in due sea on. 2 But thi form of acceptance,
like all other , unle thi conchtion be waiv cl mu t corr pon l
'"ith the offer ma le. Hence an or ler for a given quantity of
goods cannot be deemed to have b en accepted, so as to bind
the person ordering, merely by the bipment of a 1 s quantity· 3
though a again t the sbipper, the sending of part may be evidence of an acceptance of the whole order; 4 nor would the
p r~on ordering the good be required to accept ales quantity

the following day plaintiff replied five cars. The court, however, held

by telegram: "Ship quick five cars that defendant by this correspond-

prime red wheat to Stemton as trial ence and conduct had accepted the

lot." On same day plaintiff con- offer for five cars.
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1 Taylor v. Jones, L. R. 1 Com. P. firmed this oi·der by letter. DefendD iv. 87; Crook v. 9owan, 64 N. C. ant replied on the ame day: "I end
743; IcCormick Harve t.ing Iach. you ample of wheat. I will send
o. v. Richard on (1 93), 9 Iowa, 523, one car soon, anu if sati factory will
56 N. \V. R. 6 2.
ship more.· I hip thi at price
2A to which, ee §~ 2-±J, 245.
named." Plaintiff replied that ample
3 Bruce v. Pearson (1 0 ), 3 John . wa sati factory, and urged ha te in
lJ._ • Y.) .".i34.
ending the ii ve car . After several
4 Thus in Eckert v. Schoch (1 93), days and mor8 urging, defendant
1.55 Pa. St. 530, 26 Atl. R. 634, it wrote: ''I hip one car to Stem ton
appeared that defendant wrote to on this day, contents 444: bu . Will
plaintiff as follow : ' If you can pay ship one more on Monday." No more
83! c. on track here for prime Pa. was shipped, and defendant denied
wheat, will send you sample." On the exi tence of any agreement for
the following day plain tiff replied fh·e car . The court, howe-ver, held
by telegram: "Ship quick five car. that defendant by thi corre pondprime red wheat to temton a trial ence and conduct had accepted the
lot." On same day plaintiff con- offer for five cars.
226
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but if he does accept the less quantity and appropriates the

goods to his own use, he will be deemed to have waived the

requirement of a full delivery as a condition precedent, and he

will be liable to pkypro tanto for the part actually received. 1

§ 243.

So, though one has not ordered goods shipped

but if
good
requir
will b

he cl s accept the le quantity and appro1 riate the
to hi own u e, b will be d m d to have wai\ cl the
m nt of a full d liv r. a a con liti n l r c dent, and he
li ble t pa pro tanto for th I, rt actually r ceiYecl.1
T

to him, yet if, with knowledge of the facts, he retains them and

uses them, or exercises over them acts of ownership, he will be

deemed to have assented to their sale to him and will be liable

as a purchaser. 2

§ 244. Time of acceptance. — Where the period, within which

an offer may be accepted is limited by the terms of the offer,

the offer, if not withdrawn, is to be regarded as an open and

continuing one during that period only, and it must be accepted,

if at all, within the time so fixed. If not so accepted the offer

expires by its own limitations, and no subsequent acceptance

2-!3. - - .
th0twh n
to him
t if with kn \\ 1 ] ,
u
over th
ente l to th
l
2
a " l ur ha r.

ha not or ler l o l bippe l
of th fa t h r tain th man l
m , t of owner hir, he will be
ir ale t him and will be liable

will suffice unless the proposer consents. 1 Where, on the other
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i Oxendale v. WetherelL, 9 B. & C.

386; Richardson v. Dunn. 2Q. B. 222;

Hart v. Mills, 15 M. & W. 85; Avery

v. Wills,,!!. 81 X. Y. 341, 37 Am. R. 503,

~-!-!.

Tim of ace ptan
an IT r ma b a pt cl i limit l by th
h
ff r if not with lra wn i to

distinguishing Catlin v. Tobias, 26

X. Y. 217, 84 Am. Dec. 183.

2 Thompson v. Douglass, 35 W. Va.

337, 13 S. E. K. 1015.

3 "An acceptance after the time

jf at all wi bin th im
• 111' b i t w n 1i rn i tat i n

limited in the offer will not bind the

person making the offer, unless he

"'ldll uffi

unl

th

nt a c pt, nee
r , n the oth r

assents to the acceptance so made

after it is made. - ' Atlee v. Bartholo-

mew, 69 Wis. 43, 33 N. W. R. 110, 5

Am. St. R. 103, citing McCulloch v.

Eagle Ins. Co., 1 Pick. (Mass.) 378;

Larmon v. Jordan, 56 111. 204; Bos-

ton, etc. R. R. Co. v. Bartlett, 3 Cush.

(Miiss.) 224: Adams v. Lindsell, 1

Rain. & Aid. (Eng.) 681; Eliason v.

Henshaw, 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 225. " In

our law the effect of naming a defi-

nite time in the proposal is simply neg-

ative and for the proposer's benefit:

that is, it operates as a warning that

an acceptance will not be received

after the lapse of the time named.

In fact, the proposal so limited comes

to an end itself at the end of that

time and there is nothing for the

other party to accept." Union Na-

tional Bank v. Miller. 10fi X. C. 347,

11 S. E. R 321, 19 Am. St. R. 538, cit-

ing Pollock on Contracts, 9; Larmon

v. Jordan, supra; Boston, etc. R. R.

Co. v. Bartlett, supra; Mactier v.

Frith, 6 Wend. (N. Y.) 103, 21 Am.

Dec. 262; Cheney v. Cook, 7 Wis. 413;

Maclay v. Harvey, 90 111. 525. 32 Am.

R. 35; Dunlop v. Higgins, 1 H. L. Cas.

387. See also Curtis v. Blair. 26 Miss.

309, 59 Am. Dec. 257; Longworth v.

Mitchell, 26 Ohio St. 334: Potts v.

Whitehead, 20 N. J. Eq. 55: Weaver

v. Burr. 31 W. Ya. 736, 8 S. E. R. 743;

Can- v. Duval. 14 Pet. (39 U. S.) 77.

In James v. Marion Fruit Jar Co.

(1896), 69 Mo. App. 207, the offerer

227

pe1.. on making the ff r unle ' h
1 tance o mad
a nt t th a
aft r it i. made.., Atlee v. a rtbolom ,,, 69 Wrn. 43, 33 N. \V. R. 110
rn. t. R. 1 3 citinO' )le 'ullo h v.
Eao-1 In . 'o., 1 Pi ·k. pra ._) 97 :
Larmon v. J orclan, :-6 Ill. 204. · B ·
09 59 Am. Dec. 2.-7 · Longworth v.
ton et . R. R. 'o. v. Bartl tt 3 u h.
(:\Ia ·.) 2.2-1; Adam v. Lind 11, 1 ~IitcheU, 26 Ohio •'t. 33-1: Pott: v.
Barn. & kl. (Eng.) 6 1; Elia on v. Whiteh ad, 20 N. J. Eq. 5:-; W aver
. E. R. i-13;
H n, haw, -1 \\heat. (U. •. ) 225. ·In v. Burr, 31 ·w. Va. 136
arr v. uval, 14 Pet. (39 U. .) 77.
our law- tb effect of naming a defiIn Jam v. Marion Fruit Jar Co.
nit time in th prop ~a l i imply n gative aml for the pr po er' benefit: (1 96), 69 1\Io. App. 207, the offer r

§§ 245, 2±6. J

LAW OF SALE.

[BOOK I.

§§ 245, 246.] law of sale. [book i.

hand, the period for its acceptance is not fixed, the offer must

be accepted within a reasonable time. 1

§ 245. . What is a reasonable time depends here, as in

other cases, upon the particular circumstances of each .individ-

hand, the periocl for its acceptance is not fixed, the offer mu t
be accepted witllin a reasonable time. 1

ual case. 2 If the parties are present and personally negotiat-

ing, that reasonable time will, unless further time is granted,

be limited to the period of such negotiation, and if, without,

stipulating for further time, the parties separate before a bar-

gain is concluded, offers then made will be deemed to be with-

drawn and cannot subsequently be accepted. 3 Where the par-

ties are not thus personally present and orally negotiating, but

are conducting their negotiations otherwise, as by letter or tel-

egram, the offer, unless previously withdrawn, will be deemed

to continue until the letter or telegram containing it is received,

and the party addressed has had a fair opportunity to answer

it. 4 The subject of communication by letter or telegram will

be more fully considered in a later section. 5

§246. Question of acceptance, how determined. — The
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question whether or not the offer has been accepted is one

which may address itself to the court or jury under varying

circumstances. Where the negotiations were in writing, 6 or

had telegraphed an offer saying that 447, 11 Pac. R. 441; Ferrier v. Storer,

prices were higher and advancing, 63 Iowa, 484, 19 N. W. R. 288.

and saying: " Wire instantly or this z Martin v. Black, supra; Dunlop

is withdrawn." This message reached v. Higgins, supra; Mactier v. Frith,

the town of its destination at 7:05 supra; Loring v. Boston, 7 Mete.

P. M. on Saturday evening, but was (Mass.) 409; Chicago, etc. Ry. Co. v.

not delivered until about 10 o'clock. Dane, 43 N. Y. 240; Stone v. Har-

At 10:15, on the following Monday, nion, 31 Minn. 512, 19 N. W. R 88;

§ 24:5. - - . What is a reasonable time depends here, as in
other cases, upon the particular circumstances of each .in livj 1ual case. 2 If the parties are pres nt an l per onally n gotiating, that reasonable time will, unless further time is granted,
be limited to the period of such n gotiation, and if, without.
stipulating for further time, the partie s parate before a bargain is concluded, offers then ma le will be deemed to be withdrawn and cannot subsequent1y be acccpted. 3 \Vh ere the parties are not thus personally present and orally n ·otiating, but
are conducting their negotiations otberwi e, as by letter or telegram, the offer, unless previously withf1rawn, will be deemed
to continue until the letter or telegram containing it is received,
and the party addressed has had a fair opportunity to answer
it. 4 The subject of communication by letter or telegram 'vill
be more fully considered in a later section. 5

the offer was accepted by telegram. McCurdy v. Rogers, 21 Wis. 197; Judd

The offerer responded: "We specified v. Day, 50 Iowa, 247.

§ 24:6. Question of acceptance, how determined.- The

instant answer. Price now $2 per 3 Averill v. Hedge, 12 Conn. 424;

gross higher." Held, that the ac- Cooke v. Oxley, 3 T. R. 653.

ceptance on Monday was not in time. 4 Averill v. Hedge, 12 Conn. 424.

1 Craig v. Harper, 3 Cush. (Mass.) & See post, § 247 et seq.

158; Beck with v. Cheever, 21 N. H. 6 Jordan v. Patterson, 67 Conn. 473,

question whether or not the offer has been accepted is one
which may address itself to the court or jury under varying
circumstances. Where the negotiations were in writing, 6 or

41; Martin v. Black, 21 Ala. 721; Chi- 35 Atl. R. 521; Eckert v. Schoch, 155

cago, etc. R. Co. v. Dane, 43 N. Y. Pa. St. 530, 26 Atl. R. 654; James v.

240; Trounstine v. Sellers, 35 Kan. Marion Fruit Jar Co., 69 Mo. App. 207.
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had telegraphed an offer saying that 447, 11 Pac. R. 441; Ferrier v. Storer,
prices were higher and advancing, 63 Iowa, 484:, 19 N. W. R. 2 8.
and saying: "Wire instantly or thi
i Martin v. Black. supra; Dunlop
is withdrawn." This message reached v. Higgins, supra; Iactier v. Frith,
the town of its de tination at 7 :05 siipra; Loring v. Bo ton, 7 Mete.
P. M. on Saturday evening, but was (Mass.) 409; Ch icago, etc. Ry. Co. v.
not delivered until about 10 o'clock. Dane, 43 N. Y. 240; Stone v. HarAt 10:15, on the following Monday, mon, 31 Minn. 512, 19 N. W.R. 8 ;
t.he offer was accepted by telegram. McCurdy v. Rogers, 21Wis.197; JuJd
The offerer responded: "We specified v. Day, 50 Iowa, 247.
instant an wer. Price now $2 per
3 Averill v. Hedge, 12 Conn. 424;
gross higher." Held, that the ac- Cooke v. Oxley, 3 T. R. 653.
ceptance on l\fonday was not in time.
4 Averill v. Hedge, 12 Conn. 424.
l Craig v. Harper, 3 Cush. (Ma:-;s.)
aSee post,§ 247 et seq.
I> Jordan v. Patterson, 67 Conn. 473~
158; Beckwith v. Cheever, 21 N. H.
41; Martin v. Black, 21 Ala. 721; Chi· 35 Atl. R. 521; Eckert v. Schoeb, 155·
cago, etc. R. Co. v. Dane, 43 N. Y. Pa. St. 530, 26 Atl. R. 654; James v.
240; Trounstine v. Sellers, 35 Kan. Marion Fruit Jar Co., 69 Mo. App. 207.
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the facts are not disputed, the question of acceptance is one of

law to be determined by the court; but where the matter is to

be decided by reference to disputed facts, the question must be

regarded as for the jury.

§ 247. Communication by mail, telegraph, etc.— A person

who makes an offer by mail, telegraph or other public agency,

thereby adopts it as his agent for the transmission of his offer,

the facts are not cli puted the question of acceptance i one of
law to be letermined by the court; but where the matter is to
be decided b reference to di puted facts, the question must be
regarded as for the jury.

and he therefore assumes the risk of his agent's failure to de-

liver the message promptly, or at all, and also, within the limits

applicable to other agents, the risk of his agent's failure to de-

liver it correctly. 1 Such an adoption of a public agency by the

proposer is also, where no other direction is given, deemed

equivalent to an invitation to the party addressed to communi-

cate his reply by the same agency ; and it is well settled, there-

fore, that if the person addressed accepts the offer, and, in due

time, finally and irrevocably delivers his acceptance to the

same agency to be transmitted to the proposer,* the contract

thereby becomes complete, and the failure of the adopted

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:48 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t6xw4h56n
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

agency, without the fault of the acceptor, to transmit the ac-

ceptance to the proposer, either promptly, accurately, or at all,

does not change the result. 3 If, however, this failure is attrib-

1 Saveland v. Green, 40 Wis. 431 ; ceptance is not of itself sufficient to

Scott & Jarnagin on Telegraphs, complete a contract. In such a case

§ 345. the act must involve an irrevocable

2 Thus in Trounstine v. Sellers, 35 element, and the letter must be

Kan. 447, 11 Pac. R. 441, it is said; placed in the mail, or the telegram

" The mere determination to accept deposited in the office for transmis-

an offer does not constitute an ac- sion, and thus placed beyond the

ceptance which is binding on the power or control of the sender, before

parties. 'The assent must either be the assent becomes effectual to con-

communicated to the other party, or summate a contract; and not then,

some act must have been done which unless the offer is still standing."

the other party has expressly or im- srjunlop v. Higgins, 1 H. L. Cases,

pliedly offered to treat as a commu- 381 ; Household F. Ins. Co. v. Grant,

nication.' (Benjamin on Sales, 54.) 4 Ex. Div. 216, 6 Eng. Rul. Cas. 115,

Where parties are distant, and the 19 Rev. R. 415; Adams v. Lindsell, 1

§ 2:17. Communication by mail, tel egraph,etc .-A per on
who make an offer by mail, tele rapb or other public agency,
ther by adopt it as his a ent for the transmi ion of his offer,
and he tber fore a ume the ri k of his a.gents failure to deliver the m s age promptly, or at all, and al o, within the limits
applicable to otb r ag nt th ri k of hi ao·ent failure to deuch an a ]option of a public agency by the
liv r it corr ctly. 1
1 ropo r i al o wher n other dir ction i giv n, deemed quivalent to an invitation to the party a ldr eel to communicate his re ly by the ai e agency· and it is w 11 ttled, therefor , that if the per on a 1 lr
d ace pt th ff r and, in due
tim , finally and irre ocably d li r hi acceptance to the
ame ag nc to be tran mitt l to th propo er,i the contract
th reby b ome com11 te, and the failure of the adopt l
ag ncy, without the fault of the ace ptor, to tran mit the acceptance to the ropo'er itb r prom1 tly, a curately, or at all,
loes not change the re ult. 3 I , howe r, this failure is attrib-

contract is to be made by oorre- B. & Aid. 681, 6 Eng. Rul. Cas. 80;

spondence. the writing of a letter or In re Imperial Land Co., L. R. 7 Ch.

telegram containing a notice of ac- App. 587; Townsends Case, L. R. 13
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1 Saveland v. Green, 40 Wi
431; ceptance i not of it elf ufficient to
cott & Jarnagin on Telegraph , complete a contract. In sucha casE3
345.
the act mu t involve an irrevocable
2 Thus in Trounstine v. Sellers, 35 element, and the letter mu t be
Kan. 447, 11 Pac. R 441, it is said; placed in the mail, or the telegram
~·The mere determination to accept depo ited in the office for transmisan offer doe not constitute an ac- sion, and thus placed beyond the
-ceptance which is binding on the power or control of the ender, before
partie . 'The a ent must either be the assent becomes effectual to concommunicated to the o her party, or ummate a contract; and not then,
someactmu t have been done which unle s the offer i still tanding."
the other party has expre ly or im3 Dunlop v. Higgins, 1 H. L. Cases,
pliedly offered to reat as a commu- 3 1; Hou ehold F. In . Co. v. Grant,
nication.' (Benjamin on Sale , 54.) 4 Ex. Div. 216, 6 Eng. Rul. Cas. 115,
Where parti are di tant, and the 19 Rev. R. 415; Adam v. Linu ell, 1
contract i to be made b corre~ B. & Ald. 6 1, 6 Eng. Rul. 'a . 0:
pondence, the writing of a letter or In re Imperial Land o., L. R. 7 Ch.
telegram containing a notice of ac- App. 5 7; Townsend's Case, L. R. 13
229
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utable to the fault of the acceptor, as in misdirecting bis reply,

or delaying it beyond the proper time, or in employing careless

agents to transmit it, the contract will not thereby be com-

pleted. 1

§248. Method of acceptance in these cases. — The

adoption by the proposer of a given agency for the transmis-

utable to the fault of the acceptor as in mi lir inO' bis r
or delaying it beyond the proper time or in m1 l yin 0 car 1
agents to transmit it, the contract will not ther by be completed.1

sion of his offer is often deemed to be not only equivalent to

an invitation to reply by the same means, as stated in the pre-

ceding section, but also to be a conclusive designation of that

ao-ency as the one to be employed in the transmission of the

§ 24:8. - - Method of acceptance in t h e e ca e . -Tb
adoption by the pro po er of a gi v n agency for the t ran mi -

acceptance, so as to cast upon the acceptor the risk of employing

any other. Though the language of many of the cases appears

to give countenance to this idea, it is nevertheless to be re-

garded as too narrow a view. The proposer is not, of course,

responsible for the fidelity of amj agency which the acceptor

may see fit to employ; but where the proposer does not stipu-

late otherwise he must ordinarily be held to invite a response
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by the usual and natural agency as determined by the circum-

stances of the case. Thus where an offer was made by mes-

senger, but the acceptance was by mail, after the mailing but

before the receipt of a withdrawal of the offer, it was said by

Eq. 148; Potter v. Sanders, 6 Hare, 1; Moore v. Pierson, 6 Iowa, 279, 71 Am.

Stocken v. Collin, 7 Mees. & Wels. Dec. 409; Ferrier v. Storer, 63 Iowa,

515; Hebb's Case, L. R. 4Eq. 9; Tay- 484, 50 Am. R. 752, 19 N. W. R. 288;

lor v. Insurance Co., 9 How. (U. S.) Durkee v. Vermont Cent. R. R. Co.,

390; Patrick v. Bowman, 149 U. S. 29 Vt. 127.

411. 37 L. Ed. 790; Trevor v. Wood, In Massachusetts it has been

36 N. Y. 307, 93 Am. Dec. 511; Abbott thou ;ht that the contract was not

v. Shepard, 48 N. H. 14; Hutcheson complete until the acceptance was

v. Blakeman, 3 Mete. (Ky.) 80; Ham- received. McCulloch v. Eagle Ins.

ilton v. Insurance Co., 5 Barr (Pa.), Co., 1 Pick. 278; Lewis v. Browning,

339: Levy v. Cohen, 4 Ga. 1; Falls v. 130 Mass. 173. But is this true, since

Gaither, 9 Port. (Ala.) 614; Averill v. Brauer v. Shaw (1897), 168 Mass. 198,

Hedge, 12 Conn. 436; Wheat v. Cross, 46 N. E. R. 617, 60 Am. St. R. 387?

31 Md. 99, 1 Am. R. 28; Potts v. iMaclay v. Harvey. 90 I1L 525,32

sion of his offer is often deeme l to be not on ly quivalent to
an invitation to reply by the same m an a stat cl in the pr ceding section, but al o to be a conclu ive l i ·nati n of that
agency as the one to b
m11 rel in the tran mi ion of th
acceptance, so as to ca t u1 on the ace Etor the ri k of em1 loying
any other. Though the languaO'e of man f th
app ar
to give countenance to this idea it i neverth 1 , to be r garcled a too narrow a view. The pro1 o er i not of cour ,
respon ible for the fidelity of any a 0 ency which the acceptor
may see fit to employ; but wher the proposer do s not ti] ulate otherwise he must ordinarily be held to invite a re pon e
by the usual and natural agency as determined by the circumstance of the case. Thus where an offer was made by m senger, but the ace ptance was by mail, after the mailing but
before the receipt of a withdrawal of the offer, it was said by

Whitehead, 20 N. J. Eq. 55; Wash- Am. R. 35; Thayer v. Insurance Co..

burn v. Fletcher, 42 Wis. 152; Haas 10 Pick. (Mass.) 326; Bryant v. Booze.

v. Myers, 111 I1L 421, 53 Am. R. 634; 55 Ga. 438.
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Eq. 14 ; Potter v. Sander , 6 Hare, 1;
Stock en v. Collin, 7 Mees. & Wel .
515; Hebb's Case, L. R. 4 Eq. 9; Taylor v. Insurance Co., 9 How. (U. S.)
390; Patrick v. Bowman, 149 U. S.
411, 87 L. Eu. 790; Trevor v. Wood,
36 N. Y. 307, 93 Am. Dec. 511; Abbott
v. Sheparu, 48 i: . H. 14; Hutche on
v. Blakeman, 3 Ietc. (Ky.) 80; Hamilton v. lrn:;urance Co., 5 Barr (Pa.),
339: Levy v. Cohen, 4 Ga. 1: Falls v.
Gaither, 9 Port. (Ala.) 614; Yerill v.
Hedge, 12 Conn. 436; Wheat v-. Cros"
31 Md. 99, 1 Am. R. 28; Potts v.
Whiteh ad, 20 N. J. Eq. 55; Wa hburn v. Fl t her, 42 Wi . 152; Haas
v. Myer , 111 Ill. 421, 53 Am. R. 634;

Moore v. Pierson, 6 Iowa 279 71 Am.
Dec. 409; Ferrier v. torer, 63 Iowa
4 4, 50 Am. R. 7.J<>., 19 N. W . R. 2 ~
Durkee v. Vermont Cent. R. R. Co.,
29 Vt. 127.
Iu Massachu etts it h as bee n
thou ~ht that the contract wa not
complete until the acceptance was
received.
foCulloch v. Eagle In . .
Co., 1 Pick. 278; Lewis v. Browning,.
130 Mass. 173. But is this true, sin e
Brauer v. Shaw (1 97), 16 l\Iass. 19
46 N. E. R. 617, 60 Am. St. R. 3 7?
I Maclay v. Har v~y. 90 Ill. 525 32
Am. R. 3.5; Tliayer v. In urance Co. ~
10 Pick. (Mass.) 326; Bryant v. Booze,.
55 Ga. 438.
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Lord Hersehell, in the English court of appeal, 1 that " where

the circumstances are such that it must have been within the

contemplation of the parties that, according to the ordinary

usages of mankind, the post might be used as a means of com-

municating the acceptance of an offer, the acceptance is com-

plete as soon as it is posted." And Kay, L. J., in the same

case, declared the rule thus: " Posting an acceptance of an offer

may be sufficient where it can fairly be inferred from the cir-

cumstances of the case that the acceptance might be sent by

post." The same rule would doubtless extend also to the tele-

graph. 2

Whether the agency employed is a " natural and ordinary

mode of transmitting such an acceptance " is said to be a ques-

tion of fact for the jury. 3

§ '240. . Of course, if the acceptance is actually received in

due time, there can ordinarily be no room for question as to the

suitability of the agency employed in transmitting it; 4 though

if the proposer directs the employment of a particular agency,
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he could not, except under very unusual circumstances, be

charged with the risk of any other; and it would also be doubt-

less competent for him to expressly stipulate that he should not

be charged unless the acceptance came through a specified

channel, whether it reached him or not. 5

Lor l Iler b 11 in the Engli h court of appeal 1 that 'where
th circum tance are u h that it mu t hav b n within tbe
cont mplati n of the parti that, ac r ling to th
I linary
u a0
of m nkin 1, the po t mi ·ht b u etl s mean of c mrnunicatin~ the a c I tanc
f an offer, the accer tanc i cornpl te a o n a it i po t d.
nd Kay L. J., in th am
ca
le lar l the rul thu : Po tinO' an ace ptan of an off r
m y be uffi i nt wh r it can fairly e inf rr d from th circurn tan
of the ca that the ace l tance mio·ht be nt by
po t.
Th ame rul w uld doubtl
ext nd al o to tli telerapb.2
Wh th r the a ncy ern1 loy l i a ' natural an l or linary
mo l f tran mittin uch n c ptance r aid to b a question of fa t for th jury. 3

1 Hen thorn v. Fraser, [1892] 2 Ch. 27. the acceptance should be transmitted

,.A9. - -.

In Wilcox v. Cline (1888), rO Mich, by mail."

f

if th ace I tan

517, 38 X. W. R. 555, an oiler of sale ' 2 In Perry v. Mt. Hope Iron Co.

was made by writing delivered by (1886), 15 R. I. 380, 5 Atl. R. 632, 2

i actuall rec iv l in
m f r ue tion a to the

Cline to Wilcox at Bellefontaine, Am. St. R 902, an offer made in per-

Ohio. Wilcox lived at Detroit, Mich., son was left open for acceptance

and Cline at Frederick City. Md. until next day. Plaintiff lived in

Nothing was said as to the method Providence, R. I., and defendant had

of acceptance, but Wilcox had a pre- its office in Boston. Plaintiff sent an

scribed time within which to accept, acceptance by telegraph. Held, that

and after the delivery of the offer the contract was completed at Prov-

each party went to his home. Wil- idence when the telegram was sent,

cox afterwards, indue time, accepted 3 In Perry v. Mt. Hope Iron Co.,

the offer by mail. Held, sufficient, supra.

1e

Said the court: " We think the facts * Perry v. Mt. Hope Iron Co., supra.

show conclusively that the parties 5 See Eliason v. Henshaw, 4 Wheat,

intended from the beginning that (17 U. S.) 225.

231

1 en thorn v. Fra r, [1 9"]"
h. "7.
In Wilcox v. lin (1 ), 10 )Ii h.
17, 3 N. v . R. 5--, an off r f ale
wa made by writing deliv reel by
line to \ ilcox at Bell fontaine,
hio. \\ ik:ox liY d at D troit, llii b.,
and Cline at Frederick ity. l\I<.l.
Nothing wa aid a~ to the method
of a c I tan · , but \: il ox had a pre·
cribed time within which to ace pt,
and aft r the cl livery of the offer
each party went to hi borne. vv ilcox aft rwar , in due time, accept J
the offer by mail. H eld, uffici n t.
aid the c urt: '· \ e think the fact
how
n lu ivel that the parti
intended from the beginning that

th ac ptan
hould be tran mi tted
b mail.'
2 In Perry v. 1\It. Hop
Iron o.
(1 6), 15 R. I.
0, 5 tl. R. 6 ?, 2
Am. t. R. 90?, an offer made in peron wa left open for a ce1 tance
until next day. Plaintiff lived in
Pr idence, R. I., and defendant ha 1
it offi e in Bo -ton. Plaintiff ent an
acceptan e by telegraph. H elcl, that
the contract wa completed at Providen e when the tel gram wa. ent.
3 ln Perry v. Mt. Hope lron Co.,

sup1· l.
v. It. Hope Iron Co.. upra.
Elia on v. Hen haw, 4 Wheat.
(17 U.S.) 2?5.

231

4 Perry

5, 'ee

§§ _50, 251.J
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[n

OK I.

250, 251.]
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§ 250. . It is also competent for the proposer to stipu-

late, either expressly or impliedly, that he is to be bound only

in case the acceptance actually reaches him; and where he does

this, he will not be bound unless it is received, even though

the agency employed for transmitting the reply would other-

wise have been such as to charge him with the risk. 1

§ 251. Time of acceptance in these cases. — The due

§ 250. - - . It is al ·o com pet n t for th pr I

r to stipulate, either expr s ly or impli dl r, that h i to b b un l only
in case the acceptance actuallyr ah shim; an1 "·h r h 1o
this, he will not be l>oun l unlc it is rec iv l ,~ n th u h
the agency em1 loye l for tran mittin ()' th r J ly w ul l o h rwise have been such a to charge him 'vith th ri k. 1

time within which the acceptance must be transmitted depends

upon the principles stated in a preceding section. 2 If the time

be limited, either by express words or the nature of the subject,

or the evident intention, the answer must be transmitted within

that time. 3 In other cases the answer must be transmitted

1 Lewis v. Browning. 130 Mass. 173

[citing Theisiger, L. J., in Household,

etc. Ins. Co. v. Grant, 4 Ex. Div. 223;

Pollock on Contracts (2d ed.), 17;
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Leake on Contracts, 39, note]. In

this case the proposer had written

§ 251. - - 'J1ime of acceptan

in th
ca, e. .-Th
time within which th acccptan emu t b tran mitted l p
upon the principl
tat cl in a Ir
ling s ction.2 If th time
be limited either by X[ r
worcl or the natur f th u bj t
or the evident intention th an w r mu t b tran mitt l within
that time. 3 In oth r a
the answer mu t be tr n mi 1t cl

that, if he did not hear from the other

by a given date, he should conclude

that his offer was not accepted. To

like effect: Haas v. Myers, 111 111.

421, 53 Am. R. 634; Vassar v. Camp,

11 N. Y. 441.

2 See ante, § 244.

3 In Dunlop v. Higgins,l H. L. Cas.

387, the Lord Chancellor says:

"Where an individual makes an

offer by post, stipulating for, or by

the nature of the business having a

right to expect, an answer by return

of post, the offer can only endure for

a limited time, and the making of it

is accompanie'd by an implied stipu-

lation that the answer shall be sent

by return of post. If that implied

stipulation is not satisfied, the person

making the offer is released from it.

When a person seeks to acquire a

right, be is bound to act with a de-

gree of strictness such as may not

be required where he is only en-

deavoring to excuse himself from a

liability." Where the nature of the

business demanded a prompt answer,

it was held that the words "you will

confer a favor by giving me your

answer by return mail," do, in effect,

stipulate for an answer by return

mail. Maclay v. Harvey, 90 111. 525,

32 Am. R. 35, citing Taylor v. Rennie,

35 Barb. (N. Y.) 272. Where an offer

by telegraph states that the sender

" must have reply early to-morrow,''

a reply sent late in the evening of

that day is not in time. Union Na-

tional Bank v. Miller, 106 N. C. 347,

19 Am. St. R. 538, 11 S. E. R. 321.

In case of a proposition by tele-

graph to sell certain goods, the mar-

ket for which was subject to sudden

and great fluctuations, an immediate

answer should be returned, and an

acceptance of such pi-oposition tele-

graphed after a delay of twenty-five

hours from the time of its receipt

was not an acceptance within a rea-

Lewis v. Browning. 130 l\Ia, . 173 d a oring to ex u e him 1f from a
[citing Thei iger, L. J., in Ilou ehold, liabili y." Wh r the De tur of the
etc. In . Co. v. Grant, 4 Ex. Div. 223; bu ine demand d a prompt an wer,
Pollock on Contracts (9d ed.), 17; it ·w a helu that the word "y u will
Leake on Contract , 39, note]. In confer a fav r by giving me your
this case the propo.. er had written an wer by return mail,'' do, in effect,
that, if he did not hear from the other stipulate for an answer by return
Iaclay v. Harvey, 90 Ill. -2-,
by a given date, he should conclude mail.
that his offer ·was not accepted. To 39 Am. R. 35, citing Taylor v. Renni ,
like effect: Haas v. 1\lyer , 111 Ill. 35 Barb. (N. Y.) 272. Where an offer
421, 53 Am. R. 684; Vassar v. Camp, by telegraph state that the ender
11 N. Y. 411.
'·must have reply arly to-morrow,''
2 See ante, § 244.
a reply ent late in the evening of
3 In Dunlop v. Higgins, 1 H. L. Cas. that day is not in ti me.
nion Na3 7, the Lord Chancellor ays: tional Bank v. l\liller, 106 . C. 347,
"Where an individual makes an 19 Am. St. R. 53 , 11 . E. H.. 321.
offer by post, stipulating for, or by
In ca e of a propo ition by telethe nature of the busine · ha Ying n. graph to ell certain goods. the m ar - right to expect, an answer by return ket for which wa subject to udden
of po t, the offer can only endure for and g reat fluctuations, an immediate
a. limited time, and the makin g of it an wer should be returned, and an
is accompanie'd by an implied tipu- acceptance of such proposition telelation that the an wer shall be ent g raphed after a delay of twenty-five
by return of po t. If that implied hours from the time of its receipt
stipulation i not atisfied, the per on was not an acceptance within a reamaking the offer is released from it. sonable time and did not operate to
When a person seeks to acquire a complete the contra.ct. Minne ota
right, be i bound to act with a de- Lin eed Oil Co. v. Collier White Lead
gree of strictne s uch as may not Co., 4 Dill. (U. S. C. C. ) 431.
be required where he is only enWhere a telegram making an offer
232
I
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within a reasonable time, 1 or, as stated in a case already re-

ferred to, 2 the offer will remain open only until the party ad-

dressed has had a fair opportunity to answer it. If the delivery

of the' offer was delayed by the fault of the sender, the time

for its acceptance dates from its actual receipt, even though the

sender may in the meantime have sold the goods to others, 3

demanded an instant acceptance, but

was not received until ten o'clock on

wi bin a rea onabl time,1 or as tat d in a case alre~dy r f rr cl to 2 the off r will r main p n only until the party addr
l ha b l fair 01 I ortunit to an w r it. If the d livery
f th · o r "a d la d b) th fault of the s n r the time
f r it a ptance t from it actual receipt, ev n thoue·h the
n l r may in the meanti e ha e ol l the goo ls to other ,3

Saturday night, and the answer was

delayed until Monday, the delay was

in this case unreasonable, and the

acceptance did not bind. The court

siid: "This offer plaintiffs received

on Saturday night at 10 P. M., but

instead of wiring back their accept-

ance that night through the same
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agency, as they might have done,

they delayed action until the second

day thereafter. It is true that the

next day was Sum lay, but no reason

was shown why acceptance was not

wired back on the evening of the re-

ceipt of the offer. If the time for

acceptance had not been Limited by

the terms of the offer, the delay of

acceptance doubtless would not,

under the circumstances, be deemed

unreasonable or untimely. But the

plaintiffs were admonished by the

very terms of the offer that prompt

and immediate action was required

of them if they desired to accept the

defendant's offer, and that if they

did not so act the offer was with-

drawn. They were warned in the

same connection that the prices were

advancing, and that there was an

emergency calling for prompt and

immediate action on their part. We

feel justified in ruling, as a matter

of law, that the acceptance of the

plaintiffs, thirty-six hours after the

receipt of the offer, even under

the circumstances shown by the evi-

dence, was not an acceptance within

the time required by the terms of

the offer itself. The defendant had

a perfect right, by the terms of the

offer, to limit the time for its ac-

ceptance. The time for acceptance

Bp iiii'd in the offer was as much a

term thereof as the price, or the kind

and quantity of the goods. After

the specified time passed without ac-

ceptance the offer was determined.

Clark on Contracts, 30, 40, 52. It

follows from these observations that

the acceptance of the plaintiffs had

tlemanded an in tantacceptance, but
w not r cei e<.l until ten o'clock on
, atunlay ni ht, an l the an wer was
delay cl until Monday, the d lay
in thi ca e unrea onal le. and the
a eptanc did not bind. The ourt
id: 'Thi offer plaintiff r cei ,·ed
aturtla night at 10 P. :\I., but
in t <
wiring ba k their acceptance that uiO'ht tbrou h the me
aO' ncy, a they might have don ,
they d la eel ac ion until th
nd
1
th r aft r. It i true hat the
next da, wa unday, but n rea n
wa h w·n why accept n wa not
wir d ba k on th ev ning of th r eipt of the offer. If th tim for
a ptance ha not b en limitetl by
he t rm of th
ffer, the d l, y of
a c ptance doubtle
w ultl not,
under the circum tance , be leemed
unrea nable or untimely. But the
plaintiff were admoni bed by he
''ery term of the offer that prompt
and imme iate a tion wa required
of them if they de ired to accept the
def ndant offer, and that if they
did not o act the offer wa withdrawn. They were warned in the
ame connection that the price were
a vancing, and that there wa · an
em rgen y calling for prompt and
immediate action on th ir p rt. We
f el j ti fied in ruling a a matter
of law that the acceptance of the
plaintiff , thirty-six hour aft r the
r eipt of the offer, even under
the cir um tance shown by the evidence, wa not an acceptance within

the time required by the term of
the offer it elf. The defendant bad
f the

a.

to kham,

~Iay 16,
, and made by the offer r ' olely
from a feeling of friend hip., toward·
the offere
to purcha e c rtain
hare of tock "at any time after
January 1, 1 6, if at that time" the
latter hall o de ir , mu~ t be accepted by that date or within a r asonable time th rea.fter, and an aceptance of the offer ent on July 9,
1 6, i. not within area onable time.
Park v. Whitney, 1-! Ma . 27 , 1
N. E. R. 161.
2
verill v. Hedge, 12 Conn. 494,
citing ?ifactier v. Frith, 6 Wend.
( . Y.) 103, 21 m. Dec. 262.
a Adams v. Lind ell, 1 B. & Ald. 6 1.

no effect." James v. Marion Fruit

Jar Co.. 60 Mo. App. 807.

1 Dunlop v. Higgins, 1 H. L. Cas.

387; Duncan v. Topham. 8 Com.

Bench, 325; Minnesota Oil Co. v. Col-

lier White Lead Co., 4 Dill. (U. S.

C. C.) 431; Stockham v. Stockham,

32 M.l. 196; Abbott v. Shepard, is

X. BL 14,
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unless the fact of the delay be obvious to the receiver and he

could not reasonably rely upon it as continuing without in-

quiry.

§ 252. Right to withdraw offer. — A mere offer to enter

into a contract can, evidently, operate only during the period

of its continuance. The very purpose of its making, however,

contemplates that it shall continue until the other party can

act upon it, unless it sooner expires by its express or implied

limitations, or is sooner revoked. But, being purely voluntary,

it is equally obvious that the party making the offer may re-

tract it at any time before it has ripened into a contract by

acceptance. 1 As stated by Lush, J., of the Queen's Bench Di-

vision: 2 "It is clear that a unilateral promise is not bind-

ing, and that if a person who makes an offer revokes it before

it has been accepted, which he is at liberty to do, the negotia-

tion is at an end. 3 But in the absence of an intermediate revo-

cation, a party who makes a proposal by letter to another is

considered as repeating the offer every instant of time till the
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letter has reached its destination and the correspondent has

had a reasonable time to answer it. 4 'Common sense tells us,'

said Lord Cottenham, 5 ' that transactions cannot go on without

such a rule.' It cannot make any difference whether the nego-

tiation is carried on by post, or by telegraph, or by oral mes-

sage. If the offer is not retracted, it is in force as a continuing

offer till the time for accepting or rejecting it has arrived.

But, if it is retracted, there is an end of the proposal."

§ 253. Voluntary offer may be retracted, though time

given for its acceptance. — It is equally true that a voluntary

i Cooke v. Oxley, 3 T. R. 653; Ste- 2 In Stevenson v. McLean, L. R. 5

venson v. McLean, 5 Q. B. Div. 346; Q. B. Div. 346.

Dickinson v. Dodds, 2 Ch. Div. 463; 3 Citing Routledge v. Grant, 4 Bing.

Byrne v. Van Tienhoven, 5 C. P. Div. 653.

344; Bristol Bread Co. v. Maggs, 44 4 Citing Adams v. Lindsell, 1 B. &

Ch. Div. 616; Larmon v. Jordan, 56 A. 681.

111. 204; Paddock v. Davenport. 107 5 In Dunlap v. Higgins, 1 H. L. Cas.

N. C. 710, 12 S. E. R. 464; Bosshardt 381.

& Wilson Co. v. Crescent Oil Co., 171

Pa. St. 109, 32 Atl. R. 1120.

234

unless th fact of th delay b bvious to th r ci v r ancl h
conlcl n t rca onably r ly up n it a continuin without inquiry.

252. Right to withclraw off' r .-

m r

ff r t
nt r
into a contra,ct can, evid ntly,
rate only durin0 • th p riod
fits c ntinuance. Tb v ry puq
of it m kin "h w v r,
th r pc rty can
conternplat that it shall continu until th
act upon it, unle s it o n r Jxpir by it
r im1 li l
on r r Yok l.
ut, b ·in 0 r ur ly v luntary,
limitation , or i
it is equally obviou that th I rty ma.kin · th
tract it at any tim b f re it ha ripen 1 int
acceptan e. 1
s tc t l by Lu h, ., f th )u
2
vi ion: "It is cl ar that a uniJat ral pr mi
ing, ancl that if a p r n wh mak s an ff r r v
it has be n a ceptecl, which h i at lib rty to cl th n
tia3
tion is at an encl. nut in th ab "nce of an int rm <liat r vocation, a party who make a pr p al by 1 tt r to anotb r is
consiclerccl as repeating the off r very in tant f tim till the
letter ha reached it l tinati n and the corr I ncl nt has
had a r asonable tim to an wer it. 4 ' omm n ns t 11 u ,'
said Lord ,ott nham, 5 'that tran action cannot o on with ut
such a rule.' It cannot make any lifferenc wh th r th n gotiation is carried on by po t, pr by t leoTaI h, r by rel m ssage. If the offer i not r tract d, it is in for e sac ntinuing
offer till the time for accepting r rej cting it has arrived.
nut, if it is retracted, there is an en l of the pro1 o al."

§ 253. --Voluntary offer may be retractecl , t hou gh t im e
giYeu for it acceptance.- It is qually true that a voluntary
Cooke v. Oxley, 3 T. R. ()53; Ste2 In Steven ·on v. McLean, L. R. 5
ven. on v. 1cLean, 5 . B. Div. 346; Q. B. iv. 346.
Dickinson v. Dodds, 2 'b. Div. 46. ;
3 iting Routleuge v.
rant, 4 Bing.
Byrne v . Van Tienhoven, 5 C. P. Div. (),) . '
44:; Bri.tol Bread Co. v. Iagg , 44
4 iting Adams v. Lindsell, 1 B. &
Ch. Div. 616; Larmon v. Jordan, ,-6 A. 6 1.
Ill. 204; Paddock v. Davenport, 107
5 In Dunlap v. Higgins, 1 ILL. Cas.
N. C. 710, 12 1. E. R. 464; Bo· har<lt 3 l.
& Wil on o. v. Cresc nt Oil Co., 171
Pa. St. 109, 3
tl. R. 1120.
234
l

I. j

TI.

TR..\ T

LE- I~'"

E ...:rEl

L.

[

OH. VI. J

OONTEAOT OF SALE — I2S GENEEAL. [§§ 254,255.

offer may be retracted at any time before acceptance, even

a (n

_[ r

T

Yen
r ha

tim

though the proposition was in writing, and the proposer lias

expressly stated that he would permit the offer to remain open

for a given period, which has not yet expired. 1 The promise

to allow time for acceptance, being without consideration's,

of course, merely nudwm pactum, &nd the offer may be revoked

by the proposer before acceptance without legal liability.

n

§ 254.

and

Voluntary offer may be revoked though de-

i

k d

l'

clared irrevocable.— So a voluntary offer, as, for example, an

Wl

order for goods, may be revoked at any time before acceptance,

u 1 ·al liabili

r.

even though it may have been in writing, and contained an

express stipulation that it should be irrevocable. 2 Such a con-

'
dition, being without consideration, stands upon no better

w

j

t)t.

--

T

an

ground than the offer or order itself.

§ 255.

Unaccepted offer does not constitute such a
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contract as to exclude parol evidence.— So a written offer

l an
ntt r

or order, before acceptance, docs not constitute such a written

contract between the parties as will exclude parol evidence as

to other stipulations which are not included in the order. 3

u

i Routledge v. Grant, I Bing. 863; !»:: Mich. 328, 53 X. W. R. 555, are to

Dickinson v. Dodds, 2 Ch. I»i\. 163; the same effect

Cheney v. Cook, 7 Wis. US; School ; in Weiden v. Woodruff, 38 Mich.

r

n n

~ lf.

i

Directors v. Trefethren, 10 Bradw. 130, Woodruff Bought to recover

n h a.
ff r
n

(111.) 187; Weiden v. Woodruff, 38 upon an order addressed to him stat-

Mich. ISO; Burton v. Shotwell, 13 ing: "You will please send mi

Bush k\.. 371; Tucker v. Law-

rence, 56 \'t. 167; Quick v. Wheeler,

r8 X. V. 800; Bosshardt & Wilson

e'e v. Crescent I Ml Co., 1 7 1 Pa. St

Id'.'. ::•-> Atl. R, 1100.

-This is well illustrated, as is also

th«' rule of the following section, by

t

the recent case of National Refining

To. x. Miller. 1 S. I >. :. IS IT N. W. R,

vanized lightning rods for my house,

:\Ii h.

within sixty days, lor which 1 will

give you thirty-tive cents per foot, due

when work is completed. II. Wei-

den." Plaintiff proved that under

this order he had delivered two hun-

dred and six feet of lightning rod.

Defendant, claiming that this writ-

ten instrument did net constitutes

962, where it was expressly stipulated complete binding contract between

that the oiler (an order) should not the parties, offered to prove the con-

be subject to countermand. Peckv. versation between plaintiff's agent

Preese, lot Mich. 321, ■">!' X. W. \i. 600, ; ,nd defendant at the time tin-

and Challenge Wind Mill Co v. Kerr, was given; that defendant reserved

th

w~\

.)

,_

o-i ->n ; tha d f n<lant r

c n-

§ 236.J

LAW OF

ALE.

Ln

K

r.

§ 256.]

LAW OF SALE.

[BOOK I.

§ 256. Agreement upon consideration not to with-

draw offer. — It is undoubtedly competent for the parties, upon

a sufficient consideration, to agree that the offer shall not be

withdrawn within a specified time, and such an agreement is

binding. The consequences of the breach of such an agree-

ment are, however, material. If the offer be a mere proposal

to enter into a contract, and the proposer, in violation of his

agreement to leave the proposal open, refuses to do so, and re-

vokes it, he is clearly liable, but his liability will be, not for

the breach of the contract which was never made, but for the

breach of the agreement to leave the offer open so that such a

contract might be made. No title to the chattel to be sold

could pass by such an agreement because no contract of sale

has been entered into. This must also be the result in every

case in which the proposal does not amount to a present offer

of sale that requires no further act on the part of either party
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than a mere acceptance according to its terms. If, however,

the right to countermand the order

within sixty days; that he did in

fact within that time, and before

any of the rod was delivered, act-

ually countermand the order; and

he further offered to prove that at

the time the order was given the

number of feet of rod to be delivered

was agreed upon. This evidence was

§ 256. - - Agreement upon con icl ration u t to witl1draw offer.- It is undoubtedly om pet nt Ior the parti , u1 n
a sufficient consideration, to a ·r that th
ff r hall not b
withdrawn within a pecifi d tim , and uch an agr m nt i
binding. The con equence of th br a h f uch an a()'r ement are, however, material. If the off r be a m r pror o al
to enter into a contra t anu the prop r in vio1ati n of bi
aoTeement to leave the propo al open r fu
to do o and r vokes it, be is clearly liabl but hi liability will be not f r
the breach of the contra t which wa n v r mad , but for th
breach of the agreem nt to leave th off r p n o that su h a
cont1•act might be ma le.
-.- o ti le to th
batt l to b sold
could pas by such an a r m nt b cau e no contr t of sal
ha been ent reel into. Thi mu t al o b the re ult in ev ry
ca in which the propo al doe not amount to al r ent off r
of sale that require no further act on the part of ith r party
than a mere acceptance according to its terms. If, how v r,

all objected to and excluded, and

plaintiff recovered judgment for the

amount claimed.

Said the court: "I. This written

order did not constitute such a writ-

ten contract between the parties as

would exclude parol evidence, or pre-

vent the defendant from showing

any further agreement entered into

between the parties at the time the

order was given, and not embraced

therein. Richards v. Fuller, 37 Mich.

161; Phelps v. Whitaker, 37 Mich. 72,

and cases there cited.

"II. This instrument was but a

mere order. Woodruff was not

236

bound by it in any way to deliver

any rod. Until accepted by him it

was not binding upon either party.

Woodruff testified that he passed

upon all orders taken by his agents;

if he considered the parties good he

delivered the orders, and that if he

doubted the responsibility of the

party who gave the order, he had the

right to reject it. Under such cir-

cumstances it is preposterous to say

that there was a valid binding con-

tract between the parties before

Woodruff had accepted the order,

and in some way notified the defend-

ant of that fact. Even independent

of such testimony, before an actual

acceptance and notice thereof, the

defendant had the right to withdraw

his order. It is similar to an order

given a merchant for goods, which,

before acceptance, the party would

have a right to withdraw. 1 Par-

sons on Con. (5th ed.) 483."

the right to countermand the order
within sixty days; that he di¢! in
fact within that time. and before
any of the rod was delivered, actually countermand the order; and
he further offered to prove that at
the time the order was gh·en the
number of feet of rod to be delivereJ.
was agreed upon. This evidence was
all ol>jected to and excluded, and
plaintiff recovered judgment for the
amount claimed.
Said the court: "I. This written
order did not constitute uch a written contract between the partfos ·as
would exclude parol evidence, or prevent the defendant from showing
any further agreement entered into
between the parties at the time the
order was given, and not embraced
therein. Richards v. Fuller, 37 Mich.
161; Phelps v. Whitaker, 37 Mich. 72,
and ca es there cited.
"II. This instrument was but a
mere order.
Woodruff was not

bound by it in any way to deliv r
any rod. Until accept d by him it
wa not binding upon either party.
Woodruff te tified that he pa eel
upon all orders taken by his agent ;
if he con idered the parties good he
delivered the orders, and that if he
doubted the re pon ibility of the
party who ga.ve the order, he had the
right to reject it. Under such circum tances it is prepo terous to ay
that there was a valid binding contract between the parties hefore
Woodruff had accepted the order,
and in ome way notified the defendant of that fact. Even independent
of such te timony, before an actual
acceptance and notice thereof, the
defendant had the right to withdraw
his order. It is similar to an order
given a merchant for goods, which,
before acceptance, the party woulcl
have a right to withdraw. 1 Parsons on Con. (5th ed.) 4 ·8."
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CONTRA.CT OF SALE-IN GENERAL.

the proposal is such a complete offer of present sale, an accept-

ance of it within the time specified may operate to transfer

the title notwithstanding an attempted revocation of the offer

by the proposer.

§ 257. How offer revoked — Revocation must be act-

ually communicated.— While the offer is, in general, as has

Just been seen, subject to revocation by the proposer at any

the propo al i u h a complet off r of pr sent sal , an cc ptanc fit ithin th tim
p ifi d may operate to tran fer
th titl n t\\ itb tandin; an att mpted r ocation of the off r
by the I ropo er.

time before it is accepted, it is obvious that such revocation,

during the time that the offer might otherwise be accepted,

must, in order to be effectual, be communicated to the other

party. 1 The offer has been communicated to the latter for the

purpose of obtaining his acceptance of it. ami, clearly, if it is

to be withdrawn from his consideration during the period in

ff .rr v k d-R ro·ation mn tbeart11aJly om muni at <l.-Whil th
b n
ubj
t any

2"'7. --Ho

which he would otherwise be still invited to accept it, the fact

of such withdrawal must in some way be brought home to him.

No particular method of communicating the fact of the rev-

ocation would ordinarily be requisite. Notice might be given

expressly, or the fact might be made apparent from acts and
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conduct leading necessarily to that conclusion; as where one

who has offered a specific chattel for sale to A, sells it to 13, as

A knows, before the latter has accepted the offer. 2 The death

1 Stevenson v. McLean, 5 Q. B. Div. sell property, which can be with-

846; Byrne v. Van. Tienhoven, 5 Com. drawn at any time, and which is

PI. Div. 344; Tayloe v. .Merchants' F. made dependent on the acceptance

Ins. Co., 9 How. (U. S.) 390. of the person to whom it is made, is

1 In Dickinson v. Dodds, 2 Ch. Div. a mere nudum pactum, how is it pos-

463, Mellish, J., says: "If a man sible that the person to whom the

makes an offer to sell a particular offer has been made can by accept-

horse in his stable, and says ' I will ance make a binding contract after

give you until the day after to-mor- he knows that the person who has

row to accept the offer,' and the next made the offer has sold the property

day goes and sells tbe horse to some- to some one else? It is admitted law

body else, and receives the purchase- that, if a man who makes an offer

money from him, can the person to dies, the offer cannot be accepted

whom the offer was originally made after he is dead; and parting with

then come and say 'I accept,' so as the property has very much the same

1111

iuni at l t
latt r for the
1 arl ~ if it is
th p ri l in
It it, th fact
r u ·ht h m to him.
rev.

lC

.

ffil

m l a 11 ar nt fr m act
hat on lu i n · a wh re
1 f r al
11 it t
h d

lV Il

an
one
, as
ath

to make a binding contract, and so effect as the death of the owner, for

as to be entitled to recover damages it makes the peril >rmance of the offer

for the non-delivery of the horse? If impossible. I am clearly of opinion

the rule of law is that a mere offer to that, just as when a man who has

237

s 11 property, whi h can be wi hdrawn t any tim , and which is
mad dep ndent on the ac ptan e
of the p r on to whom it is made, is
a m r nuduni pactum, how i it p
ible that the per on to whom t e
offer ha been made can by a ·ceptance make a bindin contract f r
he knows that tbe p r on who ha
made th offer ha~ old the pr p rty
the bor e to ome- to ome one el e? It i ad mitt d law
iv
he pur ha - that, if a man ho mak an off er
die , he offer cannot be ac epted
after he i dead; and parting with
th prnperty ha v ry much the ame
eff t a the death of the owner, for
it rn l~e the perf rmance of the offer
impo ible. I am clearly of 01 inion
who has

§ 2.~ ' 259.J

LAW

F

A.LE.

[B

K

I.

§§258,259.] law or sale. [book i.

of the proposer will also operate as a revocation ; 1 as would

doubtless, in many cases, his subsequently occurring insanity 2

or bankruptcy. 3

§ 258. Mailing letter, etc., not enough. — Where the

offer was made by mail or telegraph, the requirement of actual

of the propo er will al o op rate a a reyocation · 1 a w ulcl
doubtle , in many a e , his ub equently oc urring in anity 2
or bankrnptcy. 3

communication oP its withdrawal applies with full vigor, and

it is abundantly settled that, unlike the case of the acceptance,

the mere depositing of the letter of withdrawal in the post-

office, or the delivery of a message to the telegraph company

for transmission, will not operate a revocation, and the offer

will remain open until the notice of its revocation is actually

received. 4

If, therefore, an acceptance of the offer has been duly mailed,

it wdl not be affected by a revocation of the offer mailed be-

fore the acceptance was mailed, but not received until after-

wards. 5 The acceptance made by the post is not affected by

the fact that a letter of revocation is on its way. This would

be true, moreover, even though the letter of acceptance, duly
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mailed, were delayed or never received. 6

§ 259. Offer under seal. — "An exception to the gen-

eral rule as to the revocability of an offer," says Sir William

made an offer dies before it is ac- 3 See Mechem on Agency, § 263.

cepted, it is impossible that it can be 4 Stevenson v. McLean, 5 Q. B. Div.

then accepted, so when once the per- 346; Tayloe v. Merchants* F. Ins. Co.,

son to whom the offer was made 9 How. (U. S.) 390; Wheat v. Cross,

knows that the property has been 31 Md. 99, 1 Am. R. 28; Kerftpner v.

sold to someone else, it is too late for Cohn, 47 Ark. 519, 58 Am. R. 775, 1 S.

him to accept the offer." Followed W. R. 869; Sherwin v. National Cash

in Coleman v. Applegarth, 68 Md. Register Co., 5 Colo. App. 162, 38 Pac.

21, 6 Am. St. R. 417. To like effect: R. 392.

School Directors v. Trefethren, 10 5 Byrne v. Van Tienhoven (1880), 5

Bradw. (111.) 127. See also Gilbert v. Com. PI. Div. 344. 49 Law Jour. Com.

• 258. - - Mai li nO'

l~tter,

etc., not enong h.-Wh r th

offer was made b mail r t lecrra1 h the requir m nt f a tual
communication of it withdrawal applie with full vi r and
it is abundantly settled that, unlike the ca of the ace ptan
the mere depositin of the 1 tt r of withdrawal in the p toffice, or the deliv ry of a m ag to the t l oTapb ompany
for tran mission, will not operat a r vocati n nd th ff r
will remain open until the notic of it r Yocation is actually
recei vecl. 4
·
If, th refore, an ace ptanc of th off r ha b n lulv mail 1,
it will not be aff ct cl by a revocati n of the offer mail cl before the acceptance wa mail I, but not r c iYed until aft rwards.5 The acceptance mad by the po t i not aff cted by
the fact that a. letter of revocation is on its way. Thi woul l
be true, moreover, even though the letter oE acceptance, duly
mailed, were delayed or never recei vecl. 6
1

Holmes, 64 111. 548: Ahern v. Baker, PI. 316, 42 Law Times, 371; Henthorn

34 Minn. 98,. 24 N. W. R. 341; Walker v. Fraser, [1892J 2 Ch. 27, C. A.

v. Denison, 86 111. 142; Bissell v. <"Dunlop v. Higgins (1848), 1 H. L.

Terry, 69 111. 184. Cas. 381; Household, etc. Ins. Co. v.

§ 259. - - Offer uncler seal.- " An exception to the g neral rule as to the rm'ocability of an offer," says "'ir William

!See preceding note; Anson on Grant (1879), 4 Ex. Div. 216, 48 L.

Contracts (7th ed.), 27. Jour. Ex. 577, 41 L. Times, 298, 6 Eng.

2 See Mechem on Agency, § 254. Rul. Cas. 115.

238

9 63.
3 See l\Iechem 0n Agencv,
made an offer dies before it i accepted, it is impos ible that it can be
4 teven on v. McLean, 5 Q. B. Div.
then accepted, so when once the per- 346; Tayloe v. Ierchant._· F. In . Co.,
son to whom the offer was made 9 How. (U. S.) 390; Wheat v. ro s.
knows that the property has been 31 1d. 99, 1 Am. R. 2 ; Ker~ pne r v.
sold to someone else, it is too late for Cohn, 47 Ark. 519, 5 Am. R. 775, 1 .
him to accept the offer." FolloW"ed "\V. R. 69; herwin v. T ational Ca h
in Coleman v. Applegarth, 6 Md. Regi ·ter Co., 5 Colo. App. 16'>, 3 PaC'.
21, 6 Am. t. R. 417. To like effect: R. 39 9 .
School Directors v. Trefethren, 10
5 Byrne v. Van Tienhoven (1
0), 5
Bradw. (Ill.) 127. See also Gilbert v. Com. Pl. Div. 344, 49 La.w J our. Com.
Holmes, 64 Ill. 548: Ahern v. Baker, P l. 316, 42 Law Times, 371; Henthorn
34 Minn. 9 , ,24 ..... W.R. 341; Wal-ker v. Fra er, [1 9'>] 2 Ch. 27, C. A .
6 Dunlop v. Higgins (1 4 , 1 H . L.
v. Deni on, 86 Ill 142; Bi ell v.
Ca . 3 1; Hou ehold, etc. Ins. Co. v.
Teny, 69 Ill 1 4.
L.
1 See preceding note; An on on Grant (1 79), 4 Ex. Div. 216, 4
Jour. Ex. 577, 41 L. Times, 298, 6 Eng.
Contract. (7th ed.), 27.
Rul. Cas. 115.
2 See Mechem on Agency, § 254.
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Anson, " must be made in the case of offers under seal. Such

an offer cannot be revoked: even though it is not communi-

cated to the offeree it remains open for his acceptance when

he becomes aware of its existence." 1

260. Lapse of otter — Notice.— Where the offer was,

by its express terms, to remain open for a prescribed period, it

will, unless previously accepted, lapse and expire by its own

limitation at the expiration of that period, and no notice of

such expiration is necessary. 2 So though no time was expressly

prescribed, the offer must, as has been seen, be accepted if at

all within a reasonable time, and if not so accepted it also will

lapse and expire without notice when that reasonable time has

expired. 3

But where the offer is thus one which may be accepted within

a reasonable time, and the other party signifies his acceptance

of it within a time which he could fairly have supposed to be

reasonable, good faith, it is held, 4 requires that the proposer, if

he intends to retract on account of the delay, shall make known
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that intention promptly. " If he does not, he must be regarded

as waiving any objection to the acceptance as being too late."

§ 261. Waiver of revocation. — A party who has taken

all necessary steps to withdraw an offer may, nevertheless, with

the consent of the other party, waive his revocation and com-

plete the contract. If, therefore, a person who has ordered

goods withdraws his offer, but, on being advised that the goods

have been shipped, is requested to receive them and hold for

further advice, and does receive the goods and disposes of them

as his own, the withdrawal will be deemed to have been waived

by both parties, and the vendor cannot treat the contract as

thereby rescinded. 5

i Anson on Contracts (7th ed.), 30, * Phillips v. Moor (1880), 71 Me. 78.

citing Doe v. Knight, 5 B. & C. 71: 5 Sullivan v. Sullivan. 70 Mich. 583,

Xenos v. Wickham, L. R. 2 H. L. 21)0. 38 N. W. R 472, 70 Mich. 101, 42 N.

2 Leake on Contracts 1 1878), p. 40. W. R. 1090.

8 See Ramsgate Hotel Co. v. Monte-

fiore, L. R, 1 Exch. 109.
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§ 262. Withdrawal of acceptance.— "An acceptance, while

in course of communication," says Mr. Leake, 1 "may be inter-

cepted in fact, or may be revoked by an actual communication

to that effect before the acceptance is received ; but as the com-

munication of the acceptance completes the contract, it cannot

afterwards be revoked without the consent of the other party.

" A letter once posted cannot be withdrawn by reason of the

regulations of the postoffice; 2 but the operation of the letter

may be revoked by any other means, if possible, before it is

actually delivered. 3 Thus, if a letter accepting a proposed con-

tract be posted, and a subsequent letter recalling the accept-

ance be also posted, and arrive at the same time with the former

letter, there is no contract. 4 A revocation or change of inten-

tion as to acceptance, not communicated until after the accept-

ance is complete, is void of operation."

II.

Of Unilateral Contracts.

§263. Unilateral contracts — Options. — Closely allied to
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the subject of the preceding sections is that of the so-called

option or unilateral agreement, which presents itself in various

forms, but usually in that of an undertaking by one party to sup-

ply such goods as the other may require during a given period,

though such other party may not bind himself to take any.

Upon this subject Mr. Bishop uses strong language, 5 saying

that " unless both are bound, so that an action could be main-

§ 262. lVithdrawal of acceptance.-" An acce1 tan e, while
in course of communication, " says Ir. Leak ,1 "may be int rcepted in fact, or may be revoked by an actual communication
to that effect before the acceptance is rec ived; but as the communication of the acceptance completes the contract, it cannot
afterwards be revoked without the consent of the other party.
"A letter once posted cannot b with lrawn by rea on of the
regulations of the postoffice; 2 but the operation of the l tter
may be reYoked by any oth r means, if possible, before it is
actually clelivered. 3 Thus, if a lett r ace pting a propo ed contract be posted, and a ub equent 1 tter r calling the acceptance be also posted, and arri v at the same time with the former
letter, there is no contract." A revocation or change of int ntion as to acceptance, not communicated until after the accepta nce is complete, is void of operation."

tained by either against the other for a breach, neither will be

bound. 6 This proposition is absolutely axiomatic, not admitting

II.

of being overthrown by authorities, so long as the law requires

something of value as a consideration ; for, where it is admitted

OF

1 Leake on Contracts (1878), p. 46. Shaw & Dunlop (Scotch), 190; Lang-

u NILATERAL

CONTRACTS.

2 In the United States the practice dell's Cas. on Contr. 112.

is often otherwise. 5 Bishop on Contracts, § 78.

3 Citing Cockburn, C. J., in New- 6 Citing Stiles v. McClellan, 6 Colo,

combe v. De Eoos, 2 El. & El. 271. 89; Townsend v. Fisher, 2 Hilton

*Dunmore v, Alexander (1830), 9 (N. Y.), 47; Ewins v. Gordon, 49 N. H.

444.
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§ 263. Unilateral contracts -Options.- Closely allied to
the subject of the preceding sections is that of the so-called
option or unilateral agreement, which presents itself in various
forms, but usually in that of an undertaking by one party to supply such goods as the other may require during a given period,
though such other party may not bind himself to take any.
Upon this subject Mr. Bishop uses strong language, 5 saying
that "unless both are bound, so that an action could be maintained by either against the other for a breach, neither will be
bound. 6 This proposition is absolutely axiomatic, not admitting
of being overthrown by authorities, so long as the law requires
something of value as a consideration; for, where it is admitted
1 Leake

on Contracts (1878), p. 46. Shaw & Dunlop (Scotch), 190; Langthe United Stiites the practice dell's Cas. on Contr. 112.
is of ten otherwise.
.5 Bi hop ou Contracts, § 78.
3 Citing Cockburn, C. J., in New6 Citing Stiles v. McClellan, 6 Colo.
combe v. De Roos, 2 El. & El. 271.
89; Townsend v. Fisher, 2 Hilton
4 Dunmore v, Alexander (1830), 9 (N. Y.), 47; Ewins v. Gordon, 49 N. H.
444.
2 In
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that there is nothing for A's promise to rest on butB's promise,

if B has not promised, A's promise rests on nothing, and is void.

There may be cases in seeming contradiction to this; if there

are any really so, they are not to be followed. In one case, 1

1 Great Northern Ry.Co. v. Witham,

that there i notbino- f r A's promi e tor st on but B s promi e,
if ha not promi eel
promi e rest on nothing, an is void.
Th re ma be a
in seemin 0 contra liction to thi ; if there
are any reall o they are not to be follow l. In one ca ,1

L. R. 9 C. P. 16, 7 Eng. R. 130.

In Campbell v. Lambert, 36 La.

ab olute mutualit of en agement o
that each pa1't ha the rio-ht at once
to h ld he other to po iti e a reement. 1 Par . Cont.
. Thu it
ha been h 11 that a written a r emen to iv
he r fl al of a lea e
of a farm

Ann. 35, 51 Am. R 1. the parties

signed a paper in which they de-

clare. I that they had "mutually

agreed with each other "that Lam-

bert should furnish and deliver to

Campbell such quantities of coal as

the latter might require during a

certain year "to the extent of sixty

thousand barrels, with the privilege
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of twenty thousand barrels or more,

to be delivered with dispatch in such

quantities and at such places" as

Campbell should designate, Lambert

to receive a certain price per barrel

payable at the end of each month.

Lambert delivered thirty-three thou-

sand three hundred and forty-five

barrels, and then, owing to a great

increase in price and large and rapid

orders from Campbell, refused to de-

liver more. Campbell thereupon de-

manded the balance of the eighty

thousand barrels, and upon failure

to deliver sued for the difference be-

tween the contract price and the

then market price. "But on plaint-

iff's own theory." said the court, "it

is manifest that the agreement is a

nudum pactum. We scan its pro-

visions in vain to find the imposition

on Campbell of any obligation to

take or pay for any amount of coal

whatever. He undertakes nothing,

except to pay at the end of each

month for such coal as he may have

chosen to order. One promise may

be a good consideration for another

promise, but not ' unless there is an

absolute mutuality of engagement. so

that each party has the right at once

to hold the other to a positive agree-

ment' 1 Pars. Cont, 448. Thus it

has been held that a written agree-

ment to give A the refusal of a lease

of a farm at a stipulated rent, with

no agreement on the part of A to

take it, and no other consideration,

is void. Burnet v. Biseo. 4 Johns.

235. So a contract in writing to con-

vey lands at a fixed price and within

a stated time, where the other party

did not himself take and nothing

was paid or agreed to to be paid by

him, was held void. Bean v. Bur-

bank, 16 Me. 458, Again, where the

purchaser at an execution sale gave

the defendant a written promise to

reconvey upon the payment of a

specified sum by a day named, but

the defendant did not bind himself

liver more.
mantled the
thou and barr ls and upon failur
to deliver ued for the difference b tween th contra t pri
an<l the
hen market pri e. "Bu on plaintiff' own theory · a i the court "it
i manife t that the a reement is a
nudwn paciwn. ' e can it pro, j ion in vain to find the impo ition
on ampb 11 of an obligation to
tak or pay for any arnoun of coal
wbate,er. H und rtak no hino:s:cept to pay at the end of each
m nth for ~uch coal a he may have
ho en to order. One promi e may
be a o-ood con ideration for another
prorni e but not · unle there is an

16

to make u h paym nt, b
wa hell o b without
ion. ::'II r - '· Franklin,
The followino- ca e i · y t more exactly in point, viz.: It wa held that
a written a re ment under which
one par • wa t d liv r o he other
prairie b<t 'not to exceecl wo hundred ton , pa ment to be made on
delh-ery of de io-nated in talment ,
did not confer upon the latter party
a rio-ht to enforce delh·er
o the
limit m n ioned; wa therefor without omplete mutualit., and left it
optional with each party to a oid
the agreement on o-fring notice to
the other a any period during the
time of d livery. Ho ton, etc. Co.
v-. Mitchell, ;-3 Tex. 85. If the con-
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§ 2G3.]

LAW OF SALE.

[HOOK I.

parties agreed that one of them should supply the other daring

a designated period with certain stores, as the latter might

order. He made an order which was filled; then made an-

other, which was declined; and on suit brought the defendant

parties agreed that one of them should supply the oth r durin
a designated period with certain store a the latt r rni 0 bt
or ler. He made an order which wa fill d; th n mad C:Wother, which was declined; a nJ. on suit broui::;bt th <l fondant

dition upon which defendant's prom-

ise was to take effect had been the

doing of something involving labor

or other value by Campbell, and

upon the faith of said promise, and

before its revocation, Campbell had

done the thing, different principles

would apply, not necessary to specify

here. But the foregoing cases sutli-

ciently show that the mere exercise

of an option to exact the perform-

ance of a promise does not alter the
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situation of the parties, and does not

prevent the promisor from exercis-

ing his right of refusal. The author-

ities quoted are sound and applica-

ble to our law. On these grounds

we hold that defendants were not

bound in law to execute the naked

promise contained in their agree-

ment, but had the right at any time

to refuse to proceed in execution

thereof, and for such refusal are not

responsible in damages to plaintiff."

In Thayer v. Burchard. 99 Mass.

508, A wrote to B, a common carrier

over one of two routes from the west,

that he was about to buy grain in

the west and wished to hear soon if

B was disposed to contract for its

transportation, as he should buy in a

different market for B's route than

tor the other. B, in reply, stated his

rates for carrying flour from the end

of a canal to several towns. A then

wrote asking whether the rates ap-

plied to grain as well as flour, and

whether B would abate a discrimina-

tion in them against A's town. B

answered that he would carry A's

flour and grain from the canal to

that town at a given rate "to con-

tinue in force till close of navigation

unless notice to contrary." A replied

the same day accepting the proposal.

Held, that to ascertain the terms of

the agreement, regard was to be had

to the whole correspondence, and not

the two last letters only. Held, also,

that, by the terms so ascertained, the

relation of the parties was in the nat-

ure of an open proposition by B, to

which A might from time to time

give effect as a contract by deliver-

ing flour and grain and calling for

its transportation, and B's right to

end which by notice was unqualified.

Held, further, that after giving A no-

tice of a change of rates to take effect

on a certain day, B's obligation to

carry any of A's flour or grain at the

former rates after that day was lim-

ited to such flour and grain as at the

dition upon which defendant' prom- that town a t a g iv n rate "to conise was to take effect had been t he tinue in for till clo of navigation
doing of something involving labor unle noti e to ontrary. '
r eplie
or other value by Campb 11, and the am day ace pting the propo al.
upon the faith of . aid promi e. and Eli ld, that to a certain t.he terms of
before its r evocation, am1 h 11 had the ao-reem nt. r gard wa to he had
done the thing, different principle to the whole rr pondenc . and not
would apply, not necessary to , pecify the two la. t 1 tter only. H eld, al o,
here. But the for going a · uffi- that. by the term. o a c rtained, the
ciently show that the mer e:xerci e relation of the partie wa in the natof a n option to exact the p rform- ure of an op n pr po ition by B, to
ance of a promi e does not alter the whi ch A mig ht from time to time
situation of the partie , and doe not give effect a a contrct t by deliverprevent the prorni or from xerci - ing flour an<l grain and calling for
ing hi right of refu al. The author- it transportation, and B's right to
iti es quoted are sound an l applica- end which by notice was unqualified.
ble to our law. On the e grounds Held. further, that after giving A now e hold that <lefendant were not tice of a change of rates to take effect
bound. in law to execute the naked on a certain day, B's obligation to
promise containe<l in their ag ree- carry any of A's flour or grain at the
m en t, but had the rig ht at any time former rates after that day was limto refuse to proceeu in execution ited to such flour and grain a.sat the
thereof, and fo r such refu al a re not time of the notice had been delivered
re ·ponsible in damages to plaintiff." to B by A for tran portation.
In Thaye 1~ v. Burchar<l. 99 Mass.
In Bailey v. Au trian, 19 Minn. 535,
50 , A wrote to B, a common carrier plaintiffs being engaged in a general
over one of two routes from the we t. foundry bu ines , defendant promthat he was about to buy grain in ised to supply them with all the Lake
the west and '"'i hed to hear soon if
uperior pig iron wanted by them in
B was disposed to contract for its their bu ines from September 2d
transportation, as he should buy in a until Decem ber 31st next ensuing, at
different market for B's route than specified prices, and plaintiffs simultor the other. B, in reply, tated his taneously promised to purchase of
rates for carrying flour from the end defendant all of said iron, which they
of a canal to eYeral towns. A then mi ght want in their said business
wrote asking whether the rates ap- during the time above mentioned, at
plied to grain as well as flour, and said prices. H eld, that this state of
whether B would. abate a di c rimina- fact did not establish a valid contion in them against A's town. B tract, since it did hot establish an aban \Yered that he would carry A's solute mutuality of engagement, givflour and grain from the canal to ing each party the right to hold the
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rested his case on the lack of mutuality in the contract, which,

he contended, rendered it void. Plainly it stood, in law, as a

mere continuing offer by the defendant; but, when the plaintiff

made an order, he thereby accepted the offer to the extent of

the order, and it was too late for the other to recede. So judg-

ment went for the plaintiff; Brett, J., observing that this case

'does not decide the question whether the defendant might

fendant "to deliver to plaintiff as

many grapes as he should wish at a

given price " is a mere offer, which

r tell hi ca e on the lack of mutuality in the contra t, which,
lainly it stood in la·w, as a
h cont n l cl, r n 1 red it voi 1.
m r c nti nuin
ffer by the d f ndant· but, when the plaintiff
mad an ord r, be th r by ac p d the offer to the xtent of
th or l r and it wa t o lat for he oth r to rec de. o judgment w nt for th I lain ti ; r tt, J., ol servin that this ca e
' l
not l ci
the iu stion ' b ther t e defendant miD'ht

the plaintiff had the right to accept

or reject, and defendant to retract

at anytime before acceptance; but

other to a positive agreement. See

also Tarbox v. Gotzian, 20 Minn. 139.

In Drake v. Vorse, 52 Iowa, 417,
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where the defendant contracted to

purchase from the plaintiff, at a cer-

tain fixed price, all of the castings lie

should want (luring the year in his when the plaintiff named the quan

business, it was held that the con-

tract did not preclude him from en-

tering into a partnership during the

year, and would not become obliga-

tory upon the firm.

In Burton v. Great Northern Ry.

Co., 9 Exch. 507, where an agent

agreed to transport all the goods that

might be "presented to him" tor that

purpose during the year, but the prin-

tity which he would take, the con-

1 1 act became complete, and both par-

ties were bound by it.

In Chicago, etc. Ry. Co. v. Dane, 43

N.Y. 240, where the defendant offered

by letterto receive from plaintiff and

transport a quantity of iron not to

62 1 a certain number of tons, at a

specified rate per ton, and the plaint-

iff answered merely assenting to the

cipal did not expressly agree to fur- proposal, but did not agree on his

nish any goods for transportation, it

was held that the agreement was

binding upon the agent only, and

that the principal might at any time

refuse to furnish any goods, and thus

practically terminate the agency dur-

ing the year without liability.

In Rhodes v. Forwood, L R. 1 App.

I las. 356, 15 Eng. R.(Moak), 124, where

the owner of coal mines appointed

agents for the sale of the coal at Liv-

erpool for seven years, but did not

agree to furnish them any coal to

sell during that period, it was held

that the owner might sell his mines

and terminate the agency, even

though the seven years had not ex-

pired, without liability to the agents.

In Keller v. Ybarru, 3 Cal. 147, it

was held that an undertaking by de-

part to deliver any iron for such

transportation, it was held that there

was no valid contract binding on

eil her party.

In Bryant v. Smith, 87 Mich. 525,

49 X. W. R. 889, the plaintiffs sued

oth r to a positive a!!reem nt.
ee fendant "to deliver to plaintiff as
al o Tarb x . otzian, 20 Minn. 139. m· ny grapes a he should wi h at a
In rake v. or e, 2 Iowa, 417, given pri e ':is a mere offer, which
lier the d f nclant contracted to the plaintiff had th right to ac pt
purcha. from the plaintiff, at a cer- or r je t, and defendant to retract
t in fix d pri e, all of the ca ting he at any time befor acceptan ; but
hould '"ant during the year in hi when the plaintiff named the quanu in . , it wa held that the con- ity whicl he would tak , the cont r t did not pr lu e bim from en- tra t became complete, and both part ring into a partn r hip during the ti w re Lound by it.
In hicago, etc. Ry. o. v. ane, 43
y ar, and would not be ome obligatory U[ n the firm.
N. Y. 240, wher th d f ndant ffered
In urton v. r at :rorth rn Ry. by 1 tt r to rec iv from 1 laintiff and
., 9 Exch. 507, wh re an ag nt tr n port a quantity of iron not to
agr d to trau p rt all th good that xeeecl a c rtain numb r of ton , at a
miO'ht b "pr nt cl to llim 'for that ·p ,cifi rate pert n, and the plaintpurpo e during th y r, but he prin- iff an ,,, red merely a entmg to the
-cipaJ <.licl not expr ly agr e to fur- pr po al but did not agree on his
ni l any goou for trnn lJOr ation, it part t deliv r any iron for su h
was h tu that the agr em nt wa. tra,n portation, it wa h ld th~Lt there
bin inO' upon the :10' nt only, anc.l wa. n valid contract binding on
that th principal miO'ht at any time i her party.
r efu to furni. h any ocl , and thus
In Bryant v. Smith, 7 fich . 52;-,
practlcally terminat th agency dur- 49 N. W. R. 9, the plaintiffs sued
ing the year without liabilit .
defendant for the breach of an agreeIn Rhode . Jforw d, . . 1 pp. ment which was reduced to ' riting
Ca . .56, 15 Eng. R. (!IIoFt.k), 124, where but not igned, under which defend·
th o"vner of coal mine appointed ant agreed to sell and d liver, and
aO'ent for the sale of the coal at Liv- plaintiff · to recei e and pay for, five
rr 1 for seven y ar , but did not ar-loa ls of wood at a tatecl price
to furnish th m any coal t
per cord. D fendant fu rth r agreed
uring that period, it wa held to ell and d liver to plaintiff as
that the owner might sell bis mine much more of the sam kind of
a nd terminate the ag n y, even wood as they should OrLler at the
hough the ev n year ha<.l not ex- ame pri e. After d livering eight
pired, without liability to the agen . car-load . further deliv ry was reIn Kell r v. Ybarru, 3 al. 1-17, it fu ·eel and plaintiff. were held not to
wa hel<.l that an unuertaking by le- be entitled to recover.
2-J.
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have absolved himself from the further performance by giving-

notice.' "

§ '261. . But in a very late case in Maryland, 1 the question

have absolved himself from the further p rformance by 0iYino
notice.' '

of the right of the promisor to absolve himself from further

performance by giving notice was decided in the negative. In

§ 26:!. - - . But in a verv late case in Iaryland 1 tb qu tion

that case defendants had agreed to sell and deliver to the

plaintiffs during the month of September from three hundred

to five hundred tons of acid phosphate. The phosphate was to

be "filled into buyers' bags and delivered to buyers' drays in

sellers' factory." Plaintiffs were " to give ample notice of their

wants twenty-four hours ahead" and were to pay cash on de-

livery. Three hundred tons were delivered and paid for in

cash on delivery. The defendants then informed the plaintiffs

that they would decline to deliver any more. Plaintiffs denied

their right so to decline, and on the '2'2d of September notified

defendants of their desire to take the remaining two hundred

tons and requested the delivery thereof. Defendants refused

to deliver, and suit was brought to recover damages for the
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breach of the contract. Said the court: " The plaintiffs had an

option to make a demand for the delivery of the remaining two

hundred tons of phosphate or any portion of it. The plaintiffs

were not bound to make a demand for delivery, but if they did

so, the defendant had agreed to deliver the article. It seems

to be a settled principle that an agreement may be so framed

as to leave one party an option, and thus impose no obligation

on the other party until the option is exercised so as to create

an obligation. 2 In contracts of this nature, when one party

has an option, and gives notice that he has exercised it, the

effect of such notice is to impose on the other party a binding

obligation enforceable at law." 3 As to the effect of the notice

of withdrawal of the offer, which was of the essence of the case,

the court dispose of it by adopting the rule laid down by the

1 Dambmann v. Rittler, 70 Md. 380, 3 " Such is clearly the doctrine as

14 Am. St, R. 364, 17 Atl. R. 389. expounded by Parke, J., in Chippen-

2 Citing 2 Parsons on Contracts.657; dale v. Thurston, 4 Car. & P. 101."

Wolf v. Willetts, 35 111. 88; Jenkins

v. Green, 27 Beav. 437.

214

of the right of the promi or to ab ol v him lf from furtb r
performance by giving noti wa l ci l l in the n gati . In
that ca e defendant ha l agr d to 11 and l li v r t th
plaintiffs durin<Y the month of l t mb r from thr e bundre l
to five hundred ton of acid pbo pbat . The pho pbat ''a to
be "fill d into buy r ' bao· an l cl liY r d to bu r" lray in
seller 'factory. Plaintiff w r
t giv ampl n tic of heir
want tw· nty-four hour ah al an l wer to par a h n delivery. Three hunclr d ton w r d liv r d anu pail for in
ca h on d li v ry. The l fen lant th n infi rm l the plaintiff
that they would lechne to cl li er an ., rnor . laintiff l ni l
their right o to de line and on th _,_;; l of ptem b r n tifi l
defendant of their d ir to take the remainin<Y two bun 1r d
tons and requested the delivery thereof. Defcn fant r fu l
to deliver, and uit wa br uo·bt to recover damage for the
breach of the contract. aid the court: The plaintiff had an
option to make a demand for th leliv ry of the remaining two
hundred tons of phosphate or any I ortion of it. The plain.ti s
were not bound to make a d rnand for delivery, but if they li l
o the defendant had agree l to deliv r the article. It em
to be a settled principle that an agr ement may be so framed
as to leave one party an option and thus impose no obligation
on the other party until the option is exerci eel o as to create
an obligation. 2 In contract of this nature, when one party
has an option, and give notice that he bas exercised it, th
effect of such notice is to impose on the other part a binding
obligation enforceable at law.' 3 A to the effect of the notice
of withdrawal of the offer," hich was of the es ence of the cas ,
the court dispose of it by a lopting the rule laid down by the
Dambmann v. Rittler, 70 l\fd. 3 0,
3 "Such :ls clearly the doctriue as
14 m. St. R. 364, 17 ti. R. 3 9.
expounded by Parke, J., in Chippen2Citing 2 Par ons on Contract ,6 7; dale v. Thurston, 4 Car. & P. 101."
Wolf v. Willetts, 35 Ill. 88; Jenkins
v. Green, 27 Bea v. 437.
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United States supreme court, 1 that "the promisee, if he pleases,

may treat the notice of intention as inoperative, and await the

time when the contract is to be executed, and then hold the other

party responsible for all the consequences of non-performance.

"Gnited tates upreme court 1 that' the promisee if he pleases,
ma' treat the notice of intention a inoperative and a-wait the
time wh n the contrac i to l e ex cuted and th n hol l the other
party re ponsible for all the con equenc of non-performance.

1 In Wheeler v. New Brunswick,

etc. R. R. Co.. 115 U. S. 29.

Im Rational Furnace Co. v. Keystone

Mfg. Co., 110 111. 427. where it was

that there was no mutuality,

the court said: "The undertaking,

here, was substantially this: Appel-

lant agreed to deliver in car. at Ster-

ling, Illinois, all the iron that appellee

needed in its business during the

then ensuing year, at $22.35 per ton.
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Appellee, on its part, agreed to take

its year's supply of iron of the appel-

lant, and pay for the same

ton. We do not regard the contract

void on the ground stated. It is true

that appellee was only bound by the

contract to accept of appellant the

amount of iron it needed for use in

its business; but a reasonable con-

struction must be placed upon this

part of the contract, in view of the

.situation of the parties. Appellee

was engaged in a large manufact-

uring business, necessarily using a

large quantity of iron in the trans-

action of its business. It is not to be

presumed that appellee would close

its business and need no iron, but,

on the contrary, a reasonable pre-

sumption would be that the business

would be continued, and appellee

would necessarily need the quantity

of iron which it had been in the

habit of using during previous years.

It cannot be said that appellee was

not bound by the contract. It had

no right to purchase iron elsewhere

for use in its business. If it had

done so, appellant might have main-

tained an action for a breach of the

contract. It was bound by the con-

tract to take of appellant, at the

price named, its entire supply of iron

for the year, — that is, such a quan-

tity of iron, in view of the situation

and business of appellee, as was rea-

sonably required and necessary in its

manufacturing busine>s. Such con-

tracts are not unusual. A foundry

may purchase its supply of coal for

the season, of the coal dealer. A

hotel may do the same. A city, for

the use of the public schools, may

engage its supply of coal for the

wint«r, at a specified price. Such

contracts are not uncommon, and

we have never understood that they

were void. Smith v. Morse, 20 La.

Ann. 220. is a case in point. In this

case Smith agreed to furnish Morse

all the ice he might require for the

1 In
h eler '· ... '"ew Brun wick, contract. It wa bound y the conetc. R. R. Co .. 11.'5 ~. •. <:> •
t to take of appellant. at be
In .. ~ational l"urnace Co.'· Key tone price named, i entire upply of iron
:Hf". o., 110 Ill. -127, where it wa for the year,- that · , uch a quanurge that there wa no mutuality, tity of iron, in ie of the ituation
the court aid: 'The undert kin er, ancl bu ine of ap elle , a wa reahere w
ub tantially th· : ppel- onably re iuire and nece ·ary in it.
Jant agree to deliv r m car at , t r- manufacturing busine .
uch conlin00, Illin i . all their n that appellee tract are not un ual. A foundr
neeclecl in it bu in s
urino- the m· y purcha e it upply of coal for
then n uing year at .;2•J,3,- per ton. the ea ·on, of the c al dealer.
pvellee. on it part, agre cl to take h tel may do the ame. A city for
it year' upply of iron of the appel- the
e of tha public school , may
lant. an pay for he same ...,0,3,3 per engao-e it
upply of c al for he
ton. \\"'e clo not regard the ntra · wint r at a pecified price.
ucl
YOid on the groun tate . It i true contract are not uncommon, an
that ap ellee wa only bound by the we ha •e never under tood that they
ontract to a cept of appellant the were 'oid.
mith '· )for e, 20 La.
am un of iron it neede for
e in
nn. 20 . · a ca e in point. In thi
its b in · but a rea onable con- ca e 'm1th agreed to furni h )for~e
struction mu t e placed upon th' all the ice be miaht requfre for the
part of the contract in view of the
e of hi hotel for five year , at a
ituation of the partie
Appellee certain vrice.
mith undertook to
wa enga ed in a lar""e manufact- avoid he contract. on the groun
uring b ine , nece rily u ing a that _for..;e wa not bound, but the
laro-e quantity of iron in the tran - court held the contract nlid and
action of it busine . I · not to be binding on both partie "
pre urned hat appellee would clo e
In Lee ilver lfining Co. v. Omaha,
it bu ine and need no iron, but, etc. melting Co., 16 Colo. 11 , 26
on the contrary a rea onable pre- Pac. R. 326, the meltina1 company
umption would be that the bu ine
addre -ed a letter to the mining
would be continuP-d, and appellee company saying : '·For a period of
would nece sarily need the quantity six months from date we offer for
-0f iron which it had been in the the product of the Robert E. Lee
habit of in during pre"'iou yea
mine a follow : p to ,5 ounce
lt cannot be said that appellee wa per ton, will pay 9'> per cent. of ~ -ew
no boun by the contract. It had York quotation ; '16 to 150 ounces
no ri.,.ht to urcha e ll'on el ·ewhere il er per ton 93t per cent. of >ew
for u e in it bu. ine -. If it had York quotations: 1.51 to 9 50 ounces
done o, appellant mi.,.ht have main- ilYer per ton 94: per cent. of -ew
ta.ined an action for a breach of the York quotation ; 9- 1 ounces up, il24:-
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. . . On the other hand, the promisee may, if he thinks

proper, treat the repudiation of the other party as a wrongful

putting an end to the contract, and may at once bring his ac-

tion on a breach of it." This process of reasoning seems very

On the other hand, the promisce may, if he thinks
proper, treat the repudiation of the other party as a wr n ful
putting an end to the contract, and may at once brin()' bi action on a breach of it." This proc ss of rea.sonin; se 'm v ry

ver per ton, 95 per cent, of New

York quotations. Deducting seven-

teen dollars and fifty cents ($17.50)

per ton for working charges. Price

of silver based on New York quota-

tions on day of settlement. Yours

truly, Omaha and Grant S. & R. Co.

By Henry Head. This letter was

also signed by the mining company

as evidence of its acceptance. The

mining company delivered to the

smelting company all its product for
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a n amber of months, when it leased

its mines to a stranger, who refused

to deliver any more ore to the smelt-

ing company. In an action by the

latter to recover damages, it was

urged that there was no mutuality

in the contract, but the court held

otherwise, saying: "An almost par-

allel case to the one under consider-

ation, in many respects, was Riggins

v. Railroad Co., 73 Mo. 598, growing

out of the following memorandum:

' Kansas City, Mo., November 6, 1872.

Lead from Baxter to St. Louis at 22+

per 100. All lead shipped by Chap-

man & Riggins to be forwarded by

M. R. F. S. & G. R. R. at above rates

from January 1st, 1873, to January

1st, 1874, and above rates guaranteed

for same time. H. J. Hayden, G. F. A.,

Riggins and Chapman,' — the breach

alleged being that the railroad com-

pany refused to transport large quan-

tities of lead offered by plaintiff at

the rates mentioned in the proposi-

tion. The same defenses were inter-

posed that are here insisted upon in

argument, and it was held that, al-

though Riggins & Chapman did not

agree to ship any definite quantity

of lead, they did bind themselves to

ship over the road of the company

any lead they should ship to St.

Louis, and that that was a sufficient

consideration for the company's

guaranty of rates."

In Cherry v. Smith, 3 Humph.

(Tenn.) 19, 39 Am. Dec. 150, Smith

signed a paper stating: "We agree

to ship and forward to D. Cherry

. . . a number of barrels of salt,

not to exceed one hundred and fifty,

when called on, at the rate of fifty

cents a bushel. . . ." In an ac-

tion by Cherry against Smith for a

refusal to deliver the salt, it was

urged that the paper was not a con-

tract, and if it was there was no mut-

uality. But the court said: "As to

the first point, we think the paper

contains an undertaking on the part

ver per ton, 95 per cent. of New
York quotations. Deducting eventeen dollars and fifty cents ($17. 50)
per ton for working charge . Price
of silver based on New York quotations on day of settlement. Yours
truly, Omaha and Grant S. & R. Co.
By Henry Head. This 1 tter wa
al o signeu by the mining company
as evidence of its acceptance. The
mining company delivered to the
smelting company all its product for
a number of months, when it lea ed
its mines to a stranger, who refused
to deli-ver any more ore to the melting company. In an action by the
latter to recover damages, it was
urged that there was no muLuality
in the contract. but the court held
otherwise, aying: "An almo t parallel case to the one under consideration, in many respects, ·w as Riggins
v. Railroad Co., 73 Mo. 59 , growing
out of the following memorandum:
'Kansas City, Mo., November 6, 1 72.
Lead from Baxter to St. Louis at 22t
per 100. All lead shipped by Chapman & Riggins to be forwarded by
M. R. F. S. & G. R. R. at above rates
from January 1st, 1873, to January
1st, 1874, and above rates guaranteed
for same time. H.J. Hayden, G. F. A.,
Riggins and Chapman,' - the breach
alleged being that the railroad company refused to transport large quantities of lead offered by plaintiff at
the rates mentioned in the proposi·
tion. The same defenses were interposecl that are here insisted upon in
argument, and it was held that, although Riggins & Chapman did not

agree to ship any definite quantity
of 1 ad, they did bind them lve to
hip over the road of the ·om pany
any lead they hould hip to St.
Loui , and that that wa a ufficient
con iderati n f r the company's
guaranty of rat · . "
In Cherry v. mith, 3 Humph.
(T nn.) 19, 39
m. D c. 1.30, 'mith
i ned a pap r tating: "W agr e
to ship ancl f rwarcl to D. h rry
• . . a number of barr 1 of alt,
not to exce done hundre land fifty,
when called on, at the rate of fifty
cents a bu hel. . . ." In an action by Cherry against mith for a.
refusal to deliver the salt, it wn.s
urged that the paper was not a contract, and if it wa there was no mutuality. But the court ::;aid: "As to
the first point, we think the paper
contains an undertaking on the part
of the defendants. They ay: •vVe
agree to ship and forward,' etc.,
thereby obliging themselves to perform what they thus agree to do.
As to the second point, we think
there is mutua1ity in this contract.
The fact that the agreement is optional as to one of the partie , and
obligatory as to the other. does not
destroy its mutuality. If there be a.
sufficient consideration on both sides
it is mutual. Disborough v. Neilson,
3 Johns. Cas. 81; Giles v. Bradley, 2
id. 253; Penniman v. Hartshorn, 13
Mass. 91. The stipulation here is, by
the one party, that they will deliver
the salt when called on, and by the
other that he will pay for the salt
so delivered at fifty cents per bushel.

2±6
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[§ 204.

much like petitio prinoipiij inasmuch as it appears to assume

that a contract as to the two hundred tons existed between the

parties, when this was the very question at issue.

Much conflict of authority exists, as will be seen from the

cases cited in the notes.

This constitutes the mutuality. These

promises, the one in consideration of

mnch like petitio prindpii, inasmuch as it ap1 ear to as ume
t hat a contract a to the two hundred tons exi" ted between the
partie , wh n thi was the very qu stion at issue.
hlu ·h conflict of authority exi t , as will be seen from the
ca s cited in the notes.

the other, are sufficient to make the

contract binding. The agreement

on the part of Cherry is to pay for

the salt at the rate of fifty cents per

bushel, and he cannot claim the per-

formance of the engagement on the

part of the defendants, unless he is

ready to fulfill his own as set out in

the contract. It cannot, therefore,
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be regarded as a naked undertaking

by one party only; for mutual exec-

utory undertakings constitute a suf-

ficient consideration. Disborough v.

Neilson, 3 Johns. Cas. 81."

In Kaufman Bros. & Co. v. Farley

Mfg. Co., 78 Iowa. 679, 4:; X. W. R.

612, 16 Am. St. R. 463, it was held that

"a contract to furnish a vendee with

a certain line of goods for sale in a

specified district, with a provision

that the goods shall be sent him as

he orders them, and as long as he has

sale for them, is an agreement on the

part of the vendor to furnish the

goods as ordered by the vendee, and

not only to fill orders taken by him;

nor can the vendor terminate the

contract at pleasure."

In Cooper v. Lansing Wheel Co.. 94

Mich. 272, 54 N. W. R. 39, it was held

that " where carriage manufacturers

make an order for whatever wheels

they may want during a specified

season, at prices stated in the order,

which is accepted by the orderee,

the order and acceptance, when sup-

plemented by the filling of one or

more orders for wheels, become a

valid and binding contract for the

entire season."

In Sheffield Furnace Co. v. Hull

Coal Co., 101 Ala. 446, 14 S. R. 672, it

was held that " where an agreement

m writing evidences a sale and pur-

chase of a certain quantity of coke

at a specified price, provided the

seller is able to induce coke manu-

facturers to build ovens and make a

certain portion of the stipulated

amount of coke, and provides for no-

tice by the seller at various times

mentioned as to how much of the en-

tire quantity of coke can be supplied

during certain specified periods, and

recites that the conditions of sale,

binding the buyer to take the coke

as specified and giving the seller the

option to furnish it, are entered into

to enable the seller to induce the

manufacturers to build sufficient

Thi con titute themutuality. The e valid an binding contract for the
promi e , the one in con ideration of en tire ea on."
the other, are ufficient to make the
In heffield Furnace Co. v. Hull
contract bin lin . The agreement Coal o., 101 la. 4-16, 14 . R. 6-->, it
n the part of berry i to pay for wa held that wh r an agr em nt
th alt at th r te of fifty cent p r m writing evid n
a ale and purbu h I, ancl he ann t laim the p r- cha e of a c rtain quantity of ke
f rmance of the eng gement on the at a pecifie<l price, provid cl the
part of the
f ndant , unl
he i
Iler i able to induce coke manur , <ly to fulfill hi own a
fa tur r to build ov- n and make a
th
ntract. It annot, th r for , c rtam porti n of the tipulat cl
b r O'ard d a a nak <l un l rtaking amount of cok . and pr vid for noby on party on l · for mutual exec- tice by the ell r at variou tim s
ut r ·un l rt, king on i ute a uf- mentioneu as to how much of the nfi i nt n irl ra i n.
i b rough v. tire quantity of cok an b uppli d
during c rtain pecifi d periods, and
N iLon, 3 J hn Cc
1. '
In Kaufman ro, . & o. v. Farley r ite that the condition of ale,
Mf O'. o.
Iowa, 7 , 4' N. . R. binding the buyer to take the coke
61',16 m. t.R.46 ,itwa held that a p ified and gi ing the seller the
"a c ntract to furni ha vend with option to furm h it, are enter cl into
a rtain line of gooLl for ale in a to enable the ell r to indu e the
p cifi d di tri t, with a provi ion
ufficient
that the goocl hall be ent him a o n by pr mi ing a rtain a.le of
he orde them. and a long a he ha their produ t at a fixed pri e, th
ale for them i an agreement on the eller obligating him elf to u e his
part of the v ndor to furni h the be t end a:rnr to accompli h thi
good a ord red by the vendee, and end, though at the time made uch
not only to fill ord r t ken by him· agre ment wa unilateral, imposing
nor an the vendor terminate the no enforceable obligati n on the
, eller, and therefore not binding on
ontract at pl a ure. '
In ooper v. Lansing Wheel Co.. 9.J. he bu er, when the eller indu es
l\Iicb. 97'), 54 . W .R. 39 it wa held tbe manufa turer to build ovens
that' where carriage manufa turer
ufficient in number to produce the
make an or<ler for wbate er wheel requi ite quantity of coke, he unith y may want during a p cified lateral agi·eement i converted from
e n, at prices stated in the order, a conditional and optional one in to a
which is accepted by the rdere , mutually binding contract, imposthe order and acceptance, when up- incr mutually enforceable obligation
pl mented by the .filling of one or on the partie thereto, for the breach
more orders for wheels, become a of which suit can be maintained."
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§265. Mistakes of parties in making the contract. — In

order that there may be a contract between the parties it is

evident that the parties must agree — they must, as it is so

often said, assent to the same thing in the same sense. In a

particular case, however, it may be found that, owing to the

mistake, misapprehension or ignorance of one or both of the

parties, they have not agreed, although, perhaps, they thought

they had; and some attention must now be given to the ef-

fect which a mistake may have upon the formation of the con-

tract, although its general effect upon the repudiation of the

contract will be considered later. 1

In Minnesota Lumber Co. v. "White-

breast Coal Co., 160 111. 85, 43 N. E. R.

774, 31 L. R. A. 529, it was held that
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"a contract for its ' requirements ' of

coal for a certain season, made by a

lumber company, is not void for un-

certainty and for want of mutuality,

§ 265 . lUistakes of' parties in makin 00 the ontract.-I n
order that there may be a contract between the parti it i
e-vicl nt that the partie mu t agree- they mu t, as it i
often aid, a sent to th ame thin in the ame
n e. In a
particular case, bow Yer, it may be foun l that owinO' t th
mistake, mi apprehen ion or ignorance of on or l oth f the
parti
they have not aD'reed although p rhap they th u ·ht
they had· and om att ntion mu t n w be ·iv n to th
ffect which a mi take ma ha-ve upon the f rmation of the contract, although it o· n ral e:ff ct u1 on the r pudiation of the
contract will be con idere l later. 1

where it is evidently meant to call

for the amount of coal which the

corporation should need in its busi-

ness for such season, and not merely

what it might choose to require of

the other party."

In Wells v. Alexandre. 130 N. Y.

642. 29 N. E. R. 142, 15 L. R. A. 218, it

was held that "1. The acceptance

of an offer to furnish coal for a year

at a certain price to three steamers

named, which are then employed on

a certain steamship line, makes a

definite and binding contract for the

amount of coal required to supply

them for one year in their ordinary

employment. 2. If a notice that coal

is needed is requisite to the execu-

tion of a contract to supply certain

steamers with coal for one year, a

covenant to give such notice will be

inferred. 3. The sale of steamers

after making a contract for the sup-

ply of coal to them for one year will

not relieve them from the obligation

to take the coal which their ordinary

and accustomed use required."

In Walsh v. Myers, 92 Wis. 397, 66

N. W. R 250, the court said: "By a

written contract defendants agreed

to take plaintiff's entire output of

lye cans, and he was to continue to

furnish them as theretofore their

'entire wants for cans,' which were

to be not less than ten thousand cans

per day. They agreed to keep him

supplied with ample material so as

to keep his force constantly em-

ployed, and the contract was " to con-

tinue in force as long as [the defend-

ants] use lye cans.' Held, that the

contract was not void for want of

mutuality." See further, Michigan

Stove Co. v. Harris, 81 Fed. R. 928,

27 C. C. A. 6, 54 U. S. App. 137; Shad-

bolt, etc. Iron Co. v. Topliff, 85 Wis.

513, 55 N. W. R. 854; Carter White

In :Minnesota Lumber o. v. \V-hitebreast oal o., 160 Ill . .-. 43 )l. E. R.
7 4, 81 L. R. A. 529. it wa, held that
"a contract for it • r quirements' of
coal for a certain sea on, made by a
lumber company, is not void for uncertainty and for want of mutuality,
where it is evidently meant to call
for the amount of coal which the
corporation should need in its bu ine s for such season. and not merely
what it might choo e to 'require of
the other party."
In Well v. Alexandre. 130 N. Y.
642, 29 . E. R. 142, 15 L. R. A. 91 , it
was held that "1. The acceptance
of an offer to furni h coal for a year
at a certain price to three teamers
named, which are then employed on
a certain steam hip line, makes a
definite and binding contract for the
amount of coal required to upply
them for one year in their ordinary
employment. 2. If a notice that coal
is needed is requi ite to the execution of a contract to supply certain
steamer with coal for one year, a
covenant to give such notice will be
inferred. 3. T he sale of steamers
after making a contract for the sup-

ply of coal to them for one year will
not relieve them from the obliga ion
to take the coal which their ordinary
and accu tomeu u e required."
In WaLh v. Iyer, 92 Wi. 397, 66
.J.. • vV. R. 250, the court said: ' By a
written contract defendant agreed
to ta.ke plaintiff' entire out.put of
lye can , and he wa to continue to
furni h them as theretofore their
•entire wants for cans,' which were
to be not le s than ten thou and cans
per day. They agreed to keep him
supplied with ample material o a
to keep his force con ·tantly employed, and the contract was ·to continue in force as long as [the defendant ] u e lye can .' Held, that the
contract was not •oid for want of
mutuality.
See further, Iichigan
Stove Co. v. Harri. , 1 Fed. R. 99 ,
97 C. C. A. 6, 54 U. S. App. 137; Shaclbolt, etc. Iron Co. v. Topli:ff, 85 Wi .
513, 55 N. vV. R. 54; Car ter White
Lead Co. v. Kinlin, 47 :reb. 409, 66 N .
W.R. 536; Staplesv. O'Neal, 641\linn.
27. 6.5 N. W. R. 10 3.
1 See post, ~~ 30-844 (Avoidance of
Contract for Mistake).
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The mistakes which parties may make are, of course, very

numerous; but they will, in the main, fall under one of the

following heads:

1. Mistake as to the nature of the transaction.

2. Mistake as to the parties to the transaction.

3. Mistake as to the subject-matter of the transaction.

4. Mistake as to the terms of the transaction.

5. Mistake as to the possibility of performance.

Each of these will be briefly considered.

§266. Mistake as to the nature of the transaction. — In

general, if the parties are mistaken as to the nature of the

transaction, no contract of sale is made. If through ignorance

or inadvertence, while intending to make a contract of sale

they make a contract which in legal effect is a lease, there

clearly is no sale and the lease may be avoided. If A says to

The mistakes which I artie may make are, of course, very
numerou · but they will, in the main, fall under one of the
follow in h ads:
1. 1'Ii tak a to the natia·e of the transaction.
2.
to the partie to the tran action.
3.
to th u,~ject-matter of the transaction.
4.
to th tums of the tran action.
5. Ii take as to the po ibility of p rformance.
Eac of th se will be briefly con id red.

B, "I will sell you this property for $1,000," and B replies, "I

accept your offer to lease me this property for §1,000," there is

§ 266. llli tak

clearly no agreement.
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So if A, through the fraud of B or a third person, is induced

to make a contract of sale when he supposed he was making a

contract of lease, he is not bound, 1 in the absence of negligence

or of facts creating an estoppel, even to a bona fide holder. 2

So, also, if A, intending to make a contract of lease to B, as

B knows — that being the effect of their negotiation — makes

what is in legal effect a contract of sale, as B knows but A

does not, A is not bound. But if A makes what is in legal ef-

fect a contract of sale to B, when B, who has acted in good

faith, expects a contract of sale and supposes that A intends

i See Throughgood's Case, 2 Co. R. 9. Sanger v. Dun (1879), 47 Wis. 615, 3

2 See Foster v. Mackinnon (1869). N. W. R. oSS: .Maine Mut. Ins. Co. v.

L. R. 4 C. P. 711. Of course, if a Hodgkins (1876), 66 Me. 109. And so,

party can read, but does not, and no though he cannot read, if he does

artifice or fraud is practiced [as to not ask to have it read to him.

which, see Moore v. Copp (1897), 119 Greenfield's Case (18.10), 14 Pa. St.

CaL 429, 51 Pac. R. 630], he is bound 489. 496; Waller's Appeal (1883), 103

by the contract he signs. Black v. Pa. St. o94.

Wabash Ry. Co. (1884), 111 111 351;

219

a to th nature of the tr an action.- In

g n ral if the arti
are
i taken as to the nature of the
tran ti n no on tract f al is mad . If throu 0 h ibnorance
r inad rt nee ·whil int ndin to mak a contract of ale
the make a · ntr, ct wbi h in 1 gal ff t i a 1 ase, th re
cl arl r i n al an 1 th l a ma
e a oi 1 cl. If A a s to
I Ydll ell ou thi 1 r [ erty for 1 000, ' and B repli s, "I
a pt ) ur ff r t l z e 1 thi pr p rty for ... 1, 00," there is
cl earl. no a o-re m n t.
o if
thr ugh the frau 1 f B or a thir l p r on, is in iuced
to make a con tract of al w b n e u Pl o d he was making a
contract of 1 a be i n t b un<l, 1 in the abs nee of ne ligence
r of facts er atin
n topp 1, v n to a bona fide hold r. 2
o al o, if A, int ntlin<Y to make a contract fl a e to B, as
know -that bein 0 the ffect of th ir n gotiation - makes
what i in legal e:ffe t a contract of sale, a B knmYs but A
<loe not,
i not bound.
ut if A makes what i in legal effect a contract of sale to B when B who ha acted in o-o d
faith, expects a contract of sale and suppo es that A intends
ee Through ood Ca e, 2 Co. R. 9. Sanger v. Dun (1 79), 47 Wis. 6r, 3
z ee Fo ·ter v. Iackinnon (1 69),
. v . R. 3 · :Uiaine Iut. In . 'o. v.

l

L. R. 4 C. P. 711. Of cour e, if a Hodgkin (1 76), 66 ~Ie. 109. And so,
party can read, but doe not, and no though be cannot read if he does
artifice or fraud i practiced [a to not a ·k to have it read to him.
which, ee )foore v. opp (1 97), 119 Greenfield s Ca e (1 .JO), 14 Pa. St.
al. 420 51 Pac. R. 630], he i bound 4 9 496; Weller's Appeal (1 3), 103
by the contract he igns. Black . Pa. St. 594.
Waba h Ry. Co. (1 4), 111 Ill 351;
2-!9
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to make a contract of sale — that being the apparent result of

their negotiation, — A is bound though he may have intended

a contract of lease only.

to make a contract of sale -that being the apparent r nlt of
their negotiation,- A is bound though he may have int nd d
a contract of lease on]y.

§267. Mistake as to identity of party. — Like results may

also flow from a mistake as to the identity of one of the parties

to the contract. As is said in a recent case, 1 " every one has a

right to select and determine with whom he will contract, and

cannot have another person thrust upon him without his con-

sent. In the familiar phrase of Lord Denman, 2 'you have the

right to the benefit you anticipate from the character, credit

and substance of the party with whom you contract.' " If,

therefore, at the time of making the contract, one of the par-

ties supposed the other to be another than he was, as the latter

knew or had reason to believe, there is a mistake as to a ma-

terial fact and hence no sale. 3 Thus if A orders goods of B, C,

though he is B's successor in business, cannot fill the order

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:48 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t6xw4h56n
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

without A's consent, and if be does A is not bound. 4 But

1 Mr. Justice Gray, in Arkansas

Smelting Co. v. Belclen Mining Co.,

127 U. S. 379, citing Humble v.

Hunter, 12 Q. B. 310, 317; Winchester

v. Howard, 97 Mass. 303, 305, 93 Am.

Dec. 93; Boston Ice Co. v. Potter, 123

Mass. 28, 25 Am. R. 9; King v. Batter-

son, 13 R. I. 117, 120, 43 Am. R. 13;

Lansden v. McCarthy, 45 Mo. 106.

§ 267. Mistake as to identity of party .-Like r sults may
also ft.ow from a mistake as to the identity of one of the arties
to the contract. As is said in a r c nt ca e 1 '' cv ry n ha a
right to select and determine with whom h will contra t, an
cannot have another p rson thru t upon him without bis consent. In the familiar phrase of ord Denman, 2 'y u have the
right to the benefit you anticipate from the chara t r, credit
and substance of the arty with whom you ·ontra t.'" If,
therefore, at the time of makin th contra t, ne of the parties supposed the other to be anoth r than h was a the latter
knew or had reason to believe, th re is a mi . . talre as to a material fact and hence no ale. 3 Thu if A order goo l of , 0,
though he is B's succes or in bu iness, cannot fill the order
without A's consent, and if he does A is not bouncl. 4 But

2 In Humble v. Hunter, supra.

3 Where the vendor in an executory

contract for the future sale and de-

livery of ice is led to believe by the

person who negotiates the contract

on behalf of the vendee that he is

acting for a particular firm, when

he really was acting for a, corpora-

tion of the same name, of the exist-

ence of which the vendor was igno-

rant, " there was no contract, and in

case ice had been delivered under it

without knowledge of the facts, title

to the ice would not have passed to

the plaintiff." Consumers' Ice Co. v.

Webster (1898), 32 N. Y. App. Div.

592.

4 Boulton v. Jones, 2 Hurl. & Nor.

564, furnishes an illustration of the

principle. There the defendants, who

had been in the habit of dealing with

B., sent a written order for goods di-

rected to B. The plaintiff, who on

the same day had bought B.'s busi-

ness, filled the order without giving

the defendants any notice that the

goods were not supplied to B. Upon

the plaintiff's rendering his account

to defendants they disclaimed all

transactions with him and he brought

an action for the price of the goods,

but was held not to be entitled to re-

cover. Martin, B., said: " This is not

a case of principal and agent. If

there was any contract at all, it was

not with the plaintiff. If a man goes

to a shop and makes a contract, in-

tending it to be with one particular

person, no other person can convert
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1 Mr. Justice Gray, in Arkansas
Webster (1 9 ), 32 N. Y. App. Div.
Smelting Co. v. Belden l\Iining Co., 592.
127 U. S. 379, citing Humble v.
4 Boulton v. Jones, 2 Hurl. & Nor.
Hunter, 12 Q. B. 310, 317; Winchester 564, furnishes an illustration of the
v. Howard, 97 Mass. 303, 303, 93 Am. principle. There the defendants, who
Dec. 93; Boston Ice Co. v. Potter, 123 had been in the habit of dealing with
Ma s. 28, 25 Am. R. 9; King v. Batter- B., sent a written order for goods dison, 13 R. I. 117, 120, 43 Am. R. 13; rected to B. The plaintiff, who on
Lansden v. McCarthy, 45 Mo. 106.
the same day had bought B.'s busi2 In Humble v. Hunter, siipra.
ness, filled the order without giving
3 Where the vendor in an executory the defendants any notice that the
contract for the future sale and de- goods were not supplied to B. Upon
livery of ice is led to believe by the the plaintiff's rendering his account
person who negotiates the contract to defendants they disclahned all
on behalf of the vendee that he is transa.ctions with him and he brought
acting for a particular firm, when an action for the price of the goods,
he really was acting for a . corpora- but was held not to be entitled to retion of the same name, of the exist- cover. Martin, B., said: "This is not
ence of which the vendor was igno- a case of principal and agent. If
rant, "there was no contract, and in there was any contract at all, it was
case ice had been delivered under it not with the plaintiff. If a man ~oes
without knowledge of the facts, title to a shop and makes a contract, into the ice would not have passed to tending it to be with one particular
the plaintiff." Consumers' Ice Co. v. person, no other person can convert
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where A begins negotiations for a purchase with B, supposing

that he is dealing with C, but before the negotiations are com-

pleted is informed of the mistake and completes the purchase,

he is bound and cannot afterwards set up the mistake to defeat

·in nco·otiati n for a, pur ha e with B supposing
wlJere
with , but b for th n o-otiations are comthat h i
pl t l i inf rm d of the mi ·take ancl complet the pur hase,
be i b un l n cannot afterward
t up the mi take to d f at

that into a contract with him." To

like effect: Randolph Iron Co. v. El-

liott (1869), 34 N. J. L. 184.

Lansden v. Mo) arty, 45 Mo. 10G, is

also to the same effect. Thei - e de-

fendant had entered into a contract

with B. & K. to supply their hotel

witli meat for a period of one year

at a certain rate per pound, payment

to be made at the expiration of each

month for the meat furnished during
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that month. During the year B. & K.

sold out to plaintiff and assigned to

him their meal contract with defend-

ant. Plaintiff notified defendant of

the assignment and demanded the

further performance of the contract

to himself, offering upon hi-; part to

perform all of the covenants of his

assignors. The defendant refused to

continue to furnish the meat and the

plaintiff brought an action against

him, but was not permitted to re-

cover. "The defendant,'" said the

court, " may have been willing to

deliver his meats in advance of pay-

ment by reason of the confidence ii<-

reposed in the credit and solvency of

the parties with whom he originally

contracted The readiness and offer

of the plaintiffs to pledge themselves

to a faithful performance of the stip-

ulations of the contract obligatory

upon their assignors is not to the pur-

pose. It does not meet the exigency

of the case. The question presented

was one of personal trust and confi-

dence, which it was the right of the

defendant to decide for himself."

Boston Ice Co. v. Potter, 123 Mass.

28, 85 Am. R. 9, furnishes another

illustration. Here the defendant had

made a contract with the Citizens'

Ice Co. to supply him with ice. With-

out his knowledge the Citizens' Ice

Co. sold its business to the plaintiff,

with the privilege of supplying ice

to all its customers, and the plaintiff

furn isl ied ice tothe defendant's house

for more than a year before he was

notified of the change. Defendant

had formerly purchased ice of the

plaintiff company, but had been dis-

satisfied with its performance and

had terminated his contract with the

plaintiff at the time of making the

contract with the Citizens' Ice Co.

Plaintiff sued to recover for the ice

so furnished, but it was held that it

had no cause of action. Endicott, J.,

said: "A party has a right to select

and determine with whom he will

that into a contract wi h him." To
like ffect :
n olph Iron o. v. Elli tt (l 6t ), 4 . J. L. 1 4.
Lan den v. ~Ic arty, 45 1\10. 106, is
al o to the same ffect. There de-

illu tration. Here the d fendant had
made a ontract with the Citiz n '
Ice o. to up1 ly birn with i e. \ ithout hi knowledge the itizen ' I ~
o. old it bu in
to th plaintiff,
with th privilege of upplying ice
o all it u tomer , and th plaintiff
furni heel i t the 1 f ndant· hou. e
for m r than a year before he w
notifi d of the chanae.
ef n lant
had formerly pur ha. ed ice of the
ph intiff ompany, but had been di a i fied wi h it p rf rm, n
and
hacl t rminated hi c ntract with the
plaintiff at the time of m· king the
c ntract wi h th
'itiz n Ice
Plaintiff u d to r ov
furni heel. but it \"a h kl that it
h, l no au.
f acti n. Emli ott, J.,
id: "A pc rty ha a ri "'ht to 1 ct
and d t rmin ~d h wh m h will
plc inti.ff br ught an acti n acr, in. t c ntract and annot hav another
him, but wa not p rmitted to re- p r on thru t upon him with ut his
ver. 'The def ndant," aid th
n · nt. It may be of i portance
ourt, "me y have b en willing to t him who p rform the ontra t,
deli-ver hi m ct in adv n e of pay- a when he contract~ with another
m nt by rea on of the confid n e h
to paint a pi ture, or writ a book,
r Io ed in the er dit c nd ol"ency of or furni h article of a particular
the pc rti with whom he oricrinally kind, or when he relie upon the
ntra ted. The readin
and offer
haract r or quality of an individual,
f th plaintiff to pl dcr th m elve
or ha , as in thi ca e, rea on why
t a faithful perforrnan e of th tip- he doe not wi h to deal with a parulation of the ontra t oblicratory ticular party. In all th e ca e , a
upon their a ·ignor · i · not to the pur- he may con ract with whom h
p se. It doe not me t the x:igency plea e , the ufficien · of hi' r a n.
of th ca . The que tion pre nted for
d ina cannot be inquir cl into.
wa' one of per~ona.l tru t and confi- If the defendant, before receiving
den
which it wa the right of the the ice, or during it delivery, had
<l f ndant to lecide for him lf."
rec i.-ed notice of the hang , and
B t n I
o. v. Pott r, 12! ~Ia . that the itizen ' Ice Co. could no
5 ~m. R. 9, furm. hes another 1 nger perf rrn it contract with him,
2-1
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his liability.' A sale would not be void, however, but voidable

merely, where goods are actually sold to A, though the sale was

procured by his false representation that he is D. 2

§ 268. Undisclosed principal. — So "it is true that an

agent may sell the property of his principal without disclosing

the fact that he acts as an agent, or that the property is not

his own, and the principal may maintain an action in his own

name to recover the price. If the purchaser says nothing on

the subject, he is liable to the unknown principal." 3 But the

it would then have been his un-

doubted right to have rescinded the

contract and to decline to have it

executed by the plaintiff. But this

hi liability. 1 A sale woul 1 not b Yoi l h w v r but voi lal 1 ,
merely, where o·oocls are a tually 1 l t \_ th u h th
le wa
procured by his false r pre entation that h

§ 268. - - Undisclo. ed prin it al.it i tru that an
agent may sell the prop rty of bi I rin ipal with ut h 1 mo·
the fa t that he a t a an a<Y nt r that th property i n t
hi own and the princi1 al ma maintain an a· i n in hi wn
name to recover the 1 ri
If th purcha e ay n thin on
the subject, he is liable to the unkn wn prin ir al." 3
ut the

he was unable to do, because the

plaintiff failed to inform him of that

which he had a right to know. If
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he had received notice and continued

to take the ice as delivered, a con-

tract would be implied."

Arkansas Smelting Co. v. Belden

Mining Co., 127 U. S. 379, furnishes a

late illustration of the rule. In this

case defendant had contracted with

Billing & Eilers to furnish to them

at their smelting works ten thou-

sand tons of lead ore in certain

amounts daily, upon the understand-

ing that the ore should, upon deliv-

ery, become the property of Billing

& Eilers, and should afterwards be

paid for at current New York quo-

tations, in one hundred-ton lots, ac-

cording to an assay of each lot, w T ith

a further provision for arbitration

in case the parties could not agree

upon the assay. After part of the

ore had been delivered, Billing &

Eilers dissolved partnership, and all

rights in the business and in the con-

tract for ore were transferred to

Billing, and defendant continued,

after notice of the dissolution, to

furnish ore to him under the con-

tract. Soon afterwards, and while

nearly nine thousand tons remained

undelivered. Billing sold all of his

interest in the works and in the ore

contract to the plaintiff company,

of which sale defendant had notice.

Thereupon defendant ceased to de-

liver ore under the contract, and

gave plaintiff notice that it consid-

ered the contract canceled and an-

nulled. Plaintiff, alleging its ability

and willingness to carry out the con-

tract on its part, brought an action

for damages. The circuit court sus-

tained a demurrer to the complaint,

and upon appeal to the United States

Supreme Court the judgment was af-

firmed. " During the time that must

elapse between the delivery of the

ore and the ascertainment and pay-

ment of the price," said Mr. Justice

Gray, "the defendant has no secu-

rity for its payment except in the

character and solvency of Billing &

it would then ha"\·e be n hi un- nearly nine th u c nd ton r main cl
doubted rio-bt to have re · inu d the undelfr red. illino- old all of hi
contract and to decline to haYe it int r tin th w rk and in th ore
executed by the plaintiff. But thi
on tract to the plaintiff com1 any,
he wa unable to do, becau e the of which ale d fenclant bad uotic .
1 laintiff failed to inform him of that Th r upon d fendant ea
to d which he hacl a right to know. If liver ore und r the ontra t, aud
plaintiff notice that it con idhe had recefred notice and continued ga
to take the ice a delivered, a conred the contract ancelecl and antract wou!d be implied."
nulled. Plaintiff, alleging it ability
Arkan a Smelting Co. v. Belden and willingne to carry out th conl\Iining Co., 127 U. . 379, furni he a tract on it part, brouO'ht an action
la,te illu tration of the rule. In this for damage . The circuit court ru ca e defendant had contracted with tainecl a demurrer to the com1 laint,
Billing & Eilers to furni h to them and upon appeal to the United tate ·
at their smelting work ten thou- Supreme Court the judgment wa afsand tons of lead ore in certain firmed. "During the time that mu t
amounts daily, upon the under tand- elap e between the delivery of the
ing that the ore should, upon deliv- ore and the a certah1ment and payery, become the property of Billing ment of the price,' aid Ir. Ju tice
& Eilers, and should afterwards be Gray, "the defendant ha no secupaid fo r at current New York quo- rity for its payment excer t in the
tation , in one hundred-ton lot , ac- character and olvency of Billing &
coruing to an a. ay of each lot, ·with Eiler . The defendant, therefore,
a further provision for arbitration could not be compelled to accept the
in ca e the parties could not agree liability of any other person or corupon the as ay. After part of the poration as a substit ute for the liaore had been delivered, Billing & bility of those with whom it had
Eiler· di solved partner·hip, and all contracted ..,
rights in the business and in the con11\Iudge v. Oliver, 1 Allen (l\Iass.).
tract for ore were transferred to 74.
Billing, and defendant continued,
2 Edmu nds
v. Merchants' Desp.
after notice of the di olution, to Tran p. Co., 135 lass. 2"3.
furni h ore to him under the con3 Huntington v. Knox:, 7 Cu h.
tract. Soon afterwards, and while (1\Ia .) 371; 'Winchester v. Howar d,
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other party ma} 7 expressly exclude negotiations with the prin-

cipal and confine them to the agent personally, and where he

does so the principal cannot intervene. 1 So, on the other hand,

where one is really buying goods for himself, the seller cannot

xpr ly xclu l negotiati ns with the l rinc 1 an 1 c n n
them to th a nt I r nall , and wh re he
th principal annot int r\T n .1
o on the h r han l~
n j r all bu yin · g o 1 for him lf th ell r can not
hol l a tbirtl I
r p n ibl wb
ub qu ntly bu.r the
o·o 1 fr I th
ha r b cau
he u1 I ed that the
latt r wa nl3
f uch third per"on.2

ir

1

hold a third person responsible who subsequently buys the

goods from the first purchaser because he supposed that the

latter was only the agent of such third person. 2

s -:w.

Assumed agent. — "Where an assumed agent has

no authority to bind and does not bind his alleged principal,

there is, of course, no sale. 3 Neither is there any sale where

h r an a nm
t in 1 bj alle

one, by falsely representing himself to be the agent of a named

or an unnamed principal, procures goods on the credit of such

principal ; ' and the vendor may maintain replevin for his goods

or recover their value in trover even from the honajide pledgee 5

97 Mass. 303, 93 Am. Dec. 93. This
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would, of coarse, be subject to de-

fenses against the agent. See

Mecbem <>n Agency, § 773; Baxter

v. Sherman (1898), 73 Mum. 434, 76

N. W. K. 311, 72 Am. St. R. 681; Bel-

field v. National Supply Co. (1899),

r l l'
r an unnam 1 I rin 11 l, } r cur
l rm i1 al·~ an l th ,,. nd r may m intain repl
0
rr
r th ir Yalu rn r ' r Y n fr m th uona fide l lg e 5

189 Pa St. 189, 42 Atl. R. 131, 69 Am.

o. it wa

St. H. 799.

1 Winchester v. Howard, supra.

t <liv

-Stoddard v.Ham, 139 Mass. 383,

tetl

37 Am. R. 369, distinguishing Boston

Ice Co. v. Potter, 123 Mass. 28. 23

Am. K. 9; Ilardman v. Booth, 1 H.

& C. 803: and Mitchell v. La Page,

Holts N. P. 253.

3 J. S., who pretended to represent

B. & Co., called upon D. and con-

tracted with him for wool to be con-

signed to B. & Co. at Pittsburgh, to

be paid for when D. should call. J. S.

also called upon B. & Co., pretended

to be the son of D., and contracted

to sell them wool. The wool was

shipped by D.. consigned to B. & Co.,

but was recei% T ed by J. S., who de-

livered it to B. & Co. and received

the pay for it. In an action of re-

plevin by D. against B. & Co. it was

held that D.'s titlt.> was not divested

and that he could recover. Barker

v. Dinsmore (1872), 72 Pa. St. 427. 13

Am. R. (597. Compare with McGold-

rick v. Willits (1873), 52 X. Y. 612.

4 If A., representing himself to be

a brother of a reputable merchant,

buying for him, buys, in person,

goods of another, the property in the

goods does not pass to A., and the

seller may recover them from a car-

rier to whom A. has delivered them

for carriage. Aborn v. Merchants'

Despatch Transportation Co., 135

Mass. 283.

5 The plaintiff refusing to sell goods

to C, a broker, delivered them to him

on his representation that they were

for an undisclosed principal in good

credit, and entered and billed them

as on a sale to C. It turning out that

there was no such principal, held,

that the plaintiff might maintain re-

ll them wool. The wool wa
·hipp d by .. con i ned to B. & o.,
but wa r ceivecl by J . . who deliver d it to B.
Co. and received
th pay for it. In an action of re-

for carriage. Aborn v. !er bant '
e patch Tran portation Co., 13,::\Ja . 2 3.
5 The plaintiff refusing to ell goo 1
to C., a broker. delivered th m to him
on hi repre entation that they were
for an und· clo ed principal in good
Ted.it, and entered and billed them
a on a sale to C. It turning out that
there wa no uch principal, helcl,
that the plaintiff might maintain replevin for the goods from the def ndant, who wa C: bona fide
ledge . Rodliff v. Dallinger, 141
::\Ia · . 1, 53 Am. R. 439. "It wa ad-
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or vendee l of the assumed agent, there being not even a de facto

or vendee 1 of the assum cl aO' nt th r bein er not v n a de facto
contract between the latter an l the true own r.

contract between the latter and the true owner.

§ 270. Mistake regarding the tiling sold. — Failure to con-

tract may also result from mistake regarding the thing Bold.

This mistake may be that of both parties or of one only; and

it may be respecting its existence, location or character. Some-

what different results may follow in these several c;ises.

§ 271. Existence of thing sold.— If, contrary to the

belief of both parties, the thing contracted for never had any

existence, or it had ceased to exist, as if the horse supposed to

§ 270. Mi take regarding tlrn t11ing , old.-

ailur to contract may also r esult from mi tal·e r gardina b
ld.
r f
~ and
This mistake may be that of both parti
it may be r sp cting it exi t n 1 ation r
om what different re ul~s may follow jn th e cv ral

be alive in the vendor's stable had suddenly died before the

mitted," said the court, "that Clem-

entson (C.) in fact was not acting for

such an undisclosed principal; and

it follows that if the plaintiff's evi-

dence was believed there was no sale.
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There could not be one to this sup-

posed principal, because there was

no such person, and there was not

§ 271. - - Existence of thin(J' olcl .-If,

ntr ry to th

belief of both parti s, the thin contracted f r n v r ha l any
existence, or it had c a 1 to xi t a if th b r
up1 o d t
be alive in the vendors ta bl bad u 11 nly i cl b f re the

one to Clementson. because none pur-

ported to be made to him, but, on

the contrary, such a sale was ex-

pressly refused and excluded." Cit-

ing Edmunds v. Merchants' Despatch

Transportation Co., 135 Mass. 283.

1 H., relying on the representations

of R. that he was the agent of L. &

Co., agreed to sell goods to L. & Co.

on credit, delivered them to L. & Co.

and received part of the price from

R. R. was not the agent of L. & Co.,

and had no authority to purchase for

L. & Co., and the latter bought the

goods from R., without any knowl-

edge of the fraud R. was practicing

on H. Held, that the title did not

pass and that H. could recover their

value from L. & Co. less the amount

paid by R. Ha met v. Letcher, 37

Ohio St. 336, 41 Am. R 519. Said the

court: "This, therefore, was not a

contract voidable merely, but an

agreement wholly void; and under

the circumstances the pi-operty in

the hogs never passed from Hamet.

Hence, applying the maxim that no

one can transfer a greater right or

better title than he himself possesses

(Roland v. Gundy, 5 Ohio, 202), it

necessarily follows that Letcher &

Co. are liable as for a conversion."

Citing Moody v. Blake, 117 Mass. 23;

Barker v. Dinsmore, 72 Pa. St. 427, 13

Am. R. 697; Saltus v. Everett, 20

Wend. (N. Y.) 267, 32 Am. Dec. 541;

Fawcett v. Osborn, 32 111. 411; Hard-

man v. Booth, 1 H. & C. 803; Higgons

v. Burton. 26 L. J. Ex. 342; Kings-

ford v. Merry. 1 H. & N. 503: Hollins

v. Fowler, L. R. 7 Q. B. 616; affirmed,

L. R. 7 H. L. 757; In re Reed, 3 Ch.

Div. 123; Lickbarrow v. Mason, 1

Smith L. C. 388; Cundy v. Lindsay,

L. R. 3 App. Cas. 459. Stoddard v.

Ham, 129 Mass. 383, 37 Am. R. 369;

Dean v. Yates, 22 Ohio St. 388, and

Sanders v. Keber, 28 Ohio St, 630,

mitted," said the court, "that lem- court: "ThL, ther f r was not a
ent on (C.) in fact was not a ctin <Y for contra t voidable m r ly, but an
such an undi clo ed prin ipal · and agr mPnt wholly void; and under
it follows tha.t if the plaintiff' evi- the circum tan e th prop rty in
dence was believed there was no ale. the hogs nev13r pa ed from Hamet.
There could not be one to thi u1r Bence, applyinO' the maxim that no
posed principal, becau e there wa one can tran fer a greater right or
no such person, and there wa not better title than he him elf po e,· e
one to Clement. on. because none pur- (Roland v. uncly, 5 Ohio, 209), it
ported to be made to him, but, on nece sarily follow that Letcher &
the contrary, such a sale wa ex- Co. are liable a for a couv r. ion. '
pressly refused and excluded." Cit- Citing Ioody v. Blake, 117 Ma . 23:
ing Edmunds v. Merchants' De ·patch Barker v. Dinsmore, 72 Pa. t. 4'> 7, 13
Transportation Co., 135 Ma ·s. 283.
Am. R. 697; Saltus v. E,·er tt, 20
1 H., relying on the representations
Wend. ( . Y.) 267, 32 Arn. Dec. 541;
of R. that he was t.he agent of L. & Fawcett v. 0 born, 32 Ill. 411; HardCo., agreed to sell goods to L. & Co. man v. Booth, 1 H. & C. 03 · Higgons
on credit, delivered them to L. & Co. v. Burton, 96 L . J. Ex. 342 · Kingsand received part of the price from ford v. forry. 1 H. & . 503; Hollins
R. R. was not the agent of L. & Co., v. Fowler, L. R. 7 Q. B. 616; affir med,
and had no authority to purcha e for L. R. 7 H. L. T7; In r e Reed. 3 Ch.
L. & Co., and the latter bought the Div. 123; Lickbarrow v. l\1ason, 1
goods from R., without any knowl- Smith L. C. 38 ; Cundy v. Lindsay,
edge of the fraud R. was practicing L. R. 3 App. Cas. 4~9. Stoddar d v.
on H. Held, that the title did not Ham, 129 l\fa s. 383, 37 Am. R. 369;
pass and that H. could recover their Dean v. Yate , 2) Ohio St. 3 , and
value from L. & Co. less the amount Sanders v. Keber, 28 Ohio St. 630,
paid by R. B arnet v. Letcher, 37 were also cited and reconcHed.
Ohio St. 356, 41 Am. R. 519. Said the
254
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negotiations were completed, there would clearly be no sale, 1

as both parties contemplate the sale of a living and not a dead

horse. The same result would doubtless ensue if one of the

parties had secret knowledge of the death which he concealed

from the other.

§272. Identity of tiling sold.— Xo contract of sale

ne otjation
re mpleted, there would cl arly be no sale, 1
as b th parti
nt m1 late the , le of a livin 0 an not a deal
h r . Th
m r ult would d ubtle
n ue if one of the
parti had
r t kn wl 10 of the ]eath which he concealed
fr m th th r.

obviously can result if the parties are not agreed as to the iden-

tity of the thing sold. If A says to 13: "1 will sell you my

--Ia ntitr of thin
an r ult if the par ti
11. If

black horse for one hundred dollars;" and B replies: "I ac-

cept your offer to sell me your white horse for one hundred

dollars," there is clearly no agreement; and though the nego-

tiations may not take this simple and specific form, if A sup-

Id.-

.,..o c ntract of sale

ar

3 he is selling one thing while B supposes he is buying

another, no sale results. 2

iSee Thomas v. Knowles (1879), 128

Mass. 22.
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SKyle v. Kavanagh (1809), 103

Mass. 356, -1 Am. K. 560; Stong v.

L896), 66 Minn. 94, 68 X. W. R.

n

Where a certain number of barrels

of No. 1 mackerel are sold, and by

2

ale r ul

mistake some barrels of No. '■'> mack-

erel and some barrels of salt are de-

v. Knowle

liv.nd.no title to the articles thus

delivered by mistake passes to the

purchaser. Gardner v. Lane, 9 Allen.

'.!

492, 85 Am. Dec. 779. The delivery

of a ten-dollar gold piece by mistake

instead of a fifty-cent piece conveys

no title to the gold piece. Chapman

Yyl

)Ia . .

v. Ka anagh
4 ru.
. 5G

a:rn,

L, ne (1 9G), GG )Jinn. 94,

,..I

-

•

v. Cole, 12 Gray (Mass.), 111. 71 Am.

Dec. 739.

Damaged flour was offered for sale

at auction, divided into two classes.

. 1 ma k rel are
rrel of

:r

f barr ls
an by
• 3 ma k-

One class, slightly damaged, was of-

fered by the barrel, in the barrels in

which it was originally packed. The

other, much damaged, had bni re-

h re had been no
f tlL partie had
ubject-matter f

packed, and was offered by the pound

as repacked flour or " dough." The

sale took place in an auction room;

the flour was in the street outside.

After the auctioneer had sold, as he

fered i->r sale tin- Becond class, stat-

ing the difference between the two

cla-ses. The plaintiff , who was the

highest bidder, selected bytheirnum-

bers two rows of barrels as the flour

he would take. These rows were

made up of barrels of flour of the first

.lass, accidentally mi-place. I with-

out the knowledge of the owner or

auctioneer. Held, there had been no

sale, as the minds of th parties had

not met as to the subject-matter of

the sale. Harvey v. Harris, 112 Mass.

32. The purchaser at an auction sale

by catalogue, wherein the parcels are

numbered, is entitled upon his bid

only to the parcel put up by the

auctioneer by its number, though

through mistake a parcel of another

number is exhibited to the bidders.

Where the auctioneer put up for sale

parcel No. 24 and ( '. bid thereon, sup-

posing No. 25 to be offered, and the

ale. Han- y v. Harri 112 Ia . .
The purcha er at an auction ale
y catalogue, wher in th parcel. are
numb re , i entitl d upon hi bid
only to he parcel put up by the
aucti neer by it number, though
hrou,.,.h mi take a parcel of another
number i
:xhibited to the bidder ·.
\Yher the auctioneer put up for ale
par 1 ... o. 04 and . bi i th reon, up.,.o. 25 to be ff red, and the
par el wa truck off to him, held,
tbat neither parcel wa old but the
0.

thought, all of the fust class, he of-

DamaO'etl flour a off r f r
at au tion, divided into tw· cla ·
One cla . , lio-htly damaged, wa offered by the barrel in the barrel in
w hi h it wa originally pa ked. The
oth r, much damag d, had b en r pa k <l, anJ wa offered b the pound
a r lacked fl ur or" doua-h." The
ale took place in an auction r oom ·
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Unknown article contained or concealed in

thing sold. — Allied to the cases considered in the preceding

section are those in which the thing sold contains or has at-

tached to or concealed in it some article of whose presence

the vendor was ignorant. Thus the sale of a coat passes no

title to a pocket-book which may happen to be temporarily

deposited therein; the sale of a safe or a chest of drawers

passes no title to the deposits contained therein; and the sale

of a machine conveys no title to money and valuables which

the former owner had concealed within it. 1

§ 274. Mistake as to quantity. — Mistakes as to quan-

tity may readily occur. If the quantity is open to inspection,

one party could not ordinarily escape, in the absence of artifice,

§ 273. - - { nlrnown article containecl or cone ale<l in
thing sold.- Allied to the ca
c n ider d in th pr
section are those in whi h th thing sold c nt in or ha
tachecl to or cone al d in it som article of wh . e
nee
the vendor was iO'norant. Thu tb ale f a c , t .t
no
title to a pocket-book ' hich may bar pen to be temr rarily
d po ited therein· the sale of a afe or a ch st of lraw r
passc no title to th d I it
ntaine th r in· and the sal
of a ma ·bine conveys no title t m n y aml v luables which
the former owner had on aled within it. 1

title to each remained unchanged.

Sheldon v. Capron, 3 R. I. 171.
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A sale was of ten tons of sound

merchantable hemp, but it was in-

tended by the vendor to sell St. Pe-

§ 274. - - Mi tak a. to quantity.- Ii
tity may rea lily occur. If the quantity is I n to in p ction,
one party could not ordinarily e cap , in the ab ence of artifice,

tersburg hemp, and by the buyer to

purchase Riga Rhine hemp, a supe-

rior article. The broker had made a

mistake in describing the hemp to

the buyer, and the court held that

there had been no contract whatever,

the assent of the parties not having

really existed as to the same subject-

matter of sale. Thornton v. Kemp-

ster, 5 Taunt. 786.

A contract was made for the sale

of "one hundred and twenty-five

bales of Surat cotton, guaranteed

middling fair merchants' Dhollerah,

to arrive ex Peerless from Bombay,"

and the defendant pleaded to an ac-

tion against him for not accepting

the goods on arrival, that the cotton

which he intended to buy was cotton

on another ship Peerless, which sailed

from Bombay in October, not that

which arrived in a ship Peerless that

sailed in December, the latter being

the cotton that plaintiff had offered

to deliver. On demurrer, held, that

on this state of facts there was no

consensus ad idem, no contract at

all between the parties. Raffles v.

Wichelhaus, 2 H. & C. 900.

1 Huthmacher v. Harris, 38 Pa.

St, 491, 80 Am. Dec. 502; Durfee v.

Jones, 11 R. I. 588, 23 Am. R 528;

Merry v. Green, 7 Mees. & W. 623;

Bowen v. Sullivan, 62 Ind. 281, 30 Am.

R 172; Ray v. Light, 34 Ark. 421.

The owner of a tannery sold it,

and accidentally omitted to remove

a few hides from the vats. More

than twenty years afterwards a

laborer, working for a subsequent

grantee, found them. Held, that he

got no title to them, as they were

neither lost, abandoned, derelict nor

treasure trove, but belonged to the

original owner or his representatives.

Livermore v. White, 74 Me. 452, 43

Am. R. 600.

A bought an old safe, and after-

title to each remain d un hangeJ. t cl liver. On demurrer, lielcl, that
Sheldon v. apron, 3 R. I. 171.
on thi tate of fact there wa no
A sale wa of ten ton of ound con ensus ad idem, no contract at
merchantable hemp, but it wa in- all between the partie . Raffles v.
tended by the vendor to ell 't. Pe- vVi ·helhaus, 2 H. & C. 906.
ten;burg hemp, and by the buyer to
I Huthmacher v. Harris. 3
Pa.
purchase Riga Rhine hemp, a upe- St. 491, 80 Am. Dec. 502· Durfee v.
rior article. The broker had made a Jone , 11 R. I. 5 , 23 Am. R. 52 ;
mistake in describing the hemp to Merry v. Green, 7 Mees. & W. 623;
the buyer, and the court held that Bowen v. Sullivan, 62Ind. 281, 30 Am.
there had been no contract whatever, R. 172; Ray v. Light, 34 Ark. 421.
the a sent of the parties not having
The owner of a tannery sold it,
really existed as to the ame subject- and accidentally omitted to remove
matter of sale. Thornton v. Kemp- a few hides from the vats. More
ster, 5 Taunt. 786.
than twenty years afterwards a
A contract was made for the sale laborer, working for a subsequent
of "one hundred and twenty-five grantee, found them. Held, that he
bales of Surat cotton, guaranteed got no title to them, as they were
middling fair merchants' Dbollerah, neither lost, abandoned, derelict nor
to arrive ex Peerless from Bombay," trea ure trove, but belonged to the
and the defendant pleaded to an ac- original owner or bis representatives.
tion against him for not accepting Livermore v. \Vhite, 74 Me. 452, 43
the goods on arrival, that the cotton Am. R. 600.
which he intended to buy was cotton
A bought an old safe, and afteron another ship Peerless, which sailed wards offered to sell it to B, who defrom Bombay in October. not that clined to purchase. It was then left
which arrived in a ship Peerless that with B to sell, with the privilege of
sailed in December, the latter being using it until sold. B found secreted
the cotton that plaintiff had offered in it a roll of bills belonging to some
256
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contrivance or unequal footing, because the quantity was dif-

ferent from what he supposed it to be. But if both parties

were alike mistaken, 1 or if the quantity was not open to in-

spection and one party is in error as to the quantity proposed,

there is no meeting of the minds. 2

person unknown, whereupon A de-

manded the money and also the safe

contrivance or unequal footing, becau e the quantity was diff r nt fr m bat he uppo ed it to be. But if both parties
wer alik mi tak n 1 or if the quantity wa not op n to insp ction an l ne arty i in rror a to the uantity propos d,
th r i no m ting of the mind .2

and its cimtents as when B received

defe

it. B returned the safe but kept the

money. Held, as between A and B,

that B was entitled to retain the

money as finder, it being conceded

thai A by his purchase of the safe

acquired no title to the money. Dur-

fee v. Jones, 11 R. I. 588, 23 Am. R.

538
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A girl assorting paper rags in a

paper mill found a Dumber of bank

hills in a clean, unmarked envelope,

among the ra^s. Ibid, tint as

against the proprietor of the mills

she was entitled to them, as under,

.-..,, .

that the
he difI r-

the purchase of the rags not carry-

ing with it the title to the hills.

U. .w.n v. Sullivan. 02 Ind. 281, 30

Am. R. 172.

i In Wheadon v. Ohls 1 1 B

Wend. (N. Y.) 174, the contract was

for the sale of a quantity of oats sup-

posed to contain from one thousand

six hundred to two thousand bushels.

uilL.

The oats were to be delivered from

•) 1 30

a storehouse into a canal boat; as the

delivery proceeded tallies were kept,

an 1 after the tallies amounted to five

hundred, it was proposed to guess at

the whole quantity by comparing

the amount gone into the boat with

that yet remaining, and it was finally

agreed that there were one thousand

nine hundred bushels, for which

amount the buyer paid. Afterwards

when the oats were measured out

there were found to be but one

thousand four hundred and eighty-

eight bushels, and then it was dis-

covered that both parties were in

error as to the tallies: they were of

half bushels, instead of bushels, as

the parties supposed. It appeared

also that the buyer had said, while

they were agreeing upon the quan-

tity, that lie would take the oats at

one thousand nine hundred bushels,

" hit or miss: " hut it was held that

there was such mistake that the

buyer could recover for the differ-

ence het ween the actual and the es-

timated quantity. So, where the

parties were negotiating for the sale

of a ton of hay. and. to avoid the

trouble of weighing it. measured at

a rate which they mistakenly esti-

mated would constitute a ton, but

which really made but little more

than half a ton. it was held that

there was such mistake as to justify

R. 17 .....

n, jt wa
th r w
. u h mi take a t justify
a r co er of the ex
in price
paitl.
Lt v. ·warner (1 , 0), 2 Lan .
(....... Y.) 4~.
nd to h . am .ITect i
x . Pr ntice (1 1-). 3 laule &
1. 344, wher th parti
old a bar
t r h u e into a anal boat; a the of ilver and paid for it on th ba i
<l li \"'ery pro
de tallie w re kept, of the a yer· e timat , which wa
an after he tallie amounted to fi>e proved to be incorrect.
huntlr <l, it w prop
to gue at
2 In HartforJ & N. H. R.
o. v.
the wh le quantity by c mparin.,.. Ja k on (1 56), 24 onn. 514, 63 m.
he am unt one int heh at with
ec. l 17. it ap eared that d feru:lthat y tr mainin.,.., and it wa finally ant applied to the ag nt of the cara.,..r d that th r were one th u an
rier for a rate for tran portation of
nin hun<lr d bush 1, f r which a quantity of lath. The agenta keel
amount the buy r pai .
ft rwar
how many tb re would be.
efendwben the oat were mea ured out ant turned to a ompanion, who
there w re found to be bnt one aid be thought there would be five
tbousan four hundred and eighty- hundred bundl
The agent claimed
17
2-7

~\.m.

2

§ 275.J

LAW OF SALE.

[B

K I.

§ 275.]

LAW OF SALE.

[BOOK I.

On the other hand, where one submits a plain and unam-

biguous order for goods to a manufacturer which is accepted,

the person ordering cannot be relieved because he ordered

more goods than he thought he was ordering. 1

On the other han 1 where one submit a plain and un ml)iguous order for goods to a manufa turer which is a pt. l,
the person ord ring cannot b r li v d b au e he orcl 'r cl
more goods than he thought he "\: as orderine:/

275.

Mistake as to kind, quality or character. —

Mistakes as to kind, qualit c y or character are not so easily dis-

posed of. A mistake as to kind may be so great as really to

amount to a mistake as to identity; and, if it is the mistake of

both parties, will prevent agreement, and if the mistake of one,

going to the substance of the contract, will justify him in re-

fusing to execute the attempted agreement, or in repudiating

it if*executed.

that he understood him to say one

hundred bundles, and made a rate

for that quantity. When the laths
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were delivered to the carrier the

agent discovered the mistake, and

tried to communicate with the de-

§ 275. - - Mi take as: to ldnd quality or character.::Mistakes as to kind, quality or charact r ar n t o ea ily li posed of. A mistak a to kind may b so nr at as really to
amount to a mistake a to i I ntity· an l if it i the mi take of
both parti s, will pr v nt ao-r m nt and if th mi take of on ,
going to the sub tanc of the on tract, \Vill ju tify him in refusing to execute the attem1 t d a()'r m nt, or in repudiating
it if•executed.

fendants, but did not succeed in find-

ing them. He therefore forwarded

the whole quantity, and the action

was to recover the usual rate of sur-

plus. Held, that if the parties did not

assent to the same thing in the same

sense, there was no contract, and

that whether they did so assent was

a question of fact for the jury.

> In Coates v. Early (1895), 46 S. C.

220, 24 S. E. R. 305, it appeared that

Coates & Sons had solicited from

Early an order for "needle-cards."

They sent him a sample card and a

printed blank for the order. Each

needle-card contained thirty-two

nepdles. Early filled out an order on

the blank for five thousand needle-

cards as described, with his adver-

tisement printed on each card. The

needle-cards were duly supplied,

printed as directed, but Early re-

fused to receive them because, as he

contended, he thought he was order-

ing five thousand needles, and not

five thousand cards of thirty-two

needles each. But the court held

that as the order was clear and un-

ambiguous, and as the plaintiffs

were in no way responsible for the

mistake or conscious of it, Early was

bound.

Avoidance of contract for mis-

take.— In Sherwood v. Walker, 66

Mich. 568, 11 Am. St. R. 531, Morse, J.,

says: "It must be considered as well

settled that a party who has given an

apparent consent to a contract of sale

may refuse to execute it, or he may

avoid it after it has been completed,

if the assent was founded, or the con-

tract made, upon the mistake of a

material fact, such as the subject-

matter of the sale, the price, or some

collateral fact materially inducing

the agreement; and this can be done

when the mistake is mutual." Citing

Benjamin on Sale, sees. 605, 606:

that he understood him to ay one ing five thousand needles, and not
hunure<l bundle , and made a rate five thou and anl of thirty-two
for that quantity. When the lath ne dl
each.
ut the court held
were delivered to the carrier the that as the order was clear and unagent discovered the mistake, and ambiguou , and a the plaintiffs
tried to communica.te with the de- were in no way r sponsible for th
fenda.nt , but did not ucc din find- mi take or con cious of it, Early wa
ing them. He therefore forwarded bound.
the whole quantity. and the action
Ami dance of contract for mi ·
was to recover the usual rate of. ur- take.- In Sherwood v. Walker, 66
plus. H eld, that if the parties did not Mich. 568, 11 Am. St. R. 531, Mor e, J.,
assent to the same thinO' in the sarue says: "It mu t be con idered as well
sense, there was no contract, and settled that a party who has given an
that wh ther they diJ so as ·ent was apparent consent to a contract of ale
a que tion of fact for the jury.
may refuse to execute it, or he may
1 In Coate
v. Early (1 95), 46 S. C. avoid it after it has been completed,
220, 24 S. E. R. 305, it appeared that if the assent was founded, or the conCoates & Sons bad solicited from tract made, upon the mistake of a
Early an order for "needl~-cards. " m a terial fact, such as the subjectTh ey sent him a sa mple card and a matter of the sale. the price, or some
printed bla nk for the order. Each collateral fact materially inducing
needle-card contained thirty-two the agreement; and this can be done
needles. Early filled out an or<leron when the mistake is mutual." Citing
the blank for five thousand needle- Benjamin on Sale, secs. 605, 606:
canls as described, with his adver- Leake on Contracts, 339; Story 0n
ti::;ement printed on each card. The Sales (4th ed.), ecs. 148, 377: Cutt v.
needle-cards were duly supplied, Guild, 57 N. Y. 229; Harvey v. Harri ,
printed as directed, but Early re- 112 Mass. 32; Gardner v. Lane, 9
fused to receive them becau e, as he Allen (Mass.), 492, 85 Am. Dec. 779,
contended, he thought he was order- 12 Allen, 44; Huthmacher v. Harris,
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But, in order that the mistake of one party shall have this

effect, it must be a mistake as to a fact which is of the very

essence of the contract, and not as to some collateral thing

which does not affect the substance of the whole consideration.

As is said in a late case, 1 " the mistake must be one which af-

fects the existence or identity of the thing sold. Any mistake

as to value or quality, or other collateral attributes, is not suf-

ficient if the thing delivered is existent, and is the identical

thins in kind which was sold." In another case 2 the rule is

stated thus: "If there is a difference or misapprehension as to

the substance of the thing bargained for, if the thing actually

delivered or received is different in substance from the thing

bargained for and intended to be sold, then there is no con-

tract; but if it be only a difference in some quality or accident,

even though the mistake may have been the actuating motive

to the purchaser or seller, or both of them, yet the contract

remains binding." " The difficulty in every case is to deter-

mine whether the mistake or misapprehension is as to the sub-
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stance of the matter, or only to some point, even though a

material point, an error as to which does not affect the sub-

stance of the whole consideration." 3

§ 276. . On the ground that there was such an essential

mistake in regard to the kind of article dealt with, it was held

that, where both parties believed a cow contracted for was not

a breeder, and was therefore valuable only for beef, when in

fact she was a breeder and really worth ten to twelve times

the price agreed upon, the seller might repudiate the contract

and refuse to surrender the cow. 4 So it is a material mistake

*

38 Pa. St. 491, 80 Am. Dec-, 502; Byers 2 Sherwood v. Walker, 6G Mich. 568,

v. Chapin. 28 Ohio St. 300; Gibson v. 11 Am. St. R. 531.

Pelkie, 37 Mich. 380; Allen v. Ham- 3 Kennedy v. Panama, etc. Mail

mond, 11 Pet. (U. S.) 63. Co., L. R. 2 Q. B. 580, 588.

1 Hecht v. Batcheller, 147 Mass. 335, * Sherwood v. Walker (1887), 66

9 Am. St. R. 708, citing Gardner v. Mich. 568, 33 N. W. R. 919, 11 Am.

But, in or 1 r that the mi take of one party shall have this
effect, it mu t be a mi take a to a fact which is of the very
e sence of the contract, and not a to some collateral thing
which doe not aff ct th sub tance of th whole con i leration.
s i said in a late ca 1 "the mj take must be one which af.
f ct the exi tence or i 1 ntity of the thjng sold.
n mi take
a to value r quality, r oth r collateral attribute , is not uf.
:fi ·i n t if tb thin()' Jeli ere 1 i., exi t nt and is the id en ti al
thing in kind whi h was sold." In another case 2 the rule is
tated thu : 1 ' If th re is a di:ff rence or misappreben ion a to
the sub tance of the thin()' bar ain d for if the thing actually
cl liv r d or receive 1 is di:ff r nt in sub tance from the thing
barO'ain d for and int n led to be sol l, then ther is no contract· but if it e only a li r nee in ome quality or acci lent,
ev . n thou h the mi tak ma have be n the actuating motive
to th I ur h ser or ller, or both of them, yet th contract
r main bin ling." ' The diffi ul ty in every case is to 1 t rmine wh th r the mi take or mi ar prehension is as to th ubm point, v n tb ugh a
tance of th me tter or nl
niat rial p int, an rr r a to 'Yhich does not affect the subtance of the hol con icleration. ' 3

Lane, siqwa; Spurr v. Benedict, 99 St. R. 531. "It seems to me." said

Mass. 463; Bridgewater Iron Co. v. Morse, J., writing for the majority

Enterprise Ins. Co., 134 Mass. 433. of the court, "that the mistake or

259

§ 276. - - . On. tbe ground that th ,re was such an e

ntial
mistake in r ·ard to the kin l of articl d alt with, it was held
that her both l arties belie eel a cow contracted for was not
a bree ler, an l wa th refore -valuable only for beef, when in
fact she wa a breeder and really worth ten to twelve time
the price agreed ur on the seller miD"bt repudiate the contra ·t
and refu e to surren ler the cow. 4
o it is a material mi ·take

•
3 Pa. St. 491, 0 Am. D . 502; Byer
2 Sherwood v. Walker, 66 Mich. 568,
v. ha pin. 9 Ohio St. 300; Gib on v. 11 Am. St. R. 531.
Pelkie, 3 :m b. 3 0; .Allen v. Ham·
3 Kennedy v. Panama, etc. Mail
mond, 11 Pet. ( . .) 63.
Co., L. R. 2 Q. B. 5 0, 5 .
I Hecht v. Bat heller, 147 Ma. . 33.),
4 Sherwood v. Walker (18 7), 66
9 Am. t. R. '"'O , citing Gardner v. il1ich. 56 , 33 N. W. R. 919, 11 Am.
Lane, S'ltpra; purr v. Benedict, 99 St. R. 531. "It seem to me,' aid
J\Ia . 46~; Bridgewater Iron Co. v.
fore, J., writing for the majority
.Enterpri e In. . Co., 13± Mass. 433.
of the court, "that the mistake or
259
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where the parties deal upon the understanding that the seller

has the title to the goods and may lawfully convey it, whereas-

in fact he had no title. 1

Upon the other hand, it was held that there was no such

mistake as would defeat the contract where, without any fraud

or unfairness, a woman sold to a jeweler for $1 a stone which

both supposed to be a topaz or some other curious speci-

men, but which proved to be a diamond worth $1,000. 2 Nor

misapprehension of the parties went

to the whole substance of the agree-

ment. If the cow was a breeder she

where the parties deal upon the un l r tandincr that thu 11 r
has the title to the goods and may lawfully con y it, wher as
in fact he had no title. 1
Upon the other band, it was h lcl that th r was no su ·h
mistake as would defeat the contract ·w here, without any fraud
or unfairness, a woman sold to a jeweler for $1 a ston whi h
both supposed to be a to1 az or some oth r curious sp cimen, but ·which prov d to be a diamond worth 1,000. 2 Nor

was worth at least $750; if barren,

she was worth not over $80. The

parties would not have made the

contract of sale except upon the un-

derstanding and belief that she was
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incapable of breeding, and of no use

as a cow. It is true she is now the

identical animal that they thought

her to be when the contract was

made; there is no mistake as to the

identity of the creature. Yet the

mistake was not of the mere quality

of the animal, but went to the very

nature of the thing. A barren cow

is substantially a different creature

than a breeding one. There is as

much difference between them for

all purposes of use as there is be-

tween an ox and a cow that is ca-

pable of breeding and giving milk.

If the mutual mistake had simply

related to the fact whether she was

with calf or not for one season, then

it ought have been a good sale; but

the mistake affected the character

of the animal for all time, and for

her present and ultimate use. She

was not in fact the animal, or the

kind of animal, the defendants in-

tended to sell or the plaintiff to buy.

She was not a barren cow, and, if

this fact had been known, there

would have been no contract. The

mistake affected the substance of the

whole consideration, and it must be

considered that there was no con-

tract to sell or sale of the cow as she

actually was. The thing sold and

bought had in fact no existence. She

was sold as a beef creature would be

sold; she is in fact a breeding cow

and a valuable one."

In Newell v. Smith (1885), 53 Conn.

72, plaintiff had sold defendant a cow

for which he was to pay $100 if she

was with calf, and $40 if she was not.

Six months later, both parties con-

cluded that she was not with calf,

and settled on that basis. She proved

to be with calf, and it was held that

plaintiff could recover the remain-

ing $60.

1 Varnum v. Highgate (1892), 65 Vt.

416, 26 Atl. R. 628.

2 Wood v. Boynton (1885), 64 Wis.

265, 25 N. W. R. 42, 54 Am. R. 610.

misapprehension of the parti s went mi take affected th ub tance of the
to the whole sub tance of the agree- wh le con i l ration, and it mu t be
ment. If the cow was a breeder she con iclered. that th re was no conwas worth at least 750; if barren, tra t to ell or ale of the cow a he
she was worth not over S 0. The actually was. The thing sold and
parties would not have made the bought had in fact no existence. She
contract of sale except upon the un- wa sold as a beef creature would be
der tan ding and belief that she was old; she is in fact a breeding cow
incapable of breeding. and of no use and a valuable one."
as a cow. It is true she is now the
In Newell v. Smith (1 5), 53 Conn.
identical animal that they thought 72, plaintiff had old defendant a cow
her to be when the contract was for which he was to pay $100 if he
made; there is no mistake as to the wa with calf, and $40 if she wa not.
identity of the creature. Yet the Six months later, both parties conmistake was not of the mere quality eluded that she was not with calf,
of the animal, but went to the very and settled on that basis. She proved
nature of the thing. A barren cow to be with calf, and it was held that
is substantially a different creature plaintiff could recover the remainthan a breeding one. There is as ing $60.
much difference between them for
l Varnum v. Highgate (1892), 65 Vt.
all purposes of use as there is be- 416, 26 Atl. R. 62 .
tween an ox and a cow that is ca2 Wood v. Boynton (1885). 64 Wis.
pable of breeding and giving milk. 265, 25 N. W. R. 42, 54 Am. R. 610.
If the mutual mistake had simply
So a contract for the sale of a. horse
related to the fact whether she was known by both parties to be sick. but
with calf or not for one season, then no warranty being given, cannot be
it ought have been a good sale; but afterwards repudiated becau e the
the mi take affected the character purchasers discover that the horse is
of the animal for all time, and for sicker than they thought it was.
her pr sent and ultimate use. She "Such an error or mistake a.s that in
was not in fact the animal, or the no manner affects the validity of the
kinrl of animal, the defendants in- contract. In a ca e where there is a
tended to sell or the plaintiff to buy. mutual mistake of the parties as to
She was not a barren cow, and, if the subject-matter of the contract.
this fact had been known, there or the price or terms, going to show
would have been no contract. The the want of a consensus ad idem~
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is there where a promissory note was sold, both parties suppos-

ing the makers to be doing business as usual, though in fact the

makers, two hours before the sale, had made a general assign-

ment of all their property for the benefit of creditors. 1

§ 277. Mistake as to location. — A mistake as to the

is there where a promi ory note was sold, both parties suppo ing the makers to be doing bu iness as usual, though in fact the
makers two hours before the al , had made a general a signment of all their property for the benefit of er ditors. 1

location of the property may be so material, within the mean-

without which no contract can arise,

such a defense may be made. But

here the mistake of the defendants

27 7. - - Mi "take as t o l ocation .-A mi take as to the
location of the prop rty ma be so mat rial, within the mean-

was in relation to a fact wholly col-

lateral, and not affecting the essence

of the contract itself. The vendees

cannot escape from the obligation of

their contract because they have

been mistaken or disappointed in the

quality of the article purchased. In
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the absence of a warranty the prin-

ciple of caveat emptor applies, and

the buyer takes the risk of quality

upon himself." Wheat v. Cross (1869),

31 Md. 99, 1 Am. R 28.

•iHecht v. Batcheller (1888), 147

Mass. 335, 17 N. E. R 651. 9 Am. St. R.

708. "The note delivered," said the

court, " was the same note which the

parties bought and sold. They may

both have understood that the mak-

ers were solvent, whereas they were

insolvent; but such a mistake or mis-

apprehension affects the value of the

note, and not its identity. . » .

The makers of the note had made an

assignment for the benefit of their

creditors, but this did not extinguish

the note or destroy its identity. It

remained an existing note, capable

of being enforced with every essen-

tial attribute going to its nature as

a note which it had before. Its

quality and value were impaired, but

not its identity. The parties bought

and sold what they intended, and

their mistake was not as to the sub-

ject-matter of the sale, but as to its

quality.''

The same result was reached in

Sample v. Bridgforth (1894), 72 Miss.

293, 16 S. R 876, where the parties to

the sale and purchase of a note mis-

takenly supposed it was secured by

a first mortgage, but this was held to

be a mistake as to a collateral point

which affected value only and not

identity.

But where one sells promissory

notes at less than their face, repre-

senting them to be business papers

when in fact they are accommoda-

tion notes, and thus usurious and

void in the hands of the vendee, the

latter may rescind the contract and

recover back the purchase-money al-

though there be no fraud or war-

ranty. Said the court: "It is a gen-

eral rule that upon the sale and

delivery of personal property with-

out fraud or warranty, no action will

without whi h no contra t can ari e,
The same re ult was reached in
uch a defen e ma b mai. But Sample v. Bridgforth (1 94), 72 Mi s.
here the mi take of the defendants 293, 16 S. R. 76, where the I artie to
wa in rela ion to a fact wh lly col- the sale and purcha e of a note mi lateral, and not affe ting th
nc
takenly uppo ed it wa. ecured by
of the contract it elf. The vendee
a fir t mortgage, but thi wa held to
cannot e ca1 e from the oblig tion of be a mi ·take a to a collateral point
their contr ct b au e they ha e which affected v lue only and not
be n mi taken or di appoint din the identity.
quality of th arti le purcha a. In
But "\: her on
ell promi ory
the ab ence of a warranty the prin- n te at 1
than their face, repreciple of caveat emptor applie , and enting them to be bu ines papers
the buy r take the ri k of quali y when in fact th y are accommodaupon him elf." Wheat v. Cro (1 69), tion note , and thus u uriou and
31 MJ. 99, 1 A.m. R. 2 .
void in the hand of the vendee, the
·I H
ht v. B tcheller (1
), 147 latter may re cin the contract and
Ma . 335 1
. E. R. 6-1. 9 A.m. t. R. r co er back the purcha e-money al70 . ''The note delivered." • aid the thouO'h there be no fraud or warcourt, '' wa the ame note which the ranty.
aid the court: "It is a genpartie bought and old. They may eral rule that upon the sale and
both have understood that the mak- delivery of personal property wither were solvent, whereas they were out fraud or warranty, no action will
insolvent; butsuch a mistakeormi - lie again t the vendor to recover
apprehen ion affects the value of the damage for any defects which may
note, and not its identity. . , . exist; anu thi rule applies when the
The makers of the note hafl. made an article differs from the representaa . ignment for the benefit of their tions of the Geller as to quality, uncreuitors, but this did not extingui h le suchrepre entationswerefrauduthe note or destroy its identity. It lent. But when the thing old differs
remained an exi ting note, capable in substance from what the purof being enforced with every essen- cha er was led by the vendor to betial attribute going to it nature as lieve be was buying. and the differa note which it had before.
Its ence in subject-matter is so substanquality and value were impaired, but tial and essential in character as to
not it identity. The partie bought amount to a failure of consideration,
and sold what they intended, and there is no contract, and the purtheir mi take w·a not a· to the ub- cha er may recover back the money
ject-matter of the sale, but as to its paid." \~ebb v. Odell (1872), 49 N. Y ..
qualit.y."
583.
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ing of the rules just referred to, that it will prevent the for-

mation of the contract. Thus where both parties, negotiating

at Burlington, Vermont, supposed the property to be in the

custody of a storekeeper at Whitehall, where the buyer desired

to receive it, when in fact it had been forwarded to Boston

and there commingled with the goods of a commission mer-

chant, it was held that the mistake was so material that, if the

fact had been known, the contract would not have been en-

tered into, and therefore that no title passed. 1

§278. Mistake as to terms of contract — Price. — There

may also be mistake as to the terms of the contract. The mis-

take most commonly made, perhaps, is in reference to the price.

ing of the rules just referred to, that it will prevcn t the formation of the contract. Thus where both parties, n gotiating
at Burlington, Vermont, supposed the property to be in the
custody of a storekeeper at Whit hall, wh r the buy rd ired
to receive it, when in fact it had been forwar ed to o ton
and there commingled with the goods of a commis ion merchant, it was held that the mistake was o material that, if the
fact had been known, the con tract would not have been entered into, and therefore that no title passed. 1

If the parties are mutually mistaken, as where 'an offer of a

certain price for shingles was understood by the seller to be so

much per bunch and by the buyer to be so much per thou-

sand — a material difference, — it was held that there was no
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contract 2 So where one party alone is in error, but the other

1 Ketchum v. Catlin (1849), 21 Vt.

191. "If a contract," it was said,

" is made in mutual error of material

facts which have induced the con-

tract, it is invalid and may be set

aside. This is upon the principle,

mainly, that when the parties are

under a mutual mistake as to mate-

rial facts, affecting the subject-mat-

§ 278. Mistake as to term

of contract - Price.-There
may also be mistake as to the terms of the contract. The mistake most commonly made, perhap , is in ref r nee to the price.
If the parties are mutually mi taken, as wh re an offer of a
certain price for shingles was understood by the seller to be so
much per bunch and by the buyer to be so ru uch per thousand - a material difference,- it was held that there was no
contract 2 So where one party alone is in error, but the other

ter of the contract, there is a want

of a binding assent, and we think a

contract so made may be avoided in

a court of law." To like effect: Be-

dell v. Wilder (1892), 65 Vt. 406, 26

Atl. R. 589, 36 Am. St. R 871.

2 Greene v. Bateman (1846), 2

Woodb. & M. 359, Fed. Cas. No. 5762.

Where the owner of a mare asked

$165 for her, and the purchaser un-

derstood the price asked to be $65,

and took her home with him and re-

fused to pay more than the latter

named sum, there being a clear mis-

understanding between the parties,

it was held that there was no sale,

and consequently no title passed.

Rupley v. Daggett (1874), 74 111. 351.

And so in Rovegno v. Defferari

(1871), 40 Cal. 459, where the seller

understood that he was selling at one

price while the buyer understood

that he was buying at a different

price. To like effect, also, in Phil-

lips v. Bistolli, 2 B. & Cr. 511, where a

foreigner, not familiar with English,

supposed he was buying an article at

auction at forty-eight guineas while

the auctioneer understood the bid to

be eighty-eight guineas.

So in Hogue v. Mackey (1890), 44

Kan. 277, 24 Pac. R. 477, where one

of the parties undei-stood that the in-

stalments of the price were to be

paid at intervals of thirty days, and

the other understood the interval to

be ninety days, there was held to be

no sale.
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1 Ketchum

191.

v. Catlin (1849), 21 Vt.
"If a contract," it was said,

it was held that there was no sale, .
and consequently no title passed.
Rupley v. Daggett (1874), 74 Ill. 351.
And so in Rovegno v. De:fferari
(1871), 40 Cal. 459, where the seller
understood that he was selling at one
price while the buyer understood
that he was buying at a different
price. To like effect, also, in Phillips v. Bistolli, 2 B. & Cr. 511, where a
foreigner, not familiar with English,
supposed he was buying an article at
auction at forty-eight guineas while
the auctioneer understood the bid to
be eighty-eight guineas.
So in Hogue v. Mackey (1890), 44
Kan. 277, 24 Pac. R. 477, where one
of the parties understood that the instalments of the price were to be
paid at intervals of thirty days, and
the other understood the interval to
be ninety days, there was held to be
no sale.

"is made in mutual error of material
facts which have induced the contract, it is invalid and may be set
aside. This is upon the principle,
mainly, that when the parties are
under a mutual mistake as to material facts, affecting the sul>ject-matter of the contract, there is a want
of a binding assent, and we think a
contract so made may be avoided in
a court of law." •ro like effect: Bedell v. Wilder (1892), 65 Vt. 406, 26
Atl. R. G89, 36 Am. St. R. 871.
2 Greene v. Bateman (1846), 2
Woodb. & M. 359, Fed. Cas. No. 5762.
Where the owner of a mare asked
$165 for her, and the purchaser understood the price asked to he $65,
and took her home with him and refu ed to pay more than the latter
named sum, there being a clear m1sunclerstanding between the parties,
262

CH.

vr.J

CONTRACT OF SALE- IN GENER.AL.

[§ 279.

CII< vi.] CONTRACT OF SALE — IN GENERAL. [§ 279.

is aware of it and "snaps at an offer which he perfectly well

knows to be made by mistake," there is no contract. 1 But

where one party is in error, while the other is ignorant of it —

as where a party who makes an offer has made an error in his

calculations upon which the offer was based, and the other ac-

cepts in good faith and the contract is completed,— the con-

tract cannot be defeated. 3

§ 279. Mistake as to possibility of performance.— The gen-

eral question of the effect of impossibility as an excuse for the

non-performance of the contract will be considered in later

sections ; 3 but there may arise such aspects of it as are germane

to the present discussion. It must be assumed, ordinarily, that

is aware of it and "snaps at an offer which he perfectly well
knows to be made by mistake," there is no contract. 1 But
where one party is in error, while the other is ignorant of itas where a party who makes an offer has made an error in his
calculations upon which the offer was based, and the other accepts in good faith and the contract is completed,- the con·
tract cannot be defeated. 3

the parties to a contract contemplate its performance, and that

they believe it possible to perform it according to its terms.

Hence, if, through mutual error as to facts, they stipulate for

things impossible of accomplishment, or if in a contract of sale

of machinery, for example, they fix a standard of performance

which it is impossible to realize, "the contract which they in-
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tended to establish on that foundation falls when the founda-

tion itself is discovered to have no existence." *

iHarran v. Foley (1885), 62 Wis. *In Nordyke & Marmon Co. v.

584 22NW.R. 837, where the seller Kehlor (1900), 155 Mo. 643, 56 S. W.

intended to offer cattle for $261.50, R 287, the parties stipulated that

but by slip of tongue said $161.50, milling machinery should be capable

and the buyer having good reason to of producing a certain quantity ot

believe that it was a mistake imme- flour "fully equal in quality to the

diately made a payment to bind the best fifty-five per cent, that Kelly &

bargain, and claimed the cattla Lysle can make in their mill. Both

(Webster v. Cecil, 30 Beav. 62, and parties supposed that the mill ot

Tamplin v. James, L, R 15 Ch. Div. Kelly & Lysle produced flour of the

221, were cited.) To like effect; Shel- grade specified, but it in fact did

ton v. Ellis (1883), 70 Ga. 297. not and could not without change.

2 Griffin v O'Neil (1892), 48 Kan. It was held that, on the discovery ot

117 29 Pac. R. 143. the facts, the seller was justified in

§ 279. M.i take as to po ibility of performance.- The general question of the effect of impossibility as an excuse for the
non-p rformance of the contract will be considered in later
ections; 3 but there m y arise such aspects of it as are germane
to the present discu ion. It mu t be a sumed, ordinarily, that
the partie to a contract cont mplate its performance, and that
they believe it po sible to perf rm it according to its terms.
I nc , if, through mutual error as to facts, they stipulate for
thing impos ible of accomplishment, or if in a contract of sale
of machinery, for example, they fix a standard of performance
wbi h it is impo ible to realize, "the contract which they in·
tend d to establish on that foun lation falls when the founda·
tion it elf is discovered to have no existence." '

3 See post, §§ 830-844 abandoning the undertaking.

263

l Harran v. Foley (1
), 62 Wis.
5 4, 22 N. W.R. 837, where the seller
intended to offer cattle for 261.50,
but by slip of tongue aid $161.50,
and the buyer having good reason to
believe that it >vas a mistake imme.
diately made a payment to bind the
bargain, and claimed the cattle.
(Web ter v. Cecil, 30 Beav. 62, and
Tamplin v. James, L. R. 15 Ch. Div.
221, were cited.) To like effect; Shelton v. Ellis (18 3), 70 Ga. 297.
2Griffin v. O'Neil (1892), 48 Kan.
117, 29 Pac. R. 143.
a See post, §§ 830-844.

4 In Nordyke & Marmon Co.. v.
Kehlor (1900), 155 Mo. 643, 56 S. W.
R. 2 7, the parties stipulated that
milling achinery should be capable
of producing a certain quantity of
flour "fully equal in quality to the
best fifty-five per cent. that K elly &
Lysle can make in their mill." Both
parties supposed that the mill of
Kelly & Lysle produced flour of the
grade specified, but it in fact did
not and could not without change.
It was held that, on the discovery of
the facts, the seller was justified in
abandoning the undertaking.
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§ 280. Purpose of this chapter.

281. Sales prior to the statute.

I. The Statute.

282, 283. The seventeenth section

of the statute of frauds.

on

284. English sale of goods art.
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2. Contracts of Sale or Manufacture.

294. Statute applies only to con-
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change within the tatute.
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301. - - vVhether work or matecomprehen. ive.
rials is the essence of the
331. What in cl uded - Stocks contract, as the test.
Notes - Inventions.
302, 303. - - The present English
332-335. - - Fixtures.
test.
336-339. - - Growing trees.
304, 305. American cases - The
340-344-. - -- Growing crops.
rule in New York.
345. - - Crops to be raised.
306, 307. - - The rule in Massa346. - - U neut ice.
347. - - Minerals.
chusetts.
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36 . That bu 'er ought to accept,
not nough.
36 , 370.
beth r acceptance must
be final ancl onclusi\e.
371. - - Ace ptance of unfinished
article.
379.. Bur<len of proof a to acceptanc.
373. Que tion for the jury.
374. Right of seller to retract before acceptance.
3. Of Receipt by the Buyer.
375. ece ity of receipt.
376. Nature of receipt required.
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5. Earnest or Part Payment,

a. Of Earnest.

§ 404. Earnest and part payment syn-

onymous.

405. Thing in earnest must be act-

ually given.

406. Must be a thing of some value.

407. Deposit with third person by

way of forfeiture not

enough.

408. Effect of earnest in passing

the title.

b. Of Part Payment.

409. What the statute requires.

410. The amount required.

411. What may be paid.

412. Check.
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413. Buyer's note.

414. Note of stranger.

415. Money already in hands

of seller.

416. Satisfaction of previous

debt.

417. Payment of seller's debt

to third person.

418. Mere unaccepted payment not

enough.

419. 420. When part payment to be

made.

421. Part payment to agent suffices.

6. The Note or Memorandum.

422. What the statute requires.

a. What is a Note or Memorandum.

423. Is distinct from the agreement

itself.

424. At what time to be made.

425. Form of note or memorandum.

426. 427. Several papers.

428. Letters.

429. Telegrams.

430. Books.

431. Records of corporate meet-

ings.

432. Not necessary that note be ad-

dressed to or pass between

the parties.
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>. What Note or Memorandum is Suf-

ficient.

433. The requisites in general.

434. Parties must be named or de-

scribed.

435. What description suffi-

cient.

436. Agent named instead of

principal.

437. Goods sold must be stated or

described.

438. Price must be shown.

439. Terms of credit and mode of

payment must be stated.

440. Time and place of delivery

must be stated if agreed

upon.

441. All other material terms must

be included.

442. Consideration need not be ex-

pressed unless required by

b. \\That Note or M: morandum i Suf5. Earnest or Pm·t Payment.
ficient.
a. Of Earne t.
§ 404. Earnest and part payment syn- § 433. The requi ite in general.
434. Partie mu t be named or deonymous.
scribed.
405. Thing in earnest must be act435.
\ hat description suffiually given.
cient.
406. Must be a thing of some value.
436. - - Agent named instead of
407. Depo it with third person by
principal.
way of forfeiture not
437. Goods old mu t be stated or
enough.
de cribed.
408. Effect of earnest in passing
43
.
Price
must be hown.
the title.
439. Terms of redit and mode of
b. Of Part Payment.
payment mu t be ~tated.
409. What the statute requires.
440. Time and place of delivery
410. The amount required.
mu t be stated if agreed
411. What may be paid.
upon.
412. - - Check.
441. All other material terms must
413. - - Buyer's note.
be included.
414. - - Note of stranger.
442. Con ideration need not be ex415. - - Money already in hands
pressed unless required by
of seller.
statute.
416. - - Satisfaction of previous
443. Memorandum must show com·
debt.
plete con tract.
417. - - Payment of seller's debt
444. Memorandum must import a
to third person.
sale.
418. Mere unaccepted payment not
445. Parol evidence not admissible
enough.
to supply deficiencies.
419, 420. When part payment to be
446, 447. Parol evidence to contramade.
dict complete memoran421. Part paymenttoagentsu:ffices.
dum.
6. The Note or 1Vfemorandum.
448. But defendant may show
memorandum, relied upon
422. What the statute requires.
by plaintiff, to be incoma. What is a Note or Memorandum.
plete.
428. Is di ·tinct from the agreement
itself.
c. Of the Signing by the Parties.
424. At what time to be made.
449. Whether both parties must
425. Formof noteor memorandum.
sign.
426, 427. Se\'eral papers.
450. - - Written offer accepted
428. Letters.
by parol.
429. Telegrams.
451. How to be signed.
430. Books.
d. Of Signing by Agent.
431. Records of corporate meetings.
4-2. Who may be agent.
432. Not necessary that note be ad453. How appointed.
dressed to or pass between
454. - - Several owners - One as
the parties.
agent for all.
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455-45% How sign.

•i.jQ. One person as agent for both

parties.

460. Evidence of authority.

461. Signing by auctioneer.

462. Auctioneer selling his own

goods cannot sign for both.

463-466. Broker as agent for both

parties.

467. "Bought and sold notes" in

English practice*

468. English rules governing.

§ 469. Bought and sold notes

in the United States.

470. Revocation of broker's

authority.

471. Signing by one partner.

e. Of Alteration of the Memorandum.
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472. Effect of alteration.

473. Memorandum not to be altered

by parol.

474. Discharge or substitution of

agreement may be shown.

§ 2S0. Purpose of this chapter. — Having now considered

the nature of the contract of sale, its parties, the subject-mat-

ter and the price, there remains to be considered the effect of

the statute of frauds upon the negotiations of the parties.

§ 281. Sales before the statute. — The effect of this famous

statute can perhaps best be made manifest by recalling first

the requisites of a valid contract of sale at common law before

the passing of the statute, particularly inasmuch as the same

requisites, as has been seen, still prevail in respect of those con-

tracts to which the statute does not apply.

At the common law, as was seen in a previous chapter, a

contract for the sale of goods stands upon the same footing as

any other contract, requiring the mutual assent of competent

parties for a consideration. Neither a written contract or

memorandum, nor an entire or partial delivery, nor an entire

or partial payment, nor the payment of earnest, is indispensa-

ble, but it is sufficient to pass the title, if such be the intention

of the parties, that the terms are definitely agreed upon and

the chattel is distinguished, identified or separated from the

mass of which it forms a part. The purchaser may then take

possession of it, upon paying or tendering the price agreed

upon, but not otherwise, unless a credit has been agreed upon,

in which case the vendor's lien does not attach. 1

i Simmons v. Swift, 5 B. & C. 862; Dixon v. Yates, 5 B. & Ad. 313; Gil-

mour v. Supple, 11 Moore, P. C. 566.
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[BOOK I.

§§ 2S2, 2S3.] LAW OF SALE. [book I.

A more detailed examination of this subject will be made

hereafter, but this will suffice for the present purposes of con-

trast.

The Statute.

A more detailed examination of this subject will be made
hereafter, but this will suffice for the present purposes of contrast.

§ 282. The seventeenth section of the statute of frauds.

This being the state of the common law, the " Act for the pre-

vention of frauds and perjuries," commonly known as the Stat-

I.

ute of Frauds, was passed in the twenty-ninth year of the reign

of Charles the Second, and went into effect on the 2±th day of

THE STATUTE.
June, 1677. Of this act, the seventeenth section chiefly con-

cerns the present inquiry, and reads as follows: "And bee it

further enacted, by the authority aforesaid, that from and after

§ 282. The seventeenth section of tlie statute of frauds.

the said fouer and twentyeth day of June noe contract for the

Sale of any Goods, wares, or Merchandises for the price of ten

pounds Sterling or upwards shall be allowed to be good except

the Buyer shall accept part of the goods soe sold and actually

receive the same or give something in earnest to bind the bar-

gaine or in part of payment, or that some Note or Memoran-
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dum in writing of the said bargaine be made and signed by

the partyes to be charged by such contract or their agents

thereunto lawfully authorized."

283. . Afterwards, because of conflicting decisions as

to the application of this statute to executory agreements, fur-

ther legislation became desirable, and in 1S29 Lord Tenter-

den's Act declared that this seventeenth section "shall extend

to all contracts for the sale of goods of the value of ten pounds

sterling and upwards, notwithstanding the goods may be in-

tended to be delivered at some future time, or may not at the

time of such contract be actually made, procured or provided,

or fit or ready for delivery, or some act may be requisite for

the making or completing thereof or rendering the same fit

for delivery."

2G3

This being the state of the common law, the "Act for the prevention of frauds and perjuries," commonly known as the Statute of Frauds, was passed in the twenty-ninth year of the reign
of Charles the S cond, and went into effect on the 2:l:th day of
June, 1677. Of this act, the seventeenth section chiefly concerns the present inquiry, and reads as follows: "And bee it
further enacted, by the authority aforesaid, that from and after
the said fouer and twentyeth day of June noe contract for the
Sale of any Goods, wares, or 1Ierchandises for the price of ten
pounds Sterling or upwards shall be allowed to be good except
the Buye_r shall accept part of the goods soe sold and actually
receive the same or give something in earnest to bind the bargaine or in part of payment, or that some N otc or ~iemoran
dum in writing of the said bargaine be made and signed by
the partyes to be charged by such contract or their agents
thereunto lawfully authorized."
283. - - . Afterwards, because of conflicting decisions as
to the application of this statute to executory agree men ts, further legislation became desirable, and in 1 29 Lord Tenterden's Act declared that this seventeenth section "shall extend
to all contracts for the sale of goods of the value of ten pounds
sterling and upwards, notwithstanding the goods may be intended to be deli veretl at some future time, or may not at the
time of such contract be actually made, procured or provided,
or fit or ready for delivery, or some act may be requisite for
the making or completing thereof or rendering the same fit
:f.or deli very."
268

CH. Til.] CONTRACT TJXDER STATUTE OF FRAUDS. [§§ 284,285.

These two statutes are now construed as if incorporated to-

gether, the word value being substituted for the word price in

the original act. 1

§284. English sale of goods act. — The present English

statute 2 upon this subject provides as follows:

" (1) A contract for the sale of any goods of the value of ten

pounds or upward shall not be enforceable by action unless the

buyer shall accept part of the goods so sold, and actually re-

ceive the same, or give something in earnest to bind the con-

tract, or in part payment, or unless some note or memorandum

in writing of the contract be made and signed by the party to

be charged or his agent in that behalf.

" (2) The provisions of this section apply to every such con-

tract, notwithstanding that the goods may be intended to be

delivered at some future time, or may not at the time of such

contract be actually made, procured or provided, or fit or ready

for delivery, or some act may be requisite for the making or

completing thereof, or rendering the same fit for delivery.

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:48 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t6xw4h56n
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

" (3) There is an acceptance of goods within the meaning of

this section when the buyer does any act in relation to the

goods which recognizes a pre-existing contract of sale, whether

there be an acceptance in performance of the contract or not.

" (4) The provisions of this section do not apply to Scot-

land."

§ 285. The statutes in the United States. — Statutes sub-

stantially similar to the English act have been adopted in many,

but not all, of the United States. No attempt will be made to

give the language of these statutes in full, as they are collected

in the various treatises on the subject of the statute and else-

where, but the following summary of them, so far as applicable

to the contracts for the sale of goods, will sufficiently indicate

their character:

i Scott v. Railway Co., 12 M. & W. 2 Sale of Goods Act, ch. 71, 56 & 57

38; Harman v. Reeve, 18 C. B. 587. Vict. 1894, § 4.
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t;

§ 2:' 6-2

.]

LAW OF

ALE.

(n

K I.

§§ 286-288.] law of sale. [book i.

§ 286. . In Arkansas, 1 Georgia, 2 Massachusetts, 3 Maine, 4

Maryland, 5 Michigan, 6 Missouri, 7 New Hampshire, 8 New Jer-

sey, 9 South Carolina, 10 Vermont 11 and "Washington 12 the lan-

guage is " contract for the sale of goods, wares and merchan-

dise."

§ 287. . In South Dakota, 13 Colorado, 14 Idaho, 15 Minnesota, 16

Nebraska, 17 Nevada, 18 New York, 19 Utah, 20 Wisconsin 21 and Wy-

oming 22 the words used are " contract for the sale of goods, chat-

§ 286. - - . In Arkan a ,1 Georgia, 2 l!Ias acbu ett 3 Iain ,4
:Maryland,5 ~fichigan, 6 !Iis ouri, 7 :New Hamp hir ,8 ... w J rsey,9 South Carolina, 10 Vermont 11 and Wa ·hinoton 12 th language is "contract for the sale of goocls, war s and merchandise."

tels or things in action." In California, 23 Connecticut, 24 Mon-

tana, 25 Oregon 26 and North Dakota 27 the words are "agreement

for the sale of any personal property." In Iowa 28 the statutory

language is the same, but unlike the English and most of the

American statutes the act is content with forbidding evidence

to be given of the unwritten contract. The Indiana 29 statute

invalidates a "contract for the sale of any goods;" and in

Florida 30 and Mississippi 31 the wording is "contract for the sale

of any personal property, goods, wares or merchandise."

§ 288. . In Arkansas, California, Colorado, Idaho, In-
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diana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Mis-

souri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New

Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Oregon, South Carolina,

i Digest of Statutes 1894. § 3470. " General Statutes 1885, § 2631.

2 Code of Statutes 1895, § 2693. " Revised Statutes 1896, p. 1886, § 3.

3 Public Statutes 1882, ch. 78, § 5. 20 Revised Statutes 1898, § 2469.

4 Revised Statutes 1883, ch. Ill, §4 2 1 Sanborn & Berryuian Statutes

5 Corbet v. Wolford, 48 Md. 426. 1898, § 2308.

e Compiled Laws 1897, § 9516. 22 Revised Statutes 1887, § 1250.

7 Revised Statutes 1889, § 5187. 23Deering's Statutes, § 1739; Civ.

8 General Laws 1878, ch. 220, § 16. Code, Div. III.

§ 287. - . In outh Dakota 13 oloraclo 14 Idaho 15 ~Iinne otci 16
Nebra ka, 17 Kevada,' NewYork 19 ITtab, 20 \Vi on in 21 and \Vjoming22 the Vi·orcl u ed are 'contract for th sale of good , hatteJs or things in action." In alifornia, 23 onnecticut, 24 Iontana,25 Oregon 26 and r orth Dakota 27 th w rel ar 'agr m nt
for the sale of any per onal prop rty." In Iowa 2 the tatutory
language is the same, but unlike the En<Ylish and mo t of the
American statutes the act i content with forbidding evidence
to be given of the unwritten contract. The Indiana '.!9 statute
invalidates a "contract for the ale of any good ; and in
Florida 30 and !fis i sippi 31 the wording i "contract for the sale
of any personal property, goods, wares or merchandise."

9 General Statutes 1895, p. 1603, § 6. 24 General Statutes 1888, § 1367.

i« Revised Statutes 1893, vol I, § 2152. 25 Civil Code, £ 2340.

11 Statutes 1894, § 1225. 26 Hill's Annotated Laws 1892, § 785.

12 General Laws 1897, § 4577. 27 Revised Statutes 1895, § 3958.

§ 288. - - . In Arkan as, California, Colorado, Idaho, Indiana, !Iassachusetts, l!Iichigan, lifinnesota, JUi si sippi, Mis-

13 Compiled Laws of Dakota 1887. 23 Code of 1897, § 4625.

" Mill's Statutes, § 2025. 29 Revised Statutes 1897, § 6944

1 5 Revised Statutes 1887, § 6009. 30 Revised Statutes 1892, § 1996.

i 6 General Statutes 1894, § 4210. 31 Code, § 4229.

souri, :Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hamp hire, New
Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Oregon, outh Carolina,

" Compiled Statutes 1897, § 3183.
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of Statutes 1 94. § 3470.
2 Code of Statutes 18r, § 2693.
a Public Statutes 1 2, ch. 7 , § 5.
4 Revised Statute 1 83, ch. 111, § 4.
5 Corbet v. Wolford, 4 l\fd. 496.
6 Compiled Laws 1 97, § 9516.
7 Revi ed Statutes 18 9, § 5187.
s General Laws 1878, ch. 220, 16.
9 General Statute 1 95, p. 1603, § 6.
10 Revised Statutes 1893, vol. I,§ 2152.
11 tatutes 1894, § 1225.
12 General Laws 1897, § 4577.
13 Compiled Laws of Dakota 18 7.
14 rm ·s Statutes, ~ 2025.
15 Revised Statutes 1887, § 6009.
16 General tatutes 1 94, · 4911).
17 Compiled Statutes 1897, ~ 3183.
1 Digest

s

Genera.I Statutes 1 5, § 2631.
19 Revised tatutes 1 96, p. 1 6, § 3.
20 Revi ed Statutes 1 9 , § 2469.
21 anborn & Berryman Statute
1 9 , § 230 .
22 Revi ed Statutes 1 7, § 1250.
23Deering's Statutes, ~ 1739; Civ.
Code, Div. Ill.
24 General Statutes 1
, § 1367.
25 Civil Code, ~ 2340.
26 Hill's Annotated Laws 1 92, § 785.
27 Revi ed Statutes 1 95, § 3958.
2 Code of 1 97, § 4625.
29 Revised Statutes 1 97, ~ 6944.
30 Revised St.at.utes 1 92, § 1996.
31 Code, § 4229.

270
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CH. VII.] CONTRACT UXDEK STATUTE OF FRAUDS. [§§ 289-291.

South Dakota, Vermont, Utah, Washington, Wisconsin and

"Wyoming the word price is used. In Connecticut, Florida and

Maine, neither the word price nor value is used, but simply

" agreement for the sale of personal property." In Maryland '

and South Carolina the English statute is adopted. In Georgia

the words " to the amount of " are used. 2

§ 2S9. . In Connecticut, Colorado, Georgia, Indiana,

Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska,

Nevada, New York, North Dakota, Oregon, South Carolina,

South Dakota, Washington, Wisconsin and Wyoming, the

amount is fixed at fifty dollars; in Arkansas, Maine, Missouri

and New Jersey at thirty dollars; in California, Idaho, Mon-

tana and Utah at two hundred dollars; in New Hampshire at

thirty-three dollars; in Vermont at forty dollars; and in Florida

no limit is prescribed.

§ 290. . In Alabama, Arizona, Delaware, Illinois, Kan-

sas, Kentucky, Louisiana, New Mexico, 3 North Carolina, Ohio,

Pennsylvania, Ehode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia and
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West Virginia no provision similar to the seventeenth section

seems to have been adopted.

§ 291. The general effect of the statute. — The general ef-

fect of the statute, in the cases to which it applies, will be seen

to consist chiefly in the introduction of a new rule of evidence

which requires a kind of proof that the common law did not

deem necessary. This rule demands either —

(a) An actual receipt and acceptance of a part of the goods, or

(b) the giving of something in earnest to bind the bargain, or

(c) a part payment, or

1 Corbett v. Wolford, 84 Md. 426, 35 adopt the fourth section of the Eng-

Atl. R. 1088. lish statute, but are silent as to the

2 For reference to the various stat- seventeenth section, although the

utes see supra. reasoning might well apply to either

3 In Childers v. Talbott, 4 N. M. 336, section.

16 Pac. R. 275, the supreme court
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§§ 292, 293.J

[ EOOK I.

LAW OF SALE.

§§ 292, 293.] law of sale. [book i.

(d) a note or memorandum in writing of the bargain, signed

by the party to be charged thereby or by his agent thereunto

duly authorized

II.

What are Contracts for the Sale of Goods, Wares and

(d) a note or memorandum in writing of the bargain, signed
by the party to be charged thereby or by his agent thereunto
duly authorized

Merchandise.

II.

§ 292. Importance of this question. — One of the most im-

portant and difficult of the questions presenting themselves

under the provisions of this statute is, What is a contract for

the sale of goods, wares and merchandise within its operation ?

WHAT ARE CONTRACTS FOR THE SALE OF

Does it apply to executory agreements or only to the completed

Goons,

WARES AND

MERCHANDISE.

contract? Is there a contract for the sale when the goods are

not in esse, but are to be grown, produced or manufactured?

1. Executory Contracts.

§ 293. Statute applies to executory contracts. — It was

thought at one time in England that the statute had no appli-

cation to the case of executory contracts by which the present

title was not conveyed, but this question was set at rest by
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Lord Tenterden's Act, 1 and the application of the statute to such

contracts has always been recognized by the courts of the

United States. Thus it is said in a leading case 2 in Connecti-

cut: "It seems now to be well settled, in accordance with the

rules of just interpretation, as well as the dictates of reason

§ 292. Importance of this question.- One 9f the most important and difficult of the que tions presenting themselves
under the provisions of this statute is, What is a contract for
the sale of goods, wares and merchandise within its operation?
Does it apply to executory agreements or only to the completed
contract? Is there a contract for the sale when the goods are
not in esse, but are to be grown, produced or manufactured?

and common sense, that a contract for the sale of goods is not

without the purview of the statute merely because it is execu-

1. Executory Contracts.

tory."

1 See ante, § 283. Hargreaves (1885), 47 N. J. L. 334, 54

2 Atwater v. Hough (1861), 29 Conn. Am. R. 162]; Edwards v. Grand Trunk

508, 79 Am. Dec. 229. To the same Ry. Co. (1860), 48 Me. 379, 54 Me. 105;

§ 293. Statute applies to executory contracts.- It was

effect: Mechanical Boiler Cleaner Co. Ide v. Stanton (1843), 15 Vt. 685,40

v. Kellner (1899), 62 N. J. L. 544, 43 Am. Dec. 698; Downs v. Ross (1840).

Atl. R. 599 [citing Carman v. Smick 23 Wend. (N.Y.) 270; Hanson v. Rolter

(1836), 15 N. J. L. 252; Finney v. Apgar (1885), 64 Wis. 622.

(1865), 31 N. J. L. 206; Pawelski v.
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thought at one time in England that the statute had no application to the case of executory contracts by which the present
title was not conveyed, but this question was set at rest by
Lord Tenterden's Act,1 and the application of the statute to such
contracts has al ways been recognized by the courts of the
United States. Thus it is said in a leading case 2 in Connecticut: "It seems now to be well settled, in accordance with the
rules of JUSt interpretation, as well as the dictates of reason
and common sense, that a contract for the sale of goods is not
without the purview of the statute merely because it is executory."
ante, § 283.
Atwater v. Hough (1861), 29 Conn.
50 , 79 Am. Dec. 229. To the same
effect: M chanical Boiler Cleaner Co.
v. Kellner (1899), 62 N. J. L. 544, 43
Atl. R. 599 [citing Carman v. Smick
(1 36), 15 N. J. L. 252; Finney v. Apgar
(1865), 31 N. J. L. 266; Pawelski v.
1 See

2

Hargreaves (1885), 47 N. J. L. 334, 54
Am. R. 162]; Edwards v. Grand Trunk
Ry. Co. (1860), 48 Me. 379, 54 Me. 105;
Ide v. Stanton (1843), 15 Vt. 685, 40
Am. Dec. 698; Downs v. Ros (1840),
23 Wend. (N. Y.) 270; Hanson v. Rolter
(1 85), 64 Wis. 622.

272

CH. VII.] CONTRACT UNDER STATUTE OF FRAUDS. [§§ 294, 295.

2. Contracts of Sale or for the Manufacture of Goods.

§ 294. Statute applies only to contracts for the sale and

not for the manufacture of goods. — The statute of frauds,

by its express terms, applies only to contracts for the sale of

goods, wares and merchandise, and not to contracts for their

manvfacture. In the abstract, the distinction between a con-

tract for the sale of goods and a contract for the manufacture

of goods seems clear enough, but in respect of the application

of this statute the question is one of the most confused and

perplexing in the law. Most goods have to be manufactured,

and the seller is often the manufacturer. If a contract is made

with such a seller for the sale of goods of the kind he makes,

and he happens not to have them already made, he must set

at work to manufacture them. The fact that he will or must

so manufacture them may have been clearly within the con-

templation of both parties at the time they made the contract.

Is the contract, then, one for the manufacture or the sale of

the goods? Suppose, further, that in the particular case the
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goods are not of the kind that the party usually manufactures,

but are to be made in accordance with some special ideas or

needs of the other. Is it now a contract for manufacture or sale?

Suppose, still further, that the goods are such as the maker

never produces except upon the order and to suit the case of

the person who orders them, as in the case of a contract to

supply a set of artificial teeth ; what kind of a contract is this —

for manufacture or sale ?

Quite widely differing views have, not unnaturally, been

taken of these questions, and a full exposition of the subject

can scarcely be made without setting forth at some length a

few of the leading cases. Beginning with the early English

cases, the following will indicate the manner in which the sub-

ject has developed:

§295. English cases — Immediate sale as the test. — In

1724 the case of Towers v. Osborne 1 came before Chief Justice

1 (1724) 1 Strange, 506.

18 273

~§

296, 297.]

LAW Olf SALE.

[n

OK I.

§§ 296, 297.] law of sale. [book r.

Pratt. The report is very brief, and may be reproduced en-

tire. " The defendant bespoke a chariot, and when it was made

refused to take it; and in an action for the value it was ob-

jected that they should prove something given in earnest, or a

note in writing, since there was no delivery of any part of the

goods. But the chief justice ruled this not to be a case within

the statute of frauds, which relates only to contracts for the

actual sale of goods, where the buyer is immediately answer-

able, without time given him by special agreement, and the

seller is to deliver the goods immediately."

§ 296. . This case was said to be " directly in point " in

Clayton v. Andrews, 1 a case which came before Lord Mansfield

in 1767. There the defendant had " agreed to deliver one load

and a half of wheat to the plaintiff within three weeks or a

month from the said agreement, at the rate of twelve guineas

a load, to be paid on delivery; which wheat was understood

Pratt. The report is v ry bri f, and may be rcpro luc d ntire. "The defendant bespoke a chariot, an 1 wh n it was made
refused to take it; and jn an action f r the value it wa objected that they should prove som thing o-i n in arn t or a
note in writing, since th re wa no cl livery of any l art f the
goods. But the chief ju ti e rul d thi not to b a ca e within
the statute of fraud , which relate only to contract for the
actual sale of goods, where the buy r i immediately answerable, without time giv n him by sp ial agre ment, and the
seller is to deliver the good immodiat ly."

by both parties to be at that time unthrashed. No part of the

said wheat so sold was delivered; nor any money paid by way
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of earnest for the same; nor any memorandum thereof made

on writing." The question was whether the contract was

within the statute. The trial judge had held the case not to

be within the statute, relying upon Towers v. Osborne, and the

court of king's bench concurred.

§ 297. . Both of these cases, however, were distinguished

and put on different ground twenty-five years later in Rondeau v.

Wyatt, 2 before Lord Loughborough. The defendant here " had

entered into a verbal agreement to sell and deliver three thou-

sand sacks of flour to the plaintiff, to be put in sacks which the

plaintiff was to send to the mill, and shipped on board vessels

to be provided by him in the river, on an express condition

that the flour should be exported to foreign ports." The ex-

portation proving to be impossible, the defendant refused to

deliver the flour and an action for damages ensued. The de-

fense was based upon the statute of frauds, and the court of

i (1767) 4 Burrows, 2101. 2 (1799) 3 Henry Blackstone, 63.
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§ 296. - - . This ca was ai 1 to be 'directly in point" in
Clayton v. Andrews, 1 a case which cam before Lord :.Mans elcl
in 1767. There the defendant had "agreed to d liver one load
and a half of wheat to the plaintiff within tbr e weeks or a
month from the said agr ement, at the rate of twelve guineas
a load, to be paid on delivery; which wheat was understood
by both parties to be at that time unthrashed. No part of the
said wheat so old was d livered· nor any money paid by way
of earnest for the same; nor any memorandum thereof made
on writing." The question was whether the contract was
within the statute. The trial judge had held the case not to
be within the statute, relying upon Towers v. Osborne, and the
court of king's bench concurred.

§ 297. - - . Both of these cases, however, were distinguished
and put on different ground twenty-five years later in Rondeaitiv.
TVyatt, 2 before Lord Loughborough. The defendant here "had
entered into a verbal agreement to sell and deliver three thousand sacks of flour to tl{e plaintiff, to be put in sacks which the
plaintiff was to send to the mill, and shipped on board vessels
to be provided by him in the river, on an express con<;lition
that the flour should be exported to foreign ports." The exportation proving to be impossible, the defendant refused to
deliver the flour and an action: for damages ensued. The defense was ba eel upon the statute of frauds, and the court of
1 (1767)

4 Burrows, 2101.

2 (1792)

274

2 Henry Blackstone, 63.

CH. VII. J CONTRACT UNDER STATUTE OF FRAUDS. [_§ ^98.

en.

VIL]

COXTRACT

NDER

TATUTE OF FR UDS.

common pleas sustained the defense. Referring to the two

cases already noticed Lord Loughborough said: "The case of

Towers v. Osborne was plainly out of the statute, not because

it was an executory contract, as it has been said, but because it

was for work and labor to be done, and materials and other

necessary things to be found, which is different from a mere

contract of sale, to which species of contract alone the statute

is applicable. In Clayton v. Andrews, which was on an agree-

ment to deliver corn at a future period, there was also some

work to be performed, for it was necessary that the corn should

be threshed before the delivery. This, perhaps, may seem to

be a very nice distinction, but still the work to be performed

in threshing made, though in a small degree, a part of the con-

tract."

§ 298. Impossibility of present delivery as the test —

Goods not in existence. — In lSli the case of Groves v. Buck*

was decided. Here " the defendant agreed by parol to pur-

chase of the plaintiff, for a sum exceeding 1<>/., a quantity of
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oak pins, which were not then made, but were to be cut of slabs

and delivered to the defendant at Weymouth." In an action

for not accepting the pins the statute of frauds was again relied

upon, and the three cases above referred to were cited. Lord

Ellen borough said : " The subject-matter of this contract did not

exist in rerum natura; it was incapable of delivery and of part

common plea u tained the defen e. Reforring to the two
ca e alr ad3 noticed Lor 1 Loughborough said: "The case of
Tower v. 0 oorne was I lainly out of the statute, not becau e
i.t wa an executory ontr ct, as it has been aid, but becau e it
wa for work an l labor to be clone, and materials and other
n c ary thing to b found which i different from a mere
c n ract of le, to ""i hi h pecie of contract alone the tatute
i applicabl . In Clayton v. Andrew. which was on an agree1nent t deliv r corn at a future p riod, there wa al o some
"'" rk t be p rformed, for it wa necess ry that the corn sh uld
b thr bed before the d liv ry. Thi , perhaps, mays em to
b a v ry nice di tinction but tiU the work to be performed
i.n thr shin 0 made, though in a mall degree, a part of the contract."

acceptance, and where that is the case the contract has been

considered as not within the statute of frauds. In Rondeau v.

Wyatt the thing contracted for existed in the very shape and

substance in which it was to be delivered; and it was held that

the circumstance of its being to be shipped on board vessels,

to be provided by the buyer, for exportation, did not take the

case out of the statute. And that is very good sense, for if the

thing be capable of delivery at the time, why is it not done;

but the same reason does not apply where the goods are not

deliverable."

1(1814) 3 Maule & Selwyn, 17a
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§ 29 . - - Impo. ibility of pr . ent d Ii ery a the te t Goocl. not in ex.i ten . - In 1 1± the ca e f GTo e v. B wk 1
w
1 cid d. I r
the def n ant aO'r ed by parol to I urcha e f the plaintiff for a um xce ding ll l., a uantity of
-0ak pin which w r n t th n mad , but were to be cut of slabs
an l leli r d to the l f nclant at eymouth." In an action
for not ace ptin ·the pin th tatute of framl was again reli cl
up n, an l the three ca e bove r f rre l to were cited. Lord
Ell n borough aid: "The ubject-matter of this contract di l not
exi t in rer·wn nutura; it wa in a I able of deliv~ry and of part
ace ptanc and w h re that is the ca e the contract has be n
con id red a not "Within the statute of frauds. In Rondea/l(, v.
W:yatt the thin()' contracted for existed in the very shape and
ub tan e in "Which it wa to be clelivere l · and it was held that
the circum tance of it being to be shipped on board ve ' els,
to be pr vi led by the bu er, for exportation, ·did not tak the
ca e out of the statute. And that is very good sen e, for if the
thing be capable of cl li ery at the time, why is it not done;
but the ame rea on does not apply where the goods are not
deliverable."
1 (1

14) 3 l\Iaule & Selwyn, 178.
275

§§ 299, 300.J

LAW OF

LE.

[B

K

I.

§§ 299, 300.] LAW OF SALE. [book I.

§ 299. . In Garbuttv. Watson, 1 decided in 1822, the same

distinction was made. There it appeared that the plaintiffs,

who were millers, made an agreement with the defendant, a

corn-merchant, for the sale of one hundred sacks of flour at

50s. per sack, to be got ready by the plaintiffs to ship to the

defendant's order. There was no memorandum or earnest. The

flour at the time of the bargain was not prepared, so as to be

capable of being immediately delivered to the defendant. In

an action by the sellers the defense of the statute was inter-

posed and the four preceding cases were discussed. The plaint-

iffs were nonsuited. Abbott, C. J., said : " In lowers v. Osborne,

the chariot which was ordered to be made would never, bat

for that order, have had any existence. But here the plaint-

iffs were proceeding to grind the flour for the purposes of gen-

eral sale, and sold this quantity to the defendant as part of

their general stock. The distinction, indeed, is somewhat nice,

but the case of Towers v. Osborne is an extreme case and ought

not to be carried further. I think this case was rightly de-
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cided, the contract being one for the sale of goods and falling

within the seventeenth section of the statute of frauds." Bay-

ley, J., said: "The nearest case to this is Clayton v. Andrews.

But that decision was, as it seems to me, corrected by Rondeau

v. Wyatt. This was substantially a contract for the sale of flour,

and it seems to me immaterial whether the flour was at the

time ground or not. The question is whether this was a con-

tract for goods, or for work and labor and materials found. I

think it was the former, and if so, it falls within the statute of

frauds." Holroyd, J., said: "I am of the same opinion. I

cannot agree with the judgment of the court in Clayton v. An-

drews. This was a contract for the sale of goods, and there-

fore the verdict was right."

§ 300. Work on one's own materials as test. — In Smith

v. Surman? decided in 1829, it appeared that the plaintiff, who

was the owner of grounds upon which were growing trees which

i (1822) 5 Barn. & Aid. 613, 7 Eng. 2 (1829) 9 Barn. & Cress. 561, 17 Eng.

Com. L. 335. Com. Law, 253, 4 Man. & RyL 455.
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§ 299. - - . In Garbutt v. Wctt on,1 cleci<lecl in 1 2"'"', th

me
distinction was made. There it app arecl that the plaintiff ,
who were millers, made an agreement with the defen lant, a
corn-merchant, for the sale of one hundr d sacks of fl ur at
50s. per sack, to be got ready by the plaintiffs to ship to th
defendant's order. There wa no memorandum or earnest. The
flour at the time of the bargain was not prepared, so as to be
capable of being immediately delivered to the d fondant. In
an action by the sellers the defen e of the statute was int rposed and the four preceding cas were discu. el. The plaintiffs were nonsuited. Abbott, . J., said: "In Tower v. 0 ·borne,
the chariot which wa ordered to be made \Y uld n
r, but
for that order, have had any xi tence·.
ut here the plaintiffs were proceedinO' to grind the flour for the purpo es of o·eneral sale, and sold this quantity to the def n lant as part of
their general stock. The di tinction, indeed, is somewhat nice,
but the case of Towers v. Osborne is an extreme case and ouo·ht
not to be ·carried further. I think this case was rightly decided, the contract being one for the sale of goods and falling
within the seventeenth section of the statute of frauds." Bayley, J., said: "The nearest case to this is Clayton v. A.ndr ws.
But that decision was, as it seems to me, corrected by Rondeau
v. Wyatt. This was substantially a contract for the sale of flour,
and it seems to me immaterial whether the flour was at the
time ground or not. The question is whether this was a contract for goods, or for work and labor and materials found. I
think it was the former, and if so, it falls witb'in the statute of
frauds." Holroyd, J., said: " I am of the same opinion. I
cannot agree with the judgment of the court in Clayton v. Andrews. This was a contract for the sale of goods, and therefore the verdict was right."

§ 300. - - Work on one's own materials as test.- In Smith
v. Srurma1n, 2 decided in 1829, it appeared that the plaintiff, who
was the owner of grounds upon which were growing trees which
I (1822) 5 Barn. & Ald. 613, 7 Eng.
2 (1829) 9 Barn. & Cress. 561, 17 Eng.
Com. L. 335.
Com. Law, 253, ~ 1\fan. & Ryl. 455.
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he desired removed, had ordered them cut down. "While the

work was going on and after part had been felled, defendant

orally bargained for the timber at so much per foot, and the

trees felled and to be felled were numbered. The defendant

also gave some instructions as to the manner of cutting. The

defendant afterwards refused to take the timber, alleging its

unsoundness. In an action for his failure to take and pay for

the timber the defendant relied upon both the fourth and the

seventeenth sections of the statute. The court of king's bench

held that this was not a contract for the sale of an interest

in lands, and was therefore not within the provisions of the

fourth section, but that it was a contract of sale within the

purview of the seventeenth section. Bayley, J., said : " It seems

to me that the true construction of the bargain is, that it is a

contract for the future sale of the timber when it should be in

a state fit for delivery." The vendor, so long as he was felling-

it and preparing it for delivery, was doing work for himself

and not for the defendant. Garbutt v. Watson is in point." After
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recalling the facts in that case he proceeded: "I think, there-

fore, that the contract in this case was only a contract for the

sale of goods, wares and merchandise within the seventeenth

section of the statute, and that there ought to have been a note

or memorandum of it in writing, or a part acceptance, earnest

or part payment." Parke, J., after referring to Groves v. Buck

and Garbutt v. Watson, said: "The true question in such cases

is as to whether the contract be substantially a contract for

the sale of goods, or for work and labor and materials found.

In this case the contract was substantially a sale of goods, viz.,

timber at so much per foot."

§ 301, Whether work or materials is the essence of

the contract, as test. — In 1856 the case of Clay v. Yates 1

came before the court of exchequer. It appeared there that

the plaintiff had orally agreed to print for defendant a treatise

on military tactics, furnishing the paper and printing five hun-

dred copies, at a certain price per sheet. The book was to con-

1 (183fi) 1 Hurl. & Norm. 73.
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he l ired rem ved, bacl or lered tbem cut down. While the
work was 0 oing on an l aft r part ha<l been felled, d f ndant
orally bargaine l for the timber at so much per foot, and tbe
trees f 11 l and to be f Ile 1 were numbered. The defen fant
also a e some in truction a to the manner of cutting. The
def n lan t aft nYar l refu ed to take th timber, alleging its
un un ln
In an action for hi failure to take anu pay for
th timb r the defen 1ant r li d upon both the fourth an 1 the
v nt nth
tion f th tatute. The ourt of kino·' b:.lnch
h 1 that thi i.va not
ontra t for the a.le of an interest
in land an l wa th refor n t within the rovi ion of the
f urth
ction, ut that it wa a contra t of sale within the
pur i w of th
v nt nth cti n.
a31 y J., ai 1: It e ms
t me that the tru con tru tion of the bargain i , that it is a
ntr t fort e futur ... ale of the timb r wh n it hould b in
tate fit for deliv ry: T vendor, s 1 ng as he wa f llin 0 •
it an l pr p ring it for d livery, was oin0 work for him elf
an<l not f r the d f n ant.
arbutt v. Wat on is in I int." Aft r
rec lling the facts in that ase h pr ce d d: "I think, th ref or tbat the contract in thi ca wa only a contract for the
sale of goo l , war s and m rcbantli within th seventeenth
e tion of the tatut , and that there ought to have been a note
r m morandum 0£ it in writinO', or a part ace ptance, earne t
or part payment." arlr J., after ref rring to Groves v. B ,uck
an Garb'lttt v. Watson, said: The true u tion in such cas s
is as to whether the contract be sub tantially a contract for
the ale 0£ goo ls, or for work and labor and materials found.
In thi case the contract wa ub tantially a sale of goods, viz.,
timber at so much per foot."

§ 301. - - "het her work or m aterials i t h e e ence of
th e cont r act, as te t . - In 1856 the case of Olay v. Yates 1
came before the court of exchequer. It appeared there that
th plaintiff had orally agr ed to print for defendant a treatise
on military tactics, furni bing the paper and printing five hundred copi s, at a certain price per sheet. The book was to conI

(1 311) 1 Hurl. & Norm. 73.
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tain a dedication to Sir William Napier. When the plaintiff

began printing, this dedication had not been written, but was

afterwards supplied and put in type before plaintiff had notice

of it. When plaintiff came to read the proof of the dedication,

he found it to contain libelous matter, and refused to print it.

The defendant would not pay for the treatise without the dedi-

cation, and the action was brought to recover for printing the

treatise. The defense, among other things, was that the con-

tract was for the sale of goods within the seventeenth section.

Pollock, C. B., with whom the otherjudges concurred, said:

" The first question is, whether this is a contract for the sale of

goods within the seventeenth section of the statute of frauds,

and I am of opinion that it is properly a contract for work,

labor and materials. « . : It may happen that part of the

materials is found by the person for whom the work is done,

and part by the person who does the work; for instance, the

paper for printing may be found by the one party, while the

ink is found by the printer. In such cases it seems to me that
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the true criterion is, whether work is the essence of the con-

tract, or whether it is the materials supplied. My impression

is, that in the case of a work of art, whether in gold, silver,

marble or plaster, where the application of skill and labor is

of the highest description, and the material is of no importance

as compared with the labor, the price may be recovered as

work, labor and materials. No doubt it is a chattel that was

bargained for, and, if delivered, might be recovered as goods

sold and delivered, still it may also be recovered as work, labor

and materials. Therefore it appears to me that this is prop-

erly a contract for work, labor and materials. I am inclined to

think that it is only where the bargain is for goods thereafter

to be made, and not where it is a mixed contract for work and

materials to be found, that Lord Tenterden's Act (9 Geo. IV.,

ch. 14) applies; and the reason why no cases on this subject are

found in the books is that, before Lord Tenterden's Act passed,

the statute of frauds did not apply to the case of goods not

actually made or fit for delivery. I think, therefore, that the

objection does not arise."
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tain a dedication to Sir William Napier. Wh n the plaintiff
began printing, this dedication had not been written, but wa
afterwards supplied and put in tyre before plain tiff had notice
of it. When plaintiff came to read the proof of the dedication,
he found it to contain libelous matter, and refused to print it.
The defendant would not pay for the treatise without the dedication, and the action was brought to recover for printing the
treatise. The defense, among other things, was that the contract was for the sale of goods within the seventeenth section.
Pollock, 0. B., with whom the other .judges concurre l, ail:
"The first question is, whether this is a contract for the sale of
goods within the seventeenth section of the statute of frauds
and I am of opinion that it is properly a contract for work,
labor and materials.
: It may happen that part of the
materials is found by the person for whom the work is done,
and part by the person who does the work; for instance, the
paper for printing may be found by the one party, while the
ink is found by the printer. In such cases it seems to me that
the true criterion is, whether work is the essence of the contract, or whether it is the materials supplied. ~Iy impres ion
is, that in the case of a work of art, whether in gold, silver,
marble or plaster, where the application of skill and labor is
of the highest description, and the material is of no importance
as compared with the labor, the price may be recovered as
work, labor and mc-1.teeials. No doubt it is a chattel that was
bargained for, and, if delivered, might be recovered as goods
sol<l and delivereu, still it may also be recover cl as work: labor
and materials. Therefore it appears to me that this is properly a contract for work, labor and materials. I am inclined to
think that it is only where the bargain is for goods thereafterto be made, and not where it is a mixed contract for work and
materials to be found, that Lord Tenterdcn's Act (9 Geo. IV.,
ch. 14) applies; and the reason why no cases on this subject are
found in the books is that, before Lord Tenterd n's Act passed,
the statute of frauds did not apply to the ca e of goods not
actually made or fit for delivery. I think, therefore, that theobjection does not arise."
278
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§ 302. The present English test — Whether the sub-

ject-matter is a chattel to be afterwards delivered. — In 1861

arose the case of Lee v. Griffin} which has since been regarded

as declaratory of the rule in English courts, and which has had

a marked influence upon judicial thought in the United States.

The plaintiff, a dentist, sued to recover the price of two sets

of artificial teeth ordered by a lady who had died before they

could be fitted. The defendant was her executor. The dec-

laration was for goods bargained, sold and delivered, and for

work and labor done and material furnished. The defense

was that the contract was not for labor and material, but for

the sale of a chattel, and therefore void under the seventeenth

section of the statute of frauds. This defense was sustained.

Crompton, J., said: 2 "When the contract is such that a chat-

tel is ultimately to be delivered by the plaintiff to the defend-

ant, when it has been sent, then the cause of action is goods

sold and delivered. . . . I do not agree with the proposi-

tion that whenever skill is to be exercised in carrying out the
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contract that fact makes it a contract for work and labor, and

not for the sale of a chattel; it may be the cause of action is

for work and labor when the materials supplied are merely

ancillary, as in the case put of attorney or printer. But in the

present case the goods to be furnished, viz., the teeth, are the

principal subject-matter; and the case is nearer that of a tailor,

who measures for a garment and afterwards supplies the article

fitted." Hill, J., said: "When the subject-matter of the con-

tract is a chattel to be afterwards delivered, then the cause of

action is goods sold and delivered, and the seller cannot sue

for work and labor;" and Blackburn, J., said: "If the con-

tract be such that it will result in the sale of a chattel, the

proper form of action, if the employer refuses to accept the ar-

ticle when made, would be for not accepting. But if the work

and labor be bestowed in such a manner as that the result

1 (1861) 1 Best & Smith, 272, 30 L. Journal Reports, which differ some-

Jour. R. (Q. B.) 252. what in form, but not in substance,

2 These quotations are made from from the report in Best & Smith,

the reports of the case in the Law
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§ 302. - - The present EngIi h test- w·110ther the subject-matter i. a chattel to be afterwards delivered.- In 1 61
arose the ca e of L ee v. G1·ij/zn, 1 which has since been regarded
as declaratory of the rule in Engli h court , an l which has ha l
a marked influence upon ju licial thought in the United Stat s.
The plaintiff, a denti t, sued to recover the price of two sets
of artificial teeth ordered by a lady who had died before they
could be fitted. The def ndant was her executor. The d claration was for goods bargained, sold and delivered, and for
work and labor done and material furni hed. The d f nse
was that the contract was not for labor an l material, but for
th sal of a chattel, an ther fore void under the sevent en th
ection of the tatute of fraud . This def n e was sustaine l.
rompton J. aid: 2 "
hen the contract is such that a chatt 1 i ultimat ly to b d liY r l by the plaintiff to the defendant, ' hen it ha b n sent, th n the cau e of action is goods
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I o not agree with the proposition that wb nev r skill is t b exercised in carrying out the
ontra ·t that fact make it a ontract for work and labor, and
not for th ale of a chatt 1; it may be the cause of action is
for work an l labor when the materials supplied are merely
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pre ent case the
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would not be anything which could properly be said to be the

subject of sale, then an action for work and labor is the proper

remedy. ... I do not think that the relative value of the

labor and of the materials on which it is bestowed can in any

case be the test of what is the cause of action; and that if

Benvenuto Cellini had contracted to execute a work of art for

another, much as the value of the skill might exceed that of

the materials, the contract would have been nevertheless for

the sale of a chattel."

§ 303. . Mr. Benjamin expressed surprise "that a rule

so satisfactory and apparently so obvious " should not have

been earlier suggested, and concludes: "From the very defini-

tion of a sale, the rule would seem to be at once deducible

that, if the contract is intended to result in transferring for a

would not be anything which could properly be said to be the
subject of sale, then an action -for work and labor is the proper
remedy.
I do not think that the relative value of th
labor and of the materia.ls on which it is bestowed can in any
case be the test of what is the cause of action; and that if
Benvenuto Cellini had contracted to execute a work of art for
another, much as the value of the skill might exceed that of
the materials, the contract would have been nevertheless for
the sale of a chattel."

price from A to B a chattel in which A had no previous prop-

erty, it is a contract for the sale of a chattel, and unless that

be the case there can be no sale." l

§ 304:. American cases — The rule in New York. — In New
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York, on the other hand, entirely opposite conclusions are

reached, following the rule of stare decisis, though the court

admit that the modern English doctrine is at once philosophical

and comprehensible. In Cooke v. Millard, 2 the defendants ver-

bally ordered lumber of the plaiutiffs, to be taken from certain

lots designated by defendants in plaintiffs' yard, and to be cut

by plaintiffs into sizes required by defendants and placed on

plaintiffs' dock. Notice was then to be given to defendants,

who were thereupon to remove it. Plaintiffs prepared the

lumber, placed it upon the dock, and notified defendants as

§ 303. - - . 1fr. Benjamin expressed surprise "that a rule
so satisfactory and apparently o obvious" should not have
been earlier suggested, and concludes: "From the very d finition of a sale, the rule would seem to be at once deducible
that, if the contract is intended to result in transferring for a
price from A to B a chattel in which A bad no previous property, it is a contract for the sale of a chattel, and unless that
be the case there can be no sale." l

agreed, but before it was removed the lumber was destroyed by

accidental fire. It was held that the contract was one of sale.

§ 305. . After statino- the English and the Massachusetts

§ 3C4:. American cases - The rule in 'New York.- In New

rule, the court, speaking through the late Professor T. W.

Dwight, Commissioner, said: "The New York rule is still dif-

1 Benjamin on Sales, § 103. 2 65 N. Y. 352, 22 Am. R. 619.
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York, on the other hand, entirely opposite conclusions are
reached, following the rule of stare decisis, though the court
admit that the modern English doctrine is at once philosophical
and comprehensible. In Cooke v. Mitlard,2 the defendants verbally ordered lumber of the plaintiffs, to be taken from certain
lots de ignated by defendants in plaintiffs' yard, and to be cut
by plaintiffs into sizes required by defendants and placed on
plaintiffs' dock. Notice was then to be given to defendants,
who were thereupon to remove it. Plaintiffs prepared the
lumber, placed it upon the dock, and notified defendants as
agreed, but before it was removed the lumber was destroyed by
accid ntal fire. It was held that the contract was one of sale.

§ 305. - - . After stating the En_glish and the 1fassachusetts
rule, the court, speaking through the late Professor T. W.
Dwight, Commissioner, said: "The New York rule is still dif1 Benjamin

on Sales,§ 103.

2
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65 N. Y. 352, 22 Am. R. 619.
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fercnt. It is held here by a long course of decisions, that an

agreement for the sale of any commodity not in existence at

the time, but which the vendor is to manufacture or put in a

condition to be delivered, such as flour from wheat not yet

ground, or nails to be made from iron belonging to the manu-

facturer, is not a contract of sale. The New York rule lays

stress on the word sale. There must be a sale at the time the

contract is made. The latest and most authoritative expres-

sion of the rule is found in a recent case in this court, Par-

sons v. Loueks. 1 The contrast between Parsons v. Zoucks, in

this State, on the one hand, and Lee v. Griffin? in England, on

the other, is, that in the former case the word sale refers to

the time of entering into the contract, while in the latter ref-

erence is had to the time of delivery as contemplated by the

parties. If at that time it is a chattel, it is enough, according

to the English rule. Other cases in this State agreeing with

Parsons v. Zoucks are Crook-shank v. Burrell? Sewall v. Fitch^

Robertson v. Vaughn, 5 and Parker v. Schenck* These cases are
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based on certain old decisions in England, such as Towers v.

Osborne? and Clayton v. Andrews? which have been wholly

discarded in that country.

1 48 N. Y. 17, 8 Am. R 517. mined, though upon a wrong prin-

2 1 B. & S. 272. ciple, as has since been held both by

8 18 Johns. (N. Y.) 58, 9 Am. Dec. the common pleas and the king's

187. bench."

< 8 Cow. (N. Y.) 215. In Crookshank v. Burrell (1820), 18

5 5 Sandf. (N. Y.) 1. Johns. 58, 9 Am. Dec. 187, the same

6 28 Barb. 38. was held of a contract to make and

7 1 Strange, 506. deliver a wagon at a future day.

8 4 Burr. 2101. In Downs v. Ross (1840), 23 Wend.

The leading case in New York is 270, the contract was for the delivery

Sewall v. Fitch (1828). 8 Cow. 215. of wheat, part being then in granary

The contract was for a quantity of and part unthrashed; that in granary

nails not then on hand, but which was to be cleaned again and the rest

fercnt. It i held here by a long course of deci ions that an
agreement for the ale of an. commodity not in exi tence at
the time but which the ven loris to manufacture or put in a
condition to be d livered, uch as flour from wheat not yet
ground or nails to be made from iron belonging to the manufacturer, i not a contract of sale. The New York rule lays
stre on the word sale. There mu t be a sale at the time the
contract is made. The latest and mo t authoritative expr ssion of the rule is found in a recent ca e in this court, Parons v. Louck .1 The contrast bet\ een Par ons v. Louck , in
thi tate on the one ban 1, and Lee v. Gnjfin,2 in England on
the oth r, i , that in the former ca e the \-vord ale refer to
the time of nt ring into the contract, while in the latter reference i ha l to the time of delivery a contemplated by the
parti
If at that time it i a chattel it is enough, accordin 0
to the Et\:,lish rule.
th r case in thi
tate agreeing with
P a1' on v. L oucks are Crook lwnk v. B 'urrell, 3 ewall v. Fitcli, 4
Roue'l't on v. Vaughn 5 an Parker v. clienck. 6 These case are
ba ed on certain old d ci ions in England, such as Towers v.
layton v. AndJ'ews, which have been wholly
0 borne 7 an
discar ed in that country.

the seller said "could soon be knocked thrashed. Held, to be a contract of

off " and sent on the opening of navi- sale within the statute. Bronson, J.,

gation. Held, to be a contract for said of the cases cited to the contrary, '

work and labor, and therefore not that, "with a single exception, they

within the statute. Savage, C. J., all relate to contracts for the sale of

said: "Towers v. Osborne and Clay- a thing not then in existence, but

ton v. Andrews were rightly deter- which was to be constructed or man-
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14 N. Y.1, Am. R. 517.
mined, though upon a wrong prin21 B. & . '>72.
ciple, as has ince been held both by
318 John (N. Y.) 58, 9 Am. Dec. the common plea and the king's
bench."
1 7.
4 Cow. (N. Y.) 215.
In Crook hank v. Burrell <1 '>0), 18
s 5 · ndf. (N. Y.) 1.
John. 5 , 9 Am. Dec. 1 7, the ame
s2 Barb. 3.
wa held of a contract to make and
71 trange, 506.
deliver a wagon at a future day.
8 4 Burr. 2101.
In Down v. Ro s (1 40), 23 \Vend.
The leading ca e in New York is 270, the contract wa for the delivery
Sewall v. Fitch (1 2 ).
Cow. 21-. of wheat, part being then in granary
The contract wa for a quantity of andpartunthra bed; that in granary
nail not then on hand, but which wa to be cleaned again and the re t
the eller said" coulu oon be knocked thra hed. Held, to be a contract of
off" and ent on the opening of navi- sale within the tatute. Bron on, J.,
gation. Held. to be a contract for aid of the ca e cited to the contrary,
" ·ork and labor, and ther~fore not that 'with a ingle exception, they
within the tatute. Savage, C. J., all relate to contract for the ale of
said: "Tower v. 0 borne and Clay- a thing not then in existence, but
ton v. Andrews were rightly 'deter- which was to be constructed or man281
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"The case at bar does not fall within the rule in Parsons v.

Loucks. The facts of that case were, that a manufacturer

agreed to make for the other party to the contract two tons of

book paper. The paper was not in existence, and so far as it

LAW OF SALE.

[n

K I.

"The case at bar ]oes not fall within the rul in Par· on. v.
Lou,ck . The facts of that ca e wer , that a manufa tur r
agreed to make for the other party to the contract two ton of
book pap r. The paper was not in existence, and so far as it

ufactured by the vendor." Citing as a general article of merchandise.

the cases of the chariot (Towers v.

Osborne), the oak pins (Groves v.

Buck), the wagon (Crookshank v.

Burrell), the buggy (Mixer v. How-

arth. 21 Pick., Mass., 205), and the

nails (Sewall v. Fitch). The excep-

tion in Clayton v. Andrews he pro-

nounced overruled. Cowen, J., dis-

sented.

In Seymour v. Davis (1848), 2 Sandf.

239, a contract to sell and deliver
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cider in future, to be procured from

farmers and refined by the seller,

was held within the statute.

In Passaic Mfg. Co. v. Hoffman

(1871), 3 Daly, 495, is a review of this

subject by Daly, C. J., in which he

says : " It may be stated as the result

of several well-considered cases that

where the contract is for an article

coming under the general denomina-

tion of goods, wares and merchandise,

and it is made with one who sells

that kind of commodity to all who

traffic in it, the quantity required and

the price being agreed upon, it is a

contract of sale, and that it in no

way affects the character of the con-

tract, in such a case, whether the

manufacturer and vendor has, when

the order is given, the requisite

quantity on hand or has to manu-

facture it afterward. . . . But if

what is clearly contemplated by the

agreement is the skill, labor, care or

knowledge of the one who fabricates

the article or commodity, or if it

would not' have been produced if the

order had not been given for it, or if,

when produced, it is unfitted for sale

being adapted for use only by the

person ordering it, then the contract

is one for work and labor and is not

within the statute."' He doubted

Sewall v. Fitch, and pronounced

Downs v. Ross "still more doubtful *'

and now repudiated. Robertson v.

Vaughn, 5 Sandf. 1, and Donovan v.

Willson, 26 Barb. 138, were also de-

clared to be discredited since Smith

v. New York Cent. R. Co., supra.

This was followed in Flint v. Corbitt

(1876), 6 Daly, 429, where the defend-

ant selected some unfinished furni-

ture and ordered it covered in a cer-

tain material to be supplied by the

plaintiff. This was held to be a sale

within the statute.

In Kellogg v. Witherhead, 6 Thomp.

& C. 525, the same was held of a con-

tract to buy hams to be smoked.

" The plaintiffs were not to make the

ufactured by the vendor." Citing
the case of the chariot (Towers v.
Osborne), the oak pin (Groves v.
Buck ), the wagon (Crookshank v.
Burrell), the buggy (l\lixer v. Howarth. 21 Pick., .Ma ., 205), and the
nails (Sewall v. Fitch). The exception in Clayton v. Andrews he pronounced overruled. Cowen, J., di sented.
In Seymour v. Davi · (1 4 ), 2 Sandf.
239, a contract to sell and deliver
cider in future, to be procured from
farmer and refined by the seller,
wa held within the tatute.
In Pa aic 1\Ifg. Co. v. Hoffman
(1 i 1), 3 Daly, 495, is a review of thi
subject by Daly, C. J., in which he
says: "It may be stated a the re ult
of eYeral w 11-con ·idered ca e that
where the contract is for an article
coming under the general denomination of good , ware and merchandi e,
and it i made with one who ells
that kind of commodity to all who
traffic in it, the quantity required and
the price bcling agreed upon, it is a
contract of sale, and that it in no
way affect the character of the contract, in such a case, whether the
manufacturer and vendor has, when
the order i · given, the requi ite
quantity on hand or has to manufacture it afterward. . . • But if
what is clearly contemplated by the
agreement i the skill, labor, care or
knowledge of the one who fabricates
the article or commodity, or if it
would not have been produced if the
order had not been given for it, or if,
when produced, it is unfitted for sale

as a general article of merchandi e,
being adapted for u e only by the
per on ordering it, then the contract
is one for work an labor and i not
within the statute." He doubte l
Sewall v. Fitch, and pronounced
Down v. Ro " till more doubtful ''
and now repudiated. Robert on v.
Vaughn, 5 andf. 1, and Donovan v.
Will on, 26 Barb. 13 , were also declared to be di. credited ince mith
v. New York Cent. R. o., supra.
Thi wa followed in Flint v. orbitt
(1 76), 6 Daly, 429, ·where the d fendant elected some unfini bed furmture and ordered it covered in a certain material to be upplied by the
plaintiff. This wa held to be a ale
within the statute.
In Kelloggv. \Vitherhead,6Thomp.
& C. 5'>5, the same was held of a contract to buy ham · to be smoked.
"The plaintiff were not to make the
ham ; they were to moke them."
In 1\Iead v. Ca e (1 60), 33 Barb. 20'>,
the agreement was for a monument,
the piece of which had been put together, but which the plaintiff was to
poli ·h, letter and fini h. Held, not
within the statute. The court said:
"It is very plain, I think, that the
monument bargained for was to be
afterwards made by the plaintiff's
labor and skill, and had no existence
as such at the time of the bargain.
. . . It is precisely this labor and
skill that was neces ary to convert it
into the monument which the plaintiff agreed to furnish. Without this,
it wa. no monument whatever, certainly not to the defendant's deceased
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appears, not even the rags, 'except so far as such existence

may be argued from the fact that matter is indestructible.' So

in St wall v. Fitch, sttpra, the nails which were the subject of

the contract were not then wrought out, but were to be made

and delivered at a future day.

" Nothing of this kind is found in the present case. The

relatives. A monument is something with certain alterations and fixtures,

designed and constructed to perpetu-

ate the memory of some particular

appears, not even the rags, 'except o far as such existence
may be argued from the fact that matter is indestructible.' o
in ewall v. Fitcli, sitpra., the nails which were tbe subject of
the contract were not then wrought out, but were to be made
and delivered at a future day.
" othin 0 of this kind js found in the present case. The

person or event. Before the material

was polished and the inscriptions

engraved upon it, it was a mere

structure of stone, blank and mean-

ingless. It was not this stone, in this

condition, that the defendant bar-

gained for; if it had been, the con-

tract would most likely have been
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within the statute. What he bar-

gained for was the necessary labor

and skill to convert this stune into

an enduring memorial of the dead.

This labor and skill did not convert

the stone into any article of general

merchandise, but into the particular

thing bargained for. For any other

purpose the valuable material had

been wholly destroyed. It was then

entirely unfitted for a sale to any

other person; or for any other pur-

pose." Daly, C. J., in the case of

Passaic Mfg. Co. v. Hoffman, pro-

nounces this reasoning conclusive:

on the other hand, Dwight, C, in

Cooke v. Millard, supra, pronounces

it a "border case." Smith, J., dis-

sented.

In Bates v. Coster (1874), 1 Hun,

400, an agreement to buy a stallion

colt, to be operated upon and kept by

the plaintiff till he got well, was

held within the statute. The court

doubted Mead v. Case.

In Fitzsimmons v. Woodruff, 1

Thorn p. & C. 3, a contract for a mar-

ble mantel, to be put up in a house

was held within the statute.

In Donnell v. Hearn, IT N. Y. Wkly.

Dig. 4G3. a contract to manufacture

certain lamps of a peculiar and un-

usual pattern was held not within

the statute. So in Pierce v. Bourton,

17 N. Y. Wkly. Dig. 444, of a contract

to imitate certain woven goods in

felt, of a kind not usually dealt in by

the plaintiff.

In Smith v. N. Y. Cent. R. Co., 4

Keyes. 180, it was held that a con-

tract for the delivery of wood to be

relatives. A monumenti omething
d igned and constructed to erpetuate the m mory of ome particular
p er on ore nt. Before the material
wa poli bed and the in cription
engr v d upon it, it wa a mere
tructure of tone, blank and meaningle . It wa not thi tone, in thi
nd1tion, that the d fendant bargained for· if it had been, the contra t would mo t likely ha\e be n
within th
tatute. What e bargain d f r "a he n ce ary lab r
and kill to conv rt thi tone into
an nduring memorhtl of the d ad.
Thi. lab r and kill did not on v rt
the ~tone into ny arti l f eneral
merchandi e, but into th particular
hing barg ined f r. For any other
pnrpo e th 'aluabl m· t rial had
been wholly d tr ye . It wa. then
ntirely unfitted for a . ale to any
ther per on; or for any o her purpo e. ' Daly, C. J., in the ca e of
Pa ~ aic 1\Ifg. Co. v. Hoffman pronounces thi rea oning conclu fre;
on the other hand, Dwight, . in
ooke v. Iillard, supra, pronounce
it a "bord r ca e.'
mith, ~-, di ented.
In Bate '· Co ter (1 74), 1 Hun
400, an agreement to buy a tallion
·ol , to be operated upon and kept by
the plain tiff till he got well, wa
held within the tatute. The court
doubted l\Iead v. Ca e.
In Fitz immon v. Woodruff 1
Thomp. & . 3 a contract for a marble mantel, to be put up in a hou e

with certain alteration and fixtures,
wa held within the tatute.
In Donnell v. Hearn, 1 N. Y. Wkly.
Dig. 463, a con ract to manufacture
certain lamp of a peculiar and unu ual patt rn wa held not "·i hin
the tatute. o in Pierce v. Bourton,
17 N. Y. Wkly. Dig. 444, of a contract
to imitate ertain woven good in
felt, of a kind not u ually dealt in by
the plain tiff.
In , mi h v. ~. Y. Cent. R. Co., 4
Keye . 1 , it wa held that a contract for th deli very of wood to be
u from tanding tree is within the
tatute.
iting Down v. Ro , and
arbutt v. \ at on, and , mith v. urman, 9 B. & C. 61, a prec' ely imilar
ca. e. The court, b vV oodruff, J.,
id: There would eem no very
en ible rea on for holding, with
reference to two -verbal contract
with wagon maker for the purcba e
and deli ery of t"·enty wagon on a
future day named, that one is void
becau e the wagon maker ha the
wagon on hand and the other is
valid becau e the other wagon maker
mu t manufacture them in order to
their delivery at the time appointec.l.
Without however di regarding the
ca e which hold that where the subtance of the contract is work and
labor to be done in converting material into a new and totally different
article, it i not within the fatute,
we may ay that there is no ju t n
tion of manufacture involved in an
agreement to delfrer a specified num-

cut from standing trees is within the

statute. Citing Downs v. Ross, and

( rarbutt v. Watson, and Smith v. Sur-

man, 9 B. & C. 561, a precisely similar

case. The court, by Woodruff, J.,

said: "There would seem no very

sensible reason for holding, with

reference to two verbal contracts

with wagon makers for the purchase

and delivery of twenty wagons on a
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lumber, with the possible exception of the clapboards, was all

in existence when the contract was made. It only needed to

be prepared for the purchaser — dressed and put in a condition

to fill his order. The court, accordingly, is not hampered in

the disposition of this cause by authority, but may proceed

upon principle.

" Were this subject now open to full discussion upon princi-

ple, no more convenient and easily understood rule could be

adopted than that enunciated in Lee v. Griffin. It is at once

so philosophical, and so readily comprehensible, that it is a

matter of surprise that it should have been first announced at

so late a stage in the discussion of the statute. It is too late

to adopt it in full in this State. So far as authoritative decis-

ions have gone, they must be respected even at the expense of

sound principle. The court, however, in view of the present

state of the law, should plant itself, so far as it is not precluded

from doing so by authority, upon some clearly intelligible

ground, and introduce no more nice and perplexing distinc-
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tions. I think that the true rule to be applied in this State is,

ber of cords of firewood; no change In Higgins v. Murray, 73 N. Y. 252.

in the thing sold and to be delivered a contract to make circus tents, ma-

is contemplated. The circumstance terials to be furnished by the plaint-

that it stands in the woods at the iff, was held not within the statute.

time involves nothing more than a In Hinds v. Kellogg, 13 N. Y. Supp.

necessity to cut it, that it may be 922, 133 N. Y. 536, 30 N. E. R. 1148, a

delivered. In this respect it is not contract to furnish circulars, to be

different from a purchase and agree- used exclusively in the business of

ment to deliver wood of a prescribed the person ordering them, was held

length, split into pieces of convenient not within the statute. To the same

size, the parties knowing and intend- point see Pelletreau v. United States

lumber, with the possible exception of the clapboards, was all
in existence wh n the contract was made. It only needed to
be prepared for the purchaser - dres d and put in a condition
to fill bis order. The court, accordingly, is not hamper d in
the disposition of this cause by authority, but may proce cl
upon principle.
''Were this subject now open to full discus ion lipon principle, no more convenient and easily understood rule could be
adopted than that enunciated in L ee v. Griffin. It is at once
so philosophical, and so r adily comprehensible, that it is a
matter of surprise that it should have been first announced at
so late a stage in the discussion of the statute. It is too late
to adopt it in full in this State. So far as authoritative decisions have gone, they must be respected even at the expense of
sound principle. The court, however, in view of the pres nt
state of the law, should plant itself, so far as it is not precluded
from doing so by authority, upon some clearly intelligible
ground, and introduce no more nice and perplexing distinctions. I think that the true rule to be applied in this State is,

ing that delivery shall be had of wood Electric Light Co., 34 N. Y. Supp. 125,

already cut, but of a greater length 13 Misc. 237.

and not split at all." But in Killmore In Warren Chemical Co. v. Hol-

v. Howlett, 48 N. Y 569, while a brook, 118 N. Y 586, 23 N. E. R. 908,

similar contract was held not to be 16 Am. St. R. 788, a contract for the

for the sale of an interest in lands, sale and delivery of patent roofing,

the court said it was "rather a con- to be thereafter manufactured and

tract by the defendant to bestow delivered, was held not within the

work and labor upon his own ma- statute, relying on Parsons v. Loucks,

terial, and deliver it in its improved 48 N. Y 17, 8 Am. R. 517.

condition to the plaintiff."
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ber of cords of firewood; no change
In Higgins v. Murray, 73 N. Y. 252,
in the t.hing sold and to be delivered a contract to make circus tents, mais contemplated. The circumstance terials to be furnished by the plaintthat it stands in the woods at the iff, was held not within the statute.
time involves nothing more than a
In Hinds v. Kellogg, 13 N. Y. Supp.
necessity to cut it, that it may be 922, 133 N. Y. 536, 30 N. E. R. 1148, a
delivered. In this respect it is not contract to furnish circulars, t o be
different from a purchase and agree- used exclusively in the business of
ment to deliver wood of a prescribe l the person ordering them, was held
length, split into pieces of convenient not within the statute. To the same
size, the parties knowing and intend- point see Pelletreau v. United States
ing that delivery shall be had of wood Electric Light Co., 34 N. Y. Supp. 125,
alr ady ·ut, but of a greater length 13 Misc. 237.
and not split at all." But in Kill more
In Wanen Chemical Co. v. Holv. Ho"·lett, 48 N. Y. 569, while a brook, 118 N. Y. 586, 28 N. E. R. 908,
similar contract was held not to be 16 Am. St. R. 788, a contract for the
for the sale of an interest in lan ls, sale and delivery of patent roofing,
the court said it was "rather a con- to be thereafter manufactured and
tract by the defendant to be tow delivererl, was held not within the
work and labor upon his ovvn ma- statute, r lying on Parsons v. Loucks,
terial, and deliver it in i ts improved 48 N. Y. 17, 8 Am. R. 517.
condition to the plaintiff."
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that when the chattel is in existence, so as not to be governed

by Parsons v. ZoueJcs, supra, the contract should be deemed to

be one of sale, even though it may have ordered from a seller

who is to do some work upon it to adapt it to the uses of the

purchaser. Such a rule makes but a single distinction, and

that is between existing and non-existing chattels. There will

still be border cases where it will be difficult to draw the line,

and to discover whether the chattels are in existence or not.

The mass of the cases will, however, readily be classified. If,

on further discussion, the rule in Lee v. Griffin should be found

most desirable as applicable to both kinds of transactions, a

proper case will be presented for the consideration of the leg-

islature."

§ 306. The Massachusetts rule. — In Massachusetts a

somewhat middle ground is taken, well illustrated in the case

of Goddard v. Binney. 1 There the defendant had orally or-

dered of the plaintiff, a manufacturer, a buggy of a certain

kind, and gave full instructions as to its construction and finish.
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The plaintiff made the buggy in all respects as ordered, and

when it was completed he notified the defendant and sent him

a bill for the price. Plaintiff sent again for a check for the

amount, and defendant said he would pay it soon, and would

see the plaintiff. Plaintiff sent a third time, and defendant re-

plied that he would " come and see him right away." While

matters were in this condition, the buggy was destroyed by

accidental fire. Plaintiff finally brought this action for the

price. The defense was the statute of frauds, but the contract

was held not to be within the statute.

§ 307. . In pointing out the distinction which prevails

in Massachusetts between the English rule on the one hand,

and the New York rule on the other, Ames, J., said :

" According to a long course of decisions in Xew York and

in some other States of the Union, an agreement for the sale

of any commodity not in existence at the time, but which the

1 (1874) 115 Mass. 450, 15 Am. R, 112.
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vendor is to manufacture or put in a condition to be delivered

(such as flour from wheat not yet ground, or nails to be made

from iron in the vendor's bands), is not a contract of sale within

the meaning of the statute. 1 In England, on the other hand,

the tendency of the recent decisions is to treat all contracts of

such a kind intended to result in a sale, as substantially con-

tracts for the sale of chattels; and the decision in Lee v. Griffin 2

goes so far as to hold that a contract to make and fit a set of

artificial teeth for a patient is essentially a contract for the sale

of goods, and therefore is subject to the provisions of the

statute. 3

"In this Commonwealth, a rule avoiding both of these ex-

tremes was established in Mixer v. Uowarthf and has been rec-

ognized and affirmed in repeated decisions of more recent date.

The effect of these decisions we understand to be this, namely,

that a contract for the sale of articles then existing, or such as

the vendor in the ordinary course of his business manufactures

or procures for the general market, whether on hand at the
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time or not, is a contract for the sale of goods, to which the

statute applies. But on the other hand, if the goods are to be

manufactured especially for the purchaser, and upon his special

order, and not for the general market, the case is not within

the statute. 5 ' The distinction,' says Chief Justice Shaw in Lamb

v. Crafts? ' we believe is now well understood. When a per-

son stipulates for the future sale of articles which he is habitu-

ally making, and which at the time are not made or finished,

it is essentially a contract of sale, and not a contract for labor;

otherwise, when the article is made pursuant to the agreement.'

In Gardner v. Joy, 1 a contract to buy a certain number of boxes

i Citing Crookshank v. Burrell. 18 B. & Aid. 321: Baldey v. Parker, 2

Johns. (N. Y.) 58, 9 Am. Dec. 187; B. & C. 37; Atkinson v. Bell, 8 B. &

Sewall v. Fitch, 8 Cow. (N. Y.) 215; C. 277.

Eobertson v. Vaughn, 5 Sandf. (N. Y.) 4 21 Pick. (Mass.) 205, 32 Am. Dec.

1: Downs v. Ross, 23 Wend. (N. Y.) 256.

270; Eichelberger v. McCauley, 5 H. 8 Citing Spencer v. Cone, 1 Mete.

& J. (Md.) 213, 9 Am. Dec. 514. (Mass.) 283.

2 1 B. & S. 272. 6 12 Mete. (Mass.) 353.

3 Referring to Maberley v. Shep- "• 9 Mete. (Mass.) 177.

pard, 10 Bing. 99; Howe v. Palmer, 3
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vendor is to manufacture or put in a condition to be deli v reel
(such as flour from wheat not yet ground, or nails to be made
from iron in the vendor' hand ), i not a contract of sale within
the meaning of the statute. 1 In England, on the other hand,
the tendency of the recent decisions is to treat all contract of
such a kin cl intenued to result in a sale, a substantiall v contracts for the sale of chattels; and the decision in Lee v. Griffin:?
goes so far as to hold that a contract to make and fit a set of
artificial teeth for a patient is es entially a contract for the sale
of goods, and therefore is subject to the provi ions of the
statute. 3
"In this Commonwealth, a rule avoiding both of these extremes was established in .Jiixer v. llowarth, 4 and has been recognized and affirmed in repeated decision of more recent date.
The effect of these decisions we understand to be this, namely,
that a contract for the sale of articles then existing, or such as
the vendor in the ordinary course of his business manufactures
or procures for the general market, whether on hand at the
time or not, is a contract for the sale of goods, to which the
statute applies. But on the other hand, if the goods are to be
manufactured especially for the purchaser, and npon his special
order, and not for the general market, the case is not within
the statute. 5 'The distinction,' says Chief Justice Shaw in Lamb
v. Crafts, 6 'we believe is now well understood. When a person stipulates for the future sale of articles which be is habitually making, and which at the time are not made or finished,
it is essentially a contract of sale, and not a contract for labor;
otherwise, when the article is ma<le pursuant to the agreement.'
In Gardner v. Joy,7 a contract to buy a certain number of boxes
l Citing Crookshank v. Burrell. 18
Johns. (N. Y.) 58, 9 Am. Dec. 187;
Sewall v. Fitch, 8 Cow. ( . Y.) 215;
Robertson v. Vaughn, 5 Sa.ndf. (N. Y.)
1; Downs v . Ross, 23 Wend. (N . Y .)
270; Eichelberger v. McCauley, 5 H.
& J. ( Id.) 213, \) m. Dec. 514.
21 B. & . 272.
3 Referring to Maberley v.
heppard, 10 Bing. 99; Howe v. Palmer, 3

B. & Ald. 321; Baldey v. Parker, 2
B. & C. 37; Atkinson v. Bell, 8 B. &

c. 277.
4 21

Pick. (l\lass.) 205, 32 Am. Dec.

256.
5 Citing Spencer v. Cone, 1 Mete.
(Mas.) 2 3.
6 12 Mete. (Mas .) 353.
7 9 Mete. (Mass.) 177.
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of candles at a fixed rate per pound, which the vendor said he

would manufacture and deliver in about three months, was

held to be a contract of sale and within the statute. To the

same general effect are Waterman v. Meigs l and Clark v. Nich-

ols} It is true that in ' the infinitely various shades of differ-

UCush. (Mass.) 497.

2 107 Mass. 547.

The leading case in Massachusetts

of candles at a fixed rate per pound, which the Yenclor said be
would manufactur and deliver in about three months, was
held to be a contract of ale and within the tatute. To the
same general effect are Watennan v . .Meigs 1 an] Olm·k v. Nichol .2 It is true that in 'the infinitely various shades of differ-

is Mixer v. Howarth (1838), 21 Pick.

205, 32 Am. Dec. 256, where the con-

tract was for a carriage in the seller's

possession, unfinished, and which he

was to finish and line with a certain

lining selected by the buyer. This

was held not within the statute.

Shaw, C. J., said: "Where the con-

tract is a contract of sale, either of
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an article then existing or of articles

which the vendor usually has for

sale in the course of his business, the

statute applies to the contract, as

well where it is to be executed at a

future time as where it is to be exe-

cuted immediately. But where it is

an agreement with a workman to

put materials together and construct

an article for the employer, whether

at an agreed price or not, though in

common parlance it may be called a

purchase or sale of an article to be

completed infuturo, it is not a sale

until an actual or constructive de-

livery or acceptance, and the remedy

for not accepting is on the agree-

ment." Citing Sewall v. Fitch, 8

Cow. (N. Y.) 215; Cooper v. Elston, 7

T. R. 14.

In Lamb v. Crafts (1847), 12 Mete.

353, where one whose business was

collecting raw tallow and preparing

it for market agreed to " furnish "

another in the future with a certain

quantity of prepared tallow, held,

within the statute. Shaw, C J., said:

-Where a person stipulates for a

28'

future sale of articles which he is

habitually making, and which, at

the time, are not made or finished,

it is essentially a contract of sale,

and not a contract of labor; other-

wise when the article is made pursu-

ant to the agreement.*'

In Clark v. Nichols, 107 Mass. 547,

the contract was to deliver ash build-

ing stuff and plank, the logs to be

sawed into plank at the buyer's di-

rection. Held, within the statute.

In Gardner v. Joy (1845). 9 Mete.

177, A asked B what he would take

for candles; B said he would take

twenty-one cents per pound; A said

he would take one hundred boxes:

B said they were not made, but he

would make and deliver them in the

course of the summer. Held, within

the statute. Shaw, C. J., said: "If

it is a contract to sell and deliver

future sale of articles which he is
habitually making, and which, at
the time, are not made or finished,
it is e entially a contract of ale,
and not a contract of labor; otherwi e when the article is made pur uant to the agreement.''
In lark v. i: icbol , 107 Mass. 547,
the contract wa to deliver a h building tuff and plank, the log to be
sawed into plank at the buyers direction. Held, within the tatute.
In ardner Y. Joy (1 ±-). 9 )1etc.
177, A a keu B what he would take
for candle ; B aid he would take
twenty-one cent per pound: A saiJ.
he would take one hundred boxe :
B ~ aid they were not made, but he
would make and deliver them in the
our e of the ummer. Held, within
the statute.
haw. C. J., aid: "If
it i a contract to sell and deliv r
good whether they are then completed or not, it i within the tatute. But ff it i a ontract to make
and deliv ran article or quantity of
good., it i not within the statute."
o, in \Vaterman v. Meig (1 4:9) 4
Cu h. 497, au agreement for t.he delivery of a quantity of planks. for
. hip-building, at a future time, wa
held "-ithin the tatutE>.
In Smalley v. Hamblin rl89 ), 110
)fa . 3 0, 49 N. E. R. 626, it i held
that where there is an under tarnlin er that the article are not to be
manufactured by the vendor, but are
to be procured by him of ome other
per on who manufacture and ' ells
them, and are to be delivered by tho

14 Cu, b. (l\Ia .) 497.
2107 l\Ia . 547.
The leading ca e in l\Ia achu etts
i - Mixer v. Howarth (1 3 ), 21 Pick.
205. 30 Am. Dec. 2J6 where th
ontract wa for a arriage in he ·eller'
po e ion, unfini. hed, and which he
wa to fini h and line with a certain
lining elected by the buyer. Thi
was held not within the tatute.
l haw, C. J., said: "Where the contract i a contra t of ale, either of
an article th n xi ting or of article
which the vendor u ·ually ha for
. ale in the cour e of hi bu ine the
tatute appli
to the contra t, as
well where it i to be executed at a
future time a where it i to b xecuted immediately. But where it i
an agr ement with a workman to
put material together and con truct
an article for the employer, whether
at an agreed price or not, tbouo-h in
ommon parlance it may be called a
purcha e or ale of an article to be
completed in futuro. it is not a ale
until an actual or con tructi ve delivery or acceptance, and the remedy
for not accepting i on the agreement." Citing Sewall v. Fitch,
Cow. (N. Y.) 215; Cooper v. El ton, 7
T. R. 14.
In Lamb v. Crafts (1 ~47), 1'> ~Ietc.
3;-3, where one who
bu ine. wa
collecting raw tallow and preparing
it for market agreed to "furni h"
another in the future with a certain
quantity of prepared tallow, held,
within the statute. Shaw, C. J., aid:
·'·where a person tipulates for a
2

j
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ALE.
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§§ 308, 309.] LAW OF SALE. [book I.

ent contracts,' there is some practical difficulty in disposing of

the questions that arise under that section of the statute. But

we see no ground for holding that there is any uncertainty in

the rule itself. On the contrary, its correctness and justice

are clearly implied or expressly affirmed in all of our decisions

upon the subject-matter. It is proper to say also that the

present case is a much stronger one than Mixer v. Ilowarth.

In this case the carriage was not only built for the defendant,

but in conformity in some respects with his directions, and at

his request was marked with his initials. It was neither in-

tended nor adapted for the general market. As we are by no

means prepared to overrule the decision in that case, we must

therefore hold that the statute of frauds does not apply to the

contract which the plaintiff is seeking to enforce in this action."

§ 308. The rule in Vermont. — In a recent case 1 in

Vermont the court had before it a contract for the construction

of a monument to be erected for the State of Minnesota upon

the battle-field at Gettysburg. The court held the contract to
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be not within the statute, and declared its preference for the

Massachusetts rule, saying: " Under this rule the test is, not

the non-existence of the article at the time of the bargain, as

in New York, nor whether the contract will result in the sale

ent contracts,' there is ome practical diffi ulty in di p ing of
the que tions that ari e un ler that section f the statu .
ut
we see no groun l for hol ling that there i any unc rtaint. in
the rule itself. On the contrary, its corr tness arnl ju tice
are clearly implied or xpres ly affirmed in all of our d ci ion
upon th ubject-matter. It is proper to say also that th
present case i a much stroncr r one than j]Jixer v. llowartli .
In thi case the carriage was not only built for the d f n<lant,
but in conformity in some r p t with his irection , and at
his request was mark l with hi initials. It was n ith r intended nor adapted for the g n ral mark t.
s we are by no
means I repared to overrule the dec ision in that ca , we must
therefore bold that th tatute of frauds does not appJy to the
contract which the plaintiff is se king to enforce in this action."

of a chattel, as in England, but whether the goods are such as

the vendor, in the ordinary course of his business, manufact-

ures or procures for the general market, or whether they are

manufactured especially for the vendee, and on his special

order, and not for the general market, and for which they are

neither intended nor adapted."

§ 309. The rule in Oregon. — So in a late case 2 in Ore-

gon an oral contract to manufacture and furnish iron work for

vendor to the purchaser for an agreed land of the vendor, who was to tear

price as completed articles of mer- it down and deliver it in the condition

chandise, the transaction is a sale of timber,— the contract was held

within the statute of frauds. not within the statute. Scales v.

i Forsyth v. Mann (1896). 68 Vt. 116, Wiley, 68 Vt. 39, 33 Atl. R. 771.

34Atl. R. 481,32L.RA.788. The same 2 Heintz v. Burkhard (1896), 29

conclusion is reached where one Oreg. 55, 43 Pac. R 866, 31 L. R A.

bought a building situated on the 508.
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§ 308. - - The rule in Vermont.- In a recent case 1 in
Vermont the court ha befor it a contract for the con truction
of a monument to be erected for the State of :Minnesota upon
the battle-field at Getty burg. The court held the contract to
be not within the statute and declared its preference for the
~1assachus tts rule, saying: "Under this rule the test i's, not
the non-exi tence of the article at the time of the bargain, as
in New York, nor whether the contract will result in the sale
of a chattel, as in England, but whether the goods are such as
the vendor, in the ordinary course of his business, manufactures or procures for the general market, or whether they are
manufactured _especially for the vendee, and on his special
order, and not for the general market, and for which they are
neither intended nor adapted."

§ 309. - - The rule in Oregon.- So in a late case 2 in Oregon an oral contract to manufacture and furnish iron work for
vendor to the purcha er for an agr eed land of the vendor, who was to tea r
vrice a completed article of mer- it down and deliver it in the condition
chandi ·e, the transaction is a sale of timber,-the contract was held
within the tatute of fraud .
not within the statute. Scale v.
I Forsyth v. Mann (1 96). 68 Vt. 116, Wiley, 68 Vt. 39, 33 Atl. R. 771.
34Atl. R. 4 1,32L. R. A. 7 . The ame
2 H eintz v. Burkhard (1 96), 29
conclu ion i r each ed where one Oreg. 55, 43 Pac. R. 866, 31 L. R. A..
bough t a building situated on the 50 .
288

Cn. VII.] CONTRACT UNDER STATUTE OF FRAUDS. [§§ 310,311.

IT.

II.

J

CONTRA.CT UNDER STATUTE OF FR.AUDS.

[§§ 310, 311.

a brick building according to special designs and measurements

and suitable for use on that particular building was held not

to be a contract of sale within the statute. The court declared

the Massachusetts rule to be the one most widely adopted in

the United States, but found it unnecessary to express a pref-

erence as between it and the New York rule, as the case would

be excluded from the operation of the statute under either

rule,— under the New York rule as being for an article not in

existence when the contract was made, and under the Massa-

chusetts rule as an article made upon special design and not

such as the manufacturer usually produced. Lee v. Griffin

was repudiated.

g 310. The rule in Washington and Michigan.— Like

results, for like reasons, were reached in Washington. 1 And

in Michigan, a contract for the painting of a portrait, not or-

dered as a chattel having any marketable value, was held not

to be a contract of sale within the statute. 2

§ 311. The rule in Maine and New Hampshire.— Still
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a different rule has been laid down in Maine and New Hamp-

shire, based upon the element of the delectus persona supposed

a brick uilding accordinO' to spe ial designs and measm~ements
an l suit ble f r us on that I articular building was held not
to be a ntract f sale within th statute. The court de lared
the 1\Ia a hus tt rule to be the on mo t wi l ly adopted in
th
tat , but foun l it unnec s cry to XI r ss a prefr nc as b tw nit and th
w York rule, as the case woul l
x lu 1 l fr m th op ration f the tatut und r ither
rul , - un ler th
w 1'. ork rul s b inO' for an article not in
xi t nc w n th contract wa ma l and un l r the a ahu tt rule as an arti le ma le upon ·p ial d ign and not
uch a the manufacturer u ually produced. L ee v. Griffin
was r pmliat d.

to exist in the contract of the parties. Thus in the leading

case in Maine, 3 Shepley, J., laid down the rule as follows: " If

i Fox v. Utter (1893), 6 Wash. 299, mould," is not for a sale (Abbott

33 Pac. R 354 (a monument case); v. Gilchrist, 38 Me. 260); nor is a con-

Puget Sound Machinery Co. v. Rigby tract to manufacture barrel-staves

(1895), 13 Wash. 264, 43 Pac. R. 39. out of a particular lot of timber at

2 Turner v. Mason (1887), 65 Mich, so much per thousand. Crockett v.

662, 32 N. W. R. 846. Scribner, 64 Me. 447. On the other

3 Hight v. Ripley, 19 Me. 137, where hand, a contract to take " all the

31 .
f
in Ii hi
cl r d
t be
c

--Th rul in lVa hhwton ancl Michicran.-Like
r lik r a n " r r ach d in Wa hinbt n. 1
nd
· n, a ntra t f r th paintin of a p rtrait not orch tt 1 h, in any mark tabl . valu , wa h 11 not
ntra t f al within th st tute. 2

a contract by defendants " to furnish wood the plaintiff would put on the

as soon as practicable from one thou- line of the road that season " was

sand to one thousand two hundred held a contract of sale, as no ele-

malleable iron hoe-shanks, agreeable ment of personality or particular

to patterns left with them on terms," method of manufacture entered into

etc., was held not a contract of sale. it. Edwards v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co.,

So a contract "to procure and de- 48 Ma 379; s. C, 54 Me. 105. And a

liver, at a certain time and place, contract " for the delivery, and not

one-half of a frame for a vessel, to for the manufacture and delivery,

in Main ancl Jew Hamp hire.- till
a iff r nt rul h b n 1 i l l wn in aine an l r w Ilampl UI n th l m nt of the d ,z tu p er 01 ce uppo ed
ntr- t of th I arti . Thus in the 1 ading
xi t in the
., la.id <l wn th rule as f llow : "If

be hewn and fashioned according to of blocks which may have been man-

19 2S9

1 Fox v. Utter (1 93), 6 Wa h. 999,
3 a . R 3,-4 (a monum nt a e);
un Machinery ~o. . icrby
u t
(1 9-) 13 Wa b. 64, 43 Pa . R 39.
~Turn r v. fa on (1 7), 65 1ich.
69, 39 N. \ . R. 4.6.
3 Hight v. Ripl
19 l\I . 137 where
a ontra by def ndant "t furni h
a
n a pra ti able from one thouand to on th usand two hundred
mall all iron hoe- hank , agr able
to patt rn l ft wi h th m on term , '
t ., wa. h ld not a ontract of sale.
o a on tra t "to pro cur and deJi r, at a ertain time and place,
ne-lialf of a frame for a v sel, to
be hewn and fa hioned according to
19
2

mould," is not for a ale (Abbott
v. il hri t, 3 Ie. 260); nor i a contra t to manufactur barrel- tave
out of a particular lot of timber at
o much p r thou ·and. Cro kett v.
ribner, 64 'l:e. 447. On the other
band, a contract to take ' all the
ood the plaintiff would put on the
line of the road that ea on ' wa
held a ontract of ale, a no element of p r nality or particular
m tbod of manufacture entered into
it. Edward v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co.,
48 Ie. 379; s. c., 54 Ie. 105. .And a
contract "for the delivery, and not
for the manufa ture and delivery,
of blocks which may have been man~
9

~ ::31~.J
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K

I.

§ 312.] LAW OF SALE. [BOOK I.

the contract be one of sale it cannot be material whether the

article be then in the possession of the seller or whether he

afterward procure or make it. A contract for the manufacture

of an article differs from a contract of sale in this: The person

ordering the article to be made is under no obligation to re-

ceive as good or even a better one of the like kind purchased

from another and not made for him. It is the peculiar skill

and labor of the other party combined with the materials for

which he contracted and to which he is entitled. Hence it

has been said that if the article exist at the time in the condi-

tion in which it is to be delivered, it should be regarded as a

contract for sale."

§ 312. . In an early Xew Hampshire case, 1 Bellows, J.,

says: "If a person contract to manufacture and deliver at a

future time certain goods, at prices then fixed or at reasonable

prices, the essence of the agreement being that he will bestow

his own labor and skill upon the manufacture, it is held not to

be within the statute. If, on the other hand, the bargain be
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to deliver goods of a certain description at a future time and

the contract b one of sal it cannot be material wh th r th
articl be then in the l o
"'ion of the s 11 r or w ther h
afterward procure or make it.
contract f r the manufa tur
of an arti le diff r from a c ntra t £ al in thi : Th I r n
orcl ring the arti 1 to be ma l i und r n obliO'ati n t rec iv as g ocl or 'T n ab t r one f the lik kind I ur ha l
from another and not mad for him. It i th l uliar skill
and labor of th othrr I art Tc mbined with th mat ri" 1 f r
which be contract l and t whi h h 1 ntitl d. II nc it
has been aid that if th arti 1 xi t t th tim in th con lition in \Ybich it i to be d liYer d, it should be r g rcled as a
con tract for sale. '

they are not existing at the time of the contract, but the seller

does not stipulate to manufacture them himself or procure a

particular person to do so, the contract is within the statute.

The distinction is that in the one case the party stipulates that

he will himself manufacture the article, and the buyer has the

right to require him to do it, and cannot be compelled to take

one as good, or even better, if made by another; while, in the

other case, the seller only agrees to sell and deliver the article,

ufactured at the time," is a contract their non-delivery it was held that

of sale and within the statute. Fick- it was a question for the jury to de-

ett v. Swift, 41 Me. 65, 66 Arn. Dec. termine whether under the contract

214. the defendant was bound to raise

1 Pitkin v. Noyes, 48 N. H. 294, 2 the potatoes himself — in which case

Am. R. 218. In this case plaintiff it would be a contract for work,

made a parol contract with defend- labor and materials, and not within

ant, whereby the latter was to raise the statute — or whether he might

three acres of potatoes and deliver procure them by purchase or other-

them to plaintiff at a stipulated wise — which would render it a con-

price per bushel In an action for tract of sale and therefore void.

290

§ 312. - - . In an arly T w rr amp hir
Hows, J.,
say : "If a p r n contra t to manufactur and d liv r at a
future tim c rtain O' d at pric th n fix I r at r a onabl
price , the e n of th aO'r m nt bein that h will b tow
his own labor and kill upon th rnanufactur , it is h ld not to
be within the tatut . If, n th
th r ban 1, the bargain be
to c1 liver good of a c rtain cl cription at a future time and
they are not exi ting at th time of the contract, but the seller
does not tipolate to manufacture them him elf or procure a
particular person to do o the contract is within the statute.
The d1stinction is that in the one ca e the party stipulates that
he will himself manufacture the article, and the buyer has the
right to require him to do it and cannot be compelled to take
one a good, or even better if made by another; while, in the
other case, the seller only agrees to sell and deliver the article,
ufactured at the time," is a contract
of sale and within the tatute. Fickett v. Swift, 41 1\fe. 65, 66 Am. Dec.
214.
I Pitkin v. Noyes, 48 N. H. 294, 2
Am. R. 21 . In this case plaintiff
made a parol contract with defendant, whereby the latter was to raisA
three acres of potatoes and clelirnr
them to plaintiff at a stipulated
price per bushel. In an action for

their non-delivery it was held that
it -was a que tion for the jury to det ermine whether under the contract
the defendant was bound to raise
the potatoes himself - in which case
it would be a contract for work.
labor and materials, and not within
the statute-or whether he might
procure them by purchase or otherwise-which would render it a con.tract of sale and therefore void.
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OH. VII.] CONTRACT UNDER STATUTE OF FRAUDS. [§§ 313, 314-.

and is under no obligation to make it himself but may purchase

it of another."

§ 313. . In a later case, 1 in the same State, however,

the court applied the English rule, Foster, J., saying: "Where

the contract is for a chattel to be made and delivered, it clearly

is a contract for the sale of goods. In such case the party sup-

plying the chattel cannot recover for his labor in making it.

If the contract be such that when carried out it would result

in the sale of a chattel, the party cannot sue for labor; but if

the result of the contract is that the party has done work and

labor which end in nothing that can become the subject of a

sale, the party cannot sue for goods sold and delivered. 2 . . ,

Where the contracting parties contemplate a sale of goods, al-

though the snbject-matter at the time of making the contract

does not exist in goods, but is to be converted into that state by

the vendor's bestowing labor on his own raw materials, that

is a case of a contract of sale within the statute of frauds." 3

314. The rule in Wisconsin and California. — In
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Wisconsin 4 the court approves the early English cases prior to

Lee v. Griffin,) which they deem to have been controlled by

Lord Tenterden's Act. and lavs down the rule as follows: "That

while an executory contract for the sale of an article for the

1 Prescott v. Locke, 51 N. II. 94, 12 materials, and not for the def end-

Am. R. 55. Here it was held that ant-.'* Citing Smith v. Surman, 9 B.

a contract by defendant to buy of & C. 561.

plaintiff all the spokes he should 2 Citing Lee v. Griffin, 1 B. & S.

manufacture at his mill, not more 272.

than one hundred thousand in all, 3 Citing Garbutt v. Watson. 5 B. &

was a contract of sale. "The true Aid. 613; Smith v. Surman, supra.

(•.instruction in this case." said the 4 Meincke v. Falk. 55 Wis. 4','7. 13

court, "is that the contract was for X. W. R. 545. 42 Am. R. 722. This

the future sale of the spokes when case contains a very exhaustive re-

they should be in a state fit for de- view of the authorities. See also

livery. The vendor," so long as he Hardell v. McClure, 2 Pin. (Wis

was sawing the timber and doing s. c. 1 Chand. (Wis.) 271; Central

any other work preparing it for de- Lith. & Eng. Co. v. Moore, 75 Wis.

livery in the form of spokes, was 170, 6 L. R. A. 788; Goodland v. Le

doing work for himself upon his own Clair, 7 V Wis. 170. 47 N. W. R. 268.

291
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price of fifty dollars or more may be within the statute, not-

withstanding such article does not at the time exist in solido y

yet where such contract is to furnish materials and manufact-

ure the article according to the specifications furnished or a

model selected, and when without the special contract the

thing would never have been manufactured in the particular

manner, shape or condition it was, then the contract is essen-

tially for special skill, labor or workmanship, and is not within

the statute."

§ 315. . In California the court adopts the rule as laid

down in "Wisconsin, and in almost the same language. 1

§ 316. The rule in New Jersey. — In New Jersey 2 the

rules are said to be, "First. That a contract for the sale of goods

which is purely executory is as much within the statute as is-

prjce of fifty dollars or more may be within the tatute, notwithstanding such article does not at the time exi t in solido,
yet where such contract is to furnish materials and manufacture the article according to the specifi ations furnished or a
model selected, and when without the pecial contract th
thing would never have been manufactured in the particular
manner, shape or condition it was, then the contract is essentially for special skill, labor or workman hip, and is not within
the statute."

one to be executed in prcesenti. Second. That where a contract

is made for an article not existing at the time in solido, and

when such article is to be made according to order, and as a,

thing distinguished from the general business of the maker,
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then such contract is in substance and effect not for a sale,

§ 315. - - . In California the court adopts the rule as laid
down in vVisconsin, and in almost the same language. 1

but for work and materials."

1 Flynn v. Dougherty, 91 Cal. 669, alterations were made in them by

14 L. R. A. 230, 27 Pac. R. 1080. the plaintiffs at defendants' request,

2 Finney v. Apgar, 31 N. J. L. 266, and while they were still on plaint-

which was a contract for the sale of iffs' premises, a painter, employed by

a quantity of spokes which the de- the defendants, painted their name

fendant was to "get out." Held, and business on the trucks. De-

within the statute. Pawelski v. Har- fendants refused to pay for the»

greaves, 47 N. J. L. 334, 54 Am. R. 162. trucks when the money was de-

In this case the defendants went to manded before they were taken

the shop of plaintiffs, who were from the plaintiffs' premises. In an

wagon and carriage makers, to pur- action for damages, held, that the

chase brewery trucks. Plaintiffs, contract was within the statute,

not having any on hand, ordered The whole subject is again elabo-

them with defendants' assent from rately considered in Mechanical

makers in another town, and, when Boiler Cleaner Co. v. Kellner (1899),

§ 316. - - The rule in New Jersey.-In New Jersey 2 the
rules are said to be, "First. That a con tract for the sale of goods
which is purely executory is as much within the statute as is
one to be executed in prcesenti. 8 cond. That where a ci:mtract
is made for an article not existing at the time in solido, and
when such article is to be made accor ling to order, and as a.
thing distinguished from the general business of the maker,
then such contract is in substance and effect not for a sale,
but for work and materials."

the trucks arrived, plaintiffs ac- 62 N. J. L. 544, 43 AtL R. 599.

cepted and paid for them. Some
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Flynn v. Dougherty, 91 ('.al. 669, alterations were made in them by
14 L. R. A. 230, 27 Pac. R. 1080.
the plaintiffs at defendants' reque t,
2 Finney v. Apgar, 31 N. J. L. 266,
and while they were till on plaintwhich was a contract for the sale of iffs premises, a painter, employed by
a quantity of spokes which the de- the defendants, painted their name
fendant was to "get out." Held, and business on the trucks. Dewithin the statute. Pawelski v. Har- fendants refused to pay for the
greaves, 47 N. J. L. 334, 54 Am. R. 162. trucks when the money was deIn this case the defendant went to manded before they were taken
the shop of plaintiffs, who were from the plaintiffs' premises. In an
wagon and carriage makers, to pur- action for damages, held, that the
chase brewery trucks. Plaintiffs, contract was within the statute.
not having any on hand, ordered The whole subject is again elabothem with defendants' a sent from rately considered in Mechanical
makers in another town, and, when Boiler Cleaner Co. v. Kellner (1899),
the trucks arrived, plamtiffs ac- 62 N. J. L. 544, 43 AtL R. 599.
cepted and paid for them. Some
292
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«H. VII.] CONTRACT UNDER STATUTE OF FRAUDS. [§§ 317-319.

cH. vn.]

CONTRACT U TDER STATUTE OF FRAUDS.

[§§ 317-319.

§ 317. The rule in New Mexico.— In a New Mexico

.case * the court said that " the result of the doctrine declared

b}^ the greater part of the decisions seems to be that when the

work and labor is to be performed upon materials belonging to

the vendor, and the chattel, when completed, is to be delivered

to the vendee, or when, the materials being the property of the

vendor, the goods ordered are of the kind usually manufactured

by him, and which he generally sold in the ordinary course of

business, the contract is within the statute.

" But when the materials belong to the person to whom the

goods are to be delivered when completed, and the other party

is simply to expend his skill and labor upon them for the use

of the owner, or where the goods to be made are of a special

kind which the maker could not sell, unless the person order-

ing them should take them, the contract is without the stat-

ute."

§ 318. The rule in Colorado.— In a late case 2 in Colo-

rado the court held a contract for the purchase and sale of a
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number of hemlock ties within the statute, although they were

to be prepared from standing timber. The court says: " This

was not essential to the contract; the goods might just as well,

conformably with the contract, have been obtained by pur-

chase ; " and asserts the rule that the true criterion is the con-

dition of the goods at the date fixed for delivery.

| 319. The rule in Minnesota.— In a recent Minnesota

case, 3 where the contract was for the furnishing of certain

glass work in the reconstruction of a building, and the evidence

§ 317. - - The rule in New Mexico.- In a New J\1:exico
-case 1 t he court said that "the result of the doctrine declared
by t he greater part of the decisions seems to be that when the
work and labor is to be performed upon materials belonging to
the vendor, and the chattel, when completed, is to be delivered
to the vendee, or when, the materials being the property of the
vendor, the goods ordered are of the kind usually manufactured
by him, and which he generally old in the ordinary course of
bu ine , the contract is within the statute.
"But when the materials belong to the person to whom the
oods are to be delivered when completed, and the other party
i imply to xpend his skill and labor upon them for the use
-of the own r, or where the goods to be made are of a special
kind which the maker could not sell, unless the person ordering them should take them, the contract is without the statute."

showed that some labor would be necessary upon the materials,

as cutting and beveling the plate-glass, setting it in frames and

31 . - - The rule in Colorado.- In a late case 2 in Oolo-

cutting the other glass into sheets of the proper size, before the

goods would be ready for use about the building, the court

held that the contract was not one for the sale of goods within

i Orman v. Hagar, 3 N. Mex. 568, 9 3 Brown & Haywood Co. v. Wun-

Pac. R. 363. der, 64 Minn. 450, 67 N. W. R. 357.

2 Ellis v. Denver, etc. Ry. Co., 7

Colo. App. 350.
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ra lo the court held a contract for the purchase and sale of a
number of hemlock ties within the statute, although they were
to be prepared from standing timber. The court says: "This
was note ential to the contract; the goods might just as well,
-conformably with the contract, have been obtained by pur-0hase;" an asserts the rule that the true criterion is the con·<lition of the goods at the date fixed for delivery.

319. - - The rule in Minnesota.- In a recent Minnesota
<ease, 3 where the contract was for the furnishing of certain
glass work in the reconstruction of a building, and the evidence
showed that some labor would be necessary upon the materials,
as cutting and beveling the plate-glass, setting it in frames and
-cutting the other glass into sheets of the proper size, before the
goods would be ready for use about the building, the court
held that the contract was not one for the sale of goods within
1 Or man

v. Hagar, 3 N.

l[e:x. 56 , 9

-Pac. R. 363.
2 Ellis

3 Brown & Haywood Co. v. Wunder, 64 Minn. 450, 67 N. W. R. 357.

v. Denver, etc. Ry. Co., 7

Colo. A pp. 350.
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the statute, " but was a contract for the manufacture of articles

of special and peculiar design, not suitable for the general

trade." As authority for this position the court cites a very-

early case l in the same State, in which, after an exhaustive re-

view of the authorities, an identical conclusion is reached.

In this latter case the plaintiff orally agreed to prepare and

fit, for putting up in a specified place, four portable houses; he

was only to fit the materials and not to put up the houses. The

court said that the contract was not one for the sale of goods,

and cites with approval the rule laid down by Mr. Parsons, 2

that if the contract states or implies that the thing is to be

made by the seller, blending the price of the thing, and the

compensation for materials, work, labor and skill indiscrimi-

nately, it is not a contract of purchase and sale within the stat-

ute, but is one of hiring and service.

§ 320. The rule in Missouri. — In a recent case 3 in

Missouri the subject is very fully examined, and the following

rule is formulated : " That, where the contract is for articles-
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coming under the general denomination of goods, wares and

merchandise, the vendor being at the same time a manufacturer

and a dealer in them as a merchant, or, so dealing, has them

manufactured for his trade by others; and the vendee being

also a merchant dealing in and purchasing the same line of

goods for his trade, of which fact the vendor is aware; the

the statute," but was a contract for the manufacture of articl s
of special and peculiar design, not suitable for the general
trade." As authority for this position the court cites a very
early case 1 in the same State, in which, a.fter an exhaustive review of the authorities, an identical conclusion is reached.
In this latter case the plaintiff orally agreed to prepare and
fit, for putting ~p in a specified place, four portable houses; he
was only to fit the materials and not to put up the houses. The
court said that the contract was not one for the sale of goods,.
and cites with approval the rule laid <lown by 1ilr. Parson ,z
that if the contract states or implies ·that the thing is to be
made by the seller, blen<ling the price of the thing, and the
compensation for materials, work, labor anJ. skill indiscriminately, it is not a contract of purchase and sale within the statute, but is one of hiring and service.

quantity required and the price being agreed upon, and the

§ 320. - - The rule in Missouri.- In a recent case 3 in

goods contracted for being of the same general line which

the vendor manufactures or has manufactured for his general

trade as a merchant, requiring the bestowal of no peculiar

care or personal skill or the use of material, or a plan of con-

struction different from that obtaining in the ordinary produc-

tion of such manufactured goods for the vendor's general stock

in trade, the contract is one of sale, and within the statute of

iPhipps v McFarlane, 3 Minn. 61 sp ra tt v. Miller, 109 Mo. 78, 18 S.

(109). W. R. 965, 32 Am. St. R. 656.

2 Parsons on Contracts, vol. II,

p. 344 [voL III, 8th ed., *p. 54].
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Missouri the subject is very fully examined, and the following
rule is formulated: "That, where the contract is for articles.
coming under the general denomination of goods, wares and
merchandise, the vendor being at the same time a manufacturer
and a dealer in them as a merchant, or, so dealing, has them
manufactured for his trade by others; and the vendee being
also a merchant dealing in and purchasing the same line of
goods for his trade, of which fact the vendor is a ware; the
quantity required and the price being agreed upon, and the
goods contracted for being of the same general line which
the vendor manufactures or has manufactured for his general
trade as a merchant, requiring the bestowal of no peculiar
care or personal skill or the use of material, or a plan of construction different from that obtaining in the ordinary production of such manufactured goods for the vendor's general stock
in trade, the contract is one of sale, and within the statute of
I

Phipps v McFarlane, 3 Minn. 61

(109).
2

3 Pratt v. Miller, 109 Mo. 78, 18 S.
W. R. 965, 32 Am. St. R. 656.

Parsons on Contracts, vol. II,

p. 344 [vol III, 8th ed., *p. 5±].
294

CB. VII.] CONTRACT UNDER STATUTE OF FRAUDS. [§§ 321, 322.

frauds, although the goods are not in solido at the time of the

•contract, but are to be thereafter made and delivered."

§ 321. The rule in Georgia. — In a case 1 in Georgia,

often cited, the cases in which the statute may or may not apply,

and the rules applicable to them, are classified as follows: "All

contracts for the sale of goods, existing at the time in solido,

and capable of immediate delivery, constitute a class about

which there can be no difficulty — they are within the statute,

without a case to the contrary. The other class of contracts

which are equally free from difficult}' are like that in Towers

v. Osborne, where an agreement is made for goods not in esse,

and therefore incapable of immediate delivery, but by the

agreement to be made by the work and labor and with the

material of the vendor, and which, when made, may be reason-

ably presumed to be unsuited to the general market, such as

contracts for the manufacture of goods suited alone to a par-

ticular market, or for the painting of one's own portrait. In

a former class, the contracts are for the sale of goods upon
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which no work or labor is to be bestowed. In the latter class,

the work and labor and material constitute the prime considera-

tion. They are for work and labor, and are, by authority and

upon principle, without the influence of the statute. Ex equo

et bono, a man who agrees to bestow his labor in the manu-

facture of goods for a price, and which price he must lose un-

less the goods are received by him who ordered them, ought to

be paid; and a statute which would protect the purchaser from

liability in such a case, would be alike impolitic and unjust.

§ 322. . "The cases which are difficult of determination

are those which partake in some degree of both the classes

referred to, yet fall decidedly within neither — contracts for

goods upon which some labor must be bestowed to prepare

them for delivery, and which, when ready for delivery, are

vendible in the general market. . . . There really is but

one exception to the operation of the statute, to wit : contracts

1 Cason v. Cheely (1849), 6 Ga. 554

295

§ 323.J
§ 323.] LAW OF SALE. [liOOK I.

for work and labor; and this grows out of the palpable injus-

tice of compelling a man, by law, in any case to lose the price

of his labor. All cases which are not within the reason of this

exception are not within the exception itself. Hence it is

that a contract for goods (cotton bagging or cotton cloth, if

you please) which are of pretty uniform value, of common

consumption, and therefore very generally in demand, with a

manufacturer of these articles, is not within the exception, al-

though not in esse at the time, and to make which work and

labor are necessary. The manufacturer does not necessarily

lose the price of his labor — if the purchaser does not take the

goods, others will — the work and labor bestowed are in the

line of his business, and his work and labor would be bestowed

in the production of such goods had the contract not been

made. The goods and their price are the considerations of the

contract, and not the work and labor and their price. With

greater reason a contract for goods upon which work and labor

must be bestowed, not to make them, but to prepare them for
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delivery, as the threshing of wheat, is not within the exception.

In the light of all these views, the rule which we adopt and

which I find admirably well expressed by Judge Butler in Bird

v. Muhlinbrink, 1 is this: Such contracts only are excluded from

the operation of the seventeenth section of the statute of frauds

' as primarily contemplate work and labor to be done at the

instance of the purchaser and for his use and accommodation,

so as to make the work and labor of the contracting vendor,

or such as he may procure to be bestowed at his expense, the

essential consideration of the contract.' The cases which recog-

nize the principle thus expressed are numerous."

§ 323. The rule in Maryland. — In a late case 2 in this

State, it is said that " from a very early period it has been the

settled law of Maryland, where the statute of Charles has al-

ways been in force, that when work and labor are to be be-

stowed by the vendor upon the article sold before it is to be

1 1 Rich. (S. C.) L. 199, 44 Am. Dec. 2 Bagby v. Walker, 78 Md. 239, 27

247. AtL R. 1033.
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for work and labor; and this grows out of the palpable injustice of comr elling a man, by law, in any case to lose the price
of his labor. All case which are not within the reason of this
exception are not within the exception itself. 1 ence it is
that a contract for goods (cotton bagging or cotton cloth, if
you please) which are of pretty uniform value, of common
consumption, and therefore very generally in demand, with a
manufacturer of these articles, is not within the exception, although not in esse at the time, and to make which work and
labor are necessary. The manufacturer does not necessarily
lose the price of his labor -if the purchaser does not take the
goods, others will-the work and labor besto1Yed are in the
line of his business, and his work and labor would be bestO\ved
in the production of such goods had the contract not been
made. The goods and their price are the considerations of the
contract, and not the work and labor and their price. With
greater reason a contract for goods upon which work and labor
must be bestowed, not to make them, but to prepare them for
delivery, as the threshing of wheat, is not within the exception.
In the light of all these views, the rule which we adopt and
which I find admirably well expressed by Judge Butler in Bird
v. Jluhlinbrink,11s this: Such contracts only are excluded from
the operation of the seventeenth section of the statute of frauds
'as primarily contemplate work and labor to be done at the
instance of the purchaser and for bis use and accommodation,
so as to make the work and labor of the contracting vendor,
or such as he may procure to be bestowed at his expense, the
essential consideration of the contract.' The cases which recognize the principle thus expressed are numerous."

323. - - The rule in Maryland.- In a late case 2 in this
State, it is said that "from a very early period it has been the
settled law of Maryland, where the statute of Charles has always been in force, that ·when work and labor are to be bestowed by the vendor upon the article sold before it is to be
11 Rich. (S. C.) L. 199, 44 Am. Dec.

247.

v. Walker, 78 Md. 239, 21
Atl. R. 1033.
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delivered, the contract is not within the statute. 1 And the

reason is that when work and labor are necessary to prepare

an article for delivery, the work and labor to be done by the

vendor form part of the consideration of the contract, and, as

these are not within the statute, the sale is not a sale of goods,

wares and merchandise within the meaning of the seventeenth

section."

§ 324.

The rule in Iowa.— The statute of frauds in

Iowa contains an exception which provides that the statute

snail not apply " when the article of personal property sold is

delivered, the contract is not within the statute. 1 And the
reason is that when work and labor are nece ary to prepare
an article for delivery the \York and labor to be done by the
vendor form part of the consideration of the contract, and, as
these are not within the tatute, the sale is not a sale of goods,
ware and merchandi e within the meaning of the seventeenth
ection."

not, at the time of the contract, owned by the vendor and

ready for delivery, but labor, skill or money are necessarily to

be expended in producing or procuring the same." In a recent

case 2 it appeared that the plaintiff had orally contracted with

i Eichelberger v. McCauley. 5 H. &

J. (Md.) 213, 9 Am. Dec. 514; Rentch
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v. Long. 27 Md. 188.

zffighell v. Dougherty, 86 Iowa,

480, 53 N. W. R. 402, 17 L. R. A. 755.

The court further said: " A brief re-

view of a few cases which support

the rule above laid down may bet-

324:. - - The r ule in I owa.- The tatute of frauds in
Iowa contain an exception which provides that the statute
hall not apply "when the article of per onal property sold is
not, at the time of the contract owned by the vendor and
r ad for deliv ry but labor, skill or money are nece sarily to
be xp nded in produ ing or procuring the same. ' In a recent
-0a e 2 it appeare 1 that the plaintiff ha orally ontracted with

ter illustrate its application. Baker,

Sales. § 54. Chief Justice Shaw held

that when a contract is for an arti-

cle then existing, or such an article

as the vendor ' usually has for sale

in the course of his business, the

statute applies.' Mixer v. Howarth,

21 Pick. 205, 32 Am. Dec. 256. In the

same case, Harris, J., expressed the

opinion that, if the work and labor

required to be done, in order to fit

the subject-matter of the contract

for delivery, was to be done for the

vendor, the case would be within

the statute. Story said ' that, where

the subject-matter of the contract

was not to be created by manufact-

ure, but, being already in existence,

was merely to be subjected to cer-

tain labor for the purpose of render-

ing it deliverable, or perhaps even

of changing its character, the con-

tract would be within the statute of

frauds, it being essentially a con-

tract of sale.' Story, Sales (Perkins'

ed.), ?'?■ 260-260&. In other words, if

the labor and service were wholly

incidental to a subject-matter in esse,

the statute applied." Id., § 260c.

" The rule is thus stated in a late

Massachusetts case: ' A contract for

the sale of articles then existing, or

such as the vendor, in the ordinary

course of business, manufactures or

procures for the general market,

whether on hand or not, is a con-

tract for the sale of goods, to which

the statute applies. But. on the

other hand, if the goods are to be

manufactured especially for the pur-

chaser, and upon his special order,

and not for the general market, the

case is not within the statute.' God-

dard v. Binney, 115 Mass. 450, 15 Am.

R. 112. In O'Neil v. New York & S.

1 Ei helberger v. Mccaul y, 5 H. & tain labor for the purpo e of r nderJ. (Md.) 213, 9 Am. De . 514· Rentch ing it deliverable, or perhaps even
of changing i character, the conv. Long, 27 l\I . 1 .
2 iiiio-bell v.
oughert , 6 ro, a, tract would be within the tatute of
4 0 53 . W. R. 40'), 1 L. R.
55. fraud it being e · entially a contory, Sales (P erkins'
The court further id: 'A brief re- tract of ale.'
view of a few ca e whi h upport ed.), · 260-'>60b. In other word , if
the rule above laid down may bet- the labor and ervice were wholly
ter illu trate it application. Baker, incidental to a ubject-matter in esse,
ale , 54. Chief Ju tice haw held the tatute applied." Id. , § '>60c.
that hen a con ract i for an arti"The rule i thu tate in a. late
cle then exi ting. or uch an article l\Ia ach etts ca e: 'A contract for
a the vendor 'u ually ha for ale the ale of articles then exi ting, or
in the cour e of hi bu ine , the uch as the vendor, in the ordinary
tatute applie . Mixer v. Howarth, cour e of busine , manufactures or
21 Pick. 205, 32 Am. Dec. 256. In the procure for the general marke ,
ame ca e, Harri , J., expre ed the whether on hand or not, is a con-Opinion that, if the work and labor tract for the sale of good , to which
required to be done, in order to fit the tatute applie . But, on the
the ubject-matter of the contract other hand, if the good are to be
for delivery, wa to be done for the manufactured especially for the pur-vendor, the ca..,e would be within cha er, and upon hi special order,
the tatute. Story said that, where and not for the general market, the
the ubject-matter of the contract case i not within the statute.' Godwas not to be created by manufact- dard v. Binney, 115 fass. 450, 15 Am.
ure but, being already in exi tence, R. 11'>. In 0 ' Teil v. New York & S.
wa merely to be subjected to cer- P. lin. Co., 3 Nev. 141, the court,
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defendant for the delivery to plaintiff, at a certain price, of

fifteen hundred bushels of oats, then raised .but unthreshed.

Defendant, having made default, contended that the contract

LAW OF SALE.

[BOOK I •.

defendant for the delivery to plaintiff, at a certain pric , of
fifteen hundred bushels of oat , th n raised .but unthre h d.
Defen lant, having made default, contended that the contract
was within the statute, while plaintiff urged that the case fell

was within the statute, while plaintiff urged that the case fell

virtually following the rule laid

down in Massachusetts, held that,

to make the case one for work and

labor, the contract should contem-

plate or require some change in the

condition, business or circumstances

of the vendor. In Downs v. Ross, 23

Wend. 270. the contract was for the

purchase of wheat, only a part of

which was threshed, and that which

had been threshed was to be further

cleaned. It was held that the case
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was one of sale, not for work and

labor. The court said: ' If the thing

sold exist at the time in solido, the

mere fact that the seller is to do

something to put it in a marketable

condition did not take the contract

out of the operation of the statute of

frauds.' Cooke v. Millard, 5 Lans.

246; Baker, Sales, §£ 30, 43. In Gil-

man v. Hill, 36 N. H. 311, it was held

that a contract for sheep pelts, to be

taken from sheep, was a contract of

sale. So a contract for the purchase

of all the flax straw to be raised

from forty-five bushels of flax seed,

and to be ' delivered in a dry condi-

tion, free from grass, weeds and all

foreign substances,' was held a con-

tract of sale, not for work, labor or

skill, in producing the straw. Brown

v. Sanborn, 21 Minn. 402. When

wheat was sold to be delivered at a

certain mill, and there was a con-

flict in the evidence as to whether

all of it was threshed prior to the

time of making the contract, and

the court refused to instruct the

jury that, the wheat existing in

solido at the time the contract was

made, and not having to be raised or

manufactured, though unthreshed,

it was a contract within the statute

of frauds, and the plaintiff could not

recover, the case was reversed for

the refusal to give the instruction.

The court adhered to the doctrine

that a contract for the sale of goods

which may not at the time of such

contract be actually made,, procured

or provided, or fit or ready for deliv-

ery, or some act may be requisite for

the making or completing thereof,

or rendering the same fit for deliv-

ery, is within the statute. Hardell v.

McClure, 2 Pinn. 289, 1 Chand. 271.

"In a cause decided in 1882 this

same court approved the holding in

Handell v. McClure, and, in referring

to the contract in that case, says: ' It

was clearly not a contract for special

labor in manufacturing anything,

virtually following the rule laid made, and not having to be raised or
down in )fas achu ·etts, held that, manufactured. though untbre bed,
to make the ca e one for work and it was a contract within the statute
labor. the contract should contem- of frauds, and the plaintiff could not
plate or require some change in the recover. the case was rever e<.l for
condition, bu iness or cirumstances the refu al to give the instruction.
of the vendor. In Downs v. Ro , 23 The court adhered to the doctrine
Wend. 270. the contract was for the that a contract for the sale of goods
purcha e of wheat, only a part of which may not at the time of such
which was threshed, and that which contract be a tually made,, pro ured
had been thre hed was to be further or provided, or fit or ready for delivcleanecl. It was held that the case ery, or some a t may be requi ite for
wa one of ale, not for work and the making or completing thereof,
labor. The court said: 'If be thing or rendering the ame fit for delivsold exi t at the time in soliclo, the ery, is within the statute. Hardell v.
mere fact that the eller is to do Mc lure, 2 Pinn. 2 9, 1 Chand. 271.
something to put it in a marketable
"In a cause decided in 1882 this
condition did not take the contract same court approved the holding in
out of the operation of the tatute of Randell v. McClure, and, in referring
frauds.' Cooke v. l\1illard, 5 Lan . to the contract in that ca e. say : 'It
246; Baker, Sales, §: 30, 43. In Gil- was clearly not a contract for pecial
man v. Hill, 36 N. H. 311, it was held labor in manufacturing anything,
that a contract for sheep pelt , to be but a contract to sell and deliver a
taken from sheep, was a contract of certain quantity of wheat.' l\feincke
sale. So a contract for the purcha e v. Falk, 55 Wis. 437, 13 N. W. R 545.
of all the flax straw to be raised See Clark v. Nichol , 107 fa s. 547.
from forty-five bushels of flax seed, A contract for the sale of the whole
and to be 'delivered in a dry condi- of a crop of cotton for a certain year,
tion, free from gra s, weecl and all to be delivered at a certain price per
foreign substance ,'was held a con- pound as· soon as it could begathered
tract of ale, not for work, labor or and prepared for market, was held
skill, in producing the straw. Brown within the statute. Cason v. Cheely,
v. Sanborn, 21 Minn. 402. When 6 Ga. 554. The rule we have anwheat was sold to be deliYered at a nounced as applicable to the case at
certain mill, and there wa a con- bar also finds support in the followflict in the evidence as to whether ing cases: Spencer v. Cone, 1 Met.
all of it was thre hed prior to the 2 3; Lamb v. Crafts, 12 Met. 353;
time of making the contract, and Gardner v. Joy, 9 Met. 177; Pre cott
the court refu ed to in truct the v. Locke, 51 N. H. 94, 12 Am. R. 55;
jury that, the wheat exi ·ting in Atwater v. Hough, 29 Conn. 508, 79
solido at the time the contract was Am. Dec. 229; Finney v. Apgar, 31
29
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within the exception. The court held, however, that the case

was not within the exception, but was a contract of sale within

the operation of the statute. Upon the first point the court

said that the oats were not produced or procured since the

contract within the meaning of the exception. " The grain

existed at the time of the making of the contract, in the iden-

tical form in which it would finally be sold. True, it must be

harvested and separated from the straw and chaff. So the

grain was not produced by the defendant at all, nor did he

procure it. He had the oats, but, to put them in proper shape

for market, he must cut, thresh and haul them. All this he

would have done at his own instance, even if he had never

heard of the plaintiff. This labor, skill and money, then, was

not expended specially at the instance of the plaintiff."

§ 3*25. . Upon the second point the court said : " In

cases like this we think the true rule is, if the grain is sold and

no part of it delivered, and no part of the price is paid, and

the contract is not in writing, and the labor, skill and money
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which is necessary to be expended upon it to fit it for market

is such only as, in the ordinary course of the defendant's busi-

ness, he would be compelled to expend upon it, or devote to

it, in order to preserve and care for it as a good husbandman,

the case is purely a sale, and comes within the statute. It may

within the exception. The court held, however, that the case
was· not within the exception, but was a contract of sale within
the operation of the statute. Upon the first point the court
said that the oats were not produced or procured since the
contract within the meaning of the exception. "The grain
existed at the time of the making of the contract, in the identical form in which it would finally be sold. True, it must be
harvested and separated from the straw and chaff. So the
grain was not produced by the defendant at all, nor di<l he
procure it. He had the oats, but, to put them in proper shape
for market, he must cut, thre h and haul them. All this he
would have done at his own instance, even if he had never
heard of the plaintiff. This labor skill and money, then, was
not expended specially at the instance of the plaintiff."

be, if the defendant had contracted to plant or raise a crop of

such a character or kind as required special skill, labor or

work, other than that required in the ordinary performance of

§ 3... ... - - . Upon the second point the court said: " In

his labors incident to raising and harvesting his crops, and

such special skill and labor was contemplated at' the time the

N. J. L. 266; Edwards v. Grand Trunk would have done if there had been

E. Co., 48 Me. 379, 54 Me. 105; Saw- no contract of sale. The case, then,

yer v.Ware, 36 Ala. 675; Bird v.Muh- is one clearly within our statute,

linbrink, 1 Rich. (S. C.) L. 199. The contract not being in writing,

" The evidence in this case shows no part of the price having been

without conflict that the defendant paid, none of the oats having been

expended no work, labor, skill or delivered, no evidence of the con-

money on the oats other than he tract was properly receivable."
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ca es like this we think the true rule is if tbe grain is sold and
no part of it delivered, and no part of the price is paid, and
the contract is not in writing, and the labor, skill and money
which is nece ary to be expended upon it to fit it for market
is such only as in the ordinary course of the defendants busine s, he would be compelled to expen l upon it, or de ote to
it, in order to preserve and care for it as a good husbandman,
the case is purely a sale, and comes within the statute. It may
be, if the defendant had contracted to plant or raise a crop of
such a character or kind as required special skill, labor or
work, other than that required in the ordinary performance of
his labors incident to raising and harvesting his crops, and
such special skill and labor was contemplated at· the time the
N. J. L. 266; Ed wards v. Grand Trunk would have done if there had been
R. Co., 48 Me. 379, 54 ie. 10-; Saw- no contract of sale. The case, then,
yer v. Ware, 36 Ala. 675; Bird v. l\Iuh- is one clearly within our statute.
linbrink, 1 Rich. (S. C.) L. 199.
The contract not being in writing.
"The evidence in thi ca e shows no part of the price having been
without conflict that t.be defendant paid, none of the oats having been
expended no w~rk, labor, skill or delivered, no evidence of the conmoney on the oats other than he tract was properly receivable."
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§ 32G, 327.]

L.AW OF

.ALE.

[B OK I.

§§ 320, 327.] law of sale. [book r.

contract was made, and was to be bestowed at the instance of

and for the benefit of the plaintiff, that the case would be within

the exception provided in our statute."

In a later case l a contract for the sale of corn to be shelled,

and that unfit for shelling to be thrown out, was held to be

within the statute, as no labor was theu necessary to produce

or procure the corn.

§ 326. The true rule. — The simplest and most satis-

factory rule is doubtless that laid down by the English court

in Lee v. Griffin. The fact that it was decided in. contempla-

tion of Lord Tenterden's Act can be of no importance, inas-

contract was made, and was to be bestowed at the instance of
and for the benefit of the plaintiff, that the case would be within
the exception provided in our statute."
In a later case 1 a contract for the sale of corn to be shelle l,
and that unfit for shelling to be thrown out, wa~ held to be
within the statute, as no labor was then necessary to produce
or procure the corn.

much as it has always been conceded in the United States that

the statute of frauds is applicable to executory contracts. The

New York distinction between things in existence and those

not in existence, while definite and easily applied, is purely

arbitrary, and is in manifest conflict with the clear intention

of the parties in many cases. The Massachusetts rule, which

excludes from the operation of the statute contracts for those
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articles which the vendor does not usually make, but which he

undertakes to make in the particular instance in accordance

with the special order of his customer, is more nearly satisfac-

tory; but this distinction also, in some cases, does violence to

the intention of the parties, inasmuch as it is usually the re-

sult, and not the means or the method, which the parties are

contracting for.

Lee v. Griffin, however, has found but little following in the

United States, while the Massachusetts rule seems likely to be

received with favor wherever the courts are not debarred by

earlier decisions from adopting it.

3. Auction Sales.

§ 327. Sales by auction are within the statute. — Notwith-

standing some early doubts, it is now entirely settled that sales

1 Lewis v. Evans (1899), 108 Iowa, effect: Dierson v. Petersmeyer (1899),

296, 79 N. W. R. 81. See, also, to same — Iowa, — , 80 N. W. R. 389.
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§ 326. - - The true rule.-The simplest and most satisfactory rule is doubtless that laid lown by the English court
in L ee v. Griffin. The fact that it was decided in contemplation of Lord Tenterden's Act can be of no importance, inasmuch as it has always been conceded in the United States that
the statute of frauds is applicable to executory contracts. The
New York distinction between things in existence and those
not in existence, while definite and easily applied, is purely
arbitrary, and is in manifest conflict with the clear intention
of the parties in many cases. The Massachusetts rule, which
excludes from the operation of the statute contracts for those
articles which the vendor does not usually make, but which be
undertakes to make in the particular instance in accordance
with the special order of his customer, is more nearly satisfactory; but this distinction also, in some cases, does violence to
the intention of the parties, inasmuch as it is usually the result, and not the means or the method, which the parties are
contracting for.
L ee v. Griffin, however, has found but little following in the
United States, while the Massachusetts rule seems likely to be
received with favor wherever the courts are not debarred by
earlier decisions from adopting it.
3 . ..Auction Sales.

§ 327. Sales by auction are within the statute.-N otwithstantling some early doubts, it is now entirely settled that sales
1 Lewis v. Evans (1 99), 108 Iowa, effect : Dierson v. Petersmeyer ( 1 899)~
296, 79 N. W. R. 81. See, a lso, to same - - Iowa, - , 80 N. W. R. 389.
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OH. VII.] CONTRACT UNDER STATUTE OF FRAUDS. [§§ 328, 329.

of chattels at auction are sales within the operation of the

statute of frauds. 1

4. Contracts for Exchange or Resale.

§ 328. Contracts for exchange or resale, when within the

statute. — Contracts of barter or exchange are included within

the provisions of the seventeenth section. 2 So an independent

contract for the rescission of an unconditional sale and the

repurchase of the goods is within the statute; but not where

the agreement for the rescission and resale was part of the orig-

inal contract. 3

III.

"What are Goods, Wares and Merchandise.

§ 329. English rule includes only corporeal movable prop-

erty. — " The seventeenth section of the statute," says Mr. Ben-

jamin (§ 111) in laying down the English rule, " applies to con-

tracts for the sale of 'goods, wares and merchandise,' — words

which comprehend all corporeal movable property. The statute,

therefore, does not apply to shares, stocks, documents of title,
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choses in action, and other incorporeal rights and property.

The following cases have been decided on this point: The stat-

ute does not apply to a sale of shares in a joint-stock banking

company, 4 nor to a sale of stock of a foreign State, 5 nor to a

i Davis v. Eowell, 2 Pick. (Mass.) N. E. E. 377, 15 Am. St. E, 394, 5 L.

64, 13 Am. Dec. 398; Pike v. Balch, E. A. 630; Fay v. Wheeler, 44 Vt. 292

38 Me. 302,61 Am. Dec. 248; John- Williams v. Burgess, 10 Ad. & E. 499

son v. Buck, 35 N. J. L. 338, 10 Am. Dickinson v. Dickinson, 29 Conn. 600

E. 243; Norris v. Blair, 39 Ind. 90. Hilliard v. Weeks, 137 Mass. 304.

2 Bennett v. Hull, 10 Johns. (N. Y.) Contract for payment of debt in

364; Eutan v. Hinchman, 30 N. J. goods is a sale within the statute.

. L. (1 Vroom), 255; Ash v. Aldrich, Sawyer v. Ware (1860), 36 Ala. 675.

67 N. H. 581, 39 Atl. E. 442; Gorman Contra, Woodford v. Patterson (1860),

v. Brossard (1899), 120 Mich. 611, 79 32 Barb. (N. Y.) 630.

N. W. E. 903. 4 Humble v. Mitchell, 11 A. & E.

3 Wulschner v. Ward, 115 Ind. 219; 205.

Johnston v. Trask, 116 N. Y. 136, 22 5 Heseltine v. Siggers, 1 Ex. 856.
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§§ 330, 331.J

LAW OF SALE.

[n

K I.

§§ 330, 331.] law or sale. [book r.

sale of railway shares, 1 nor to a sale of shares in a mining com-

pany on the cost-book principle, 2 nor to a sale of tenants' fix-

tures." 3

§ 330. Rule in United States more comprehensive. — In the

sale of railway shares 1 nor to a sale of shares in a minincr com pany on the cost-book principle,2 nor to a sale of tenants fixtures." 3

United States, as will be observed from the summary given, 4

the statutes are often more comprehensive than the English

act, extending to "goods" in some cases, and in others to "per-

sonal property." This variance has caused a somewhat differ-

ent line of results to be reached here, though there is doubtless

at the same time a tendency to give the statute in its original

form a more liberal interpretation. 3 The general rule in this

country unquestionably includes not only corporeal movable

property, both animate and inanimate, 6 but also those choses

in action "which are subjects of common sale and barter, and

which have a visible and palpable form." 7

§ 331. What included — Stocks — Notes — Inventions, etc.

Thus, live animals are included. "For whatever may have

been the received meaning formerly of the words 'goods and
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merchandise,' it is quite certain that at present, according to

our standard linguistic authorities, the word goods ' may well

include oxen." 8

Stocks in corporations, which are generally not included in

England, are here usually deemed to be within the statute,

though this ruling in some cases was made under the more com-

prehensive statutes referred to. In the leading case 9 in Massa-

§ 330. Rn le in United States more comprehensive.- In tbe
United States, as will be ob ervecl from the summary given, 4
the statutes are often more comprehensive tban the Engli h
act, extending to "goods" in some cases and mothers to ' personal property." This variance has cau e 1 a some,vhat li:ff rent line of results to be reached here, thou h there is loubtle s
at the same time a tendency to gi' e the statute in its original
form a more liberal interpr tati n. 5 The ·eneral rule in this
country unquestionably include not only corporeal movable
property, both animate anu inanimate, 6 but also those choses
in action "which are subj cts of common sale and barter, an l
which have a visible and palpable form.' 17

1 Tempest v. Kilner, 3 C. B. 249; ^Weston v. McDowell (1870), 20

Bowlby v. Bell, 3 C. B. 284; Bradley Mich. 353.

v. Holdsworth, 3 M. & W. 422; Dun- 7 Sonierby v. Buntin, supra. See

cuft v. Albrecht. 12 Sim. 189. also Wood on Statute of Frauds,

2 Watson v. Spratley, 10 Ex. 222; §283; Browne on Statute of Frauds,

Powell v. Jessopp, 18 C. B. 336. g 295.

3 Lee v. Gaskell, 1 Q. B. Div. 700. 8 Weston v. McDowell (1870), 20

4 See ante, %% 286, 287. Mich. 353.

5 Thus see, per Gray, C. J., in 9 Tisdale v. Harris (1838), 20 Pick.

Somerby v. Buntin (1875), 19 Am. R. (Mass.) 9. So also Boardman v. Cut-

459; and Graves, J., in Weston v. ter (1880), 128 Mass. 388; Pray v.

McDowell (1870), 20 Mich. 353. Mitchell (1872), 60 Me. 430; North v.
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§ 331. '"hat included-Stocks-Notes-Inventions, etc.
Thus, live annnals are included. "For whatever may have
been the rece.i ved meaning formerly of the words 'goods and
merchandise,' it is quite certain that at present, according to
our standard linguistic authorities, the word goods,. may well
include oxen." 8
Stocks in corporations, which are generally not included in
England, are here usually deemed to be within the statute,
though this ruling in some cases was made under the more comprehensive statutes referred to. In the leading case 9 in :1\Iassa1 Tempest v. Kilner, 3 C. B. 249;
Bowlby v. Bell, 3 C. B. 284; Bradley
v. Holdsworth, 3 M. & W. 422; Duncuft v. Albrecht, 12 Sim. 189.
2 Watson v. Spratley, 10 Ex. 222;
Powell v. Jessopp, 18 C. B. 336.
3 Lee v. Gaskell, 1 Q. B. Div. 700.
4 See ante, §§ 286, 287.
5 Thus see, per Gray, C. J., in
Somerby v. Buntin (1875), 19 Am. R.
459; and Graves, J., in Weston v.
McDowell (1870), 20 Mich. 353.

6 We ton v. McDowell (1870), 20
Mich. 353.
i Somerby v. Buntin, sup1·a.
See
also vVood on Statute of Frauds,
§ 283; Browne on Statute of Frauds,

§ 295.
8 Weston v. McDowell (1870), 20
Mich. 353.
9 Tisdale v. Harris (1838), 20 Pick.
(Mass.) 9. So also Boardman v. Cutter (1880), 128 Mass. 388; Pray v.
Mitchell (1872), 60 Me. 430; North v.
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CH. VII.] CONTRACT UNDER STATUTE OF FRAUDS. [§ 331.

CH. VII .]

CONTRACT UNDER STATUTE OF FRAUDS.

[§ 331.

chusetts, where the statutory language was "goods, wares and

merchandise," it was said: "There is nothing in the nature of

stocks, or shares in companies, which in reason or sound policy

should exempt contracts in respect to them from those reason-

able restrictions designed by the statute to prevent fraud in

the sale of other commodities. On the contrary, these com-

panies have become so numerous, so large an amount of the

property of the community is now invested in them, and as the

ordinary indicia of property, arising from delivery and posses-

sion, cannot take place, there seems to be peculiar reason for

extending the provisions of this statute to them." On the other

hand, in a late case in Maryland, 1 it is said: "A subscription

for shares of stock in an ordinary corporation is not a contract

for the sale of 'goods, wares and merchandise;' words which

comprehend only corporeal movable property. Shares of stock

are but choses in action, and are not within the statute."

Promissory notes are also in the doubtful class, 2 and United

States treasury checks have been held not to be included. 3
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Gold, when " regarded, not as money, but as a commodity," is

within the statute; 4 and so are the bills of a State bank; 5 and

Forrest (1843), 15 Conn. 400; Spear v. In Meehan v. Sharp (1890), 151

Bach (1892), 82 Wis. 192, 52 N. W. R Mass. 565, 24 N. E. R. 90T, it is said to

97- Mayer v. Child (1872), 47 Cal. 142; be at least doubtful whether a sale

Fine v. Hornsby (1876), 2 Mo. App. of stock that had not been regularly

61; Bernhardt v. Walls (1888), 29 Mo. issued could be brought within the

App. 206; Brownson v. Chapman statute.

(1875) 63 N Y 625. 2 That they are included: Baldwin

So also Southern L. Ins. Co. v. Cole v. Williams (1841), 3 Mete. (Mass.)

(1852) 4 Fla. 359, though here the 365; that they are not: Whittemore

statute says « personal property." v. Gibbs (1852), 24 N. H. 484; Vawter

i Webb v. Baltimore & East Shore v. Griffin (1872), 40 Ind. 593; Hudson

Ry. Co. (1893), 77 Md. 92, 26 Atl. R. v. Weir (1856), 29 Ala. 294.

113, 39 Am. St. R. 396 [repudiating 3 Beers v. Crowell (1831), Dud. (Ga.)

chusetts, where the statutory language was "goods, wares and
merchandise," it was said : "There is nothing in the nature of
stocks, or shares in companies, which in reason or sound policy
should exempt contracts in respect to them from those rea onable r strictions design d by the s atute to prevent fraud in
the sale of other commodities. On the contrary, these compan-ie have become so numerous, so large an amount of the
prop rt of the community is now invested in them, and as the
-Ordinary indicia of property, ari ing from delivery and possession, cannot take plac , there seems to be peculiar reason for
extending the provisions of this statute to them." On the other
hand, in a late case in far.) land,1 it is said: "A sub cription
for shar s of stock in an ordinary orpor tion is not a contract
for the ale of 'good , wares and merchandise;' words which
-0ompr .h n only corpor al movable I rop rty.
hares of stock
are but ho es in acti n, and are not witl in the statute."
Promi ory notes are also in the doubtful cla ·s, 2 and United
tates treasury che 1 s have be n h ld not to be in lucled. 3
Gold, when ' r O' rdecl, not as money, but as a commodity,'' is
within the statute; 4 and so are the bills of a tate bank; 5 and

Colvin v. Williams (1810), 3 H. & J. 28.

(Md.) 38, 5 Am. Dec. 417]. See also 4 Peabody v. Speyers (1874), 06 N. Y.

Gadsden v. Lance (1841), 1 McMul. 230.

<S. C.) Eq. 87, 37 Am. Dec. 548; 5 Gooch v. Holmes (IS06), 41 Me.

Vawter v. Griffin (1872), 40 Ind. 593; 523.

Rogers v. Burr (1898), 105 Ga. 432, 31

S. E. R 438, 70 Am. St. R. 50.
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Forrest (1843), 15 Conn. 400; Spear v.
In Meehan v. Sharp (1 90 l, 151
Bach (1892), 82 Wis. 192, -2 N. W. R. Ma s. 56-, 24 N. E. R. 907, it i. said to
97; fayer v. Child (1 72), 47 Cal. 142; be at lea t doubtful whether a sale
Ffoe v. Hornsby (1 '"'6), 2 fo. App. of stock that had not been regularly
~1; Bernhardt v. Walls (1
), 99 l\lo. is ued could be brought within the
App. 206; Brownson v. Chapman statute.
(1 7.-), 63 N. Y. 695.
2 That they are included: Bald win
So al o Southern L. Ins. Co. v. Cole v. Williams (1 41), 3 l\'Ietc. ( fas .)
(1 52), 4 Fla. 359, though here the 365; that they are not: Whittemore
statute says "per onal property."
v. Gibbs (1852), 2-! N. H. 484; Vawter
1 Webb v. Baltimore & Ea t Shore v. Griffin (1 ~72), 40 Ind. 593; Hudson
Ry. Co. (1 93), 7 id. 99, 26 Atl. R. v. ·weir (1 56), 29 Ala. 294.
3 Beer v. Growell (1 ~1), Dud. (Ga.)
113, 39 Am. St. R. 396 [repudiating
Colvin v. Wi1liams (1810), 3 H. & J. 2 .
(~Id . ) 38, 5 Am. Dec. 417].
ee al o
4 Peabody v. Speyers (1874), 56 N. Y.
Gadsden v. Lance (1841), 1 Mc fol. 230.
5 Gooch v. Holmes (1856), 41 Me.
(S. C.) Eq. 87, 37 Am. Dec. 54 ;
Vawter v. Griffin (1872), 40 Ind. 593; 523.
Rogers v. Burr (1 9 ), 105 Ga. 432, 31
. E . R 43 , 70 Am. St. R. 50.
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~

332, 333.J

LAW OF

.A.LE.

[BOOK I.

§§ 332, 333.] law of sale. [book i.

so has been held to be an account against a private person. 1 A

bond and mortgage are also to be included. 2

An invention for which letters patent have not yet been

granted is held not within the statute, 3 and the court also ex-

pressed an opinion that the letters patent themselves when

granted might not be, though this was confessedly obiter}

§332. Fixtures. — Whether articles of personal prop-

erty, so affixed to real estate as to fall within the domain of

" fixtures," are, for purposes of sale, within the provisions of the

so bas been held to be an account against a private person. 1 A
bond and mortgage are also to be incl uded. 2
An invention for which letters patent have not yet been
granted is held not within the statute,~ and the court also expressed an opinion that the letters patent themselves when
granteu might not be, though this was confessedly obiter. 4

seventeenth section, or whether they are to be governed by the

provisions relative to sales of interests in land, is a question of

§ 332. - - Fixtures.- Whether articles of personal prop-

some difficulty. The English courts construe the rule that what

is affixed to the realty is to be deemed part of it, with more

strictness than the American; but under either system the

question whether the article is incorporated into the realty or

is only annexed to it is a material one.

g 333. . In the case of the sale by a tenant of a remov-

able fixture, to be removed by the tenant for delivery within
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i Walker v. Supple (1875), 54 Ga. and effect of words which have al-

178. ready been carried quite far enough.

^ Greenwood v. Law (1892), 55 N. J. " But it is not necessary in this

L. 168, 26 Atl. R. 134. case to go so far as to say that a sale

3 Somerby v. Buntin (1875), 118 of letters patent for an invention is

Mass. 279, 18 Am. R. 459. not within the statute of frauds.

"The words of the statute," said Before letters patent are. obtained,

Gray, C. J., "have never yet been the invention exists only in right,,

erty, so affixed to real estate as to fall within the domain of
"fixtures," are, for purposes of sale, within the provisions of the
seventeenth section, or whether they are to be governed by the.
provi ions relative to sales of interests in land, is a question of
some difficulty. The English courts construe the rule that what
is affixeu to the realty is to' be deemed part of it, with more
strictness than the merican; but under either system the
question whether the article is incorporated into the realty or
is only annexed to it is a mater~al one.

extended by any court beyond secu- and neither that right, nor any evi-

rities which are subjects of common dence of it, has any outward form

sale and barter, and which have a which is capable of being transferred

visible and palpable form. To in- or delivered in specie, or which, upon

elude in them an incorporeal right any construction, however liberal,

§ 333. - - . In the case of the sale by a tenant of a removable fixture, to be removed by the tenant for delivery within

or franchise, granted by the govern- can be considered as goods, wares or

ment, securing to the inventor and merchandise."

his assigns the exclusive right to 4 Jones v. Reynolds (1890), 120 N. Y.

make, use and vend the article pat- 213, 24 N. E. R. 279, assumes the con-

ented ; or a share in that right, trary to be true,

which has no separate or distinct ex- A contract for publication of an

istence at law until created by the advertisement is not within the stat-

instrument of assignment, would be ute. Goodland v. Le Clair (1890), 78-

unreasonably to extend the meaning Wis. 176, 47 N. W. R. 268.
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1 Walker

v. Supple (1875), 54 Ga.

178.

Greenwood v. Law (1 92), 55 N. J.
L. 168, 26 Atl. R. 134.
3 Somerby >. Buntin (1875), 118
1\fas . 279, 18 Am. R. 459.
"The words of the statute," said
Gray, C. J., "have never yet been
extended by any court beyond securities which are subjects of common
sale and barter and which have a
visible and palpable form. To inelude in them an incorporeal right
or franchise, granted by the government, ecuring to the inventor and
his as igns the exclusive right to
make. u e and vend the article patented; or a share in that right,
which has no separate or distinct existence at law until created by the
in trument of assignment. would be
unreasonably to extend the meaning
2

and effect of words which have already been carried quite far enough.
"But it is not necessary in this
case to go so far as to say that a sale
of letters patent for an invention is
not within the statute of frauds.
Before letters patent are. obtained,
the invention exists only in right,.
and neither that right, nor any evidence of it, has any outward form
which is capable of being transferred
or delivered in specie, or which, upon
any construction, however liberal.
can be considered as goods, wares or
merchandise."
4Jones v.Reynolds (1890), 120 N. Y.
213, 24 N. E. R. 279, assumes the contrary to be true.
A contract for publication of an
advertisement is not within the statute. Goodland v. Le Clair (1890), 78Wis. 176, 47 N. W.R. 268.
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the term, there could be little doubt that the sale would be

treated as a sale of a chattel ; and it is probable, too, that the

same result would be reached where the article was to be re-

moved by the buyer during the tenant's term. 1 The same rule

would also govern where the owner of a chattel, e. g., a build-

ing, places it temporarily on the land of another with the hitter's

consent: it would retain its character as a chattel whatever

might be thought of the assignability of the license to re-

move it. 2

§ 334. . So, as between the owner of land and his vendee

of chattels thereto annexed to be removed and delivered by the

seller, there could be as little doubt that the articles sold would

be regarded as goods, wares and merchandise and not as land. 3

And a sale of like articles to be removed by the purchaser has

been held not to be a sale of an interest in land. 4 Such a sale

authorizes the purchaser to enter upon the land to remove the

article, and this license has been held to be irrevocable. 5

§ 335. . As between such a purchaser, however, and a
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honafide purchaser who bought the land before the articles had

1 See cases following in this and 3 Bostwick v. Leach, 3 Day (Conn.),

the succeeding section. See also 476; Michael v. Curtis (1891), 60 Conn.

Heysham v. Dettre, 89 Pa. St. 506; 863. 22 Atl. R. 949; Long v. White, 42

Powell v. McAshan, 28 Mo. 70. Ohio St. 59; Moody v. Aiken (1887),

On a sale by the tenant to his land- 50 Tex. 65; Shaw v. Carbrey (1866),

lord, the fixtures not having been re- 13 Allen (Mass.). 462. Nut unless first

moved during the term, the fourth severed from the land. Brown v.

section does not apply (Hallen v. Roland, 92 Tex. 54, 45 S. W. R. 795.

Bunder. 1 Cr. Mees. & Ros. 266); nor * Rogers v. Cox, 96 Ind. 157, 49 Am.

does the seventeenth. Lee v. Gaskell, R, 152; Foster v. Mabe, 4 Ala. 402, 37

1 Q. B. Div. 700. See also South Bal- Am. Dec. 749; Bostwick v. Leach, 3

timore Co. v. Muhlbach (1888), 69 Md. Day (Conn.), 476.

395. 16 Atl. R, 117. 5 Rogers v. Cox, supra; Sterling v.

-'Dame v. Dame, 38 N. H. 429, 75 Warden, 51 N. H. 217. 12 Am. R. SO;

Am. Dec. 195. See also Keyser v. White v. Elwell, 48 Me. 360. 77 Am.

District No. 8 (1857), 35 X. H. 477; Dec. 231; Nettleton v. Sikes, 8 Mete.

Hartwell v. Kelly (1875), 117 Mass. (Mass.) 34.

235.
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been removed and in ignorance of their separate sale, the arti-

cles would doubtless be deemed realty, and the purchaser of

the land would prevail, leaving the purchaser of the chattels

to his remedy against the seller. 1

been removed and in ignorance of their separate al , th 'trticles would doubtless be deemed realty, an l the purcha r of
the land would prevail, leaving the purchaser of the chatt 1
to his remedy against the seller. 1

§ 336. Growing trees. — Whether a sale of growing trees is

a sale of an interest in land is a question upon which the au-

thorities are much in conflict. By a large number of author-

ities such a sale is regarded as a sale of an interest in lands, and

must therefore be made by writing, though, of course, when

severed, the trees become personalty. 2 . Where the trees are to

be severed and taken from the land by the vendee, a parol

agreement for their sale, it is said in a well-considered case, 3

i Prince v. Case, 10 Conn. 375, 27

Am. Dec. 675. But see Russell v.

Richards, 10 Me. 429, 25 Am. Dec. 254

In the case of Thayer v. Rock, 13
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Wend. (N. Y.) 53, a contract was

made by parol for the purchase and

§ 336. Growing trees.- Whether a sale of oTmving trees is
a sale of an intere t in land is a qu stion upon which the authoritie are much in conflict. By a larg number of authorities such a sale is reO'arcl d as a sal of an inter '"'t in lan l , an<l.
must · therefore be made by writing, though, of course, when
s vered, the trees become personalty. 2 Where the tre s are to
be severed and taken from the Ian l by the vend e, a p rol
agreement for their sal , it is said in a w 11-con id l'ed ca e, 3

sale of a mill site and timber. The

contract was entire for both, the

mill site being an interest in lands.

So much of the contract as related

to this was void, since it rested en-

tirely in parol; but it was contended

that, as there had been part payment

of the purchase price, the contract

should be maintained as to the per-

sonalty, i. e., the timber; but the

court held that the contract, being

entire, must stand or fall as a whole;

part being clearly void, the whole is

bad and will not be sustained.

2 Slocum v. Seymour, 36 N. J. L.

138, 13 Am. R. 432; Green v. Arm-

strong, 1 Denio (N. Y.), 550; Buck v.

Pickwell, 27 Vt. 157 (but see Fitch

v. Burk, 38 Vt, 683; Sterling v.

Baldwin, 42 Vt. 306); Putney v. Day,

6 N. H. 430, 25 Am. Dec. 470; Kings-

ley v. Holbrook, 45 N. H. 313; Harrell

v. Miller, 35 Miss. 700, 72 Am. Dec.

154; Yeakle v. Jacob, 33 Pa. St.

376; Huff v. McCauley, 53 Pa. St.

206; Pattison's Appeal, 61 Pa. St.

294; Bowers v. Bowers, 95 Pa.

St. 477 (but see McClintock's Appeal,

71 Pa. St. 365); Owens v. Lewis, 46

Ind. 488, 15 Am. R. 295; Armstrong v.

Lawson, 73 Ind. 498; Cool v. Peters

Lumber Co., 87 Ind. 531; Hostetter

v. Auman, 119 Ind. 7, 20 N. E. R.

506: Russell v. Myers, 32 Mich. 522;

Wetmore v. Neuberger, 44 Mich.

362; Spalding v. Archibald, 52 Mich.

365, 50 Am. R. 253; Daniels v.

Bailey, 43 Wis. 566; Lillie v. Dun-

1 Prmce

v. Case, 10 onn. 375, 27
Am. Dec. 675. But see Ru ell v.
Richards, 10 Me. 429, 25 Am. Dec. 234.
In the ca e of Thayer'· Rock, 13
Wend. (N. Y.) 53, a cont.ract wa
made by pa,rol for the purcha e and
sale of a mill site and timber. The
contract was entire for both, the
mill site being an fatere tin land .
So much of the contract a related
to this was void, 8ince it rested enti rely in parol; but it was contended
that, as there had been part payment
of the purchase price, the contract
bould be maintained as to the peronalty, i. e.. the timber; but the
court held that tbe contract, being
entire, mu t stand or fall as a whole;
part being clearly void, the whole is
bad and will not be susta.ined.
2 Slocum v. Seymour, 36 N. J. L.
13 , 13 Am. R. 432; Green v. Arm·trong, 1 Denio (N. Y.), 550; Buck v.
Pick well, 27 Vt. 157 (but see Fitch
v. Burk, 38 Vt. 683; Sterling v.
Bald win, 42 Vt. 306); Putney v. Day,
6 N. H. 430, 25 Am. Dec. 470; Kingsley v. Holbrook, 45 N. H. 313; Harrell
v. Miller, 35 1\1.iss. 700, 72 Am. Dec.

154; Yeakle v. Ja ob, 33 Pa. St.
376; Huff v. McCauley, 53 Pa. St.
206; Patti on' A µpeal, 61 Pa. St.
294; Bowers v. Bower , 95 Pa.
St. 477 (but see 1\1.cClintock's Appeal,
71 Pa. St. 365); Owens v. Lewis, 46
Ind. 488, 15 Am. R. 295; Armstrong v.
Lawson, 73 Ind. 498; Cool v. Peters
Lumber Co., 87 Ind. 531; Hostetter
v. Auman, 119 Incl. 7, 20 N. E. R.
506: Russell v. Myer , 32 Mich. 522;
\\T et more v.

·Mo. A.pp. 152; Deland v. Vanstone, 26
l\Io. App. ~ 97: Andrews v. Costican,
30 Mo. App. 29; Railroad Co. v. Freeman, 61 Mo. 80; Alt v. Grosclose, 61
Mo. App. 409, 1 Mo. App. R. 64~;
Walton v. Lowrey, 74 Miss. 484, 21
S. R. 243; Hirth v. Graham, 50 Ohio
St. 57, 33 N. E. R. 90, 40 Am. St. R. 641.
3 Owens v. Lewi , 46 Ind. 488, iAm. R. 295 [citing Pierrepont v. Bar-

bar, 62 Wis. 198; Hicks v. Smith, 77

Wis. 146, 46 N. W. R. 133; Carpen-

ter v. Medford, 99 N. C. 495, 6 Am.

St. R. 535; Potter v. Everett, 40

Mo. App. 152; Deland v. Vanstone, 26

Mo. App. ^97; Andrews v. Costican,

30 Mo. App. 29; Railroad Co. v. Free-

man, 61 Mo. 80; Alt v. Grosclose, 61

Mo. App. 409, 1 Mo. App. R. 645;

Walton v. Lowrey, 74 Miss. 484, 21

S. R. 243; Hirth v. Graham, 50 Ohio

Neuberger, 44 1\Iich.

362; Spalding v. Archibalu, 52 1\Iicb.
365, 50 Am. R. 253; Daniels v.
Bailey, 43 Wis. 56n; Lillie v. Dunbar, 62 Wis. 198; Hicks v. Smith, 77
Wis. 146, 46 N. W. R. 133; Carpenter v. l\1euford, 99 N. C. 495, 6 Am.
St. R. 535; Potter v. Everett, 40
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" will amount to a license for the vendee to enter upon the

vendor's land for the purpose of making such severance, and,

if such license is not revoked before the trees are severed, the

title to the trees will vest in the vendee, and the license, after

severance, will become coupled with an interest and irrevocable,

and the vendee will have a perfect right to enter and remove

the trees thus severed; but if, before the trees are severed, the

vendor should revoke such license, no title will pass to the

sendee, and no rights will vest by virtue of such contract."

This seems to be the prevailing rule. 1

nard, 2 Seld. (N. Y.) 279; Drake v.

Wells, 11 Allen (Mass.), 141; Giles v.

Simomls. 15 Gray (Mass.), 441. 77

Am. Dec. 37:3; McNeal v. Emerson, 15

Gray (Mass.), 384; Nettleton v. Sikes,

8 Mete. (Mass.) 34; Heath v. Randall,

''will amount to a licen e for the V"endee to enter upon the
vendor lan l for the purpo e of makin 0 • uch se erance, and,
if u h lie n e is not revoke l before the tre are e ered, the
title to the tree will v t in th v nde and the licen e, after
erance will b come ·oupl l with an int rest and irr vocable,
an l the v n 1 will hav a perf ct right to enter and remove
the tree thu s v red · but if befor the trees are sev r cl, the
v l r should r oke such lie n e, no title will pa s to the
n l e, and no rio·bt will \e t by irtue of uch contract."
Thi
m to be the preV"ailing rule. 1

•1 Cush. (Mass.) 195; Barnes v. Barnes,
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c> \"t. 388; Mumford v. Whitney, 15

Wend. (N. Y.) 380, 30 Am. Dec. 60;

Smith v. Benson, 1 Hill (N. Y.), 176;

Russell v. Richards, 10 Me. 429, 35

Am. Dec. 254; Riddle v. Brown, 20

Ala. 412, 56 Am. Dec. 202; Bennett v.

Scutt, 18 Barb. (N. Y.) 347; Douglas

v. Shumway, 13 Gray (Mass.), 198;

Erskine v. Plummer, 7 Greeul. (Me.)

447, 22 Am. Dec. 210: Selch v. Jones,

28 Ind. 255]. In Fletcher v. Living-

ston, 153 Mass. 388, there was a writ-

ten contract to sell to plaintiff " all

the wood and timber standing " on a

certain piece of land, li with one

year's time to get it off." There was

a verbal extension of this time, and,

after the vendor's death, a written

extension by her administrator.

None of the timber was removed

within the time so extended and the

administrator sold the land. Plaint-

iff brought an action against the ad-

ministrator and the purchaser for

respectively selling the land and

cutting the timber. Said the court:

"It is well settled that a contract

like that relied on by the plaintiff"

does not immediately pass a title to

property, and is not a sale or a con-

tract for a sale of an interest in land,

but an executory agreement for the

sale of chattels, to take effect when

the wood and timber are severed

from t lie land, with a license to enter

and cut the trees and remove them.

Such a contract, if oral, is not within

the statute of frauds, and its con-

struction is the same as if it were in

writing. Claflin v. Carpenter, 4 Mete.

580; Giles v. Simonds, 15 Gray. 441;

Drake v. Wells, 11 Allen, 141; Hill

v. Hill, 113 Mass. 103, 105; United So-

ciety v. Brooks, 145 Mass. 410. The

subject was fully considered by

Chief Justice Bigelow in Drake v.

Wells, nbi supra, and was discussed

in the earlier case of Giles v. Simonds,

and it was held that a purchaser of

standing wood and timber, after sev-

ering the trees from the land, had an

"It is well settled that a contract
like that relied on by the plaintiff
doe not immediately pa a title to
property, and i not a ale or a contract for a ale of an inter t in land,
ut n ex cut ry agreem nt for the
l of battel , to take :ffect when
th w cl and timber are evered
from thebn<l. with a licen t nter
and ut tl e trees and remo e them.
uch a ontr t, if oral, is n t within
th
tatute of fraud , and it contruction i the ame as if it' ere in
writing. la.Bin v. 'arpenter, 4 fetc.
5
ile Y. imond , 1- Gray. 441 ·
Drake . \V 11., 11 11 n, 141 · Hill
, .. rrm,11 :Jfa .103,10.-; United.oci ty v. Brook , 145 l\:Ia . 410. The
ubject was fully con idered by
hief Ju tice Bigelow in Drake v.
vVell , ubi upra, and was di cu ed
int he earlier ca e of Gile v. Simond ,
and it w·a held that a purcha er of
tanJing wood and timber, after evering the tree from the land. had an
irrevocable license to enter and remove them· but that before they are
cut hi licen e may at any time be
revoked by the lan<l.-owner, leaving
iff br ught an action again t the ad- him no r medy but an action to remini trator and the purcba er for cover damages for the breach of the
re pectively selling the land and contract.'
<mtting the timber. Said the court:
I In addition to the cases cited
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On the other hand, as has been seen, a contract

for the sale of trees to be cut and delivered by the vendor has-

been held to be a sale of chattels, 1 and in some cases a parol

contract for the sale of trees to be at once or soon cut and re-

moved by the vendee has been held to fall within the seven-

teenth section; 2 and in one such case, 3 where the vendee had

entered and cut a part of the trees and sold some of them to

a third person, but had not yet removed any, and the vendor

then forbade him to enter on the land and to cut or remove

any of the trees, it was held that the acts of the vendee

amounted to a sufficient acceptance and receipt to satisfy the

seventeenth section, and that the parol license to enter and

take the trees, being thus coupled with a valid sale of them, was

irrevocable. That the trees are to be soon removed seems to

above, see Poor v. Oakman, 104 Mass.
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309; White v. Foster, 102 Mass. 375;

Wilson v. Fuller, 58 Minn. 149, 59 N.

W. R. 988. In a written contract for

the sale of all the pine timber on cer-

§ 337.

On the other hand, as has been seen, a con tract
for the sale of trees to be cut and deli verecl by the vendor has
been held to be a sale of c:hattels,1 and in some cases a parol
contract for the sale of trees to be at once or soon cut and removed by the vendee has been held to fall within the seventeenth section; 2 and in one such case, 3 where the vendee bad
entered and cut a part of the trees and sold some of them to
a third person, but had not yet removed any, and the vendor
then forbade him to enter on the land and to cut or remove
any of the trees, it was held that the acts of the vendee
amounted to a sufficient acceµtance and receipt to atisfy th
seventeenth section, and that the parol license to enter and
take the trees, being thus coupled with a valid sale of them, wa
irrevocable. That the trees are to be soon removed seems to

tain land, a stipulation that it is to

be cut and removed before a certain

date is a condition of the grant and

not a covenant, and conveys all the

designated timber which shall be re-

moved within the time specified.

All trees which the grantee cuts

down before the time limited be-

come his personal property, which

he has a right to remove within a

reasonable time, even though the

time fixed in the deed has expired.

Hicks v. Smith, 77 Wis. 146, 46 N. W.

R 133.

i Smith v. Surman, 9 B. & C. 561.

2 According to these cases, " a sale

of standing trees in contemplation

of their immediate separation from

the soil by either the vendor or

vendee is a constructive severance

of them, and they pass as chattels,

and consequently the contract of

sale is not embraced by the statute."

Byassee v. Reese, 4 Mete. (Ky.) 372,

83 Am. Dec. 481 [citing 1 Greenl. Ev.,

§ 271 ; Cain v. McGuire, 13 B. Mon.

(Ky.) 340]. In Leonard v. Medford

(1897), 85 Md. 666, 37 Atl. R. 365, 37

L. R. A. 449, it is said: " In Maryland,

Massachusetts, Maine, Kentucky and

Connecticut sales of growing trees

to be presently cut and removed by

the vendee are held not to be within

the operation of the fourth section

of the statute of frauds.'' Citing

Smith v. Bryan, 5 Md. 141, 59 Am. Dec.

104; Purner v. Piercy, 40 Md. 212, 17

Am. R. 591; Claflin v. Carpenter, 4

Mete. (Mass.) 5S0, 38 Am. Dec. 381;

Nettleton v. Sikes, 8 Mete. (Mass.) 34;

Bostwick v. Leach, 3 Day (Conn.),

476; Erskine v. Plummer, 7 Me. 447,

22 Am. Dec. 216; Cutler v. Pope, 13

Me. 377; Cain v. McGuire, supra;

Byasse v. Reese, supra. See also

Crosby Hardwood Co. v. Trester, 90

Wis. 412, 63 N. W. R. 105<7.

above, see Poor v. Oakman, 104 Mass. sale is not em braced by the statute.''
309; Whit.e v. Foster, 102 l\fa s. 375; Byassee v. Reese, 4 Mete. (Ky.) 372,
Wilson v. Fuller, 58 Minn. 149, 59 N. 83 Am. Dec. 481 [citing 1 Greenl. Ev.,
W.R. 9 8. In a written contract for § 271; Cain v. McGuire, 13 B. Mon.
the sale of all the pine timber oncer- (Ky.) 340]. In Leonard v. Medford
tain land, a stipulation that it is to (1897), 85 Md. 666, 37 Atl. R. 365, 37
be cut and removed before a certain L. R. A. 449, it is said: "In Maryland,
date is a condition of the grant and Massachusetts, Maine, Kentucky and
not a covenant, and conveys all the Connecticut sales of growing trees
designated timber which shall be re- to be presently cut and removed by
moved within the time specified. the venJee are held not to be within
All trees which the grantee cuts the operation of the fourth section
down before the time limited be- of the statute of frauds.'' Citing
come his personal property, which Smith v. Bryan. 51\id. 141, 59 Am. Dec.
he has a right to remove within a 104; Purner v. Piercy, 40 Md. 212, 17
reasonable time, even though the Am. R. 591; Claflin v. Carpenter, 4
time fixed in the deed has expired. Mete. ( Ia s.) 580, 38 Am. Dec. 381;
Hicks v. Smith, 77 Wis. 146, 46 N. W. Nettleton v. Sikes, 8 Mete. (Mass.) 34:
R. 133.
Bostwick v. Leach, 3 Day (Conn.),
1 Smith v. Surman, 9 B. & C. 561.
476; Erskine v. Plummer, 7 Me. 447,
2 According to these cases, "a sale 22 Am. Dec. 216; Cutler v. Pope, 13of standing trees in contemplation Me. 377; Cain v. McGuire, supra;
of their immediate separation from Byasse v. Reese, supra. See also
the soil by either the vendor or Crosby Hardwood Co. v. Trester, 90
vendee i a con tructive severance Wis. 412, 63 N. W. R. 105(7.
of them, a.nd they pass as chattels,
3 Marshall v. Green, L. R. 1 C. P.
and consequently the contract of Div. 35.
308
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be the test applied by these cases, and in the one last referred

to Lord Coleridge said : " I think we must look to the position

of matters at the time of the contract; and I think that where,

at the time of the contract, it is contemplated by the parties

that the purchaser should derive benefit from his land, then

there is a contract within the fourth section; but if the thing

purchased is to be immediately withdrawn from the land, then,

the parties having had no intention of dealing with any in-

terest in or concerning land, the contract does not fall within

that section.''

§ 338. . In still other cases this distinction is repudi-

ated. Thus in a case in Maryland 1 it is said: "The circum-

stance that the produce purchased may, or probably or cer-

tainly will, derive nourishment from the soil between the time

of the contract and the time of the delivery, is not conclusive

as to the operation of the statute. . . . Where timber or

other produce of the land, or any other thing annexed to the

freehold, is specifically sold, whether to be severed from the
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soil by the vendor or to be taken by the vendee under a spe-

cial license to enter for that purpose, it is still, in contempla-

tion of the parties, a sale of goods only, and not within the

statute."

| 339. . "Where trees are raised for the purpose of trans-

planting and sale, as in the case of a nursery, it is held that a

parol sale is valid. 2

§34.0. Growing crops. — Growing crops are of two

kinds — those which spring naturally and perennially from the

soil, such as grass, fruit, and the like, and known as fructus

not urates; and those which do not spring spontaneously from

the soil, but grow as the result of planting or sowing of seed

i Purner v. Piercy, 40 Md. 212, 17 Mete. (Mass.) 313; Miller v. Baker,

Am. R. 591. id. 27.

-'Whitmarsh v. Walker (1810), 1

309
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and cultivation, such as corn, wheat and other cereals, potatoes,

and the like, which are called fructus industriales.

§ 341. Fructus naturales. — As to the former class,

and cultivation, such as corn, wheat and other cereals, potato s,
and the like, which are calledfructus indu triales.

much of the same uncertainty exists which prevails as to grow-

ing trees, which obviously belong to the same class, and most

of that which has been said regarding trees is applicable here.

Mr. Benjamin 1 lays down the English rule as follows: "Grow-

ing crops, if fructus naturales, are part of the soil Tjefore sever-

ance, and an agreement, therefore, vesting an interest in them

in the purchaser before severance is governed by the fourth

section ; but if the interest is not to be vested till they are con-

verted into chattels by severance, then the agreement is an

executory agreement for the sale of goods, wares and merchan-

dise, governed by the seventeenth and not by the fourth sec-

tion of the statute."

In the United States a variety of rules have been suggested,

though, in general, the English rule prevails. 2 In some cases-

it has been thought that if the crops were yet to derive some
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nourishment from the soil, the contract is to be considered one

for an interest in land; but that, where the process of veg-

etation is over, or where the parties agree that the thing*

sold shall be immediately removed, the land is regarded as-

a mere warehouse for the thing sold, and the contract is for

goods.

| 342, Fructus industriales. — In respect of this class

Mr. Benjamin 3 gives the English rule as follows: "Growing

crops, if fructus industriales, are chattels, and an agreement

for the sale of them, whether mature or immature, whether

the property in them is transferred before or after sever-

ance, is not an agreement for the sale of anj^ interest in land

i Benjamin on Sales, § 126. strong, 1 Denio (N. Y.), 550; Cutler

2 See cases cited supra as to grow- v. Pope, 13 Me. 377; Smith v. Leighton,

ing trees. See also Wescott v. De- 38 Kan. 544, 5 Am. St. R. 778.

lano, 20 Wis. 514; Green v. Arm- 3 Benjamin on Sales, § 126.

310

§ 34:1. - - Fructus naturales.-As to the former clas ,
much of the same uncertainty exists which pr vails as to growing tr es, which obviou ly belon 0 to the same class, and mo t
of that which has been said regarding tre s is applicable here.
Mr. Benjamin 1 lays down the English rule as follows: "Growing crops, if friwtus nat1brales, are part of the soil before severance, and an agreement, th refor , vesting an interest in them
in the purchaser before severan e is governed by the fourth
section; but if the interest is not to be v sted till they are converted into chattels by severance, then the agreement is an
executory agreement for the sale of goo ls, wares and m rchanclise, governed by the seventeenth and not by the fourth section of the statute."
In the United tates a variety of rules have been suggested,
though in general, the English rule prevails. 2 In some cases
it has been thought that if the crops were yet to derive some
nourishment from the soil, the contract is to be considered one
for an interest in land; but that, where the process of vegetation is over, or where the parties agree that the thing
sold shall be immediately removed, the land is regarded as
a mere warehouse for the thing sold, and the contract is for
goods.
§ 342. - - Frnctus industriales.-In respect of this class
~Ir. Benjamin 3 gives the English rule as follows: "Growing
crops, if friwtus inditstriales, are chattels, and an agreement
for the sale of them, whether mature or immature, whether
the property in them is transferred before or after severance, is not an agreement for the sale of any interest in land
Benjamin on Sale , § 126.
strong, 1 Denio (N. Y.), 550; Cutler
e ca es cited supra as to grow- v. Pope, 131\fe. 377; mi th v. Leighton,.
ing tree .
ee al o We cott v. De- 3 Kan. 544, 3 Am. t. R. 778.
3 Benjamin on Sales,§ 126.
lano, 20 Wis. 514; Green v. Arm310
I
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CH. VII.] CONTRACT UNDER STATUTE OF FRAUDS. [§§ 343, 344.

and is not governed by the fourth section of the statute of

frauds."

In the United States the same rule prevails, 1 though it is

usually held that a sale of the land carries with it the crops

growing thereon in the absence of a written reservation of the

crops. 2

Such crops only, it is held, can be regarded as fructus in-

(hisfriales, so far as the right to emblements is concerned, as

ordinarily repay the labor by which they are produced within

the year in which that labor is bestowed, though the crop may,

in extraordinary seasons, be delayed beyond that period. 3

§ 34-3. — — Fruit, hops, etc. — Many kinds of fruit are prop-

erly to be classed under the head of fructus naturales, and so it

was formerly held of hops. But on account of the great labor

required to be annually bestowed upon them, it is now held that

hops 4 and many kinds of fruit are rather to be classed among

the fructus ind ust /'idles.

§ 344. . Thus, in a leading case in Maryland, 5 it was held
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that a sale of a crop of peaches then growing in the seller's

orchard, to be gathered and removed by the purchaser as they

matured, was not within the statute as a sale of an interest in

land, the court saying that " a growing crop of peaches or other

1 Carson v. Browder, 2 Lea (Term.), Mcllvaine v. Harris, 20 Mo. 457, 64

701; Frank v. Harrington, 36 Barb. Am. Dec. 196.

(N. Y.) 415; Davis v. McFarlane, 37 3 Graves v. Weld, 5 B. & Ad. 105.

CaL 634, 99 Am. Dec. 340; Bricker v. 4 Frank v. Harrington, 36 Barb.

Hughes, 4 Ind. 146; Weatherby v. (N. Y.) 415; Rodwell v. Phillips, 9 M.

] 1 1 -ins, 6 Ind. 73; Moreland v. Myall, & W. 501.

14 Bush (Ky.), 474; Holt v. Holt, 57 sPurner v. Piercy, 40 Md. 212, 17

Mo. App. 272. Am. R. 591. That fruit requiring

2 Vanderkarr v. Thompson, 19 Mich, annual labor, like apples, peaches,

82; Tripp v. Hasceig. 20 Mich. 254: blackberries, and the like, is fructus

Scriven v. Moote, 36 Mich. 64; Rug- industriales, see also Smock v.

gles v. First Nat. Bank, 43 Mich. 192; Smock, 37 Mo. App. 56; Vulicevich

Coman v. Thompson, 47 Mich. 22; v. Skinner, 77 CaL 239.

Knapp v. "Woolverton, 47 Mich. 292;
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fruit, requiring periodical expense, industry and attention in.

its yield and production, may be well classed as fructus in-

dustriales, and not subject to the fourth section of the statute."

In this case the court, ignoring many of the distinctions often

made, lays down the rule as follows: " There is nothing in the

vegetable or fruit which is an interest in or concerning land,

when severed from the soil, whether trees, grass and other

spontaneous growth {prima vestura), or grain, vegetables, or

any kind of crops (fructus industriales) the product of peri-

odical planting and culture; they are alike mere chattels, and

the severance may be in fact, as when they are cut and re-

moved from the ground; or in law, as when they are growing,

the owner in fee of the land, by a valid conveyance, sells them

to another person, or where he sells the land, reserving them

by express provision.

" As a general rule, if the products of the earth are sold

specifically, and by the terms of the contract to be separately

delivered, as chattels, such a sale is not affected by the fourth
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section of the statute, as amounting to a sale of any interest in

the land.

"When such is the character of the transaction, it matters

not whether the product be trees, grass or other spontaneous

growth, or grain, vegetables or other crops raised periodically

by cultivation; and it is quite as immaterial whether the prod-

uct is fully grown or in the process of growing at the time of

making the contract.

" The circumstance that the produce purchased may, or prob-

ably or certainly will, derive nourishment from the soil be-

tween the time of the contract and the time of the delivery, is

not conclusive as to the operation of the statute.

"If the contract, when executed, is to convey to the pur-

chaser a mere chattel, though it may be in the interim a part

of the realty, it is not affected by the statute; but if the con-

tract is, in the interim, to confer upon the purchaser an exclusive

right in the land for a time, for the purpose of making a profit

of the growing surface, it is affected by the statute, and must

312
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fruit, r qmrmg periodical expens , in lu try an l attention in
its yield and prouuction, may be well cla sed as fructit ind?.tstricf;les, and not subject to the fourth section of the statute."
In this case the court, ignoring many of the di tinctions o{t n
made, lays down the rule as follows: "There is nothing in the
vegetable or fruit which is an int rest in or concerning lan 1,
when severed from the soil, whether tre , gra s and oth r
spontaneous growth (prtnia Vect1CJ'a), Or grain, vegetables, Or
any kin l of crops (fructus indust'r iale ) the product of p riodical planting and culture; th y are alike m re chattels, an L
the severance may be in fact, as when they are cut an<l. removed from the ground; or in law, as when th y are growing,
the owner in £ee of the land, by a valid conveyance, sells th m
to another person, or where he sells the land, reserving them
by express provision.
"As a general rule, if the products of the earth are sold
specifically, and by the terms of the contract to be separately
delivered, as chattels, such a sale is not affecte<l. by the fourth
section of the statute, as amounting to a sale of any interest in
the land.
"When such is the character of the transaction, it matter
not whether the product be trees, grass or other spontaneous
growth, or grain, vegetables or other crops raised periodically
by cultivation; and it is quite as immaterial whether the product is fully grown or in the process of growing at the time of
making the con tract.
"The circumstu,nce that the produce purchased may, or probably or certainly will, derive nourishment from the soil between the -time of the contract an l the time of the delivery, is
not conclusive as to the operation of the statute.
"If the contract, when executed, is to convey to the purchaser a mere chattel, though it may be in the interim a part
of the realty, it is not affected by the statute; but if .the contract i , in the interini, to confer upon the purchaser an exclusive
right in the land for a time, for the purpose of making a profit
of the growing surface, it is affected by the statute, and must
312
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be in writing, although the purchaser is at the last to take from

the land only a chattel."

§ 345. Crops to be raised.— A contract for the sale of

a crop to be raised and delivered by the owner of the soil is

be in writing although the purchaser is at the last to take from
the land only a chattel. '

clearly not within the provisions of the fourth section, 1 though

question might be made whether it was a contract for the sale

of goods or a contract for work and labor. 2

Contracts for crops to be raised by the party who is to have

them stand obviously upon different ground.

g 346. Uncut ice. — Ice gathered and prepared for the

market is, of course, a subject of sale as personalty; 3 but even

while yet uncut and ungathered a contract for its sale has been

held to be for a sale of personalty. Thus, in the leading case, 4

Campbell, C. J., says : " The ephemeral character of ice renders

it incapable of any permanent or beneficial use as part of the

soil, and it is only valuable when removed from its original

place. Its connection — if its position in the water can be

3!5. - - rop to be rai ed.-A contract for the sale of
a crop to be rai ed and delivered by the owner of the soil is
clearly not within the provisions of the fourth section, 1 though
, que tion might be made whether it wa a contract for the sale
of goo l or a ontract for work and labor. 2
ontract for crop to be raised by the party who is to have
them stan l obviou ly upon different ground.
n

called a connection — is neither organic nor lasting. Its re-
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moval or disappearance can take nothing from the land. It

can only be used and sold as personalty, and its only use tends

to its immediate destruction. We think that it should be dealt

with in law according to its uses in fact, and that any sale of

ice ready formed, as a distinct commodity, should be held a sale

of personalty, whether in the water or out of the water."

§ 347. Minerals. — Although the term "land " includes

what is above and below the surface of the earth, and minerals

1 Watts v. Friend. 10 B. & C. 446; 3 See Morse v. Moore, 83 Me. 473, 22

Pitkin v. Noyes, 48 N. H. 294, 97 Am. AtL R. 362, 13 L. R. A. 224, 23 Am.

Dec. 615. 2 Am. R. 218. See also St. R. 783; Murchie v. Cornell, 155

Webster v. Zielly, 52 Barb. (N. Y.) Mass. 60, 29 N. E. R. 207, 14 L. R. A.

482; Talmadge v. Lane, 41 N. Y. 492.

Supp. 413, 17 Misc. 731. Contra, Bow- * Higgins v. Kusterer, 41 Mich. 318,

man v. Conn, 8 Ind. 58. 32 Am. R. 160. But see State v. Pott-

2 See Pitkin v. Noyes, supra. meyer, 33 Ind. 402, 5 Am. R. 224.
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3!6. - - neut ice.- Ice gathered and prepared for the
market i of cour e, a ubject f sale as per onalty; 3 but even
while y t uncut and un 0 ath re a contr~lCt for its sale has been
h lcl to be for a ale of p r onalty. Thus, in the leading case 4
ampb 11, 0. J., a s: ' The phemeral character of ice renders
it inca1 ble of any p rmanent or beneficial use as part of the
soil, and it is onl3 valuable when r moved from it original
place.
t connecti n - if it po ition in the water can be
calle l a connection - is neither organic nor lasting. It remo al or di appearance can take nothing from the land. It
can only be us d and old as personalty, and it only use tends
to it immediate destruction. We think that it should be dealt
vith in law according to it u es in fact, and that any sale of
ice rea ly forme 1, as a di tinct commodity, should be held a sale
of per onalty, whether in the water or out of the water."

34:7. - - Minerals.- Al though the term "land" includes
what is above and below the surface of the earth, and minerals
1 \ att v. Friend. 10 B. & C. 446;
a See Iorse v. Moore, 83 l\Ie. 4""3, 22
Pitkin v. Noyes, 4 N. H. 094, 97 Am. Atl R. 362, 13 L. R. . 224, 23 Am.
Dec. 61-. 2 Am. R. 01 . See al o St. R. 783; Murchie v. Cornell, 1.55
Web ter v. Zielly, 52 Barb. (N. Y.) l\lass. 60, 29 N. E. R. 207, 14 L. R. A.
9 • Talmadge v. Lane, 41 N. Y.
492.
4 Higgins v. Ku terer 41 ·~\Iich. 318,
upp. 413, 17 l\lisc. 31. Contra, Bow32 Am. R. 160. But see State v. Pottman v. Conn, 8 Ind. 58.
meyer, 33 Ind. 402, 5 Am. R. 224.
2 See Pitkin v. Noyes, supra.
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lying below it are included in the general definition of land,

nevertheless when these ores or minerals are severed from their

immediate connection with the earth, as they must necessarily

be in mining, they cease to be a part of the land and become

chattels. 1 Hence a contract by which parties are to work quar-

ries of stone or mines of lead upon another's land is not a con-

tract for the sale of an interest in land when the contract also

provides that the parties are to divide the proceeds from the

sale of stone so quarried or the minerals so dug; 2 for the par-

ties who work the quarries or mines have no interest in any

land, but only in the substances taken by them, which are chat-

tels. So also in the mining States on the Pacific slope the

claim to mine or the right to mine is a chattel interest, while

the mine itself is realty. 3 The reason for this rule is, that

the right rests only upon possession and is not an interest in

land.

IV.

Of the Pkice or Yalue.
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§348, Operation of the statute.— As has been seen, the

English statute by its terms applies only to contracts for the

sale of goods, wares and merchandise of the price or value of

ten pounds and upwards; and this provision has been gen-

erally adopted in the American States, the limit fixed being

usually $50, but varying in other States from no stated amount

whatever up to $300.

LAW OF SALE.

[nooK r.

lying below it are included in the general definition of land,
nevertheless when these ores or minerals are se-vered from th ir
immediate connection with the earth, as they must neces arily
be in mining, they cease to be a part of the land and become
chn,ttels. 1 Hence a contract by which parties are to work quarries of stone or mines of leatl upon another's land is not a contract for the sale of an interest in land when the contract also
provides that the parties are to divide the proceeds from the
sale of stone so quarri d or the mineral so dug; 2 for the parties who work the quarries or mines have no inter tin any;
land, but only in the substanc s taken by them, which are chattels. So also in the mining States on the Pacific slope the
claim to mine or the right to mine is a chattel inter st, while
the mine itself is realty. 3 The reason for this rule is, that
the right rests only upon possession and is not an interest in
land.

Consideration has also been given to the various methods of

IV.

fixing the price, and nothing further need here be said on that

subject.

Where the parties have expressly fixed the price, or where it

OF

THE PRICE OR

v ALUE.

is readily ascertainable from the data or standards agreed

upon, the question whether the price or value is such as to

§ 34:8. Operation of the statute.-As has been seen, the

i Green v. Ashland Iron Co., 62 Pa. 3 Hardenbergh v. Bacon, 33 Cal. 356;

St. 97; Kelley v. Ohio Oil Co., 57 Ohio Table Mount, etc. Co. v. Stranahan,

St. 317, 49 N. E. R. 399, 39 L. R. A. 765. 20 CaL 198.

* Treat v. Hiles, 68 Wis. 344.
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English ·statute by its terms applies only to contracts for the
sale of goods, wares and merchandise of the price or value of
ten pounds and upwards; and this provision has been generally adopted in the American States, the limit fixed being
•
usually $50, but varying in other States from no stated amount
whatever up to $300.
Consideration has also been give~ to the various methods of
fixing the price, and nothing further need here be said on that
subject.
Where the parties have expressly fixed the price, or where it
is readily ascertainable from the data or standards agreed
upon, the question whether the price or value is such as to
1 Green v. Ashland Iron Co., 62 Pa.
s Harden bergh v. Bacon, 33 Cal. 356;
St. 97; Kelley v. Ohio Oil Co., 57 Ohio Table Mount. etc. Co. v. Stranahan,
St. 317, 49 N. E. R. 399, 39 L. R. A. 765. 20 Cal 198.
2 Treat v. Hiles, 68 Wis. 344.
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CH. VII.] CONTRACT UNDER STATUTE OF FRAUDS.

[§ 349. '

[§ 349.

make the statute applicable is usually one of little difficulty.

Certain unusual questions may, however, present themselves,

to which some attention must be paid. Thus —

§ 349. Sales of various articles aggregating more than

the limit. — "Where a sale is contracted for of various articles,

make the statute applicable is usually one of little difficulty.
Certain unusual questions may, however, present themselves,
to which some attention mu t be paid. Thus -

none of which by itself is of the price or value fixed, but the

aggregate of which falls within the provisions of the statute,

the question of the statute's application presents some diffi-

culty.

The usual rule is that where several articles are sold at sub-

stantially the same time and as part of the same transaction,

though at a separate price for each article, the contract will be

deemed to be entire, and the statute will apply according as

the aoffreixate falls within or without the limit. 1 This has

DO ©

1 The leading case upon this sub-

ject is that of Baldey v. Parker. 2
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B. & C. 87. There the plaintiffs were

linen-drapers, and the defendant

came to their shop and bargained

for several articles. A separate price

was agreed for each, and no one arti-

cle was of the value of 10/. Some

were measured in his presence, some

§ 3-!9. Sales of varieus article aggregating more than
tb e limit.- Where a sale is contracted for of various .articles,
none of which by itself is of the price or value fixed, but the
ao-gregate of which falls within the provisions of the statute,
the question of the statut 's application presents some difficulty.
The u ual rule is that where several articles are sold at ubstantially the same time and as part of the same transaction,
thou;h at a separate price for each articl , the contract will be
leemed to be ntire, and the statute will apply accordi ng as
the aggre 0 ate falls within or without the limit. 1 This has

he marked with a pencil, others he

assisted in cutting from a large bulk.

He then desired an account of the

whole to be sent to his house, and

went away. The account as sent

amounted to 707., and he demanded

a discount of 20/. per cent, for ready

money, which was refused. The

goods were then sent to his house,

and he refused to take them. Held,

that this was one entire contract

within the seventeenth section. All

the judges, Abbott, C. J., Bayley,

Holroyd and Best, JJ., gave separate

opinions. Abbott, C. J., said: " Look-

ing at the whole transaction, I am of

opinion that the parties must be con-

sidered to have made one entire con-

tract for the whole of the articles."

Bayley, J., said : " It is conceded that

on the same day, and indeed at the

same meeting, the defendant con-

tracted with the plaintiffs for the

purchase of goods for a much greater

amount than 107. Had the entire

value been set upon the whole goods

together, there cannot be a doubt of

its being a contract for a greater

amount than 10/. within the seven-

teenth section; and I think that the

circumstance of a separate price

being fixed upon each article makes

no such difference as will take the

case out of the operation of that law.''

Holroyd, J., said: "This was all one

transaction, though composed of dif-

ferent parts. At first it appears to

have been a contract for goods of

less value than 10/., but in the course

of the dealing it grew to be a con-

tract for a much larger amount. At

last, therefore, it was one entire con-

tract within the meaning and mis-

315

I The leading case upon thi subject i that of Baldey v. ParkE>r. 2
. & C. 37. There the plaintiff were
linen-draper , and the defendant
·ame to their bop and bargain cl
for e eral article . A p rate pri e
was agreed for each and no one artile was of the value of lOZ.
ome
~ere mea ured in hi pre ence, ome
he marked with a pencil, other be
a si ted in cutting from a large bulk.
He then de ired an ac ount of the
whole to be ent to his hou e, and
went away. The account as sent
amounted to 707., and he demanded
a discount of 9.0l. per cent. for r eady
money, which was refused. The.
good -were then ent to his house,
and he refu ed to take them. H eld,
that this was one entire contra t
within the seventeenth section. All
the judges, Abbott, C. J., Bayley,
Holroyd and Be t, JJ., gave separate
opinion . Abbott, C. J., said: ''Looking at the whole transaction, I am of
opinion that the parties must be con-

idered to have mad one entire contract f r the whole of the a rticles."
Bayley, J., said: ' It is conceded that
on the ame day, and indeed at the
same meeting, the defendant contracted with the plaintiffs for the
pur ha, e of good for a much greater
amount than 10l. Had the entire
value been set upon the whole goods
together, there cannot be a doubt of
it~ being a contract for a greater
amount than 10l. within the seventeen th ection; and I think that the
circumstance of a separate price
being fixed upon each article makes
no such difference as will take the
case out of the operation of that law.. ,
Holroyd, J .. said: " This was all one
transaction, though composed of clifferent parts. .At first it appears to
have been a contract for goods of
les value than 10l., but in the cour e
of the dealing it grew to be a contract for a much larger amount. At
last, therefore, it was one entire contract within the meaning and mis-
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350.]
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[BOOK I.

been held to be so, though the articles were to be delivered at

different times; 1 though part were yet to be manufactured; 2

and though the various articles contracted for were at different

places and the bargain as to each was made where each article

was, but all on the same day. 3

" The mere fact that a separate price is agreed upon for each

article," it is said, "or even that each article is laid aside as

purchased, makes no difference so long as the different pur-

chases are so connected in time or place or in the conduct of

the parties that the whole may be fairly considered one entire

transaction." 4

350.

There may be cases, however, where the con-

tract as to each article is distinct, and then the statute must

be applied to each sale separately. Thus it has been held that

been beld to be so, though the articles were to be delivered at
different times; t though part were yet to be manufactured· 2
and though the -various articles contracted for were at different
places and the bargain as to each was made where each article
was, but all on the same day. 3
"The mere fact that a separate price is agreed upon for each
article,' it is said, "or even that each article is laid aside as
pnrchased, makes no difference so long as the different purchase are so connected in time or place or in the conduct of
the parties that th whole may be fairly considered one entire
transaction." 4

where the terms and responsibilities differ as to the various
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articles, the contracts are distinct; 5 and so they are where dif-

chief of the statute of frauds, it being

§ 350. - - . There may be cases, however, where t he con-

the intention of that statute that

tvhere the contract, either at the com-

mencement or at the conclusion,

amounted to or exceeded the value of

101., it should not bind unless the

requisites there mentioned were com-

plied with. The danger of false tes-

trnct as to each article is distinct, and then the statute mu t
be applied to each sale separately. Thus it ha been held that
where the terms and responsibilities differ as to the various
articles, the contracts are distinct; 5 and so they are where dif-

timony is quite as great where the

bargain is ultimately of the value of

10Z. as if it had been originally of

that amount." Best, J., said: '-What-

ever this might have been at the be-

ginning, it was clearly at the close

one bargain for the whole of the arti-

cles. The account was. all made out

together, and the conversation about

discount was with reference to the

whole account." Baldey v. Parker

is followed in Allard v. Greasert, 61

N. Y. 1, and in the cases cited in fol-

lowing notes. See also Cooke v. Mil-

lard, 65 N. Y. 352, 22 Am. R. 619.

i Gault v. Brown, 48 N. H. 183, 2

Am. R. 210.

2 Scott v. Railway Co., 12 M. & W.

33.

3 Bigg v. Whisking, 14 C. B. 195.

4 Browne on the Statute of Frauds,

§314.

5 Thus where there was a sale by

auction of various articles, in differ-

ent amounts and at different prices,

the court, after referring to other

cases deemed to be entire, said : " But

in neither of these cases was there

any difference in the terms of sale or

of warranty by the seller — the terms

were precisely the same, and the

guaranty the same, as to every arti-

cle sold. In the case before us the

terms and responsibility were differ-

ent, and there were two distinct con-

tracts; and it requires no reasoning

nor authority to show that two dis-

tinct contracts are not one contract."
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chief of the statute of frauds, it being

1 Gault

v. Brown, 48 N. H. 183, 2

the intention of that statute that Am. R. 210.
whern the confract, either at the com2 S ott v. Railway Co., 12 l\f. & W.
niencement or at the conclusion, 33.
amounted to or exceeded the value of
3 Bigg v. Whi king, 14 C. B. 195.
IOZ., it should not bind unless the
4 Browne on the Statute of Fra u ds,
requisites there mentioned were com- § 314.
plied with. The danger of false tes5 Thu where ther e was a sale by
timony is quite as great where the auction of various a rticles, in differbargain is ultimately of the value of ent amounts and at different prices,
10l. as if it bad been originally of the court . after r eferrin g t o other
that amount." Best, J., saicl: "What- cases deemed to be en t ire, sai<l: "But
ever this might have been at the be- in neither of the e cases was t here
ginning, it was clearly at the clo e any differ ence in the terms of sale or
one bargain for the whole of the arti- of warranty by the seller - t he ter ms
cles. The account wa~ all made out were precisely the same, and the
together, and the conver ·ation about guaranty the same, as t o every artidiscount was with reference to the cle sold. In the case before u t he
whole account." Baldey v. Parker terms and r espon ibility were differi followed in Allard v. Greasert, 61 ent, and ther e were two distin t onN. Y. 1, and in the ca e cit din fol- tracts; and it req uir es no rea oning
lowino- notes. See al o Cooke v. Mil- nor authority to how that two di lard, 65 N. Y. 352, 22 Am. R. 619.
tinct cont racts are not one contract. "
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[§ 351.

ferent articles are bought at distinct prices, to be delivered at

different times and paid for on delivery. 1

§ 351.

ferent articles are bought at di tinct prices, to be delivered at
different times and paid for on delivery. 1

Sales of various articles at auction. — Al-

though the contrary has been held in the case of sales by auc-

tion of distinct parcels of land at separate biddings and for a

several price for each, 2 in regard to sales of various articles of

personalty by auction it has been held that the same rule ap-

plies which applies, as has been seen, to private sales, i. e., that

ordinarily the contract is to be regarded as entire for all the

articles, even though the articles were numerous and were

struck off separately at separate and distinct prices, 3 and that it

can make no difference, in this respect, whether the auction con-

tinued one day or several days upon the same lot of goods sold

on the same terms. 4

Barclay v. Tracy (1842), 5 Watts &

Serg. (Pa.) 45.
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1 Thus where there was negotiation

for the sale of apples and a crop of

barley, the apples to be delivered im-

mediately, and the barley as soon as

a car could be procured for shipping

it, the court said: "The articles sold

were of different characters: they

351. - - Sa le

of ,·ariou

article

at anction.-Al-

thouo·h the contrary ha been held in the a e of sales by auction of li tinct parcels of land at eparate bidding. and for a
veral price for ea h,2 in regard to ale of various article of
p r onalt by auction it ha been held that the am rule ap}Jli which applies, a ha been seen, to private al s, i . e., that
rclinaril the ontract is to be regar led as entire for all the
article even tbouo·h the article w re numerou an l \Vere
truck off separately at eparate and di tinct price ·, 3 and tbat it
an make no clifferenc in tbi r pect, whether the auction contin u l one lay or everal lay upon the same lot of goods sold
on the same terms. 4

were to be delivered at different

times, and paid for respectively on

delivery. The contract was to be

executed distributively, as was said

by Judge Der.io in respect to the

hogs sold in the case of Tipton v.

Feitner, 20 N. Y. 425. The case seems

to me precisely within the rule or

exception stated by Chancellor Wal-

worth in Mills v. Hunt, 20 Wend.

434." Aldrich v. Pyatt (1872), 64 Barb.

(N. Y.) 391.

In Irvine v. Stone, 6 Cush. 508,

where thex - e was an oral contract for

the sale of a large quantity of coal,

and also for its transportation, it was

held that the contract being void as

to the sale was void also as to the

transportation: but in Harman v.

Reeve, 25 L. J. Com. PI. 257, where

the contract was for the sale and

pasturing of a mare and colt, worth

over 10/., the court, while holding the

contract entire, said that a recovery

could be had for the pasturing.

. - Van Eps v. Schenectady, 12 Johns.

(N. Y.) 436, 7 Am. Dec. 330.

A fortiori so if a separate memo-

randum is signed for each. Wells v.

Day, 124 Mass. 32.

3 Mills v. Hunt, 17 Wend. (N. Y.)

336, 20 id. 431 ; Coff man v. Hampton,

2 Watts & Serg. (Pa.) 377, 37 Am.

Dec. 511; Jenness v. Wendell, 51

N. H. 63, 12 Am. R. 48; Tompkins v.

Haas, 2 Pa. St. 74 (citing also 1 Salk.

65).

The remarks in Messer v. Wood-

man, 22 N. H. 172, 53 Am. Dec. 241,

to the contrary, are said, in Jenness

v. Wendell, supra, to be mere dicta.

* Jenness v. Wendell, 51 N. H. 63,

12 Am. R. 48.
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Barclay v. Tracy (1 42), 5 \Vatt & to the ale was void al o as to the
erO'. (Pa.) 4-,
tran portation: but in Harman v.
l Thu where there wa negotiation ReeYe, 25 L. J.
om. Pl. 257, where
for th ale of ap1 le and a crop of the contract wa for the ale and
barle , the apple to be delivered im- pa turing of a mare and colt, worth
mediately, and the barley a oon a ' OV"er 10l., the court, while hold in()' the
a car could be procured for hipping contract entire, aid that a recovery
it, the court said: The article old could be had for the pa turing.
were of different character : they
2 Van Ep v. Schenectady, 12 John .
were to be delivered at lifferent (.1. • Y.) 436 7 Am. Dec. 330.
time , and paid for re, p ctively on
A fortiori o if a eparate memodelivery. The contract wa to be randum i igned for each. Wells v.
executed distributively, a W'a aid Day, 194 :Ma . 32.
by Judge De1'!io in re pect to the
31\Iill v. Bunt, 17 Wend. (N. Y.)
hog old in t'.1e ca e of Tipton '" 336, 20 id. 431; Coffman v. Hampton,
Feitner, 20 N. Y. 425. The ca ·e eems 2 \ att & erg. (Pa.) 377, 37 m.
to me preci ely within the rule or Dec. 511 · Jenne
v. Wendell, 51
exception tated by Chancellor \Val- N. H. 63, 19 Am. R. 4 ; Tompkins v.
worth in Mill v. Hunt, 20 Wend. Haa , 2 Pa. St. 74 (citing also 1 Salk.
43..J-. · Al lri h v. Pyatt (1872), 64 Barb. 65).
( . Y.) 391.
The remarks in lfesser v. WoodIn In·ine v. tone, 6 Cush. 50 , man, 22 . H. 172, 53 Am. Dec. 2±1,
wh re there wa an oral contract for to the contrary, are said, in Jenne s
the ale of a large quantity of coal, v. Wendell, supra, to be mere dicta.
and al o for its tran portation, it wa
4 Jenne
v. Wendell, 51 N. H. 63,
held that the contract being void as 12 Am. R. 4 .
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§§ 332, 353.J

LAW OF SALE.

[BOOK I.

§§ 352, 353.] law of sale. [book i.

§ 352, How, when amount uncertain at time of sale. —

"Where, at the time the contract for the sale is entered into,

the amount is uncertain, as where the exact quantity, weight

or price is yet to be ascertained, the application of the statute

is to be determined by the result. 1 Thus, a contract to sell all

the broom-corn which might be raised in a given year on a

certain piece of ground at a fixed price per ton, 2 or to sell all

the flax-straw at a given price per ton which might be raised

from a certain quantity of seed, 3 or to buy all the mules of a

given strain which might be bred during a certain season at a

fixed price per head, 4 is within the statute where the result

shows the aggregate to exceed the statutory limit, though in

each case the minimum unit was below the limit.

Where no price at all is expressly agreed upon, Mr. Browne 5

expresses the opinion that the parties, agreeing thus tacitly

upon the quantum valet, "do contract for a fair price, which

is capable of being ascertained by proof, and thus their bargain

is brought within the reach of the statute, where that price is

Y.
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shown to exceed the amount therein fixed."

Of Acceptance and Receipt.

§ 353. What the statute requires. — The English statute

declares, and the American statutes are substantially the same,

that no contract of sale of the kind already considered shall be

good, unless —

1. The buyer shall accept part of the goods so sold and act-

ually receive the same ;

2. Or give 'something in earnest to bind the bargain, or in

part payment;

1 Watts v. Friend, 10 B. & C. 446; 3 Brown v. Sanborn, supra.

§ 352. How, when amount uncertain at time of ale.Where, at the time the contract for the sale is nterecl into,
the amount is uncertain, as where the exact quantity, weight
or price is yet to be ascertained, the application of the statute
is to be determined by the result. 1 Thus, a contract to se11 all
the broom-corn which might be raised in a given year on a
certain piece of ground at a fixed price per ton, 2 or to sell all
the flax-straw at a given price per ton which might be raised
from a certain quantity of seed, 3 or to buy all the mules of a
given strain which might be bred during a certain season at a
fixed price per head,4 is within the statute where the result
shows the aggregate to exceed the statutory limit, though in
each case the minimum unit wa below the limit.
Where no price at all is expre ly agreed upon, ~fr. Browne 5
expr sses the opinion that the parties, agreeing thus tacitly
upon the qitanturn valet, "do contract for a fair price, which
is capable of being ascert.ained by proof, and thus their bargain
is brought within the reach of the statute, where that price is
shown to exceed the amount therein fixed."

Carpenter v. Galloway (1881), 73 Ind. 4 Carpenter v. Galloway, supra.

418; Brown v. Sanborn (1875), 21 Minn. 5 Browne on Statute of Frauds,

v.

402; Bowman v. Conn (1856), 8 Ind. 58. § 313.

2 Bowman v. Conn, supra.
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OF

AccEPTANCE AND RECEIPT.

§ 353. What the statute reqnires.-The English statute
declares, and the American statutes are substantially the same,
that no contract of sale of the kind already considered shall be
good, unless 1. The buyer shall accept part of the goods so sold and actually receive the same;
2. Or give ·something in earnest to bind the bargain, or in
part payment;
l Watts v. Friend, 10 B. & C. 446;
s Brown v. Sanborn, supra.
Carpenter v. Galloway (1881), 73 Ind.
4 Carpenter v. Galloway, supra.
418; Brown v. Sanborn (1875), 21 Minn.
5 Browne on Statute of Frauds,
402; Bowman v. Conn (1856), 8 Ind. 58. § 313.
2 Bowman v. Conn, supr·a.
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CH. VII.] CONTRACT UNDER STATUTE OF FRAUDS. [§§ 354, 355.

3. Or that some note or memorandum in writing of the said

bargain be made and signed by the parties to be charged by

such contract, or their agents thereunto lawfully authorized.

The first of these exceptions must now be considered. And,

at the outset, it must be noticed that — ■

§ 354. Delivery, acceptance and actual receipt are re-

quired. — The statute requires two things of the buyer which

are here radically different in their nature, neither of which is

the equivalent of the other, and neither of which can be dis-

pensed with, i. e., (1) that the buyer shall accept part of the

goods so sold, and (2) shall actually receive the same. But be-

fore the buyer can accept and actually receive the goods, it is

evident that there must be a delivery of them by the seller.

The result, therefore, is to require a delivery by the seller, and

an acceptance and actual receipt by the buyer. Each one of

these elements may exist without the others, but the absence of

any one of them will invalidate the sale. Thus —

1. Of Delivery l)ij the Seller.
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§ 355. Necessity of delivery. — There must be a delivery of

the goods by the seller in pursuance of the contract and with

the intention to pass the title. 1 This delivery must also be the

voluntary, intentional act of the seller. If, therefore, the pur-

chaser acquires possession of the goods without the seller's con-

sent, by mistake or fraud, 2 or by legal process, 3 or without the

seller's knowledge, 4 or after his order for their delivery had

been countermanded, 5 or from an agent whose authority was

not sufficient or had expired, 6 there will not be such a delivery

as the statute contemplates.

1 Washington Ice Co. v. Webster, 3 Washington Ice Co. v. Webster,

62 Me. 341, 16 Am. R. 462; Smith v. supra.

Hudson, 6 B. & S. 431. 4 Young v. Blaisdell, 60 Me. 272.

2 Brand v. Focht, 1 Abb. App. Dec. 5 Smith v. Hudson, supra.

(N. Y.) 185. 6 Matthiessen, etc. Co. v. McMahon,

38 N. J. L. 536.
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§§ 3 6-35 .]

LAW OF SALE.

[u

K

r.

§§ 356-358.] law of sale. [book r.

§ 356. B ut delivery alone not enough.- But, obv10usly, in-

§ 356. But delivery alone not enough. — But, obviously, in-

asmuch as there may be a form of delivery without either an

acceptance or actual receipt by the purchaser, delivery alone is

not enough. Thus, though the delivery of goods to a common

carrier, consigned to the buyer for transportation to him, may

be a sufficient delivery to pass the title, it does not constitute

such an acceptance and receipt by the buyer as will satisf}^ the

statute, even though the carrier were one designated by the

buyer, unless the latter also authorizes the carrier to accept. 1

The requirements of the statute demand action on the part of

both the seller and the buyer, and clearly, therefore, no act of the

seller alone, in attempted execution of the contract, can suffice. 2

The fuller expositions of this principle will be found in the

following subdivisions.

2. Of Acceptance faj the Buyer.

§357. Acceptance must be shown. — Passing now to the

acts required of the buyer, attention will be paid to the require-

ment of acceptance. Not only must there be a delivery by the
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seller, but the buyer must also accept a part, at least, of the

goods sold. As will be at once seen, there may be both a de-

livery and a receipt of the goods without an acceptance, as

where the buyer has the right to examine the goods after their

receipt to determine whether he will accept; but both such a

asmuch as there may be a form of delivery without ither an
ace ptance or actual receipt by the purchaser, deli very alone i
not enough. Thus, though the delivery of goods to a common
carrier, consigned to the buyer for transportation to him, may
be a sufficient delivery to pass the title, it does not constitute
such an acceptance and receipt by the buyer as will sati fy the
statute, even though the carrier were one designated by the
buyer, unle s the latter also authorizes the carrier to accept. 1
The requirements of the statute demand action on the part of
both the seller and the buyer, and clearly, therefore, no act of the
seller alone in attempted execution of the contract, can suffice. 2
The fuller expositions of this principle will be found in the
following subdivi ions.

delivery and receipt will not suffice without acceptance.

2. Of .Acceptctnce by the Buyer.

§358. Must be voluntary and unconditional. — The

acceptance of the goods which will satisfy the requirement of

the statute must be the voluntary, unequivocal and uncondi-

tional act of the buyer or his authorized agent, manifesting his

1 See post, § 365. W. R. 465; Jamison v. Simon, 68 Cal.

2 Caulkins v. Hellman, 47 N. Y. 449, 17, 8 Pac. R. 502; Hansen v. Roter,

7 Am. R. 461; Taylor v. Mueller, 30 64 Wis. 622, 25 N. W. R. 530; Smith

Minn. 343, 44 Am. R. 199, 15 N. W. R. v. Brennan, 62 Mich. 349, 28 N. W. R.

413; Simmons Hardware Co. v. Mul- 892; Ex parte Parker, 11 Neb. 309;

len, 33 Minn. 195, 22 N. W. R. 294; Powder Live Stock Co. v. Lamb, 38

Fontaine v. Bush, 40 Minn. 141, 41 N. Neb. 339, 56 N. W. R. 1019.
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§ 357 . Acceptance m ust be shown.- Passing now to the
acts required of the buyer, attention will be paid to the requirement of acce1 tance. Not only must there be a delivery by the
sell r, but the buyer must also accept a part, at least, of the
goods sold. As will be at once seen, there may be both a <leli very and a receipt of the goods without an acceptance, as
where the buyer has the right to examine the goods after their
receipt to determine whether he will accept; but both such a
<leli very and receipt will not suffice without acceptance.

§ 358. - - Mu t be voluntary and uncondition al.-The
acceptance of the goods which will satisfy the req uirement of
the statute must be the voluntary, unequivocal and unconditional act of the buyer or his authorized agent, manifesting his
post, § 36!5.
Vv. R. 465; Jamison v. Simon, 68 Cal.
aulkin v. Hellman, 47 N. Y. 449, 17, 8 Pac. R. 502; Hansen v. Roter,
7 Am. R. 461; Taylor v. Mueller, 30 64 Wis. 622, 25 N. W.R. 530; Smith
l\finn. 343, 44 Am. R. 199, 15 N. W.R. v. Brennan, 62 Mich. 349, 28 N. "\V. R.
413; immons Hardware Co. v. 1\ful92; Ex parte Parker, 11 Neb. 309;
len, 33 Minn. 195, 22 N. W. R. 294; Powder Live tock Co. v. Lamb, 38
Fontaine v. Bush, 40 Minn. 141, 41 N. Neb. 339, 56 N. W. R. 1019.
320
1 See

2

CH. Til.] CONTRACT UNDER STATUTE OF FRAUDS.

en. nr.]

CO~"'TRACT

UXDER

T.A.TUTE OF FR.A.lJDS.

[§ 35*

intention to accept the goods in pursuance of the contract,

and to appropriate them to himself as owner by virtue of the

contract. 1

1 Hinchman v. Lincoln, 124 U. S.

38; Jones v. Reynolds, 120 N. Y. 213;

intention to accept the goo 1 in pursuance of the contract,
an 1 to appropriate them to himself as owner by virtue of the
contract. 1

Stone v. Browning, 51 N. Y. 211, 68

id. 598; Gilman v. Hill, 36 N. H. 311;

Remick v. Sandford, 120 Mass. 309;

Jones v. Mechanics" Bank. 29 Md. 287,

96 Am. Dec. 533; Hausman v. Nye,

62 Ind. 485. 30 Am. R 199; Hershey

Lumber Go. v. St. Paul Sash Co., 66

Minn. 449, 69 N. W. R. 215; Schmidt

v. Thomas, 75 Wis. 529, 44 N. W. R.

771; Dauphiny v. Red Poll Creamery

Co. (1899), 123 Cal. 548, 56 Pac. R. 451;

Young v. Blaisdell. 60 Me. 272; Din-
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nie v. Johnson (1898). 8 N. Dak. 153,

77 N. W. R. 612.

" To take a contract out of the stat-

ute of frauds the vendor must no1

only act with the purpose of vesting

the right of possession in the vendee,

but the latter must actually accept

with the intention of taking posses-

sion as owner." Dierson v. Peters-

meyer (1899), Iowa, — , 80 N. W.

R. 389.

In Hinchman v. Lincoln, supra,

the court said: "In order to take the

contract out of the operation of the

statute, it was said by the New York

court of appeals in Marsh v. Rouse,

44 N. Y. 643. 647, that there must be

acts ' of such a character as to un-

equivocally place the property within

the power and under the exclusive

dominion of the buyer 'as absolute

owner, discharged of all lien for the

price. This is adopted in the text of

Benjamin on Sales, £ 179, Bennett's

4th Am. ed., as the language of the

decisions in America, In Shindler

v. Houston, 1 N. Y. 261, 49 Am. Dec.

316. Gardiner, J., adopts the language

21 3

of the court in Phillips v. Bistolli. 2

B. & C. 511, 'that to satisfy the stat-

ute there must be a delivery by the

vendor with an intention of vesting

the right of possession in the vendee,

and there must be an actual accept-

ance by the latter with the intent of

taking possession as owner.' And

adds, ' This, I apprehend, is the cor-

rect rule, and it is obvious that it

can only be satisfied by something

done subsequent to the sale unequiv-

ocally indicating the mutual inten-

tions of the parties. Mere words are

not sufficient. Bailey v. Ogden, 3

Johns. 399, 3 Am. Dec. 509. ... In

a word, the statute of fraudulent con-

veyances and contracts pronounced

these agreements, when made, void,

unless the buyer should " accept and

receive some part of the goods." The

language is unequivocal and de-

1 Hinchman v. Lincoln, 124 U. S.
of the court in Phillips v. Bistolli, 2
3 ; Jone v. Reynold , 120 N. Y. 913; B. & C. 11, 'that to ati fy the tatton v. Browning -1 . Y. 911, 6 ute there mu t be a delivery by the
iJ. -9 · Gilman v. Hill 36 N. H. 311; vendor with an intention of ve ting
Remi k '· andford, 120 Ia . 09; the right of po ·e ion in he vendee,
Jone v. ?iie hanic 'Bank, 9 9 :Mel 2 7 and there mu t be an actual accept96 Am. Dec. -313. Hau man v. Nye, ance by th latter with the intent of
6'> Ind. 4 -. 0 Am. R. 199; Her h y taking po
ion a owner.'
nd
Lumber Co. v. t. Paul a ·h o., 66 add. , ·Thi , I apprehend, i the cor)linn. 449, 69 . \ . R. 915 ·
hrnidt rec rule, and it i obviou that it
'· Th ma T Wi" -09, 44 X W. R. can only be ~ a.ti tied by omething
771; auphiny v. Red Poll reamery done ub equent to the ale unequiv. (1 90) 12· al. - , -6 Pac. R. 4-1; ocall indicating the mutual intenYoun o- v. Blai d 11, 60 l\Ie.... 7'>; in- tion of the partie . i\Iere w rd are
nie v. John n (1 9 ). ... . Dak. 1-3, not uffi i n t. Bailey v. Ogden, 3
77 N. \ . R. 612.
John . 399, 3 Am. Dec. -09, . . . In
·• T take a ontra tout of the tat- a word the tatute of fraudulent conveyance · aml contra.ct pr nounced
be e agreement , when made, oid,
unle th buyer hould "accept and
receive 0111 part of the good . The
language i unequivocal and demands the action of both partie , for
acceptance implie delivery. and
there can be no complete delivery
In Hinchman v. Lincoln, upra, ' ithout a ceptance.' Page 26.-. In
the court aid: ·In order to take the the ame ca e ·wright, J., a.id: 'The
contract out of the operation of the act of the partie mu t be of uch a
tatute, it wa aid by the ..L.Jew York character a to unequivocally place
court of appeal in Mar h v. Rou e. the property within the power and
4-1 N. Y. 6.J.3. 64:7, that there mu. t be under the exclu ive dominion of the
act of uch a character a to un- buyer. Thi i the doctrine of tho e
equfrocally place the property within ca e that have carried the principle
he power and under the exclusive of con tructive delivery to the utdominion of the buyer' a ab olute mo t limit. . . . Where the acts
owner, di charged of all lien for the of the buyer a.re equivocal, and do
price. Thi i adopted in the text of not lead irre i tibly to the conclu. ion
Benjamin on ale · · 179, Bennett' that there ha been a tran fer and
4th m. ed., a the language of the acceptance of the po e ion, the
deci 'ion in merica. In hindler ca e qualify the inference to be
v. Hon ton, 1 N. Y. 261, 49 Am. Dec. drawn from them, and bold the con316. Gardiner, J., adopts the language tract to be within the tatute. • . .
21
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§§ 359, 360.J
§§ 359, 3G0.] LAW OF SALE. L B00K r «

§ 359. No acceptance while awaiting test or oppor-

tunity for examination. — Until, therefore, the buyer has had

LAW OF SALE.

lB

OK I.

§ 359. - - No acceptance while awaiting te t or opportunity for examination.- Until, therefore, the buyer has ha l

an opportunity to accept, as where the goods are a part of a

larger mass from which they have not yet been separated, 1 or

while the goods are not yet ready for acceptance, as where the

vendor is to do some act in reference to them to put them into

the agreed condition, 2 or while the goods are awaiting or being

subjected to examination to ascertain whether they will be

accepted, 3 there can, of course, be no such acceptance as is

here required.

§360. Acceptance may be implied. — The acceptance by

the buyer need not be express, but may be implied from his

acts. As is said in a late case : 4 " The act of acceptance is

something over and beyond the agreement of which it is a

part performance, and which it assumes as already existing.

an opportunity to accept, as where the goods are a part of a
larger mass from which they have not yet b en separated, 1 or
while the goods are not yet ready for accer tance, as where the
vendor is to do some act in reference to them to put them into
tlle agreed condition,2 or while the goods are awaiting or being
subjected to examination to ascertain '"hether they will be
accepted, 3 there can, of course, be no such acceptance as is
here required.

It is a fact to be proven as are other facts. Acts of ownership

constitute strong evidence of acceptance. 5 So, too, does a long

and unreasonable delay in returning goods. 6 If a vendee does
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any act with reference to the thing sold, of wrong if not the

owner, or of right if he is the owner, it is evidence that he has

accepted it. 7 The rule may be broadly stated that any act

from which it may be inferred that the buyer has taken pos-

session as owner presents a question for the jury to determine

whether the act was done with intent to accept." 8

I think I may affirm with safety that 3 Stone v. Browning, 51 N. Y. 211,

the doctrine is now clearly settled 68 id. 598; Rernick v. Sandford, 120

that there must not only be a deliv- Mass. 809; Mechanical Boiler Cleaner

ery by the seller, but an ultimate Co. v. Kellner (1899), 62 N. J. L. 544,

acceptance of the possession of the 43 Atl. R. 599.

goods by the buyer, and that this 4 Jones v. Reynolds, 120 N. Y. 213.

delivery and acceptance can only be 5 Reed on Statute of Frauds, § 261.

evinced by unequivocal acts inde- 6 Citing Bushell v. Wheeler, 15 Q.

pendent of the proof of the con- B. 442; Treadwell v. Reynolds, 39

tract.'" Conn. 31. To same effect: Chambers

i Knight v. Mann, 118 Mass. 143; v. Lancaster (1899), 160 N. Y. 342, 54

Terney v. Doten, 70 Cal. 399. N. E. R. 707.

2Gilman v. Hill, 36 N. H. 311; Out- ' Citing Parker v. Wallis, 5 El. &

water v. Dodge, 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 85; Bl. 21.

Wegg v. Drake, 16 U. C. Q. B. 252. 8 Citing Baines v. Jevons, 7 C. & P.

322

§ 360. Acceptance may be implied.-The acceptance by
the buyer need not be express, but may be implied from his
acts. As is said in a late case: 4 "The act of acceptance is
something over and beyond the agreem nt of 'vhich it is a
part performance, and which it assumes as already existing.
It is a fact to be proven as are other facts. Acts of ownership
constitute strong evidence of acceptance. 5 So, too, does a long
antl unreasonable delay in returning goods. 6 If a vendee does
any act with reference to the thing sold, of wrong if not the
owner, or of right if he is the owner, it is evidence that he has
accepted it. 7 The rule may be broadly stated that any act
from which it may be inferred that the buyer has taken possession as owner presents a question for the jury to determine
whether the act was done with intent to accept." 8
I t.hink I may affirm with safety that
3 Stone v. Browning, 51 N. Y. 211.
the doctrine is now clearly settled 68 id. 598; Remick v. Sandford, 120
that there must not only be a deliv- Mass. 309; Mechanical Boiler Cleaner
ery by the seller, but an ultimate Co. v. Kellner (1899), 62 N . J. L. 544,
acceptance of the posses ion of the 43 Atl. R. 599.
goods by the buyer, and that this
4 Jones v. Reynolds, 120 N. Y. 213.
deli very and acceptance can only be
5 Reed on Statute of Frauds, § 2fil.
evinced by unequivocal acts inde6 Citing Bushell v. Wheeler, 15 Q.
pendent of the proof of the con- B. 442; Treadwell v. Reynolds, 39
tract.'"
Conn. 31. To same effect: Chambers
1 Knight v. Mann, 118 Mass. 143;
v. Lancast.er (1899), 160 N. Y. 342, 5-±
Terney v. Doten, 70 Cal. 399.
N. E. R. 707.
2 Gilman v. Hill, 36 N. H. 311: Out7 Citing Parker v. Wallis, 5 El. &
water v. Dodge, 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 85; Bl. 21.
\Vegg v. Drake, 16 U. C. Q. B. 252.
B Citing Baines v. Jevons, 7 C. & P.
322

OH. VII.] CONTRACT UNDER STATUTE OF FRAUDS. [§§ 3C1, 362.

§ 361. . Other illustrations of tlie same rule are found

in such acts of ownership as selling, offering to sell, or pledg-

ing the goods, 1 directing the goods, e. (/., silverware, to be en-

graved with the buyer's name; 2 ordering alterations to be

made in a carriage and using it ; 3 cutting down a part of tim-

ber sold and reselling a portion of it, 4 or selecting and mark-

ing the trees ; 5 taking possession of wood sold and hiring it

repiled; 6 expressing satisfaction with an article delivered and

asking for other things which are to go with it; 7 trying on a

dress made and saying one will take it, though it is then left

with the dressmaker temporarily for the buyer's convenience; 8

sending one's servants to take possession of and bale a stack

of hay bought, though the whole stack was accidentally burned

about twenty minutes after they began; 9 expressing satisfac-

tion with the deposit of the goods for him in a warehouse and

making a partial payment of the price, though the buyer had

not yet examined them. 10

§ 362. When acceptance must occur, — The acceptance and
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receipt need not take place at the time the contract of sale is

made, but may occur subsequently. 11 Neither is it necessary

that the acceptance and the receipt should be contemporane-

288; Pinkham v. Mattox, 53 N. H. 3 Beaumont v. Brengeri, 5 Com. B.

600; Gray v. Davis, 10 N. Y. 285. See 301.

also Stockwell v. Baird, 15 Del. 420. 4 Marshall v. Green, L. R. 1 C. P. D.

31 Atl. R. 811. 35.

i Chaplin v. Rogers, 1 East, 192; ^Byassee v. Reese, 4 Mete. (Ky.)

Morton v. Tibbett. 15 Q. B. 428; Phil- 372, 83 Am. Dec. 481.

lips v. Ocmulgee Mills. 55 Ga. 633; 6 Richards v. Burroughs, 62 Mich.

Taylor v. Mueller, 30 Minn. 343, 44 117.

Am. R. 199; Roman v. Bressler, 49 ' Schmidt v. Thomas, 75 Wis. 529.

Neb. 368, 49 N. W. R. 368. The pay- 8 Galvin v. Mackenzie, 21 Oreg. 184,

ing of freight on goods, opening the 27 Pac. R. 1039.

boxes and removing a portion of the 9 Corbett v. Wolford, 84 Md. 426, 35

■contents, and giving a chattel mort- AtL R. 1088.

gage upon them, constitute such acts 10 Shaw Lumber Co. v. Manville, —

of ownership as will imply accept- Idaho, — , 39 Pac. R. 559.

ance. Wyler v. Rothschild, 53 Neb. "Amson v. Dreher, 35 Wis. 615;

566, 74 N. W. R. 41. McKnight v. Dunlop, 5 N. Y. 537, 55

2 Walker v. Boulton, 3 U. C. Q. B. Am. Dec. 370; Gault v. Brown, 48

(O. S.) 202. N. H. 183, 2 Am. R. 210; Bush v.
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~
§§363-365.] law or sale. [book I.

ous, but the goods may be accepted before they are received,,

or received before they are accepted. 1

363- oo'"'.]

LA.W OF

ALE.

[B

K I.

ous, but the gootls may be accepted before they are received,
or received before they are accepte L1

§ 363. Who may accept — Agent.— The acceptance may be

not only by the buyer himself, but by an agent with sufficient

authority. 2 This authority may be conferred in the same man-

ner as in other cases, and may be established either by proof, a

prior authorization or a subsequent ratification. 3 It cannot,

however, depend upon the same parol agreement which is

sought to be rendered valid by the acceptance. 4

The authority relied upon must, moreover, be adequate to the

act to be established. Thus an authority to receive the goods

will not, of itself, suffice to warrant an acceptance of them, and

vice versa. 5

§ 364. Tenants in common.— A delivery to and an ac-

ceptance by tenants in common will, it is held, be sufficient to

support a sale of the goods to one of them. 6

| 365. Carrier. — A carrier employed to transport the

goods, even though designated by the buyer, is not thereby au-
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thorized to accept the goods, though when so designated he is,

of course, authorized to receive them. To authorize him to ac-

cept, some other authorization than his mere employment as a

§ 363. "'ho may accept-Agent.-The ace ptance may benot only by the buyer himself, but by an agent with sufficient
authority. 2 This authority may be conferred in the same manner a in other cases, and may be establi h d either by proof a
prior authorization or a subsequent ratification. 3 It cannot
ho,1e1er, d pend u1 on the ame parol agreement which i
sought to be rendered valid by the ace ptance. 4
The authority reli d upon mu t mor ov r be adequate to the
act to b
tablish d. Thus an authority to receive the ood
will not, of itself, uffice to warrant an acceptance of them, and
vice versa.5

carrier is necessary. 7

Holmes, 53 Me. 417; Marsh v. Hyde, Oneida Co., 76 Wis. 56, 45 N. W. R.

3 Gray (Mass.), 331 ; Ortloff v. Klitzke, 21.

43 Minn. 154, 44 N. W. R. 1085. 3 See Mechem on Agency, § 81.

i Cross v. 0"Donnell, 44 N. Y. 661, 4 Hawley v. Keeler, 53 N. Y. 114.

4 Am. R. 721; Pinkham v. Mattox, 5 Taylor, Ev., § 1045.

53 N. H. 600; Knight v. Mann, 118 6 Wilkinson 's Adm'r v. Wilkinson,.

§ 364. - - rrenant in common.-A delivery to and an acceptan e by tenant in common will, it is hel 1, be uffi ient to
support a ale of the 0 oods to one of ·thern. 6

Mass. 143; Garfield v. Paris, 96 U. S. 61 Vt. 409.

557, 1 i n Johnson v. Cuttle, 105 Mass.

§ 365. - - Carrier .-A carrier employed to transport the-

2 Snow v. Warner, 10 Mete. (Mass.) 447, 7 Am. R. 545, Gray, J., said:

132, 43 Am. Dec. 417; Jones v. Me- "Mere deliveryis not sufficient; there

chanics' Bank, 29 Md. 287, 96 Am. must be unequivocal proof of an ac-

Dec. 533; Gaff v. Homeyer, 59 Mo. ceptance and receipt by him. Such

345; Wilcox Silver Plate Co. v. Green, acceptance and receipt may indeed

72 N. Y. 17; Vanderbilt v. Central R. be through an authorized agent. But

R. Co., 43 N. J. Eq. 669; Alexander v. a common carrier (whether selected
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good , even though designated by the buyer, is not thereby authorize l to accept the goods, though when so designated be is,
of course, authorized to receive them. To authorize him to accept, some other authorization than his mere employment as a
carrier i necessary. 7
Holme , 53 Me. 417; Mar h v. H yde, Oneida Co., 76 Wi . 56, 45 N. W. R.
3 Gray (1\Ia .), 331; Ortloff v. K!itzke, 21.
43 Minn. 154. 44 N. vV. R. 10 5.
3 See Mechem on Agency,§ 81.
1 Cro s v. o·DonnelL 44 N. Y. 661,
4 Hawley v. Keeler, 53 N. Y. 114.
4 Am. R. 791; Pinkham v. fattox,
5 Taylor, Ev., • 1045.
53 N. H. 600; Knight v. Mann, 118
6 Wilkin on's Adm'r v. Wilkinson,.
Ma s. 1413; Garfield v. Paris, 96 U. S. 61 Vt. 409.
557.
7 In Johnson v. Cuttle, 105 Mass~
2 Snow v. ""\iVarner, 10 !etc. (l\Ia .)
447, 7 Am. R. 545, Gray, J., sa i d~
13 9, 43 Am. Dec. 417; Jone v. le- '· foredelivery i notsufficient;there
chanic ' Bank, 29 !\Id. 2 7, 96 Am. mu t be unequivocal proof of an acDec. 533; aff v. Homeyer, 59 fo. ceptance and receipt by him. Such
343; Wil ox ilver Plate Co. v. Green, a ceptance and receipt may ind eed
72 N. Y. 17· Vanderbilt v. entral R. be through an a uthorized agent. But
R. Co., 43 N. J. Eq. 669; Alexander v. a common carrier (whether selected
324

en. til] contract under statute of frauds.

<CIT. VII.

J

CO ...'TRACT uNDER

TATUTE OF FRAUDS.

[§ 366.

[§ 366.

§ 366.

Administrator. — A special administrator can-

not, it is held, accept goods in pursuance of a parol contract

made by bis intestate. Said the court: "While an adminis-

trator or executor may be authorized, and under some circum-

stances compelled, to carry out the terms and provisions of a

valid contract entered into by the deceased, he cannot make

any contracts for him or ratify his void transactions." J

by seller or by the buyer), to whom

the goods are intrusted without ex-

press instructions to do anything but

366. - - Admini. trator .- A special ad mini trator cannot it i held, accept ood in pursuance of a parol contract
made b., bi in te tate.
aid the court: 'While an ad ministrator or executor may be authorized, and under ome circ·umtance com pe1led, to arry out the term and provisio.n of a
valid contract entered into by the deceased, be cannot make
any contract for him or ratify his void tran actions. 1

to carry and deliver them to the

buyer, is no more than an agent to

carry and deliver the goods, and has

no implied authority to do the acts

required to constitute an acceptance

and receipt on the part of the buyer,
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and to take the case out of the statute

of frauds;" citing Snow v. Warner,

10 Mete (Mass.) 132, 43 Am. Dec. 417;

Frostburg Mining Co. v. New Eng-

land Glass Co., 9 Cush. (Mass.) 115;'

Boardman v. Spooner, 13 Allen

(Mass.). 353, 90 Am. Dec. 196; Quintard

v. Bacon, 99 Mass. 185; Norman v.

Phillips. 14 M. & W. 277; Nicholson

v. Bower. 1 El. & El. 172.

To same effect: Allard v. Greasert,

61 N. Y. 1 ; Billin v. Henkel. 9 Colo.

394; Simmons Hardware Co. v. Mul-

len, 33 Minn. 195; Taylor v. Mueller,

30 Minn. 343, 44 Am. R. 199: Atherton

v. Newhall, 123 Mass. 141, 25 Am. R.

47; Hudson Furniture Co. v. Freed

Furn. Co., 10 Utah, 31, 36 Pac. R. 132;

Waite v. McKelvy, 71 Minn. 167, 73

N. W. R. 727; Salomon v. King (1899),

m N. J. L. 39. 42 AtL R. 745.

In Iowa, where acceptance is not

required by the statute, a delivery to

the carrier is enough. Bullock v.

Tschergi, 13 Fed. R. 345. Many cases

hold that a delivery to a carrier, not

designated by the buyer, is not

3

enough, but the facts did not require

a ruling as to the effect if the carrier

had been designated by the buyer.

Hausman v. Nye, 62 Ind. 485, 30 Am.

R. 199; Keiwert v. Meyer, 62 Ind.

587, 30 Am. R. 206; Webber v. Howe,

30 Mich. 150; 24 Am. R. 590; Grimes

v. Van Vechten, 20 Mich. 410; Rinds-

kopf v. De Ruyter. 39 Mich. 1; Cross

v. O'Donnell, 44 N. Y. 661, 4 Am. R.

721 ; Maxwell v. Brown, 39 Me. 98, 63

Am. Dec. 605; Fontaine v. Bush, 40

Minn. 141, 12 Am. St. R. 722: Sim-

mons Hardware Co. v. Mullen, 33

Minn. 195; Leggett & Meyer Co. v.

Collier, 89 Iowa, 144, 56 N. W. R. 417.

In Vermont a delivery to a carrier

named by the buyer is held a suffi-

cient acceptance, though the court

say: "But this will depend upon

the intention of the parties, to be

gathered from the circumstances of

each case to some extent.'' Spencer

by eller or by the buyer), to whom enough, but the facts did not require
the goods are intru ·ted without ex- a ruling as to the effect if the carrier
pre in truction t do anything but had been designated by the buyer.
to carry and deli er them to the Hausman v. Nye, 69 Ind. 485, 30 Am.
buyer, i no more than an agent to R. 199; Keiwert v. Meyer, 62 Ind.
carry and deliver the good and ha 5 7 30 Am. R. 206· Webber v. Howe,
no impli d autbori y to do the act 36 liiich. i-o, 24 Am. R. 590; Grime
Tequireu to con ti tu e an acceptance v. an echten 90 l\Iich. 410; Rind and receipt on he part of the buyer, kopf v. De Ruyter 39 Mich. 1; Cro
and totak the ca eoutofthe tatute v. O'Donnell, 44 . Y. 661, 4 Am. R.
of fraud ; "citing now v. ·warner, 791; Maxwell v. Brown, 39 Me. 9 , 63
10 )Iet . (Ma .) 132, 43 Am. Dec. 41 ;
m. Dec. 605; Fontaine v. Bu h, 4U
Fr tburg lining .Co.
ew Eng- Iinn. 141, 19 Am. t. R. 799; imland la Co., 9 u b. (i\la .) 115· · mon Hardware o. v. l\Iullen, 33
Boardman v.
pooner, rn Allen )Iinn. 19-: Leggett & Meyer Co. .
(:\fa .). 3-3, 90 m. Dec.196· uintard Collier, 9 Iowa, 144, -6 :r. \V. R. 417.
v. Bacon, 99 1a . 1 5; orman v.
In errnont a delivery to a carrier
Phillip , 14 I. & W. 277; Nichol on named by the buyer i held a suffiv. Bower, 1 El. & El. 1 9,
cient acceptance, though the court
To ame effect: .Allard v. Greasert, ay: "But thi will depend upon
61 N. Y. 1; Billln v. Henkel, 9 Colo. the intention of the parties, to be
394· Simmons Hardware Co. v. ~Iul- gathered from the circum tance of
len 33 1\Iinn. 195· Taylor v. Mueller, each ca e to ome extent.'
pencer
30 Minn. 843, 44Am. R. 199· A herton v. Hale, 30 Vt. 314, 3 m . Dec. 309;
v. ~ewhall, 123 Ma . 141, 25 Am. R. Strong v. Dodds, 47 Vt. 34 .
47; Hud on Furniture Co. v. Freed
But where the goods were to be
Furn. Co., 10 Utah, 31, 36 Pac. R. 132; delivered by the ellers and the buyer
Waite v. McKelvy, 71 :Minn. 167, 3 was to receive them from the carrier
N. W.R. 97; alomon v. King (1 99), and pay the freight on tbe eller '
63 N. J . L. 39. 42 AtL R. 74 .
account, it wa held that thi negaIn Iowa, where acceptance is not tived the idea that the carrier was
required by the tatute, a deli very to the buyer's agent to accept. Agnew
the caITier i enough. Bullock v. v. Duma , 64 t. 147, 23 Atl. R. 634.
T cbergi 13 Fed. R. 345. fany case
I Smith v. Brennan, 62 Mich. 349, 4
hold that a delivery to a carrier, not Am. St. R. 867.
<le ignated by the buyer, is not
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§§ 367, 368.J

LnooK r.

LAW OF SALE.

§§ 307, 368.] LAW OF SALE. [book I.

§367. That buyer ought to accept, not enough.— The

question here involved is not whether the buyer ought, in point

of morals or good faith, to accept the goods, but whether he

has, in fact, accepted them. He may refuse for entirely frivo-

lous or untenable reasons or for no reasons at all, but so long as

he does not accept, for whatsoever reasons, he is not bound. 1

There are occasions when it is important to ascertain whether

the goods are such as the buyer ought to accept, but this is not

one of them.

§ 368. Whether acceptance must be final and conclusive. —

Whether there may be such an acceptance as will satisfy the

statute of frauds and yet leave it open to the buyer to after-

wards reject the goods as not being such in quantity and qual-

ity as the contract calls for, is a question upon which the

§ 367. That buyer ought to accept, not enoug11.-The
question here involved is not whether the buyer oitglit, in point
of morals or good faith, to accept the goods, but wh th r he
has, in fact, accepted them. 1Ie may refuse for entirely frivolous or untenable reasons or for no reasons at all, but so long a
he does not accept, for what o v r rea on , he is not bound. 1
There are occa ions when it i important to ascertain wheth r
the goods are such as the buyer ought to accept, but this is not
ohe of them.

authorities are not in harmony. In the leading English case 2

there was a sale of wheat by sample, and the purchaser, with-

out examining the bulk, directed its delivery to a carrier and

sold it by the same sample to a third person, who rejected it as
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not in conformity to the sample. The first purchaser there-

upon also repudiated his purchase. In an action by the orig-

inal seller against the first purchaser, Lord Campbell held that

there may be an acceptance and receipt within the meaning of

the statute, " without the buyer's having examined the goods or

done anything to preclude him from contending that they do

not correspond Avith the contract. The acceptance to let in

parol evidence of the contract appears to us to be a different

acceptance from that which affords conclusive evidence of the

contract's having been fulfilled." The court therefore held

" that, although the defendant had done nothing which would

have precluded him from objecting that the wheat delivered

to the carrier was not according to the contract, there was evi-

1 Wood on Statute of Frauds, § 305; A few cases lay down a contrary

Gibbs v.Benjamin, 45 Vt. 124; Knight rule. See Meyer v. Thompson, 16

v. Mann, 118 Mass. 143; Hewes v. Oreg. 194, citing Smith v. Stoller, 26

Jordan, 39 Md. 472, 17 Am. R. 578; Wis. 671, and Bacon v. Eccles, 43 id.

Stone v. Browning, 51 N. Y. 211, 68 227.

id. 598. 2 Morton v. Tibbett, 15 Q. B. 428.
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§ 368. Whether acceptance mu t be final and conclu ive.Whether there may be suJh an acceptance as will satisfy the
statute of frauds and yet leave it op n to the buyer to afterward reject the goods as not being· such in quantity and quality as the contract calls for, is a que tion upon which the
authorities are not in harmony. In the lea<lin Engli h case 2
there was a sale of wheat by sample, and the purchaser, without examining the bulk, directed its delivery to a carri r and
sold it by the same sample to a third person, who rejected it as
not in conformity to the sample. The fir t purchaser thereupon also repudiated his purchase. In an action by the original seller against the first purchaser, Lord Campbell held that
there may be an acceptance and receipt within the meaning of
the statute," without the buyer's having examined the goods or
done anything to preclude him from cont nding tt:.tt they do
not correspond with the contract. The acceptance to let in
parol evidence of the contract appears to us to be a different
acceptance from that which affords conclusive evidence of the
contract's having been fulfilled.' The court therefore held
"that, alth~ugh the defendant ha l done nothing which would
have precluded him from objecting that the wheat delivered
to
, the carrier was not according .to the contract, there was evi0

I Wood on Statute of Frauds, § 305;
A few case lay down a contrary
Gibbs v. Benjamin,45 Vt.124; Knight rule. See Meyer v. Thomp on, 1()
v. Mann, 11 Ma s. 143; Hewes v. Oreg. 194, citing Smith v. Stoller, 20.
Jordan, 39 Md. 470, 17 Am. R. 57 ; vVi . 671, and Bacon v. Eccles, 43 id.
Stone v. Browning, 51 N. Y. 211, 6 227.
id. 598.
21\forton v. Tibbett, 15 Q. B. 428.
326

CH.

TH.]

CONTRACT UNDER STATUTE OF FRAUDS.

[§ 369.

CH. VII.] CONTRACT UNDER STATUTE OF FRAUDS.

[§ 369.

dence to justify the jury in finding that the defendant accepted

and received it."

§ 369. . This doctrine, though meeting with some dis-

dence to justify the jury in finding that the defendant accepted
and received it."

approval in England, 1 seems finally to be established there, 2

and has been approved by several of the courts in the United

States. 3 In others it has been approved only with modifica-

1 See Hunt v. Hecht, 8 Exch. 814;

Coombs v. Railway Co., 3 H. & N.

510; Castle v. Sworder, 6 H. & N. 828;

Smith v. Hudson, 6 B. & S. 431.

§ 369. - -. This doctrine, though meeting with some disapproval in Englan l,1 seems finally to be established th re, 2
a nd bas been approved by several of the courts in the United
tates. 3 In others it bas been approved only with modifica-

2 Kibble v. Gough, 38 L. T. (N. S.)

204; Rickard v. Moore, 38 L. T. (N. S.)

841.

» Remick v. Sandford, 120 Mass. 309 ;

Strong v. Dodds, 47 Vt. 348; Smith v.

Stoller, 26 Wis. 671; Garfield y. Paris,

96 U. S. 557: Hinchman v. Lincoln,
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124 U. S. 38. See also Meyer v. Thomp-

son, 16 Oreg. 194, 203; Taylor v. Muel-

ler. 30 Minn. 343, 44 Am. R. 199.

In Remick v. Sandford, 120 Mass.

309, the court said: ''There may un-

doubtedly be an acceptance, which

will not afford conclusive evidence

that the contract has been fulfilled

and its terms complied with, and

which will yet satisfy the statute

and let in evidence of those terms,

which otherwise could only be proved

in writing. If the buyer accepts the

goods as those which he purchased,

he may afterwards reject them if

they are not what they were war-

ranted to be, but the statute is satis-

fied. But, while such an acceptance

satisfies the statute, in order to have

that effect it must be by some une-

quivocal act done on the part of the

buyer, with the intent to take pos-

session of the goods as owner. The

sale must be perfected, and this is to

be shown, not by proof of a change

of possession only, but of such change

with such intent. When it is thus

definitely established that the rela-

tion of vendor and vendee exists,

written evidence of the contract is

dispensed with, although the buyer,

when the sale is with warranty, may

still retain his right to reject the

goods if they do not correspond with

the warranty. Morton v. Tibbett, 15

Q. B. 428; Johnson v. Cuttle, 105 Mass.

447; Knight v. Mann, 118 Mass. 143,

and cases cited.

"That there has been an accept-

ance of this character, or that the

buyer has conducted himself, in re-

gard to the goods, as owner (as by a

resale, which would deprive him of

the option to take or decline them,

and which is of itself an acceptance),

is to be proved by the party setting

up the contract. It cannot be in-

ferred, as matter of law, merely from

the circumstance that the goods have

come into the possession of the buyer.

All that the ruling gives to the de-

I See Hunt v. Hecht, 8 Exch. 814;
definitely establi ·hed that the rel~
oomb v. Railway Co., 3 H. & N. tion of vendor and vendee exist:,
510· Ca tle v. Sworder, 6 H. & N. 828; written evidence of the contract is
mith v. Hudson, 6 B. & . 431.
dispen ed with, although the buyer,
2 Kibble v. Gough, 3 L. T. (N. S.) when the sale is with warranty. may
204-; Rickard v. l\Ioore, 38 L. T. (N. S.) still retain his right to reject the
4:1.
goods if they do not corre pond with
3 Remick v. Sandford, 120 Ia s. 309; the warranty.
forton v. Tibbett, 15
trong v. Dodds, 47 Vt. 3 ; mith v. Q. B. 42 ; Johnson v. Cuttle, 1051\Ias .
toller, 26 Wi . 671; Garfield v. Pari, 447; Knight v. l\Iann, 118 l\Ia s. 143,
96 U. . --7: Hin hman v. Lincoln, and ca e cited.
194 U. . 3 . e I o :Meyer v. Thomp"That there has been an accept·
son, 16 Ore()'. 194, 2 3; Taylor v. luel- ance of thi character, or that the
l r, 30 finn. 343. 44 Am. R. 199.
buyer ha conducted him elf, in re·
In Remi k v. andford, 120 "Mas . gard to the good , as owner (as by a
309, the ourt aid: "There may un· r e ale, which would deprive him of
doubt Hy be an acceptan e, which the option to take or decline them,
will not afford conclu ive evidence and which i of it elf an acceptance),
that the contract ha been fulfilled i to be proved by the party setting
and it, t rm compli i with an
up the contract. It cannot be inwhich will yet ati fy the tatute ferr d, a matter of law. merely from
and let in eviden e of tho, e term , the circum tance that the goods have
which otherwi e could onl be proved come into the po session of the buyer.
in writing. If the buyer accept the _<\.11 that the ruling give to the degoods a tho e which he pur ha ed, fendants i the right to reject the
he may afterwards r eject them if good if they do not orrespond to
they are not what they were war· the ample, which they would have
r anted to be, but the statute i sa,ti · had at the common law, even if there
fied. But, while such an acceptance had been a written memorandum.
ati fie the tatute, in order to ha'e But they had more than this, a there
that effect it mu t be by some une- wa no uch memorandnm; they had
quivocal a t clone on the part of the a right arbitrarily to refu e the acbuyer, with the intent to take po · ceptance of the goods, unle s they
se ion of the goods as owner. The did or had done ome act in relation
ale mu. t be perfected, and this i to to them consistent only with their
be hown, not by proof of a change own ownership, and inconsi tent
of po e. ion only. but of uch change with that of the seller. The cfrcumwith such intent. ·when it is thus tances under which they received
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§ 369.J

LA. W OF SA.LE.

[BOOK I.

§ 369.] LAW OF SALE. [BOOK I.

tions, and in some it is not countenanced at all. Thus, in

Maryland, it is said: "Xow, it may be readily conceded that

the question whether there has been, in any particular case,

such acceptance and actual receipt of a part of the goods as

will bind the contract, may be quite different and distinct from

that as to whether the contract has been fulfilled in respect to

quantity and quality of the residue of the goods, where the

vendee has had no opportunity of examining the goods that

may be offered in fulfillment of the contract, and where he has

done nothing to preclude himself from the exercise of the right

to object that they do not correspond with those actually re-

ceived by him. The effect of the acceptance and actual receipt

of part of the goods, however small, is to prove the contract of

sale, and it is not inconsistent with this that the vendee should

have the right, with respect to the residue of the goods, when

offered in fulfillment of the contract, to object that they are

not such in quantity and quality as the contract requires; and

*in such case the question in dispute can only be determined by
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the goods, and the manner in which tract must be in writing, or there

they acted in reference to them, must be some note or memorandum

were to be considered as evidence, of the same to be subscribed by the

These might show that they re- party to be charged; but the same

ceived the goods with the intent to statute concedes that the party be-

accept them, as being the goods they comes liable for the whole amount

purchased, and as the owners of of the goods, if he accepts and re-

them, but they might also show that ceives part of the same, or the evi-

they received them only for the pur- dences, or some of them, of such

pose of examination. A receipt for things in action ; and the authorities

tions, and in some it is not count nanced at all. Thus in
}.fary land, it is s~aid: "Now, it may be readily conced l that
the question whether there has been, in any particular ca ,
such acceptance and actual rec ipt of a part of the goods a
will bind the contract, may be quite lifferent an l di tinct from
that as to whether the contract bas been fulfilled in respect to
quantity and quality of the ?'esfrlite of the goods, where the
venclee bas had no opportunity of examining the goods that
may be offered in fulfillment of the contract, and where be bas
done nothing to preclude himself from the ex rci e of the ri 0 bt
to object that they do not corre pond with those actually received by him. The effect of the acceptance and actual receipt
of part of the goods, however small, is to prove the contract of
sale, and it is not inconsi tent with this that the vendee should
have the right, with respect to the r siclue of the goods, when
offered in fulfillment of the contract, to object that they are
not such in quantity and quality as the contract requires; and
..in such case the que tion in dispute can only be determined by

such a purpose is not inconsistent agree that where the question is

with their continuing still the prop- whether the contract has been ful-

erty of the seller. Hunt v. Hecht, 8 filled, it is sufficient to show an ac-

Exch. 814; Curtis v. Pugh, 10 Q. B. ceptance and actual receipt of a

111." part, however small, of the thing

In Garfield v. Paris, 96 U. S. 557, sold, in order that the contract may

the court said: "Authorities almost be held to be good, even though it

numberless hold that there is a broad does not preclude the purchaser from

distinction between the principles refusing to accept the residue of the

applicable to the formation of the goods, if it clearly appears that they

contract and those applicable to its do not conform to the contract,

performance, which appears with Benjamin on Sales (2d ed.); Hinde v.

sufficient clearness from the Ian- Whitehouse, 7 East, 558; Morton v.

guage of the statute,— such a con- Tibbett, 15 Ad. & E. (N. S.) 428."
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the good . and the manner in which tract mu t be in writing, or there
they acted in reference to them, must be some note or memorandum
were to be considered as evidence. of the same to be subscribed by the
These might show that they re- party to be charged; but the ame
ceived the goods with the intent to statute concedes that the party beaccept them, as being the goods they comes liable for the whole amount
purcha eJ.. and as the owners of of the goods, if he accepts and rethem, but they might also show that ceive part of the same, or the evithey received them only for the pur- dences, or some of them, of such
pose of examination. A receipt for things in action; and tbe authorities
such a purpose is not inconsi::;tent agree that where the question is
with their continuing still the prop- whether the contract has been fulerty of the seller. Hunt v. Hecht, 8 filled, it is sufficient to show an acExcb. 814; Curtis v. Pugh, 10 Q. B. ceptance and actual receipt of a
part, however small, of the tr1ing
111."
In Garfield v. Paris, 96 U. S. 557, sold, in order that the contract may
the court said: "Authorities almost be held to be good, even though it
numberless hold that there is a broad does not preclude the purchaser from
distincfaon between the principles refu ·ing to accept the residue of the
appli able to the formation of the goods, if it clearly appears that they
contract and tho e a1 plicable to its do not conform to the contract.
performance, which appears with Benjamin on Sales (2d ed.); Hinde v.
sufficient clearne, s from the Ian- Whitehouse, 7 East, 558; Morton v.
guage of the statute,- such a con- Tibbett, 15 Ad. & E. (N. S.) 428."
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CH. Til.] CONTRACT UNDER STATUTE OF FRAUDS. [§§ 370-372. •

CH. \II.]

CONTRACT UNDER STATUTE OF FRAUDS.

[§§ 370-372.

the aid of parol eTidence. But in all cases where the goods

bargained for have been accepted and actually received by the

vendee, he is thereby precluded, in the absence of fraud, from.

objecting that they do not correspond with the contract. Any

other construction would certainly tend to let in all the evils

that were intended to be excluded by the particular provision

of the statute." l

g 370. . In a leading case 2 in New York, the court say

that " the best considered cases hold that there must be a vest-

ing of the possession of the goods in the vendee, as absolute

owner, discharged of all lien for the price on the part of the

vendor, and an ultimate acceptance and receiving of the prop-

the ail of parol evidence. But in all cases where the goods
bargained for have been accepted and actually received by the
vendee, he is thereby precluded in the absence of fraud, from
objectin 0 that they do not correspond with the contract. Any
other construction would certainly tend to let in all the evils
that were intended to be excluded by the particular provision
of the statute." 1

erty by the vendee, so unequivocal that he shall haTe precluded

himself from taking any objection to the quantum or quality

of the goods sold."

§ 371. Acceptance of unfinished articles.— Akin to #

the subject of the last section is the subject of the acceptance

before completion of articles to be manufactured or fitted for

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:49 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t6xw4h56n
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

deliTery. In one case 3 the court said : " There could be no

acceptance without the assent of the buyers to the articles in

their changed condition, and as adapted to their use." And

clearly in such cases acceptance will not be implied, except

from unequiTOcal acts, until the article is completed and ready

for delivery. 4

§ 372. The burden of proof.— The burden of proving that

there was such an acceptance as will take the case out of the

" 370. - - . In a leading cas

2

in New York, the court say
that "the best considered cases hold that there must be a vesting of the possession of the goods in the vendee, as ab olute
owner, discharged of all lien for the price on the part of the
vendor, and an ultimate acceptance and receiving of the property by the vendee so unequiyocal that he shall have precluded
himself from taking any objection to the qitantum or quality
of the ·oods sold."

iHewes v. Jordan, 39 Md. 472, 17 4 Thus, in Maberley v. Sheppard,

Am. R. 578. 10 Bing. 99, it was held that there

2 Shindler v. Houston, 1 N. Y. 261, was no acceptance to be inferred

49 Am. Dec. 316, citing Chitty on from the fact that the defendant,

Contracts, 390; Hilliard on Sales, 135; who had ordered a wagon made for

Maberley v. Sheppard, 10 Bing. 99; him by the plaintiff, furnished the

Acebal v. Levy, id. 384. iron work, and, during the progress

3 Cooke v. Millard, 65 N. Y. 352, of the work, sent a man to help the

22 Am. E. 619, citing, as analogous, plaintiff put it on, and also bought a

Bog Lead Co. v. Montague, 10 C. B. tilt and sent it to the plaintiff to be

(N. S.) 481. put on the wagon.
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§ 371. - - Acceptance of unfini bed articles.- Akin to.
the subject of the la t ection i the subject of the acceptance
before compl tion of articles to be manufactured or fitted for
delivery. In one case 3 the court said: "There could be no
acceptance without the assent of the buyers to the articles in
their changed condition, and as adapted to their use." And
clearly in such cases acceptance will not be implied, except
from unequivocal acts, until the article is completed and ready
for delivery. 4

§ 372. The burden of proof.-The burden of proving that
there was uch an acceptance as will take the case out of the
l Hewe v. Jordan, 39 Md. 472, 17
4 Thus, in Maberley v. Sheppard,
Am. R. 57 .
10 Bing. 99, it was held that there
2 Shindler v. Houston, 1 N. Y. 9.61,
was no acceptance to be inferred
49 Am. Dec. 316, citing Chitty on from the fact that the defendant,
Contract , 390· Hilliard on ales, 13-; who had ordered a wagon m ade for
Maberley v. Sheppard, 10 Bing. 99; him by the plaintiff, furni hed the
iron ·w ork, and, during the progress
Acebal v. Levy, id. 384.
3 Cooke v. Millard, 65 N. Y. 352,
of the work, sent a man to help the
22 Am. R. 619, citing, ·as analogou , plaintiff put it on, and also bought a
Bog Lead Co. v. Montague, 10 C. B. tilt and sent it to the plaintiff to be
(N. S.) 481.
put on the wagon.
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§§ 373-375.J

LAW OF SALE.

[BOOK I.

§§ 373-375.] law of sale. [book i.

statute of frauds rests upon the party alleging it. 1 It cannot

be inferred as a matter of law merely from the fact that the

goods have come into the possession of the buyer.

§ 373. Question of acceptance is for the jury. — Where the

statute of '.f rauds rests upon the party alleging it. 1 It cannot
be inferred as a matter of law merely from the fact that the
goods have come into the possession of the buyer.

facts are in dispute, the question whether or not they indicate

an acceptance is for the jury to determine. 2 But where the

§ 373. Question of acceptance is for the jury.-- Where the

facts in relation to the matter are not in dispute, it belongs to

the court to determine their legal effect. 3 " And so it is for

the court to withhold the facts from the jury when they are

not such as can in law warrant finding an acceptance, and this

includes cases where, though the court might admit that there

was a scintilla of evidence tending to show an acceptance, they

would still feel bound to set aside a verdict finding an accept-

ance on that evidence." 4

§ 374. Right of seller to retract before acceptance. — The

acceptance must be with the consent of the seller, by virtue of

the contract of sale and while that contract is still in force. 5

Hence if, before the buyer accepts, the seller elects to repudiate
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the agreement and withdraw his offer of sale, he may do so;

and he may do this, though there has been an actual receipt of

the goods. 6

3. Of Receipt ~by the Buyer.

§ 375. Necessity of receipt, — As has been seen, the statute

facts are in dispute, the question whether or not they indicate
an acceptance is for the jury to determine. 2 But where the
facts in relation to the matter are not in dispute, it belongs to
the court to determine their legal e:ffect. 3 "And so it is for
the court to withhold the facts from the jury when they are
not such as can in law warrant finding an acceptance, and this
includes cases where, though the court might admit that there
was a scintilla of evidence tending to show an acceptance, they
would still feel bound to set aside a verdict finding an acceptance on that evidence." 4

requires that the buyer shall not only accept but shall also

§ 374:. Right of seller to retract before acceptance.-Tbe

iRemick v. Sandford, 120 Mass. 89 Wis. 86, 61 N. W. R. 307; Galvin

309. v. Mackenzie, 21 Oreg. 184, 27 Pac. R.

2 Hinchman v. Lincoln, 124 U. S. 1039.

38; Garfield v. Paris, 96 U. S. 557 3 Hinchman v. Lincoln, 124 U.S.

[citing Bushel v. Wheeler, 15 Ad. & 38; Shepherd v. Pressey, 32 N. H.

E. (N. S.) 442; Parker v. Wallis, 5 El. 49, 56.

& Bl. 21 ; Lilly white v. Devereux, 15 4 Hinchman v. Lincoln, 124 U. S. 38

M. & W. 285; Simmonds v. Humble, [citing Denny v. Williams, 5 Allen

13 C. B. (N. S.) 258]: Borrowscale v. (Mass.), 1, 5; Howard v. Borden, 13

Bosworth, 99 Mass. 378, 381; Wart- Allen, 299; Pinkham v. Mattox, 53

man v. Breed, 117 Mass. 18; Smith N. H. 600, 604J.

acceptance must be with the consent of the seller, by virtue of
the contract of sale and while that contract is still in force. 5
Hence if, before the buyer accepts, the seller elects to repudiate
th e agreement and withdraw his offer of sale, he may do so;
an<l he may do this, though there has been an actual receipt of
the goods. 6

v. Stoller, 26 Wis. 671; Amson v. 5 See ante, § 355.

3. Of Receipt by the Buyer.

Dreher, 35 Wis. 615; Becker v. Holm, « Smith v. Hudson, 6 B. & S. 431.
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§ 375. Necessity of receipt.-As has been seen, the statute
r equires that the buyer shall not only accept but shall also
Remick v. Sandford, 120 Mass. 89 Wis. 86, 61 N. W.R. 307; Galvin
309.
v. Mackenzie, 21Oreg.184, 27 Pac. R.
2 Hinchman v. Lincoln, 124 U. S.
1039.
38; Garfield v. Paris, 96 U. S. 557
3 Hinchman v. Lincoln, 124 U. S.
[citing Bushel v. Wheeler, 15 Ad. & 38; Shepherd v. Pressey, 32 N. H.
E. (N. S.) 442; Parker v. Wallis, 5 El. 49, 56.
& BL 21; Lillywhite v. Devereux. 15
4 Hinchman v. Lincoln, 124 U.S. 38
M. & W. 285: Simmonds v. Humble, [citing Denny v. Williams, 5 Allen
13 C. B. (N. S.) 258]: Borrowscale v. (Mass.), 1, 5; Howard v. Borden, 13
Bosworth, 99 Mass. 378, 381; Wart- Allen, 299; Pinkham v. Mattox, 53
man v. Breed, 117 Mass. 18; Smith N. H. 600, 604].
v. Stoller, 26 Wis. 671; Amson v.
5 See ante, § 355.
Dreher, 35 Wis. 615; Becker v. Holm,
6 Smith v. Hudr:mn, 6 B. & S. 431.
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CU. VII.] CONTRACT UNDER STATUTE OF FRAUDS. [§§ 376, 377.

"actually receive " a part of the goods. As has been noticed,

too, this actual receipt is to be distinguished from the accept-

ance and may precede or follow that act, and may therefore

exist without it. It is. the correlative of the delivery required,

which has been already noticed. The result, therefore, is, that

there must not only be a delivery by the seller, but an accept-

ance of that delivery, i. e., an actual receipt of the goods, by

the buyer.

§376. Nature of the receipt required.— This delivery of

the goods by the seller and their receipt by the buyer are acts,

and from these acts the intention of the parties and the results

effected are to be determined. To satisfy the statute, these

acts, it is said in a leading case, 1 " must be of such a character

as to unequivocally place the property within the power and

under the exclusive dominion of the buyer;" and further,

"there must be a delivery by the vendor, with an intention of

vesting the right of possession in the vendee, and there must

be an actual acceptance by the latter with the intent of taking-
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possession as owner." 2

§ 377. Fact that title would have passed at common law,

not enough. — The fact that the negotiations may have so far

progressed that the title would have passed at common law is

not enough. Thus, where the plaintiff sued for goods sold and

delivered, the trial judge held that, to maintain the action, two

facts must be proven by the plaintiff: 1. The passing of the

title between the parties at common law ; and 2. An accept-

ance and receipt within the statute of frauds. In approving

this ruling, and speaking to the point that proof of the first

fact would not dispense with proof of the second, Gray, C. J.,

said: "In order to constitute an acceptance and receipt under

the statute of frauds, it is not enough that the title of the goods

has vested in the buyer; but he must have assumed the legal

iShindler v. Houston, 1 N. Y. 261, lips v. Bistolli, 2 B. & C. 511; Marsh

49 Am. Dec. 316. v. Rouse. 44 N. Y. 643; Hinchman v.

2 Shmdler v. Houston, sujira; Phil- Lincoln, 124 U. S. 38.
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§§ 37 ' 379.J

LAW OF SALE.

[BOOK I.

§§ 378, 379.] law of sale. [book i.

possession of them, either by taking them into the custody or

control of himself or of his authorized agent, or by making the

seller or a third person his bailee to hold them for him, so as

to terminate the seller's possession of the goods and lien for

the price." *

§ 378. Constructive delivery and receipt.— But while the

delivery and receipt must be actual, it is not always necessary,

as it is not always feasible or possible, that the buyer should

possession of them, either by taking them into the cu t cly or
control of himself or of bis authorized agent, or by making the
seller or a third person his bailee to hold them for him, o as
to termin ate . the seller's po se ·ion of the goods and lien for
the price." 1

take the goods into his physical possession. It was said by

Judge Bronson, " There may be a delivery without handling

the property or changing its position. But that is only where

the seller does an act by which he relinquishes his dominion

over the property and puts it in the power of the buyer, as by

delivering the key of the warehouse in which the goods are

deposited, or directing a bailee of the goods to deliver them to

the buyer, with the assent of the bailee to hold the property

for the new owner. In such case there is, in addition to the

words of bargain, an act by which the dominion over the goods
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is transferred from the seller to the buyer." 2

§ 379. . So in a Maryland case 3 the court said : " In re-

gard to the proof of a delivery of the goods in order to gratify

the statute, it must be conceded that an actual or manual de-

livery is not in all cases necessary. Upon this subject the law

is well settled and clearly defined, and may be thus stated :

Where the goods are ponderous and incapable of being handed

over from one to another, and where the buyer so far accepts

them as to treat them as his own, exercising acts of ownership

over them, from which possession as owner may be inferred ;

or where the delivery is symbolical, such as the delivery of

the key of the warehouse in which the goods are lodged ; or

where actual delivery is impracticable and can only be made

§ 378. Constructive delivery and receipt.- But while the
delivery and receipt must be actual, it is not always nece ary,
as it is not always feasible or po ible, that the buyer should
take the goods into bis phy ical pos s ion. It was aid by
Judge Bronson, "There may be a delivery without handling
the property or chano-ing its po iti n. But that is only where
the seller does an act by which he relinqui b s his dominion
over the property an l puts it in the power of the buyer, as by
deliverino- the key of the warehou e in which the goo ls are
depo it ll, or directing a bailee of the goods to deliver them to
the buyer, with the assent of the bailee to hold the property
for the new owner. In such case there is, in addition to the
words of bargain, an act by which the dominion over the goods
is transferred from the seller to the buyer." 2

by such symbolical means as the circumstances of the case will

1 Rodgers v. Jones, 129 Mass. 420. symbolic: Wadham & Co. v. Balfour,

2Shindler v. Houston, 1 N. Y. 261, 32 Oreg. 313, 51 Pac. R. 612.

49 Am. Dec. 316. To the same point 3 Atwell v. Miller, 6 Md. 10.

that delivery may be constructive or
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§ 379. - - . So in a 1'faryland case 3 the court said: "In regard to the proof of a delivery of the goods in order to gratify
the statute, it must be conceded that an actual or manual delivery is not in all cases necessary. Upon this subject the law
is well settled and clearly defined, and may be thus stated:
Where the goods are ponderous and incapable of being handed
over from one to another, and where the buyer so far accepts
them as to treat them as his own, exercising acts of ownership
oYer them, from which possession as owner may be inferred;
or where the delivery is symbolical, such as the delivery of
the key of the warehouse in which the goods are lodged; or
where actual delivery is impracticable and can only be made
by such symbolical means as the circumstances of the case will
1 Rodgers

v. Jones, 129 Mass. 420.
symbolic: Wadham & Co. v. Balfour,
v. Houston, 1 N. Y. 261, 32 Oreg. 313, 51 Pac. R. 6±2.
49 Am. Dec. 316. To the ame point
3 Atwell v. Miller, 6 Md. 10.
that delivery may be constructive or
332
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allow, as in the case of a ship or cargo at sea, etc., — actual or

manual delivery is not necessary."

§ 380. What sufficient. — Illustrations of this symbol-

allow, as in the case of a ship or car 0 0 at sea, etc.,- actual or
manual d liv ry i not nee ary.'

ical or constructive delivery are numerous. Thus, the delivery

of the key of the building in which the goods are stored, 1

though the delivery be made at a point distant from the build-

ing,- has often been held sufficient; and so is the delivery of

the order, receipt or bill of lading usually recognized as the

representative of the goods. 3

Catching and branding of cattle sold and then turning them

loose upon a common range is sufficient; 4 and so is going in

sight of a lot of logs lying within a boom, showing them to

the vendee and thereafter abandoning control over them, that

being as effectual a method as the nature of the case would

admit; 5 and the delivery of a raft of boards as symbolical of

a lot of logs lying in the river, and marked with the same

mark as the boards. 6 " "Where the goods are so situated," said

Shepley, J., 7 "that a delivery cannot be made at the time of
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sale, as a vessel at sea, a delivery of such, evidence of title as

the seller possesses is sufficient until the purchaser can obtain

possession. 8 And where goods, though not at sea, are not in

the actual but in the constructive possession of the seller, as

goods in another's warehouse, or logs in a river; and where it

would be very difficult on account of the weight or bulk, as a

i Gray v. Davis, 10 N. Y. 285; Pack- ^Boynton v. Veazie, 24 Me. 286.

ardv. Dunsmore, HCush. (Mass.) 282; 7 In Ludwig v. Fuller, 17 Me. 162,

Barr v. Reitz, 53 Pa. St. 236; Benford 35 Am. Dec. 245.

v. SchelL 55 Pa. St. 393; Vining v. 8 Citing Lempriere v. Pasley, 2 T,

Gilbreth, 39 Me. 496; Wilkes v. Fer- R. 483; Gardner v. Howland, 2 Pick.

ris, 5 Johns. (X. Y.) 335. (Mass.) 599. Thus, the transmission

- Vining v. Gilbreth, 39 Me. 496. of a bill of sale by mail is a sufficient

3 Bass v. Walsh, 39 Mo. 192; Wad- delivery, and, as against creditors of

hams v. Balfour, 32 Oreg. 313, 51 Pac. the vendor, is perfected the moment

R. 643; Meehan v. Sharp, 151 Mass. the letter is mailed. Begley v. Mor-

564, 24 X. E. R. 907. gan, 15 La. 162, 35 Am. Dec. 188. To

4 Walden v. Murdock. 23 Cal. 540. like effect: Cocke v. Chapman, 2

5 Jewett v. Warren, 12 Mass. 300, 7 Eng. (Ark.) 197, 44 Am. Dec. 536.

Am. Dec. 74; Carter v. Willard, 19

Pick. (Mass.) 1.
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arr v. R itz, -3 Pa. t. 2-6· Benford 35 ~ m. Dec. 245.
v.
bell, -5 Pa.
. 393; mmg v.
Citing Lempriere v. Pa ley, 2 T.
ilbreth 39 ]Ile. 496; \ ilkes v. Fer- R. 485; Gardner v. Howland, 2 Pick.
ri
John . (-'- . Y.) 33 .
(Ma .) 599. Thu , the tran mi ion
n, ining . ilbreth, 39 1\Ie. 496.
of a bill of ale by mail i a ufficient
3 a
v. Wal h, 39 l\I . 19 ; Wad- delivery, and, a against creditor of
haro v. B( lf ur 39. Oreg. 313, 1 Pac. the vendor i perfected the moment
R. 642; 1\I ban v. harp, 151 l\Ia . the 1 tt r i mailed. Begley v. for' 4, 4 . _ T • E. R. 907.
gan, 1- La. 162, 3 Aro. Dec. 1 . To
4 Wald n v. l\Iurrlo k. 23 Cal. 540.
like effect: Cocke v. Chapman, 2
s Je,,ett . Warren, 1 Ia . 30 , 7 Eng. (Ark.) 197, 44 Am. Dec. 536.
Am. D c. 4; Carter v. Willarrl, 19
Pick. ( Ia .) 1.
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vessel on the stocks, and in other eases of a peculiar character,

what is denominated a symbolical delivery is sufficient, and

this requires the performance of such an act as shows, without

any other act to be performed, that the purchaser has a right

to take possession, and that the right of the seller to control

the property has terminated." 1

| 381, . So the delivery to the vendee of a bill of par-

cels, followed by acts of ownership by the vendee, is a suffi-

cient delivery of a large quantity of pig-iron lying on the bank

L W OF

.d.LE.

[BOOK I.

vessel on the stocks and in other a es of a p culiar chara t r,
what is denominate l a ymbolical delivery i ufficient, and
this requires the performance of such an act as shows., without
any other act to be p rformed, that the purchaser has a rjcrbt
to take po session, an l that the right of the seller to contr 1
the property has terminated." 1
I

of a canal ; 2 and so where parties were negotiating regarding

a specific quantity of pig-iron lying by itself, and, having

agreed upon the terms, the vendor said to the vendees, " I de-

liver this iron to you," but before more could be done the iron

was seized by the sheriff, it was held that there was a sufficient

delivery, at least as against creditors, and the ruling would

doubtless be general. 3 " There was here nothing remaining to

be done by the vendor to consummate the sale or delivery,"

said the court. " He had no further claim upon the iron. The
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ponderous nature of the commodity rendered the removal of

it, at that time, impossible. And why should it have been

moved? The vendees were there, upon the ground, and went

up to receive the iron when it was delivered by the vendor.

The delivery was not symbolical, but actual, and it was re-

ceived by the vendees at the hands of the vendor with the in-

tent to take and hold possession of it. The iron was not to be

weighed off and separated from any other, and thus desig-

nated. There it was, a parcel of ninety-three tons, by itself." 4

Other cases are referred to in the notes. 5

i Citing Harman v. Anderson, 2 2 Van Brunt v. Pike, 4 Gill (Md.),

Camp. (Eng.) 243; Manton v. Moore, 270, 45 Am. Dec. 126.

7 T. R. (Eng.) 67; Hollingsworth v. 3 Calkins v. Lockwood, 17 Conn.

Napier, 3 Cai. (N. Y!) 182, 2 Am. Dec. 154, 42 Am. Dec. 729.

268; Wilkes v. Ferris, 5 Johns. (N. Y.) 4 Citing Chaplin v. Rogers, 1 East,

335, 4 Am. Dec. 364; Jewett v. War- 192; Stoveld v. Hughes. 14 East, 308:

ren, 12 Mass. 300, 7 Am. Dec. 74; Bad- Manton v. Moore, 7 T. R. 67.

lam v. Tucker, 1 Pick. (Mass.) 389, 11 5 In Jones v. Reynolds, 120 N. Y.

Am. Dec. 202; Homes v. Crane, 2 213, 24 N. E. R. 279, the delivery of a

Pick. 607. model of an invention was held to be
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§ 381. - - . So th delivery to the venclee of a bill of parcels followed by act of owner hip by the vendee, is a sufficient .lelivery of a laro·e quantity of pig-iron lying on the bank
of a canal; 2 and so where partie were negotiating regarding
a specific quantity of pig-iron lying by it elf, and, havinoagreed upon the term . the ven lor ail to the vendees, "I deliver this iron to you," but befor more could be done the iron
was seized by the sh riff, it wa held that th re was a ufficient
delivery, at lea t as again t creditor, and the ruling would
doubtle be general. 3 "There was h re nothing remaining to
be done L>y the vendor to consummate the sale or delivery, '
said the court. "He had no furth r claim upon the iron. The
ponderous nature of the commodity rendere l the removal of
it, at tilat time impossible. And why should it have been
moved? The vendee were there, upon the ground, and went
up to receive the iron when it was delivered by the vendor.
The delivery was not symbolical, but actual, and it was received by the vendees at the hands of the vendor with the intent to take and hold possession of it. 'l'he iron was not to be
weighed off and separated from any other, and thus designated. There it was, a parcel of ninety-three tons, by itself." 4
Other cases are referred to in the notes. 5
1 Citing Harman v. Anderson, 2
2Van Brunt v. Pike, 4 Gill (Md.),
Camp. (Eng.) 243; l\1anton v. Moore, 270. 45 Am. Dec.. 126.
7 T. R. (Eng.) 67; Hollingsworth v.
3 Calkins v. Lockwood, 17 Conn.
Napier, 3 Cai. (N. Y.) 182, 2 Am. Dec. 154, 42 Am. Dec. 729.
4 Citing Chaplin v. Rogers, 1 Ea t,
268; Wilkes v. Ferris, 5 Johns. (N. Y.)
335, 4 Am. Dec. 364; Jewett v. War- 199; StoYeld v. Hughes, 14 Ea t, 30 :
ren, 12 lass. 300, 7 Am. Dec. 74; Bad- Man ton v. Moore, 7 T. R. 67.
lam v. Tucker, 1 Pick. (Ma .) 3 9, 11
5 In Jones v. Reynolds, 120 N. Y.
Am. Dec. 202; Homes v. Crane, 2 213, 24 .... E. R. 279, the delivery of a model of an invention was held to be
Pick. 607.
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CH. VII.] CONTRACT UNDER STATUTE OF FRAUDS. [§§ 382,383.

§ 382. Mere words do not constitute a delivery and re-

ceipt, — Mere words, it is held, cannot amount to a delivery

and receipt of the goods, but there must be, in addition, some

acts of the parties over and above the terms of the contract,

indicating on the part of the seller an unequivocal intention

to surrender the ownership and possession of the goods to the

buyer, and, on the part of the buyer, an intention to assume

such ownership and possession in pursuance of the contract.

Thus, where the parties negotiating in view of the goods agreed

upon terms, the plaintiff making an offer and the defendant

saying "It is yours," nothing further being done, the court

held that there was no delivery and receipt which would sat-

isfy the statute, the words being rather a communication of

the agreement than a delivery of the chattels in pursuance of

it. 1 This decision has been followed in many other cases, 2

though with some it is not reconcilable. 3

| 3S3. . So long, however, as the statute by its terms

requires an actual receipt, it would seem that that rule must
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be the true one which demands something more than the mere

words of the parties indicative merely of their assent to the

agreement. It certainly cannot be possible that one portion

of the verbal agreement which it is sought to establish can be

made use of to authenticate the whole contract. 4 The evident

as complete a delivery as could be 300, 7 Am. Dec. 74, which seems also

made of the invention. opposed, did not involve the statute

i Shindler v. Houston, 1 N. Y. 261, of frauds.

49 Am. Dec. 316. 4 See Alderton v. Buchoz, 3 Mich.

2 Gorman v. Brossard (1899), 120 322; Shindler v. Houston, supra. See

Mich. 611, 79 N. W. R. 903; Hallen- also Hawley v. Keeler. 53 N. Y. 114.

back v. Cochran, 20 Hun (N. Y), 416; In Alderton v. Buchoz, supra, the

Dehority v. Paxson, 97 Ind. 253; Kel- plaintiff had contracted to sell to the

logg v. Witherhead, 6Thomp. & Cook defendant for $70 a quantity of mill

(N. Y.)i 525; Alderton v. Buchoz, 3 irons from a mill recently burned;

Mich. 322; Hinchman v. Lincoln, 124 part of the irons were on the mill-

U. S. 38; Edwards v. Railway Co., 54 site and others in the cellar of a third

Me. 105; Kirby v. Johnson, 22 Mo. 354. person. Defendant knew where the

3 Calkins v. Lockwood, 17 Conn, irons were and had examined them,

154, 42 Am. Dec. 729, seems directly but at the time of the contract the

opposed. Jewett v. Warren, 12 Mass. irons were not present; no attempt
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purpose of the statute is that the mere words of the contract

shall be supplemented by acts in addition to and in pursuance

LAW OF

ALE.

[n

OK I.

purpo e of the tatute is that the m re words of the c ntract
shall be uppl mented by acts in a., dition to and in I ur uanc
of that contract.

of that contract.

§ 384. Delivery and receipt where goods still remain in

seller's possession. — Where the goods are left in the posses-

sion of the seller, the presumption, ordinarily, would be that

they had not yet been delivered to and received by the buyer;

but where it appears that the terms of the contract have been

fully agreed upon and the property has been placed under the

dominion of the buyer, who has been requested or permitted

it to remain with the seller as the bailee or agent of the buyer,

there may be a sufficient delivery and receipt to satisfy the

statute.

was made to comply with the stat-

ute, " but it was expressly agreed

that the defendant should take the

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:49 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t6xw4h56n
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

property where it then was, and that

the plaintiff should not be troubled to

make any delivery." Neither party

intermeddled with the irons until

~

384:. Delivery and receipt wl1 re good till remain in
. eller's posses ion.- here the good are left in th Io ssion of the sell r, the presumption ordinarily, would
that
they bad not y t be n d liver to an l r iv by th buy r;
but wh re it ap1 ear that the t rm f th
ntract have b n
fully agreed up n an 1 th pro rty ha b n place l un l r the
dominion of th bu er wh ha b n r qu t l or p rrnitt d
it to remain with th
11 r a th bail e or ()' nt of th buy r,
tber may be a su:ffi i nt deliv ry and r c i1 t to sati fy the
statute.

suit was brought, though defendant

on one occasion stated to a third per-

son that he had bought the irons, and

asked if the latter had one of them

in his possession, and was answered

in the negative. Afterwards the

third party informed the defendant

that he did have the iron in question,

to which the defendant replied, "very

well." Held, that there was no such

delivery as would satisfy the statute.

Said the court: "The stipulation of

the defendant in the agreement to

take the irons where they then were

was also relied on in the argument

as evidence to save the case from the

statute. This, however, will not do.

This stipulation was a part of the

entire verbal agreement and it can-

not be separated; hence, the contract

being void by the statute, this stipu-

lation must fall with the other pro-

visions," citing Shindler v. Houston,

supra.

In Gorman v. Brossard (1899), 120

Mich. 611, 79 N. W. R. 903, it appeared

that the plaintiff sold the defendant

a quantity of stone, which was de-

livered and accepted. Subsequently

the defendant discovered that more

stone had been delivered than he or-

dered, and most of the excess was

hauled into an alley and the plaintiff

notified that it was subject to his

order. The two parties then went

together to where the stone lay, and

agreed that the plaintiff should take

the stone and credit its value against

the debt owed by the defendant for

it. Held, that the transaction was

a sale within the statute of frauds;

that the agreement within sight of

the stone did not constitute a deliv-

ery; that the cancellation of the

vendor's debt to the vendee was not

payment within the meaning of the

statute.

wa made to comply with the tat- being void by the statute, thi stipuute, ''but it ·wa
xpre ly agr ed lation mu t fall with the other protbat the def ndant should take the Yi ions," citing Shindler v. Hou ton,
property where it then wa , and tliat 111 ra.
In Gorman v. Bros ard (1 99), 120
the plaintiff should not be troubled to
1nake any delivery.' Neither party l\1i h. 611, 79 N. \V. R. 903, it appeared
intermeddled with the iron until that the plaintiff old the defendant
suit was brought. though defendant a quantity of stone, which was deon one occasion stated to a third per- livered and accepted. Subsequently
son that he had bought the iron . and the defendant di coYered that more
a ked if the latter had one of them stone had been delivered than he orin his possession, and was an wered dered, and mo t of the ex e s wa ·
in the negative. Afterwards the hauled into an alley and the plaintiff
thircl party informed the defendant notified that it was subject to his
that he Jid have the iron in question, orJer. The two parties then v.ent
to which the defendant replied, "very together to where the stone lay, and
well." Held, that there was no such agreed that the plaintiff should take
delivery as would satisfy the statute. the stone and credit its value against
Said the court: "The stipulation of the debt owed by the defendant for
the defendant in the agreement to it. Held, that the transaction was
take the irons where they then were a sale within the statute of frauds;
was also relied on in the argument that the agreement within sight of
a evidence to save the case from the the stone did not constitute a delivstatute. This, however, will not do. ery; that the cancellation of the
This stipulation was a part of the vendor's debt to the vendee was not
entire verbal agreement and it can- payment within the m~aning of the
not be separated; hence, the contract statute.
336
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g 335. . Thus it has been held sufficient, where, after a

sale of horses, the purchaser requests the seller to keep them at

livery for him and the seller consents, and thereupon removes

them from his sale stable to his livery stable; 1 where, after the

sale of a horse, the seller requested the buyerto loan it to him,

which was done; 2 where a carriage was bought but was left

with the seller to make certain alterations; 3 where sheep were

bought but were left, separately yarded, with the seller, who

was to keep them for a given time for the buyer, who agreed

to pay therefor; 4 where barrels of beef were sold, the pur-

chaser requesting the seller to keep it for him and resell it, and

part was so sold by the purchaser's direction; 5 where a sale of

hides was agreed upon, and they were separated and marked

with the buyer's name, but left, at his request, on storage in

the seller's warehouse. 8

:;s(i. Goods remaining in seller's possession as seller.

But there can usually be deemed to be no delivery to and receipt

by the purchaser while the goods continue in the possession of
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the seller as such. Thus, where the sale is for cash, ami the goods

yet remain in the seller's possession, by virtue of the vendor's

lien, awaiting the performance of that condition precedent- —

pavment; 7 or where the goods are to remain in the vendor's

possession until a certain date, when payment is to be made, 8

1 Elmore v. Stone, 1 Taunt 437. See statute." Per Holroyd, J., in Baldey

al-, i stockwell v. Baird, 15 Del. 420, 81 v. Parker, 2 B. & C. 37, 44. To same

Atl. R. 811. But compare Tempest effect: Safford v. McDonough, 120

v. Fitzgerald.3B. &Ald. GSO, and Car- Mass. 290; Marsh v. Rouse, 44 X. Y.

ter v. Toussaint, 5 B. & Aid. 855. G43; Edwards v. Railway Co., 54 Me.

-Marvin v. Wallis, 6 Ell. & B. 720. 105; Messer v. Woodman, 22 N. H.

» Beaumont v. Brengeri, 5 C. B. 301. 172, 53 Am. Dec. 241.

4 Green v. Merriam, 28 Vt. 801. 8 In Terney v. Doten, 70 Cal. 399,

sjanvrin v. Maxwell, 23 Wis. 51. the defendants agreed verbally to sell

6 Safford, Ex parte, 2 Low. (TJ. S. the plaintiff one hundred unbroken

C. C.) 5G3. horses, at a specified price each, out

7 "As long as the seller preserves of a band of horses belonging to them,

his control over the goods, so as to then running at large. The contract

retain his lien, he prevents the vendee provided that the defendants were

from accepting and receiving them to gather up a number of the horses

BS his own within the meaning of the of the band from time to time, from

22 337
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or security given; 1 or where any other condition precedent

to the passing of title remains to be performed by the buyer;

or where something remains to be done by the seller to fit the

goods for delivery ; or where the seller has yet to identify them

or security given; 1 or where any other con lition prec lent
to the passing of title remains to be performed by the buy r;
or where something r mains to be done by the seller to fit the
goods for delivery; or where the seller has yet to identify them

which the plaintiff was to select a

certain number and commence

breaking them, after which the num-

ber so selected and broken were to

be turned into the defendant's pas-

tui - e and another selection made in

like manner until the whole number

agreed to be sold should be gathered

up, selected and broken. Thereupon

the horses were to be paid for by the

plaintiff and then taken by him from

the premises of the defendants. The
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defendants gathered up a number of

the horses, from which the plaintiff

selected twenty-two, which he broke

and turned into the pasture of the

defendants. Thereafter the defend-

ants refused to further perform their

part of the contract. Held, that the

contract was void under the statute

of frauds. Said the court: "In the

case at bar none of the horses form-

ing the subject-matter of the con-

tract ever passed into the absolute

possession and control of the plaint-

iff. There was, therefore, no accept-

ance and receipt of any of them by

plaintiff within the meaning of the

statute."

To the same effect is Tempest v.

Fitzgerald, 3 B. & Aid. G80, where

A agreed to buy a horse from B for

cash, and to take him away within

a time agreed upon, and about that

time A rode the horse and gave di-

rections as to the treatment, but re-

quested that it might remain a further

time in B's possession, at the expira-

which the plaintiff was to select a
ertain number and commence
breaking them, after 'vhich the number so selected and broken were to
be turned into the defendant's pasture and another selection made in
like manner until the whole number
agreed to be sold should be gathered
up, selected and broken. Ther upon
the hor es were to be paid for by the
plaintiff and then taken by him from
the premises of the defendant ·. The
defendants gathered up a number of
the horses, from which the plaintiff
selected twenty-t•>Yo, which he broke
and turned into the pasture of the
defendants. Thereafter the defendants refuseJ to further perform their
part of the ('Ontract. H eld, that the
contract was void under the statute
of frauds. Sairl the court: "Io the
case at bar none of the horse forming the subject-matter of the contract ever passed into the ab olute
possession and control of the plaintiff. There was, therefore, no acceptance anu receipt of any of them by
plaintiff within the meaning of the
statute."

To the same effect is Tempe t v.
Fitzgerald, 3 B. & Ald. 6 O. where
A agreed to buy a hor, e from B for
ca h, and to take him away within
a time agreed upon, and about that
time A rode the horse and gave direction a to the treatment, but requested thatitmightremain afurther
time in B' po es ion. at the expiration of which time be agreed to take
the horse and pay the price, to which
B a ented, but the horse died before
A took him away.
To like effect, al o, is Carter v.
Tou aint, 5 B. & Ald. 55. There
plaintiff sold to defendant a horse
for £30, by verbal contract. At the
time of the sale the horse required to
be fired, which was done, with the approbation of the defendant and in his
pre ence, and it was then agreed that
the horse should be kept by the plaintiff for twenty days without charge.
At the e·xpiration of the twenty
days the horse was taken by plaintiff, at defendant's request, to Kingston Park, to be turned out to grass.
There the horse was entered in
plaintiff's name, at request of defend-

tion of which time he agreed to take

the horse and pay the price, to which

B assented, but the horse died before

A took him away.

To like effect, also, is Carter v.

Toussaint, 5 B. & Aid. 855. There

plaintiff sold to defendant a horse

for £30, by verbal contract. At the

time of the sale the horse required to

be fired, which was done, with the ap-

probation of the defendant and in his

presence, and it was then agreed that

the horse should be kept by the plaint-

iff for twenty days without charge.

At the expiration of the twenty

days the horse was taken by plaint-

iff, at defendant's request, to Kings-

ton Park, to be turned out to grass.

There the horse was entered in

plaintiff's name, at request of defend-

i In Parker v. Mitchell, 5 N. H. 165,

there was a sale of an anvil at auction.

One of the conditions of the sale was

that the purchaser should have a

credit of ninety days on giving good

1 In Parker v. Mitchell, 5 N. H. 16.),
conclusive evidence to show a dethere was a sale of an anvil at auction. livery by the seller or acceptance by
One of the conditions of the sale was the buyer. At furthest it only shows
that the purcha er should have a what might, perhaps, be considereu
credit of ninety days on giving good an acceptance if the seller elected so
security. The bidder removed the to consider it.. For it is clear the
anvil a little way in the auction buyer bad no right to take the anvil
room, but afterwards refused to take until the seuurity was given." To
it or gi'e ecurity. Said the court: same effect: Messer v. ·woodman, 22
"The circum tance that the buyer N. H. 172, 53 Am. Dec. 241.
took the anvil and moved it is not
338

•CH. VII.] CONTRACT UNDER STATUTE OF FRAUDS.

-CH. III.]

OOXTRACT

NDER

TATUTE OF FRAUD •

[§ 3 G.

[§ 386.

or separate them from a larger mass, 1 — there can be no such

delivery and receipt as will satisfy the statute. There must

first be a delivery by the seller with intent to give possession

of the goods to the buyer.

ant. No time was specified for pay-

ment. Afterwards defendant re-

-Or eparate them from n. larger mass, 1 -there can be no such
-d elivery and receipt as will sati fy the statute. There mu t
first be a delivery by the seller with intent to give possession
Df the goods to the buy r.

fused to take the horse. Held, that

the contract of sale was not opera-

tive, as the horse had never left the

possession of the sellers, who had a

lien on him for the price. Elmore

-v. Stone, 1 Taunt. 457, was distin-

guished.

In Spear v. Bach, 82 Wis. 192, 52

N. W. K. 97. which was an action for

the price of stock alleged to have been

sold to defendant, plaintiff testified
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that lie met defendant on a train

and there sold and delivered the

stock to him; but that afterwards,

the defendant, not having the money

with him to pay for it, handed it

hack to plaintiff ami requested him

to send it to a certain bank and draw

on him for the price. Plaintiff sent

the stock to the bank with draft at-

tached, but the defendant failed to

take it. Held, no acceptance and re-

ceipt.

In Dole v. Stimpson. 21 Pick.

(Ma^s. ) 384, the defendant offered the

plaintiff a certain price for a steam-

engine, a part of the money to be

paid when the engine should be

taken away by the defendant, which

was to be done in two or three weeks,

and the balance to be secured by a

promissory note. The plaintiff ac-

cepted the offer and said, " then you

consider the engine to be yours as it

is,"' and the defendant said " yes."

The boiler was set in bricks, in the

plaintiffs shop, and could not be re-

moved until they were taken away.

and the plaintiff was to take them

away, winch he did the next week.

The defendant told a witness he had

bought the engine, and made inqui-

ries on what terms he could get it

carried to another place. The bar-

gain was not in writing, and the de-

fendant did not pay or secure any

part of the price, and did not take

away the engine. It was held that

there was no delivery and that the

sale was therefore void under the

statute of frauds.

In Kirby v. Johnson, 22 Mo. 354, a

contract was made for the sale of

cattle in the field of the seller. The

purr I laser told the seller to keep the

cattle and feed them until he sent

for them, at the expense of the pur-

chaser. The seller agreed to do so,

but told the purchaser that, if any of

them died, he must bear the loss, to

which the latter assented. Held, no

delivery to take the contract out of

ant. No time wa -pecifi d for pay- away, which he did the next week.
m nt.
fterward defendant re- The defendant told a witne ·she had
fu d to take the hor e. Helcl, that bought the engine, and made inquithe ontract of ale wa not opera- rie on what terms he could g tit
ti ve, a the hor e had nev r left the carried to another place. The bar] o , ion of the eller , who had a gain was not in writing, and the delien on him for the price. Elmore fendant did not pay or secure any
v. tone. 1 Taunt. 457, wa di tin- part of the price, and did not take
gui heel.
away the engine. It' as held that
In , pear v. Ba h, '> Wi . 199, 5'> there wa no delivery and that the
N. \ . R. 9 , which wa an action for ale '"a therefore void under the
th price of tock alleged to ha<;' been tatute of fraud .
okl t cl fendant, plaintiff te tified
In Kirby v. John on, '>'>Mo. 354, a
that he rn t d fondant on a train contract wa made for the saJe of
and there old a.nd cleliv r d the
attle in the field of the seller. The
to k to him; but that afterward., purcha er told the eller to keep the
th cl fendant, not ha vino- the money
attle and feed them until he ·ent
with him to pay for it, handed it for them. at the expen e of the purhack t plaintiff and requ ted him ·ha er. The eller agreed to do so,
to nd it to a cert in bank and draw but told the purcha er that, if any of
on him for the pri e. Plaintiff ent hem died, he mu t bear the lo. s, to
the tock to the bank with lraf at· which the latter a en ed. H elcl, no
tached, but the defendant failed to d li ery to take the contract out of
take it. Held, no acceptance and re- th tatute of frauds. The court receipt.
garded Elmore v. Stone, 1 Taunt. 457
In Dole v. Stimp. on. 91 Pick. (cited in 3 5, supra), as overruled,
(1\Ia . .) 3 4-, the defendant offered the on the strength of Proctor v. Jone ,
1 laintiff a certain price for a team- '> C. & P. 539. Chaplin v. Roger , 1
en()'ine, a part of the money to be Ea t, 1!)9 (cited in \:3 361. siipra), wa
paid when the engine should be di tingui hed. The ca e, however,
t ken away by the defen lant, which mightwellhavere tedon the ground,
wa to be done in two or three week , al o mentioned by the court, that the
and the balance to be secured by a vendor's lien bad not been divested.
promi ory note. The plaintiff ac1 Thus on a sale of a quantity of
epted the offer and said, 'then you hay, part of a larger mass, there can
con ider the engine to be your a it be no delivery and receipt o long as
i ," and the defendant aid "yes." the bay remains unseparated and
Th e boiler wa et in brick, in the unweighed.
lesser v. "Woodman, 22
plaintiff hop. and coulU not be re- N. H. 172 53 Am. Dec. 241. In Rodgm 'eel until they were taken away, er v. Jone , 129 Ma s. 420, a lot of
.and the plaintiff was to take them
kins had been sold, to be as ortecl
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§ 387.] LAW OF SALE. [BOOK I,

§ 387. Delivery and receipt where goods are in possession

of a third person. — "When the goods at the time of the

sale," says Mr. Benjamin, 1 " are in possession of a third person,

an actual receipt takes place when the vendor, the purchaser,,

and the third person agree together that the latter shall cease

to hold the goods for the vendor and shall hold them for the

purchaser. They were in possession of an agent for the ven-

dor, and therefore, in contemplation of law, in possession of the

vendor himself; and they become in the possession of an agent

for the purchaser, and therefore in that of the purchaser him-

self. But it is important to remark that all of the parties,

must join in this agreement, for the agent of the vendor can-

not be converted into an agent for the vendee without his own

knowledge and consent. Therefore, if the seller have goods

in the possession of a warehouseman, a wharfinger, carrier, or

any other bailee, his order given to the buyer directing the

bailee to deliver the goods, or to hold them subject to the con-

trol of the buyer, will not effect such a change of possession as
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amounts to actual receipt, unless the bailee accepts the order

or recognizes it, or consents to act in accordance with it, and

until he has so agreed he remains agent and bailee of the

vendor."

This assent of the bailee need not be express, but may be

inferred from acts or from acquiescence, as in other cases. 2

and weighed and then to be removed was left in the seller's possession, he

by the purchaser. An agent of the to select and deliver the two bales,

purchaser assisted in assorting part The contract was held invalid as

of the skins, and then went away within the statute. Smith v. Evans,

leaving the sellers to complete the 36 S. C. 69, 15 S. E. R. 344.

work. The sellers did this, set the * Benjamin on Sales, § 174

whole lot apart in bundles marked 2 A delivery order given to the

with the purchaser's name, and noti- purchaser does not amount to a re-

fied the latter's agent that the skins ceipt until warehouseman accepts

were ready for delivery. Before de- it and thereby assents to hold the

livery they were burned. Held, that goods as agent of the vendee. Bent-

there was no acceptance and receipt all v. Burn. 3 B. & C. 423. Nor does-

within the statute. Likewise when the delivery of a warrant for the

two bales of cotton were agreed to goods to the purchaser, though the

§ 387. DeliYery and receipt where goods are in pos c . ion
of a third person.- " When the good at the time of th esale," says Mr. Benjamin,1 "are in possession of a third p r on,.
an actual receipt takes place when the vendor, the purchaser,.
and the third person agree together that the latter shall cea e
to hold the goods for the v ndor and shall hold them for the
purchaser. They were in po session of an ag nt for the venion of th
dor, and therefore, in contemplation of law, in pos
vendor himself; and they become in the po session of an ao·ent
for the purchaser, and th erefore in that of the purcha er himself. But it is important to remark that all of the l artie ·
must join in this acrreem nt, for the agent of the vendor cannot be converted into an ag nt for the vendee without his own
knowledge and consent. Therefore, if the seller have goods.
in the possession of a warehou ema n, a wharfinger, carrier, or
any other bai lee, bis order given to the buyer dire ting the
bailee to deliver the goods, or to bold them subject to th e control of the buyer, will not eff ct such a change of possession as
amounts to actual receipt, unless the bailee accepts the order
or recognizes it, or consents to act in accordance with it, and
until be has so agreed he remains agent and bailee of the
vendor."
This assent of the bailee need not be express, but may be
inferred from acts or from acquiescence, as in other cases. 2

be taken from three, but the whole purchaser keeps the warrant for ten
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and weighed and then to be removed was left in the seller's possession, heby the purchaser. A n agent of the to select and deliver the two bales.
purchaser assisted in assorting part The contract was h eld im·alid as
of the skins, and then went away within the statute. Smith v. Evans~
leavin;; the sellers to complete the 36 S. C. 69, 15 S. E. R. 344.
work. The sellers did this, set the
1 Benjamin on Sales, § 174.
whole lot apart in bundles marked
2 .A delivery order given to thewith the purchaser's name, and noti- purchaser does not amount to a refied the latter's agen t that the kins ceipt until warehouseman accepts
were ready for delivery. Before de- it and thereby assents to hold the
livery they were burned. H eld, that goods as agent of the vendee. Bentthere was no acceptance and receipt all v. Burn. 3 B. & C. 423. Nor does
w ithin the statute. Likewise when the delivery of a warrant for the
two bales of cotton were agreed to goods to the purchaser, though the
be taken from three, but the whole purchaser keeps the warrant for ten
340

OH. VII.] CONTRACT UNDER STATUTE OF FRAUDS. [§§ 3SS, 389.

§ 388. . Where the goods are in a government ware-

house, with duties unpaid, not even the agreement of the bailee

to deliver them to the vendee will amount to a receipt by the

vendee, for the goods are really in the custody of the govern-

ment and the custodian has no authority to deliver them until

the fees are paid and the regulations complied with. 1 And

where the custodian of the goods is a prior vendor, having a

lien on them for the price, the fact that he is notified of a re-

sale of them to a purchaser who will and does give directions

as to their shipment, will not amount to a receipt by such pur-

chaser if the goods are not so shipped and the custodian does

nothing to waive his vendor's lien. 2

AY here goods are left with a third person by the vendor with

instructions to deliver them to the vendee when called for, but

the vendee does not call for them and they remain in the pos-

session of such third person, there is clearly no receipt by the

vendee. 8

§ 389. Delivery and receipt when goods are already in pos-
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session of purchaser. — Where the goods, at the time of the

contract of sale, are already in the possession of the purchaser

by virtue of some other arrangement, the nature of the deliv-

months and refuses to return it, but Spooner, 13 Allen (Mass.), 353, 90 Am.

does not present it or get the goods. Dec. 190.

Farina v. Home, 10 M. & W. 119. Nor But where, upon the sale of cotton

is there a receipt where, though the stored in a warehouse, the seller

goods are transferred, by the order of gave the purchaser an oi'der for it,

the vendor, on the warehouseman's notifying the warehouseman also of

book, but their delivery is subse- the sale, and the purchaser there-

quently countermanded by the ven- upon applied for the cotton, but the

dor on account of the vendee's fail- delivery was postponed until next day

ure to pay. Godts v. Rose, 17 C. B. by agreement between the purchaser

229. and warehouseman, it was held that

Where a person in Massachusetts there was a sufficient receipt. King

sells some hides in a New York ware- v. Jarman, 35 Ark. 190, 37 Am. R. 11.

house, and gives a bill of the goods See also Townsend v. Hargraves,

and an order on the warehouseman 118 Mass. 325, and post, chapter on

to the buyer, without notifying the Deliver//.

warehouseman, this is not such a de- * In re Clifford, 2 Sawy. 428.

livery to ami receipt by the buyer as - Marsh v. Rouse, 44 N. Y. 643.

satisfies the statute. Boardman v. 3 Hart v. Tyler, 15 Pick (Mass.) 171.
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§ 390.J

LA. W OF

ALE.

[BOOK I~

§ 390.] LAW OF SALE. [BOOK I.

ery and receipt which will satisfy the statute is necessarily dif-

ferent. It is not necessaiy that the parties should go through

the idle ceremony of returning the property to the seller that

he may make a new delivery to the buyer, who is then to re-

ceive it anew. 1 It is sufficient that the attitude of the party in

possession shall be changed from that of a mere bailee to that

of a purchaser in pursuance of the contract of sale, and this

change of attitude can be shown by proof of such acts and con-

duct as indicate it. 2 " If it appears," said the court in the lead-

ing case 3 upon the subject, "that the conduct of a defendant

in dealing with goods already in his possession is wholly in-

consistent with the supposition that his former possession con-

tinues unchanged, he may properly be said to have accepted

and actually received such goods under a contract, so as to take

the case out of the operation of the statute of frauds ; as, for

instance, if he sells or attempts to sell goods, or if he disposes

absolutely of the whole or any part of them, or attempts to do

so, or alter the nature of the property, or the like."
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Whether the acts show a receipt of this nature is ordinarily

a question of fact for the jury, 4 though where the facts are not

in dispute the court may determine it. 5

§ 390. Delivery where seller and purchaser occupy same

premises. — "Where A was at work and living with B upon the

latter's farm, and a sale of a part of B's hogs to A was agreed

upon, and the parties designated the hogs, but agreed that

they should remain upon the farm and be fed and cared for

by A with the others until they could be sold, it was held that

there was a sufficient delivery to satisfy the statute and as

i Snider v. Thrall, 56 Wis. 674, 14 hay, part of a large mass, already in

N. W. R. 814. the purchaser's barn, was sold at auo

^Edan v. Dudfield. 1 Q. B. 302; tion. After the sale, the seller offered

Lillywhite v. Devereux, 15 M. & W. to weigh and deliver the hay, pro-

285; Snider v. Thrall, supra. vided the purchaser would either pay

3 Lillywhite v. Devereux, supra. the price or secure the payment. The

ery and receipt which will satisfy the statute is necessarily different. It is not necessary that the parties should go through
the idl ceremony of returning the property to the seller that
he may make a new delivery to the buyer, who is then to receive it anew. 1 It is sufficient that the attitude of the party in
possession shall be changed from that of a mere bailee to that
of a purchaser in pursuance of the contract of sale, and this
change of attitude can be shown by proof of such acts and conduct as indicate it. 2 "If it appears, said the court in the leading case 3 upon the subject, ''that the conduct of a defendant
in dealing with goods already in his posses ion is wholly inconsistent with the suppo ition that his former l o es ion continues unchanged, he may properly be said to have ace pted
and actually received such good under a contract, so as to take
the ca e out of the operation of the statute of frauds; as, for
in tance, if he sells or attempts to sell goods, or if he disposes
au olutely of the whole or any part of them, or attempts to do
so, or alter the nature of the property, or the like."
Whether the acts show a receipt of this nature is ordinarily
a question of fact for the jury,4 though where the facts are not
in dispute the court may determine it. 5

4 Edan v. Dudfield; Lillywhite v. purchaser refused to do either, and

§ 390. Delivery where seller and purchaser occupy sam(}

Devereux, supra. also refused to accept a delivery of

5 In Messer v. Woodman, 22 N. H. the hay from the seller. Held, no-

172, 53 Am. Dec. 241, a quantity of delivery.
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premises.-Where A was at work and living with B upon the
latter's farm, and a sale of a part of B's hogs to A was agreed
upon, and the parties designated the hogs, but agreed that
they should remain upon the farm and be fed and cared forby A with the others until they could be sold, it was held that
there was a sufficient delivery to satisfy the statute and as.
nicler v. Thrall, 56 Wi . 674, 14
R. 14.
2 Edan v. Dudfield, 1 Q. B. 309;
Lillywhite v. Devereux, rn I. & W.
2 5; nider v. Thrall, supra.
a Lillywhite v. Devereux, sup1·ct.
4 Edan v. Dudfield; Lillywhite v.
Devereux, supra.
5 In Ie er v. "\"\ ood man, 22 N. H.
172, 53 Am. Dec. 241, a quantity of
l

N.

vV.

hay, part of a large mas , already in
the purchaser's barn, was sold at auction. After the a.le, the seller offere l
to weigh and deliver the hay, provided the purcha er wou!d either pay
the price or secure the payment. The
purchaser refu cl to do eitlier, and
al o refu ed to ace pt a deli very of
the hay from the seller. Held, nodelivery.

3-12

CII. VII.] CONTRACT UNDER STATUTE OF FRAUDS. [§§ 391,392.

\

against ITs creditors. Said Cooley, J. : " It was all the deliv-

ery that could well have been made under the circumstances

without requiring Anderson to remove the hogs from the farm

where he was employed to some other place where they would

have been less in his possession than they were; and for this

there could have been no sufficient reason." l

§ 391. Receipt by agent — Common agent.— The receipt of

the goods, like their acceptance, may be not only by the pur-

chaser in person, but also by his authorized agent. 2 But here

also the authority of the agent must be adequate and to the

point, 3 for authority to accept does not necessarily include

authority to receive, any more than the contrary case. 4 This

authority, however, like the other, may be express and formal,

or its existence may be inferred from acts and conduct. 5 It is

not enough, however, that it be created by the same parol

agreement sought to be made valid by such receipt. 6

g 392, . The same person cannot at the same time law-
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fully act as agent both for the seller and the buyer without

their knowledge and consent; 7 but, with such knowledge and

i Webster v. Anderson, 42 Mich. Weiner, 82 Wis. 298, 52 N. W, R 435;

554, 36 Am. R. 452, citing Adams Moore v. Hays, 12 Ind. App. 476, 40

Mining Co. v. Senter, 26 Mich. 73. N. E. R. 638.

Where the owner of a horse rents 3 Spear v. Bach, 82 Wis. 192, 52 N.

a barn to keep him in and then sells W. R. 97.

him to a person who thereafter rents 4 See ante, % 363.

the same barn and continues to keep 5 See ante, § 363; Wilcox Silver

the horse in it, there is nothing to Plate Co. v. Green, 72 N. Y. 17.

negative delivery. Hallock v. Al- ^Hawley v. Keeler, 53 N. Y. 114.

vord, 61 Conn. 194, 23 Atl. R. 131. 'Mechem on Agency, § 66. See

So also where one who owned a Caulkins v. Hellman, 47 N. Y. 449, 7

building on the land of another sold Am. R. 461; Rodgers v. Jones, 129

the building to the owner of the Mass. 420; Spear v. Bach, 82 Wis.

land on which it stood, and remained 192, 52 N. W. R 97. In the last case

therein, paying rent to the vendee, it was held that where a person who

it was held there was a sufficient de- has agreed to buy shares of stock re-

livery and acceptance to satisfy the quests the seller to send the certifi-

statute. Reinhart v. Gregg, 8 Wash, cate, with draft for price, to a cer-

191. 35 Pac. R. 1075. tain bank, where he will take it up,

2 See ante, §363; Michelstetter v. and the seller does so, the bank is
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§§ 303, 394.j

LAW OF

ALE.

[BOOK I.

§§ 393, 394.] la.w of sale. [book i.

consent, he may act both for the seller in delivering and the

buyer in receiving. 1 "There can be no presumption," says

Justice Campbell, 2 " that the agent of the two parties will deal

unfairly with either. And when they both deliberately put

him in charge of their separate concerns, and there is any like-

lihood that he may have to deal with the rights of both in the

same transactions, instead of lessening his powers it may be-

come necessary to enlarge them far enough to dispense with

such formalities as one man would use with another, but which

could not be possible for a single person to go through with

alone."

§ 393. Carrier as agent to receive.— The authority of

a carrier as agent to accept the goods has already been consid-

ered. 3 And, in general, the same rule applies in this case as in

that. A delivery to a carrier not designated by the purchaser

cannot of itself be deemed a receipt by the buyer; 4 but where

the purchaser directs the delivery of the goods to a carrier des-

consent, be may act both for the seller in delivering and the
buyer in receivin 0'. 1 "There can be no presnmption," says
Justice Campbell, 2 "that the ag nt of the two parties will <leal
unfairly with either. And when they both deliberately put
him in charge of their separate concerns, and there is any likelihood that he may have to deal with the rights of both in the
same transaction in tead of les ening his powers it may become neces ary to enlarge them far enough to dispense with
such formalities as one man would use with another, but which
could not be pos ible for a single per on to go through with
alone."

ignated by him, such a delivery will satisfy the statute. 5 The
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authority of the carrier to receive, however, need not be ex-

pressly conferred, but may be shown in the same manner as in

other cases, as by conduct, acquiescence or ratification. It must,

however, have some other origin than the parol agreement which

is sought to be validated by such receipt. 6

§ 394. Acceptance and receipt may precede the passing of

title.— It is not essential that the absolute legal title to the

not thereby made the agent of the 6 Cross v. O'Donnell. 44 N. Y. 661, 4

buyer to receive and accept the Am. R. 721; Wilcox Silver Plate Co.

stock, but is the agent of the seller v. Green, 72 N. Y. 17; Caulkins v.

only. Hellman, 47 N. Y. 449, 7 Am. R. 461;

iMechem on Agency, § 67; Fitz- Dawes v. Peck, 8 T. R. 330; Wait v.

simmons v. Express Co., 40 Ga. 330, 2 Baker, 2 Ex. 1; Fragano v. Long, 4

Am. R. 577. B. & C. 219; Dunlop v. Lambert, 6

2 In Adams Mining Co. v. Senter, C. & F. 600; Johnson v. Dodgson,

26 Mich. 73. 2 M. & W. 633; Norman v. Phillips,

3 See ante, § 365. 14 M. & W. 277 ; Meredith v. Meigh, 2

4 Cross v. O'Donnell, 44 N. Y. 661, 4 E. & B. 364; Cusack v. Robinson, 1 B.

Am. R. 721; Hausman v. Nye, 62 Ind. & S. 299; Smith v. Hudson, 6 id. 431.

485, 30 Am. R. 199. 6 Hawley v. Keeler, 53 N. Y. 114.
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§ 393. - - Carrier as agent to receive.-The authority of
a carrier as agent to accept the goods has already been considered.3 And, in gQneral, the ame rule applies in this case as in
that. A deli very to a carrier not designated by the purchaser
cannot of itself be deemed a receipt by the buyer; 4 but where
the purchaser directs the delivery of the goods to a carrier designated by him, such a delivery will satisfy the statute. 5 '.Phe
authority of the carrier to receive, however, need not be expressly conferred, but may be sho'\\"n in the same manner as in
other cases, as by conduct, acquiescence or ratification. It must,
howev r, have some other origin than the parol agreement which
is sought to be validated by such receipt. 6
§ 394. Acce1ltance and receipt may prececle the passing of
title.- It is not essential that the absolute legal title to the
not thereby made the agent of the
6 Cross v. O'Donnell, 44 N. Y. 661, 4
buyer to receive and accept the Arn. R. 721; Wilcox Silver Plate Co.
stock, but is the agent of the seller v. Green, 72 N. Y. 17; Caulkins v.
only.
H ellman, 47 N. Y. 449, 7 Am. R. 461;
l lVfechem on Agency, B67; Fit.zDawes v. Peck, 8 T. R. 330; ·wait v.
simmon v. Express Co., 40 Ga. 330, 2 Baker, 2 Ex. 1; Fragano v. Long, 4
Am. R. 577.
B. & C. 219; Dunlop v. Lambert, 6
2 In Adams Mining Co. v. Senter,
C. & F. 600; Johnson v. Dodgson,
26 Mich. 73.
2 lVI. & vV. 653; Norman v. Phillips,
3 See ante, § 365.
14 M. & W. 277; Meredith v. Meigh, 2
4 Cro . v. O'Donnell, 44 N. Y. 661, 4 E. & B. 364; Cusack v. Robinson, 1 B.
Am. R. 721; Hausman v. Nye, 62 Ind. & S. 299; Smith v. Hud on, 6 icl. 431.
485, 30 Arn. R. 199.
s Hawley v. Keeler, 53 N. Y. 114.
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OH. VII.] CONTRACT UNDER STATUTE OF FRAUDS: [§§ 395, 390.

goods shall pass to the purchaser at the time of the making of

the contract of sale, in order to render effective, under the stat-

ute, an acceptance and receipt then occurring, but such accept-

ance and receipt will sustain the contract, although the absolute

legal title is not to pass to the purchaser until the happening of

some event or the performance of some condition subsequent.

Thus, upon a contract of sale upon condition that, though pos-

session is at once given, the legal title shall not pass until the

price is paid, the purchaser's acceptance and receipt of the goods

at the time the contract is made will satisfy the statute. 1

§ 395. Receipt and acceptance may be complete though

terms of contract in dispute.— "It is quite true," says Mr.

Justice Matthews, 2 "that the receipt and acceptance by the

vendee under a verbal agreement, otherwise void by the statute

of frauds, may be complete, although the terms of the contract-

are in dispute. Keceipt and acceptance by some unequivocal

act, sufficiently proven to have taken place under some contract

of sale, are sufficient to take the case out of the prohibition of
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the statute, leaving the jury to ascertain and find from the tes-

timony what terms of sale were actually agreed on. 3 But as

was said by Williams, J., 4 the acceptance by the defendant

must be in the quality of vendee. ' The statute does not mean

that the thing which is to dispense with the writing is to take

the place of all the terms of the contract, but that the accept-

ance is to establish the broad fact of the relation of vendor and

vendee.' The act or acts relied on as constituting a receipt and

acceptance, to satisfy the statute, must be such as definitely es-

tablish that the relation of vendor and vendee exists." 5

§ 396. No title passes if goods not received and accepted.

Until the goods have been received and accepted, no title, of

iPinkham v. Mattox, 53 N. H. 600. 118 Mass. 325; Benjamin on Sales,

2 In Hinchman v. Lincoln, 124 TJ. S. § 170.

3 g 5 4 # 4 i n Tomkinson v. Staight, 17 C. B.

» Citing Marsh v. Hyde, 3 Gray 697.

(Mass.), 331; Townsend v. Hargraves, 5 Citing Remick v. Sandford, 120

Mass. 309.
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LA.W OF SA.LE.

[BOOK I.

§§ 397-400.] LAW OF SALE. [book I.

course, passes to the purchaser, and they are therefore not sub-

ject to levy and sale as his goods at the suit of his creditors. 1

§ 397. Question of receipt is for jury,— Like the question

course, passes to the purchaser, and they are therefore not subject to levy and sale as his goods at the suit of his creditors. 1

of acceptance, 2 the question whether or not there has been such

a delivery and receipt as will satisfy the statute is, where the

facts are in dispute, for the jury to determine in view of all

the circumstances, 3 though, where tlie facts are not disputed,

the court may dispose of it as a matter of law.

4. Part of the Goods Sold.

§ 398. Acceptance and receipt of part of the goods suf-

fices. — The statute requires the acceptance and receipt of

" part of the goods so sold." It does not designate what part,

but clearly requires that it shall be a part of the particular

goods so sold. Hence —

§ 3H7. Question of receipt is for jury.-Like the question
of acceptance,2 the question whether or not there has been such
a delivery and receipt as will satisfy the statute is, where the
facts are in di pute, for the jury to determine in view of all
the circumstances, 3 though, where the facts are not disputed,
the court may dispose of it as a matter of law.

§ 399. Any part, though small, suffices.— Any appreciable

part of the goods, though small, will suffice to satisfy this re-

4. Part of the Goods Sold.

quirement. 4

§ 400. But it must actually be part of the goods sold —
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Sample — Specimen.— The part received must be actually a

part of the goods so sold. Hence, the acceptance and receipt

of a mere sample or specimen like the goods sold, but not act-

ually apart thereof, is not enough; 5 but if the sample be act-

ually taken from the mass of goods contracted for, diminishing

by so much the balance to be subsequently delivered, it will

i Winner v. Williams, 62 Mich. 863, stock) are acting in unison and con-

28 N. W. R. 904. sidering their several shares as con-

§ 398. Acceptance ancl receipt of part of the goods suf·
fices.- The statute requires the acceptance an<l receipt of
"part of the goo<ls so sold." It does not designate what part,
but clearly requires that it shall be a part 0£ the particular
goods so sold. Hence -

2 See ante, § 373. stituting one block will not make

3 See ante, § 373; Theilen v. Rath, the several interests so far one that

80 Wis. 263, 50 N. W. R. 183; Pratt v. a delivery of the shares of one will

Chase, 40 Me. 269; Houghtaling v. defeat the statute as to the others.

Ball, 19 Mo. 84, 59 Am. Dec. 331; Tompkins v. Sheehan (1899), 158 N. Y.

Pinkham v. Mattox, 53 N. H. 600. 617, 53 N. E. R. 502.

§ 399. Any part, though small, suffices.-Any appreciable
part of the goods, though small, will suffice to satisfy this requirement.4

4 But the mere fact that the own- 5 Moore v. Love, 57 Miss. 765; Cooper

ers of several and distinct interests v. Elston, 7 T. R. 14.

(e. g., the owners of several shares of
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§ 4:00. But it must actually be part of the goods sold Sample - Specimen.-The part received must be actually a
part of the goods so sold. I-Ience, the acceptance and receipt
of a mere sample or specimen like the goods sold, but not actually a part thereof, is not enough; 5 but if the sample be actually taken from the mass of goods contracted for, diminishing
by so much the balance to be subsequently delivered, it will
I ·winner v. Williams, 62 l\Iich. 363, stock) are acting in unison and con·
28 N. W. R. 904.
sidering their several shares as con2 'ee ante, § 373.
stituting one block will not make
3 See ante,
373; Theilen v. Rath, the several interests so far one that
80 Wis. 263, 50 N. W.R. 183; Pratt v. a delivery of the shares of one will
Chase, 40- Me. 269; Houghtaling v . l feat the statute as to the others.
Ball, 19 fo. 4, 59 Am. Dec. 331; Tompkins v. Sheehan (1899), 158 N. Y.
Pinkham v. Mattox, 53 N. H. 600.
617, 53 N. E. R. 502.
4 But the mere fact that the own5 Moore v. Love,57 Miss. 765; Cooper
er of severail and di tinct interests v. El ton, 7 T. R. 14.
(e. g., the owners of several shares of
346
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CH. VII.] CONTRACT UNDER STATUTE OF FRAUDS.

CH. VII.]

CO TRACT

NDER

T.A.TUTE OF FRAUDS.

[§ ±01.

[§ 401.

suffice. 1 The sample must, of course, be accepted and actually

received within the rules already laid down. 2

§ 401. At what time the part may be accepted and re-

suffice. 1 The sample must, of course, be accepted and actually
received within the rules already laid down. 2

ceived.— It is not essential that the part delivery, acceptance

and receipt should be at the time of making the contract. The

parol agreement, unless revoked, may stand for a mutual agreed

§ 4:01. At w11at time the part may be accepted and re·

proposition, at least for a reasonable time, where none is fixed,

and the subsequent acceptance and receipt, while the proposi-

tion remains open, of a portion of the goods which were the

subject of the parol negotiation, will make the entire contract

effective. 3

i Gardner v. Grout, 2 C. B. (N. S.)

340; Moore v. Love, 57 Miss. 763; Gil-

liat v. Roberts, 19 L. J. Ex. 410.

2 Thus, a mere taking of a sample

in the hand, without any express un-

derstanding that such taking was to
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be a delivery, would amount to noth-

ing. Carver v. Lane, 4 E. D. Smith

cei ved .-It is not essential that the part delivery, acceptance
and receipt should be at the time of making the contract. The
parol agreement, unless revoked, may stan l for a mutual agreed
proposition, at least for a reasonable time, where none is fixed,
and the subsequent acceptance an l receipt, while the propo i·
tion remains open, of a portion of the goods which were the
subject of the parol negotiation, will make the entire contract
effective. 3

(N. Y.), 168. Nor taking a sample

for the purpose of testing it only,

and then refusing to accept. Me-

chanical Boiler Cleaner Co. v. Kellner

(1899), 62 N. J. L. 544, 43 Atl. R. 599.

In Dierson v. Petersmeyer (1899). —

Iowa, , 80 N. W. R. 389, the court

said: "When making the contract

the defendant took some corn in a

small sack to send away as a sample.

He simply helped himself to this,

and it was neither delivered nor

taken as part of the corn bought.

No part of that sold was accepted."

Held, not sufficient.

3 Sprague v. Blake, 20 Wend. (N. Y.)

61; Rickey v. Tenbroeck, 63 Mo. 563;

McKnight v. Dunlop, 5 N. Y. 537, 55

Am. Dec. 370; Davis v. Moore, 13 Me.

424. Where, under a verbal agree-

ment for the sale of a lot of cattle, a

part was to be delivered in one week

and the remainder in instalments

as the buyer might require, held, that

though the contract when made was

void as such under the statute, it

was good as a proposition concern?

ing the price, and the subsequent de-

livery and acceptance of the first

instalment, at the time fixed, with-

out any change in the proposition,

made it binding and took it out of

the statute. Rickey v. Tenbroeck,

63 Mo. 563.

Where the contract is entire, the

acceptance and receipt of a part of the

goods, though shipped at a different

time from the other, will make the en-

tire contract valid. Farmer v. Gray,

16 Neb. 401.

Where the part was not accepted

and received until after the expira-

tion of the time within which the

whole contract was to have been com-

pleted, the court doubted whether

such part receipt would save the

contract; but the point was immate-

rial, as the court found that a new

contract was made at the time of the

I Gardn r v. Grout, 2 C. B. (N. S.) a the buyer might require, held, that
3-!0· l\Ioore v. Love, 57 Mi . 765; Gil- though the ontract when made was
\Oid a su h under the statute, it
liat v. Robert , 19 L. J. Ex. 410.
2 Thu , a mere taking of a
ample was good as a propo ition con prnin the hand, without any expre s un- ing the price, and the subsequ nt ueder. tandiog that u h taking was to livery and acceptance of the .first
be a clelivery, would amount to noth- in talment, at the time fixed "-ithing. Carver v. Lane, 4 E. D. mith out any hange in the propo. i.tion,
(N. Y.), 16 . Nor taking a ample made it binding and took it out of
for the purpo e of te ting it only, the ~ tatute. Rickey v. Tenbroeck,
and then refu ing to a cept.
le- 63 Io. 563.
chanical Boiier Cleaner Co. v. Kellner
Where the contract is entire, the
(1 99), 62 N. J. L. 544, 43 Atl. R. 599. a cceptance and receipt of a part of the
Ju Dier on v. Peter meyer (l 99). good , though shipped at a different
Iowa, - , 0 N. W. R. 3 9 the court time from the other, will make the enaid: "When making the contract tire contract valid. Farmer v. Gray,
the defendant took ome corn in a 16 eb. 401.
mall ack to end away a. a ample.
Where the part was not accepted
He simply helped him. elf to this, and received until after the expi r aand it was neither delivered nor tion of the time within which the
taken a part of the corn bought. whole eon tract was to have been comNo part of that old wa acce]Jted." pleted, the court doubted whether
Hild, not sufficient.
uch part receipt would save the
3 Sprague v. Blake, 20 W nd. (N. Y.)
contract; but the point was immate61; Rickey v. Ten broeck, 6i3 Io. 563; rial, as the court found that a ne'v
McKnight v. Dunlop, 5 N. Y. 537, 55 contract was made at the time of the
Am. Dec. 370; Davi v. Moore, 13 Me. part delivery, which new contract
424. Where, under a verbal agree- was made good by suuh part delivment for the ale of a Jot of cattle. a ery. Damon v. Osborn, 1 Pick. (l\Ias .)
part wa to be delivered in one week 476. 11 Am. Dec. 229.
and the r emainder in in talments
On January 1, plaintiff made a
347

§ 402 403.J
C>

LAW OF

ALE.

[BOOK I.

§§ 402, 403.] LAW OF SALE. [book t.

And this is true even though the goods consist of several

parcels, or are to be delivered in instalments at different times. 1

§ 402. After part acceptance and receipt, loss of remainder

And this is true even tbonO'h the goods con ist of several
parcels or are to be delivered in in talment'"' at differ nt tim 1

before delivery falls on purchaser.— The entire contract

being thus made effective by the part acceptance and receipt,

the rights and liabilities of the parties must be determined as

of the date of the agreement. Hence, if after a part accept-

ance and delivery the remainder of the goods, though still in

the hands of the seller, are destroyed without his fault, the

loss must fall upon the purchaser. 2

§ 403. Acceptance and receipt of part must be in pursu-

ance of contract. — The acceptance and receipt of the part must

be in pursuance of and with the intention of performing the

entire contract, of whose continuing existence they are to be the

recognition. If, therefore, at the time of receiving the part the

buyer repudiates the contract, and receives the part as being

the maximum extent of his obligation, such an acceptance and

§ 402. After part acceptance and receipt, loss ofremaincler
before . delivery falls on purcha er.-The entire contract
being thus made effective by the part acceptance and r ceipt,
the right and liabiliti s of the parties mu t be determined as
of the elate of the agreement. Hence, if after a part acceptance and delivery the remainder of tho ood , though still in
the hand of the seller, are de troyed without his fault, the
lo s must fall upon the purcbaser. 2

receipt cannot save the contract as to the residue. 3
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parol contract with defendant to sell x See cases in foregoing note.

him all the wood upon a certain lot So also in Gilbert v. Lichtenberg,

at a fixed price per cord, and to de- 98 Mich. 417, 57 N. W. R. 259, where

liver as much as he could that win- there was a sale of a quantity of ou-

ter and the balance the winter and ions, aggregating three car-loads, it

year following, the defendant to pay was held that the delivery and ae-

on demand for amount delivered at ceptance of one car-load satisfied the

the close of each winter's delivery, statute as to the whole transaction.

Plaintiff delivered a portion of the See also to the same point, Fruit Co.

wood that year, which was accepted v. McKinney, 65 Mo. App. 220.

and paid for; the remainder he deliv- 2 Townsend v. Hargraves, 118 Mass.

ered the winter and spring following, 325; Vincent v. Germond. 11 Johns,

but defendant refused to accept or 283; Gilbert v. Lichtenberg, 98 Mich,

pay for it. Held, that the contract 417, 57 N. W. R. 259.

§ 403. Acceptance and receipt of part must be in pursuance of contract.- The acceptance and receipt of the part must.
be in pursuance of and with the intention of p rforining the
entire con tract, of who e continuing exi t nee they are to be the
recognition. If, therefore, at the time of receiving the part the
buyer repudiates the contract, and receives the part as being
the maximum extent of his obligation, such an acceptance and
receipt cannot save the contract as to the residue. 3

was entire, and that the delivery and SAtherton v. Newhall, 123 Mass.

acceptance of the first part took the 141, 25 Am. R. 47, citing Townsend v.

whole contract out of the statute. Hargraves, 118 Mass. 325, 333; Remick

Gault v. Brown, 48 N. H. 183, 2 Am. v. Sandford, 120 id. 309.

R. 210. See also Edgar v. Breck, 172

Mass. 581.
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parol contract with defendant to sell
him all the wood upon a certain lot
at a fixed price per cord. and to deliver a much as he could that winter and the balance the winter and
year following, the defendant to pay
on demand for amount delivered at
the clo e of each winter's delivery.
Plaintiff delivered a portion of the
wood that year, which wa accepted
and paid for: the remainder be delivered the winter and spring following,
but defendant refused to accept or
pay for it. Helcl, that the contract
wa. entire, and that the delivery and
acce]_Jtance of the fir t part took the
whole contract out of the statute.
Gault v. Brown, 4 N. H. 1 3, 2 Am.
R. 210.
ee also Edgar v. Breck, 172
Mass. 581.

I See cases in foregoing note.
'foal o in Gilbert v. Lichtenberg,
98 Mich. 417, 57 N. W. R. 2 9, where
there was a sale of a quantity of onions, aggregating three ear-loads, it
wa held that the deli very and acceptance of one car-load sati fied the
statute as to the whole tran action.
See also to the ame point, Fruit Co.
v. l\IcKinney, 65 Io. App. 220.
2 Townsend v. Hargraves, 118 fass.
325; Vincent v. Germond. 11 Johns.
2 3; Gilbert v. Lichtenberg, 9 Mich.

417, 57 N. W. R. 259.

Atherton v. Newhall, 123 l\1ass.
141, 25 Am. R. 47, citing Town end v.
Hargrave " 1181\'Iass. 32:1, 333; Remick
v. Sandford, 120 id. 309.

348

3

CH. VII.]

CONTRACT U "DER

TATUTE OF FRAUDS.

[§§ 404-406.

CH. VII.] CONTRACT UNDEK STATUTE OF FRAUDS. [§§ 404-406.

5. Em-nest or Part Payment,

a. Of Earnest.

5. Earn st or Part Payment.

§ 404. Earnest and part payment synonymous.— The idea

of giving something in earnest to bind the bargain was bar-

rowed from the civil law, 1 and among the Komans earnest con-

a. Of Earnest.

sisted of money or some gift or token given by the buyer to the

seller and accepted by the latter in recognition of the final and

§ 404:. Earne t and part payment synonymous.-The idea

conclusive assent of the parties to the bargain. As such it was

formerly in use in England. 2

In modern times, however, earnest and part payment are re-

garded as synonymous. Thus it is said in Massachusetts: " As

used in the statute of frauds, ' earnest ' is regarded as a part

payment of the price." 3 But no sufficient reason is apparent

why the giving of some token in earnest should not still have

its ancient effect.

§ 405. The thing in earnest must be actually given.— But

to have the effect contemplated by the statute, the thing in

earnest must actually be given by the buyer and received by
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the seller. The mere crossing of the vendor's hand, therefore,

by the buyer with a piece of silver, which the latter afterwards

puts back into his pocket and retains, is not sufficient. 4

§ 406. And must be a thing of some value — Buyer's note.

So it is held that the thing in earnest must be a thing of value.

Therefore the buyer's own note for a part of the purchase price,

being without other consideration than the parol agreement,

was held insufficient as earnest, as being of no value. 5

i Howe v. Hay ward, 108 Mass. 54, Pordage v. Cole, 1 Saund. 3197i; Lang-

of o·iving something in earnest to bind the bar0 ain was barrowecl from the civil la\ ,1 and amono· the Roman earne t coni tecl of money or orne gift or token given by the buyer to the
eller and accepted by tbe latter in rec D'Ilition of the final and
onclu ive a nt of the parties to the bargain. .A uch it was
form erly in u e in Englan l. 2
In mod rn time , however, earn e t and part payment are regard 1 a ynonymou . Thu it i aid in :Thla achu etts: ".As
u ed in the tatute of fraud
earne t' is regarde l as a part
3
pa m nt of tbe price."
But no ufficient rea on is apparent
why the givin · of om token in earnest should not still have
its anci nt effect.

11 Am. R. 306; Benjamin on Sales, fort v. Tiler, 1 Salk. 113; Morton v.

g 189 . Tibbett, 15 Q. B. 428; Walker v. Nus-

2 Benjamin on Sales, § 189, citing sey, 16 M. & W. 302; 1 Dane's Abr.

Bracton, 1, 2, c. 27; Bach v. Owen 235.

(1793), 5 T. R. 409; Goodall v. Skelton *Blenkinsop v. Clayton, 7 Taunt.

(1794), 2 H. Bl. 316. 597.

a Howe v. Hay ward, 108 Mass. 54, ^Krohn v. Bantz, 68 Ind. 277.

11 Am. R. 306, citing 2 BL Com. 447;
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4 5. The thing in arne t mu. t be actnallJ given.-· But
to ha\ e the ff ct contemplat d by the tatute, the thing in
earne t mu t actually be given by the buyer and rece.ivecl by
the eller. The m re cro in of the en lor's band, therefore,
by th buyer with a pi ce of silver, which the latter afterwards
puts back into his pocket and retain , is not sufficient.'

§ 4:06. And mu t be a thing of some value-Buyer' note.
o it i held that the thing in earnest must be a thing of value.
Therefore the buyers o" n note for a part of the purchase price,
being without other consideration than the parol agreement,
was held insufficient as earnest, as being of no value. 5
1 Howe v. Hayward, 10
la . 54,
11 m. R. 306; Benjamin on Sale ,
§ 1 9.
2 Benjamin on
ales, § 1 9, citing
Bracton, 1, 2, c. 27; Bach v. Owen
(179uJ, 5 T. R. 409; Goodall v. Skelton
(1794), o H. Bl. 316.
3 Howe v. Hayward, 10 Mass. 54,
11 Am. R. 306, citing 2 BL Com. 447;

Pordage v. Cole, 1 Saund. 319h; Langfort v. Tiler, 1 Salk. 113; Morton v.
Tibbett, 15 Q. B. 428; Walker v. Nusey, 16 1. & W. 302; 1 Dane's Abr.
235.
4 Blenkinsop v. Clayton, 7 Taunt.
597.
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5 Krohn

v. Bantz, 68 Ind. 277.

§§ 407-412.J

LAW OF

ALE.

[n

K I.

§§ 407-412.] LAW OF SALE. [BOOK I.

§ 407. A deposit with a third person by way of forfeiture

not enough. — A deposit, by each party, of a sum of money with

a third person " as a forfeiture, to be paid over to the party who

was ready to perform the contract, if the other party neglected

to do so," fails obviously to fall within either the definition of

earnest or of part payment, and will not save a contract by

parol. 1 And the same is true where each party deposits his

check as a forfeiture. 2

§408. The effect of earnest in passing title. — This is a

question reserved for future consideration, 3 the only question

here being the effect of earnest in giving validity to the con-

tract.

§ 4-07. A deposit with a tl1i r d per son by way of fo r f it nre
not eno ugh .-A depo it, by each party, of a um of mon y with
a third person "as a forfeiture, to be paid over to the party who
was ready to perform the contract, if the other party n gl ctetl
to do so," fails obviou ly to fall within either the definition of
earnest or of part payment, an l will not save a contract by
parol.1 Anu the same is true where each party deposits his
check as a forfeiture. 2

1). Of Part Payment.

§409. What the statute requires. — The statute requires

the giving of something in part payment. This clearly con-

templates a part payment of the purchase price, — something

which is to be deducted from the whole amount, and not, like

earnest proper, something in addition to it.
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§ 410. The amount required. — The statute does not specify

the amount to be paid, but clearly any appreciable amount

paid and received as a part payment will satisfy the statute.

§ 411. What may be given in part payment. — The statute

§ 408. '11 he effect of earne t in pa. ing t itle. -This is a
question reserved for future con ideration, 3 the only qu stion
here being the effect of earnest in gi Ying validity to the contract.
o. 0 E Part Payment.

does not require the payment of money, but of " something " in

part payment. Clearly, therefore, anything of value which

may be used in payment, .and which the parties give and take

as such, will suffice. 4 Thus —

§ 412. Check. — A check, drawn upon funds and duly

paid, will suffice where the parties give and receive it as part

iHowe v. Hay ward, 108 Mass. 54, 18 N. E. R. 24, Judge Elliott says:

11 Am. R. 30G; Jennings v. Dunham. "What the parties agree shall con-

60 Mo. App. 635. stitute payment the law will ad-

§ 409. \Vhat the tatute reqnires.-The statute requires
the giving of something in part payment. This clearly contemplates a part payment of the purchase price,- something
whic..:h is to be deducted from the whole amount, and not, like
earnest proper, something in addition to it.

'-'Noakes v. Morey, 30 Ind. 103. judge to be payment. It is compe-

3 See post, %% 514, 532. tent for parties to designate by their

4 In Weir v. Hudnut, 115 Ind. 525, contract how and in what payment

350

§ 410. The amount req u ired.-The statute does not specify
the amount to be paid, but clearly any appreciable amount
paid and received as a part payment will satisfy the statute.

§ 4J 1. °"That may be given in part payment.- The statute
does not require the payment of money, but of" something" in
part payment. Clearly, therefore, anything of value which
may be used in payment, artd which the parties give and take
as such, will suffice. 4 Thus-

§ 412. - - Cbeck.-A check, drawn upon funds and duly
paid, will suffice where the parties give and receive it as part
1 Howe v. Hayward, 108 .Ma s. 54,
1 N. E. R. 24, Jmlge Elliott says:
11 Am. R. 306; Jennings v. Dunham. "What tbe parties agree slrn,ll con60 Mo. App. 635.
stitute payment the law will ad2 Noakes v. Morey, 30 Ind. 103.
ju lge to be payment. It; is compe3 See post,
514, 532.
tent for parties to designate by their
4 In Weir v. Hudnut, 115 Ind. 525, contract how and in what payment
350

CII. VII.] C0NTKACT UNDER STATUTE OF FKAUDS. [§§ 413-415.

payment. 1 So it was held that a check drawn upon a deposit

will suffice, although it has not yet been presented for pay-

ment. 2

| 413. Buyer's note.— But, inasmuch as a mere prom-

ise to pay cannot be regarded as an actual payment, it is clear

that the buyer's own note cannot satisfy the statute unless it

be received and treated as payment. 3

§ 414. Note of strangers.— But the note of a third

person, accepted as payment, and not merely as collateral, will

suffice. 4

§ 415. Money already in hands of seller.— Where

money, already in the hands of the seller and due to the buyer

upon previous dealings, is agreed by both parties to be retained

and applied by the seller as part payment, it will suffice. 5 The

parties need not go through the idle ceremony of having the

seller pay the money to the buyer in satisfaction of the previ-

ous indebtedness, to be immediately returned to the seller as

part payment.
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may be made. It is by no means

true that payment can only be made

in money; on the contrary, it may

be made in property or in services.

In short, whatever the parties agree

shall constitute payment will be re-

garde 1 by the courts as payment,

provided the thing agreed upon is of

some value." In this case there was

a sale of corn, and the parties agreed

that sacks delivered by the pur-

chaser to the seller to be used in

transporting the corn should const i-

stitute a part payment; that is, their

use by the seller should be taken as

a part satisfaction of the price of the

corn. This point of the agreement

distinguishes this case from the de-

cision in Hudnut v. Weir, 100 Ind.

501, in which it was shown that the

sacks were delivered, but the fact

that the value of their service was

to be deducted, by agreement of the

parties, from the cost of the corn

was not made to appear.

i Hunter v. Wetsell, 84 N. Y. 549,

38 Am. R. 544

^McLure v. Sherman, 70 Fed. R.

190.

3Krohn v. Bantz, 68 Ind. 277: Ire-

land v. Johnson, 18 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.J

392. The surrender by the buyer of

the seller's note previously given is

sufficient. Sharp v. Carroll, 66 Wis.

63, 27 N. W. R. 832.

4 Combs v. Bateman,10 Barb. (N. Y.)

573.

5 Dow v. Worthen, 37 Vt. 108.
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§§ 416- 419.J

LAW OF SALE.

[BOOK I.

§§ 416-419.] LAW OF SALE. [BOOK I.

§ 416. Agreement to satisfy previous indebtedness

as part payment. — But a mere agreement that the price or a

part thereof shall be applied upon a prior indebtedness of the

buyer to the seller cannot operate as a payment in whole or in

part. 1 In order to satisfy the statute there must be some act,

such as a receipt or a discharge, or an indorsement or an entry,

by which the application is actually made. 2

§ 417. Payment of seller's debt to third person, —

But the actual payment by the buyer to a third person, at the

seller's direction, of a debt due from the seller to such third

person, is as effectual as a payment to the seller in person. 3

§ 416. - - Agreement to sati f'y preTions indebtedne
as part payment.- But a mere agreement that the price or a
part ther of shall be applied upon a prior indebtedn ss of the
buyer to the seller cannot operate as a payment in whole or in
part. 1 In ortler to satisfy the statute there mu t be some act,
such as a receipt or a discharge, or an indorsement or an entry,
by which the application is actually made. 2

§ 418. Mere unaccepted part payment not enough.— The

payment must clearly be actually made and received, and a

§ 417. - - Payment of' seller'

debt to third per on.-

proffered payment not accepted is therefore not enough. Thus

where the seller wrote that he should stand to the contract,

" but shall want you to pay me fifty dollars to bind it," and the

buyer at once sent the money in a letter which the seller im-

mediately returned, there was held to be no part payment. 4

But the actual payment by the buyer to a _third per on, at the
seller's direction, of a debt due from the seller to such third
person, is as effectual as a payment to the seller in per on. 3
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§ 419. When part payment to be made — "At the time."

The statute in New York and some other States requires 3 the

part payment to be made " at the time " of the contract, and a

lArtcherv. Zeh, 5 Hill (N. Y.), 200; 2 Gorman v. Brossard (1899), 120

Clark v. Tucker, 2 Sandf. (N. Y.) 157; Mich. 611, 79 N. W. R. 903; Clark v.

Matthiessen, etc. Co. v. McMahon, 38 Tucker, supra; Walker v. Nussey, 16

N. J. L. 536; Gaddis v. Leeson, 55 111. M. & W. 302; Galbraith v. Holmes, 15

83; Brabin v. Hyde, 32 N. Y. 519; Ind. App. 34, 43 N. E. R. 575; Nor-

Mattice v. Allen, 3 Abb. App. Dec. wegian Plow Co. v. Hanthorn, 71

(N. Y.) 248, 3 Keyes, 492. Wis. 529, 37 N. W. R. 825.

An agreement that a sum of money, 3 Wood on Statute of Frauds,

which had been overpaid to the §294, n.; Brady v. Harrahy, 21 Up.

vendor upon previous sales to the Can. Q. B. 340; Stoddard v. Graham,

§ 4:18. Mere unaccepted part payment not enough.- The
payment must clearly be actually made and received, and a
proffered payment not accepted is therefore not enough. Thus
where the seller wrote that he should stand to the contract,
"but shall want you to pay me fifty dollars to bind it," and the
buyer at once sent the money in a letter which the seller immediately returned, there was held to be no part payment. 4

same purchaser, should be returned 23 How. Pr. 518.

to apply on a later one in question, 4 Edgerton v. Hodge, 41 Vt. 676;

§ 419. When part payment to be made-" At the time."

does not constitute such part pay- Bowers v. Andersen, 49 Ga. 145.

ment as satisfies the statute. Norton 5 As in Alabama, Arizona, Califor

v. Davison, [1899] 1 Q. B. 401, approv- nia, Colorado, Dakota, Idaho. Minne-

ing Walker v. Nussey, 16 M. & W. sota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada,

The statute in New York and some other States ~equires 5 the
part payment to be made "at the time" of the contract, and a

302. Oregon, Utah, Wisconsin, Wyoming,

352

2 Gorman v. Brossard (1 99), 120
I Artcher v. Zeb 1 5 Hill (N. Y. ), 200;
Clark v. Tucker, 2 Sandf. (N. Y.) 157; Mich. 611, 79 N. W. R. 903; Clark v.
l\fatthiessen, etc. Co. v. McMahon, 38 Tucker, supra; Walker v. Nussey, 16
N. J. L. 536; Gaddis v. Leeson, 55 Ill. M. & W. 302; Galbraith v. Holmes, 15
83; Brabin v. Hyde, 32 N. Y. 519; Ind. App. 34, 43 N. E. R. 575; NorMattice v. Allen, 3 Abb. App. Dec. wegian Plow Co. v. Hanthorn, 71
(N. Y.) 248, 3 Keyes, 492.
Wis. 529, 37 N. W.R. 825.
An agreem~nt that a sum of money,
3 Wood on Statute of Frauds,
which had been overpaid to the § 294, n.; Brady v. Harrahy, 21 Up.
ven<.lor upon previous sales to the Can. Q. B. 340; Stoddard v. Graham,
same purchaser, should be returnecl 23 How. Pr. 518.
4 Edgerton v. Hodge, 41 Vt. 676;
to apply on a later one in question,
does not constitute such part pay- Bowers v. Anderson, 49 Ga. 145.
:>As in .Alabama, Arizona, Califor
ment as satisfies the statute. Norton
v. Davison, [1899] 1 Q. B. 401, approv- nia, Co~orado, Dakota, Idaho, Minneing Walker v. Nussey, 16 M. & -w. sota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada,
302.
Oregon, Utah, Wisconsin, Wyoming,
352

CH. VII.] CONTRACT UNDER STATUTE OF FRAUDS. [§§ 420, 421.

payment made subsequently will not suffice, except (1) where

the parties subsequently meet, and for the express purpose of

then complying with the statute and making the contract valid,

a payment is made on the contract at the request of the seller;

or (2) where the parties subsequently come together and sub-

stantially restate, reaffirm or renew its terms, so as then and

there, by the meeting of their minds, to make a contract, and

then a payment is made upon it. 1

§ 420. . A substantial compliance with the statute in

this respect suffices. " The statute does not mean rigorously

eo instanti. It does contemplate that the contract and the

payment shall be at the same time in the sense that they con-

stitute parts of one and the same transaction." 2

Under such a provision, the contract seems to take effect

from the date of the part payment, which is the date of what

is practically a new contract. 3

Where, however, the statute does not require payment "at

the time," payment made and accepted at any time before ac-
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tion brought would seem to be sufficient; 4 and in such case,

by analogy to part receipt, 5 the contract would take effect from

its date.

§ 421. Part payment to agent suffices.— The payment of

part of the purchase price to the seller's agent, if authorized to

receive such payment, suffices. Authority to receive such pay-

ment may, as in other cases, be conferred either by prior au-

i Browne on Stat. Frauds, § 343, n. ; 2 Hunter v. Wetsell, 84 N. Y. 549,

Hunter v. Wetsell, 57 N. Y. 375, 15 38 Am. R. 544

Am. R 508; s. C, 84 N. Y. 549, 38 Am. 3 Wood on Statute of Frauds, § 294;

R 544; Jackson v. Tupper, 101 N. Y. Bissell v. Balcom, 39 N. Y. 275; Mo-

515; Bates v. Chesebro, 32 Wis. 594, Knight v. Dunlop, 5 N. Y. 537, 55 Am.

36 Wis. 636; Paine v. Fulton, 34 Wis. Dec. 370.

83; Kerkhof v. Atlas Paper Co., 68 *See Thompson v. Alger, 12 Mete.

Wis. 674, 32 N. W. R. 766; Crosby (Mass.) 428; Walker v. Nussey, 16 M.

Hardwood Co. v. Trester, 90 Wis. 412, & W. 302, per Parke, B.

63 N. W. R. 1057; Hanson v. Roter, 5 Gault v. Brown, 48 N. H. 183, 2

64 Wis. 622. Am. R. 210.

23 353

§§ 422- 42-1.J

LAW OF

ALE.

[B OK I.

§§ 422-424.] LAW OF SALE. [book I.

thorization or subsequent ratification, 1 but it cannot be made

to depend upon the same verbal agreement which, by such

payment, is sought to be sustained. 2

6. Of the Note or Memorandum.

thorjzation or subs quent ratification,1 but it cannot b ma.de
to depend upon the same verbal agreement which, by uch
payment, is sought to be sustained. 2

§422. What the statute requires.— The statute provides

that the agreement for the sale shall not be good in the ab-

6. Of tlle ]{ote or JJfemorandmn.

sence of the acts already referred to, " except that some note

or memorandum in writing of the said bargain be made and

signed by the parties to be charged by such contract, or their

agents thereunto duly authorized."

There must now be considered, therefore, —

a. What is a note or memorandum.

h. What note or memorandum will suffice.

c. The signing by the parties.

d. The signing by their agents duly authorized.

a. What is a Note or Memorandum.

§ 423. Is distinct from the agreement itself.— And first

it may be noticed that the note or memorandum of the agree-
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ment is distinct from the agreement itself. If the parties have

formally reduced their agreement to writing, there is, of course,

no occasion for any further note or memorandum of it. What

the statute here refers to is a parol agreement of which some

written note or memorandum is made.

§ 424. At what time note or memorandum must be made.—

It is not essential that the note or memorandum should be

made contemporaneously with the agreement itself. 3 It is suf-

~

422. lVhat the statute requires.- The tatute provides
that the agreement for the sale shall not be good in the absence of the acts already referred to, "except that some note
or memorandum in writing of th said bargain be made and
signed by the parties to be charg l by such contract, or their
agents thereunto duly authorized."
There mu t now be considered, therefore,a. What is a note or memorandum.
b. What note or memorandum will suffice.
c. The signing by the parti s.
cl. The signing by their agents duly authorized.

ficient if made at any time before action brought upon the

agreement. 4 Whether it may be made after action brought

a. What is a Note or :M emorandum.

has been thought not so clear. Peters, J., says in one case: 5

" There has been some judicial inclination to favor the doc-

i Hawley v. Keeler, 53 N. Y. 114. * Bill v. Bament, 9 M. & W. 3G.

2 Hawley v. Keeler, mpra. 5 Bird v. Munroe, 66 Me. 337, 23

3 Sherwood v. Walker, 66 Mich. 568, Am. R. 571.

11 Am. St. R. 531.

354

§ 423. Is distinct from tl10 agreement itself.-And first
it may Le noticed that the note or memorandum of the agreement is distinct from th e agreement itself. If the parties have
formally reduced their agreement to writing, there is, of course,
no occasion for any further note or memorandum of it. What
the statute here refers to is a parol agreement of which some
written note or memorandum is made.

§ 424. At what time uote or memorandum must be made.It is not essential that the note or memorandum should be
made contemporaneously with the agreement itself. 3 It is sufficient if made at any time before action brought upon the
agreement.4 \Vhether it may be made after action brought
has been thought not so clear. Peters, J., says in one case: 5
"There has been some judicial inclination to favor the doc1 Hawley

v. Keeler, 53 N. Y. 114.
4 Bill v. Bament, 9 M. & W. 36.
Hawley v. K~eler, supm.
a Bird v. fonroe, 66 Me. 337, 22
3 Slierw ocl v. Walker, 66 Mich. 568, Am. R. 571.
11 Am. St. R. 531.
354
2

•CH. VII.] CONTRACT UNDER STATUTE OF FRAUDS. [§§ 425, 426.

trine to that extent even, and there may be some logic in it.

Still the current of decision requires that the writing must

exist before action brought. And the reason for the require-

ment does not militate against the idea that a memorandum

is only evidence of the contract. There is no actionable con-

tract before memorandum obtained. The contract cannot be

sued until it has been legally verified by writing; until then

there is no cause of action although there is a contract. The

writing is a condition precedent to the right to sue." And in

a recent English case' it is held that the writing must exist at

the time the action is begun.

§425. Form of the note or giemorandnm. — The statute

prescribes no form for the note or memorandum, and it is well

settled that no particular form is required, but that any writing,

howsoever informal, may suffice, provided always it contains the

essential elements of the agreement and is duly signed. 2 Thus —

^ 420. Several papers. — The note or memorandum need not

be comprised in a single paper, but may be composed of a num-
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ber of papers, and they may be made at different times. 3 J Jut

unless each paper is properly signed, 4 it is essential that the

1 Lucas v. Dixon, 22 Q. B. Div. 357. citing Levned v. Wannemacher, 9

-Mason v. Decker. 72 N. Y. 595, 2s Allen (Mass.). 412; Rhoades v. Cast-

Am. R. 190; Dresel v. Jordan. 1<>4 ner, 12 id. 132; Peek v. Vandeniark,

Mass. 407; Newby v. Rogers, 40 Ind. 99 N. Y. 29; Lee v. Mahony, 9 Iowa,

9; Ide v. Stanton. 15 Yt. 685, 40 Am. 344; Jelks v. Barrett. 52 Miss. 315;

Dec. 69S; Getchell v. Jewett. 4 Greenl. Fisher v. Kuhn, 54 id. 480; Thayer v.

(Me.) 350; Old Colony R. R. Co. v. Luce. 22 Ohio St. 62; Salmon Falls

Evans. 6 Gray (Mass. >, 25, 06 Am. Dec. Mfg. Co. v. Goddard. 14 How. (U. S. 1

394: Ivory v. Murphy, 36 Mo. 534: 447: Parkhurst v. Van Cortland, 14

Worrall v. Munn, 5 N. Y. 229, 55 Johns. (N. Y.) 15]; American Oak

Am. Dec. 330; Lowry v. Mehaffy. 10 Leather Co. v. Porter, 94 Iowa. 117,

Watts (Pa.). 3S7; Douglass v. Spears. 62 X. W. R. 658; Fowler Elevator Co.

2 N. & McC. (S. C.) 207, 10 Am. Dec. v. Cottrell, 38 Neb. 512, 57 X. W. R. 19;

588; McConnell v. Brillhart, 17 111. Turner v. Lorillard Co., 100 Ga. 045.

35 1. 65 Am. Dec. 661. 28 S. E. R. 383; Olson v. Sharpless, 53

3 Johnson v. Buck, 35 X. J. L. 338. Minn. 91. 55 X. W. R. 125: GriffithsCo.

10 Am. R. 243; Louisville Asphalt v. Humber, [1899] 2 Q. B. 414.

Varnish Co. v. Lorick, 29 S. C. 533, * In Thayer v. Luce. 22 Ohio St. 62,

8 S. E. R. 8, 2 L. R. A. 212 [and note it is said: "That several writings,

335

§ 426.J

LAW OF

ALE .

[n

K I.

426.]

LAW OF SALE.

[BOOK I.

unsigned papers be either physically annexed to the signed

paper, 1 or that there be such reference in the signed paper to

the unsigned that they may be construed as one instrument. 2

Reference in the unsigned paper to the signed paper is not

enough; 3 nor is parol evidence admissible to connect the un-

signed to the signed ; 4 though if the signed paper contains a

clear reference to an unsigned paper, but does not sufficiently

though executed at different times,

may be construed together, for the

un sign ed papers be eith r physically annex d to the wn cl
paper,1 or that there be such reference in the signed pap r to
the unsigned that they may be construed as one jnstrum nt. 2
R ef rence in the unsigned paper to the signed pap r js not
enough; 3 nor is parol evidence ad mis i ble to connect the unsigned to the signed; 4 though if the signed paper contains a
clear reference to an unsigned paper, Lu t does not suffici n tly

purpose of ascertaining the terms of

a contract and for the purpose of

taking an action founded thereon

out of the statute of frauds, is fully-

settled. In such cases, however, the

mutual relation of the several writ-

ings to the same transaction must
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appear in the writings themselves,

parol evidence being inadmissible for

the purpose of showing their connec-

tion. If one only of such papers be

signed by the party to be charged in

the action, the rule seems to be that

special reference must be made

therein to those papers that are not

so signed; but if the several papers

relied on be signed by such party, it

is sufficient if their connection and

relation to the same transaction can

be ascertained and determined by in-

spection and comparison."

"The connection between them

must appear by internal evidence

derived from the signed memoran-

dum." Johnson v. Buck, supra.

A letter written by an agent,

within the scope of his authority,

which refers to and recognizes an

unsigned document as containing the

terms of a contract made by his prin-

cipal, is sufficient. Griffiths Co. v.

Humber, [1899] 2 Q. B. 414.

1 As by pinning or otherwise fast-

ening them together. Talhnan v.

Franklin, 14 N. Y. 584.

«'Coe v. Tough, 11G N. Y. 273 [cit-

ing Baptist Church v. Bigelow, 16

Wend. (N. Y.) 28; Wright v. Weeks,

25 N. Y. 153; Drake v. Seaman, 97

N. Y. 230; Stone v. Browning, 68

N. Y. 598]; Johnson v. Buck. 35 N. J.

L. 338, 10 Am. R. 243; Griffiths Co. v.

Humber, [1899] 2 Q. B. 414.

3 Thayer v. Luce, 22 Ohio St. 62.

4 "The connection between the

signed and the unsigned papers can-

not be made by parol evidence that

they were actually intended by the

parties to be read together, or of facts

and circumstances from which such

intention may be inferred. The con-

nection between them must appear

by internal evidence derived from

the signed memorandum. Parol tes-

timony will be received only for the

purpose of interpretation or explana-

tion where technical terms are em-

ployed, or to identify papers which,

:.! Coe v. Toug h, 116 N. Y. 273 [citthough executed at different ti mes,
may be con trued together, for the in g Bapti t Chur c h v. Big low, 16
purpo e of a certaining the terms of W nd. (N. Y.) 2 ; Wright v. W eek s,.
a contract and fo r the purpose of 25 N. Y. 153; Drake v. Seaman, 97
taking an action founded thereon N. Y. 230; Stone v. Browning, 6
out of the statute of fraud , i fully N. Y. 59 ]' J ohn on v. Buck. 3,- N. J.
settled. In sw:ih cases, however, the L. 33 , 10 Am. R. 243; Griffiths Co. v.
mutual relation of the several writ- Humber [1 99] 2 Q. B. 414.
J Thayer v. Luce. 22 Ohio t. 62.
ings to the same transaction must
appear in the writings them elves,
4 ''The conn ection between the
parol evideuce beinginatlmi sible for s1gned a nd the unsi O'ned papers cantbe purpose of showing their connec- not be made by parol evidence that
tion. If one only of uch papers be they were actually intended by the
signed by the party to be charged in parties to be read together, or of facts
the action, the rule seem to be that and cir umstances from which such
special reference must be made inten tion may be inferred. The contherein to those papers that are not nection between them must appear
so signed; but if the several papers by internal evidence derived from
relied on be signed by such party, it the signed memorandum. Parol tesis sufficient if their connection and timony will be received only for the
relation to the same transaction can purpose of interpretation or explanabe ascertained and determined by in- tion where technical terms are emspection and comparison. "
ployed, or to identify papers vvhich,
"The connection between them by a reference in the signed memomust appear by internal evidence randum, are made parts of it." Johnderived from the signed m em oran- son v. Buck, 35 N. J. L. 33, , 10 Am. R.
dum." Johnson v. Buck, supra.
243 (citing Boydell v. Drumrnond , 11
A letter written by an agent, East, 142; Coles v. Trecothic k, 9 Ves.
within the scope of his a uthority, 234; Clinan v. Cooke, 1 Sch. & Lefwhich refers to and recognizes an roy, 22; Dobell v. Hutchinson, 3 Ad.
unsigned document as cont a iuing the & E. 355; Ridgway v. Wharton, &
terms of a contract made by his prin- H. of L. Cas. 238; Parkhurst v. Van
cipal, is sufficient. Griffiths Co. v. Cortlandt. 1 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 273).
Humber, [1 99] 2 Q. B. 414.
See also Brown v. Whipple, 58 N. H.
1 As by pinning or otherwise fast- 229; Hin le v. Whitehouse, 7 East,
ening them together. Tallman v. 55 ; K enworthy v. Schofield, 2 B. &
Franklin, 14 N. Y. 584.
c. 945.
356
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describe it, it is held that parol evidence may be resorted to to

identify the unsigned paper referred to; 1 and where the refer-

ence to the unsigned paper is ambiguous, parol evidence may

be admitted to solve the ambiguity. 2

§ 427. . But the several papers, though sufficiently con-

nected, must also be consistent and harmonious, for, if they

are contradictory or inconsistent, they will clearly be insuffi-

cient to satisfy the statute, inasmuch as it would be impossible

to determine what the bargain was without the introduction

of parol evidence to show which paper stated it correctly. 3

And so, obviously, when all the papers which are actually

annexed or by reference incorporated do not constitute a com-

plete memorandum, they will be insufficient to satisfy the stat-

ute. 4

§428. Letters. — Letters may be, and constantly are, re-

sorted to for the purpose of supplying the necessary note or

memorandum, and they are unquestionably sufficient as such,

either alone or in connection with other instruments, if, with-
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i il When it is proposed to prove the biguity." Thesiger, L. J., in Bauman

existence of a contract by several v. James, 3 Ch. 508. To like effect:

documents, it must appear upon the Long v. Millar, 4 C. P. Div. 450: Cave

face of the instrument, signed by the v. Hastings, 7 Q. B. Div. 125; Shard-

party to be charged, that reference low v. Cotterell, 18 Ch. D. 280; Wilk-

is made to another document, and inson v. Taylor Mfg. Co., 67 Miss. 231,

this omission cannot by supplied by 7 S. R. 356; Turner v. Lorillard Co.,

verbal evidence. If, however, it ap- 100 Ga, 645, 28 S. E. R. 383.

pears from the instrument itself that In Oliver v. Hunting, 44 Ch. Div.

another document is referred to, that 205, parol evidence was admitted to

document may be identified by ver- show the relations and situation of

bal evidence. A simple illustration the parties, from which it appeared

•of this rule is given in Ridgeway v. that a letter written by one referred

Wharton, 6 H. L. Cas. 238. There 'in- to a previous memorandum of sale,

structions ' were referred to; now in- 2 See cases cited in preceding note,

structions may be either written or See also Ansley v. Green, 82 Ga. 181;

verbal; but it was held that parol Mohr v. Dillon, 80 Ga. 572.

evidence might be adduced to show 3 Cooper v. Smith, 15 East, 103;

that certain instructions in writing Richards v. Porter, 6 B. & C. 437;

were intended. This rule of inter- Smith v. Surman, 9 B. & C. 561;

pretation is merely a particular ap- Archer v. Baynes, 5 Ex. 625.

plication of the doctrine of latent am- 4 Taylor v. Smith, [1893] 2 Q. B. 65.

357

§ 428.J

L.A.W OF SALE.

[ ll OK I~

428.]

LAW OF SALE.

[book

out the aid of parol testimony, the parties, the subject-matter

and the terms of the contract may be collected from them. 1

A letter making a proposition and a letter accepting it present

a plain case. 2 And even a letter written to repudiate an agree-

ment or countermand an order, the terms of which it stated or

referred to, has been held a sufficient memorandum to sustain

the agreement. 3

i Austin v. Davis, 128 Ind. 472, 25

Am. St. R. 45G; Wills v. Ross, 77 Ind.

out the aid of parol testimony, the parties, the ubject-ma tterand the terms of the contract may be collected from tbem. 1
A letter making a propo ition and a letter accepting it pr nt
a plain ca e. 2 Anrl ven a letter written to repu liate an agreement or countermand an order tbe t rms of which it stated orreferrecl to, has been held a ufficient memorandum to sustain
the agreement. 3

1, 40 Am. R. 279; Lee v. Cherry, 85

Tenn. 707, 4 Am. St. R. 800; Francis

v. Barry, 69 Mich. 311 (citing Allen

v. Bennet, 3 Taunt. 169; Jackson v.

Lowe, 1 Bing. 9; Dobell v. Hutchin-

son, 3 Ad. & E. 355; Jones v. Will-

iams, 7 M. & W. 493; Telegraph Co.
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v. Railroad Co., 86 111. 246; Moore v.

Mountcastle, 61 Mo. 424; Abbott v.

Shepard, 48 N. H. 14); Beckwith v.

Talbot, 2 Colo. 639; Doughty v. Man-

hattan Brass Co., 101 N. Y. 644; Smith

v. Colby, 136 Mass. 562; Linsley v.

Tibbals, 40 Conn. 522; Brown v.

Whipple, 58 N. H. 229; Jenness v.

Mt. Hops Iron Co., 53 Me. 20; Thames,

etc. Co. v. Beville, 100 Ind. 309; Mizell

v. Burnett, 4 Jones (N. C), 249, 69

Am. Dec. 744. See also Cunningham

v. Williams, 43 Mo. App. 629; Pitcher

v. Lowe, 95 Ga. 423, 22 S. E. R. 678.

2 Gulf. etc. Ry. Co. v. Settegast, 79

Tex. 256; Kenney v. Hews, 26 Neb.

213; Wilkinson v. Taylor Mfg. Co..

67 Miss. 231, 7 S. R. 356.

3 Drury v. Young, 58 Md. 546, 42

Am. R. 343; Louisville Asphalt Co.

v. Lorick, 29 S. C. 533, 2 L. R. A. 212.

See also Wilson v. Lewiston Mill Co.,

150 N. Y. 314, 44 N. E. R. 959, 55 Am.

St. R. 680; Elliott v. Dean, Cab. & El.

283; Martin v. Haubner, 26 Canada

Sup. R. 142.

In Louisville Asphalt Varnish Co.

v. Lorick, supra, defendants gave an

order for paint to plaintiff's travel-

ing salesman, who entered it in his-

book and sent a copy of it to plaint-

iff. The day after giving the order

defendants wrote to plaintiff not to

ship paint "ordered through your

salesman. We have concluded not

to handle it." This letter was not

received until plaintiff had shipped

the paint. Held, that this letter suf-

ficiently referred to the order, which

stated the terms, as to furnish a good

note or memorandum.

1 Austin

v. Davis, 12 Ind. 472, 2Am. St. R. 456; Wills v. Ro s, 77 Ind.
1, 40 Am. R. 279; Lee v. Cherry, 5
Tenn. 707, 4 m. St. R. 00; Fran is
v. Barry, 69 1\1ich. 311 (citing Allen
v. Bennet, 3 Taunt. 169; Jackson v.
Lowe, 1 Bing. 9; Dobell v. Hutchinson, 3 Ad. & E. 355; Jones v. Williams, 7 1\1. & vV. 493; T legraph o.
v. Railroad Co., 6 Ill. 246; Ioore v.
Mountcastle, 61 Mo. 424; Abbott v.
Shepard, 48 N. H. 14); Beckwith v.
Talbot, 2 Colo. 639; Doug hty v. l\Ianhattan Brass Co., 101 N. Y. 644; Smith
v. Colby, 136 Mas . 560; Linsley v.
Tibbals, 40 Conn. 522; Brown v.
Whipple, 58 N. H. 229; Jenness v.
Mt. Hope Iron Co., 53 Me. 20; Thames,
etc. Co. v. Beville, 100 Ind. 309; lizell
v. Burnett, 4 Jone ( . C.), 249, 69
Am. Dec. 744. See also Cunningham
v. Williams, 43 Mo. App. 629; Pitcher
v. Lowe, 9fl Ga. 423, 22 S. E. R. 67 .
2 Gulf, etc. Ry. Co. v. ettegast, 79
Tex. 256; Kenney v. He,vs, 26 Jeb.
213; Wilkin on v. Taylor Mfg. Co.,
67 Miss. 231, 7 S. R. 356.
3 Drury v. Young, 5 l\Id. 546, 40
Am. R. 3-13; LouLville A phalt Co.
v. Lorick, 29 S. C. 533, 2 L. R. A. 212.
See also Wilson v. Lewi. ton Mill Co.,
150 N. Y. 314, 44 N. E. R. 959, 55 Am.
St. R. 6 O; Elliott v. Dean, Cab. & El.
2 3; iartin v. Haubner, 26 Canada
Suµ. R. 142.
In Loui ·ville Asphalt Varnish Co.
v. Lorick, siipra, defendants gave an

order for paint to plaintiff'. traveling ale man, who entered it in hi
book and ent a copy of it to plaintiff. The day after giving the order
defendant wrote to plaintiff not to
hip paint "order d through your
alesman. We have conclud.ed not
to handle it." Thi 1 tter was not
received until plaintiff bad hipped
the paint. H eld, that thi letter ufficiently referred to the order, which
stated the term , as to furnish a good
note or memorandum.
In Bailey v. Sweeting, 9 C. B. (N. S.)
843, the defendant wrote to plaintiff
describing the good he had previously ordered and giving the price,
but saying, "Which goods I havenever received, and have long since
declined to have." Held, a sufficient
memorandum.
In vVilkinson v. Evans, L. R. 1 C. p_
407, the defendant wrote, on the back
of the in voice, a letter to the plaintiff in which he refused the goods be-cause they were badly crushed. Held,
a sufficient memorandum.
In Leather Cloth Co. v. Hieronimus, L. R. 10 Q. B. 140, the defendant wrote a letter to plaintiff admitting the purchase and referring to
the plaintiff's letter containing theinvoice, but repudiating any liability, as the goods had been sent by a
wrong route. Held, sufficient.
See, to ame effect, Saunderson v_
Jackson, 2 B. & P. 238; Cave v. Hast-

In Bailey v. Sweeting, 9 C. B. (N. S.)

843, the defendant wrote to plaintiff

describing the goods he had previ-

ously ordered and giving the price,

but saying, "Which goods I have

never received, and have long since

declined to have." Held, a sufficient

memorandum.

In Wilkinson v. Evans, L. R. 1 C. P.

407, the defendant wrote, on the back
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CONTRACT UNDER STATUTE OF FRAUDS.

[

§ 429- 432.

§ 429. Telegrams. — So the note or memorandum may be

wholly or partly found in telegrams, 1 provided that they, like

other instruments, embrace the essentials of the contract, 2 — a

subject more fully discussed in the next subdivision. That

telegrams shall have this effect is expressly provided by statute

in several of the States/ and, in general, telegrams are given the

same effect as letters.

§ 430. Books. — So the memorandum may, of course, consist

of entries in trade, 4 broker's 5 or private memorandum 6 books,

or of writing's of any nature, however informal, so long as they

possess the necessary requisites.

§ 431. Records of corporate meetings. — Entries in the rec-

§ 429. Telegrams.- So the note or memorandum may be
wholly or partly found in tel grams, 1 prm ided that they, like
oth r instruments, embrace the ess ntials of the contract, 2 - a
subject more fully di cu ed in the next subdi vi ion. Tlrn t
t elegrams hall have thi eff ct is expres ly provided by statute
in sev ral of the tates/ and, in general, telegrams are given the
ame effect as letters.

ord books of private and municipal corporations of resolutions

and other actions had at corporate meetings, when signed by

the clerk and containing the essential elements of the contract,

430. Book .- o the memorandum may, of course, consist

are sufficient to satisfy this requirement of the statute. 7

§ 432. Not necessary that memorandum be addressed to

or pass between the parties. — It is not necessary that the note
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ings, L. R. 7 Q. B. Div. 125; Dobell v. * Newell v. Radford, L. R. 3 C. P.

Hutchinson, 3 Ad. & E. 355. 52; Vandenbergh v. Spooner, L. R. 1

f entri in trade, 4 broker' 5 or private memorandum 6 books,
or of writin of any nature, however informal, so long as they
Io
then ce ary r qui ite .

But a letter referring to "condi- Ex. 316; Sari v. Bourdillon, 1 C. B.

tions of sale," but not stating them, (N. S.) 188.

is insufficient. Riley v. Farnsworth, 5 Coddington v. Goddard, 16 Gray

431. Record . of' corporate meeting .-Entries in the rec-

116 Mass. 23a (Mass.), 436.

i Trevor v. Wood, 36 N. Y. 307, 93 « Wiener v. Whipple, 53 Wis. 298,

Am. Dec. 511; Wells v. Railway Co., 40 Am. R. 775; Champion v. Plum-

30 Wis. 605; King v. Wood, 7 Mo. 389; mer, 4 B. & P. 252; Allen v. Bennett,

Little v. Dougherty, 11 Colo. 103. 3 Taunt. 169.

- Watt v. Wisconsin Cranberry Co., 7 Argus Co. v. City of Albany, 55

6a Iowa, 730, 18 N. W. R. 898; Whaley N. Y. 495, 14 Am. R. 296; Johnson v.

r l bo k of pri ate and municipal corporation of r olutions
an l oth r a tion ha at corporate me tinD'S when igned by
th clerk and c ntaining th
ntial element of th contract,
ar ufficient to ati fy thi r quirement of the statute. 7

v. Hinchman, 22 Mo. App. 483; North Trinity Church. 11 Allen (Mass.), 123;

v. Mendel, 73 Ga. 400, 54 Am. R. 879; Tufts v. Plymouth Mining Co., 14

Lincoln v. Erie Preserving Co., 132 Allen (Mass.), 407; Chase v. City of

Mass. 129. Lowell, 7 Gray (Mass.), 33; Dykers v.

3 As in California, Nevada, Oregon Townsend, 24 N. Y. 57.

4:32. ~ot n ce ary that memorandum be addre sed to
or pa betw en the parti , .- It i not nece ary that the note

and Utah.
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in o-, L. R. 7 Q. B. Div. 19-. Dobell v.
Hut bin on, 3 Ad. & E. .- -.
But a letter referring to "condition of ale,' but not tating them,
i in -ufficient. Riley v. Farn worth,
116 l\Ia ' . 993.
1 Trevor v. Wood 36 N. Y. 307, 93
m. Dec. 11; -wells v. Rail way o.,
HO Wi . 60.- ; King v. Wood 7 Mo. 3 9;
Little v. Dougherty, 11 olo. 103.
:.i ·w att v. vVi con in Cranberry Co.,
6€3 Iowa, 730, 1 N. W.R. 9 ; Whaley
v. Hinchman, 22 l\Io. pp. 4 3 · orth
v. l\I nd l, 73 Ga. 400, 54: Am. R. 79;
Lincoln v. Erie Pre erving Co., 139
:Ma . 1 9.
3 A in California, Nevada, Oregon
and Utah.

4 ,. ew

11 v. Radfonl. L. R. 3 C. P.

9; Vandenbergh v. pooner, L. R. 1
Ex. 316; arl v. Bounlillon, 1 C. B.
( . S.) 1 .
5 Coddington v. Goddard, 16 Gray
()Ia .). 436.
0 Wiener v. Whipple, 53 Wis. 29 ,
40 Am. R. 775· Champion v. Plummer, 4 B. & P. 252; Allen v. Bennett,
3 Taunt. 169.
7 Argu
'o. ~. City of Albany, 55
N. Y. 49-, 14 Am. R. 206; John on v.
Trinity Church. 11 Allen ( fa .), 123;
Tuft v. Plymouth Mining o., 14

llen (l\Ia s.), 407; Chase v. City of
Lowell, 7 Gray ( fa .). 33; Dykers v.
Townsend, 24 N. Y. 57.
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§§ 433, 434. J law of sale. [book t.

or memorandum be a writing addressed to or passing between

the parties. Thus a letter written by defendant to bis own

agent, 1 or to his principal, 2 or to a third person, 3 is enough.

b. "What Note or Memorandum is Sufficient.

§ 433. The requisites in general. — To satisfy the require-

or memorandum be a writing addressed to or pas ing between
the parties. Thus a letter writt n by def mlant to Lis own
agent, 1 or to his principal,2 or to a third person, 3 is enough.

ments of the statute, the note or memorandum must, in general

terms, contain a statement of all of the essential terms of the

contract, naming or describing with reasonable" certainty the

b. What Note or :Memorandum is Sufficient.

parties thereto; describing or furnishing reasonably certain

means for identifying the property; stating the price, when

§ !33. The requisites in general.-To satisfy the require-

agreed upon, or showing the data from which it may be ascer-

tained; and setting forth all of the essential terms, as to time

and place of payment and delivery, the terms of credit, or

other incidents of the agreement. 4 It must also be a note or

memorandum of the entire contract and not simply of the

major portion of it. 5

Following this general rule more fully into its details, we

have — ■
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§ 434. Parties must be named or described. — And first it

may be noticed that the note or memorandum should name both

buyer and seller, or describe them with reasonable certainty, 6

1 Gibson v. Holland, L.R1C.P.1; salesman who showed me the goods.

Spangler v. Danforth. 65 111. 152; Please put them up in fine shape as

Wood v. Davis, 82 111. 811; Lee v. promptly as possible," was an insuf-

Cherry, 85 Tenn. 707, 4 Am. St. R. flcient memorandum to satisfy the

800. Contra, Steel v. Fife, 48 Iowa, statute.

99, 30 Am. R. 388. « Champion v. Plummer, 4 B. & P.

2Peabody v. Speyers, 56 N. Y. 230. 252; Allen v. Bennett, 3 Taunt. 169;

3 Browne on Stat, Frauds, § 354a. Williams v. Lake, 2 E. & E. 349; Me-

4 See cases cited in following sec- Elroy v. Seery, 61 Md. 389, 48 Am. R.

tions. 110; McGovern v. Hern, 153 Mass.

ments of the statute, the note or memorandum must, in general
terms, contain a statement of all of the es ential terms of the
contract, naming or describing with rea onable-certainty the
parties thereto; describing or furnishing r easonably certain
means for identifying the property; stating the price, when
agreed upon, or showing tbe data from which it may be ascertained; arn1 setting forth all of the essential terms, as to time
and place of payment anrl delivery, the terms of credit, or
other incidents of the agr ement.4 It must also be a note or
memoran lum of the entire contract and not simply of the
major portion of it. 5
Following this genera.I rule more fully into its details, we
have-

& CJoud v. Greasley, 125 111. 313. So 308, 25 Am. St. R. 832, 10 L. R. A. 815,

in Sheley v. Whitman, 67 Mich. 397, 26 N. E. R. 861; Lewis v. Wood, 153

34 N. W. R. 879, it was held that a Mass. 321, 25 Am. St. R. 634, n., 11 L.

clause in a letter, "you may place the R. A. 143, 26 N. E. R. 862; Williams

gas fixtures I selected to-day. The v. Byrnes, 1 Moore, P. C. (N. S.) 154;

dining-room fixtures may as well be Vandenbergh v. Spooner, L. R. 1

§ 434. Parties must be named or described.- And first it
may be noticed that the note or memorandum should name both
buyer and seller, or describe them with reasonable certainty, 6

changed as talked over with the Exch. 316; Fessenden v. Mussey, 11
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1 Gibson v. Holland, L. R. 1 C. P. 1; salesman who showed me the goods.
Spangler v. Danforth. 65 Ill. 152; Please put them up in fine shape as
Wood v. Davis, 82 Ill. 311; Lee v. promptly as possible," was an in ufCherry, 85 Tenn. 707, 4 Am. St. R. ficient memorandum to sati fy the
800. Confra, teel v. Fife, 48 Iowa, statute.
99, 30 Am. R. 388.
6 Champion v. Plummer, 4 B. & P.
2 Peabody v. Speyers, 56 N. Y. 230. 252; Allen v. Bennett, 3 Taunt. 169;
3 Browne on Stat. Frauds, § 354a. Williams v. Lake, 2 E. & E. 349; Mc4 See cases cited in following sec- Elroy v. Seery, 61 .l\ld. 389, 48 Am. R.
tions.
110; McGovern v. Hern, 153 Mass.
5 CJoud v. Grea ley, 125 Ill. 313. So 308, 25 Am. St. R. 632, 10 L. R. A. 815,
in Sheley v. Whitman, 67 Mich. 397, 26 N. E. R. 861; Lewis v. Wood, 153
34 N. W. R. 879, it was held that a Mass. 321, 25 Am. St. R. 634. n., 11 L.
clau ~ e in a letter, "you may place the R. A. 143, 26 N. E. R. 862; Willia.ms
gas fixtures I selected to-day. The v. Byrnes, 1 Moore, P. C. (N. S.) 154;
dining-room fixtures may as well be Vandenbergh v. Spooner, L. R. 1
changed as talked over with the Exch. 316; Fessenden v. Mussey, 11
360
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[§ 434.

and should distinguish the one from the other, 1 and for this

purpose parol evidence may be received to show the relation of

Cush. (Mass.) 127; Coddington v.

and should distinguish the one from the other, 1 and for this
purpose parol evidence may be received to show the relation of

Goddard, 16 Gray (Mass.), 436; Lin-

coln v. Erie Preserving Co., 132 Mass.

129; Grafton v. Cummings, 99 U. S.

100; Nichols v. Johnson, 10 Conn.

192; Sherburne v. Shaw, 1 N. H. 157,

8 Am. Dec. 47; Ross v. Allen, 45 Kan.

331. 10 L. R. A. 835; Mentz v. New-

wit ter, 122 N. Y. 491, 25 N. E. R. 1044,

11 L. R. A. 97; Knox v. King. 36 Ala.

367; Clampet v. Bells, 39 Minn. 272;

Anderson v. Harold. 10 Ohio, 399;

Sabre v. Smith, 62 N. H. 663; Peoria

Grape Sugar Co. v. Babcock, 67 Fed.

R. 892.
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i Frank v. Eltringham, 65 Miss. 281,

3 S. R. 665.

A memorandum in a broker's

book, unsigned, as follows: i'Sold

Huguet, for J. Ogden & Co.," etc.,

does not show who was the seller

and who the buyer, Ogden & Co.

being the parties alleged to be the

buyers. Bailey v. Ogden, 3 Johns.

(N. Y.) 399, 3 Am. Dec. 509.

A memorandum as follows:

"Bought of W. Plummer,*' etc., but

not signed by anybody, is not suffi-

cient, as it does not show who

bought the goods. Champion v.

Plummer, 4 Bos. & Pul. 252.

A note of an order given to plaint-

iffs' traveling salesman, made by

him in his memorandum or order-

book, as follows: "T. F. Hall & Co.,

88 South Charles Street, Baltimore,

Maryland," followed by a list of the

goods, etc., is not enough, not being

signed by any one as seller nor other-

wise showing who the seller was.

McElroy v. Seery, 61 Md. 389, 48 Am.

R 110.

Three telegrams as follows: "Tel-

egraph how much corn you will sell,

with lowest cash price;" answer:

"Three thousand cases, one dollar

five cents, open one week;" reply:

"Sold corn, will see you to-morrow,"

do not show who the buyer is, and

are therefore insufficient. Lincoln

v. Erie Preserving Co., 132 Mass. 129.

In Coddington v. Goddard. 16 Gray

(Mass.), 436, the memorandum was:

"9th. W. W. Goddard to T. B. Cod-

dington & Co., 20,000 pounds Chili

pig copper," etc. Said the court : " It

is objected that the memorandum

made by the broker in the present

case was insufficient to take the case

out of the operation of the statute.

because it does not show who were

the vendor and vendee of the mer-

chandise. This would be a fatal ob-

jection if it were well founded; for

although a memorandum of this nat-

ure may be very brief, it must nev-

with lowest ca h price;" answer:
'·Three thousa,nd ca es, one dollar
five cent:;;, open one week;'' reply:
"Sold corn, will see you t -morrow,"
do not show who the buyer i, and
are therefore insufficient. Lincoln
v. Erie Preserving Co., 182 Mas . 129.
In Coddington v. Goddard, 16 Gray
( Ia s. ), 436, the memorandum ·w as:
"9th. W. vV. Goddard to T. B. Coddington & Co., 20,000 pound Chili
pig copper," etc. aid the court: "It
i · objected t.hat tile memorandum
made b the broker in the pre ent
a e wa in uffi ient to take the case
1 Fr nk v. Eltringham, 65 l\Ii . 2 1, out of the operation of the statute.
3 . R. 66.-.
because it, does not how who were
A memorandum in a broker' the 'endor and vendee of the merbook, un ign d, as follow : " old
handi ·e. Thi would be a fatal obHu'Yu t, for J. Oglen & o.,' etc., jection if it were w 11 founded; for
doe n t how wh wa the ell r although a memorandum of this natand who the buyer, Ogden &
o. ure may be very brief, it mu t ne\being the partie alleo'.ed to be the erth le s how with rea onable cerbuyer . Bailey v. Ogd n, i3 Johns. tainty who were the partie to the
(N. Y.) 399, 3 Am. D c. 509.
ontract, and the term of the al ,
A mem r andum as follow : o that they may appear from the
"Bought of W. Plummer," etc., but writing it ·elf. But in the pre ent
not signed by anybody, i not uffi- ca e the entry is perfectly intelligible
cient, as it does not how who and free from doubt. If it is re::i.cl
bought the goorl .
hampion v. with reference to the book in which
Plummer, 4 Bo & Pul. 259.
it i ' made, as an entry by a broker
A note of an order given to plaint- in the regular cour e of bis bu ine s
iff ' traveling sale man, made by as an agent of third partie · for the
him in his memorandum or order- purcha e and sale of good . it clearly
book, as follow·s: '' T. F. Hall & Co., indicates a sale from defendant to
'outh Charle Street, Baltimore, the plaintiff. It i ·usceptible of no
Iaryland," followed by a li t of the other interpretation."
good., etc., is not enough, 11ot being
In Butler v. Tbomp on, 99 U.
signed by any one a seller nor other- 419, it was held that a memoranclum
wi e bowing who the seller wa . a follow : " old for Ie r . Butler
IcElroy v. Seery, 61 l\ld. 3 9, 4 Arn. & Co.. Bo ton, to l\Ie r . A. A. TbompR. 110.
on & o., Jew York,' etc. , was a
Three telegrams as follows: "Tel- ufficient memorandum not only of
egraph how much corn you will ell, the obligation of Butler & Co. to sell,
361

Cu h. ( Ia s.) 127; Coddington v.
Goddanl, 16 Gray (l\Ia .), 436; Lin·
coln v. Erie Pre erving Co., 139 fa s.
129: Grafton v. Cummings, 99 U. S.
100· Nichols v. Johnson, 10 Conn.
199; Sherburne v. Shaw, 1 N. H. 157,
Am. Dec. 47; Ro v. Allen, 45 Kan.
2 1. 10 L. R. . 3-. Ientz v. Neww;tt r, 122 N. Y. 491, 2- N. E. R. 1044,
11 L. R. . 97; Knox v. King, 36 la.
367; lam pet v. Bell , 9 l\Iin n. 279;
n l r n v. Harold. 10 Ohio, 399;
abre v. mith, 62 . H. 66: ; Peoria
ugar o. v. Babcock, 67 Fed.

§ 435.J

[n

LAW OF SALE.

K J.

§ 435.] LAW OF SALE. [BOOK I.

the parties. 1 They need not be expressly named. It is enough

that they are described, and in that case parol evidence is ad-

missible to apply the description and identify the persons

meant. 2 But where the parties are neither named nor so de-

scribed, parol evidence is not admissible to show who they were. 3

§ 435, What description sufficient. — Merely to refer

to the persons selling as vendors is not enough, 4 though a de-

scription by the term " proprietor," 5 or " trustee selling under a

the parti s. 1 They need not be expr ly named. It i
th at they are d e crib d, a nd in that a parol
p r on
missible to apply the cl criJ tion an l i l ntif
2
m ant.
But where the parti are n ith r n, m d n r
scribed, parol evidence is not admi ible to ho' who they w re. 3

but also of the reciprocal obligation In Sanborn v. Flagler, 9 Allen, 474,

of Thompson & Co. to buy. Adams' Cas. 685, the note began,

iln Newell v. Radford, L. R. 3 C. "'Will deliver S. R. & Co.," and was

P. 52, the memorandum was as fol- signed "J. H. F., J. B. R." Parol evi-

lows: "Mr. H. 32 sacks culasses at dence was admitted that J. B. R. was

§ 435. - - What de cription ufficient.- J r ly t r fer
to the person selling a v nclor i n t n ugh 4 th u h a d scription by the t rm 'pr pri tor,

5

r

tru t

llin un ler a

39s., 280 lbs., to wait orders," signed one of the partners in S. R. & Co.,

"John Williams." It was objected and signed for them, and that J. H. F.

that this was insufficient as not show- were the initials of Flagler. Held

ing who was purchaser and who was sufficient.

seller. Parol evidence was allowed - McGovern v. Hern, 153 Mass. 308,
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of the situation of the parties, that 25 Am. St. R. 632, 10 L. R. A. 815, 26

Williams was defendant's agent and N. E. R. 861, citing Jones v. Dow, 142

made the entry in plaintiff's book. Mass. 130, 140; Catling v. King, 5 Ch.

"The plaintiff," said the court, "was Div. 660; Rossiter v. Miller, L. R. 3

a baker, who would require flour, and App. Cas. 1124, 1141, 5 Ch. Div. 648.

the defendant was a person who was Where the parties are referred to

in the habit of selling it," and the by fictitious names, parol evidence is

memorandum was held sufficient. admissible to identify them. Bibb v.

In Salmon Falls Mfg. (Jo. v. God- Allen, 149 U. S. 481, 496.

dard, 55 U. S. ( 14 How.) 446, the mem- 3 Mentz v. Newwitter, 122 N. Y. 491,

orandum was: 25 N. E. R. 1044, 11 L. R. A. 97, 19 Am.

" Sept. 19— W. W. Goddard, 12 mos. St. R. 514; North v. Mendel, 73 Ga.

300 bales S. F. drills - 7± 400, 54 Am. R. 879. (In this case the

100 cases blue do - C£ entry was, " Sold account of C. H.

R. M. M. North & Co., Mendel," etc. The word

W. W. G." " Mendel " was said to mean the firm

Parol evidence was permitted that of "M. Mendel & Brother," but the

"R. M. M." signed for M. & S., who court said that could only be made

were agents of plaintiff, and that apparent by resort to parol evidence,

Goddard signed "W. W. G.," and the which was inadmissible, and the

memorandum was held good. Two memorandum was therefore held

judges dissented. But this use of insufficient.)

parol proof was criticised in Grafton 4 McGovern v. Hern, 153 Mass. 308,

v. Cummings, 99 TJ. S. 100, and de- 25 Am. St. R. 632, 10 L. R. A. 815;

clared to be " clearly in conflict with Potter v. Duffield, L. R. 18 Eq. 4.

the general current of authority" in 5 Sale v. Lambert, L. R. 18 Eq. 1;

Mentz v. Newwitter, post. Rossiter v. Miller, 5 Ch. Div. 648.
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but al o of the re ipro al obligation
of Thomp on & o. t buy.
I In
ewell v. Ra<l for<l, L. R.

o.,' and ·w
ign d '' J. H. ., J. . R." Parol evid n e wa admitt <l that J. B. R. wa
on of th partn r in . R. & Co.,
and ign d fo r th m. and that J. H. F.
w r the initial: f Flacrler. H eld
ing who was purcha r an<l who wa · uffici nt.
:t I Govern v. H rn, 153 fa·.
0.
sell r. Parol evi<len e wa. a llo,Yed
of the ituation of the parti
that 2- m. t. R. 6. '>, 10 L. R. A. 1.1, 26
William was defendant's ag nt an<l N. E. R. 61, iting Jone v. Dow, 142
m a de the entry in plaintiff' book. 1a . 130, 140; 'at.ling v. King 5 h.
"The plaintiff,·· aid the court, "wa Div. 660; Ro it r v. Iiller, L . R. 3
a baker, who woul<l. requir flour, and App. a . 11')4, 1141, 5 h. iv. 64 •
Where the partie are r f e rred to
the d fenclant wa a per on who wa
in the habit of elling it, ' and the by fi titious name., parol evicl n e i
admi ibl to identify them. Bibb v.
memorandum wa lielJ. ·ufficient.
In Salmon Fall · l\lfg. Co. "· God- Allen, 149 U. S. 4 1, 496.
3 I en tz v . N ewwi tter, 1'>2 N. Y. 491,
dard, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 446, the mem25 N. E. R. 1044, 11 L. R. A. 97, 19 Am.
orandum was:
"Sept. 19-\ V. W. Goddard, 12 mo . t. R. 514; North v. Mend 1, 73 Ga.
400, 54 Am. R. 79. (In thi ca e the
300 bales S. F. drill - 7t
entry wa , " old account of C. H.
100 cases blue do
d
North
& Co., l\fendel," etc. Tlle word
R. l\I. M.
"
Iendel"
was said to mean the firm
W. vV.G.'
Parol evidence was permitted that of '' lVI. ~Ie ndel & Brother, ' but the
"R. M. M." signed for M. & S., who court said that could only be made
w e re agents of plaintiff, a nd that apparent by r e ort to parol evidence,
Goddard . igned "W. W. G.," and the which was inadmissible, and the
m emorandum was held good. Two m emorandum was therefore held
judges dissented. But thi u se of insuffic ient.)
41\fcGovern v. Hern, 153 l\fa . 30 ,
parol proof wa criticised in Grafton
v. Cummin gs, 99 U. S. 100, and de- 25 Am. St. R. 632, 10 L. RA. 815;
clared to be " elearly in conflict with Potter v. Duffield, L. R. 18 Eq. 4.
5 Sale v. L a mbert, L. R. 1 Eq. 1;
the general current of authority" in
Rossiter
v. Miller, 5 Ch. Div. 64 .
Mentz v. Newwitter, post.
362
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trust for sale," 1 has been held sufficient, because it is always

possible in such cases to ascertain from the records who the

parties are who answer the description. But, as is said by Sir

G. Jessel, M. It., " the court ought to be careful not to manu-

facture descriptions, or to be astute to discover descriptions

which a jur}^ could not identify, for, as I understand it, at law

that would be a question for a jury." 2

It is not necessary that the christian name or the initials bo

given, but a party is sufficiently described as " Mr. Lee." This

is, at most, a latent ambiguity, which may be resolved by parol.*

§436. Agent named instead of principal. — ft is no

objection to the sufficiency of the memorandum that the party

named therein as Imyeror seller is but an agent of the real

party in interest, as the latter may always sue or be sued <>n

the contract made by his agent in his behalf. 4 But the mere

fact that certain persons are named in the memorandum of sale

as auctioneers does not sufficiently show that they are agents

of the sellers within this rule. 5
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§ 437. Goods sold must be stated or described. — The note

or memorandum must also show what goods were sold and in

what quantities. This rule requires that the goods sold shall

be set out either by name or by such description as will enable

them to be ascertained without other recourse to parol evi-

dence than to identify the goods or apply the description to

them. 6

1 Catling v. King, 5 Ch. Div. 660. B McGovern v. Hern, supra.

-'In Commins v. Scott, L. R. 20 6 North v. Mendel, 73 (ia. Inn. 54

Eq. 11. Am. R 879: Clampet v. Bells, 39 Minn.

s Lee v. Cherry, 85 Tenn. TOT, 4 Am. 272; Waterman v. Meigs, 4 Cush.

St. R. 800. (Mass.: 497; May v. Ward. 134 Mass.

♦Mechem on Agency, g§ 429, T01; 12T: New England Dressed Meat &

Salmon Falls Mfg. Co. v. Goddard, 14 Wool Co. v. Standard Worsted Co.,

How. (U. S.) 446: Gowen v. Klous, 165 Mass. 328, 43 N. E. R, 112,52 Am.

101 Mass. 449; Sanborn v. Flagler, 9 St. R. 516; Pulse v. Miller, 81 Ind.

Allen (Mass.), 474; McGovemv. Hern, 190: Holmes v. Evans, 4s Miss. 247,

153 Mass. 308, 25 Am. St. R. 632, 10 12 Am. R 372: Eggleston v. Wagner,

L. R, A. 815. 46 Mich. 610, 10 N. W. R. 3T; Heffron
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LBOOK I.

§ 438.]

LAW OF SALE.

§ 4:38. The price mu t be shown.-Tbe price al o is an c -

[book

§ 438. The price must be shown. — The price also is an es-

sential element, and, where it has been fixed, the note or mem-

orandum must show the price or furnish the data from which

it maybe ascertained; l otherwise it must appear that, the price

sential element, and, where it has been fix ed, tbe note or m moram1um must show the price or furnish tbe data from which
it may be ascertained; 1 otherwise it must appear that. the price

v. Armsby, 61 Mich. 505, 28 N. W. R.

672; Peoria Grape Sugar Co. v. Bab-

cock, 67 Fed. R. 892.

In North v. Mendel, supra, the

memorandum was: "Sold account

of C. H. North & Co., Mendel, 5

bellies 8." The words " 5 bellies 8 "

were alleged to mean five boxes of

pork bellies at eight cents per pound.

Held, insufficient.

In New England Dressed Meat &

Wool Co. v. Worsted Co., supra, the
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memorandum was: " Bought of New

Eng. D. M. & W. Co. about 2000 to

2500 lbs. F C and all they make for

thirty days." The court said : "The

most doubtful question arising on

the memorandum is whether the

words 'about 2000 to 2500 lbs. F C,'

taken in connection with the words

following, 'and all they make for

thirty days,' etc., is a sufficient desig-

nation of the property sold. The

rule is that the goods must be desig-

nated in the writing, and cannot be

shown by parol. . . . But we have

no doubt that the meaning of the

letters 'F C,' which are technical

abbreviations used in the wool trade,

may be shown by parol, as well when

they appear in a memorandum re-

lied on under the statute of frauds

as in any other writing. Where

parol evidence is not competent to

contradict or vary the terms of such

a memorandum to show what is in-

tended, we are of opinion that the

situation of the parties and the sur-

rounding circumstances at the time

when the contract was made may

be shown to apply the contract to

the subject-matter. Upon this point

the decision in Macdonald v. Long-

bottom, 1 El. & El. 987, which was

concurred in by all the judges sit-

ting in the exchequer chamber, is

an authority which fully covers the

present case. When it is shown who

and where the parties were at the

time of making the contract, and

what property the plaintiff had on

hand of the kind described, it is

clear, without more, that the mem-

orandum referred to the 2,443 pounds

of wool on hand recently manufact-

ured and to the additional amount

which might be manufactured within

the thirty days. See Mead v. Par-

ker, 115 Mass. 413; Hurley v. Brown,

98 Mass. 545; Scanlan v. Geddes, 112

Mass. 15; Slater v. Smith, 117 Mass.

96; Nichols v. Johnson, 10 Conn. 192;

Waring v. Ayres, 40 N. Y. 357; Cole-

v. A r m by, 61 ficb. 505, 2 N. vV. R. the subject-matter. Upon thi point
672; P eoria Grape Sugar Co. v. Bab- the deci ion in l\facdonalJ v. Longcock, 6r Feel. R. 9'>.
bottom, 1 El. & EL 9 7, which was
In Iorth v. l\Iendel, sup1·a, the concurred in by all the judge itrnemorandum was: "Sold account ting in the exchequer chamber, is
of C. H . orth & Co., M ndel, 5 an authority which fully cover the
bellies 8." The words" 5 bellies 8" present case. When it is shown who
w ere alleged to mean five boxes of and where the parties were at the
p rk bellie at eight cent per pound. time of making the contract, and
H eld, insufficient.
what property the plaintiff had on
In New England Dr sed Meat & hand of the kind de cribed, it is
Wool Co. v. Worsted Co., supra, the clear, without more, that the m emmemoramlnm was : "Bought of New orandum referred to the 2,443 pounJs
Eng. D. l. & W. Co. about 2000 to of wool on han l r ecently manufact2500 lbs. F C and a ll they make for ured and to the add itional amount
thirty da y . " The court said: " The which might be manufactured within
most doubtful question ari ing on the thirty days.
ee Mead v. Parthe memorandum is whether the k er, 115 l\Iass. 413; Hurley '" Brown,
wor ds 'about 2000 to 2500 lb . F C,' 9 Mass. 545; Scanlan v. Gedde , 112
taken in connection with the words fass. 15; Slater v. mith, 117 Mass.
following, 'and all they make for 96; Nichols v. John on, 10 Conn. 192;
thirty day ,'etc., is a sufficient de ig- ·waring v. Ayre , 40 N. Y. 357; Colenation of the property sold. The rick v. Hooper, 3 Ind. 316."
rule is that the good~ must be desigA telegram to a hop dealer, by his
nated in the writing, and cannot be agent W., stating: "Bought thirteen
shown by parol. • • . But we have at eleven five-eighths net you; conno doubt that the m eaning of the firm purchase by wire to B. ;" with
letters 'F C,' which are technical a r eply by the dealer sent to B.: '''.Ve
abbreviation used in the wool trade, confi rm pmchase \V-. eleven fl ve-eight
may be shown byparol, as well when cent, hke sample,'' constitute a sufthey appear in a memorandum. re- ficien t memorandum, where it can
lied on under the statut,e of frau ds be shown by parol evidence that, aca in any other writing. Where cording t o the usages of the hop bu ilJarol evidence is not competent to ne ·s, the words were understood by
contraJict or vary the terms of such the parties to mean an agreement to
a memorandum to show what is in- purcha e a certain quantity of hops
tended, we a re of opinion that the of a certain grade for a certain price.
situation of the parties and the sur- Brewer v. Horst-Lachmund Co. (1900),
rnunding ircum. tances at the time 127 Cal. 643, 60 Pac. R. 41 .
when the contract wa made may
I Hanson v. Marsh, 40 finn. 1 (citbe shown to apply the contract to ing Elmore v. King -cote, 5 B. & C.
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was left to be determined afterward, as by the market or rea-

sonable value, or by valuers, or the like, 1 — methods which have

already been considered. 2

§ 439. Terms of credit or particular mode of payment

must be stated. — Where no terms of credit are agreed upon,

the sale will be deemed to be one for cash on delivery, and

this therefore need not be stated. 3 But where a term of credit

is agreed upon, or a particular mode or time of payment is fixed,

it is an essential element of the sale, and a memorandum which

does not state the fact is insufficient. 4

§ 440. Time and place of delivery, if agreed upon, must be

stated. — It is not essential to a contract of sale that the time

or place of delivery should be stipulated, but, if they are ex-

583; Acebal v. Levy, 10 Bing. 376;

Goodman v. Griffiths, 1 H. & N. 574:

Ide v. Stanton, 15 Vt. 685, 40 Am.

Dec. 6!»^: Waterman v. Meigs, 4 Cush.

(Mass.) 497; Ashcroft v. Butterworth,
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L36 Mass 511; Stone v. Browning. 68

N. Y. 598; James v. Muir, 33 Mich.

223); Smith v. Arnold, 5 Mason (U. S.

C. C.) 414; Phelps v. Stillings, 60 N.

H. 505; Adams v. McMillan, 7 Port,

(Ala.) 73; Soles v. Hickman, 20 Pa.

St. 180; Sabre v. Smith, 62 N. H. 663;

Heffron v. Armsby, 61 Mich. 505, 28

X. W. R. 672; Peoria Grape Sugar

Co. v. Babcock, 67 Fed. R. 892: Tur-

ner v. Lorillard Co., 100 Ga. 645, 28 S.

E. R. 383; Reid v. Diamond Plate-

Glass Co., 54 TJ. S. App. 619, 29 C. C.

A. 110. 85 Fed. R. 193. See also Web-

ster v. Brown, 67 Mich. 328.

'Valpy v. Gibson, 4 C. B. 837;

Hoadly v. McLaine, 10 Bing. 482;

Ashcroft v. Morrin, 4 M. & G. 450;

O'Neil v. Crain, 67 Mo. 200.

2 See ante, §§ 207-213.

3 Wood on Stat. Frauds, p. 656.

4 Browne on Stat. Frauds, § 382

[citing Morton v. Dean, 13 Mete.

(Mass.) 385; Davis v. Shields,26 Wend.

(N. Y.) 341; McFarsons Appeal, 11

Pa. St. 503; Soles v. Hickman, 20 Pa.

St. 180; Buck v. Pickwell, 27 Vt.

157]; Norris v. Blair, 39 Ind. 90, 10

Am. R, 135; Wardell v. Williams,

62 Mich. 50, 28 N. W. R. 796, 4 Am.

St, R. 814; Lester v. Heidt, 86 Ga.

226, 10 L. R. A. 108, 12 S. E. R. 214.

In Norris v. Blair the sale was

upon a term of credit of nine months,

by giving note with security and

waiving valuation and appraisement

laws, but the memorandum did not

show this; held, insufficient. In War-

dell v. Williams a part of the pur-

chase was to be secured by a mort-

gage to contain a clause authorizing

the release of lots on the payment of

a valuation, but the memorandum

did not show the valuation; held, in-

sufficient. In Lester v. Heidt the

memorandum stated the price to

be cash on terms agreed upon, but

did not state the terms; held, insuffi-

cient.
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LAW OF SALE.

[BOOK I.

§§ 44:1-443.] LAW OF SALE. [book I.

pressly agreed upon, they thus become material parts of the

agreement, and a note or memorandum which does not include

them is defective. 1

§ 441. All other material terms must be included.— And

the note or memorandum must also contain any other special

pressly agreed upon, they thus become mat rial part ·of the
agreement, and a note or memoran lurn which does not include
them is clefective.1

terms or conditions, such as a right of rejection if not ap-

proved, 2 or a special warranty, 3 which the parties have made a

§ 44:1. A ll other material terms must be included.-And

part of their contract. It is not enough that it is a note or

memorandum of the greater part of the contract: it must be a

note or memorandum of the whole of it. 4

§ 442. Consideration need not be stated unless required

by statute.— The statute in some cases, as in Oregon, expressly

requires that the consideration of the contract must be ex-

pressed in the note or memorandum, and such a requirement

must, it is held, be complied with to render the note or memo-

randum sufficient. 5 In several of the statutes it is expressly

declared that the consideration need not be stated. In the ma-

the note or memoran lum must al o contain any other special
t erms or condition s, such as a right of rej ction if not approve<l:2 or a special warranty, 3 which the parties have made a
part of their contract. It is not enough that it is a note or
memorandum of the g reater I art of the contra.ct: it must be a
note or memorancl um of the ·whole of it. 4

jority of the States, however, the statute is silent upon the sub-
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ject, but it is quite universally held in such cases that the

statement of the consideration is not essential.

§443. Memorandum must show complete contract.— In-

asmuch as it is the note or memorandum which gives the prior

parol contract its legal force, it follows that to make a com-

plete contract it is essential that the note or memorandum must

be complete. Thus, it is essential that the terms be agreed

upon with certainty, and that the parties assent to the same

thing in the same sense; 6 and if it appears from the note or

i Browne, Stat. Frauds, § 384 [cit- 2 Boardman v. Spooner, 13 Allen

ing Davis v. Shields, supra; Gault v. (Mass.), 353, 90 Am. Dec. 196.

Stormont, 51 Mich. G38, 17 N. W. R. 3 Peltier v. Collins, 3 Wend. (N. Y.)

214; Smith v. Shell, 82 Mo. 215, 52 459, 20 Am. Dec. 711; Newberry v.

Am. R. 365 (followed in Lehenbeuter Wall, 65 N. Y. 484

Co. v. McCord, 65 Mo. App. 507); 4 Cloud v. Greasley. 125 111. 313.

Salmon Falls Mfg. Co. v. Goddard, 14 5 Corbitt v. Salem Gas Light Co., 6

§ 442. Consideration need not be state£l unless required
by statute.-The statute in ome cases, as in Oregon, expressly
requires that the consid0ration of th e contract must be expressed in the note or memorancl nm, and such a r equirement
must, it is held, be complied with to rend er th note or memorandum sufficient. 5 In several of the statutes it is expressly
declared that the con ideration need not be staited. In the majority of the States, however, the statute is silent upon the ubject, but it is quite universally held in such cases tha:t the
statement of the consideration is not essential.

How. (U. S.) 446; Kriete v. Myer, 61 Oreg. 405, 25 Am. R. 541.

Md. 5581 6 Breckinridge v. Crocker, 78 Cal.

529; Oakmanv. Rogers, 120 Mass. 214.
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§ 443. Memprandum must show complete contract.- Inasm uch as it is the note or memorandum which gives the prior
parol contract its legal force, it follows that to make a complete contract it is essential that the note or memorandum must
be complete. Thus, it is essential that the t erms be agreed
upon with certainty , and that the parties assent to the Sil.me
thing in the same sense; 6 and if it appears from the note or
I Browne, Stat. Frauds, § 384 [cit·
2 Boardman v. Spooner, 13 A llen
ing Davis v. Shield , supra; Gault v. (Ma s.), 353, 90 Am. Dec. 196.
Stormont, 51 Mich. 638, 17 N. W. R. _ J Peltier v. Collins, 3 W end. (N. Y.)
214; mith v. Shell, 82 Mo. 215, 52 439, 20 Am. Dec. 711; Newberry v.
Am. R. 365 (followed in Lehenbeuter W a.11 65 N. Y. 4 -±.
Co. v. McCord, 65 Mo. App. 507);
4 Cloud v. Grea ley. 123 Ill. 313.
Salmon Falls Mfg. Co. v. Goddard, 14
5 Corbitt v. Salem Gas Light Co. 6
How. (U. S.) 446; Kriete v. Myer, 61 Oreg. 405, 25 Am. R. 54.1.
l\1d. 55 ].
6 Breckinridge v. Crocker 78 Cal.
529; Oakma n v. Rogers, 120 fass. 214.
366
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[§§ 444--4±6.

memorandum that this has not been done, or that some of the

terms have not yet been settled, 1 or if the note or memorandum

refer to other terms agreed upon than those stated, 2 such a note

or memorandum will fail to establish an enforceable agree-

ment.

§ 444. Memorandum must import a sale.— The memoran-

dum must, moreover, be such as to import a sale, rather than

some other agreement or arrangement. Thus, where the con-

tract asserted was a sale of four car-loads of corn, but the mem-

m morandum that this has not be n done, or that some of the
terms ha Ye not yet been settled, 1 or if the note or memorandum
ref r to other t rms agreed upon than those tated, 2 uch a note
or memorandum will fail to establi h an enforceable agreement.

orandum relied upon was: " We can spare you four car-loads of

corn. If nothing prevents, can load cars in about two weeks,"

the court held it insufficient; saying that the word "spare"

did not necessarily or usually import a sale; and that a memo-

randum, in order to suffice, must, "in its very terms, import a

sale, and it must contain all the essential parts of the bargain,

and they must be clearly deducible from it without resort to

the parol agreement." 3

§ 445. Parol evidence not admissible to supply deficiencies.
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It must also be kept in mind, as has frequently been stated in

the preceding sections, that parol evidence is not admissible to

supply deficiencies or omissions in the note or memorandum. 4

It may be resorted to, to apply descriptions, to aid identifica-

tion, or to explain a latent ambiguity, but farther than this it

cannot go.

§ 446, Parol evidence not admissible to contradict com-

plete note or memorandum made by both parties.— So, on

the other hand, where the parties have deliberately made and

i Wardell v. Williams, 62 Mich. 50, sRedus v. Holcomb (1900), — Miss.

4 Am. St. R. 814; May v. Ward, 134 — , 27 S. R. 524.

444. Memorandum mu. t import a sale.- The memorandum must, moreov r, be such a to import a sale, rather than
ome other a r ement or arranlYement. Thus, where the contract a erted was a sal of four car-loads of corn, but the memoran lum relied upon wa : 'We can pare you four car-loads of
corn. If nothing prev nt , can load cars in about two weeks, '
the court h 11 it insufficient; saying that the word "spare"
did not nece arily or u ually import a ale; and that a memoran lnm, in or l r to uffice, mu t, ' in its v ry terms, import a
al an lit mu t contain all the essential I< rt of the bargain,
an l they mu t be cl arly deducible from it without resort to
the parol agr em nt.' 13

Mass. 127, where memorandum re- 4 See American Oak Leather Co. v.

ferred to essential terms "to be Porter, 94 Iowa, 117, 62 N.W. R. 658;

agreed upon." Watt v. Wisconsin Cranberry Co., 63

°2 Riley v. Farnsworth, 116 Mass. Iowa, 730, 18 N. W. R. 898; Wilson v.

223, where memorandum referred to Lewiston Mill Co., 150 N. Y. 314, 44

the "condition: of sale," but did not N. E. R. 959, 55 Am. St. R. 680; Frank

state them. v. Eltringham, 65 Miss. 281 ; Rector

367

445. Parol evidence not ad mi ible to supply deficiencie .
It mu t also be k pt in mind, as has frequ ntly been stated in
th pr cedinO' ection , that parol evidence is not admi ible to
u1 ply d fici ncie or omis ion in the note or m moranclum. 4
It may be re orted to to apply de cription , to aid id entification, or to explain a latent ambieuity, but farther than this it
cannot go.

ible to contraclict complete note or memorandum made by both parties.- So, on
§ 44:6. Parol evidence not admi

the other hand, where the parti

have deliberately made and

1 Wardell v. 'Williams, 69 lich. 50,
3 Redus v. Holcomb (1900), - J\fi ..
4 Am. St. R. 14; fay v. Ward, 134 - , 27 S. R. 524:.
l\fa . 197, where memorandum r e4 See
merican Oak Leather Co. v.
f rred to es ential term •·to be Porter, 94: Iowa, 117, 132 :r. W. R. 6.) ;
agreed upon."
Watt v. Wi con in Cranberry Co., 63
2 Riley v. Farn worth, 116 Mas . Iowa, 730, 1 N. W. R. 9 ; Wilson v.
223 where memorandum referred to Le\"vi ·ton M.ill Co., 150 N. Y. 314, 44
th " onditiou: of sale," but did not :r. E. R. !r9, 55 Am. t. R. CLO; Frank
tate them.
v. Eltringham, 65 1i s. 9 1; Rector
367
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LAW OF SALE.

[BOOK I.

U7.]

LAW OF SALE.

[book

delivered a note or memorandum of their contract, as and for

a complete statement of its essential terms, and such note or

memorandum is capable of a clear and intelligible interpreta-

tion, it must be regarded, like other written contracts, as the

final repository of their agreement and conclusive between

them; and parol evidence is therefore inadmissible to contra-

dict or vary its terms or construction. 1

§ 447. . Thus it is not competent, by parol, to add to or

vary the terms of the contract by showing a particular time

delivered a note or memorandum of their contract, as and for
a complete statement of its essential terms, and such note or
memorandum is capable of a clear and intelligible interpretation~ it must be regarded, like other written contracts, as the
final repository of their agreement and conclusive between
them; and parol evidence is therefore inadmissible to contradict or vary its terms or construction. 1

for payment or delivery, no time being mentioned; - or to show

that the sale was by sample where that did not appear; 3 or to

change the place 4 or time 5 of delivery fixed by the contract;

or to prove the existence 6 or the waiver 7 of a warranty ; or a

modification of a stipulation as to valuation; 8 or to relieve one

party from personal obligation by showing that he was simply

the agent of another person, though parol evidence might be
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admissible to charge that other also. 9

Provision Co. v. Sauer, 69 Miss. 235,

13 S. R. 623; Redus v. Holcomb, —

Miss. — , 27 S. R. 524

i Williams v. Robinson, 73 Me. 186,

40 Am. R. 352 [citing Small v. Quincy,

4 Me. 497; Codclington v. Goddard, 16

Gray (Mass.), 436; Hawkins v. Chace,

19 Pick. (Mass.) 502; Ryan v. Hall, 13

Mete. (Mass.) 520; Warren v. Wheeler,

8 Mete. (Mass.) 97; Cabot v. Winsor,

§ 4-!7. - - . Thus it is not competent, by pa.rol, to. add to or
vary the terms of the contract by showing a particular time
for payment or deli very, no time being mentioned; 2 or to show
that the sale was by sample where that did not appear; 3 or to
change the place 4 or time 5 of deli very fixed by the contract;
or to prove the existence 6 or the waiver 7 of a warranty; or a
mo lifica.tion of a stipulation as to valuation; 8 or to relieve one
party from personal obligation by showing that he was simply
the agent of another person, though parol evidence might be
admissible to charge that other also. 9

1 Allen (Mass.), 546; Remick v. Sand-

ford, 118 Mass. 102] ; Wiener v. Whip-

ple, 53 Wis. 298, 40 Am. R. 775 [cit-

ing Meyer v. Everth, 4 Camp. 22;

Gardiner v. Gray, 4 Camp. 144J; Har-

rison v. McCormick, 89 Cal. 327, 26

Pac. R. 830, 23 Am. St. R. 469; Thomp-

son v. Libby, 34 Minn. 374, 26 N. W.

R. 1; McQuaid v. Ross, 77 Wis. 470;

Gilbert v. Stockman, 76 Wis. 62, 44

N. W. R. 845, 20 Am. St. R. 23; State

v. Hoshaw, 98 Mo. 358: Hills v. Rix,

43 Minn. 543, 46 N. W. R. 297; Burch

v. Augusta R. R. Co., 80 Ga. 296; Hill

v. Blake, 97 N. Y. 216.

2 Williams v. Robinson, 73 Me. 186,

40 Am. R. 352.

3 Wiener v. Whipple, 53 Wis. 298,

40 Am. R. 775; Harrison v. McCor-

mick, 89 Cal. 327, 26 Pac. R. 830, 23

Am. St. R 469; Meyer v. Everth, 4

Camp. 22.

4 Moore v. Campbell, 10 Ex. 323;

Stowell v. Robinson, 3 Bing. N. C.

928; Marshall v. Lynn, 6 M. & W.

109; Stead v. Dawber, 10 A. & E. 57.

s Noble v. Ward, L. R. 1 Ex. 117.

6 Thompson v. Libby, 34 Minn. 374.

7 Goss v. Nugent, 5 B. & Ad. 58.

8 Harvey v. Grabham, 5 A. & E. 61

9 Bulwinkle v. Cramer, 27 S. C. 376

3 S. E. R. 776, 13 Am. St. R. 645

Higgins v. Senior, 8 M. & W. 834

Nash v. Towne, 5 Wall. (U. S.) 689

Jones v. Littledale, 6 Ad. & E. 486

Mechem on Agency, §§ 429, 701.
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Provi ion Co. v. Sauer, 69 Miss. 235, v. Augusta R.R. Co.• 80 Ga. 296; Hill
13 S. R. 623· Redus v. Holcomb, v. Blake, 97 N. Y. 216.
l\1iss. - , 27 S. R. 524.
2 Williams v. Robinson, 73 Me. 186,
I Williams v. Robinson, 73 Me. 1 6,
40 .Am. R. 352.
40 Am. R. 352 [citing Small v. Quincy,
3 Wiener v. Whipple. 53 Wis. 298,
4 J\le. 4-97; Coddington v. Goddard, 16 40 Am. R. 775; Harrison v. McCorGray (lVIa s.), 436; Hawkins v. Chace, mick, 9 Cal. 327, 26 Pac. R. 30, 23
19 Pick. (Mass.) 502: Ryan v: Hall, 13 .Am. St. R. 469; Meyer v. Everth, 4
Mete. (l\Iass.) 520; Warren v. Wheeler, Camp. 22.
8 .l\Ietc. ( las .) 97; Cabot v. Winsor,
4 Uoore v. C3.mpbell, 10 Ex. 323;
1 .Allen (Mass.), 546; Remick v. Sand- Stow~ll v. Robinson, 3 Bing. N. C.
ford, 118 Mass. 102]; ¥Viener v. Whip- 928; Marshall v. Lynn, 6 M. & W.
ple, 53 Wi . 298, 40 Am. R. 775 [cit- 109; Stead v. Dawber, 10 A. & E. 57.
ing Ieyer v. Everth, 4 Camp. 22;
5 Noble v. Ward, L. R. 1 Ex. 117.
Gardiner v. Gray, 4 Camp. 144j; HarGThompson v. Libby, 34 Minn. 374.
ri on v. McCormick, 89 Cal. 327, 26
7 Goss v. Nugent, 5 B. & Ad. 58.
Pac. R. 30, 23 Am. St. R. 469; Tho mps Harvey v. Grabham, 5 A. & E. 61.
son v. Libby, 34 Minn. 374, 26 N. W.
9 Bulwinkle v. Cramer, 27 S. C. 376,
R. 1; IcQuaid v. Ro , 77 Wis. 470; 3 . E. R. 776, 13 Am. St. R. 645:
Gilb ~ rt v.
tockman, 76 Wis. 62, 44 Higgins v. Senior, 8 M. & vV. 834:
N. vV. R. 45, 20 Am. St. R. 23; State . . ash v. Towne, 5 Wall. (U. S.) 6 9;
v. Ho haw, 9 l\fo. 358: Hills v. Rix, Jon s v. Littledale, 6 Ad. & E. 486;
43 Iinn. 543, 46 N. W. R. 297; Burch Mechem on Ageucy §§ 429, 701.
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CONTRACT UNDER STATUTE OF FRAUDS.

CII. VII.] CONTRACT UNDER STATUTE OF FRAUDS. [§ 448.

§ 448. But defendant may show note or memorandum set

§ 4:4:8. But defendant may how note or memorandum set

up by plaintiff to be incomplete.— But the rule of the last

section does not conflict with that which permits a defendant

to show by parol that the note or memorandum relied upon

by the plaintiff is not a note or memorandum of any previous

parol agreement at all, 1 or that it is a note or memorandum of

but a part of such agreement. 2 The rule of the last section

precludes the admission of parol evidence to add to, contradict

or vary the written agreement deliberately entered into by

both parties, as being in itself their agreement and not merely

as a memorandum at a previous parol agreement upon which

they rely. The rule of the present section permits the defend-

ant to show that what is set up as such a note or memorandum

as will render the previous parol agreement enforceable is not

a complete note or memorandum of that agreement. The dis-

tinction is between impeaching a written agreement upon

which the party relies and impeaching a note or memorandum

of the previous parol agreement upon which he relies. 3
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!Pym v. Campbell, 6 E. & B. 370; to bind the defendant except as au-

Wake v. Harrop, 6 H. & N. 768; Hus- thorized by him, and that parol evi-

sey v. Home-Payne, 4 App. Cas. 311, denee was admissible to show what

p. 320; Coddington v. Goddard, 10 the authority was. Said the court:

Gray (Mass.), 436. " It would seem to follow as a nec-

2 Pitts v. Beckett, 13 M. & W. 743; essary consequence that evidence of

Elmore v. Kingscote, 5 B. & C. 583; the verbal agreement into which the

Goodman v. Griffiths, 1 H. & N. 574; defendant entered for the sale of the

Acebal v. Levy, 10 Bing. 376; Cod- copper was competent and material

dington v. Goddard, supra; Turner on the question of the extent of his

v. Lorillard Co., 100 Ga. 645, 28 S. E. authority to bind the defendant.

r 383. Nor does the admission of this evi-

up by plaintiff to be incom plete.- But the rule of the last
section does not conflict with that which permits defendant
to how by parol that the note or memorandum relied upon
by the plaintiff i not a note or memorandum of any previous
I arol agreement at all,1 or that it is a note or memorandum of
but a part of such agreement. 2 The rule of the last section
preclu l s tbe admi ion of parol evidence to add to, contradict
or Yary tlie written aar ement leliberately entered into by
both parties, as being in it elf their agre ment and not merely
a a memorandum at a previou parol agreement upon whi h
they rely. Th rule of the pre ent ection I ermits the d fendant to bow that what is et up a such a not or memorandum
a will r nd r the previou parol ao-re m nt enforceable i not
a complete not or mem ran lum of that agreement. The dist in tion is betw n impea bing a written agreement u1 on
which the part relie and impeaching a note or memorandum
of the pre iou. parol aD'reement upon which be relies. 3

a

3 See Williams v. Robinson, 73 Me. dence for this purpose at all contra-

186, 40 Am. R. 352; Turner v. Loril- vene the rule that parol proof is in-

lard Co., 100 Ga. 645, 28 S. E. R. 383; competent to vary or control a writ-

Wiener v. Whipple, 53 Wis. 298, 40 ten contract. It is offered for a

Am. R. 775. In Coddington v. God- wholly different purpose. It bears

dard, supra, the defendant sought to solely on a preliminary inquiry. The

show that a broker's memorandum object is not to explain or alter a

of an alleged sale was not a memo- contract, but to show that no con-

randum of the bargain as made. The tract was ever entered into, because

court held that the broker was a the person who executed it had no

special agent and had no authority authority to make it. The authority
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Pym v. Campbell, 6 E. & B. 370; to bind the defendant except a au\ Vake v. Harrop, 6 H. & N. 16 ; Hu - thorized by him, and that parol eviey v. Horne-Payne, 4 App. Cas. 311, dence wa · admis ible to show what
p. 390; Coddington v. GoJdard, 1U the authority was. Said the court:
ray ( Ja s.), 436.
" It would eem to follow a a nec2 Pitt v. Beckett, 13 I. & \ . 743;
e ·ary con equence that evidence of
Elmore v. King cote, 5 B. & C. 5 3; the verbal agreement into which the
GooJman v. Griffith-, 1 H. & N. 574; defendant entered for the ale of the
A ebal v. Levy, 10 Bing. 376: od- copper wa competent and material
dington v. Goddard, sitpra; Turner on the que tion of the extent of his
v. Lorillard Co., 100 Ga. 645, 2 S. E. authority to bind the defendant.
R. 3 3.
Nor doe. the admi ion of thi · evi3 ee William v. Robin on, 73 l\Ie. dence for thi purpose at all contra1 6, 40 Arn. R. 352; Turner v. Loril- \ene the rule that parol proof i. inla rd Co., 100 Ga. 645, 2 S. E. R. 3 3; competent to vary or control a writW iener v. Whipple, 53 ·wis. 29 , 40 ten contract. It is offered for a
m. R. / 5. In Coddington v. God- wholly different purpose. It bears
dard, SU]J'ra, the defendant ought to . olely on a preliminary inquiry. The
show that a brok r · memorandum object i not to explain or alter a
of an alleged ale wa · not a memo- contract, but to show that no conr andum of the bargain as made. The tract was ever entered into, beca.u e
court held that the broker was a the per on who executed it had no
special agen t and had no authority authority to make it. The authority
M
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§ 449-]

LAW OF SALE.

c. Of the jgning of the Parti s.

[BOOK I.

c. Of the Signing of the Parties.

§ 449. Whether signing by both parties necessary.— The

language of the statute usually is that the note or memoran-

dum shall be signed by the party to be charged thereby, though

the English statute used the word parties. Some importance

has, at times, been attached to the use of the plural form, but,

though a strong a priori argument might be made that both

parties are to be charged or bound by the agreement, it is now

well settled by the preponderance of authority that the note

or memorandum need be signed only by the party against whom

it is to be enforced and that the want of mutuality is no objec-

tion. 1 On the other hand, where the contract consists of mut-

ual promises, it is held in some cases that though the party

to be charged has signed, yet if the party bringing the action

§ 44:9. W heth er s igning by bot h part ie. nece . ary.-Th
language of the statut usually i that th n t or m m randum shall be siO'ned by the pcuty to b cbarg tl th re by, thouO'h
the English statute u l the wortl parti . . ~ me imp rtanc
ha , at time , been att( heel to th u of th plural form but
though a stronO' a, priori arcrum nt mi ht be ma le that both
parties are to be charg l or b und by the a<>T m nt, it 1 now
w 11 settled by the pr poncleranc of authority that the n t
or memoran lurn ne cl b iO'ned nl by th ·ut a<Yain t whom
it is to be enforced and that the want f mutuality i no obj ction. t On the oth r band, where th contra t con i ts f mutual promise , it is h kl in som ca s tbat though the l arty
to be charo·ed has igned, } et if th l arty bringing the actio n
hc1s not ignecl and con equ ntly could not be compelleu to per1

has not signed and consequently could not be compelled to per-

of an agent may always be shown
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by parol; but the contracts into

which he enters within the scope of

his authority, when reduced to writ-

ing, can be proved only by the writ-

ing itself. The necessity of admit

ting evidence of the verbal contract

entered into with a broker, in cases

where his authority is drawn in

question, is quite obvious. If such

proof were incompetent, a broker

who had entered into negotiations

with a person might make a memo-

randum of a contract wholly differ-

ent from that which he was author-

ized to sign, and thereby effectually

preclude all proof that no such con-

tract was ever made. Allen v. Pink,

4M. & W. 140; Pitts v. Beckett, 13

M. & W. 743, 750."

i Allen v. Bennet, 3 Taunt. 169;

Thornton v. Kempster, 5 Taunt. 786;

Laythoarp v. Bryant, 2 Bing. N. C.

735; Old Colony R. R. Corp. v. Evans,

6 Gray (Mass.), 25, 66 Am. Dec. 394;

Williams v. Robinson, 73 Me. 186, 40

Am. R. 352; Smith's Appeal, 69 Pa.

St. 474; Tripp v. Bishop, 56 Pa. St.

424: Perkins v. Hadsell, 50 111. 216;

Ide v. Leiser, 10 Mont. 5, 24 Am. St.

R. 17; Hodges v. Kowing, 58 Conn.

12, 7 L. R. A. 87; Clason v. Bailey,

14 Johns. (N. Y.) 484; McCrea v. Pur-

mort, 16 Wend. (N. Y.) 460, 30 Am.

Dec. 103; Richards v. Green, 23 N. J.

Eq. 536; Sabre v. Smith, 62 N. H. 663;

Case Threshing Mach. Co. v. Smith,

16 Oreg. 381, 18 Pac. R. 641 ; Mason v.

Decker, 72 N. Y. 595, 28 Am. R. 190;

Gartrell v. Stafford, 12 Neb. 545, 41

Am. R. 767; Shirley v. Shirley, 7

Blackf. (Ind.) 452; Douglass v. Spears,

2 N. & McC. (S. C.) 207, 10 Am. Dec.

588; Morin v. Martz, 13 Minn. 191;

Anderson v. Harold, 10 Ohio, 399;

Lowber v. Connit, 36 Wis. 176; Ivory

v. Murphy, 36 Mo. 534; De Cordova

v. Smith, 9 Tex. 129, 58 Am. Dec. 136;

Cunningham v. Williams, 43 Mo. App.

629.
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of an agent may alway be hown William v. R bin on, 73 l\Ie. 1 6, 40
by parol; but the contract into Am. R. 33'>; mith's Appeal, 69 Pa.
which he enter within the cope of , t. 474; Tripp v. Bi hop, 56 Pa. St.
hi. authority, when reclu eel to writ~ 42±: Perkin v. Had ell, GO 111. 216;
ing, can be proveu only by the ·w rit- Ide v. Lei er, 10 1\lont. 5, 24 Am. St.
ing itself. The neces ity of admit R. 17; Hodge v. Kowing, 5 Conn.
ting evidence of the verbal contract 12, 7 L. R. A. 87; Clason v. Bai ley,
entered into with a broker, in ca ·e
14 John . ( . Y.) 4 4; 1\IcCrea v. Purwhere his authority is drawn in mort, 16 \Vend. ( . Y.) 460, 30 Am.
que ~tion, is quite ob,,ious. If such Dec. 103; Richard v. Green, 23 N. J .
proof were incompetent, a broker Eq. 536; Sabre v. Smith, 62 N. H . 663;
wbo had ent red into negotiations Ca e Threshing >Iach. Co. v. Smith,
with a per on might make a memo- 16 Oreg. 3 1, 1 Pac. R. 641; l\fa on'·
randum of a contract wholly differ- Decker, 72 N. Y. 595, 28 Am. R. 190;
ent from that which he wa author- Gartrell v. Stafford, 12 Neb. 54-, 41
ized to sign, and thereby efrectually Am. R. 767; Shirley v. Shirl ey, 7
preclude all proof that no uch con- Blackf. (I ncl.) 452; Douglass v. Spears,
tract was ever made. Allen v. Pink, 2 N. & McO. (S. C.) 207, 10 Am. Dec.
4 M. & W. 140; Pitts v. Beckett, 13 5 ; l\Iorin v. Martz, 13 1\1inn. 191;
1. & W. 743, 750."
Ander son v. Harold, 10 Ohio, 399;
l Allen v. Bennet, 3 Taunt. 169; Lowber v. Connit., 36 Wis. 176; Ivory
Thornton v. Kempster, 5 Taunt. 786; v. Mur phy, 86 Mo. 534; De Cordova
Laythoarp v. Bryant, 2 Bing. N. C. v. m it h, 9 Tex. 129, 58 Am. Dec. 136;
735 : Old Colony R. R. Corp. v. Evan , Cunningham v. W illia ms, 43 Mo. App.
6 Gray (Mass.), 25, 66 Am. Dec. 394; 629.
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€11. VII.] CONTRACT UNDER STATUTE OF FRAUDS. [§§ 450, 451.

form on his part, there is such a lack of mutuality in the con-

tract as renders it binding upon neither. 1

§ 450. Written offer accepted by parol. — In accord-

ance with the prevailing rule it is held that if one party makes,

in writing signed by him, an offer to buy or sell personal prop-

erty, the person to whom such offer is made may accept it by

parol, and after such an acceptance may enforce the agree-

ment against the person signing. 2

§ 451. How sign. — The party signing may write his name

in full or in part; 3 he may use his initials only; 4 he may make

his mark, 5 or any sign which is intended to denote his signature ; G

he may touch the pen while some one else guides it; 7 or he may

sign his name through the medium of a third person who writes

it in his presence and by his express direction. 8 A mere de-

1 Wilkinson v. Heavenrich.58 Mich.

574, 55 Am.K. 70&

2 Justice v. Lang, 42 N. Y. 493, 1

Am. R. 576, 52 N. Y. 823; Mason v.
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Decker. 72 N. Y. 595, 28 Am. K. 190;

Case Threshing Mach. Co. v. Smith,

16 Oreg. 381; Dressel v. Jordan, 104

Mass. 407.

3 Tims the omission of a middle

name or initial is not fatal (Fessen-

den v. Mussey. 11 Cush., Mass.. 127),

nor is the signing only by the first

name. Zann v. Haller, 71 Ind. 181).

36 Am. R. 193.

* Salmon Falls Mfg. Co. v. Goddard,

14 How. (U. S.) 446, where the party

signed " R. R. M. ; " Sanborn v. Flag-

ler, 9 Allen (Mass.), 474, where the

party signed "J. B. F."

5 Baker v. Dening, 8 A. & E. 94;

Zimmerman v. Sale, 3 Rich. (S. C.)

76; Foye v. Patch, 132 Mass. 105;

Brown v. McClanahan, 9 Baxt.(Teun.)

347.

6 Thus the use of the figures "1, 2,

8 "will suffice where the party in-

• tends that as his signature. Brown

v. r.utchers' Bank, 6 Hill (N. Y). 443.

41 Am. Dec. 755. Nelson, C. J., says

that "a party may become bound by

any mark or designation he thinks

proper to adopt, provided it be used

as a substitute for his name and he

intend to bind himself." See also

Palmer v. Stephens, 1 Denio (N. Y.),

471; Brainerd v. Heydrick, 32 How.

Pr. (N. Y.) 97; Mclntire v. Preston,

5 Gilm. (111.) 48, 48 Am. Dec. 821;

lias -all v. Life Ass'n, 5 Hun (N. Y),

151; Dewitt v. Walton, 9 N. Y. 571;

David v. Insurance Co., 83 N. Y. 265,

38 Am. R. 418; Bickley v. Keenan, 60

Ala. 293.

7 Helshaw v. Langley, 11 L. J. Ch.

(X. S.)17.

8 Mechem on Agency, § 96; Jansen

v. McCahill, 22 Cal. 563, 83 Am. Dec.

84; Frost v. Deering, 21 Me. 156; Bird

v. Decker, 64 Me. 550; Nye v. Lowry,

82 Ind. 316; Croy v. Busenbark. 72

Ind. 48: McMurtry v. Brown, 6 Neb.

868. ( ontrci, Simpson v. Common-

wealth, 89 Ky. 412, 12 S. W. R. 630.
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451.]

LAW OF SALE.

[BOOK I.

scription of himself as "your father" is not enough, 1 but a

fictitious name 2 or mark, adopted as a signature," will suffice.

The party may sign the note or memorandum at the begin-

ning, in the body, or at the end of it. 4 He may use a pencil,*

scription of himself as "vour fa th er" is not enongh ,1 but a.
fictitious name 2 or mark, adopted a a signature, 3 wi ll suffic .
The party may sign the note or mernoranclum at th b ginning, in the bocly, or at the encl of it. 4 He may u e a pencil,:>

i Selby v. Selby, 3 Meriv. 2.

2 Thus, see fourth note to this sec-

Selby v. Selby, 3 Meriv. 2.
Cal. 447, 49 P ac. R. 462, it wa.s held
see fourth note to this sec- that the writing of the name aero
tion. So one who has a French name the face of the memorandum was a
may use the English tran~ lation of sufficient signature and subscription
it, as where one Couture wrote hi to satisfy the statute, the party innarne Seam. Augur v. Couture, 6 tending thereby to signify his intent
Me. 427.
to accept and be bound by the con3 See fourth note to this section.
tract. If it appear· in the body of
4 Knight v. Crockford, 1 E p. 190; the memorandum, it is enough. New
Lemayne v. Stan ley, 3 Lev. 1; Sa.un- Eng. etc. Meat Co. v. Standard Wor d erson v. Jackson, 2 B. & P. 23 ; ted Co., 165 Mas . 328, 43 N. E. R. 112,
Coddington v. Goddard, 16 Gray 52 Am. St. R. 516. In Durrell v.
(Mass.), 436; Saunders v. Hackney, 10 Evans, 1 H. & C. 174, Lord Bla.ckLea (Tenn.), 194. In Drury v. Young, burn said: "If the matter were res
58 Mel. 546, 42 Am. R. 343; Schneider integra, I should doubt wbetber a
v. Norris. 2 l\f. & S. 286. and Saunder- name printed or written at the head
son v. Jackson, a printed name at of a bill of parcels was such a sig·
the head of the memorandum was n a ture as the statute contemplated;
held good. In Johnson v. Dodgson, 2 but it is now too late to discu s tha t
M. & W. 653, the defendant himself q~e tion. If the name of the party
wrote the terms of the bargain in his to be charged is printed or written
own book, beginning, "Sold J ohn on a document, intended to be a.
Dodgson," and the seller sig ned it. m emorandum of the contract, either
H eld, that t his was a sufficient sign- by himself or his a uthorized agent,
ing by Dodgson to bind him. Lord according to Schneider v. Norris
Abinger said: "The ca es have de- {sup1·a), and Saunderson v. Jackson
cided that though the signature be in (supra), it is hL· signature, whether
the beginning or middle of the instru- it is at the beginning or middle or
ment, it is as binding as if at the foot of the document. In Johnson
foot; the question being always open v. Dodg on (sup1·a), the memoranto the jury whether the pa.rty, not dum was r etained by tbe defendant
having signed it regularly at the in his own possession, but as it confoot, meant to be bound by it as it tained his name, and was intended
stood, or whether it was left so un- to be a note of the contract, it was
signed because he refused to com- h eld binding on him, although theplete it." So if C D writes, ·•A B fact of his keeping it was a clear inbought of C D," etc., this is a good dica.tion that he never intended it as
signature by C D personally or by a voucher of his being bound, but
hi authorized agent. Hawkins v. only to bind the other party."
Chace, 19 Pick. (Mass.) 502. In Cali5 Geary v. Phy ic, 7 D. & R. fi53, 5
fornia Canneries Co. v. Scatena, 117 B. & C. 234.
372
I

tion. So one who has a French name

may use the English translation of

it, as where one Couture wrote his

name Seam. Augur v. Couture, 68

Me. 427.

3 See fourth note to this section.

* Knight v. Crockford, 1 Esp. 190;

Lemayne v. Stanley, 3 Lev. 1 ; Saun-

derson v. Jackson, 2 B. & P. 238;

Coddington v. Goddard, 16 Gray
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(Mass.), 436; Saunders v. Hackney, 10

Lea (Tenn.), 194. In Drury v. Young,

58 Md. 546, 42 Am. R. 343; Schneider

v. Norris, 2 M. & S. 286, and Saunder-

son v. Jackson, a printed name at

the head of the memorandum was

held good. In Johnson v. Dodgson, 2

M. & W. 653, the defendant himself

wrote the terms of the bargain in his

own book, beginning, "Sold John

Dodgson," and the seller signed it.

Held, that this was a sufficient sign-

ing by Dodgson to bind him. Lord

Abinger said: "The cases have de-

cided that though the signature be in

the beginning or middle of the instru-

ment, it is as binding as if at the

foot; the question being always open

to the jury whether the party, not

having signed it regularly at the

foot, meant to be bound by it as it

stood, or whether it was left so un-

signed because he refused to com-

plete it." So if C D writes, "A B

bought of C D," etc., this is a good

signature by C D personally or by

his authorized agent. Hawkins v.

Chace, 19 Pick. (Mass.) 502. In Cali-

fornia Canneries Co. v. Scatena, 117

Cal. 447, 49 Pac. R. 462, it was held

that the writing of the name across

the face of the memorandum was a

sufficient signature and subscription

to satisfy the statute, the party in-

tending thereby to signify his intent

to accept and be bound by the con-

tract. If it appears in the body of

the memorandum, it is enough. New

Eng. etc. Meat Co. v. Standard Wors-

ted Co., 165 Mass. 328, 43 N. E. R. 112 r

52 Am. St. R. 516. In Durrell v.

Evans, 1 H. & C. 174, Lord Black-

burn said: "If the matter were res

integra, I should doubt whether a

name printed or written at the head

of a bill of parcels was such a. sig-

nature as the statute contemplated;

but it is now too late to discuss that

question. If the name of the party

to be charged is printed or written

on a document, intended to be a

2 Thus,

VH.

nr.J
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CH. VII.] CONTRACT UNDER STATUTE OF FRAUDS. [§ 452.

or a stamp, 1 or may use and adopt a printed signature. 2 The

question in every case, where a substituted form of signing is

adopted, is whether b\ T that form the party intended to be

bound, and this is usually a question of fact.

But the party must sign the memorandum which is to be

binding on him, and hence where the memorandum was in

two parts, and each party signed the one which the other ought

to have signed, it was held insufficient. 3

a. Of the Signing by Agent.

§ 45'2. Who may he agent. — It is a general rule that any

person who has sufficient capacity to act for himself is compe-

tent to act as the agent of another; but the rule may bo stated

still more broadly, for many persons are competent to act for

or a tamp 1 or may use and ado1 ta printe l signature. 2 The
que tion in cv ry ca e, where a ub titutel form of igning is
adopted, i whether by that form the party intended to be
bound, an l this i u ually a que tion of fact.
But the party mu t sign the memorandum which is to be
binr1ino· on him, an l hence where the memorandum was in
tn o part and each party sio·ned the one which the other ought
to have signed, it was held in u:fficient. 3

others who would not be competent to bind themselves, such

as infants and married women, and it is often said that any

person may be an agent except a lunatic, imbecile or child of

a.

f the iO'ning by

g nt.

tender years. 4

As a rule a person cannot at the same time be both a party
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to the transaction and the agent of the opposite party ; 5 though

with the full knowledge and consent of the opposite party

there is no legal incapacity to so act. 6

i Bennett v. Brumfitt, L R 3 C. P. thereby adopted the printed heading

28. But it must appear that it was as their signature. To the same ef-

the intention to adopt this as his feet: Schneider v. Xorris, 2 M. & S.

signature. Boardman v. Spooner, 13 2S6; Saunderson v. Jackson, 2 B. &

Allen (Mass.), 353, 90 Am. Dec. 196; P. 238; Tourret v. Cripps, 48 L. J.Ch.

Wood on Statute of Frauds, § 412. 567.

*Grieb v. Cole, 60 Mich. 397. "It » Canterberry v. Miller, 76 I1L 355.

is a sufficient signing if the name be 4 Mechem on Agency, § 57.

in print, and in any part of the in- 5 Mechem on Agency, § 68. One

strument, provided that the name is party to the contract cannot, there-

recognized and appropriated by the fore, be the agent of the other to

party to be his. Drury v. Young, 58 bind the latter by signing the mem-

Md. 546, 42 Am. R. 343. In this case orandum. Sharman v. Brandt, L. R.

the defendants wrote the note or 6 Q. B. 720: Wilson v. Lewiston Mill

memorandum on one of their printed Co., 150 X. Y. 314, 44 N. E. R, 959, 55

§ 4:52. Who maJ be agent.- It is a general rule that any
per on who has sufficient capacit to act for hims lf is comp tent to act as the a · nt of anoth r · but the rule ma3 b.: tated
till more broa lly, for many p r on are competent to act for
oth r who would not be compct nt to bind them el e uch
a. infant and marri 1 wom n, an lit is oft n ail that any
person may be an ag nt xc pt a lunatic, imbecile or child of
tender
ars. 4
s a rule a I r on cann t at th ame time be both a party
to the tran action an th a nt f th oppo ite party; 5 thou h
with the full knowledO'e and con nt of the opposite party
there is no legal incapacity to so act. 6

letter-heads containing their firm Am. St. R. 680.

and individual names, but did not b Mechem on Agency, § 68.

sign it. Held, sufficient, as they

:;73

1 Bennett v. Brumfitt, L. R 3 C. P. thereby adopted the printed heading
'2 . But it must appear that it was a· their ignature. To the ame efthe intention to adopt this a bi fect: chneider v. Norri~ , 2 l\f. & .
signature. Boardman v. Spooner 13 2 "6; aunderson v. Jack on, 2 B. &
Allen (Mas .), 353, 90 Am. Dec. 196; P. 23 ; TouITet v. Cripp. , 4 L. J. h.
Wood on tatute of Fraud § 412.
5.67.
2 Grieb v. Cole, 60 Iich. 397.
"It
3 Canterberry v. filler 76 Ill 355.
i a sufficient igning if the name be
4 Iechem on Agency, · 57.
in print, and in any part of the in51\lecbem on gency, : 6 . One
trument, pro,ided that the name i party to the contract cannot, thererecoo-nized and appropriated by the fore. be the agent of the other to
-part o be hi . Drury v. ~ oung, 5 bind the latter by igning the memMd. 5-±6, 49 Am. R. 3-±3. In thi ca e orandum.
barman v. Brandt, L. R.
the defendant wrote the note or 6 Q. B. 720; W il on v. Lewi ton l\Iill
memorandum none of their printed
o. 1-0 i: . Y. 314, 44 N. E. R. 959, 55
letter-head containin their firm Am. t. R. 6 0.
and indh-idual name~ . but did not
61\Iechern on Agency, § 68.
ign it. Held, ufficient, a they
. ;;3

§§ 453-455.J

LA.W OF SA.LE.

[BOOK I.

§§ 453-455.] law of sale. [book i.

§453. How appointed.— The language of the fourth sec-

tion of the statute requires that, as to interests in land, the

authority of the agent shall be conferred by writing, but no

such requirement is found in the seventeenth section. That

the agent must be " thereunto lawfully authorized " is the only

requirement. The power of the agent, therefore, in this case

may be conferred in the same manner as in other cases — either

by a prior authorization, express or implied, 1 or by a subse-

quent ratification. 2 Evidence of such a ratification would be

found, for example, where the principal afterward adopted

and delivered a memorandum made by another, as a memo-

randum of his agreement. 3

It is not essential that the agent shall be specially author-

ized to sign the memorandum; here, as elsewhere, it is suffi-

cient if the making of such a memorandum falls within the

general scope of his authority. 4

§ 454. Several owners acting in unison — One as

agent for all. — But though owners of several interests are
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acting in unison, one has not thereby any implied power to

bind the others; and the mere fact that one has, in writing,

expressed his willingness to sell if the others did, gives no au-

thority to the others to bind him, and this writing does not

constitute such a memorandum as will defeat the statute. 5

§ 455. How sign. — The appropriate manner for an agent to

sign is to write his principal's name, followed by such a state-

§ 4-53. How appointed .-The language of the fourth section of the statute requires that, as to interests in land, the
authority of the agent shall be conferred by writing, but no
such requirement ]s found in the seventeenth section. That
the agent must be ''thereunto lawfully authorized" is the only
requirement. The power of the agent, therefore, in this case
may be conferred in the same manner as in other cases - either
by a prior authorization, express or implied,1 or by a ubsequent ratification. 2 Evidence of such a ratification would be
found, for example, where the principal afterward adopted
and delivered a memorandum made by another, as a memorandum of his agreement. 3
It is not es ential that the agent shall be specially authorized to sign the memorandum; here, as elsewhere, ]tis utficient if the making of such a memoran lum falls within the
general scope of his autbority. 4

ment as indicates that it was done by him as agent; as, A B

by C D, his agent ; or, for A B, C D agent, etc. 6 But though

these forms are appropriate they are not indispensable, and the

agent may sign his principal's name alone, 7 or his own name

i See Mechem on Agency, §§ 80- 4 Griffith Co. v. Humber, [1899] 2

10G. Q. B. 414.

2 Mechem on Agency, § 145; Mac- 5 Tompkins v. Sheehan (1899), 158

lean v. Dunn, 4 Bing." 722; Soames N. Y. 617, 58 N. E. R. 502.

v. Spencer, 1 Dowl. & R. 32. 6 See Mechem on Agency, § 432.

3 Hawkins v.Chace, 19 Pick. (Mass.) "See Mechem on Agency, §§ 427-

502. 429; Hawkins v» Chace, 19 Pick..

374

§ 4-5!. - - Several owners acting in unison - One as
agcut for all.- But though owners of several interests are
acting in unison, one has not thereby any implied pow r to
bind the others; and the mere fact that one has, in writing,
expressed his willingness to sell if the others did, gives no authority to the others to bind him, and this writing does not
constitute such a memorandum as will defeat the statute.5

§ 455. How sign.-The appropriate manner for an agent to
sign is to write his principal's name, followed by such a statement as indicates that it was done by him as agent; as, AB
by 0 D, his agent; or, for A B, 0 D agent, etc. 6 But though
the e forms are a ppropriatc they are not indispensable, and the
agent may sign his principa.l's name alon ,7 or his own name1 See l\Iechem on Agency, §§ 804 Griffith Co. v. Humber, [1899] Z
106.
Q. B. 414.
2 Ie<..:11em on
gency, § 145; }fac5 Tompkins v. Sheehan (18!)9), 158
lean v. Dunn, 4 Bing. 7'N; Soames N. Y. Gl 7, 53 N. E. R. 502.
v. , "pen er, 1 Dowl. & R. ~2.
6 See Iechem on Agency, ~ 432.
3 Ha·wkins v. Chace, 19 Pick. (Ma s.)
i See Mechem on Agency,§§ 42750,.,.
429; Hawkins V> Chace, 19 Pick..

374

CH. VIL]

CONTRACT UNDER

T.ATUTE OF FR.AUD'.

[§ 45G.

CH. VII.] CONTRACT UNDER STATUTE OF FRAUDS.

[§ ^C.

alone. 1 So he may sign his name in full or in part, 2 or may

use his initials only. 3

§ 456. Where. — Unless the statute requires the signa-

alo ne.1 So he may sign his name in full or in part, 2 or may
use f1is initials only. 3

ture to be at the end — and the word " subscribed " has been

held to amount to such a requirement, 4 — the agent's signature

may be in any part of the memorandum, provided it was in-

tended to have effect as such. 5

(Mass.) 502 ; Clason v. Bailey, 14 Johns.

(N. Y.) 484; Hunter v. Giddings, 97

Mass. 41, 93 Am. Dec. 54.

But in Simpson v. Commonwealth,

89 Ky. 412, 12 S. W. R. 630, the court

§ 456. - - 'Vhere.- Unless the statute requires the signature to be at the end- and the word "subscribed" has been
held to amount to such a requirement,4 - the agent's signature
may be in any part of the memorandum, provided it was mtended to have effect as such. 5

held that the signing by the agent,

in the principal's presence and by his

direction, of the principal's name

alone, was neither a signing by the

principal nor the agent within the
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meaning of the statute.

1 Wiener v. Whipple, 53 Wis. 298,

40 Am. R. 775; Trueman v. Loder, 11

Ad. & El. 589, 594; Higgins v. Senior,

8 M. & W. 840; Stowell v. Eldred, 39

Wis. 614; Huntington v. Knox, 7

Cash. (Mass.) 371.

2 See ante, § 451.

3 Salmon Falls Mfg. Co. v. Goddard,

14 How. (U. S.) 446.

* Davis v. Shields, 26 Wend. (N. Y.)

341; James v. Patten, 6 N. Y. 9, 55

Am. Dec. 376; In re Clifford, 2 Saw.

(TJ. S. C. C.) 428.

5 In Hawkins v. Chace, 19 Pick.

(Mass.) 502, it is said: "Two things

may be conceded, as well settled by

authorities: (1) that to constitute a

signing within the meaning of the

statute of frauds, it is not necessary

that the signatures be placed at the

bottom, but if the party to be charged

has inserted his name in any part of

the paper, in his own handwriting, it

is sufficient to give it effect (Saunder-

son v. Jackson, 2 Bos. & Puk 238;

37,

Knight v. Crockford, 1 Esp. 190; Pen-

niman v. Hartshorn, 13 Mass. 87);

and (2) that the authority of one

person to sign for another need not

itself be proved by other evidence,

but may well be proved by parol evi-

dence."

Thus, a memorandum in this form:

"W. H. Hawkins & Co., Bought of

William H. Chace," etc., is suffi-

ciently signed by Chace if written

by an authorized agent. Hawkins v.

Chace, siqora.

So a memorandum, by an author-

ized agent, in this form: "Bought

for Isaac Clason of Bailey & Voor-

hees," etc., is thereby sufficiently

signed to bind each. Clason v. Bailey,

14 Johns. (N. Y.) 484. In Merritt v.

Clason, 12 id. 102, 7 Am. Dec. 286,

the memorandum was: "Bought of

Daniel & Isaac Merritt . . . for

Isaac Clason," etc. Said the court:

" In the body of this memorandum

(l\fas .)509; la on v. Bailey, 14Johns.
(N. Y.) 4 4; Hunter v. Gidding , 97
Ma s. 41, 93 Am. Dec. 54.
But in imp on v. ommonwealth,
89 Ky. 412, 12 S. W. R. 630, the court
held that the signing by the aO'ent,
in the principal's pre ence and by his
direction, of the principals name
alone, was neither a signing by the
J rin ipal nor the agent within the
meaning of the tatute.
I Wien er v. Whipple, 53 vVi . 29 ,
40 m. R. 775; Trueman v. Loder, 11
Ad. & El. - 9 94; Hi gin v. Senior,
l\I. & vV. 40; to well v. Eldred, 39
Wis. 614; Huntington v. Knox, 7
Cu h. (i\fa .) 371.
2 ee ante, § 451.
3 almon Fall ' Ifg. Co. v. Goddartl,
14 How. (U. S.) 446.
4 Davi v. Shield , 26 Wend. (N. Y.)
341; Jame v. Patten, 6 N. Y. 9, 55
m. Dec. 316; In re Clifford, 2 Saw.
(U. S. . C.) 42 .
5 In Hawkins v. Chace, 19 Pick.
(Ma .) 509, it is said: "Two things
may be conceded, as well settled by
authoritie : (1) that to con titute a
signing within the meaning of the
statute of frauds, it is not nece ary
that the ignatures be placed at the
bottom, but if the party to be charged
ha in erted his name in any part of
the paper in his own handwriting, it
i ufficient to give it effect ( aunderson v. Jack on, 2 Bos. & Pul 23

Knight v. Crockford, 1 Esp. 190; Penniman v. Hart horn, 13 Mass. 7);
and (2) that the anthority of one
person to sign for another need not
it elf be proved by other evidence,
but may well be proved by parol evidence."
Thu , a memorandum in thi. form:
"\V. H. Hawkfus & Co., Bought of
William H. Chace," etc., is suffi·
ciently igned by Chace if written
by an autborizedagent. Hawkinsv.
Chace, sup-ra.
So a memorandum, by an authorized agent, in thi form: " Bought
for I aa Clason of Bailey & Voorhee ," et ., is thereby ufficiently
iO'ned to bind each. Cla. on v. Bail y,
14 John . (N. Y.) 4 4. In Merritt v.
Cla on, 12 id. 102, 7 Am. Dec. 2 6,
the memorandum was: "Bought of
Daniel & I aac l\Ierritt . • . for
I aac Cla on," etc. Said the court:
"In the body of thi memorandum
the name of I aac Clason, the defendant, is written by his agent,
whom he had expre ly authorized
to make this contract. The memo·
randum, therefore, is equally binding on the defendant as if he had
written it with bi own hand; and
if he had u ' eel his own band, in. tead
of the hand of hi agent, the law is
well ettled that it is immaterial, in
such a ca e, whether the name is
written at the top, or in the body, or

375

§§ 45 7, 458.J

L.A. W OF SALE.

[BOOK I.

§§ 457, 458.]

LAW OF SALE.

[book T.

457.

Delegation. — Like other mechanical acts, the

signing by the agent may be through the medium of another, as

his clerk, who signs in his presence and by his direction. 1 But,

on the other hand, where the agency is a personal one, it can-

not be delegated, 2 and hence if one person is authorized to make

' the memorandum, one signed by another person will not suf-

fice. 3

458.

§ 457. - - Delegation.- Like other mechanical acts, the
signing by the agent may be through the medium of another, a
his clerk, who signs in his presence and by hi clir ction. 1 But,
on the other hand, where the agency is a personal one, it cannot be delegated,2 ancl hence if one person is authorize 1 to make
• the memoranLlum, one signed by another person will not suffice.3

Not as witness. — The signature of the agent

which will suffice must, moreover, be that of the agent as agent;

at the bottom of the memorandum.

It is equally a signing within the

§ 458. - - Not as witness.- Th e signature of the ag nt
which will suffice must, moreover, be that of the ag nt as ag nt;

statute."

So a memorandum in a broker's

book in this form is sufficient: "9th.
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W. W. Goddard to T. B. Coddington

& Co.," followed by items and terms.

This memorandum shows that God-

dard is the seller and Coddington &

Co. the buyers; and such writing of

their names by their duly-authorized

agent is sufficient without further

signing. Coddington v. Goddard, 16

Gray (Mass.), 436. Said Bigelow, C. J. :

" We know of no case in which it has

been held that the signature of the

name of the agent through whom the

contract is negotiated should appear

in the writing. It is sufficient if the

names of the pai-ties to be charged

are properly inserted, either by them-

selves or by some person duly au-

thorized to authenticate the docu-

ment. Brokers and auctioneers are

deemed to be the agents of both par-

ties, and by virtue of their employ-

ment stand in such relation to their

principals that they can sign the

names of the parties to a contract of

sale effected through their agency.

Such authority is implied from the

necessity of the case; because with-

out it they could not complete a con-

37

tract of sale so as to make it legally

binding on the parties. Nor is it at

all material that the names should

be written at the bottom of the

memorandum. It is sufficient if the

names of the principals are inserted

in such form and manner as to indi-

cate that it is their contract, by

which one agrees to sell and the

other to buy the goods or merchan-

dise specified upon the terms therein

expressed. It is the substance, and

not the form, of the memorandum,

which the law regards. The great

purpose of the statute is answered,

if the names of the parties and the

terms of the contract of sale are

authenticated by written evidence,

and do not rest in parol proof. Pen-

niman v. Hartshorn, 13 Mass. 87;

Hawkins v. Chace, 19 Pick. (Mass.)

502, 505; Fessenden v. Mussey, 11

at the bottom of the memorandum. tract of sale so a" to make it l gally
It is equally a signing within the binding on the parties. Nor i it at
statute."
all material that the n a m es should
So a memorandum in a broker's be written at the bottom of the
book in this form is sufficient: "9th. memorandum. It is s ufficient if the
W. W. Goddard to T. B. Coddington names of the princi1 als are in , erted
& Co.," followed by items a nd terms. in such form and manner as to indiThis memorandum shows that God- cate that it is their contract, by
dard is the seller and Coddington & wbieh one agrees to ell and the
Co. the buyers; and such w riting of other to buy the goods or m erchantheir names by their du ly-authorized dise specified upon the t erms therein
agent is sufficient without further expressed. It is the sub t ance, and
signing. Coddington v. Goddar d, 16 not the form, of the memorandum .
Gray (Mass.), 436. Said Bigelow, C. J.: which the law r egards. The great
"We know of no case in which it has purpose of the statute is answered,
been held that the signature of the if the names of the parties and the
nameoftheagentthr ough whom the terms of the contract of sa.le are
contract is negotiated should appear a uthenticated by written evidence,
in the writing. It is sufficient if the and do not re tin parol proof. Pennames of the paTties to be charged niruan v. H artshorn, 13 Ma s. 87;
are properly inserted. either by them- Hawkins v. Chace, 19 Pick. (Mass.)
selves or by some person duly au- 50B, 503; Fe enden v. Mussey, 11
thorized to authenticate the docu- Cush. ( fass.) 127; l\Iorton v. Dean. 13
ment. Brokers and auctioneers are Met. (Mass.) 385; Salmon Fall s Mfg.
deemed to be the agents of both par- Co. v. Goddard, 14 How. (U. S.) 446."
tie , and by virtue of their employSee also New England Dressed
ment stand in such relation to their Meat Co. v. Standard Worsted Co.,
principals that they can sign the 165 Mass. 328, 43 . E. R. 112.
names of the parties to a contract of
1 Williams v. Woods, 16 Md. 220.
sale effected through their agency.
2 Mechem on Agency, § 185.
Such authority is implied from the
3 H enderson v. Barne"·all, 1 Y. &
nece ity of the case; becau e with- J. 387. In thi case a broker 's clerk
out it they could not complete a con- was deputed to make the mernora n376

CH. VII.] CONTRACT UNDER STATUTE OF FRAUDS. [§§ 459, -iGO.

if, therefore, he signs merely as a witness to the transaction, it

is not enough. 1

§ 459. One person as agent of both parties. — A person may

act as the agent of two or more parties in the same transaction

if his duties to each are not such as to require him to do incom-

patible things; but wherever, from the nature of his employ-

ment, each of two principals whose interests are antagonistic

is entitled to the benefit of the agent's judgment, discretion or

personal influence, the agent will not be permitted to act for

both in the same transaction, except with their full knowledge

and consent. 2 If, however, with full knowledge of his relations

to each, they see fit to mutually confide in him, there is no

legal objection to it, nor can either principal afterwards escape

responsibility because of such double employment. 3

§ 460. ■ Evidence of authority to sign for both. — But

while one person may thus act for both parties, such a double

relation will not be lightly inferred, but the evidence must be

such as to indicate an intention on the part of both that the act
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of the agent should be their act respectively. 4 Thus, where the

plaintiff's traveling agent wrote out an order for goods in du-

plicate upon printed headings in the presence of the defendant,

handing him the duplicate and retaining the original, it was

held that there was no evidence in this that plaintiff's agent

was authorized to sign the memorandum as defendant's agent

also. 5

dum. and it was held that a memo- the buyer of goods requested the

randum made by the broker would agent of the seller to write a note of

not suffice. the contract in the buyer's book,

^osbell v. Archer, 2 Ad. & El. 500. which the agent did. and signed it

2 Mechem on Agency, §67, and with his own name. Held, that this

cases cited. request did not constitute him the

3 Mechem on Agency, §67, and buyer's agent, so as to make hi- sig-

cases cited. nature bind the buyer. It was said.

4 See extract from Murphy r.Boese, however, by Coll man, J., that if he

L. R. 10 Exch. 126, in second note had signed the buyer's name instead

below. of his own the case might have been

5 Murphy v. Boese, supra. So in different.

Graham v. Musson, 5 Bing. X. C. 603,

377

§ 460.J

LAW OF SALE.

[BOOK I.

§ 460.]

LAW OF SALE.

[BOOK I.

But in another case plaintiff had goods in the possession of

his agent and went with the defendant to the agent's premises

and there conducted a bargain in the agent's presence. The

agent thereupon made a memorandum in his book and also a

counterpart, tore out the memorandum and gave it to defend-

ant, who kept it and carried it away. Before going, defendant

requested an alteration to be made in the memorandum, and

the agent made it with the plaintiff's assent. The memoran-

dum was in the following form : " Messrs. Evans (the defend-

ants) bought of T. T. & W. Xoakes (the agents), T. Durrell "

(the plaintiff), followed by a description of the goods and the

price. The counterpart entry was, " Sold to Messrs. Evans,

T. Durrell," etc. It was held that there was evidence to go to

the jury that the agent in making these entries was the agent

of the defendant as well as the plaintiff, and if he was, then his

writing the name " Messrs. Evans " was a sufficient signing to
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bind them. 1

i Durrell v. Evans, 1 H. & C. 174

reversing s. C, 6 H. & N. 660. (Gra-

ham v. Musson, supra, was distin-

guished, and the case was likened to

Johnson v. Dodgson, 2 M. & W. 653.)

In the later case of Murphy v. Boese,

supra, Pollock, B., said: "I think

that it is extremely important in all

But in another case plaintiff had goods in the po e sion of
his agent and went with the defendant to the a 0 • nt' pr mi
and there conducted a bargain in the agent's I resenc . The
agent thereupon made a memorandum in his book and al o a
counterpart, tore out the memorandum and gave it to defendant, who kept it and carrie<l it away. Before going, defendant
requeste<l an alt ration to be made in the memoran lum, and
the agent made it with the plaintiff's ass nt. The memorandum was in the following form: ":Thie rs. Evans (the defendants) bought of T. T. & \.V. :Noakes (the ag nt ), T. Durrell"
(the plaintiff), followed by a description of the goo 1 and the
price. The counterpart entry was, "Sold to :Mes r . Evans,
T. Durrell," etc. It was held that there wa evidence to go to
the jury that the agent in making these entri s was the agent
of the defendant as well as the plaintiff, and if he was, then bis
writing the name ":Messrs. Evans" was a sufficient signing to
bind them. 1

those cases in which it is attempted

to prove an implied agency, or that

there is evidence from which an

agency may be inferred, to take into

account the character of the parties

and their usual course of dealing.

The act requires that the note of the

bargain should be signed by an agent

of the party to be charged. At first

sight it would seem odd that where

two contracting parties meet to-

gether, that one who is in a position

somewhat adverse to the other should

be his representative and agent. But

no doubt such a thing may happen,

as in the instance, which has very

properly been cited, of the auction-

eer's clerk signing as the agent of

both parties. In Lord St. Leonard's

work on Vendors and Purchasers

(14th ed., p. 147) he explains the prin-

ciple upon which the auctioneer can

bind both vendor and purchaser by

his signature, citing Earl of Glengal

v. Barnard, 1 Keen, 769, and Emmer-

son v. Heelis, 2 Taunt. 38, and stat-

ing that the implied agency of an

auctioneer is hot extended to other

cases. Therefore the present case

is not within this exceptional rule.

The case to which it has the nearest

analogy is that of Durrell v. Evans,

1 H. & C. 174, 31 L. J. (Ex.) 337, and

it is remarkable that when that case

came before the court of exchequer,

Lord Penzance seems to have drawn

the conclusion that what was done

was nothing more than what occurs

in making out and giving an invoice.

I am bound to say that I agree with

his reasoning, and I will apply it to

the present case. I think Durrell v.

1 Durrell vA Evans, 1 H. & C. 174~ eer's clerk signing as the agent of
reversing s. c., 6 H. & N. 660. (Gra- both parties. In Lord St. Leonard's
ham v. f us on, supra, was di tin- work on Vendors and Purchasers
guished, and the case was likened to (14th ed., p. 147) he explain the prinJohnson v. Dodgson, 2 M. & W. 653.) ciple upon which the auctioneer can
In the later case of Murphy v. Boese, bind both vendor and purchaser by
l:>"ltpra, Pollock, B., said: "I think his ignature, citing Earl of Glengal
that it is extremely important in all v. Barnard, 1 Keen, 769, and Ernmerthose cases in 'vhich it is attempted son v. Heeli , 2 Taunt. 3 , and tatto prove an implied agency, or that ing that the im1 lied agency of an
there is evidence from which an auctioneer is not extended to other
agency may be inferred, to take into case.. Therefore the present ca e
account the character of the pFirties is not within this exceptional rule.
and their usual course of dealing. The case to which it has the neare t
The act requires that the note of the analogy is that of Durrell v. Evans,
bargain should be signed by an agent 1 H. & C. 174, 31 L. J. (Ex.) 337, and
of the party to be charged. At first it is remarkable that when that ca e
sight it woulu eem ocJd that where came before the court of exchequer,
two contracting parties meet to- Lord Penzance seems to have drawn
gether, that one who is in a positfon the conclusion that what was done
, 01newhatadverse to the other. hould was nothing more than what occurs
be bi representative and agent. But in making out and g iving an invoice.
no doubt uch a thing may happen, I am bound to say that I agree with
a in the instance, which has very his reasoning, and I will apply it to
properly been cited, of the auction- the present case. I tliink Durrell v.
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§ 461. Signing by auctioneer. — An auctioneer employed by

the owner of real or personal property 7 , or of rights of any kind,

to sell or dispose of the same at auction, is primarily the agent

of the owner, and of him alone; and he remains his agent ex-

clusively up to the moment when he accepts the bid of the pur-

chaser and knocks down the property to him. Upon the accept-

ance of the bid, however, the auctioneer becomes the agent of

the purchaser also, to the extent that it is necessary to enable

the auctioneer to complete the purchase, and he may therefore

bind the purchaser by entering his name as such and by sign-

ing the memorandum of the sale. 1 Such a signing is sufficient

to satisfy the statute of frauds. 2 But in order to so bind the

purchaser, the entry of the name of the purchaser must be done

Evans, supra, can only be supported

if it decides that the agency did not

commence till after the memoran-

dum had been written out. and that
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will distinguish it from the facts be-

fore us. It might be said that tl in-

direction given by the defendant to

Noakes, the factor, to alter the instru-

461. i<>'ning by auction eer .-An au tioneer employed by
the Ol'i ner of real or per nal propert or fright of any kin l,
to 11 or di po e of th ame at auction i primarily the aa nt
f th own r and of him al ne· and he remain hi agent exlu iv ly up to the mom nt when he ace pts the bid of the purba er an l knock clown the propertj to him. Upon the ace ptance of the bi l bow v r th auctioneer become the ag nt of
th pur ha er alsoi to the xtent that it i nece ary to enable
the auction er to complete the purchase, an l he ma th r for
incl the purcha r b nt rinO' hi name as such and b
ing be memoran lum of th al .1
to ati f the tatute of frau l .2 But in orcl r to o bind th
pur ha r be entr of the name of the urcha er mu t be l ne

ment was an adoption of his act in

preparing it, or a recognition ab ini-

tio of the whole document as con-

taining the contract. Or one might

go further and say that, from the

nature of the transaction and the

meeting of the parties at the office,

it might be thought that there was

evidence that it was meant that

Evan S'ltpra, can only be upported
if it d cide that the aO'enc did not
omm n e till after th mem ran<lum had b en writt n out. and hat
in ui ·h it fr m th fact belt miO'h be 'aid tha the

Noakes should act as the scribe of

both parties in drawing up a note of

the contract. But here there is an

entire absence of any act of recogni-

tion by the defendant of the traveler

as bis agent."

i Bent v. Cobb, 9 Gray (Mass.), 397,

69 Am. Dec. 295; Doty v. Wilder, 15

111. 407, 60 Am. Dec. 756; Thomas v.

Kerr, 3 Bush (Ky). 619, 06 Am. Dec.

262; Walker v. Herring, 21 Gratt.

(Va.) 678, 8 Am. R. 616.

2 Bent v. Cobb, supra; Sanborn v.

Chamberlin, 101 Mass. 409: Craig v.

Godfrey, 1 Cal. 415,54 Am. Dec. 299;

Thomas v. Kerr, supra; Harvey v.

Stevens. 43 Vt. 653; Hart v. Woods,

7 Black f. (Ind.) 568; Adams v. Mc-

Millan. 7 Port. (Ala.) 73; O'Donnell v.

Leeman. 43 Me. 158; Linn Boyd To-

bacco Co. v. Terrill, 13 Bush i Ky. |,

463; Brent v. Green, 6 Leigh (Va. t, 16;

Pike v. Balch, 38 Me. 302; Pugh v.

Chesseldine, 11 Ohio, 109, 37 Am.

Dec. 414: McComb v. Wright, 4 Johns.

(N. Y.i Ch. 659; First Baptist Church

v. Bigelow, 16 Wend. (N. Y.) 28; Davis

v. Rowell, 2 Pick. (Mass.) 64. 13 Am.

Dec. 398; Morton v. Dean, 13 Mete

(Mass.) 385; Johnson v. Buck, 35 N.

J. L. 338, 10 Am. R. 243; Farebrother

v. Simmons, 5 B. & Aid. 333: Simon

v. Motivos, 3 Burr. 1921; Hinde v.

Whitehouse, 7 East. 558; White v.

Proctor, 4 Taunt. 209; Emmerson v.

Heelis, 2 Taunt. 38. But where the

auctioneer is a party in interest, his

memorandum is not sufficient. Bent

pr paring it, or a r
O'niti n ab 'initio of the whole docum nt a containinO' the contr ct. Or on might
go further antl ay that. fr m the
nature of the tran acti n and the
me ing of the partie at the office
it miO'ht be thouO'h that there wa
\illence that it wa me, nt that
oake houlu act a the cri be of
both partie in drawing ·up a note of
the contra t. But here there i an
n ire ab ence of any a ·t of recognition by the u fendantof the traveler
a hi aO'ent."
1 Bent v.
obb, 9 Gray (Ma .), 3
6 Am. ec. '>95: Doty v. \\ild r 15
Ill. 40 , 60 m. De . ,.-6: Thoma v.
K rr. 3 u b (Ky.). 61 96 m. Dec.
262· \Yalker v. Herring, '>1 Gratt.
( a.) 61 ,
m. R. 616.
T

'· immon 5 B. &
im0n
v. )fotivo~, 3 Burr. 1921; Hinde v.
Whitehou e, 7 Ea ·t, 5,5 ; \Yhite v.
Proctor, 4 Taunt. 209; Emmer. on v.
Heeli , 9. Taunt. 3 . But where the
au tioneer L a party in intere t, hi.
memorandum i not ufficient. Bent
v. Cobb, Sllpra ·Tull v. David, .i.- Jlo.
444, 100 m. Dec. 3 .-; John on v.
Buck, 85 N. J. L. 33 , 10 Am. R. 2-±8.
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LAW OF

ALE.

[BOOK I.

§ 161.]

LAW OF SALE.

[BOOK I.

by the auctioneer or his clerk immediately upon the acceptance

of his bid and the striking down of the property^ it must be

done at the time and place of the sale, and cannot be done

after the sale is over. 1 The principle upon which this rule is

founded, as is said by a learned judge, is "that the auctioneer

at the sale is the agent; that the purchaser, by the act of bid-

ding, calls on him or his clerk to put down his name as the

purchaser. The entry, being made in his presence, is presumed

to be made with his sanction, and to indicate his approval of

the terms thus written down. In such case there is but little

danger of mistake or fraud. But if a third person, not pres-

ent, or even the auctioneers, may afterward add the name of

another purchaser, they may strike out the name already in-

serted and substitute that of a new and different purchaser.

They may defeat rights already vested. They may impose lia-

bilities never contracted. The party to be charged may thus
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iMechem on Agency, §893. "It

appears now to be settled by the Eng-

lish authorities, . . . that the auc-

tioneer is a competent agent to sign

for the purchaser either of lands or

goods at auction; and the insertion

of his name as the highest bidder in

by the auctioneer or his clerk immediately upon the acceptance
of his bi(l and the striking clown of the l roperty · it must be
done at the time and place of the sale, an 1 cannot be do ne
after the sale is over. 1 The principle upon which this rule is
founded, as is said by a learned judge, is "that the auctioneer
at tile sale is the agent; that the purchaser, by the act of bidding, calls on hiin or his clerk to put clown his name as the
purchaser. The entry, being made in his presence, is presumed
to be made with bis sanction, and to indicate his approval of
the terms thus written down. In such case there is Lut little
danger of mi stake or fraud. But if a third person, not present, or even the auctioneers, may afterward add the name of
another purchaser, they may strike out the name already inserted and substitute that of a new and different l urcbas.er.
They may defeat rights already vested. They may impose liabilities never contracted. The party to be charged may thus

the memorandum of the sale by the

auctioneer, immediately on receiving

his bid and striking down the ham-

mer, is a signing within the statute

so as to bind the purchaser." Chan-

cellor Kent, in McComb v. Wright, 4

Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 659, 663.

" It is now well settled by authori-

ties, that a sale of real estate at auc-

tion, where the name of the bidder

is entered by the auctioneer, or by

his clerk under his direction, on the

spot, and such entry is so connected

with the subject and terms of sale as

to make a part of the memorandum,

is a contract in writing, so as to take

the case out of the statute of frauds."

Story, J., in Smith v. Arnold, 5

Mason (U. S. C. C), 414, 419.

" The name of the bidder must be

entered by the auctioneer, or by his

clerk under his direction, on the

spot." Shaw, J., in Gill v. Bicknell,

2 Cush. (Mass.) 355, 358.

"The law, therefore, when it al-

lows him (the auctioneer) to act in

the nearly unprecedented relation of

agent for both parties, imposes a

qualification not applied in the usual

cases of agency, and requires that the

single act for which, almost from ne-

cessity, he is authorized to perform

for the buyer, shall be done at the

time of sale, and before the termina-

tion of the proceedings." Kent, J.,

in Horton v. McCarty, 53 Me. 394-398.

To the same effect, see Craig v. God-

frey, 1 Cal. 415, 54 Am. Dec. 299,

where the entry was held too late,

though made in the afternoon of the

same day; Hicks v. Whitmore, 12

Wend. (N. Y.) 548, where one hour's

delay was held fatal.

380

I Mechem on Agency, § 893.
"It
" The name of the bidder mu t be
appears now to be settled by the Eng- entered by the auctioneer, or by his
lish authorities, . . . that the auc- clerk under his direction, on the
tioneer is a competent agent to sign spot." Shaw, J., in Gill v. Bicknell,
for the purchaser either of lands or 2 Cush. (Mass.) 355, 358.
goods at a uction; and the insertion
"The law, therefore, when it alof his name as the hig hest bidder in lows him (the auctioneer) to act in
the niemorandum of the sale by the the nearly unprececlenteJ relation of
a uctioneer, imm ediately on r eceiving agent for both partie , imposes a
bis bid and striking down the ha m- qualification not applied in the u ual
mer, is a signing within the statute cases of agency, and requires that the
so as to bind the purchaser." Chan- single act for which, almost from necellor Kent, in l\IcComb v. Wright, 4 ce ·sity, he is authorized to perform
Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 659, 663.
for the buyer. shall be done at the
"It is now well settled by authori- time of sale, and before the termi naties, that a sale of real estate at auc· tion of the proceedings." Kent, J.,
tion, where the name of the bidder in Horton v. M;cCarty, 53 Me. 394-398.
is entered. by the auctioneer, or by To the same effect, see Craig v. Godhi clerk under his direction, on the fray, 1 Cal. 415, 54 Am. Dec. 299,
spot, and such entry is so connected where the entry was held too late,
with the subject a nd terms of sale as though made in the afternoon of the
to make a part of the memonmdum, same nay; Hi cks v. Whitmore, 12
i a contract in writing, so as to take Wend. (N. Y. ) 548, where one hour's
the a e out of the statute of franJ ·." delay was held fatal.
Story, J., in mith v. Arnold, 5
l\fa on (U. S. C. C.), 414, 419.
380
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CONTRA.CT UNDER STATUTE OF FRAUDS.

[§ ±62.

[§ 462.

be held liable by a writing he never saw, signed by an agent

of whom he never heard." *

§ 462. But auctioneer who sells his own goods cannot sign

be held liable by a writing he never saw, signed by an agent
of w horn he never heard." 1

for buyer. — Where, however, the auctioneer is himself the

seller of the goods, this implied power to bind the buyer does

not exist, 2 inasmuch as the same party cannot, as has b^en seen, 3

be at once both party and agent for the opposite party, with-

out the latter's knowledge and consent. With such express con-

sent, however, he may act for both. 4

But the clerk of the auctioneer may act as agent for both

parties, and bis memorandum will bind both. 5

1 Staples, J., in Walker v. Herring,

21 Gratt. (Va.) 678, 8 Am. R 616.

2 In Johnson v. Buck, 35 N. J. L.

338, 10 Am. R. 243, it is said: "The

agent, to make the signature, must

be some third person. Neither of the
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contracting parties can be agent for

the other. A signature by the vendor

§ 4:62. Bu t auctioneer who sells l1is own goocl cannot sign
for buyer.- Where, however, the auctioneer is himself the
seller of the goods, this implied power to bind the buyer does
not exi t, 2 inasmuch as the ame party cannot, as has lY' n se n, 3
be at once both party and agent for the opposite party without the latter's knowledge and consent. With such expre s consent, however, he may act for both. 4
But the clerk of the auctioneer may act as agent for both
parties, and his memorandum will bind botb. 5

or purchaser, of the name of the

other, is not a sufficient signing.

Wright v. Dannah, 2 Camp. 203;

Rayner v. Linthorne, 2 C. & P. 124;

Sharman v. Brandt, L, R. 6 Q. B. 720;

Bent v. Cobb, 9 Gray (Mass.), 397, 69

Am. Dec. 295. Where the suit is

brought by the auctioneer himself,

for the purposes of that suit he is re-

garded as a contracting party, and

a signing by him of the name of

the defendant is insufficient. Fare-

brother v. Simmons, 5 B. & Aid. 333."

See also Smith v. Arnold, 5 Mason

(U. S. C. C), 414; Tull v. David, 45

Mo. 444, 100 Am. Dec. 385.

3 See ante, § 452.

4 Mechem on Agency, § 68.

5 In Johnson v. Buck, supra, the

court further say: "But the reason

of this disqualification to be the

agent of the purchaser, for the pur-

pose of signing, does not apply to the

clerk of the auctioneer. When the

bids are announced, and the property

struck off, the clerk is the agent of

both parties to record the sales and

affix the signature of the purchasers,

although he is employed to act as

clerk by the auctioneer. No reason

for his disability to act as agent for

the purpose of making the signature

of the purchaser, as between the lat-

ter and the auctioneer, can be ad-

duced, which will not operate equally

to exclude the auctioneer, where the

litigation is directly between the

vendor and purchaser. The question,

in every case, is one of fact, whether

the person by whom the signature

has been made was an agent law-

fully authorized to make the same.

Auctioneers and brokers, by virtue

of their business, by the usages of

trade, are assumed to have such au-

thority; and where the auctioneer's

clerk, or a volunteer, acts openly at

a sale in entering the successful bids,

as they are publicly announced, his

1, taple , J., in vValker v. Herring, clerk of the auctioneer. When the
21 Gratt. (Va.) 678, 8 Am. R. 616.
bids are announced, and the property
2 ln John on v. Buck, 35 N. J. L.
struck off, the clerk is the agent of
33 , 10 Am. R. 243, it is said: "The both parties to record the sales and
agent, to make the signature, mu t affix the signature of the purcba ers,
be ome third person. Neither of the although he is employed to act as
contracting parties can be agent for clerk by the auctioneer. Jo reason
the other. A signature by the vendor for hi di ability to act. as agent for
or purcha. er, of the name of the the purpo e of making the signature
other, is not a sufficient igning. of the purchaser, as between the latW right v. Dannah, 2 Cam!J. 203; ter and the auctioneer, can be adRayner v. Linthorne, 2 C. & P. 12-1; duced, which ·w ill not operate equally
barman v-. Brandt, LR. 6 Q. B. 190; to exclude the auc-tioneer, where the
Bent v. obb, 9 Gray ( fa s.), 397, 69 litigation is directly between the
Am. Dec. 295. Where the suit is vendor and purchaser. The question.
brought by the auctioneer himself, in every ca e, i one of fact, whether
for the purposes of that suit he is re- the per on by whom the signature
gardecl as a contracting party, and has been made wa an agent lawa signing by him of the name of fully authorized to make the same.
the defendant i insufficient. Fare- Auctioneers and brokers, by virtue
brother v. immons, 5 B. & Ald. 333." of their busine s, by the usages of
See al o Smith v. Arnold, 5 Mason trade, are a sumed to have such au(U. S. C. C.), 414; Tull v. David, 45 thority; and where the auctioneer's
Mo. 44-1, 100 Am. Dec. 38;-.
clerk, or a volunteer, acts openly at
3 See ante, § 452.
a sale in entering the successful bid ,
4 Mechem on Agency, § 68.
as they are publicly announced, hi
5 In John. on v. Buck, sup1·a, the authority to ac-t for the purchaser in
court further ~ay: "But the rea on the prerui es is e ta.bli bed. Con eof this disqualification to be the quently, it has been held that, in a
agent of the purcha er, for the pur- suit in the name of the auctioneer
pose of signing, does not apply to the against a purchaser to recover the
381
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§§463,464.] LAW OF SALE. [BOOK I.

§ 463. Broker as agent of both parties.— The purchase and

sale of goods is constantly being effected through the medium

of a special class of agents called brokers. The broker, like other

ao-ents, owes a duty of fidelity and single-mindedness to his

employer which renders him incompetent to enter into the serv-

ice of both parties to the same transaction, except with the full

knowledge and consent of both. 1 With this knowledge and

consent, however, he may act for both,' 2 and in a great number

of mercantile transactions he represents both parties by their

express or implied authority ; and where he does so, his signing

of the name of each party binds each. 3

| 464. How authorized. — This authority need not be

expressly conferred, and in practice ordinarily is not. At the

outset the broker is the agent of the party who first employed

him, but he becomes the agent of the other also, when the lat-

ter instructs him to close the bargain, 4 or deals with him as

representing both parties, 5 or subsequently ratifies what, as

§ 463. Broker as agent of both parties.- The pure.base ancl
sale of goods is constantly being effected through the medium
of a special class of agents called brokers. Tlie broker, like other
agents, owes a duty of fidelity and single-mindecln s to his
employer which renders him incomp .tent to enter into the service of both parties to the same transaction, except with the full
knowledge and consent of both. 1 With this knowledge and
consent, however, he may act for botb, 2 and in a great number
of mercantile transactions he represents both parties by their
express or implied authority; and where be does so, his signing
of the name of each party binds each. 3

agent of both parties, he has assumed to do. 6 When so author-
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ized he has, like other agents, implied authority to do what-

ever is necessary and proper to carry his authority into effect,

including herein the signing of the necessary memorandum. 7

price of the goods, the signing of the a broker, originally employed by the

purchaser's name by the clerk of buyer, having closed a bargain with

the auctioneer, upon the successful the sellers, made a memorandum of

bid being announced, is a sufficient it, at the time and in their presence,

bid within the statute. Bird v. in which they were described as

Boulter, 4 B. & Ad. 443; Browne on sellers, it was held that the sellers

Frauds, sec. 3G9; Durrell v. Evans, 1 thereby recognized him as their

H. & C. 174-188; Gill v. Bickhell, 2 agent also. Clason v. Bailey, 14

< ash. (Mass.) 355." See also Wood on Johns. (N. Y.) 484.

Statute of Frauds, § 427. 6 Their assent may be presumed

1 Mechem on Agency, §§ 943, 953. where they receive and retain with-

2 Mechem on Agency, ^ 943, 953. out dissent a memorandum of the

3 Wood on Statute of Frauds, §429; sale made by the broker as their

§ 464. - - How authorized.-This authority need not be
expressly conferred, and in practice ordinarily is not. At the
outset the broker is the agent of the party who first employed
him, but he become the agent of the other also, 'Ylrnn the latter in.structs him to close the barga.in, 4 or deals with him as
representing both parties,5 or subsequently ratifies what, as
agent of both parties, he has assumed to clo. 6 When so authorized he bas like other agents, implied authority to do whatever is necessary and proper to carry h.is authority into effect,
including herein the signing of the necessary memoranclum. 7

Butler v. Thomson, 92 U. S. 412; New- agent as well as of the other party,

berry v. Wall, 84 X. Y. 570; Bacon v. Newberry v. Wall, 35 N. Y. Super.

Eccles, 43 Wis. 227; Coddington v. Ct. 100; s. c, 05 N. Y. 484; s. a, 84

Goddard, 16 Gray (Mass.), 436. N. Y. 576: Remick v. Sandford, 118

4 Coddington v. Goddard, supra. Mass. 102.

5 Bacon v. Eccles, supra. So where 1 Coddington v. Goddard, supra.
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price of the goods, the signing of the a broker, originally employed by the
purchaser's name by the clerk of buyer, having closed a barJain with
the auctioneer, upon the successful the ellers, made a memoran lum of
bid being announced, is a sufficient it, at the time and in their presence,
bid within the statute. Bird v. in which they were described as
Boulter, 4 B. & Ad. 4-±3; Browne on sellers, it was held that the sellers
Frauds, sec. 369; Durrell v. Evans, 1 thereby recognized him as their
H. & C. 174-1 ; Gill v. Bicknell, 2 agent also.
Cla. on v. Bailey, 14
Cush. (l\Ia s.) 355." See also Wood on Johns. (.r • Y.) 484.
Statute of Frauds,§ 427.
oTheir as. ent may be presumed
1
Mechem on Agency,§§ 943, 953. where they r eceive and retain with2 1echem on Agency, ~~ 943, 0.13.
out dissent a memorandum of the
3 Wood on Statute of Frauds,§ 429; sale ma,de by the broker as their
Butler v. Thom on, 92 U.S. 412; New- agent as well as of the other party.
berry v. Wall, 4 N. Y. 576; Bacon v. Newberry v. Wall, 35 N. Y. Super.
Eccles, 43 Wis. 227; Coddington v. Ct. lOG; s. c., 65 N. Y. 48-±; s. c., 84
Goddaru, 16 Gray (Mas.. ), 436.
N. Y. 576: Remick v. Sandford, 118
4 oddington v. Goddard, supra.
Mass. 102.
5
Bacon v. Eccle , supra. So where
1 Coddington v. Goddard, snpra.
882
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§465. When special agent. — Where, however, he is

thus authorized to represent the other party in a single trans-

action inaugurated by the broker as agent of the first, he is

deemed to be a special agent, and he will not bind such other

party unless he keeps within the limits of the authority con-

ferred upon him. 1

8 466.

When not authorized to sign. — And where he

is not employed to make the contract, but simply acts as a go-

between to bring together the parties, who make the contract

themselves, he has no implied authority therefrom to after-

wards make any memorandum of the contract at all. 2

§467. (i Bought and sold notes" in the English practice.

In England, the usages of London have entered very greatly

into the law upon this subject, and the rights and obligations

of the parties are therefore much governed by the established

usages controlling the London broker. When such a broker

has succeeded in making a contract, says Mr. Benjamin in his
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1 Thus in Coddington v. Goddard,

siqira, where the broker, acting pri-

marily for the buyer, did not include

in the memorandum terms and con-

ditions upon which the seller author-

ized him to close the sale, it was held

that the seller was not boimd. Said

the court: "A broker, from the very

nature of his employment, has only

a, limited authority, when it appears,

as it does in the present case, that lie

had no relation to a party, other than

what is derived from a single con-

tract of sale. When he applies to a

vendor to negotiate a sale, he is not

his agent. He does not become so

until the vendor enters into the

agreement of sale. It is from this

agreement that he derives his au-

thority, and it must necessarily be

limited by its terms and conditions.

He is then the special agent of the

vendor to act in conformity with the

contract to which his principal has

agreed, but no further, and he can-

not be regarded as his agent, unless

he complies with the terms of his

special authority as derived from the

contract. In short, a broker is au-

thorized to sign only that contract

into which the vendor has entered,

not another and different contract.

If he omits to include in the memo-

randum special exceptions and con-

ditions to the bargain, he signs a

contract which he has no authority

to make, and the party relying upon

it must fail, because it is shown that

the broker was not the agent of the

vendor to sign the contract." To

same effect: Eemick v. Sandford, 118

Mass. 102.

2 Aguirre v. Allen, 10 Barb. (N. Y.)

7-4.
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work on Sales, 1 " he reduces it to writing, and delivers to each

party a copy of the terms as reduced to writing by him. He

also ought to enter them in his book and sign the entry. What

he delivers to the seller is called the sold note; to the buyer,

the bought note. No particular form is required, and from the

cases it seems that there are four varieties used in practice.

The Jlrst is where on the face of the notes the broker professes

to act for both the parties whose names are disclosed in the

note. The sold note, then, in substance, says, ' Sold for A B

to C D,' and sets out the terms of the bargain ; the bought note

begins, ' Bought for C D of A B,' or equivalent language, and

sets out the same terms as the sold note, and both are signed

by the broker. The second form is where the broker does not

disclose in the bought note the name of the vendor, nor in the

sold note the name of the purchaser, but still shows that he is

acting as broker, not principal. The form then is simply,

'Bought for C D' and 'Sold for A B.' The third form is

where the broker, on the face of the note, appears to be the
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principal, though he is really only an agent. Instead of giv-

ing to the buyer a note, 'Bought for you by me,' he gives it in

this form : ' Sold to you by me.' By so doing he assumes the

obligation of a principal, and cannot escape responsibility by

parol proof that he was only acting as broker for another, al-

though the party to whom he gives such a note is at liberty to

show that there was an unnamed principal, and to make this

principal responsible. The fourth form is where the broker

professes to sign as a broker but is really a principal, as in the

cases of Sharman v. Brandt 2 and Robinson v. Mollett? in which

case his signature does not bind the other party, and he cannot

sue on the contract.

" According to either of the first two forms, the party who

receives and keeps a note, in which the broker tells him in ef-

fect, 'I have bought for you, or I have sold for you,' plainly

admits that the broker acted by his authority and as his agent,

and the signature of the broker is therefore the signature of

i § 276. 2 l. R. 6 Q. B. 720. 3 l. R. 7 H. L. 802, 14 Eng. R 177.
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work on Sales,1 "be reduces it to writing, and delivers to each
party a copy of the terms as r ed uced to writing by him. He
also ought to enter them in his book and sign the entry. What
he delivers to the seller is called the sold note; to the buyer,
the bought note. No particular form is required, and from the
cases it seems that there are four varieties used in practice.
The first is where on the face of the notes the broker professes
to act for both the parties whose names are disclosed in the
note. The sold note, then, in substance, says, 'Sold for A B
to 0 D,' and sets out the terms of the bargain; the bought note
begins, 'Bought for 0 D of A B,' or equivalent language, and
sets out the same terms as the sold note, and both are signed
by the broker. The second form is where the broker does not
disclose in the bought note the name of the vendor, nor in the
sold note the name of the purchaser, but still shows that he is
acting as broker, not principal. The form then is simply,
'Bought for 0 D' and 'Sold for A B.' The t/1,i1·d form is
where the broker, on the face of the note, appears to be the
principal, t hough he is really only an agent. Instead of giving to the buyer a note,' Bought for you by me,' he gives it in
this form: 'Sold to you by me.' By so doing he assumes the
obligation of a principal, and cannot escape responsibility by
parol proof that he was only acting as broker for another, although the party to whom be gives such a note is at liber.t y to
show that there was an unnamed principal, and to make this
principal responsible. The fourtli form is where the broker
prof sses to sign as a broker but is really a principal, as in the
cases of Sliarman v. Brandt 2 and Robinson v. Mollett, 3 in which
case his signature does not bind the other party, and he cannot
su on the contract.
"According to either of the first two forms, the party who
receives and keeps a note, in which the broker tells him in effect 'I have bouo·bt for you, or I have sold for you,' plainly
admits that the broker acted by his authority and as his agent,
aml the signature of the broker is therefore the signature of
1§

276.

2L. R. 6 Q. B. 720.

SL. R. 7 H. L. 802, 14 Eng. R. 177.
38-1
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the party accepting and retaining such a note; but according

to the third form, the broker says, in effect, ' I myself sell to

you,' and the acceptance of a paper describing the broker as

the principal who sells, plainly repels any inference that he is

acting as agent for the party who buys, and, in the absence of

other evidence, the broker's signature would not be that of an

agent of the party retaining the note; and by the fourth form,

the language of the written contract is at variance with the

real truth of the matter."

§ 468. English rules gOTerning the bought and sold

notes. — As to the rules governing the bought and sold notes,

Mr. Benjamin gives the following summary: l

"First — The broker's signed entry in his book constitutes

the contract between the parties, and is binding on both. 2

the party accepting and retaining such a note; but according
to the third form, the broker says, in effect, 'I myself sell to
you,' and the acceptance of a paper describing the broker as
the principal who sells, plainly repels any inference that he is
acting a agent for the party who buys, and, in the absence of
other evi lence, the broker's ignature would not be that of an
agent of the party retaining the note; and by the fourth form,
the language of the written contract is at variance with the
real truth of the matter."

" Secondly — The bought and sold notes do not constitute the

contract. 3

"Thirdly — But the bought and sold notes, when they cor-

respond and state all the terms of the bargain, are complete
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and sufficient evidence to satisfy the statute; even though there

§ 46 . - - English rules governing the bought and solfl
note .- As to the rul governing the bought and sold notes,

be no entry in the broker's book, or, what is equivalent, only

an unsigned entry. 4

i Benjamin on Sales, § 294. overruled in Sievewright v. Archi-

z "This proposition rests on the au- bald.. 17 Q. B. 103, 20 L. J. Q. B. 529."

thority of Lord Ellenborough in Hey- 3 " This is the opinion of Parke, B.,

man v. Neale,2 Camp. 337, of Parke, B., in Thornton v. Charles, 9 M. & W. 802,

in Thornton v. Charles, 9 M. & W. of Lord Ellenborough in Heyman v.

802, and of Lord Campbell, C. J., and Neale, 2 Camp. 337, and was the

Wightman and Patteson, JJ., in unanimous opinion of the four judges

Sievewright v. Archibald, 17 Q. B. in Sievewright v. Archibald, 17 Q. B.

103, 20 L. J. Q.B. 529 (and of the court 103. The decision to the contrary,

in Thompson v. Gardiner, 1 C. P. D. in the nisi prius case of Thornton v.

777). Gibbs, C. J., in Cumming v. Meux, M. & M. 43, and the dictum

Roebuck, Holt, 172; Abbott, C. J., in Goom v. Aflalo, 6 B. & C. 117, and

Thornton v. Meux, M. & M. 43; Den- Trueman v. Loder, 11 Ad. & E. 589,

man, C. J., in Townend v. Drake- are pointedly disapproved in the case

Mr. Benjamin gives the follo_wing summary: 1
"Fir t-The brokers signe l entry in bis book con titutes
the contract between the partie , and is binding on both. 2
"Secondly -The bought and old notes do not constitute the
contract. 3
"Thirdly-But the bought and sold notes, when they cor·
respond and state all the terms of the bar ·ain, are complete
and sufficient e i ence to ati fy the tatute; even though there
be no entry in the brokers book, or, what is equivalent, only
an unsigned entry. 4

ford, 1 Car. & K. 20, and Lord Abin- of Sievewright v. Archibald, 17 Q. B.

ger in Thornton v. Charles, 9 M. & 103, 20 L. J. Q. B. 529."

W. 802, are authorities to the con- 4 " This was first settled by Goom

trary, but they seem to have been v. Aflalo, 6 B. & C. 117, and reluct-

25 385

on Sales, § 294.
''This propo ition re t on the authority of Lord Ellen borough in Heyman v. Neale,2 Camp. 337, of Parke, B.,
in Thornton v. Charles 9 1. & W.
09., and of Lord Campb 11, C. J., and
Wightman and Patte on, JJ., in
Sievewright v. Archibalcl, 17 Q. B.
103 20 L. J. Q. B. 5<.>.9 (and of the court
in Thomp on v. Gardiner, 1 C. P. D.
7 7). Gibb , C. J. in umming v.
Roebuck, Holt, 112; Abbott, C. J., in
Thornton v. Meux :M. & 1. 43; Denman, C. J., in Townend v. Drakeford, 1 Car. & K. 20, and Lord A.binger in Thornton v. Charle , 9 :M. &
W. 02, are authoritie to the contrary, but they seem to have been
25
3
1 Benjamin

2

overruled in Sievewright v. Archi·
bald~ 17 Q. B. 103, 20 L. J. Q. B. 529."
s "Thi i the opinion of Parke, B.,
in Thornton v. Charles, 9 I. & W. 02,
of Lord Ellenborough in Heyman v.
Neale, 2 Camp. 337, and was the
unanimous opinion of the four judges
in Sievewright v. Archibald, 1 Q. B.
103. The deci ion to the contrary,
in the nisi prius ca e of Thornton v.
Ieux, M. & 1. 43, and the dictwrn
Goom v. Aflalo, 6 B. & C. 117, and
Trueman v. Loder, 11 Acl. & E. 5 9,
are pointedly di~appro-ved in the ca e
of Sievewright v. rchibald, 17 Q. B.
103, 20 L. J. Q. B. 599."
4 •·This wa first settled by Goom
v. Aflalo, 6 B. & C. 117, and reluct5

§ ±6 '.) .1
§ 468.] LAW OF SALE. [BOOK I.

" Fourthly — Either the bought or sold note alone will sat-

isfy the statute, provided no variance be shown between it

and the other note, or between it and the signed entry in the

book. 1

" Fifthly —"Where one note only is offered in evidence, the

defendant has the right to offer the other note or the signed

entry in the book to prove a variance. 2

"Sixthly — As to variance. This may occur between the

bought and sold notes where there is a signed entry, or where

there is none. It may also occur when the bought and sold

notes correspond, but the signed entry differs from them. If

there be a signed entry, it follows from the authorities under

the first of these propositions that this entry will in general

control the case, because it constitutes the contract of which

the bought and sold notes are merely secondary evidence, and

any variance between them could not affect the validity of the

original written bargain. If, however, the bought and sold

notes correspond, but there be a variance between them taken
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collectively and the entry in the book, it becomes a question of

fact for the jury whether the acceptance by the parties of the

bouo-ht and sold notes constitute evidence of a new contract

modifying 1 that which was entered in the book. 3

" Seventhly — If the bargain is made by correspondence, and

there is a variance between the agreement thus concluded and

antly admitted to be no longer ques- for granted that the defendant may

tionable in Sievewright v. Archibald, produce his own bought or sold note

17 Q. B. 103, 20 L. J. Q. B. 529." to show that it does not correspond

1 " This was the decision in Hawes with the plaintiff's."

Y- Forster, 1 Mood. & Rob. 368, of the 3 " This is the point established by

common pleas in Parton v. Crofts, 16 Hawes v. Forster, 1 Mood. & R. 368,

C. B. (N. S.) 11, 33 L. J. C. R 189 (and according to the explanation of that

of the common pleas division in case first given by Parke, B., in Thorn-

Thompson v. Gardiner, 1 C. P. D. ton v. Charles, 9 M. & W. 802, after-

777)."' wards by Patteson, J., in Sievewright

2 "Hawes v. Forster, 1 Mood. & v. Archibald, 17 Q. B. 103, 20 L. J.

Rob. 368, is direct authority in rela- Q. B. 529, and adopted by the other

tion to the entry in the book, and in judges in this last-named case." But

all the cases on variance, particularly the variance must be one in meaning

LA. W OF
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"Fourthly- Either the bought or sold note alone will ati fy the statute, provided no variance be shown between it
and the other note, or between it and the signed entry in tlie
book. 1
"Fifthly -Where one note only 1 offered in evidence, the
<lefendant has the right to offer the other note or the signed
entry in the book to prove a variance.2
"Sixthly-As to variance. This· may occur between the
bought and sold notes where there is a signed entry, or I\ here
there is none. It may al o occur when the bouglit and sold
notes correspond, but the signed entry differs from them. If
there be a signed entry, it follows from the authoriti s under
the first of these propo itions that tliis entry\\ ill in general
control the case, because it con titutes the contract of which
the bought and sold notes are merely secondary evidence, and
any variance between them could not affect the validity of the
original written bargain. If, however, the bought and sold
notes corre pond, but there be a variance between them taken
collectively and the entry in the book, it becomes a question of
fact for the jury whether the acceptance by the parties of the
bought and sold notes constitute evidence of a new contract
modifying that which was entered in the book. 3
' Seventhly- If the bargain is made by correspondence, and
there is a variance between the agreement thus concluded and.

in Parton v. Crofts, supra, it is taken and not in language merely.
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antly admitted to be no longer questionable in Sievewrigbt v. Archibald,
17 Q. B. 103, 20 L. J. Q. B. 529."
1 "This wa the decision in Hawes
y. For ter, 1 2.\Iood. & Rob. 36 , of the
common plea in Parton v. Crofts, 16
C. B. (N. S.) 11, 33 L. J.C. P. 1 9 (and
of the common pleas di vi ·ion in
Thompson v. Gardiner, 1 C. P. D.
777 )."
2 "Hawes v. Forster, 1 1\Iood. &
Rob. 36 , i direct authority in relation to the entry in the book. and in
all the ca es on variance, particularly
in Parton v. Croft supra, it is taken

for granted that the defendant may
produce hi own bought or sold note
to show that it does not correspond
with the plain tiff's."
3 "This is the point establi heel by
Hawes v. For ter, 1 ~Ioocl. & R. 36 ,
according to the explanation of that
case first giYen by Parke, B., in Thornton v. Charles, 9 1\1. & W. 02, afte~:wards by Patte on, J., in Sievewright
v. Archibald, 17 Q. B. 103, 20 L. J.
Q. B. 529, and adopted by the other
judges in this last-named ca. e." But
the variance mu t be one in meaning
and not in language merely.

3 6
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the bought and sold notes, the principles are the same as those

just stated which govern variance between a signed entry and

the bought and sold notes. 1

" Eighthly — If the bought and sold notes vary, and there is

no signed entry in the broker's book, nor other writing show-

ing the terras of the bargain, there is no valid contract. 2

" Lastly — If a sale be made by a broker on credit, and the

name of the purchaser has not been previously communicated

to the vendor, evidence of usage is admissible to show that the

vendor is not finally bound to the bargain until he has had a

reasonable time, after receiving the sold note, to inquire into

the sufficiency of the purchaser, and to withdraw if he disap-

proves." 3

§ 469. " Bought and sold notes " in the United States.

The usages of the London brokers have not been generally

adopted in the United States, though " bought and sold notes 1 '

are not rare; but, in general, here the broker's book constitutes

the appropriate place for his entry, 4 and such entries, as has
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been seen in the preceding sections, are looked upon with favor;

and, however informal or inartificial they may be, if they con-

tain the essential elements of the contract and are duly signed

the bought and sold notes, the principles are the same as those
ju t stated which gov rn variance between a signed entry and
the bought and sold notes. 1
"Eighthly- If the bought and sold notes vary, and there is
no signed entry in the broker's book, nor other writing showing the terms of the bargain, there is no valid contract. 2
"Lastly - If a sale be made by a broker on credit, and the
name of the purchaser bas not been previously communicated
to the vendor, evidence of usage is a lmi sible to show that the
vendor is not finally bound to the bargain until he bas bad a
reasonable time, after receiving the sold note, to inquire into
the sufficiency of the purchaser, and to withdraw if be disapproves.' 3

1 "As decided in Hey worth v. note signed by the broker and sent

Knight, 17 C. B. (N. S.) 298, 33 L. J. to the defendant."

C. P. 298." 3 "This was decided in Hodgson v.

2 " This is settled by Thornton v. Davies, 2 Camp. 530, and as the spe-

Kempster, 5 Taunt, 786: dimming cial jury spontaneously intervened

v. Roebuck, Holt, 172; Thornton v. in that case, and the usage was held

Meux, 1 M. & M. 43; Grant v. Fletcher, good without proof of it, it is not im-

5 B. & C. 436; Gregson v. Rucks, probable that the custom might now

4 Q. B. 737, and Sievewright v. Archi- be considered as judicially recognized

bald, 17 Q. B. 103, 20 L. J. Q. B. 529. by that decision, and as requiring no

The only opinion to the contrary is proof. See Brandao v. Barnett, 3

that of Erie, J., in the last-named C. B. 519, on appeal to H. of L. (s. C,

case. In one case, however, at nisi 12 CI. & Fin. 787), as to the necessity

pHus (Rowe v. Osborne, 1 Stark. 140), for proving mercantile usages. Also,

Lord Ellenborough held the defend- 1 Smith's L. C. 602 (ed. 1879); but it

§ 469. - - "Bonght and old note "in the United States.
The usaO'eS of the ~ondon brokers have not been generally
adopted in the United tates, though "bought anrl sold not ,,
are not rare; but, in g neral, here the broker's book constitntes
the appror riate place for his entry, 4 an] such entries, as has
been een in the prec ding ection are looked upon with favor;
and, however informal or inartificial they may be if they contain the essential el ments of the contract and are duly signed

ant bound by his own signature to a would certainly be more prudent to

bought note delivered to the vendor, offer evidence of the usage."

-which did not correspond with the 4 Bacon v. Eccles, 43 Wis. 227.
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1 " ..As decided in Heyworth v.
Knight, 17 C. B. (N. S.) 2\J , 33 L. J.
C. P. 298."
2 "Thi is ettled by Thornton v.
Kemp ter, 5 Taunt. 7 6; umming
. Roebuck, Holt, 172; Thornton -v.
l\Ieux. 11\f. & L 43; Grant v. Fletcher,
5 B. .& C. 436; Greg on v. Ruck ,
4 Q. B. 137, and iev wright v. Archibal<l, 17 . B. 103, 20 L. J. . B. 599.
The only opinion to the contrary is
-that of Erl , J., in the la t-named
ca e. In one ca e, however, at nisi
prius (Rowe v. 0 borne 1 tark. 140),
Lord Ellen borough held the defendant bound by his own signatiire to a
bought note delivered to the vendor,
which dicl not corre pond with the

note igned by the broker and sent
to the defendant."
3 "Thi was decided in Ilodg on v.
Davies, 9 amp. 530, and a the pecial jury ·pontaneou ly intervened
in that a e, and the u age m1s held
good without proof of it, it is not i mprobable that the en tom might now
be con idered as judiciallyrecognizetl
by that deci. ion, and a requiring no
proof. , ee Brandao v. Barnett, o
C. B. 519, on appeal to H. of L. ( . c.,
12 Cl. & Fin. 7 7), a to the nece. ity
for prodng mercantile u age . Al o,
1 mi th L. '. 602 (ed . 1 79)· but it
would certainly be more prudent to
offer evicl nee of the u age."
4 Bacon v. Eccles, 43 \Vi . 227.
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in such manner as signing has been found to be required, they

will suffice.

If, however, the parties adopt the English system, the rules

laid down by the English courts would of course be applicable. 1

§470. Revocation of broker's authority. — The au-

thority of the broker, like that of any other agent not coupled

in such manner as signing has been found to be required, th ey
will suffice.
If, however, the parties adopt the English system, the rules
laid down by the English courts would of course be applicable. 1

with an interest, 2 may be revoked at any time before he has

acted, as in making the memorandum ; 3 but after he has signed,

if duly authorized, the principal cannot withdraw, except in

the case, warranted by usage in England, of a sale by the agent

on credit to a person not previously disclosed, in which event

the principal may withdraw within a reasonable time after re-

ceiving the sale note, if, on inquiry, he is dissatisfied with the

responsibility of the purchaser. 4

§471. Signing by partner. — Not only may the signature

of the agent to the memorandum evidencing his contract for

his principal bind the principal, but also the signature of one

partner to a memorandum evidencing an agreement made by

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:49 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t6xw4h56n
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

him on behalf of the partnership and within the scope of its

business will bind the other partners; and this is upon the

basic rule of all partnerships that the act of one partner, within

the scope of the partnership business, is the act of the copart-

nership. 5

§ 470. - - Revocation of broker's authority .-The authority of the broker, like that of any other agent not coupled
with an interest,2 may be revoked at any time before he has
acted, as in making the memorandum; 3 but after he has signed,
if duly authorized, the principal cannot wi th<lra w, except in
the case, warranted by usage in England, of a sale by the agent
on credit to a person not previously disclosed, in which event
the principal may withdraw within a reasonable tim e after receiving the sale note, if, on inquiry, he is <lissati fi ed with the
responsibi lity of the purchaser. 4

e. Of Alteration of the Memorandum.

§ 472. Alteration of executed memorandum. — In general

a material alteration of an instrument by one party destroys

its effect in conferring any rights whatever upon him; 6 and

the other party, at his option, may repudiate it altogether or

iThus if "bought and sold notes" 339, n.; Warwick v. Slade, 3 Camp,

are given, a material variance be- 127.

tween them will vitiate them. Bacon * Hodgson v. Davies, 2 Camp. 530.

v. Eccles, 43 Wis. 227; Suydam v. » California Canneries Co. v. Sea-

Clark, 2 Sandf. (N. Y.) 133; Peltier v. tena, 117 Cal. 447, 49 Pac. R 462.

Collins, 3 Wend. (N. Y.) 459. 6 gee Bishop on Contracts, § 746 et

2 Mechem on Agency, § 938. seq.

8 Farmer v. Robinson, 2 Camp.
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§ 471. Signing by partner.- Not only may the signature
of the agent to the memorandum evid ncing his contract for
his principal bind the principal, but also the signature of one
partner to a memorandum evidencing an agreement mad e by
him on behalf of the partnership and within the scope of its
business will bind the other partners; and this is upon the
basic rule of all partnerships that the act of one partner, within
the scope of the partnership Lusin ess, is the act of the copartnership.5

e. Of Alteration of the l'Iemorandum.

§ 472 . Alteration of executed memorandum .-In general
a material alteration of an instrument by one party d stroys
Hs effect in conferring any rights whatever upon him; 6 and
the other party, at his option, may r epudiate it altogether or
1 Thus if" bought and sold notes"
are given, a material variance between them will vitiate them. Bacon
v. Eccles, 43 Wis. 297; Suydam v.
Clark, 2 Sandf. (N. Y.) 133; Peltier v.
Collins, 3 Wend. (N. Y.) 450.
2 Mechem on Agency, · 03 .
3 Farmer v. Robinson, 2 Camp.

339, n.; Warwick v. Slade, 3 Camp.
127.
4 Hodgson v. Davies, 2 Camp. 530.
5 California Canneries Co. v. Sca.tena, 117 Cal 447, 49 Pac. R 462.
6 See Bishop on Contracts, § 746 et
seq.
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rely on it in its original state. 1 Hence, if the seller makes, or

causes to be made, a material alteration in the memorandum

after it has taken effect, he cannot ignore the alteration and

enforce it as it stood. 2

§ 473. Memorandum not to be altered by parol. — And so,

as has been seen, 3 the completed memorandum is not to be

altered or modified by parol. Hence, " where a contract, af-

fected by the statute, has been put in writing, and the plaint-

iff, in a case of subsequent oral variation of some of the terms

of the written agreement, declares upon the writing as quali-

fied by the oral variation, he cannot prevail." 4

§ 474. Discharge or substitution of agreement may be

shown. — But this rule seems not to prevent a showing by

parol that the written agreement which was required by the

statute of frauds has been wholly discharged, or that some new

and different agreement has been substituted for it. 5

i Bishop on Contracts, § 748. ley v. Swanstrom, 40 Minn. 196, 41 N.

2 Powell v.Divett (1812), 15 East, 29; W. R. 1029; Hill v. Blake, 97 N. Y.
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Mollett v. Wackerbarth (1847), 5 Corn. 216; Carpenter v. Galloway, 73 Ind.

B. 181, 17 L. J. Com. P. 47, 57 Eng. 418; Rucker v. Harrington, 52 Mo.

Com. Law, 180. App. 481.

3 See ante, § 446 et seq. 5 See Browne, Statute of Frauds,

4 Browne on Statute of Frauds, §§ 429-436; Greenleaf on Evidence,

§411; Augusta Southern R. Co. v. §302; Cummings v. Arnold (1842), 3

Smith (1899), 106 Ga. 864, 33 S. E. R. Mete. (Mass.) 486, 37 Am Dec. 155;

28; Burns v. Fidelity Real Estate Co., Stearns v. Hall (1851), 9 Cush. (Mass.)

52 Minn. 31, 53 N. W. R. 1017; Heis- 31.

3S9

BOOK II.

OF THE EFFECT OF THE CONTRACT IN PASSING

TITLE.

CHAPTER I.

PURPOSE OF BOOK IL

480. Specific or unascertained

goods.

481. How questions classified.

§ 475. Subjects yet to be considered.

BOOK II.

476. Executory and executed con-

tracts.

477-479. Intention of parties

as the test.

g 475. Subjects yet to be considered.— Having considered

the questions of the making of the contract, the parties to it,

OF THE EFFECT OF THE 'fONTR CT IN PASSING
TITLE.

and its form and sufficiency, it next remains to consider the

effect of the contract in passing title to the property which

was the subject-matter of the contract. This question depends

largely upon the distinction between executory and executed

CHAPTER I.

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:49 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t6xw4h56n
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

contracts.

§476. Executory and executed contracts.- As has been

PURPO E OF BOOK IL

already seen, a distinction is to be taken between a present sale,

j M present transfer of the title, and an agreement to sell, by

virtue of which the title is to be transferred at some future time.

§ 475.

ubject yet to be con idered.

§

The first is the executed contract or sale proper; the latter is

the executory contract or the contract for a sale.

Xow it is entirely competent for the parties to make either

form of contract, and where they have clearly and unambig-

uously made one form or the other there can be no difficulty.

476. Executory and ex cuted con-

tra t.
477-4 9. -

0. Specific or una ertaine<l
good.
4 1. How que tion cla ified.

Int n ion of par ie

a the te t.

The difficulty arises in those cases in which they either had no

definite intention at all, or, if they had, they have failed to

make it clear.

475.

ubj t. yet to be c n id red.-

aving con idered
the qu tion f the making of the contract, the partie to it
nd it form and u:fficiency it n xt remains to con id r the
ff .. t of the contract in pa ing title to the property which
wa the ubject-m tter of the c ntract. Thi que ti n lepends
largely upon the i tincti n b twe n executory and execute l
contract .

, 176. Executory and

x cut d contract .- As ha been

alr a 1
en a distinc ion i to be taken between a pre en t ale,
i. e. a I re ent tran fer of the ti le, an 1 an a reement to sell, y
irtue of which the title i to e tran ferred at ome futur tim .
The fir ti the ex cut d contract or ale proper· the latter is
the xe utorv contract or the contract for a ale.
K ow it is entirely competent for the partie to mak either
form of contract, and wh re th y have clearly and unambiguous!. ma le one form or the oth r there can be no difficulty.
The di:ffi ulty ari e in tho e a e in which they either had no
lefinite int ntion at all, or, if they bad, they have failed to
make it clear.
391

§§ 477, 478.J

LAW OF SALE.

(BOOK II.

§§ 4T7, 478.] LAW OF SALE. [BOOK II.

The consequences, however, are material ; for if the title has

not yet passed, the intending seller is charged with the respon-

sibility for the goods, is liable for their loss, has no present

claim for the price, but, at the same time, he has incurred as

yet no risk of not getting his pay. If the contract be executed,

on the other hand, all this is changed; for the risk of the goods

has passed to the purchaser, who is liable for the price, while

the seller has either the price in hand or the right to it, and

may have a lien upon the goods to secure its payment.

§ 477. Intention of the parties is the criterion.—

The question of possession is sometimes significant, but it is

not the criterion; for, as will be seen, the title may pass though

the seller retains possession, or the title may be retained though

possession has been given to the prospective purchaser. The

true criterion is the intention of the parties, to be discovered,

The consequences, however, are material; for if the title has
not yet passed, the intending seller is charged with the responsibility for the goods, is liable for their loss, has no present
claim for the price, but, at the same time, he has incurred as
yet no risk of not getting his pay. If the contract be executed,
on the other band, all this is changed; for the ri k of the goo ls
has passed to the purchaser, who is liable for the price, while
the seller bas either the price in hand or the right to it, and
may have a lien upon the goods to secure its payment.

when possible, from their express declarations; and where this

is not possible, to be gathered from all the circumstances of

§ 4:77. - - Intention of the parties is the criterion.-

the case, as well as from their declarations, if any.
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§ 478. . There are, however, many incidents which, as

will be seen, are ordinarily regarded as raising a presumption

that the title has or has not passed, though this presumption

yields to the intention. For example, it is said, 1 " Though by

the general rule of law the sale is not complete if anything

remains to be done between the parties, yet they may agree,

either expressly or tacitly, to change this, and that the title to

the property shall pass at once. Conditio quce initio contractus

dicta est, postea alia jpactione immutari potest. 2 Thus, though

it is implied that a sale is for ready money unless otherwise

agreed, yet the condition to pay immediately may be waived,

and the goods at once passed to the buyer. 3 Writings may be

The question of possession is sometimes significant, but it is
not the criterion; for, as -will be seen, the title may pas though
the seller retains po s ssion, or the title may be retained though
possession has been given to the prospective purchaser. The
true criterion is the intention of the parties, to be discovereu,
when possible, from their express declarations; and where this
is not possible, to be gathered from all the circumstances of
the case, as well as from their declarations, if any.

agreed to be made, but this stipulation may be changed or

1 In Fuller v. Bean (1857), 34 N. II. 3 Citing 2 Kent, Cora. 496; Schind-

290. ler v. Houston, 1 Denio (N. Y.), 48;

2 Citing Dig. 18, 1, 6; Alexander Mixer v. Cook, 31 Me. 340; Blackb.

v. Gardner, 1 Bing. N. C. 671; 2 Kent, Sale, 147.

Com. 496; Blackb. on Sale, 160.
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§ 4-78. - - . There are, however, many incidents which, as
will be seen, are ordinarily regarded as raising a presumption
that the title has or has not passed, though this presumption
yields to the intention. For e~ample, it is said,1 '~Though by
the general rule of law the sale is not complete if anything
remains to be done between the parties, yet they may agree,
either expressly or tacitly, to change this, and that the title to
the property shall pass at once. Conditio qiim initio contractus
dicta est, po tea alia pactione immutrcri potest. 2 Thus, though
it is implied that a sale is for ready money unless otherwise
agreed, yet the condition to pay immediately may be waived,
and the goods at once pas ed to the buyer. 3 Writings may be
agreed to be made, but this stipu1ation may be changed or
1 In Fuller v. Bean (18.J ), 34 N. H.
3 Citing 2 Kent, Com. 496; Schind290.
ler v. Hou ' ton, 1 Denio (N. Y.), 48;
2 Citing Dig. 18, 1, 6; Al xander Mixer v. Cook, 31 Me. 340; Blackb.
v. Gardner, 1 Bing. N. C. 671; 2 Kent, Sale, 147.
Com. 496; Blackb. on Sale, 160.
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CH.

I.]

PURPOSE OF BOOK II.

["' § ±79,4 0.

waived. 1 Measures to ascertain quantity or" price may be agreed

upon, but tacitly waived or expressly postponed, or dispensed

with." 2

§ 479. . So it was said by Lord Brougham: 3 " To con-

stitute a sale which shall immediately pass the property, it is

necessary that the thing sold should be certain, should be

waived. 1 ::Measures to ascertain quantity or price may be agreed
upon, but tacitly waived or expressly postponed, or dispensed
with." 2

ascertained in the first instance, and that there should be a

price either ascertained or ascertainable. But the parties may

buy or sell a given thing, nothing remaining to be done for

ascertaining the specific thing itself, but the price to be after-

wards ascertained in the manner fixed by the contract of sale,

or upon a quantum valeat; or they may agree that the sale

shall be complete and the property pass in the specific thing,

chattel or other goods, although the delivery of possession is

postponed, and although nothing shall remain to be done by

the seller before the delivery; or they may agree that nothing

remains to be done for ascertaining the thing sold, yet that the

sale shall not be complete and the property shall not pass till
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something is done to ascertain the amount of the price. The

question must always be, what was the intention of the par-

ties in this respect, and that is of course to be collected from

the terms of the contract. If those terms do not show an in-

tention of immediately passing the property, until something

is done by the seller before delivery of possession, then the

sale cannot be deemed perfected, and the property does not

pass until that thing is done."

§ 480. Specific or unascertained goods. — In addition to the

question of the executed or executory nature of the contract,

the character and situation of the goods are material. Are the

goods specific and definitely agreed upon, or are they not yet

ascertained, or perhaps not yet in existence? Are they now

in the condition in which they are to be delivered, or are they

1 Citing Draper v. Jones, 11 Barb. 3 In Logan v. Le Mesurier, G Moore,

(N. Y.) 263. P. C. 116.

2 Citing Macomber v. Parker, 13

Pick. (Mass.) 175.
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§ 479. - - . So it was said by Lord Brougham: 3 "To constitute a sale which shall immediately pass the property, it is
necessary that the thing sold should be certain, should be
ascertained in the first instance, and that there should be a
price either ascertained or ascertainable. But the parties may
buy or sell a given thing, nothing remaining to be done for
ascertaining the specific thing itself, but the price to be afterwards ascertained in the manner fixed by: the contract of sale,
or upon a quantitm valeat; or they may agree that the sale
shall be complete an l the property pass in the specrnc thing,
chattel or other goods, although the delivery of posse sion is
postponed, and although nothing shall remain to be done by
the seller before the delivery; or t]:iey may agree that nothing
remains to be done for ascertaining the thing sold, yet that tbe
sale shall not be complete and the property shall not pass till
something is done to ascertain the amount of the price. The
question must always be, what was the intention of the parties in this re pect, and that is of course to be collected from
the terms of the contract. If those terms do not show an intention of immediately passing the property, until something
is done by the seller before delivery of pos e sion, then the
sale cannot be deemed perfected, and tlte property does not
pass until that thing is done."

§ 480. Specific or una certained goods.-In addition to the
question of the executed or executory nature of -the contract,
the character and situation of the goods are material. Are the
gooqs specific and definitely agreed upon, or are they not yet
ascertained, or perhaps not yet in existence? Are they now
in the condition in which they are to be delivered, or are they
l Citing Draper v. Jones, 11 Barb.
a In Logan v. Le Mesurier, 6 l\Ioore,
(N. Y.) 263.
P. C. 116.
2 Citing Macomber v. Parker, 13
Pick. (Mass.) 175.
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yet to be fitted for delivery ? Are they separated from the mass

of which they previously formed a part, or are they still in the

mass and yet to be separated and set apart for the buyer ? These

and similar questions are obviously material ; and the two classes

of questions present a variety of combinations.

§ 481. How questions classified .— Attempting to group these

various elements in logical order there will be considered here :

I. Unconditional contracts for the sale of specific chattels.

yet to be fitted for delivery? Are they separated from the mass
of which they previously formed a part, or are they till in the
mass and yet to be separated and set apart for the buyer? These
and imilar que tions are obviously material; and the two classes
of questions present a variety of combinations.

II. Conditional contracts for the sale of specific chattels.

III. Contracts respecting existing chattels not yet identified.

IV. Contracts respecting goods to be manufactured or grown.

Y. Contracts reserving jus disponendi.

Each of these will be made the subject of a separate chapter,

and together these questions will form the subject-matter of

Book II.
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§ 481. How questions classified.-Attempting to group these
various elements in logical order there will be eonsidered here:
I. Unconditional con tracts for the sale of specific chattels.
II. Conditional contracts for the sale of specific chattels.
III. Contracts respecting existing chattels not yet identified.
IV. Contracts respecting goods to be manufactured or grown.
V. Contracts reserving jus disponendi.
Each of these will be made the subject of a separate chapter,
and together these questions will form the subject-matter of
Book IL
394

CHAPTER II.

OF THE UNCONDITIONAL SALE OF SPECIFIC CHATTELS.

§492,

- Or though goods remain

with seller as bailee for

buyer.

493-495. Title may pass though

price not yet paid.

496-498. Or though something

remains to be done to ascer-

tain the price.

499. The question is one of inten-

tion.

500, 501. Rules for determining the

intention.

502. Question of intention, by whom

decided.

§ 482. Purpose of this chapter.

483, 484. Title passes at once on un-
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conditional sale of specific

chattel.

485, 486. Title may pass though

goods not delivered.

487, 488. Or though seller is

yet to make delivery.

489. Or though seller is to do

some other act before de-

livery.

490. Or though seller is to do

something to the goods after

delivery.

491. Or though goods are in

hands of seller's bailee or

agent.

§482. Purpose of this chapter.— It is proposed in this

chapter to take up what is perhaps the simplest and most com-

mon of the several combinations of questions referred to in the

preceding chapter, namely, the case of the unconditional con-

tract to sell a specific chattel. And the particular question

will be this: Where the parties have in mind a definite, ascer-

tained and existing chattel, and they respectively agree with-

out condition or qualification that one shall then sell and the

other shall then buy that particular chattel, what is the effect

of their agreement upon the transfer of the title to the chattel ?

To this question it is believed that the law returns the an-

swer which forms the substance of the following section, viz.:

§ 483, Title passes at once on unconditional sale of spe-

cific chattel.— When the terms of the contract of sale have

been definitely agreed upon and the goods have been specific-
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ally ascertained, and nothing remains to be done by the seller

except to deliver the goods, the effect of the contract, as be-

tween the parties thereto, 1 will, unless a contrary intention

appears, be to vest the title to the property immediately in

the purchaser, even though the goods have not yet been de-

livered or paid for. The purchaser cannot, indeed, take the

goods away until he has paid for them, unless a term of credit

has been given, but the title and therefore the risk of the goods

will be in him, and the seller may have his remedies for the

price. 2

i The question may be affected, of the bargain the property was in the

course, by the rules which, regulate

the effect, so far as creditors and sub-

sequent purchasers are concerned, of

ally ascertained, and nothing remains to be done by th seller
except to deliver the goods, the effect of the contract, as between the parties thereto, 1 will, unless a contrary int ntion
appears, be to vest the title to the property immediately in
the purchaser, eYen though the goods have not y t be n delivered or paid for. The purchaser cannot, indeed, take the
goods a way until he has paid for them, unless a term of cre<lit
has been given, but the title and therefore the risk of the gooJs
will be in him, and the seller may have his remedies for the
price. 2

the retention of possession by the

seller. See post. §§ 963, 979. But
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those rulas are foreign to the present

consideration.

2 In Wade v. Moffett, 21 111. 110, 74

Am. Dec. 79, Breese, J., says: "It is

a general rule of the common law as

to sale of chattels, that, as between

the vendor and vendee, no actual de-

livery, symbolical or otherwise, is

necessary, the completion of the bar-

gain being all that is requisite to

pass the title, though not the posses-

sion, until the price be paid or satis-

factorily arranged. In Noy's Max-

ims, as quoted by Lord Ellenborough,

C. J., in Hinde v. Whitehouse and

Galan, 7 East, 558, it is said: ' If I sell

my horse for money, I may keep him

until I am paid; but I cannot have

an action of debt until he be deliv-

ered; yet the property of the horse is

by the bargain in the bargainor or

buyer. But if he do presently tender

me my money, and I do refuse it, he

may take the horse or have an action

of detainment. And if the horse die

in my stable between the bargain

and delivery, I may have an action

of debt for my money, because by

buyer.' So in 2 Bl. Com. 448, citing

Noy. Kent says: 'When the terms of

sale are agreed on, and the bargain is

struck, and everything that the seller

has to do with the goods is complete,

the contract of sale becomes absolute

as between the parties, without act-

ual payment or delivery, and the prop-

erty and the risk of accident to the

goods vest in the buyer.' 2 Kent's

Com. 492. In Potter v. Cowand,

Meigs, 22, it is said: 'It is not the de-

livery or tender of the property, nor

the payment or tender of the pur-

chase-money, which constitutes a

sale. The sale is good and complete

as soon as both parties have agreed

to the terms — then the rights of

both are instantly fixed. But to

have an action for the price, the

seller must deliver or offer to deliver

the property. If he tenders a deliv-

ery of the property and demands the

The question may be affected, of
course, by the rules which regulate
the effect, so far as creditors and subsequent purchasers are concerned, of
the retention of pos ession by the
seller. See post. §§ 962, 979. But
those rub ~ are foreign to the present
con.:;iuPrntinn.
2 In Wade v. Moffett, 21Ill.110, 74
Am. Dec. 79, Breese, J., says: "It is
a general rule of the common law as
to sale of chattels, that, as between
the vendor and vendee, no actual delivery, symbolical or otherwi e, is
necessary, the completion of the bargain being all that is requisite to
pass the title, though not the possession, until the price be paid or satisfactorily arranged. In Noy's Maxims, as quoted by Lord Ellen borough,
C. J., in Hinde v. Whitehouse and
Galan, 7 East,558,it is said: 'If I sell
my horse for money, I may keep him
un til I am paid; but I cannot have
an action of debt until he be delivered; yet the property of the horse is
by the bargain in the bargainor or
buyer. But if be do presently teuder
me my money, and I do refu e it, he
may take the horse or have an action
of detainment. And if the horse die
in my stable between the bargain
and delivery, I may have an action
of debt for my ruoney, because by
I

the bargain the property was in the
buyer.' So in 2 Bl. Com. 44 , citing
Noy. Kent say : 'When the terms of
sale are agreed on, and the bargain is
struck, and everything that the seller
has to do with the goods is complete.
the contract of sale become ab olute
as between the parties, without actualpaymentordelivery,and theproperty and the ri k of accident to the
goods vest in the buyer.' 2 Kent'8
Com. 492. In Potter v. Cowand,
Meigs, 22, it is said: 'It is not the delivery or tender of the property, nor
the payment or tender of the purchase-money, which constitutes a
sale. The sale is good and complete
as soon as both parties have agreed
to the terms-then the rights of
both are instantly fixed. But to
have an action for the price, the
seller must deliver or otler to deliver
the property. If he tenders a deli very of the property and demands the
purchase-money, he may have his
action of debt or assumpsit if it be
refused.' In Willis v. Willis' Adm'r,
6 Dana, 48, the doctrine was declared
that a sale of goods become ab olute, the property vested in the buyer
and at his risk, as soon as the bargain
is conclude<l, without actual paymentor delivery. In Tarling v. Baxter, 6 Barn. & Cress. 360, 9 Dow. &
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CH. II.] UNCONDITIONAL SALE OF SPECIFIC CHATTELS. [§ 4S4.

§ 484. . The rules here applicable were very clearly

stated in an English case by Parke, J., as follows: "I take it

to be clear that by the law of England the sale of a specific

chattel passes the property in it to the vendee without deliv-

Ry. 272, the court say: 'The rule of

law is that where there is an imme-

diate sale, and nothing remains to be

done by the vendor as between him

and the vendee, the property in the

tiling sold vests in the vendee, and

then all the consequences resulting

from the vesting of the property fol-

low, one of which is that if. it be de-

stroyed the loss falls on the vendee.'

So in Gardner v. Howland, 2 Pick.

599; Shumway v. Rutter, 8 id. 443, 19

Am. Dec. 340: Parsons v. Dickinson,

11 id. 352. The same doctrine is rec-
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ognized in North Carolina. State v.

Fuller, 5 Ired. L. 26. So in Ohio, the

court say, in Hooban v. Bidwell, 16

Ohio, 509, 47 Am. Dec. 386: 'The

civil law required a delivery, and so,

it has been said, did the common

law. But we think delivery not nec-

essary by the common law to pass

the title to personal property ; that a

sale without it is complete as be-

tween the parties, though it be not

so as to affect the interests in certain

cases of third persons.' In New

Hampshire (Ricker v. Cross, 5 N. H.

571, 22 Am. Dec. 480), the court say:

'The general rule is that the delivery

of possession is necessary in a con-

veyance of personal chattels as

against every one except the vendor.

Between the vendor and the vendee

the property will pass without deliv-

ery, but not with respect to third

persons who may afterwards, with-

out notice, acquire a title to the

goods under the vendor. An actual

delivery by the vendor to the vendee

is not in all cases necessary.' So in

Maine (Wing v. Clark, 24 Me. 366), it

is held that ' when the terms of sale

of personal property are agreed on,

and the bargain is struck, and every-

thing the seller has to do witli the

goods is complete, the contract of

sale becomes absolute without actual

payment or delivery, and the prop-

erty in the goods is in the buyer; and

if they are destroyed by accidental

fire he must bear the loss.' So in

Bradeen v. Brooks, 22 Me. 463. A

party becomes a buyer when goods

are knocked down to him at an auc-

tion. Hilliard on Sales, 323. In the

case of Lansing v. Turner, 2 Johns.

13, the court held to the rule as laid

down by Blackstone; and Thomp-

son, J., says: 'This I apprehend to be

the rule in all cases on the sale of a

specific chattel where the identity of

the article cannot be controverted,

the inference of the law being that

the vendor is a mere bailee, retain-

§ 485.]
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ery. . . . Where there is a sale of goods generally, no prop-

erty in them passes till delivery, because until then the very

goods sold are not ascertained. But where by the contract

itself the vendor appropriates to the vendee a specific chattel,

and the latter thereby agrees to take that specific chattel

and to pay the stipulated, price, the parties are then in the

same situation as they would be after a delivery of the goods

in pursuance of a general contract. The very appropriation

of the chattel is equivalent to delivery by the vendor, and the

assent of the vendee to take the specific chattel and to pay the

price is equivalent to his accepting possession. The effect of

the contract, therefore, is to vest the property in the bargainee." '

§ 485. Title may pass though goods not yet delivered.

Following the general rule as laid down in the preceding section

more fully into details, it is to be observed that the title to the

goods may often, as between the parties, 2 pass though the goods

have not yet been delivered. Assuming that the statute of

frauds is not involved or has been satisfied, and that the rights
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of subsequent purchasers or creditors are not concerned, it is

ery. .
Where there is a sale of good generally, no property in them passes till delivery, because until then the v- r
goods sold are not ascertained . But where by the contract
itself the vendor appropriates to the v ndee a S[ ecific chattel,
and the latter thereby agrees to take that pecific chattel
and to pay tbe stipulated _price, the parties are then in the
same situation as they \vould be after a delfrery of the goods
in pursuance of a general contract. The very appropriation
of the chattel is equivalent to cl livery by the Y n<lor, and the
nssent of the vendee to take the pecific hattel and to pay the
price is equivalent to hi accepting po se ion. The effect of
tbe contract, therefore, is to vest the pro1 erty in the bargainee." 1

abundantly settled that if the goods are fully identified, appro-

priated to the contract, and are in condition for delivery, and

if the terms of the contract are agreed upon, the title will, un-

less a contrary intention appears, pass at once upon the comple-

tion of the contract, even though the goods are not delivered, 3

accept, and the goods are in the pos- (N. S.) 84; Turley v. Bates, 2 H. & C.

session of the seller, and nothing re- 200 ; Chambers v. Miller, 13 C. B. (N. S.)

mains to be done to identify them, or 125; Hmde v. Whitehouse, 7 East,

in any way prepare them for deliv- 558; Tarling v. Baxter, 6 B. & C. 360;

ery, the sale is complete, and the Martindale v. Smith, 1 Q. B. 389;

property in the goods passes at once. Wood v. Bell, 6 E. & B. 355.

The buyer acquires not a mere jus ad 2 It must be kept in mind that the

rent, but an absolute jus in re, and he question of the validity of sales as

may demand delivery at once on against creditors and subsequent

tender of the price, and sue for the purchasers is not now being dealt

goods as his own if delivery be re- with. There, as will be seen, differ-

fused. 2 Kent's Com. 492; 2 Parsons ent considerations are involved and

on Contracts (4th ed.), 320; 1 id. 441; an actual change of possession often

Story on Sales, sec. 300." requisite. See post, %% 962, 979.

1 Dixon v. Yates, 5 B. & Ad. 313, :i " Standard authorities," said the

§ 485. Title may pass though goocls not yet deli rerefl.
Following the general rule as laid down in the pr ceding section
more fully into details, it is to be obseryed that the title to the
goods may often, as between the parties, 2 I ass though the goods
have not yet been delivered. Assumin · that the statute of
frauds is not involved or has been satisfied, and that the right
of subsequent purchasers or creditors are not concerned, it is
abundantly settled that if the goods are fully identified, appropriated to the contract, and are in condition for deli very, a nd
if the terms of the contract are agreed upon, the title will, unless a contrary intention appears, pass at once upon the completion of the contract, even though the goods are not deli \Tered, 3

340. See also Joyce v. Swann, 17 C. B. United States supreme court in
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accept, and the goods are in the possession of the seller. and nothing remains to be done to identify them, or
in any way prepare them for delivery, the sale i complete, and the
property in the goods pas~es at once.
The buyer acquire~ not a mere fus ad
r em, but an ab olute jus in re, and he
m ay demand delivery at once on
tender of the price, and sue for the
good as his own if delivery be refu ed. 2 Kent's Com. 492; 2 Parson
on Contracts (4th ed.), 320; 1 id. 441;
Story on Sales, sec. 300."
1 Dixon v. Yates, 5 B. & Ad. 313,
3-±0. See also Joyce v. Swann, 17 C. B.

(N. S.) 84; Turley v. Bates, 2 H. & C.
200; Chambers v. l\Iiller, 18 C. B. (N. S.)
125; HmJe v. W hitehonse, 7 Ea. t,
558; Tarling v. Baxter, 6 B. & C. 360;
Martindale v. Smith, 1 Q. B. 3 9;
\Vood v. Bell, 6 E. & B. 355.
2 It mu t be kept in mind that the
question of the validity of sales as
against creditors and subsequent
purchaser is not now being dealt
with. Th ere, as will be seen, differ·
ent considerations are involved and
an actual change of possession often
requisite. See post, :§ 962, 979.
a" Standard authorities," said the
United States s upreme court in
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or, as will be seen in a later section, notwithstanding that the

price has not yet been paid. 1 As stated in a recent Minnesota

case, 2 " Contracts for the purchase and sale of chattels, if com-

plete and unconditional, and not within the statute of frauds,

Hatch v. Oil Co., 100 U. S. 124, "show

that where there is no manifestation

of intention, except what arises from

the terms of sale, the presumption is,

if the thing to be sold is specified

and it is ready for immediate deliv-

ery, that the contract is an actual

sale, unless there is something in the

subject-matter or attendant circum-

stances to indicate a different inten-

tion." That delivery in such cases

is not essential to the transfer of the

title: Rail v. Little Falls Lumber

Co., 47 Minn. 422, 50 N. W. R. 471;
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Penley v. Bessey, 87 Me. 530, 33 Atl.

R. 21; Cummings v. Oilman, 90 Me.

.524, 38 Atl. R. 538; Com. v. Hess, 148

Pa. St. 98, 23 AtL R. 977, 33 Am. St.

R. 810; Clinton Nat. Bank v. Sfcude-

mann. 74 Iowa, 104, 37 N. W. R. 112;

England v. Forbes, 7 Houst. (Del.)

301, 31 Atl. R. 895; Fletcher v. Nel-

son, 6 N. Dak. 94, 69 N. W. R. 53;

Benedict, etc. Mfg. Co. v. Jones, 64

Mo. App. 218; Kneeland v. Renner,

2 Kan. App. 451, 43 Pac. R. 95; Suth-

erland v. Brace, 34 U. S. App. 638, 73

Fed. R. 624, 19 C. C. A. 589 ; Montgomery

Furn. Co. v. Hardaway, 104 Ala. 100,

16 S. R. 29; Briggs v. United States,

143 U. S. 346; Albemarle Lumber Co.

v. Wilcox, 105 N. C. 34, 10 S. E. R.

871; Scarbrough v. Alcorn, 74 Tex.

358, 12 S. W. R. 72.

In Leonard v. Davis, 1 Black (U. S.),

470, where there was a written con-

tract reciting that one party had

" bought of " the other certain logs,

described by their location, at so

much per thousand feet for a certain

quality, less per thousand for an in-

ferior quality, all not merchantable

to be rejected, the scaling and sort-

ing to be done by a person desig-

nated, it was held that the property

in the logs passed to the vendee by

the force of the contract; since noth-

ing remained to be done by the seller,

the title passed to the buyer at the

time the contract was executed.

Likewise in First Nat. Bank of

Ottumwa v. Reno, 73 Iowa, 145, 34 N.

W. R. 796, where the words of the

written contract were, '"I hereby

sell," it was held that this phrase

clearly indicated the intention of the

parties to make a present sale and

transfer of the property, notwith-

standing that it was not delivered,

and that the price remained un-

ascertained, dependent upon the con-

dition of the property in the future.

So also in Ruthrauff v. Hagenbuch,

58 Pa. St. 103. there was a written

contract which recited that the

§ 4 6.J
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are sufficient as between the parties to vest the property in the

purchaser without delivery. The rule is that when the chat-

tels are clearly designated and appropriated to the contract,

are ready for immediate delivery, and the terms of sale, includ-

ing the price, are explicitly given, there is an executed contract,

and the title to the property, as between the parties, passes to

the purchaser, even without actual payment or delivery."

g 486. . This general rule, however, yields to evidence

LAW OF SALE.

[BOOK II.

are sufficient as between the parties to vest the property in the
purchaser without delivery. The rule is that when the chattels are clearly designated and appropriated to the contract,
are ready for immediate delivery, and the terms of ale, including the price, are explicitly given, there is an executed contract,
and the title to the property, as between the parties, passes to
the purchaser, even without actual payment or delivery."

of a contrary intention, and the existence of such a contrary

save the last, the wording of the

agreement has been held significant

§ 486. - - . This general rule, however, yields to evidence

of the true intention of the parties

and of the character of the trans-

of a contrary intention, and the existence of such a contrary

action. This intention in all the

cases was the cardinal point toward

which inquiry was directed, and

vail.
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when ascertained was held to pre-

When the property is incapable of

delivery into the hand of the pur-

chaser it will come under his control

and title will pass to him by delivery

of a bill of sale (Fletcher v. Nelson,

6 N. D. 94, 69 N. W. R. 53; Cook v.

Van Home, 76 Wis. 520, 44 N. W. R.

767), although the seller be put in

possession as bailee (White v. Mc-

Cracken, 60 Ark. 613, 31 S. W. R. 882);

and although there be nothing done

symbolical of an intention to vest

the title in the purchaser, and owing

to the ponderous nature of the arti-

cles, as of brick in a kiln, or copper

in large quantity, it is impossible to

make a manual delivery, the title

will pass, if such is clearly shown to

be the intention of the parties. Tay-

lor v. Thurber, 68 111. App. 114; Hay-

den v. Demets, 53 N. Y. 426. In this

latter case it was said that the title

passed without delivery, and if the

purchaser refused to accept the goods

and pay the price, "the vendor may,

after proper notice, sell the goods

and recover the difference in price

from the vendee, or sue for the dif-

ference between the contract and

the actual price, in which case he

elects to retain the property as his

own, or he may recover the contract

price, in which case he holds the prop-

erty in trust for the vendee."

In Briggs v. United States, 143 U. S.

346, there was a sale to plaintiff, by

one Morehead, of " all the cotton in

my two plantations in Mississippi,

near Eggs' Point and Greenville.

Said cotton so sold embraces all that

I may have baled and unbaled,

gathered and ungathered, . . . sup-

posed to be two thousand bales."

This cotton was seized and sold by

the United States during the war of

the Rebellion. After the war was over

the action was brought against the

United States in the court of claims

to recover the value of the cotton so

save the last, the wording of the and pay the price, ''the vendor may,
agreement has been held significant after proper notice, sell the goods
of the true intention of the parties and recover the difference in price
and of the character of the trans- from the vendee, or sue for the difaction. This intention in all the ference between the contract and
cases was the cardinal point toward the actual price, in which case he
which inquiry was directed, and elects to retain the property as his
when ascertained was held to pre- own, or he may recover the contract
vail.
price, in which case he hold the propWhen the property is incapable of erty in trust for the vendee."
delivery into the band of the purIn Briggs v. United States. 143 U.S.
chaser it will come under bis control 346, there was a sale to plaintiff, by
and title will pass to him by delivery one Morehead, of ''all the cotton in
of a bill of sale (Fletcher v. Nelson, my two plantations in Missi sippi,
6 N. D. 94, 69 N. W. R. 53; Cook v. near Eggs' Point and Greenville.
Van Horne, 76 Wis. 520, 44 N. W. R. Said cotton so sold embraces all that
767), although the seller be put in I may have baled and unualed,
possession as bailee (White v. Mc- gathered and ungathered, . . . supCracken, 60 Ark. 613, 31 S. W.R. 882); posed to be two thousand bales."
and although there be nothing done This cotton was seized and sold by
symbolical of an intention to ve t the United States during the war of
the title in the purchaser, and owing the Rebellion. After the war wa over
to the ponderous nature of the arti- the action was brought against the
cles, as of brick in a kiln, or copper United States in the court of claims
in large quantity, it is impossible to to recover the value of the cotton so
make a manual delivery, the title seized. Mr. Justice Field held the
will pass, if such is clearly shown to title to the cotton was in the plaintbe the intention of the parties. Tay- iff, at the time of the seizure, by virlor v. Thurber, 68 Ill. App. 114; Hay- tue of the bill of sale, and that notden v. Demets, 53 N. Y. 426. In this withstanding the fact that it covlatter case it was said that the title ered cotton yet to be rai ed, the title
pa . ed without delivery, and if the to this passed o soon as it appeared
purchaser refused to accept the goods abo>e the ground.
400
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intention, when in dispute, is usually a question of fact for the

jury, as will be seen in a later section. 1

| 48?. Or though the seller is yet to make delivery.

The title may also pass at once, if that appears to be the inten-

tion, even though the seller is yet to make a delivery. Thus,

it is said by the United States court of appeals: " Undoubtedly,

the general rule is, that if the seller obligates himself as a part

of his contract to deliver the property to the buyer at some speci-

fied place, title will not pass until such delivery; " but, quoting

from Mr. Benjamin, the court continues: "Slight evidence is,

however, accepted as sufficient to show that title passes imme-

diately on the sale, though the seller is to make a delivery.

The question, at last, is one of intent, to be ascertained by a

consideration of all the circumstances." 2

| 488. . The fact that the price is paid before the deliv-

ery is strong evidence that the title has already passed. Thus,

in a case 3 often cited, it was said by Selden, J.: "If the pay-

ment was to be made on or after delivery, at a particular place,
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it might fairly be inferred that the contract was executory

until such delivery; but where the sale appears to be absolute,

the identity of the thing fixed, and the price for it paid, I see

no room for an inference that the property remains the seller's

merely because he has engaged to transport it to a given point.

I think in such case the property passes at the time of the con-

tract, and that in carrying it the seller acts as bailee and not

as owner."

The payment of the price is not, however, indispensable; for

1 Post, % 502. Hagins v. Combs, 102 Ky. 165, 43 S.

2 In McElwee v. Metropolitan Lum- W. R. 222; Rail v. Little Falls Lum-

ber Co., 37 U. S. App. 266, 69 Fed. R. ber Co., 47 Minn. 422, 50 N. W. R.

302, 16 C. C. A. 232. 471 ; Morris v. Winn, 98 Ga. 482, 25

3 Terry v. Wheeler, 25 N. Y. 520. S. E. R. 562; Clinton Nat. Bank v.

To like effect: Bethel Steam Mill Co. Studemann, 74 Iowa, 104, 37 N. W. R.

v. Brown, 57 Me. 9; Penley v. Bessey, 112; Burcham v. Griffeth, 31 Neb. 778,

87 Me. 530, 33 Atl. R. 21; Lynch v. 48 N. W. R. 824,

Daggett, 62 Ark. 592, 37 S. W. R. 227;

20 401
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if such appears to be the intention, the title will pass without

either payment or present delivery. 1

§ 489. Or though seller is to do some other act he-

if such appears to be the intention, the title will pass without
either payment or present delivery. 1

fore delivery. — So, to state affirmatively what is hereafter

stated negatively, 2 the title to a specific chattel may pass at

once, if that appears to have been the intention of the parties,

even though the seller has yet to do something to the goods to

put them into the form or condition in which they are to be

delivered.

. " And even if something is to be done by the vendor, but

only when directed by the vendee, and for his convenience,

as, for instance, to load the goods upon a vessel for transporta-

tion, the property may pass by the contract of sale notwith-

standing." 3

§490. Or though seller is to do something to the

goods after delivery. — So, clearly, the title to a specific chat-

tel may pass at once, even though the seller is bound to do

something in reference to the goods after their delivery, 4 as to
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repair or regulate a w T atch sold, or put in operation an engine

sold, 5 and the like. The question is one of intention as in

other cases ; but the title may pass at once, leaving to the pur-

chaser, perhaps, the right to rescind the contract if the act

agreed upon is not performed, or to retain the title and pos-

§ 489. - - Or thougl1 seller is to do some other act before delivery.- So, to state affirmatively what is hereafter
stated negatively, 2 the title to a specific chattel may pass at
once, if that appears to have been the intention of the parties,
even though the seller has yet to do som tliing to the goods to
put them into the form or conclition in which they are to be
delivered .
. "And even if something is to be done by the vendor, but
only when directed by the vend e, and for bis conv nience,
as, for instance, to load the good upon av s l for tran portation, the property may pass by the contract of sale notwithstanding." 3

session and maintain an action for the breach of the agree-

ment. 6

§ 491. Or though goods are in hands of seller's bailee

or agent.— The fact that the goods, at the time of the sale,

§ 490. - - Or though seller i. to do omething to the
goods afte r delivery.- So, clearly, tbe title to a specific chat-

are in the possession of a bailee or agent of the seller, will not

1 Thayer v. Davis, 75 Wis. 205, 43 * See Hammond v. Anderson, 1 Bos.

N. W. R. 902. & Pul. N. R 69.

2 See post, §§ 507-514, where the 5 Mt. Hope Iron Co. v. Buffinton,

subject is more fully considered. 103 Mass. 62.

3 Per Cooley, J., in Lingham v. Eg- 6 Mt. Hope Iron Co. v. Buffinton,

gleston, 27 Mich. 324, citing Whit- supra.

comb v. Whitney, 24 Mich. 486; Terry

v. Wheeler, 25 N. Y. 520.
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tel may pass at once, even though the seller is bound to do
something in reference to the goods after their delivery, 4 as to
repair or regulate a watch sold, or put in operation an engine
sold,5 and the like. The question is one of intention as in
other cases; but the title may pass at once, leaving to the purchaser, perhaps, the right to rescind the contract if the act
agreed upon is not performed, or to retain the title and possession and maintain an action for the breach of the agreement.6

§ 491. - - Or though goods are in hands of seller's bail ee
or agent.-The fact that the goods, at the time of the sale,
are in the possession of a bailee or agent of the seller, will not
1 Thayer v. Davis, 75 Wis. 205, 43
4 See Hammond v. Anderson, 1 Bos.
N. W. R. 902.
& Pul. N. R. 69.
2 See post, §§ 507-514, where the
5 Mt. Hope Iron Co. v. Buffin ton,
subject i more fully considered.
103 Mass. 62.
3 Per Cooley, J., in Ling ham v. Eg6 Mt. Hope Iron Co.· v. Buffin ton,
gleston, 27 Mich. 324, citing Whit- supra.
comb v. Whitney, 24 Mich. 486; Terry
v. Wheeler, 25 N. Y. 520.
402
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deprive the transaction of its character as a completed sale, if

that result seems to have been intended by the parties. As

was said by the court 1 in Missouri, " In the sale of personal

property, in order to pass the title to the vendee, it is not nec-

essary that the vendor should be in the possession. The sale

may be entirely good although the goods are in the possession

of a third party. 2 When the goods are in the possession of a

bailee or agent of the seller, a completed or absolute sale con-

fers an immediate and valid title to the purchaser without any

formal delivery of the possession; the possession of the bailee

or agent then becomes that of the purchaser, and operates not

merely as a transfer of a right in action, but of the goods

themselves." 3 The utmost that can be requisite, as between the

parties, is that the vendor shall deliver to the vendee such evi-

dence, authority or token as may be necessary to show the

latter's right to receive possession. 4

§ 492. Or though goods remain in hands of seller as

bailee for buyer.— Where the goods have been ascertained
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and the terms of the sale are agreed upon, the title will pass

as between the parties, 5 unless a contrary intention appears,

i In Erwin v. Arthur, 61 Mo. 386. vendor's bailee to deliver the goods

2 Citing Ben j. on Sales (3d Am. ed.), sold to such purchaser or agent,

^ 6, note a. there is a constructive delivery of

3 To same effect. Williams v. Gray, the property; and the delivery of the

39 Mo. 201 ; Harding v. Manard, 55 order vests the purchaser with the in-

Mo. App. 364; Allgear v. Walsh, 24 dvAa of ownership, and has the same

Mo. App. 134. effect in transferring the title to the

« Where the goods are in the pos- property as the delivery of the prop-

session of a bailee of the vendor, a erty." Union Stock Yard Co. v.

bill of sale by the vendor gives an Mallory, 157 111. 554, 41 N. E. R. 888,

immediate and valid title to the pur- 43 id. 979, 48 Am. St, R. 341 [citing

chaser without a formal delivery of McCormick v. Hadden, 37 111. 370;

the possession. Williams v. Gray, Burton v. Curyea, 40 111. 320. 89 Am.

supra [citing Heine v. Anderson, Dec. 350; Webster v. Granger, 78 111.

2 Duer. 318: Wood v. Tassell, 6 Ad. & 230: Tuxworth v. Moore, 9 Pick. 347,

El. (N. S.) 234; Sigerson v. Harker, 20 Am. Dec. 479; Carter v. Willard,

15 Mo. 101]. 19 Pick. 1]. See also Hatch v. Bay-

'• When the vendor delivers to the ley, 12 Cush. (Mass.) 27; Gibson v.

purchaser, or to the purchaser's au- Stevens, 49 U. S. (8 How.) 384.

thorized agent, an order upon the 5 As to the effect upon the rights of
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even though the goods are to remain, for some purpose, in the

hands of the seller as bailee of the buyer. Thus, for example,

where there was a sale of all the lambs which the seller had in

his flock at a given price per head, and it was further agreed

that the seller should keep the lambs at pasture until the buyer

should call for them, it was held that the title passed at once

and the risk of the lambs was imposed upon the buyer, even

though they had not been separated from the other sheep and

had not been paid for. Said the court: " The case is entirely

unlike the sale of certain articles out of a large number. Here

the sale was of all the spring lambs owned by the appellee.

There was no setting apart to be done. There was no act of

separation to be performed. There was no necessity for any

counting, or weighing, or for any similar acts. The fact that

the appellee was to retain possession of and pasture the lambs

did not change the character of the transaction. It was none

the less a sale because the seller agreed to care for the property.

It was just as competent for the parties to agree that the seller
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should hold possession as bailee as for them to agree that any-

body else might do so." 1

Many similar cases are cited in the notes. 2

creditors and subsequent purchasers Hall, 4 Ind. 189); and when there

of leaving the goods in the possession was a sale of lambs to remain with

of the seller, sse post, §§ 962, 979. the seller until required by the

1 Elliott, C. J., in Bertelson v. vendee (Bertelson v. Bower, 81 Ind.

Bower, 81 Ind. 512 [citing Henline 512), it was held the title to the prop-

v. Hall, 4 Ind. 189; Cloud v. Moor- erty passed to the vendee, notwith-

man, 18 Ind. 40; Scott v. King, 12 standing its remaining in the pos-

Incl 203; Marble v. Moore, 102 Mass. session of the vendor. Barrow v.

443]. To same effect, Robertson v. Window, 71 111. 214. So also in an

Hunt, 77 Tex. 321. 14 S. W. R. 68; early Kentucky case (Willis v. Willis'

White v. McCracken, 60 Ark. 613, 31 Adm'r, 6 Dana, 48), where there was

S. W. R. 882; Barrow v. Window, 71 an exchange of slaves, but owing to

even though the goods ·are to remain, for ome purpo e, in the
bands of the seller as bailee of the buyer. Thus, for example,
where there was a sale of all the lambs which the seller bad in
hi flock at a given price per head and it ·was further a 0 Teecl
that the seller should keep the lamb at pa ture until the buyershould call for them, it was held that the title pa sed at once
and the risk of the lambs was imposed upon the buy r, even
though they had not been separated from the other heep and
had not been paid for.
aid the court: "The case is ntirely
unlike the sale of certain articles out of a large number. Here
the sale was of all the spring lambs owned by the appellee.
There was no etting apart to be done. There wa no act of
separation to be performed. There was no neces ity for any
counting, or weighing, or for any similar act . The fact that
the appellee was to retain posses ion of and pasture the lambs
did not change the character of the tran action. It was none
the less a sale because the seller agreed to care for the property.
It wa just as com potent for the parties to agree that the seller
should hold possession as bailee as for them to agree that anybody el e might do so." 1
Many similar cases are cited in the notes. 2

I1L 214. See also Cady v. Zimmer- their youth the possession was not

man, 20 Mont. 225, 50 Pac. R. 553. changed, it was held that neverthe-

2 Thus, where there was a sale of less the property passed, and they

a particular colt, and a stipulation were at the risk of their respective

that it should remain with its mother bargainees. Likewise, where hay was

until weaned (Sweeney v. Owsley, sold by letter, the amount by weight

14 B. Mon. (Ky.) 332; Henline v. being unknown, but all that was in
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creditors and subsequent purchasers Hall, 4 Ind. 189); and when there
of leaving the goods in the pos ession wa a sa,le of lambs to remain with
of the eller, Sve post, §§ 962, 979.
the eller until required by the
1 Elliott, C. J., in Bertelson v. vendee (Bertel on v. Bower, 81 Ind.
Bower, 1 Ind. 512 [oiting Henline 512) it was held the title to the propv. Hall, 4 Ind. 1 9; Cloud v. Moor- erty passed to the vendee, notwithman, 18 Ind. 40; Scott v. King, 12 standing its remaining in the posIncl. 203; Marble v. foore, 109 _fass. se sion of the vendor. Barrow v.
443]. To ame effect, Robert on v. Window, 71 Ill. 214. So also in an
Hunt, 77 Tex. 321. 14 S. W. R. 6 ; early Kentucky case (Willis v. Willi '
White v. :McCracken, 60 Ark. 613, 31 Adm'r, 6 Dana, 4 ), where there was
'. W. R. 2; Barrow v. Window, 71 an exchange of sla"e8, but owing to·
Ill 214.
ee al o Cady v. Zimmer- tl1eir youth the po ses ion wa not
man, 20 Mont. 225, 50 Pac. R. 553.
changed, it was held that neverthe2 Thu , where there wa a sale of less the property pa sed, and they
a particular olt, and a . tipulation were at the ri k of their re pective
that it hould remain with it mother bargainees. Likewi ·e, where bay was
until weaned ( ween y v. Owsley, sold by letter, the amount by weight
14 B. l\fon. (Ky.) 33'3; Henline v. being unknown, but all that was in
404
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§493. Title may pass though price not yet paid. — It is

not at all essential to the transfer of the title that the price

shall have been paid. The title, as has been seen, passes as

a particular place was conveyed, it .

was held a good sale without deliv-

ery, imposing the risks of loss on the

bargainee. Phillips v. Moor, 71 Me.

78. To the same effect is the case of

"Wing v. Clark, 24 Me. 366, where

there was a sale of a machine which

the vendee sent his agent for, with a

team, but the agent, fearing it was

too bulky after getting it on his ve-

hicle, left it with the vendor, and it

was the same night accidentally de-

stroyed by fire. It was held that the

title had passed, and that the vendee

must bear the loss. So also in Roth-
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well v. Alves, 60 111. App. 156, there

was a sale of a buggy, the price being

paid, but owing to the muddy condi-

tion of the road the purchaser did

not wish to take it away, and the

seller, to accommodate him, permit-

ted it to remain at the shop. The

court held the title passed, and that

a subsequent purchaser under a bill

of sale' generally, describing all the

property at the shop, took no title to

the carriage.

In Penley v. Bessey, 87 Me. 530, 33

Atl. R. 21, plaintiff's agent bought a

pair of oxen of defendant, s iw them

and paid for them. Defendant agreed

to bring them to plaintiff on a later

date. Subsequently, but before de-

livery of the cattle, one of them,

without defendant's fault, died, and

the action was brought to recover

his value. It was held that the title

had passed and the verdict for the

plaintiff was set aside.

In Clinton Nat. Bank v. Studemann,

74 Iowa, 104. 37 N. W. R. 112, cattle

were bought, paid for and delivered

to the vendee, who then redelivered

40

them to the vendor to be cared for

by him and driven to market. Be-

fore they were so driven they were

levied upon by the sheriff, with full

notice of the sale, as the property of

the vendor. It was held the levy was

invalid; that the property in the cat-

tle had passed to the vendee.

Likewise it is held that the pur-

chaser must bear the loss occasioned

by a destruction of property which

is the subject of sale while in transit

from the seller to the purchaser.

This is upon the theory that the

title passes on delivery of the prop-

erty to the carrier, this being the

last act within the vendor's con-

trol. Farmers' Phosphate Co. v. Gill,

69 Md. 537, 16 Atl. R. 214, 1 L. R, A.

767: Mee v. McXider, 109 N. Y. 500,

17 N. E. R. 424; Lord v. Edwards, 148

Mass. 476, 20 N. E. R. 161.

§ 493.J

(BOOK II.

LAW OF SALE.

493.]
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the result of the agreement of the parties. As stated by the

supreme court of Minnesota, 1 " The rule is that when the chat-

the result of the agreement of the parties. As stated by the
supreme court of Minnesota, 1 "The rule is that when the chattels are clearly designated and appropriated to the contract,.

tels are clearly designated and appropriated to the contract,.

in care of the vendor until autumn.

Meanwhile they were levied upon as

property of the vendor, and in a con-

test between the officer and the

vendee seeking to recover the value

of the cattle, it was held that the

vendee could recover, as he was the

owner of the cattle at the time of the

levy. Kennedy v. Whittie, 27 Nova

Scotia, 460.

In Benedict & Burnham Mfg. Co.

v. Jones, 64 Mo. App. 218, defendant's

assignor had purchased wire of
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plaintiffs, but becoming financially

embarrassed offered to return what

lie had bought less a very little that

had been sold. Plaintiffs accepted

this offer and requested prepayment

of freight, and payment for that part

of the wire which had been used. Al-

though defendant's assignor was in

possession of the goods, in such a

condition as to be easily distinguished

from the balance of his stock, he neg-

lected to make the shipment, hence

the action of replevin was brought

for the wire against the assignee.

The court held that although the

wire was mixed with other stock of

the assignor, nevertheless, as it re-

mained in original packages and bore

the shipping tags of plaintiffs, it was

so clearly distinguishable from the

residue of assignor's stock that the

title passed to plaintiffs by means of

the previous correspondence concern-

ing its shipment. So in Montgomery

Furniture Co. v. Hardaway, 104 Ala.

100,. where there was a sale of horses

to the agent of the furniture com-

pany, but the animals were to remain

in the care of the vendor for some

little time before payment was to be

made or the horses delivered, it was

held that the title passed without de-

livery, the price having been fixed

and the property being identified. So-

it was held where hogs were sold

while out of the possession of both

vendor and vendee, being on the cars

in transit to a market, and it was

in care of the vendor until autumn.
Meanwhile they were levied upon as
property of the vendor, and in a contest between the officer and the
-venclee seeking to recover the value
of the cattle, it was held that the
vendee could recover, as he was the
owner of the cattle at the time of the
levy. Kennedy v. Whittie, 27 Nova
Scotia., 460.
In Benedict & Burnham Mfg. Co.
v. Jones, 64 Mo. App. 218, defendant's
as ignor had purchased wire of
plaintiffs, but becoming financially
embarra sed offered to return what
he had bought less a very little that
had been sold. Plaintiffs accepted
this offer and requested prepayment
of freight, and payment for that part
of the wire which had been used. Although defendant's assignor was in
posse sion of the goods, in such a
condition as to be easily distinguished
from the balance of hi stock, he neglected to make the shipment, hence
the action of replevin was brought
for the wire against the as ·ignee.
Tbe court held that although the
wire was mixed with other stock of
the assignor, nevertheless, as it remained in original packages and bore
the shipping tags of plaintiffs, it was
so clearly distinguishable from the
rnsidue of assignor's stock that the
title passed to plaintiffs by means of
the previous correspondence concerning its shipment. So in Montgomery
Furniture Co. v. Hardaway, 10-i Ala.
100,. where there was a sale of horses
to the agent of the furniture com-

pany, but the animals were to remain.
in the care of the vendor for some
little time before paym nt was to be
made or the horse delivere<l, it wa
held that the title pa ed without delivery, the price having been fixed
and the property being identifietl. 0o
it was held where bog were sold
while out of the po session of lJoth
vendor and vendee, being on the cars
in transit to a market, and it was
agreed that the consignee hould a count to the vendee for the price, a d
he did o account, that the contra t
of sale wa compl te; that the titl
passed, and the vendee was liable
for the contract price. Harding v.
Manard, 55 Mo. A pp. 364.
In utberland v. Bruce, 73 Fed. R
624, there was an agreement to trade
horses. In pur uance of this contract one of the parties deli Yered his
horse, but the ot.her refused to fulfill
his bargain. Held, that replevin would
lie on behalf of the bargainor who·
had delivered his horse for the anima.l for which he traded; thFtt the
title had passed and with it the right
of posse f:don. Likewise where there
was a contract concerning ·ome hogs
which were identified by the partie ,.
and in part paid for, it was held that
notwithstanding the fact that theswine were left with the vendor, thecontract was a sale, the title passed,
and the vendee could compel a delivery. O'Farrell v. McClure, - Kan~
App. - , 47 Pac. R. 160. So in Lynch.
v. Daggett, 62 Ark. 592, 37 S. \V. R~
227, there wa a contract concern-

agreed that the consignee should ac-

count to the vendee for the price, and

he did so account, that the contract

of sale was complete; that the title

passed, and the vendee was liable

for the contract price. Harding v.

Manard, 55 Mo. App. 364.

In Sutherland v. Bruce, 73 Fed. R.

624, there was an agreement to trade

horses. In pursuance of this con-

tract one of the parties delivered his

horse, but the other refused to fulfill

his bargain. Held,tha,t replevin would

Rail v. Little Falls Lumber Co., 47 Minn. 422, 50 N.
Hatch v. Oil Co., 100 U.S. 124.
l
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are ready for immediate delivery, and the terms of sale, in-

cluding the price, are explicitly given, there is an executed

contract, and the title to the property, as between the parties,

ing some wagon tongues and other

lumber in a pile on the premises of

the vendor. It was agreed that

vendor should draw this material to

the railway for the vendee, and was

to receive a fixed pa-ice for the pile.

The court held that the title passed

by the force of the contract, the de-

livery not being made in no way

affecting the title. So, when there

was a sale of logs, an unknown quan-

tity in feet, but identified and

branded by the purchaser, it was

held that the title passed, although

there was no manual delivery of the
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property. Hagins v. Combs, 102 Ky.

165, 43 S. W. R 222.

In Thayer v. Davis, 75 Wis. 205, 43

N. W. Ff. 902. there was a sale of a

definite number of piles of lumber, at

a fixed price per thousand feet. As

the property was yet undelivered it

was coutended that the title did not

pass; but the court held that this was

immaterial; that from the fact that

the agent of the vendee counted the

piles and courses in the pile and gave

orders for their disposition, an inten-

tion to pass the title was shown, and

this intention prevailed.

In Gatzmer v. Moyer (Pa. St.), 13

Atl. R. 540. there was a sale of all the

standing and fallen timber on a cer-

tain tract at a fixed price per thou-

sand feet sawed: the vendee was to do,

the sawing. After the logs had been

gotten out they were levied upon as

the property of the vendee, and it was

held that the title passed to him by

virtue of the contract of sale, and the

fact that the timber had not yet been

measured was immaterial. Likewise

where colts were sold to be subse-

quently delivered, it was held the

title passed and a levy upon them as

property of the vendor was void.

Kneeland v. Renner, 2 Kan. App. 451,

43 Pac. R 95.

In Burcham v. Griff eth, 31 Neb.

778, 48 N. W. R. 824, there was a sale

of cattle, the price being paid, to be

delivered at a future date. While

driving them to the place of delivery

several were injured without fault

of the vendor. Held, the title had

passed and that the loss was on the

vendee.

When liquors were being pur-

chased, from week to week, of a bot-

tler, by a hotel keeper in another

city, and the practice was, upon re-

ceiving orders for the liquor, to set it

aside for the purchaser and charge

its price to him, delivery being made

either by shipment by rail or by the

seller's wagon, and the seller, who had

§ 494.J
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[BOOK II.

passes to the purchaser, even without actual payment or de-

passes to the purchaser, even without actual pay ment or delivery." 1

livery." '

§494.

The payment of the price may, however, be

made either expressly or impliedly a condition precedent to

the passage of the title; and when such is the case, the COndi-

§ 4:94:. - - . The payment of the price may, however, be
made either expressly or impliedly a condition prec dent to
the passage of the title; and when such is the case, the con di-

the contract are complied with. (See

next chapter.) Diehl v. McCormick,

143 Pa. St. 584. 22 Atl. R. 1033. Or

when the contract does not clearly

evidence an intention to pass the

title, as where one told another he

might take a certain mule in pay-

ment of a debt, and the other said he

would, but there was no further act

showing passage of title, it was held
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to be no sale of the property. Weedon

v. Clark, 94 Ala. 505, 10 S. R. 307.

Likewise where there was a contract

for the sale and purchase of a full

boatload of coal slack, it was held

that the title to the property did not

pass as fast as the boat was loaded, for

until fully loaded the contract was ex-

ecutory. It was the intention of the

parties that the property should all

be in the boat before the title passed.

Hays v. Pittsburgh, etc. Packet Co.,

33 Fed. R. 552.

However when the property which

is the subject of the contract of sale

is on realty owned by the vendee

and in place where it will be used, as

mining machinery at the head of a

mine, the title will pass without de-

livery. Hall v. Morrison, 92 Ga. 311,

18 S. E. R. 293. Or, as in the case of

lumber yet to be sawed from logs and

piled on sticks in vendor's yard, the

title will pass to the vendee when

the lumber is so piled, and he will be

entitled to its possession. Martz v.

Putnam, 117 Ind. 392, 20 N. E. R. 270.

1 In Hayden v. Demets, 53 N. Y.

426, it is said: "Upon a valid sale of

specific chattels, when nothing re-

mains to be done by the vendor ex-

cept delivery, whether conditioned

upon payment or not, the right of

property passes to the vendee, at

whose risk it is retained by the

vendor." In Clark v. Greeley. 02

N. H. 394, it is said: "As a general

rule, under a contract of sale of spe-

cific chattels at a stipulated price,

when nothing remains to be done

to designate the property sold or the

price to be paid, the title, independ-

ently of the statute of frauds, imme

diately vests in the buyer and a right

to the price in the seller, unless it

can be shown that such was not the

intention of the parties. Clark v.

Draper, 19 N. H. 419, 421; Bailey v.

Smith, 43 N. H. 141, 143; Townsend

v. Hargraves, 118 Mass. 325, 332:

Phillips v. Moor, 71 Me. 78; Dixon v.

the contract are complied with. (See
next chapter.) Diehl v. McCormick,
143 Pa. St. 584. 22 Atl. R. 1033. Or
when the contract does not clearly
evidence an intention to pass the
title, as where one told another he
might take a certain mule in payment of a debt, and the other aid he
would, but there was no further act
showing passage of title, it was held
to be no sale of the property. Weedon
v. Clark, 94 Ala. 505, 10 S. R. 307.
Likewise where there was a contract
for the sale anu purcha ·e of a full
boatload of coal slack, it was held
that the title to the property did not
pass as fast a the Loat was loaded, for
until fully loaded the contract wa executory. It was the intention of the
parties that the property shoulJ a ll
be in the boat before the title passed.
Hays v. Pittsburgh, etc. Packet Co.,
33 Fed. R. 552.
However when the property which
is the subjeut of the contract of sale
is on realty owned by the vendee
and in place where it w ill be used, as
ruining machinery at the head of a
mine, the title will pass without delivery. Hall v. Morrison, 92 Ga. 311,
18 S. E. R. 293. Or, as in the case of
lumber yet to be sawed from logs a nd
piled on sticks in vendor's yard, the
title will pass to the vendee when
the lumber is so piled, and he w ill be
entitled to its po session. Martz v.
Putnam, 117 Ind. 392, 20 N. E. R. 270.
1 In Hayden v. Dernet , 53 N. Y.
426, it is said: "Upon a valid sale of

specific chattels, when notlling remains to be done by the vendor except deliver¥, whethei' onditioned
upon payment or not, the rig ht of
property pas es to the vendee, at
whose risk it is r etained by the
vendor." In Clark v. Greeley. 62
N. H. 394, it is said: "As a gener:il
rule, under a contract of sale of pecific chattels at a st ipnlat ed priee
when nothing remains to be done
to designate the property sold or the
price to be paid. the title, independently of the statute of fra.u cls, imme diately vests in the buyer and a rig ht
to the price in the seller, unle s it
can he shown that such was not the
intention of the pa rties. Clark v.
Draper, 19 N. H. 419, 421; Ba,iley v.
Smith, 43 N. H. 141, 143; Townsend
v. Hargra-ves, 118 MaRs. 325, 332:
Phillips v. Moor, 71 Me. 7 ; Dixon v.
Yates, 5 B. & Ad. 313. 340. Although
the title passes so as to subject the
buyer to the risk of future injury to
the property, the right of possession
does not pass, but is qependent upon
the payment of the price. In the
absence of any agreement, payment
and delivery are to be concurrent
act , and the seller has the right to
retain the possession until the price
is paid. " In Olyphant v. Baker, 5
Denio (N. Y. ), 379, it is said by B8ardsley, C. J.: '·It is a general rule of the
common law tllat a mere contract
for the sa,le of goods. whore nothing
remain to be done by the seller before ma.king delivery, transfers the
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tion will be operative unless its provisions are waived, as will

be seen in the following chapter; 1 but in the absence of such

a condition the title passes, as already stated.

§ 4-95. . The passing of the title must nevertheless be

constantly distinguished from the delivery of the possession.

For, though the title may have passed, it may well be, as will

be seen hereafter, 2 that the vendor, by virtue of his vendor's

lien, is entitled to retain possession of the goods until the price

is paid. The title to the goods, the liability to pay for them,

and the risk of their loss, may thus all be in the buyer, while

the right to the price and to retain possession of the goods to

secure its payment may be in the seller. And this being true,

it is of course clear that where all the elements of an actual

sale, as distinguished from an executory agreement, are pres-

ent, there is nothing inconsistent in an express stipulation that

the seller shall retain possession until, and as security for, the

payment of the price. 3

§ 496. Or though something remains to be done to
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ascertain the price. — As will be seen hereafter, 4 it is well set-

tled that when something remains to be done by the seller,

such as counting, weighing or measuring, which is necessary

in order to identify the goods or separate them from a larger

mass of which they form a part, the title will not pass until

such act is done, for the reason that until that act is done the

goods are not ascertained or identified. 5 But where the entire

mass is sold, and must be counted, weighed or measured sim-

ply with a view to the ascertainment of the price for the pur-

pose of a settlement, though this act may be presumptively a

right of property, although the price W. R. 902; Sweeney v. Owsley, 14 B.

has not been paid nor the thing sold Mon. (Ky.) 332; Leonard v. Davis, 1

delivered to the purchaser."' To the Black (U. S.). 476.

same effect: Phillips v. Moor, 71 Me. l Soepost, eh. III.

78; Towne v. Davis, 66 N. H. 396, 22 -Seepoa*. § 1474.

Atl. R. 450; Bertelsou v. Bower, 81 3 Arkansas Cattle Co. v. Mann

Ind. 512; Jenkins v. Jarrett, 70 N. C. (1888), 130 U. S. 69.

255; Barrow v. Window. 71 111. 214; 4 See post, § 520.

Thayer v. Davis, 75 Wis. 205, 43 N. 5 See post, § 520.
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condition precedent, as will be seen hereafter, 1 the weight of

authority is to the effect that the title may pass at once

if such appears to have been the intention of the parties, al-

though the goods have not been delivered and the act in ques-

tion has not been done. 2 The distinction is found between a

specific commodity and an indefinite one. 3

g 497. . This distinction was forcibly put in a leading

case 4 as follows: "If the goods sold are clearly identified,

then, although it may be necessary to number, weigh or meas-

condition precedent, as will be seen hereafter,1 th weight of
authority is to the effect that the title may pa at once
if such appears to haye been the intention of th p rti s although the goods have not been deliver d and the act in question has not been done. 2 The <listinction is found between a
specific commodity and an indefinite on .3

ure them in order to ascertain what would be the price of the

whole at a rate agreed upon between the parties, the title

§ 497. - - . This distinction was for ·ibly put in a lea ling

passes. If a flock of sheep be sold at so much a head, and it

is agreed that they shall be counted after the sale in order to

determine the entire price of the whole, the sale is valid and

complete. But if a given number out of the whole are sold,

no title is acquired by the purchaser until they are separated

and their identity thus ascertained and determined. The dis-

tinction in all these cases does not depend so much upon what
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is done as upon the object which is to be effected by it. If

that be specification, the property is not changed; if it be

merely to ascertain the total value at designated rates, the

change of title is effected."

§ 498. . What is thus true where the act is to be done

by the seller is equally true where it is to be performed by the

buyer. Thus, where definite terms are agreed upon concern-

ing specific goods, the title may pass at once, unless a contrary

intention appears, even though, as in the case of the sale of a

i See post, § 525. 223: Kohl v. Lindley, 39 111. 195; Graff

2 Cleveland v. Williams. 29 Tex. v. Fitch, 58 111. 373,11 Am. R. 85;

204, 94 Am. Deo. 274; Crofoot v. Ben- Cook v. Van Home, 76 Wis. 520, 44

nett,2N. Y. 258; Francis-Chenoweth N. W. R. 7G7: Welch v. Spies, 103

Hardware Co. v. Gray, 104 Ala. 236, Iowa, 389, 72 N. W. R. 548.

15 S. R 911; Greene v. Lewis, 85 3 Cunningham v. Ashbrook, 20 Mo.

Ala. 221, 7 Am. St. R. 42; Hagins v. 553; Cleveland v. Williams, supra;

Combs, 102 Ky. 165,43 S. W. R. 222; Crofoot v. Bennett, supra.

Burke v. Shannon (Ky.), 43 S. W. R. 4 Crofoot v. Bennett, 2 N. Y. 258.
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case 4 as follows: "If the good -sold are clearly i 1entifiecl,
then, although it may be neces ary to number, weigh or mea ure them in ortler to ascertain what wou l l be the price of the
whole at a rate agreed upon between the parties, the title
passes. If a flock of sheep be sold at so much a head, and it
is agreed that they shall be counted aft r the sale in onler to
determine the entire price of the whole, the sale is vali l and
complete. But if a given number out of the whole are sold,
no title is acquired by the purchaser until they are separated
and their identity thus ascertained and determined. 1he distinction in all these cases does not depen :l so much upon what
is done as upon the object which is to be effected by it. If
that be specification, the property is not changed; if it be
merely to ascertain the total value at designated rates, the
change of title is effected."

§ 498. - - . What is thus true where the act is to be done
by the seller is equally true where it is to be performed by the
buyer. Thus, where definite terms are agreed npon concerning specific goods, the title may pass at once, unless a contrary
intention appears, even though, as in the case of the sale of a
post, ~ 525.
223; Kohl v. Lindley, 39 Ill. 195; Graff
Cleveland v. Williams. 29 Tex. v. Fitch, 58 Ill. 373, 11 Am. R. 85;
20±, 94 Am. Deu. 274; Crofoot v. Ben- Cook v. Van Horne, 76 Wis. 520, 44
nett, 2 N. Y. 25 ; Francis-Chenoweth N. W . R. 767: Welch v. Spies, 103
Hm·dware Co. v. Gray, 104 Ala. 286, Io~ a, 389, 72 N. W. R. 548.
15 S. R. 911; Greene v. Lewis, 83
3 Cunningham'· Ashbrook, 20 Mo.
Ala. 221, 7 Am. St. R. 42; Hagins v. 553; Cleveland v. Williams, supra;
Comb, 102 Ky. 165, 43 S. W . R. 222; Crofoot v. Bennett, sup1·a.
Burke v. Shannon (Ky.), 43 S. V\T. R.
4 Crofoot v. Bennett, 2 N. Y. 258.
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stack of hay, the buyer is ye't to weigh or bale it. 1 In a Ken-

tucky case, 2 marked " not to be officially reported," the court

said : " Where one purchases personal property of another, and

the buyer leaves it with the seller until the performance of

i Burke v. Shannon (Ky.), 43 S. W.

R. 223; Kohl v. Lindley, 39 111. 195;

Phillips v. Moor, 71 Me. 78.

2 Burke v. Shannon, supra.

It is said in Joyce v. Adams, 8 N. Y.

291 : " It is a general rule of law that

where a contract is made for the pur-

chase of goods, and nothing is said

about payment or delivery, the prop-

erty passes immediately, so as to cast

upon the purchaser all future risk, if

nothing further remains to be done

to the goods, although he cannot take
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them away without payment of the

price. But if anything remains to

be done on the part of the seller, as

between him and the buyer, such as

weighing, measuring or counting out

of a common parcel before the goods

purchased are to be delivered, until

that is done the right of property has

not attached in the buyer, and the

future risk, of course, remains with

the seller." In this case the price was

undetermined and the contract did

not provide the method of determin-

ing it; so it was held that the risk

was with the seller. On the other

hand, in the application of a like rule

in Burke v. Shannon (Ky.), 43 S. W.

R. 223, the court held the risk of loss

was in the purchaser when the duty

fell upon him to ascertain the price

in a method which the contract pro-

vided. So also where butter in fir-

kins was sold at a fixed price per

firkin it was held the title had passed

without payment of the price for

which the buyer was liable. Seckel

v. Scott, 66 111. 106.

Where the contract furnished a cri-

terion for ascertaining the price, as

when on any day the seller might

name it should be a certain amount

less than the price of like articles on

that day at another city, it was held

that the property passed to the ven-

dee upon delivery of the goods*, al-

though the amount of the price was

not fixed. McConnell v. Hughes. 29

Wis. 537. Likewise, where a certain

barn of hay was sold at a fixed price

per ton, the buyer to weigh the hay,

it was held the title passed, ami. al-

though the property was destroyed,

the buyer was liable for the price.

Phillips v. Moor, 71 Me. 78. So in

Francis-Chenoweth Hardware Co. v.

Gray, 104 Ala. 236, 15 S. R. 911, where

there was a sale of a stock of goods

in payment of a debt, the goods yet

to be inventoried and the price thus

determined to be so applied to the

payment, any discrepancies to be

§ 499.J
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subsequent acts by the buyer, such as weighing, measuring, or

otherwise ascertaining the quantity, it is left at the risk of the

buyer, unless there is an express contract to the contrary; the

title having passed immediately upon the trade being closed."

subsequent acts by the buyer, such as weighing, measuring, or
other\\~ise ascertaining the quantity, it is left at the ri k of the
buyer, un1es there is an express contract to the contrary; the
title having passed immediately upon the trade being closed."

§499. The question is one of intention. — It has been de-

cided, 1 said Judge Cooley in one case, 2 "that the question

whether a sale is completed or only executory is usually one

to be determined from the intent of the parties as gathered

from their contract, the situation of the thing sold, and the

circumstances surrounding the sale; that where the goods sold

to the purchaser, notwithstanding

the fact that the price be undeter-

mined. Greene v. Lewis, 85 Ala. 221,

4 S. R. 740, 7 Am. St. R. 42; Phiferv.

Erwin, 100 N. C. 59, 6 S. E. R. 672.

§ 4:99. The que tion is one of intent ion.- It has been decicled,1 said Judge Cooley in one case,2 "that the question
whether a sale is completed or only executory is usually one
to be determined from the intent of the parties as gathered
from their contract, the situation of the thing sold, and the
circumstances surrounding the sale; that where the goods sold

In Sanger v. Waterbury, 116 N. Y.
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371, 22 N. E. R. 404, it was held that

where a certain number of bags of

coffee were bought to be taken from

a larger number of bags, but so

marked as to be easily distinguish-

able, the title passed, although the

coffee must needs be weighed for the

purpose of ascertaining the price.

Likewise, when standing timber was

bought for the purpose of being con-

verted into wood, to be paid for at so

much a cord, the title passes to the

wood that is cut and the price of this

may be recovered although it be de-

stroyed by fire. Upson v. Holmes,

51 Conn. 500.

Where all the corn in two cribs

was sold at so much a bushel, the

title may pass at once, if such ap-

pears to be the intention, even though

the seller has the right to retain for

his own use two or three hundred

bushels. Welch v. Spies, 103 Iowa,

389, 72 N. W. R. 548.

1 In Lingham v. Eggleston, 27 Mich.

324.

2 Byles v. Colier, 54 Mich. 1 [refer-

ring, for the same conclusion, to

Hatch v. Fowler, 28 Mich. 205; Hahn

v. Fredericks, 30 Mich. 223, 18 Am. R.

119; Wilkinson v. Holiday, 33 Mich.

386; Grant v. Merchants' Bank, 35

Mich. 515; Scotten v. Sutter, 37 Mich.

526; Carpenter v. Graham, 42 Mich.

191; Brewer v. Salt Association, 47

Mich. 526. Judge Cooley refers also

to Kelsea v. Haines, 41 N. H. 246;

Southwestern Freight Co. v. Stan-

ard, 44 Mo. 71, 100 Am. Dec. 255;

Shelton v. Franklin, 68 111. 333; Straus

v. Minzesheimer, 78 111. 492; Crofoot

v. Bennett, 2 N. Y. 258; Groat v. Gile,

51 N. Y. 431; Burrows v. Whitaker,

71 N. Y. 291, 27 Am. R. 42; Dennis v.

Alexander, 3 Pa. St. 50; Calloway v.

Week, 54 Wis. 604; Cay wood v. Tim-

mons, 31 Kan. 394]. To same effect

also: Hood v. Bloch, 29 W. Va. 244,

11 S. E. R. 910; Wadhams v. Balfour,

32 Oreg. 813, 51 Pac. R. 642; Barker

v. Freeland, 91.Tenn. 112, 18 S. W. R.

to the purchaser, notwithstanding ring, for the same oonc1u ion, to
the fact that the price be undeter- Hatch v. Fowler, 2 Mich. 205; Hahn
mined. Greene v. Lewi , 5 Ala. 221, v. Fredericks, 30 1\lich. 293, 18 Am. R.
4 S. R. 740, 7 Am. St. R. 42; Phifer v. 119; Wilkinson v. Holiday, 33 Mich.
Erwin, 100 N. C. 59, 6 S. E. R. 672.
3 6; Grant v. Merchants' Bank, 35
In Sanger v. Waterbury, 116 N. Y. Mich. 515; Scotten v. Sutter, 37 'lich.
371, 22 N. E. R. 404, it was held that 526; Carpenter v. Graham, 42 Mich.
where a certa.in .number of bags of 191; Brewer v. Salt Association, 47
coffee were bought to be ta.ken from Mich. 526. Judge Cooley refers also
a larger number of bags, but so · to Kelsea v. Haines, 41 N. H. 246;
marked as to be easily distinguish- Southwestern Freight Co. v. Stanable, the title passed, although the ard, 4:4 Mo. 71, 100 Am. Dec. 255;
coffee must needs be weighed for the Shelton v. Franklin, 68 Ill. 333; St.raus
purpose of ascertaining tlie price. v. Minzesheimer, 78 Ill. 492; Crofoot
Likewise, when tanding timber was v. Bennett, 2 N. Y. 258; Groat v. Gile,
bought for the purpose of being con- 51 N. Y. 431; Burrows v. Whitaker,
verted into wood, to be paid for at so 71 N. Y. 291, 27 Am. R. 42; Denn is v.
much a cord, the title pas es to the Alexander, 3 Pa. St. 50 ; Galloway v.
wood that is cut and the price of this Week, 54 Wis. 604; Caywood v. Tim·
may be recovered although it be de- mons, 31 Kan. 394]. To same effect
stroyed by fire. Upson v. Holmes, also: Ifood v. Bloch, 29 W. Va. 244,
51 Conn. 500.
11 S. E. R. 910; Wad hams v. Balfour,
Where all the corn in two cribs 32 Oreg. 813, 51 Pac. R. G42; Barker
wa sold at so much a bushel, the v. Freeland, 91, Tenn. 112, 18 S. W . R.
title may pa · at once, if such ap- 60; Restad v. Engemoen, 65 Minn.
pear tobetheintention,eventhough 148, 67 N. W. R. 1146; \ V"agar v.
the eller has the right to retain for Detroit, etc. R. Co., 79 Mich. 648, 44
hi own u e two or thl'ee hundred N. W.R. 1113; Day v. Gravel (1898),
bu h ls. Welch v. Spies, 103 Iowa., 72 Minn. 159, 75 N. W. R. 1; Bo well
3 9. 72 N. ·w. R. 54 .
v. Green, 25 N. J. L. 390; Pacific
1 In Lingham v. Eggleston, 27 Mich.
Lounge Co. v. Rude beck, 15 \ Vash.
324.
336, 46 Pac. R. 392.
2 Byles v. Colier, 54 'lich. 1 [refer412
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are designated, so that no question can arise as to the thing in-

tended, it is not absolutely essential that there should be a

delivery, or that the goods should be in a deliverable condition,

or that the quantity or quality, when the price depends upon

either, should be determined; these being circumstances indi-

cating intent, but not conclusive; but that where anything is

to be done by the vendor, or by the mutual concurrence of both

parties, for the purpose of ascertaining the price of the goods,

as by weighing, testing or measuring them, where the price is

to depend upon the quantity or quality of the goods, the per-

formance of these things, in the absence of anything indicating

a contrary intent, is to be deemed presumptively a condition

precedent to the transfer of the property, although the indi-

vidual goods be ascertained, and they appear to be in a state

in which they may be and ought to be accepted."

Many other cases, some of which are referred to in the note,

show how fully the question is one of the intention of the par-

ties. 1
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1 In Towne v. Davis, 66 N. H. 396,

22 Atl. R. 450, the question was

whether the title had passed to a

quantity of hay sold at auction.

"This," said the court, "is a question

of the intention and understanding

of the parties, which is a question of

fact. A referee has found that the

title did not pass, and the verdict

must stand if there was evidence

competent to sustain it.

" As between the parties, neither

delivery nor payment is necessary to

a completed sale except when re-

quired by the statute of frauds.

Clark v. Draper, 19 N. H. 419, 421;

Bailey v. Smith, 43 N. H. 141, 143;

Clark v. Greeley, 62 N. H. 394. At

the common law an agreement for

the present sale of specific chattels

casts on the buyer the risk of loss.

But if anything remains to be done

between the parties to identify the

goods sold, or to determine the price

to be paid, the sale is not complete

so as to pass the title, unless it may

be inferred from the evidence that

the parties intended the title should

pass at once. If the goods are sold

by number, weight, measure, or the

like, the sale is prima facie not com-

plete till the quantity is ascertained,

and if they are mixed with others,

not until they are separated and des-

ignated. Warren v. Buckminster, 24

N. H. 336; Fuller v. Bean, 34 N. H.

290; Ockington v. Richey, 41 N. H.

275; Prescott v. Locke, 51 N. H. 94.

" The general doctrine on this sub-

ject is, that when something remains

to be done in relation to the articles

which are the subject of the sale, as

that of weighing or measuring, and

there is no evidence tending to

show an intention of the parties to

make an absolute and complete sale,
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§ 500. Rules for determining the intention.— In order to

aid in ascertaining the intention in doubtful cases, certain rules

have been formulated, based upon the presumed iutention of

aid in ascertajning the intention in doubtful cases, certain rules
have been formulated, based upon the presumed intention of

the performance of such act is a pre-

requisite to the consummation of

the contract; and until it is per-

formed the property does not pass to

the vendee. But in the case of sales

where the property to be sold is in a

state ready for delivery, and the pay-

ment of money or giving security

therefor is not a condition precedent

to the transfer, it may well be the

understanding of the parties that the

s de is perfected and the interest

passes immediately to the vendee,
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although the weight or measure ,of

the articles sold remains yet to be

ascertained. Such a case presents a

question of the intention of the par-

ties to the contract. The party af-

firming the sale must satisfy the jury

that it was intended to be an abso-

lute transfer, and all that remained

to be done was merely for the pur-

pose of ascertaining the price of the

articles sold at the rate agreed upon.

Riddle v. Varnum, 20 Pick. (Mass.)

280, 283, 284.

" The terms of the sale were ' cash,

or a bankable note,' and this fact is

to be considered in determining

whether the parties intended a com-

pleted sale. If by the use of these

terms the parties understood merely

that no credit was to be given, and

that the seller would insist on his

right to retain possession of the hay

until the price was paid or secured,

the sale might still be so far com-

pleted and absolute that the prop-

erty would pass; but if it was the

understanding that the hay was to

remain the property of the seller

until the price was paid or secured,

the sale was conditional, and the

title would not pass, even on deliv-

ery, without performance of the con-

dition. Clark v. Greeley, 62 N. H.

394, 396.

" In Paul v. Reed, 52 N. H. 136. the

buyer, moving into the seller's house,

examined and selected a hog, some

butter, sugar, tea and other articles,

and agreed to take them at certain

prices. He mixed the sugar with

his own, changed the hog to another

pen, and took out his pocket-book to

pay for them; but at that moment

the money clue for the price was at-

tached by a creditor of the seller,

and the seller took back his goods.

The question was whether the title

was vested in the purchaser. The

court say: 'The question then is

whether the delivery here was abso-

lute, intending to pass the title to the

the performance of such act is a prerequisite to the consummation of
the contract; and until it is performed the property does not pass to
the vendee. But in the case of sales
where the property to be sold is in a
state ready for delivery, and the payment of money or giving security
therefor is not. a condition precedent
to the transfer, it may well be the
understanding of the parties that the
s 1le is perfected and the interest
passes immediately to the vendee,
although the weight or measure of
the articles sold remains yet to be
a certained. Such a case presents a
question of the intention of the parties to the contract. The party affirming the sale must satisfy the jury
that it was intended to be an absolute transfer, and a ll that remained
to be done was merely for the purpose of ascertaining the price of the
articles sold at the rate agreed upon.
Riddle v. Varn um, 20 Pick. (Mass.)
2 0, 283, 284.
" The terms of the sale were 'cash
or a bankable note,' and this fact is
to be considered in determining
whether the parties intended a completed sale. If by the use of these
terms the parties understood merely
that no credit was to be given, and
t.hat the seller wonld insi t on his
right to retain possession of the hay
until the price was paid or secured,
the sale might &till be so far completed and absolute that the property would pass; but if it was the
understanding that the hay was to
remain the property of the seller
until the price was paid or secured,
the sale was conditional, and the

title would. not pass, even on delivery, without performan e of the condition. Clark v. Gr eeley, 62 N. H.
394, 396.

" In Paul v. Reed, 52 N. H. 136. the
buyer, moving into the seller's hou e,
examined and selected a hog, some
butter, sugar, tea and other article ,
and agreed to take the m at certain
prices. He mixed the sugar with
his O\.v n, cha nged the hog to another
pen, and t ook out his po ket-book to
pay for them; but at that moment
the money due for the price was atfached by a creditor of the seller,
and the seller took back his goods.
The que~·tion was whether the title
was vested in the purchaser. The
court say: 'The question then is
whether the delivery here was absolute, intending to pass the title to the
vendee and trust him for the price,
or whether it was made with the expectation that the ca h would be
paid immediately on delivery. This
is a question of fact, but it is submitted to the court for decision. Ordinarily it should be passed upon at
the trial term.' . . . Assuming
that the questions both of law and
fact were r e er ved, the court found
that the goods were sold for cash,
and of course that the deli very of the
goods and the payment of the price
were to be simultaneous; and that
when a part had been delivered, a nd
the seller was figuring up the amount
and the buyer had taken out his
money to pay the price, the act was
a rrested by the service of proce s,
the sale was not completed, and the
title had not vested in the buyer."
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the parties in such cases, which will often be of service in mak-

ing the issues clear, or will turn the scales where they would

otherwise be balanced.

Many cases, of course, need no such aid ; for the parties have

themselves made their intention plain. In many cases, also,

the parties have expressly interposed conditions in the way of

the transfer of the title, — and these will be considered in the

following chapter; but the rules in question are not designed

to apply to cases of that nature. They are designed to aid in

answering this question: Where the parties have bargained

concerning specific chattels, but have not by their contract im-

posed express conditions, or otherwise made their intention

clear, when will the title pass ?

The rules, moreover, it must be understood, are not fixed

principles of law, but simply presumptions as to intention, to be

applied where the intention of the parties is not already clear.

They must, therefore, like similar rules which govern in the

construction of wills, be applied constantly subject to this pro-
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viso: — "unless a contrary intention appears."

§ 501. . These rules have been stated in many forms,

but, in substance, including the proviso, they are:

1. "Where the terms Of the contract have been definitely

agreed upon, and the goods have been specifically ascertained,

and nothing remains to be done by the seller except to deliver

the goods, or by the buyer except to pay for them, the title will,

unless a contrary intention appears, vest at once in the buyer,

even though the goods have not been delivered or paid for.

In this case, as has been seen, the buyer may retain posses-

sion until the goods are paid for; but it is possession which he

thus retains and not title.

2. Where, by the agreement, the vendor of specific goods is

bound to do something to the goods for the purpose of putting

them into that condition in which the buyer is bound to accept

them, the title will not pass, in the absence of evidence show-

ing an intention to the contrary, until such thing is done.

3. Where, though the specific goods are in a deliverable con-

41. I
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dition, there still remains some act, like measuring, weighing

or testing, in order to determine the price, where the price is

to depend upon the quantity or quality of the goods, the title

usually will not pass, in the absence of evidence of an intention

to the contrary, until this act is done.

The first of these rules has been already considered in the

present chapter; the other two, with many other forms of

more express conditions, will be dealt with in the following

chapter.

§ 502. Question of intention, by whom decided.— The ques-

tion of the intention of the parties is usually one to be deter-

mined from all the facts and circumstances surrounding the

particular case, and, like such questions generally, is pre-emi-

nently a question to be determined by a jury. 1

dition, there still remains some act, like measuring, weighing
or testing, in order to determine the price, where the price is
to depend upon the quantity or quality of the goods, the title
usually will not pass, in the absence of evidence of an ·intention
to the contrary, until this act is done.
The first of these rules has been already considered in the
present chapter; the other two, with many other forms of
more express conditions, will be dealt with in the following
chapter.

Where, however, the facts are not disputed, and the only

§ 502. Question of intention, by whom decided .-The ques-

question is one as to their legal effect, the determination is for

the court. 2 And so where the whole contract is reduced to

writing, the question whether it operates as a present transfer
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of the title is likewise for the court. 3

1 Riddle v. Varnum, 20 Pick. (Mass.) and whenever a dispute arises as to

280; Lingharn v. Eggleston, 27 Mich, the true character of the agreement,

324; Byles v. Colier, 54 Mich. 1; Cun- the question of intent is rather one

ningham v. Ashbrook. 20 Mo. 553; of fact than one of law; and the find-

Bates v. Conkling, 10 "Wend. (N. Y.) ing of the trial court, when sustained

389; Olyphant v. Baker, 5 Denio by the evidence, will not be disturbed

(N. Y.), 379; Bogy v. Rhodes, 4 Greene upon review." To same effect, OTar-

(Iowa), 133; Towne v. Davis, 66 N. H. rel v. McClure, — Kan. App. — , 47

396, 22 Atl. R. 450; Kneeland v. Ren- Pac. R. 160; Towne v. Davis, supra.

ner, 2 Kan. App. 451, 43 Pac. R. 95; ^ Merchants' Nat. Bank v. Bangs,

Graff v. Fitch, 58 111. 373, 11 Am. 102 Mass. 291; Wigton v. Bowley, 130

R. 85. Mass. 252; Kerr v. Henderson, 62 N.

tion of the intention of the parties is usually one to be determined from all the facts and circumstances surrounding the
particular case, and, like such questions generally, is pre-eminently a question to be determined by a jury. 1
Where, however, the facts are not dispnted, and the onlyquestion is one as to their legal effect, the determination is for
the court. 2 And so where the whole contract is reduced to
writing, the question whether it operates as a present transfer
of the title is likewise for the court. 3

In Kneeland v. Renner, supra, the J. L. 724, 42 Atl. R. 1073; Smalley v.

court said: " In a contract of sale of Hendrickson, 29 N. J. L. 371.

personal property the intent of the 3 Leonard v. Davis, 1 Black (IT. S.),

parties controls, and if they intended 476; Rail v. Little Falls Lumber Co.,

a present vesting of the title, the 47 Minn. 422, 50 N. W. R. 471; First

title may in fact pass at once to the Nat. Bank v. Reno, 73 Iowa, 145, 34

purchaser, although the actual de- N. W. R 796; Ruthrauff v. Hagen-

livery is to be made subsequently; buch, 58 Pa. St. 103.
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title may in fact pass at once to the Nat. Bank v. Reno, 73 Iowa, 145, 34
purcha er, although the actual de- N. W. R. 796; Ruthrauff v. Hagenlivery i to be made subsequently; buch, 58 Pa. St. 103.
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CHAPTER III.

OF THE CONDITIONAL SALE OF SPECIFIC CHATTELS.

§ 503. Purpose of this chapter.

504-506. What classes of cases to be

considered.

L Where Goods are to be Pre-

pared for Delivery.

507, 508. Where specific goods are

CHAPTER III.

to be completed or prepared

for delivery, no title passes

' until this is done.

OF THE CONDITIONAL SALE OF SPECIFIC CHATTELS.

509-511. Unless a contrary inten-

tion appears.

512. But title will pass when

required act is done.

513. Effect of part performance of

condition.

514 Effect of earnest or part pay-

ment.

519.
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518.

IL Where Goods are to be Meas-

ured, Weighed or Tested.

515-517. Title to goods not de-

livered presumptively does

not pass if goods are yet to

be weighed, measured or

tested to ascertain price.

— Presumption not conclu-

sive.

— Broader rule in some

States.

520, 521. Nor where goods are yet

to be measured, etc., with a

view to identification.

§ 525-597. How where whole body of
§ 503. Purpose of this chapter.
goods is delivered to buyer.
504-506. "\'Vhat cla ses of cases to be
528. - - What delivery sufficient.
considered.
529, 530. - - How when contemL WHERE GOODS ARE TO BE PREplated method fail .
PARED FOR DELIVERY.
531. Effect of part performance.
507, 50 . Where spe ific goods are
532. Effect of earne t or part payto be completed or prepared
ment.
for delivery, no title pas es
Ill WHERE BUYER I TO DO SOMEuntil this is done.
THING OTHER THAN TO PAY
509-511. Unle s a contrary intenPRICE.
tion appears.
512. - - But title will pas when
533. What here included.
required act. is done.
534, 535. Title will not pass till act
513. Effe t of part performance of
performed.
condition.
536. Unle s a contrary intention
514. Effect of earne tor part payappears.
ment.

522, 523. Nor where goods are yet

to be measured, etc., in order

to ascertain if they comply

IL

WHERE GOODS ARE TO BE MEASURED, WEIGHED OR TESTED.

with contract.

524 By whom weighing, etc., to be

done.

27 417

goods is delivered to buyer.

528. What delivery sufficient.

518.

plated method fails.

531. Effect of part performance.

519.

532. Effect of earnest or part pay-

ment.

IIL Where Buyer is to do Some-

520,

thing Other than to Pay

Price.

533. What here included.

534. 535. Title will not pass till act

522,

performed.

536. Unless a contrary intention

appears.

IV. Where Payment of Price is a

Condition Precedent.

537. What here included.

1. Payment of Price as Implied Con-

dition Precedent.

538, 539. In general — Payment as

condition precedent when

sale for cash.

Payment as implied condition

where sale expressly for

cash.

Meaning of "cash sale."

524.

WHERE PAYMENT OF PRICE IS A
Co ·mTION PRECEDENT.

537. What here included.
not delivered pre umpth·ely does 1. Payment of Price as Implied Condition Precedent.
not pas if good are yet to
be weighed, me<:t ured or
538, 539. In general- Payment as
tested to ascertain price.
condition precedent when
- - Presumption not conclusale for ca h.
sive.
540. Payment as implied condition
- - Broader rule in some
where sale expressly for
States.
ca h.
521. Nor where goods are yet
541. - - Meaning of " ea.sh sale. '
to be mea ured, etc., with a
542. - - Title may pas though
view to identification.
po ses ion retained - Pay523. Nor where goods are yet
ment and delivery concurto be measured, etc., in order
rent.
to ascertain if they comply
543, 544. - - Or title may not pass
with contract.
until payment.
By whom weighing, etc., to be
545. - - Check or draft not pay·
done.
ment.
I

515-517. Title to good

§ 525-527. How where whole body of

529, 530. How when contem-

IV.

27
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§ 546, 547. Giving of note or security

as condition precedent.

548. Consideration for condi-

tion.

549. Waiver of condition of pay-

ment or security.

550. Delivery to carrier as

waiver.

551-553. Further of waiver.

554. Goods may be retaken if con-

dition not performed.

555. Even from bona fide pur-

chaser.

556. Clearly from attaching

creditors, etc.

557. Usage does not defeat.

2. Payment of Price as Express Con-
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dition Precedent, and herein

of "Conditional Sales" or

"Instalment Contracts.''-

558. Formal contracts of so-called

"conditional sales."

559. Confusion respecting name.

560. What is a conditional sale.

561. 562. What varieties pos-

sible.

563. What here meant by

"conditional sale."

564. Validity and form of " condi-

tional sale."

565. Contract in form absolute

shown to be conditional.

566. Express promise co pay

does not render absolute.

567. Construction of such con-

tracts.

568. Declaration of parties not

conclusive.

569-571. Instruments in form

of lease held conditional con-

tracts to sell.

572, 573. Instruments in form

of lease held sales upon con-

dition subsequent.

574-576. Instruments in form

of lease held absolute sales |

418

reserving lien or chattel

mortgages.

577-579. Instruments in form

of conditional sale held ab-

solute reserving lien or mort-

gages.

580, 581. The rule in Pennsyl-

vania.

Bailment and conditional

sale distinguished.

Conditional sale and chat-

tel mortgage distinguished.

The true theory.

On conditional contract to sell

no title passes until perform-

ance.

Note not payment.

587. Nature of interest acquired by

vendee.

Whether assignable or

leviable.

reserving lien or chattel
§ 546, 547. Giving of n ote or security
mortgages.
as condition precedent.
548. - - Consideration for condi- § 577-579. - - Instruments in form
of conditional sale held abtion.
solute reserving lien or mort549. Waiver of condition of paygages.
ment or security.
580, 581. - - The rule in PennsylG50. - - Deli very to carrier as
vania.
waiver.
582.
- Bailment and conditional
551-553. Further of waiver.
sale di tinguished.
554. Goods may be retaken if con583. - - Conditional ale and chatdition not performed.
tel mortgage distinguished.
555. - - Even from bona fide pur584. - - The true theory.
chaser.
·5S3. On con litional con tract to sell
556. - - Clearly from attaching
11 title passes until I er fo rmcreditors, etc.
ance.
557. - - Usage does not defeat.
586. - - Note not payment.
2. Payment of Price as Express Con587. Nature of intere t acquired by
dition Precedent. and herein
vendee.
of " Conditional Sales " or
588. - - Whether assignable or
"Instalrnent Contracts."
le viable.
558. Formal contracts of so-called
589. - - Entitled to legal protection.
"conditional sales."
559. Confusion r especting name.
590. - - P erformance of condition
560. What is a conditional sale.
inures to benefit of trans561, 562. - - What varieties posferee.
591. Nature of interest retained. by
sible.
563. - - What here meant by
vendor.
"conditional sale."
592. - - Interest may be sold,
564. Validity and form of "condiseized, etc.
tional sale."
593. - - May assign interest with
565. - - Contract in form absolute
contract.
shown to be conditional.
594-596. The right of possession.
566. - - Express promise ~o pay
597, 598. Condition good against
does not render absolute.
creditors of vendee.
567. Construction of such con599, 600. Condition good against
tracts.
bona fide purc;haser.
568. - - Declaration of parties not
601, f)02. - - But not where goods
conclusive.
bought for resale.
569-571. - - Instruments in form
603, 604. Statutes r equiring filing
of lease helcl conditional conor r ecording of contract.
tract to sell.
605. Default by purchaser- What
572, 573. - - Instruments in form
constitutes.
of lease held sales upon con606-608. Effect of vendee's dedition sub equent.
fault.
574-576. - - Instruments in form
609-612. Waiver of default by
of lease held absolute sales
seller.
418
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§ 613, 614. Remedies of seller upon

default.

615. What choice offered.

616. Election of remedy.

617. Rescission.

618. Recaption.

619. Personal action.

620-623. Does recovery of goods

bar action for price?

624. Waiver by vendor of right

to retake property.

625. Vendee usually has no elec-

tion.

626. 627. Vendee's right to take pos-

session on default — Entry

on premises — License.

628. Necessity of demand before

recovery.
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629. Return of payments if prop-

erty retaken by seller.

630. Equities of purchaser.

631. How when action against

third person.

632. 633. Return of notes re-

ceived.

634, 635. Destruction of property

before payment.

636. Additions to or increase of

property before payment.

637. Additions to stock of

goods sold.

638-641. Changes in form or nature

of property.

642. Accession and confusion of

goods.

643. Substitution of goods.

644-647. Effect of annexing goods

to land.

648-650. Conflict of laws.

V. Contracts of Sale Subject to

Other Conditions.

651. In general

1. Sale of Goods "to Arrive."

652. Such contracts conditioned

on arrival of the goods.

5 653. Contracts limiting time of

shipment.

654. Giving notice of name of ship.

655. Classification of cases.

2. Sale of Goods " to be Shipped."

656. Such contracts conditional.

3. Sale on Approval.

657. Sale, if goods are approved.

658. Title and risk pending ap-

proval.

659. Within what time option to

be exercised.

660. Effect of failure to return

within time fixed.

661. Necessity for notice of disap-

proval.

662. How notice to be given.

4. Sale if Goods Satisfactory to

Buyer.

663. Sale if buyer satisfied.

064. Who to be satisfied.

66o. If buyer not satisfied, no sale.

666. Reasons for his dissatisfac-

tion.

~§

503, 504.J

LAW OF

ALE.

[nooK

II.

§§ 503, 504.]

§ 677. Nature of title acquired by

vendee — Risk of loss.

678. Option usually vendee's only —

Security of seller.

679. Stipulations reserving

title.

680. Form of option.

681. Within what time option ex-

ercised.

682. Effect of not returning in

time prescribed.

683. How, when buyer puts it out

of his power to return.

684 How, when return becomes

impossible.

685. How return effected.

8. Sale with Option in Vendee to Re-

take.
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686. Title in vendee until option

exercised.

§ 677. Nature of title acquired by § 687. Waiver of option.
vendee -Risk of loss.
9. Sale with Right in Vendee to R<?
678. Option usually vendee's onlypurchase.
Security of seller.
679. Stipulations reserving
688. Title in vendee until right extitle.
erci ·ed.
680. Form of option.
689. Such contracts strictly con681. Within what time option exstrued.
erci ed.
690. Within what time right exer6 2. Effect of not returning in
cised.
time prescribed.
691. Interests in goods before re683. How, when buyer puts it out
purchase.
of his power to return.
684. How, when return becomes· 10. Sale to be Void if Vendor Pnys.
impo sible.
692. Such contracts valid.
6 5. How return effected.
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687. "Waiver of option.

9. Sale with Right in Vendee to Re-

purchase.

688. Title in vendee until right ex-

ercised.

8. Sale with Option in Vendee to Re-

take.
686. Title in vendee until option
exercised.

11. Sale to be Void if Vendee Does
Not Pay.
693. Such coutracts valid.

689. Such contracts strictly con-

strued.

690. Within what time right exer-

cised.

691. Interests in goods before re-

purchase.

10. Sale to be Void if Vendor Pays.

692. Such contracts valid.

11. Sale to be Void if Vendee Does

Not Pay.

693. Such contracts valid.

§ 503. Purpose of this chapter. — In the preceding chapter

there has been considered the case of the unconditional sale

of a specific chattel. But, as has been already intimated, this

is but one of a number of forms which the contract may as-

sume, each of which requires special consideration. The one

most closely allied to the form discussed in the foregoing chap-

ter is, perhaps, the case in which the chattel is, as there, iden-

§ 503. Purpose of this cllapter.-In the preceding chapter
there bas been considered the case of the unconditional sale
of a specific chattel. But, as has been already intimated, this
is but one of a number of forms which the contract may assume, each of which requires special con ideration. The one
most clo ely allied to the form discussed in the foregoing chapt er is, perhaps, the case in which the chattel is, as there, identified and certain, but in which the contract for its sale is subject to conditions, express or implied, and either precedent or
subsequent.

tified and certain, but in which the contract for its sale is sub-

ject to conditions, express or implied, and either precedent or

subsequent.

§ 5<M. What classes of cases to be considered. — The forms

which the conditional contract of sale may assume are various.

Two classes of cases were, by Lord Blackburn, said to arise, for

which he laid down the following rules, the substance of

which has already been referred to in another connection in

the preceding chapter:

First. "Where by the agreement the vendor is to do any-

thing to the goods for the purpose of putting them into that

state in which the purchaser is to be bound to accept them,

420

§ 504:. What classes of cases to be considered.-The forms
which the condit:onal contract of sale may assume are various.
Two classes of cases were, by Lord Blackburn, said to arise, for
which he laid down the following rules, the substance of
which has already been referred to in another connection in
the preceding chapter:
First. Where by the agreement the ve-qdor is to do anything to the goods for the purpose of putting them into that
state in which the purchaser ~s to be bound to accept them,
490

OH. III.] CONDITIONAL SALE OF SPECIFIC CHATTEL'S. [§ 504.

or, as it is sometimes worded, into a deliverable state, the per-

formance of those things shall, in the absence of circumstances

indicating a contrary intention, be taken to be a condition

precedent to the vesting of the property.

Secondly. Where anything remains to be done to the goods,

for the purpose of ascertaining the price, as by weighing,

measuring or testing the goods, where the price is to depend

on the quantity or quality of the goods, the performance of

these things also shall be a condition precedent to the transfer

of the property, although the individual goods be ascertained,

and they are in the state in which they ought to be accepted.

But this rule has not been followed to this extent in this

country, as will be seen, and Lord Blackburn himself did not

approve of it. 1

iLord Blackburn says of these

rules: " The first of these rules seems

to be founded in reason. In general,

it is for the benefit of the vendor
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that the property should pass; the

risk of loss is thereby transferred to

the purchaser, and as the vendor

may still retain possession of the

goods so as to retain a security for

the payment of the price, the trans-

ference of the property is to the

vendor pure gain. It is therefore

reasonable that where, by the agree-

ment, the vendor is to do something

before he can call upon the pur-

chaser to accept the goods as corre-

sponding to the agreement, the in-

tention of the parties should be taken

to be that the vendor was to do this

before he obtained the benefit of the

transfer of the property. The pre-

sumption does not arise if the things

might be done after the vendor had

put the goods in the state in which

he had a right to call upon the pur-

chaser to accept them, and would be

unreasonable where the acts were to

be done by the buyer, who would

thus be rewarded by his own de-

fault.

"The second rule seems to be

somewhat hastily adopted from the

civil law, without adverting to the

great distinction made by the civil-

ians between a sale for a certain

price in money and an exchange for

anything else. The English law

makes no such distinction, but, as it

seems, has adopted the rule of the

civil law, which seems to have no

foundation except in that distinc-

tion.

" In general, the weighing, etc.,

must from the nature of things be

intended to be done before the buyer

takes possession of the goods, but

that is quite a different thing from

intending it to be done before the

vesting of the property; and as it

must in general be intended that

both the parties shall concur in the

act of weighing, when the price is to

depend upon the weight, there seems

little reason why, in cases in which

the specific goods are agreed upon,

§§ 505-507.]
§§ 505-507.] LAW OF SALE. [dook II.

§ 505. . To these two rules of Lord Blackburn, Mr. Ben-

jamin added a third, as follows:

Thirdly. Where the buyer is by the contract to do anything

as a condition, either precedent or concurrent, on which the

passing of the property depends, the property will not pass

until the condition be fulfilled, even though the goods may

have been actually delivered into the possession of the buyer.

The thing which the buyer is thus to do under this rule is,

usually, to pay the price ; but it may be something else, as will

be seen.

To these three must clearly be added another, as follows:

Fourthly. Where, by the terras of the contract, any other

act or event is made a condition of the passing of the title, the

property will not pass unless and until such act or event hap-

pens or the performance is waived.

§ 506. . These cases will be seen to be, in brief:

1. Where the seller is yet to prepare the goods for delivery.

2. Where something remains to be done to ascertain the price.
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3. Where the buyer is to do something, other than to pay the

price, before he acquires the title, even though he may already

have possession. 4. Where the buyer is to pay the price be-

fore he acquires the title. 5. Where the sale is made upon

some other condition.

LA.W

SA.LE.
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§ 505. - - . To these two rules of Lord Blackburn, Mr. Benjamin added a third, as follows:
Thirdly. Where the buyer is by the contract to do anything
as a condition, either precedent or concurrent, on which the
passing of the property depends, the property will not pass
until the condition be fulfilled, even though the goods may
have been actually delivered into the possession of the buyer.
The thing which the buyer is thus to do under this rule is,
usually, to pay the price; but it may be something else, as will
be seen.
To these three must clearly be added another, as follows:
Fourthly. Where, by the terms of the contract, any other
act or event is made a condition of the passing of the title, the
property will not pass unless and until such act or event happens or the performance is waived.

Taking these up in their order, there may be considered —

I.

Where Goods are to be Prepared foe Delivery.

§ 507. Where specific goods are to be completed or pre-

pared for delivery no title passes until this is done. — Where,

though the goods are identified, the seller is, by the terms of

tention of tlie parties to render the definition of a perfect sale, transfer-

delay of that act, in which the buyer ring the risk and gain of the thing

is to concur, beneficial to him. sold; but the English law does not

Whilst the price remains unascer- require that the consideration for a

tained, the sale is clearly not for a bargain and sale should be in moneys

certain sum of money, and therefore numbered, provided it be of value.'*

does not come within the civilian's Blackburn on Sales, 175.

422

§ 506. - - . These cases will be seen to be, in brief:
1. Where the seller is yet to prepare the goods for delivery.
2. Where something remains to be done to ascertain the price.
3. Where the buyer is to do something, other than to pay the
price, before he acquires the title, even though he may already
have possession. 4. Where the buyer is to pay the price before he acquires the title. 5. Where the sale is made upon
some other condition.
Taking these up in their order, there may be considered -

I.
WHERE Goons A.RE To BE PREPARED FOR DELIVERY.

§ 507. Where specific goods are to be completed or prepared for delivery no title passes until this is done.-Where,.
though the goods are identified, the seller is, by the terms of
tention of the parties to render the
delay of that act, in whic h the buyer
is to concur, beneficial to him.
Whilst the price remains unascertained, the sa,le is clearly not for a
certain sum of money, and therefore
does not come within the civilian's

definition of a perfect sale, transferring the risk and gain of the thing·
sold; but the English law does not
rnquire that the consideration for a
bargain and, ale should be in moneys
numbered, provided it be of value.'~
Blackburn on Sales, 175.

422
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[§ 508.

the contract, to do something to them, other than merely count-

ing, weighing, measuring, and the like, to finish the goods or

prepare them for delivery in the form or condition in which,

by the terms of the contract, they are to be delivered (not yet

speaking of contracts for the manufacture of goods not in ex-

istence), the first of the rules as laid down by Lord Blackburn

applies; and the title will not pass until the thing required has

been done, even though the goods are paid for, unless, from

the terms of the contract or the conduct of the parties, a con-

trary intention clearly appears.

508.

Thus if cattle contracted to be sold are yet to

be fattened, 1 or cotton sold is to be ginned and baled, 2 or char-

coal partly burned is to be completed, 3 or hides partly tanned

are to be finished, 4 or fish contracted for are to be dried, 5 or

oats are yet to be threshed, 6 or the goods are to be brought to

a certain place, 7 by the seller before delivery, the title will not
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iRestad v. Engemoen (1896), 65

Minn. 148, 67 N. W. R. 1146; Rourke

v. Bullens (1857), 8 Gray (Mass.), 549.

2 Smith v. Sparkman (1878), 55 Miss.

649, 30 Am. R. 537; The Elgee Cotton

Cases (1874), 22 Wall. (U. S.) 180;

Screws v. Roach (1853), 22 Ala. 675.

3 Hale v. Huntley (1849), 21 Vt. 147.

4 Pritchett v. Jones (1833), 4 Rawle

(Pa.), 260.

5 Foster y. Ropes (1872), 111 Mass. 10.

6 Groff v. Belche (1876), 62 Mo. 400.

7 McDonald v. Hewett, 15 Johns.

(N. Y.) 349, 8 Am. Dec. 241; Acraman

v, Morris, 8 C. B. 449; Miller v. Sea-

man, 176 Pa. St. 291, 35 Atl. R. 134;

North Pac. Lum. Co. v. Kerron, 5

Wash. 214, 31 Pac. R, 595; McClung

v. Kelley, 21 Iowa, 508; Johnson v.

Bailey, 17 Colo. 59, 28 Pac. R. 81. But

see as to this, § 487, ante; Terry v.

Wheeler, 25 N. Y. 520; Rail v. Little

Falls Lumber Co., 47 Minn. 422, 50 N.

W. R. 471.

So where wheat, bargained for in

the stack, is yet to be threshed, trans-

ported to a certain place and there

weighed, and then to be transported

to another place for delivery by the

bargainor, it does not, as matter of

law, become the property of the bar-

gainee at the time the contract is

made. Caywood v. Timmons (1884),

31 Kan. 394. So a contract for logs

not yet cut, but to be cut and scaled,

passes no present interest. Martin

v. Hurlbut (1864), 9 Minn. 142. Where

a contract is made for the sale of a

crop of wool, to be put in bags and

weighed, the contract is executory.

Straus v. Ross (1865), 25 Ind. 300. So,

where an " unprised crop of tobacco "

has still to be prepared for delivery

and weighed, title does not pass by a

contract of sale. Jennings v. Flanagan

(1837), 5 Dana (Ky.), 217, 30 Am. D. 683.

So, where a wagon is sold, to which

certain parts are to be added, no pres-

ent interest passes. Allman v. Davis

(1841), 2 Ired. (N. C.) 12. Where a

423

§§ 509, 510. J
§§ 509, 510.]
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pass, in the absence of a clear intention to the contrary, until
these respective acts have been performed.

pass, in the absence of a clear intention to the contrary, until

these respective acts have been performed.

509. Unless a contrary intention appears.— It is

unquestionable, however, that a person may buy a chattel in

an unfinished condition, and acquire the right of property in it,

although possession be retained by the seller to fit it for deliv-

ery. "But in such a case," said the supreme court of the

United States, " the intention to pass the ownership by the con-

tract cannot be left in doubt. The presumption is against such

an intention." l

§ 510. . On the ground, therefore, that the intention to

pass the title at once was clear, it was held 2 where a buggy in

an unfinished condition was bargained for and the full price

paid, but the buggy was left in the maker's possession to bo

painted, that the title had at once passed to the buyer, though

§ 509. - - Unless a contrary intention appears.- It is
unquestionable, however, that a person may buy a chattel in
an unfinished condition, and acquire the right of property in it,
although possession be retained uy the seller to fit it for delivery. "But in such a case," said the supreme court of the
Unitecl States," the intention to pass the ownership by the contract cannot be left in doubt. The presumption is against such
an intention." i

the court relied upon the English cases of Clarice v. Sjoence 3 and
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seller is to feed hogs, and weigh and

deliver them, title does not pass.

Lester v. East (1875), 49 Ind. 588. So,

too, where wood is contracted for

before it is all cut, to be measured

and delivered to the vendee by the

choppers when they have finished

the chopping, there is no present

sale. Frost v. Woodruff (1870). 54 111.

155. And where a vendor agrees to

§ 510. - - . On the ground, therefore, that the intention to
pass the title at once was clear, it was held 2 where a buggy in
an unfinished condition was bargained for and the full price
paid, but the buggy was left in the maker's posses ion to be
painted, that the title had at once passecl to the buyer, though
the court relied upon the English cases of Clarke v. pence 3 and

sell all the grain harvested by him,

both that which has been and that

which is to be harvested, and sack

it, and carry it to a specified place,

the contract passes no title to the

property. Hamilton v. Gordon (1892),

22 Oreg. 557, 30 Pac. R. 495. So,

where stone is to be kept in a ware-

house, storage charges paid by the

vendor, and the stone delivered to

the vendee when wanted, the con-

tract is merely executoiy. Malone

v. Minn. Stone Co. (1887), 36 Minn.

325, 31 N. W. R. 170. So, a contract

for the purchase of a cutter which

is to be finished and delivered within

a certain time does not vest the title

in the vendee. Halterline v. Rice

(1863), 62 Barb. (N. Y.) 593. And,

where coal is purchased under the

stipulation that the contract shall

not be binding unless the coal is de-

livered in accordance with the offer

of an agent as set forth in a letter

of a certain date, no property passes.

Neldon v. Smith (1873), 36 N. J..L.

148.

i The Elgee Cotton Cases, 22 Wall.

(U.S.) 180.

^Butterworth v. McKinly, 11

Humph. (Tenn.) 206. To like effect:

Paine v. Young, 56 Md. 314. Compare

Halterline v. Rice, 62 Barb. (N. Y.)

593, in preceding section.

3 4 Ad. & El. 448.
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before it is a ll cut, to be measured in the vendee. H alterline v. Rice
and delivered to the vendee by the (1863), 62 Barb. (N. Y.) 593. And,
choppers when they have finished where coal is purchased under the
the chopping, there is no present stipulation that the contract shall
sale. Frost v. Woodruff (1870). 54 Ill. not be binding unless the coal is de155. And where a vendor agrees t.o livered in accordance with the offer
sell all the grain harvested by him, of an agent as set forth in a letter
both that which has been and that of a certain date, no property pas es.
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it, and carry it to a specified place, 148.
the contract pas es no title to the
I The Elgee Cotton Cases, 22 Wall.
property. Hamilton v. Gordon (1892), (U.S.) 180.
22 Oreg. 557, 30 Pac. R. 495. So,
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where stone is to be kept in a ware- Humph. (Tenn.) 206. To like effect:
house, storage charges paid by the Paine v. Young, 56 Md. 314. Compare
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tract i merely executory. Malone
3 4 Ad. & El. 448.
v. Minn. Stone Co. (1887), 36 Minn.
424

CH. III.] CONDITIONAL SALE OF SPECIFIC CHATTELS. [§ 511-513.

Woods v. Russell, 1 which, as will be seen, 2 have not been gener-

ally approved in the United States.

§ 511. . " In all cases, however," said the supreme court

of Massachusetts, 3 " the intention of the parties as to the time

when the title is to pass can be ascertained only from the terms

of the agreement, as expressed in the language and conduct of

the parties, and as applied to known usage and the subject-

matter. It must be manifested at the time the bargain is made.

The rights of the parties under the contract cannot be affected

by their undisclosed purposes, or by their understanding of its

legal effect."

§ 512. But title will pass when act required is done.

But although the title, in the absence of a contrary intention,

will thus not pass until the act required has been performed,

yet when that act is fully performed so that nothing further

remains to be done to put the goods into that state, place or

condition in which the Durchaser is bound to accept them, the

title will then pass. 4
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§513. Effect of part performance of the condition. — Or-

dinarily the fact that a part of that which was to be done has

been performed is ineffectual to pass the title, unless the per-

formance of the residue has been waived. Where the contract

is entire, the vendee is not obliged to accept a part perform-

ance, but may insist upon the whole; and the vendor who is

seeking to enforce the contract must show a full performance

on his part or a waiver of it by the vendee. 5 And even if part

of the goods, under an entire contract, having been fitted for

delivery, are actually delivered to the vendee, it has been held

that no title to that part passes in the absence of evidence that

the vendee has accepted that part and waived the delivery of

the remainder. 6

1 5 B. & Aid. 942. 5 The Elgee Cotton Cases (1874). 89

2 See post, § 754, note, U. S. (22 Wall.) 180. See also?' 1308.

3 Foster v. Ropes (1872), 111 Mass. 10. B Kein v. Tupper (1873), 52 N. Y.

* Bond v. Greenwald (1871), 4 Heisk. 550.

(Tenn.) 453; Groff v. Belche (1876), 62 In Kein t. Tupper, supra, the con-

Mo. 400. tract was for one hundred and uine-
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§ 514.J
§ 514.]

LA.W OF SALE.

[BOOK II.

§514. Effect of earnest or part payment. — The fact that

earnest has been given or part payment made will not operate

to pass the title in these cases. The only effect of earnest is to

confirm the contract, and the question whether the title has

passed under that contract remains as before. 1

LA.W OF SALE.

[BOOK II.

§ 514-. Effect of earne. tor })art payment.- The fact that
earnest has been given or part payment made will not op rate
to pass the title in these cases. The only eff ct of arn st is to
confirm the contract, and the question wh th r the title has
passed un<ler that contract remains as before. 1

teen bales of cotton to be fitted for

delivery. Seventy bales only were

taken out of the warehouse, weighed

and samples taken, and returned to

the warehouse, and then further

work was postponed until next day.

That night the warehouse burned

and all the cotton was damaged or

destroyed. The action was for the

price of the seventy bales. The court

said: " But if there was a delivery of
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seventy bales, the action could not

be sustained. The contract was en-

tire, and the plaintiffs [the sellers]

must prove performance to entitle

them to recover. The defendants

purchased one hundred and nineteen

bales, to be paid for when delivered.

Until the delivery of the whole

quantity no action accrued to the

plaintiffs. While the destruction of

the subject-matter of the contract,

without fault of the plaintiffs, would

relieve them from an action for dam-

ages for not performing the con-

tract, yet it would not enable them

to enforce a part performance

against the defendants. (Dexter v.

Norton, 47 N. Y. 62.) The rule is well

settled in this State that, upon a con-

tract for the delivery of a specified

quantity of property, payment to be

made on delivery, no action will lie

until the whole is delivered. (Champ-

lin v. Rowley, 13 Wend. 259; Mead

v. Degolyer, 16 Wend. 632; Russell v.

Nicoll, 3 Wend. 112; Baker v. Hig-

gins, 21 N. Y. 397; Norton v. Wood-

ruff, 2 N. Y. 153.) The English rule,

that a recovery may be had for the

portion delivered, if retained until

after the time for full performance

(as held in Oxendale v. Wetherell, 9

B. & C. 3S6, 17 Eng. Com. L. 177, an, I

other cases), has never been adopted,

but expressly repudiated by the

courts of this State. (See cases cited

supra.) That rule rests upon no

solid foundation, and in effect en-

ables courts to alter the terms of

contracts as made by parties.

"The right of a vendor to demand

the portion delivered in a case of the

destruction of the remainder, so that

full performance by the vendor is

impossible, need not be considered,

because in this case the plaintiffs had

all the cotton claimed to have been

delivered, which was not destroyed.

A vendee may accept a delivery of a

part of the property, and waive the

delivery of the remainder, and this

teen bales of cotton to be fitted for
delivery. Seventy bales only were
taken out of the warehouse, weighed
and samples taken, and returned to
the warehouse, and then further
work was postponed until next day.
That night the warehou e burned
and all the cotton was damaged or
destroyed. The action was for the
price of the seventy bales. The court
said: "But if there was a delivery of
seventy bales, the action could not
be sustained. The contract was entire, and the plaintiff::. [the sellers]
must prove performance to entitle
them to recover. The defendants
purchased one hundred and nineteen
bales, to be paid for when delivered.
Until the delivery of the whole
quantity no action accrued to the
plaintiffs. While the destruction of
the subject-matter of the contract,
without fault of the plaintiffs, would
relieve them from an action for damages for not performing the contract, yet it would not enable them
to enforce a part performance
against the defendants. (Dexter v.
Norton, 47 N. Y. 62.) The rule is well
settled in this State that, upon a contract for the delivery of a specified
quantity of property, payment to be
made on deli very, no action will lie
until the whole is delivered. (Champlin v. Rowley, 13 Wend. 259; Mead
v. Degolyer, 16 Wend. 632; Russell v.
Nicoll. 3 Wend. 112; Baker v. Higgins, 21 N. Y. 397; Norton v. Wood-

ruff, 2 N. Y. 153.) The EnO"li h rule,
that a recov ry may be had for the
portion lelivered, if retained until
after th time for full performance
(a held in Ox ndale v. W ther 11, G
B. & C. 3 6, 17 Eng. Com. L. 177, and
other ca e, ), ha never been adopted,
but expr ly repudiated by the
court of thi. State. ( ee ca e. cited
supra.) That rule re ts npon no
olid foundation, and in effe t enable courts to alter the terms of
contracts as mac.le by parties.
"The right of a vendor to demand
the portion delivered in a ca e of the
destruction of the remainder, so that
full performance by the vendor is
impossible, need not be considered,
because in this case the plaintiffs bad
all the cotton claimed to have been
delivered, which was not destroyed.
A vendee may accept a delivery of a
part of the property, and waive the
delivery of the remainder, an.d this
may be shown by circumstances: but
in this case there is not the slightest
circumstance tending to establish
such acceptance and waiver. Both
parties expected to perform the contract in full. The unfortunate acci·
dent prevented it before the title
had passed from the vendors, and
the misfortune is theirs."
1 The Elgee Cotton Cases (1874), 89
U.S. (22 Wall.) 180; Nesbit v. Bnrry
(1855), 25 Pa. St. 208; Jennings v.
Flanagan (1837),5 Dana (Ky.), 217, 30
Am. Dec. 683.
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CH. III.] CONDITIONAL SALE OF SPECIFIC CHATTELS. [§ 515.

II.

"Wheke Goods are to be Measured, "Weighed or Tested.

§ 515. Title to goods not delivered presumptively does not

pass if goods are yet to be weighed, measured or tested in

order to ascertain price. — The question of the passing of title

to goods not delivered, which are yet to be weighed, measured

or tested' in order to ascertain the price, is one upon which the

English and American courts are not in harmony, nor are all

of the cases in this country consistent.

Lord Blackburn's second rule, as has been seen, 1 declared that

w r here anything remains to be done to the goods for the pur-

ree ante, § 504 In Hanson v.

Meyer, 6 East, 614, a lot of starch

lying in a warehouse had been sold

at so much per hundred weight, and

the seller had directed the warehouse-

man to weigh and deliver it. After

part had been weighed and delivered
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the buyer became bankrupt, where-

upon the sellet refused to permit the

delivery of any more. Held, that the

title to the undelivered portion had

not passed because "the price is made

to depend upon the weight."

In Rugg v. Minett, 11 East. 210, a

quantity of turpentine had been sold,

part of which was to be put up in

lots of a specified quantity, after

which the balance was to be meas-

ured and paid for. Before this was

entirely done it was consumed by fire.

Held, that the title passed in those

lots only which had been put up.

In Simmons v. Swift, 5 B. & C. 857,

bark had been sold at a given price

per ton. Part was weighed, paid for

and taken away, but title to the bal-

ance was held not to have passed be-

cause not yet weighed. '

In Logan v. Le Mesurier, 6 Moore,

P. C. 116, a quantity of timber, con-

taining about a given quantity, was

sold at a given price per foot to be

delivered at a given place and meas-

ured. The purchasers paid down the

price at the rate agreed upon for the

supposed quantity, and the surplus

or deficiency was to be provided for

when measured. The timber did not

arrive at the prescribed place at the

time agreed upon, and a great part

of it was then lost in a storm before

measurement and delivery. Held,

that title passed only to so much as

was measured and received, and the

purchasers could recover the excess

paid on the price.

In the similar case of Gilmour v.

Supple, 11 Moore, P. C. 551, the lum-

ber had been delivered to the buyer's

agent and was then lost in a storm.

It was shown that before delivery it

had been measured by a public officer

and was not to be again measured by

the seller. Held, that the title had

passed.

In Tansley v. Turner, 2 Scott. 238,

2 Bing. N. C. 151, a quantity of tim-

ber had been sold at so much per

§ 516.J
§ 516.] LAW OF SALE. [BOOK IT.

pose of ascertaining the price, as by weighing, measuring or

testing the goods, where the price is to depend on their quan-

tity or quality, the performance of this act shall be a condition

precedent to the transfer of the property, even though the

goods are ascertained and are in the state in which they ought

to be accepted. This rule, modified with respect of notice and

intention, has been incorporated in the English Sale of Goods

Act as follows: "Unless a different intention appears . . .

where there is a contract for the sale of specific goods in a de-

liverable state, but the seller is bound to weigh, measure, test

or do some other act or thing with reference to the goods for

the purpose of ascertaining the price, the property does not

pass until such act or thing be done, and the buyer has notice

thereof." 1

§ 516. In the United States the courts generally have

not gone to the extent of declaring the act to be absolutely a

condition precedent, as in Lord Blackburn's rule, and the posi-

tion assumed by the majority may perhaps be stated thus:
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Where, under a fair construction of the contract, some act other

than separation from a larger mass remains to be done in order

to determine the amount to be paid, where this depends upon

the quantity or quality of the goods not yet delivered, as to

LA.W OF

A.LE.

[BOOK II.

pose of ascertamrng the price, as by 11eiO'bing mea ·urino- or
testing the goods, 11 here the price is to d pend on their quantity or quality, the performance of thi act ball be a condition
precedent to the transfer of the property, ven though the
goods are ascertained and are in the state in which they ought
to be accepted. This rule, modified with r pect of notice and
intention, bas been incorporated in the Engli h ale of Goods
Act as follows: "Unless a diff rent intention appears
where there is a contract for the ale of specific good in a deliverable state, but the seller i bound to weigh, measure te t
or do some other act or thing with reference to the goods for
the purpose of ascertaining the price, the property does not
pass until such act or thing be done, and the buyer has notice
thereof." 1

count, weigh, measure or inspect them, the performance of this

act, in the absence of anything showing a contrary intention,

is presumptively a condition precedent to the passing of the

title; and the title, therefore, in the absence of an intention to

the contrary, will not pass until such act be done, although the

goods are definitely ascertained, and are in all respects in the

condition in which they ought to be accepted. 2

remaining trees, putting down the 1 Sale of Goods Act. § 18, rule 3.

figures but not computing the whole, 2 In Byles v. Colier (1884), 54 Mich,

and saying that he would make out a 1, Cooley, C. J., says: "In Lingham

statement and send it to the buyer, v. Eggleston, 27 Mich. 324, it was de-

which was not done. Held, that the cided that the question whether a

title passed, as nothing remained to be sale is completed or only executory

done by the vendor. To same effect: is usually one to be determined from

Cooper v. Bill, 3 H. & C. 722. the intent of the parties as gathered

428

§ 516. - - In the United State the courts generally have
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title; and the title, therefore, in the absence of an intention to
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condition in which they ought to be accepted.2
remaining trees, putting do"n the
I Sale of Goods Act, § 18, rule 3.
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2 In Byles v. Colier (1 ±), 54 l\Iich.
and saying that he would make out a 1, Cooley, C. J., says : ''In Ling ham
statement and send it to the buyer, v. Eggleston, 27 1ich. 3°4, it was dewhich was not done. H eld, that the cided that the question whether a
title pa sed,as nothingremainerl to be ale is completed or only executory
done by the vendor. To same effect: is u ually one to be determined from
Cooper v. Bill, 3 H. & C. 722.
the intent of the parties as gathered
428

CH. III.] CONDITIONAL SALE OF SPECIFIC CHATTELS.

[§ 517.

g 517. . Failure to perform such a condition precedent

may be taken advantage of by either party, and it is immate-

rial whether the weighing, measuring or testing is imposed by

the contract as an obligation or is reserved as a privilege.

from their contract, the situation of

the thing sold, and the circumstances

surrounding the sale; that where

the goods sold are designated so that

no question can arise as to the thing

intended, it is not absolutely essen-

tial that there should be a deliver}-,

or that the goods should be in a de-

lis erable condition, or that the quan-

tity or quality, when the price de-

pends upon either or both, should

be determined, these being circum-

stances indicating intent, but not
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conclusive; but that where anything

is to be clone by the vendor, or by

the mutual concurrence of both par-

ties, for the purpose of ascertaining

the price of the goods, as by weigh-

ing, testing or measuring them,

where the price is to depend upon

the quantity or quality of the goods,

the performance of these things, in

the absence of anything indicating a

contrary intent, is to be deemed pre-

sumptively a condition precedent to

the transfer of the property, although

the individual goods be ascertained,

and they appear to be in a state in

which they may be and ought to be

accepted. This case has been re-

ferred to with approval in the sub-

sequent cases of Hatch v. Fowler, 28

Mich. 205; Hahn v. Fredericks. 30

Mich. 22:3, 18 Am. R 119; Wilkin-

son v. Holiday, 33 Mich. 386; Grant

v. Merchants', etc. Bank, 35 Mich. 515;

Scotten v. Sutter, 37 Mich. 52G; Car-

penter v. Graham, 42 Mich. 191;

Brewer v. Salt Association, 47 Mich.

526. The cases elsewhere to the

same effect are numerous, and many

of them are collected in Mr. Ben-

nett's note to section 319 of the third

edition of Benjamin on Sales. And

see Kelsea v. Haines, 41 N. H. 246;

Southwestern Freight Co. v. Stanard.

44 Mo. 71, 100 Am. Dec. 255; Shelton

v. Franklin, 68 111. 333; Straus v.

Minzesheimer, 78 111. 492; Crofoot v.

Bennett. 2 N. Y. 258; Groat v. Gile,

51 N. Y. 431; Burrows v. Whitaker,

71 N. Y. 291, 27 Am. R. 42; Dennis

v. Alexander, 3 Pa. St. 50; Gallo-

way v. Week, 54 Wis. 604; Cay wood

v. Timmons, 31 Kan. 394. That the

cases referred to settle the general

principle, at least for this State, is

beyond question or cavil. Presump-

tively the title does not pass, even

though the articles be designated, so

long as anything remains to be done

to determine the sum to be paid; but

this is only a presumption, and is lia-

ble to be overcome by such facts and

§ 518.J

LAW OF SALE.

[BOOK II.

§ 513.]

LAW OF SALE.

[BOOK II.

§518. Presumption not conclusive. — This presump-

tion, however, that the title does not pass until the act of

weighing, measuring, testing and the like has been performed,

is not conclusive; and it readily gives way before evidence of

the contrary intention of the parties. 1

the plaintiff, claiming that the title

§ 518. - - Presumption not conclusive.-This presumption, however, that the title does not pass until the act of
weighing, measuring, testing and the like has been performed,
is not conclusive; and it readily gives way before evidence of
the contrary intention of the parties. 1

had passed, sued for the purchase

price. But the court held that the

title evidently had not passed, since

something of high importance re-

mained to be done by the vendor to

ascertain the price to be paid —

something, indeed, as to which there

might well be, and in fact were,

great differences of opinion, viz., the

determination of the precise amount
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of each grade of lumber.

Very like this case is Miller v. Sea-

man (1896). 176 Pa. St. 291, 35 Atl. R

134. Here there was an agreement

made by the seller, who resided at

Elmira, N. Y., with the buyer, who

lived at Williamsport, Pa., for the

sale of all the lumber in eleven piles

on the land of a third person at Du

Boistown, Pa., at a certain price per

thousand feet " shipping count, f. o. b.

cars at Williamsport, to be loaded,

inspected and measured, as ordered

by the purchasers, by " a person

named, to be paid for within thirty

days; and all lumber which re-

mained on the yard at a certain date

was then to be inspected and meas-

ured by another person named, and

paid for at a different rate. After

part had been ordered, inspected and

paid for as agreed, but before the

date named when all should be in-

spected, the lumber remaining in

the yard was swept away by a flood

and lost. The action was for the

price of the estimated quantity so

lost. It was held, however, that the

title to this lumber was still in

the seller, and that title passed to

the buyer only as fast as the lumber

was ordered, inspected, measured

and delivered f. o. b. at Williams-

port.

1 In Straus v. Minzesheimer (1875),

78 111. 492, it is said: " There are nu-

merous most respectable authorities

which hold that a contract for the

sale of specific goods, or of goods

identified, where something remains

to be done to the property, will pass

the title to the property before the

act is done, if such appears by the

contract to have been the intention

of the parties. In consonance with

this class of cases this court held, in

Graff v. Fitch, 58 111. 373, and in Shel-

ton v. Franklin, 68 111. 333, that the

title to personal property would pass

by a contract of sale, where such

was the intention of the parties, al-

the plaintiff, claiming that the tit.le the seller, a nd that title passed to
had passed, sued for the purchase the buyer only as fast. as the lumber
price. But the couTt held that the was ordered, inspected, mea ured
title evidently had not passed, since and delivered f. o. b. at Williamssomething of high importance re- port.
mained to be done by the vendor to
l In Straus v. Minzf'sheimer (1875),
ascertafo the price to be paid- 78 Ill. 492, it is said: "There are nusomething, indeed, as to which there merous mo t rnspectable authoritie
might well be, and in fact were, which hold that a contract for the
great differences of opinion, viz., the sale of specific goods, or of goods
determination of the precise amount identified, where something r emains
of each grade of lumber.
to be done to the property, will pass
Very like thi case is Miller v. Sea- the title to the property before the
man (1896), 176 Pa. St. 291, 35 Atl. R. act is done, if such appears by the
134. Here there was an agreement contract to have been the inte ntion
made by the seller, who resided at of the parties. In consonaDce with
E lmira, N. Y., with the buyer, who this class of cases this court held , in
lived at Williamsport, Pa., for the Graff v. Fitch, 58 Ill. 373, and in Shelsale of all the lumber in eleven piles ton v. Franklin. 68 Ill. 333, that the
on the land of a third person at Du title to personal property wonld pass
Boistown, Pa., at a certain price per by a contract of sale, where such
thousand feet" shipping count, f. o. b. was the intent.ion of the pa rties, a lcars at Williamsport, to be loaded, though measuring or weighing wag
inspected and measured, as ordered to be had at a subsequent time, in
by the purchasers, by" a person order to ascertain the amount to be
named, to be paid for within thirty paid."
days; and all lumber which reIn Riddle v. Varnum (1838), 20 Pick.
mained on the yard at a certain elate (Mass.) 280, the court say : " The genwas then to be inspected and meas- eral doctrine on this subjec t is unured by another person named, and doubtedly that when some act repai<l for at a different rate. After mains to be done in r elation to the
part had been ordered, insvected and articles which are the subject of the
paid for as agreed, but before the sale, as that of weighing or measurdate named when all should be in- ing, a nd there is no evidence tending
spected, the lumber remaining in to show an intention of the parties
the yard was swept away by a flood to make a n ab olute and complete
and lost. The action was for the sale. the performance of such act is
price of the estimated quantity so a prerequisite to the con ummat.ion
lo t. It was held, however, that the of the contract; and until it is pertitle to this lumber was still in formed the property does not pass to
430

CH. III.] CONDITIONAL SALE OF SPECIFIC CHATTELS. [§ 519.

519.

Broader rule in some States. — A still more

liberal rule than that stated in the preceding section may well

deserve attention. Tor where the goods are definitely ascer-

tained, and are of the kind that the seller is bound to receive,

and are in the condition in which he is to accept them, so that

nothing remains but to ascertain the price, no satisfactory rea-

son is apparent why the title should not pass at once, unless a

contrary intention appears; and several able courts have so

declared. 1

the vendee. But in the case of sales

where the property to be sold is in a

state ready for delivery, and the pay-

ment of money, or giving security

therefor, is not a condition precedent

to the transfer, it may well be the

understanding of the parties that the

sale is perfected, and the interest
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passes immediately to the vendee,

although the weight or measure of

the articles sold remains yet to be

ascertained. Such a case presents a

question of the intention of the par-

ties to the contract. The party af-

firming the sale must satisfy the jury

that it was intended to be an abso-

lute transfer, and all that remained

to be done was merely for the pur-

pose of ascertaining the price of the

articles sold at the rate agreed upon."

See also Leonard v. Davis, 1 Black

(U. S.), 476.

In Kelsea v. Haines, 41 N. H. 246,

the court also say: "So where the

process of ascertaining the quantity

has been substantially performed,

the title passes, although a trifling

act remains to be done in order to

complete the enumeration, especially

if the vendee is in possession, and

the remaining act is to be clone by

him. Hill, on Sales, 148; Tansley v.

Turner, 2 Scott, 238; Tyler v. Strang,

21 Barb. (N. Y.) 198; Oliphant v. Ba-

ker, 5 Den. (N. Y.) 379; Shepherd v.

Pressey, 32 N. H. 50; Gilman v. Hill,

36 N. H. 311."

iln Cleveland v. Williams (1887),

29 Tex. 204, 94 Am. Dec. 274, it is said:

" It is certainly correct, as laid down

in the books, that when anything re-

mains to be done by the seller, such

as counting, weighing or measuring,

the title does not pass when either

of these operations is necessary in

order to separate the goods from a

larger mass of which they form a

part; but when the entire mass is

sold and must be measured simply

with a view to the ascertainment of

its price for the purpose of a settle-

ment, the better opinion, on principle

and authority, is that the title passes.

By keeping the distinction between

a specific and an indefinite commod-

ity in view, it is believed that most

of the cases upon this subject can be

explained and their apparent conflict

reconciled. McComber v. Parker, 13

§ 520.J

LAW OF SALE.

[BO K II.

520.]

LAW OF SALE.

[BOOK II.

§ 520. Nor where goods are yet to be measured, weighed or

tested with a view to identification.— In many of the cases

in which Lord Blackburn's rule has been apparently approved,

the question was not confined to the necessity of weighing,

measuring or testing for the sole purpose of ascertaining the

price; but the additional element of identification or separa-

tion from a larger mass was involved. 1 This distinction is of

importance, though it is frequently ignored. If the object

sought to be accomplished by the weighing, measuring, testing

and the like is the identification of the goods to which the con-

tract is to apply — as where the sale is to be of all of the timber

of a certain size, all of the hogs of a certain weight, all of the

wheat of a certain grade, and the like,— there is then presented

a case of the class to be considered in the following chapter

where the goods are not specific, but it is not of the class now

under consideration. In cases of that kind the title obviously
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whole at a rate agreed upon between

the parties, the title will pass." Speak-

ing of this case in Burrows v. Whit-

aker (1877), 71 N. Y. 291, 27 Am. R.

42, it is said: "It was also laid down

that the distinction in all these cases

does not depend so much upon what

§ 520. Nor where goods are yet to be mea nred_, weig1ied or
tested with a view to identification.- In many of the cas s
in which Lord Blackburn's rule has been apparently approved,
the question was not confined to the necessity of w ighinO',
measuring or testing for the sole purpose of ascertainin the
price; but the additional element of identification or s paration from a larger ma s was in vol ved. 1 This distinction is of
importance, though it is frequently ignored. If the object
sought to be accomplished by the weighing, mea uring, testing
and the like is the identification of the good to which the contract is to apply - as where the sale i to be of all of the timber
of a certain size, all of the hogs of a certain weight, all of the
wheat of a certain grade, and the like,-there is then pre ented
a case of the class to be considered in the following chapter
where the goods are not specific, but it is not of the class now
under consideration. In cases of that kind the title obviously

is done as upon the object to be ef-

fected. If it be specification, the

property is not changed; if merely to

ascertain the total value at desig-

nated rates, the change of title is ef-

fected." To like effect: Groat v. Gile,

51 N. Y. 431; Kimberley v. Patchin,

19 N. Y. 330; Bradley v. Wheeler, 44

N. Y. 495; Sanger v. Waterbury, 116

N. Y. 371, 22 N. E. R. 404; Blackwood

v. Cutting Packing Co., 76 Cal. 212,

18 Pac. R. 248, 9 Am. St. R. 199; Las-

sing v. James, 107 Cal. 348, 40 Pac. R.

534; Boaz v. Schneider, 69 Tex. 128,

6 S. W. R. 402; Ober v. Carson, 62

Mo. 209. See ante, § 496 and cases

cited; also Farmers' Phosphate Co.

v. Gill, 69 Md. 537, 16 Atl. R 214, 9 Am.

St. R. 443, 1 L. R. A. 767.

1 See, for example, Rosenthal v.

Kahn (1890), 19 Oreg. 571, 24 Pac. R.

989; Davis v. Hill (1826), 3 N. H. 382;

Out water v. Dodge (1827), 7 Cow. 85;

Devane v. Fennell (1841), 2 Ired.

(N. C.) 36; Warren v. Buckminster

(1852), 24 N. EL 336; Joyce v. Adams

(1853), 8 N. Y. 291; Gilman v. Hill

(1858). 36 N. H. 311; Robertson v.

Strickland (1868), 28 Up. Can. Q. B.

221; Abat v. Atkinson (1869), 21 La.

Ann. 414; First Nat. Bank v. Crow-

ley (1872), 24 Mich. 492; Etahn v.

Fredericks (1874), 30 Mich. 223, 18

Am. R. 119; Pike v. Vaughn (1876), 39

Wis. 499: Galloway v. Week (1882),

54 Wis. 604, 12 N. W. R. 10; Hays v.

Pittsburg Co. (1888), 33 Fed. R. 552;

Blackwood v. Cutting Packing Co.

(1888), 76 Cal. 212, 18 Pac. R 248, 9

Am. St. R. 199.

The following cases seem to adopt

the English rule: The Elgee Cotton

Cases (1874), 22 Wall. 180; Kein v.

Tupper (1873), 52 N. Y. 550; Jones v.

whole at a rate agreed upon between
the partie , the title will pa ·s." Speaking of this case in Burrows v. Whitaker (1 77), 71 N. Y. 291, 27 Am. R.
42, it is said: "It was also laid down
that the di tinction in all these cases
does not depend so much upon what
is done as upon the object to be effected. If it be specification, the
property is not changed; if merely to
ascertain the total value at designated rates, the chang·e of title is effected." To like effect: Groat v. Gile,
51 N. Y. 431: Kimberley v. Patchin,
19 N. Y. 330; Bradley v, Wheeler, 44
N. Y. 495; Sanger v. Waterbury, 116
N. Y. 371, 22 N. E. R. 404; Blackwood
v. Cutting Packing Co., 76 Cal. 212,
1 Pac. R. 24 , 9 Am. St. R. 199; Lassing v. James, 107 Cal. 348, 40 Pac. R.
53-!; Boaz v. Schneider, 69 Tex. 12 ,
6 S. W. R. 402; 0 ber v. Carson, 62
Mo. 209. See ante, B 496 and cases
c_ited; al o Farmers' Phosphate Co.
v. Gill, 69 Md. 537, 16 Atl. R. 214, 9 Am.
St. R. 443, 1 L R. A. 767.

I See. for example, Rosenthal v.
Kahn (1 90), 19 Oreg. 571, 24 Pac. R.
9 9; Davis v. Hill (1826), 3 N. H. 3 2;
Outwater v. Dodge (1 27), 7 Cow. 85;
Devane v. Fennell (1841), 2 Ired.
(N. C.) 36; Warren v. Buckminster
(1 52), 24 N. H. 336; Joyce v. Adams
(1 53), 8 N. Y. 291; Gilman v. Hill
(1858). 36 N. H. 311; Robertson v.
Strickland (186 ), 28 Up. Can. Q. B.
221; A bat v. Atkinson (1 69), 21 La.
Ann. 414; Fir t Nat. Bank v. Crowley (1872 ), 24 Mich. 492; Hahn v.
Fredericks (1874), 30 Mich. 223, 18
Am. R. 119; Pike v. Vaughn (1876), 39
Wis. 499; Galloway v. We.ek (1882),
54 Wis. 604, 12 N. W.R. 10; Hays v.
Pittsburg Co. (1888), 33 Fed. R. 552;
Blackwood v. Cutting Packing Co.
(1888). 76 Cal. 212, 18 Pac. R. 248, 9
Am. St. R. 199.
The following cases seem to adopt
the English rule: The Elgee Cotton
Cases (1874), 22 Wall. 180; Kein v.
Tupper (1 70), 52 N. Y. 550; Jones v.
Pearce (1869), 25 Ark. 545.
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cannot pass until the goods have been identified; but the ques-

tion with which the present discussion began was, by its terms,

whether title to specific, ascertained goods, not actually de-

livered, can pass until the price has been determined by the

process of weighing, measuring or testing them. Here the ob-

ject to be effected is not to distinguish the goods, for that,

ex hypothesi, has been already done; but merely to ascertain

their total value at designated rates.

►21.

As has been stated, however, the two questions

are often presented together, and the courts, in dealing with

them, have applied Lord Blackburn's rule apparently as ap-

plicable to both. If something like weighing, measuring, test-

ing and the like is to be done to identify the goods, that is an

additional reason why the title does not at present pass, and

would of course suffice if the other element of unsettled price

were not involved. 1

1 Thus see Joyce v. Adams (1853), 8
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N. Y. 291. Here plaintiffs bought of

defendants two hundred and fifty-

nine bales of cotton. Defendants had

it in store in three parcels, one of one

hundred bales, and one of sixty-four

bales, stored at 296 Water street, and

one of ninety-five bales stored else-

where. The contract called for one

hundred and sixty-four bales de-

scribed as Charleston and sixty-four

bales described as Mobile, to be paid

for at the rate of thirteen and a half

cents per pound, delivered within

thirty days. The cotton stored at

296 Water street was destroyed by

fire before delivery, and the plaint-

iffs brought action for the return of

$5 per bale which they had advanced

upon it. The court held that the

title had not passed to the purchaser,

and in the course of the opinion said:

*' In this case the subject-matter of

the contract of sale, so far as it re-

spected the number of bales and

brands, was identified by it, but it

did not call for the cotton stored at

296 Water street. Any other bales

of cotton of the description specified

would as well have answered the ob-

ligation of the sellers with the buy-

ers. And besides, the cotton was to

be paid for at thirteen and a half

cents per pound, and to be delivered

by the sellers within or at the expira-

tion of thirty days thereafter, when

the balance of the price was to be

paid. The weight had not been as-

certained by the contract, and no

mode was specified in which it was

to be ascertained; but it was neces-

sary that it should be before the price

could be computed. . . . The con-

tract, from its nature and terms, was

clearly and wholly executory on the

part of the sellers, leaving the title of

the cotton in them, to be thereafter

passed to the buyers, on the perform-

ance of certain things by them; and

until these were performed the risk

28
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522, 523.J
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[BOOK II.

§ 522. Nor where goods are yet to be mea ured, weighed

§ 522. Nor where goods are yet to be measured, weighed

or tested to ascertain whether they are the kind or quality

of goods the buyer is to accept. — There are still other cases,

not often clearly distinguished, in which the weighing, meas-

uring, testing 1 and the like is to be done neither to ascertain

the price nor the identity of the goods alone, but also to deter-

mine whether the particular goods in question, apparently of

the kind agreed upon, are really of the kind or quality which

the buyer is bound to accept. Thus, though the parties are

contracting with reference to specific chattels, for example a

number of bales of cotton, but, by the contract, the cotton is

thereafter to be sampled by both parties to ascertain if it con-

forms to a sample which was the basis of the dealing, the title

will not pass until that act is done ; and the fact that the cot-

ton is yet to be weighed in order to ascertain the price fur-

nishes simply another reason leading to the same result. 1

§ 523. . The same result would ensue where a crop of

grain is yet to be harvested to prepare it for delivery; to be
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brought to a certain place to be weighed to ascertain the

of it remained with them." In Smart the seller to the mill of the Cocheco

v. Batchelder (1876), 57 N. H. 140, Company in Dover. Further, the

the defendant contracted to sell to price was so much per thousand, and

one Waldron all the merchantable the quantity had not been ascer-

square-edged boards at his mill, at a tained. This brings the case far

fixed price per thousand. The quan- within the authorities. When goods

tity and quality were not ascertained, are sold by number, weight or meas-

They were to be delivered at a cer- ure, the sale is incomplete until the

tain place to be surveyed. Before specified property has been separated

anything was done with them they and identified."

were attached by creditors of Wal- 1 Kein v. Tupper (1873), 52 N. Y. 550.

or tested to ascertain whether they are the kind or quality
of goods the buyer is to accept.-There are still other cases,
not often clearly distinguished, in which the weighing, measuring, testing and the like is to be done neither to ascertain
the price nor the identity of the goods alone, but also to determine whether the particular goods in question, apparently of
the kind agreed upon, are really of the kind or quality which
the buyer is bound to accept. Thus, though the parties are
contracting with reference to specific chattels, for example a
number of bales of cotton, but, by the contract, the cotton is
thereafter to be sampled by both parties to ascertain if it conforms to a sample which was the basis of the dealing, the title
will not pass until that act is done; and the fact that the cotton is yet to be weighed in order to ascertain the price furnishes simply another reason leading to the same result. 1

§ 523. - - . The same result would ensue where a crop of
grain is yet to be harvested to prepare it for deli very; to be
brought to a certain place to be weig~ed to ascertain the

dron. The court, by Ladd, J., said: Here the court said, per Church,

* I think the property in the boards C. J.: "Assuming that this was a

had not passed to Waldron at the sale of a quantity of specific cotton,

time of the attachment. It was only which I think we may do, and which

the merchantable boards in the pile is the most favorable view for the

that were to be taken by him. One plaintiffs (the sellers), yet, as the cot-

act to be done, then, before delivery, ton was to be weighed by the vend-

was the selection and separation of ors to ascertain the quantity, and

the merchantable boards from the sampled by both parties to ascertain

rest; they were to be surveyed. Then the quality, no title would pass until

they were also to be transported by these acts were done."
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of it remained with them." In Smart the seller to the mill of the Cocheco
v. Batchelder (1876), 57 N. H. 140, Company in Dover. Further, the
the defendant contracted to sell to price was so much per thousand, and
one Waldron all the merchantable the quantity had not been ascersquare-edged boards at his mill, at a tained. This brings the case far
fixed price per thousand. The quan- within the authorities. When goods
tity and quality were not ascertained. are sold by number, weight or measThey were to be delivered at acer- ure, the sale is incomplete until the
tain place to be surveyed. Before specified property has been separated
anything was done with them tbey and identified."
were attached by creditors of Wall Kein v. Tupper (1873), 52 N. Y. 550.
dron. The court, by Ladd, J., said: Here the court said, per Church,
"I think the property in the boards C. J.: "Assuming that this was a
had not passed to Waldron at the sale of a quantity of specific cotton,
time of the attachment. It was only which I think we may do, and which
the merchantable boards in the pile is the most favorable view for the
that were to be taken by him. One plaintiffs (the sellers), yet, as the cotact to be done, then, before delivery, ton was to be weighed by the vendwas the selection and separation of ors to ascertain the quantity, and
the merchantable boards from the sampled. by both parties to ascertain
re t; they were to be urveyed. Then the quality, no title would pass until
they were also to be tra.nsported by these acts were done."
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price; and to be "sacked in good merchantable sacks," in

order to make it the kind of commodity which the buyer is

bound to accept. 1

needed them, upon the credit of the

logs. The logs were delivered, but

they were not scaled, the contract

being silent as to when, where or by

whom the scaling should be done,

in order to determine the price. The

court held thafe the parties did not

intend there should be a delivery,

and the title did not pass until the

logs were inspected and scaled. " We

do not suppose," say the court, " that

the plaintiff was bound to accept all

the logs which McDonald might de-

posit at the point designated, if any
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were unfit for use." Gilman v. Hill

(1858), 36 N. H. 311. Here the plaint-

iffs agreed to buy all the pelts that

a certain butcher should take off

between July and October, at fifty

cents each, and they might take

them from time to time as they

should become dry. Eighty pelts

were counted over by the parties and

laid aside. Subsequently thirteen

more were taken off, placed upon the

eighty, and the whole lot was levied

upon as the property of the butcher.

The court held that the eighty were

clearly the property of the plaintiffs,

but that the thirteen had not been

actually accepted, as the purchasers

had not exercised their option to re-

ceive or reject the goods. Devane

v. Fennell (1841), 2 Ired. (N. C.) 36.

The plaintiff here agreed to sell a

certain raft of timber, which was to

be put in the purchaser's timber pen,

inspected and measured. It was de-

livered in accordance with the agree-

ment, but before inspection was

taken away. It was held that the

title was still in the plaintiff, since

the parties could not have intended

1 Hamilton v. Gordon (1892), 22

Oreg. 557, 30 Pac. R. 495. See also

Outwater v. Dodge (1827), 7 Cow.

(N. Y.) 85. Here the defendants con-

tracted to buy a quantity of fish that

the plaintiff had, at a fixed price per

barrel, the defendants to pay for in-

spection. If they were delivered at

a certain dock on Long Island, de-

fendants would not require plaintiff

to make up the wantage, as it was

termed, on the inspection and re-

packing; otherwise he was to do so.

Plaintiff elected to deliver them on

the Long Island dock, and did so de-

liver them, but there was no one

there to receive them. Before the

inspector began his work one of the

defendants came over to the dock

and asked him to tell plaintiff that

the fish were inferior and would not

be accepted, but the inspector was

§ 524.J
§ 524.]

LA.W OF

ALE.

[n

OK II.

§ 524:. Ily whom weighing, etc., to be done.- The act of

LAW OF SALE.

[iiOOK II.

§ 524. By whom weighing, etc., to be done.— The act of

weighing, counting and the like is usually to be performed by

the seller, and the English decisions and statute have confined

the rule to such cases; * but this is not generally deemed mate-

rial, and the contract may provide, expressly or impliedly, that

it shall be done by the buyer. In such a case the title pre-

sumptively will not pass until he has performed it, especially

where the sale is to be for cash ; 2 but this presumption, like the

other, yields to the contrary intention of the parties. 3

an absolute delivery while the tim-

ber had still to be inspected and

weighing, counting and the like is usually to be performed by
the seller, and the English decisions antl statute have confined
the rule to such cases; 1 but this is not generally deemed material, and the contract may provide, expressly or impliedly, that
it shall be done by the buyer. In such a case the title presumptively will not pass until he has performed it, especially
where the sale is to be for cash; 2 but this presumption, like tbeother, yields to the contrary intention of the parties. 3

measured.

1 See the English statute before re-

ferred to. See also the discussion in

Turley v. Bates (1863). 2 H. & C. 200,

33 L. Jour. (Ex.) 43. But that 'the in-
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tention controls, see Martineau v.

Kitching (1872), L. R. 7 Q. B. 436.

2 In Hoffman v. Culver (1880), 7 I1L

an ab olute delivery while the timber had still to be inspected and
measured.
I See the English statute before referred to. See also the discu sion in

Turley v. Bates (1 63), 2 H. & C. 200,
33 L. J our. (Ex.) 43. But th at 'the intention control". see fa rtineau v.
Kitching (1872), L. R. 7 Q. B. 436.
2 In Hoffman v. Culver (1
0), 7 IIL

3 The case of Cunningham v. Ashbrook (1855), 20 Mo. 5-3, is striking ly
like that of Ward v. Shaw, supra.
Here plaintiff had sold his hogs to
defendant at $4. 15 per cwt., net
weight. to be delivered at the slaughter-house of defendants, and to be
killed and weighed by the buyers.
After killing, but be~ore weighing,
they were destroyed by accidental
fire. Plaintiff sued to recover the
price, and at the trial it was held
that he could not r ecover, as the
title was not to pass before the price
had been ascertained by weighing.
This was rev er ed, the supreme court
holding that it was a question of intention for the jury. There is discussion in the case of the general
principles and an opinion expressed
that the general rule applies only
where identification is necessary, but.
the effect of the decision is found in
the closing lines of the opinion: "We
l'epeat what vve have before said, it
is a question for the jury. If the delivery w · re for the purpose of passing the property it had that effect,
although the price was to be after-

wards a ·certained and paid according to the net weight. and there is.
no rule of law that, unJer such circurn tances, the presumption ari ·ing
from the delivery i met and repe ll ed~
and tha t other evidence becomes
n ecessary to make out a prima facie
case of present sale. The seller has
a right, notwithstanding the bargain,
to retain his property till he is paid,
unless he agrees to allow the purchaser a cr edit (the bargain for an
immediate transfer of property implyin g a present payment of the
price), and hence, when there is no
under standing as to the time of payment, other than what is implierl in
the postponement of it, until the
quantity of the thing sold is ascertained in the manner indicated by
the contract, this circum tance is.
certainly entitled to consideration
with the jury in determining the
character of the delivery, which, if
intended to pass the thing in property, deprives the seiler of his security upon it for the pri e, at the s·a me
time that it throws upon the buyer
the f uture risk."

3 The case of Cunningham v. Ash-

brook (1855), 20 Mo. 553, is strikingly

like that of Ward v. Shaw, supra.

Here plaintiff had sold his hogs to

defendant at $4.15 per cwt., net

weight, to be delivered at the slaugh-

ter-house of defendants, and to be

killed and weighed by the buyers.

After killing, but before weighing,

they were destroyed by accidental

fire. Plaintiff sued to recover the

price, and at the trial it was held

that he could not recover, as the

title was not to pass before the price

had been ascertained by weighing.

This was reversed, the supreme court

holding that it was a question of in-

tention for the jury. There is dis-

cussion in the case of the general

principles and an opinion expressed

that the general rule applies only

where identification is necessary, but

the effect of the decision is found in

the closing lines of the opinion: "We

repeat what we have before said, it

is a question for the jury. If the de-

livery were for the purpose of pass-

ing the property it had that effect,

although the price was to be after-

wards ascertained and paid accord-

ing to the net weight, and there is

no rule of law that, under such cir-

cumstances, the presumption arising

from the delivery is met and repelled,

and that other evidence becomes

necessary to make out a prima facie

case of present sale. The seller has

a right, notwithstanding the bargain,

to retain his property till he is paid,

unless he agrees to allow the pur-

chaser a credit (the bargain for an

immediate transfer of property im-

plying a present payment of the

price), and hence, when there is no

understanding as to the time of pay-

ment, other than what is implied in

the postponement of it, until the

quantity of the thing sold is ascer-

43G
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§ 525. How where the whole body of goods is delivered to

the buyer. — Where, however, before weighing, counting or

measuring, the whole body of the goods is delivered to the

could not be done before the quan-

tity was ascertained by weighing."

And also: "It is the settled law of

England, and it ought to be the law

here, that, where goods are in the pos-

session of a third party as bailee or

agent of the vendors, if the vendors

make a contract of sale of them while

so situated for cash, and the vendee

has not paid for them, the giving by

the vendor to the vendee of a delivery

order addressed to such bailee or

agent, directing him to deliver the

goods to the vendee, but which is not

presented to such bailee or agent and
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assented to by him, will have no ef-

fect in changing the property in such

goods from the vendor to the vendee.

The property and possession will be

regarded as still remaining in the

vendor, for the reason that until such

bailee or agent attorn to the vendee

to whom such order is given, he will

be regarded as remaining the agent

of the vendor, and his possession as

that of the vendor. Bentall v. Burn,

3 B. & C. 423; Farina v. Home, 16

Mees. & W. 119; McEwan v. Smith,

2 H. of L. Cas. 309; Ben], on Sales (2d

ed.), 132, 133."

In Ward v. Shaw (1831), 7 Wend.

(N. Y.) 404, the contract was for the

sale of two oxen which the vendee

was to kill, prepare for market, then

weigh and pay for at a given price

per cwt. dressed. The vendee took

the cattle for this purpose, but on the

same day they were levied upon by

his creditors. Held, that the title had

not passed to him. Said Savage, C. J.,

after referring to the English cases:

"The rule laid down in Hanson v.

Meyer, 6 East, 614, is that the prop-

App. 450, it appeared that plaintiffs

were the owners of a carload of

wheat standing on the track at Chi-

•cago. They entered into a contract

to sell the wheat for cash to one

Martin, who was to ascertain the

number of bushels and pay a fixed

price per bushel as soon as weighed

out. Plaintiffs gave to Martin an

order on the railroad company to de-

liver to him the car. Without pre-

senting this order, or obtaining de-

livery of the car with the assent

of the railroad company, Martin

weighed out two wagon loads of

wheat, transferred it to another car

and there mixed it with other grain

of his own, without plaintiffs' con-

sent and without paying for it. It

was there seized by creditors of Mar-

tin before the remainder of the wheat

had been weighed out. Held, that

plaintiffs' title had not been divested.

§ 525.J
§ 525.]
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buyer, and the sale is not for cash upon delivery, this is very

strong evidence that the property is to vest in him at once, leav-

ing the price to be afterwards determined, 1 but it is obviously

J.A.W OF SA.LE.

[BOOK II.

buyer, and the sale is not for ca h upon cl >livery, this i v ry
strong evidence that the property is to vest in him at once, l aving the price to be afterwar I determined, 1 but it is obviou 1y
very weak evidence where the sale is for cash upon delivery.~

very weak evidence where the sale is for cash upon delivery.*

erty does not pass when anything

remains to be done by the vendor;

when the thing to be done is neces-

sary to ascei'tain the price, and the

sale is for cash, it can make no dif-

ference whether that thing is to be

done by vendor or vendee. The prop-

erty is not to pass till payment; the

price must precede the payment, and

until the price is ascertained, pay-

ment cannot be made or waived un-

less by express terms; the acts of the
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vendor cannot, before that time, be

construed into a waiver.''

In Andrew v. Dieterich (1835), 14

Wend. (N. Y.) 31, plaintiff had sold

carpets to one Simmons to furnish a

house to be paid for in cash. Plaint-

iff sent the carpets to the house in the

roll so that the necessary amounts

might be ascertained and cut off,

when the balance was to be returned

and the amount used was to be ascer-

tained and paid for. Simmons cut

off and laid what was necessary to

cover his floors, but, before paying

for it, pledged it to defendant for a

loan and absconded. Held, that

plaintiff's title had not been divested,

Ward v. Shaw, supra, being relied

upon. See also Ballantyne v. Apple-

ton (1890), 82 Me. 570, 20 Atl. R. 235,

and Pinkham v. Applet on (1890), 82

Me. 574, 20 Atl. R. 237, cited post,

under subd. Ill of this chapter.

i In Macomber v. Parker (1832), 13

Pick. (Mass.) 175, it is said: "The

general principle is, that where any

operation of weight, measurement,

counting, or the like, remains to be

performed in order to ascertain the

price, the quantity, or the particular

commodity to be delivered, and to

put it in a deliverable state, the

contract is incomplete until such

operation is performed. Brown on

Sales, 44. But where the goods or

commodities are actually delivered,

that shows the intent of the parties

to complete the sale by the delivery,

erty does not pass when anything
remains tG> be done by the vendor;
when the thing to be done is necessary to a certain the price, and the
sale i for cash, it can make no difference whether that thing is to be
done by vendo1· or vendee. The property is not to pass till payment; the
price mu t precede the payment, and
• the price is a certained, payuntil
ment cannot be made or waived unless by express terms; the act of the
vendor cannot, before that time, be
construed into a waiver.'
In Andrew v. Dieterich (1 35), 14
Wend. (N. Y.) 31, plaintiff had sold
carpets to one Simmons to furnish a
house to be paid for in cash. Plaintiff sent the carpets to the house in the
roll so that the neces ary amounts
might be ascertained and cut off,
when the balance was to be returned
and the amount used was to be ascertained and paid for. Simmons cut
off and laid what wa nece ary to
cover his floors, but, before paying
for it, pledged it to defendant for a
loan and absconded. H eld, that
plaintiffs title had not been divested,
Ward v. Shaw, supra, being reiied
upon. See also Ballantyne v. Appleton (1 90), 82 l\Ie. 570, 20 Atl. R. 235,
and Pinkham v. Appleton (1890), 2
Me. 57±, 20 Atl. R. 237, cited post,
under ubd. III of this chapter.
l In I acomber v. Parker (1839), 13
Pick. (Mas .) 175, it is said: "The
general principle i , that where any
operation of weight, rnea ·urement,

counting, or the like, remains to beperformed in order to a certain the
price, the quantity, or the particular
commodity to be delivered, and to
put it in a deliverable state, the
contract is incomplete until such
operation is performed. Brown on
Sale , 4-!. But where the good or
commoditie are actually delivered~
that how the intent of the partie
to complete the sale by the delivery,
and the weighin or mea uring or
count.ing afterwards woul l not be
con idered a any part of the contract
of sale, but would be taken to refer
to the adju tment of the final settlement a· to price. The sale would
be complete as a sale upon credit
before the actual payment of the
price. Nothing can be found in any
of the numerous ca es on this point.
w hicb militates against this position. n
In Sedgwick v. Cottingham (1 80),
54 Iowa, 512, 6 N. W. R. 738, there was
a sale of a carload of wheat which the
plain tiff was to ship to a certain point,.
where it was to be taken from the car
by the defendant, hauled to his mill,
and paid for upon being weighed by
him. The plaintiff shipped the caras agreed, but before weighing thewheat wa accidentally burned. Held,
that the title bad passed. Said the
court: "The weighing is not a pivotal matter. It wa · to be done by the
defendant after he bad received it
into his actual cu tody, and after it
had been delivered at the place fixed
by the contract. A careful consid-

and the weighing or measuring or

counting afterwards would not be

considered as any part of the contract

of sale, but would be taken to refer

to the adjustment of the final set-

tlement as to price. The sale would

be complete as a sale upon credit

before the actual payment of the

price. Nothing can be found in any

of the numerous cases on this point

which militates against thisposition."

In Sedgwick v. Cottingham (1880),

54 Iowa, 512, 6 N. W. R. 738, there was

2

§ 53 et eq.
43
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§ 526. . In a case x of the former kind, where the con-

tract was for the sale of lumber which had been placed under

the charge of the purchaser's agent, the court said: "The

whole property being identified and sold at a fixed price per

eration of the third finding (of the

facts as above stated) will demon-

strate, we think, that the weighing

has reference only to the time of pay-

ment, and whether there had been a

delivery or not is in no manner con-

trolled or affected thereby."

In Scott v. Wells (1843), 6 W. & S.

(Pa.) 357, 40 Am. Dec. 568, there

had been a contract for the sale of a

raft of timber at a given rate per

thousand feet, and the raft had been

delivered to the purchaser, though

the number of feet had not been as-
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certained. Held, that the title had

passed. Said Gibson, C. J. : " The de-

livery was unconditional, pursuant

to the contract, and complete; why,

then, did it not pass the property and

put it at the purchaser's risk? Be-

cause, say the purchaser's counsel,

the number of feet contained, or the

sum total of the price, was not set-

tled by the contract, and the conse-

quence attempted is.that the sale was

imperfect in its members. Had there

been no delivery, or a conditional

one, the purchaser would not, per-

haps, have been bound till the num-

ber of feet and entire price had been

ascertained; but the parties evinced,

by taking the last step, that nothing

remained to be done in order to per-

fect the contract."

In Haxall v. Willis (1859), 15 Gratt.

(Va.) 434, a crop of wheat not yet

ready for delivery was contracted to

be sold by sample, the seller to de-

liver it to the buyer, at a certain sta-

tion, from which it was to be taken

to Richmond at the seller's expense,

and at Richmond it was to be taken

by the purchaser at his own expense

to his own mill and there to be

weighed and tested by the sample,

and, when thus weighed and tested,

to be paid for. The wheat reached

Richmond, and most of it had been

taken to the mill by the purchaser,

but a part was consumed by fire

while in the station at Richmond be-

fore it could be removed. Held, that

the title to all had passed to the pur-

chaser, who must therefore stand the

loss. The cases are quite fully re-

viewed, and Daniel, J., says: "There

is, I think, a decided preponderance

of authority in favor of the proposi-

tion that where the subject-matter

of the contract has not only been

completely ascertained and identi-

fied, but actually delivered, the mere

fact that the weighing, counting or

measuring is yet to be done by the

buyer, in order simply to ascertain

§ 527.J
§ 527.]
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[book IL

foot, the process of ascertaining the amount was not essential

to passing the title, as it might have been if less than the whole

amount delivered was to be sold and separated by measure-

ment. In that case the measurement might be necessary to

fix the identity of the property sold. But where all is sold,

no such process is needed to pass title. The ascertainment of

the price was a mere mathematical computation, involving no

further action to bring the minds of the parties together."

e 507, 1 And in another case l of the like kind, the

LAW OF

ALE.

[BOOK II.

foot, the process of ascertaining the amount wa not es ential
to passing the title, as it might have been if less th an the whole
amount delivered was to be sold and s parated by mea urement. In that case the measurement might be n cessary to
fix the identity of the property sold. nut where all is sold,
no such process is needed t9 pa s title. The ascertainment of
the price was a mere mathematical computation, involving no
further action to bring the minds of the parties together."

court lay down the rule as follows: "Where anything re-

mains to be done between the seller and purchaser before the

21 Barb. (N. Y.) 198; Crofoot v. Ben-

nett. 2 Comst. (N. Y.) 258; Page v.

Carpenter, 10 N. H. 77; Cunning-

ham v. Ashbrook. 20 Mo. 555." The

§ 527. - -. And in another case 1 of t he like kind, the
court lay down the rule as follows: "Where any thing remains to be done between the seller an l purchaser before the

court likens the case to that of Cun-
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ningham v. Ashbrook, siipra, where

an entire drove of hogs had been

sold at so much per hundred weight,

net weight, to be delivered at the

slaughter-house of the buyer, who

was to kill and weigh them. The hogs

were delivered and slaughtered, and

the seller was notified that he might

call the next day at the packing-

house of the buyer, see the hogs

weighed, and get his pay. That

night the slaughter-house was burned

and the hogs destroyed. Held, that

the title had passed and the seller

could recover the price.

In Burrows v. Whitaker (1877), 71

N. Y. 291, 27 Am. R. 42, it appeared

that defendant agreed to buy of

plaintiff all the lumber which he

should deliver at a specified place on

the Delaware river, before a certain

time; and prices were agreed on for

the good and for the culled. De-

fendant was to cull and pile, and the

lumber was to be counted on the

bank or estimated in the raft at that

place. The delivery was commenced,

and a portion was culled and piled,

but before it could be counted or es-

timated it was carried away by a

freshet. In an action to recover the

contract price for the amount so de-

livered, held, that the evidence sus-

tained a finding of delivery and

acceptance, and that delivery of the

whole amount contracted for was

not necessary to pass title to that

delivered.

i Ober v. Carson (1876), 62 Mo. 209,

citing Cunningham v. Ashbrook, 20

Mo. 553; Glasgow v. Nicholson, 25

Mo. 29; Bass v. Walsh, 39 Mo. 192;

Williams v. Gray, 39 Mo. 201.

The rule that title to goods does

not pass so long as anything remains

to be done to ascertain the quantity

and price of the article sold, does not

apply where there is a delivery with

the intention of passing title. Cham-

blee v. McKenzie (1876), 31 Ark. 155;

O'Keefe v. Kellogg (1854), 15 111. 347;

rn ; Crofoot v. Ben- place. Thedeliverywascommenced,
nett, 2 Comst. (N. Y.) 25 ; Page v. and a portion was culled and piled,
Carpenter, 10 N. H. 77; Cunning- but before it could be counted or esh am v. A h brook. 20 fo. 555.' The timated it was carried away by a
court likens the case to that of Cun- fre het. In an action to recover the
ningham v. Ashbrook, sup1·a, where contr act price for the amount so dean entire drove of hogs had been livered, held. that the evidence sussold at so much per hundred weight, tained a finding of delivery and
net weight, to be delivered at the acceptance, and that delivery of the
slaughter-house of the buyer, who whole amount contracted for was
was to kill and weigh them. The hog not n ece ary to pas title to that
were delivered and slaughtered, and delivered.
the seller was notified that he might
l Ober v. Carson (1 76), 62 1\Io. 209,
call the next day at the packing- citing Cunningham v. A hbrook, 20
house of the buyer, see the hogs Mo. 553; Glasgow v. Nicholson, 25
weighed, and get his pay. That Mo. 29; Bass v. Wal h. 39 Mo. 192;
night the slaughter-house wa burned Williams v. Gray, 39 Mo. 201.
and the hogs destroyed. Held. that
The rule tliat title to goods does
the title had pas ed and the seller notpasss olongasan~1 thingremains
could recover the price.
to be done to ascertain the quantity
In Burrows v. Whitaker (1 77), 71 and price of the article sold, does not
N. Y. 291. 27 Am. R. 42, it appear ed a1)ply where there i s a deli very with
that defendant agreed to buy of the intention of pas ing· title. Champlain tiff all the lumber which he blee v. McKenzie (1 76). 31 Ark. 155;
should deliver at a specified place on ffKeefe v. Kellogg (l - 4), 15 Ill. 347:
the Delaware river, before a certain Dennis v. Alexander (1 46), 3 Pa. St.
time; and prices were agreed on fo r 50; Seckel v. Scott (1 72), 66 Ill. 106;
the good and for the culled. De- Foster v. fagill (18 G), 119 Ill. 75, 8
fendant was to c ull and pile, and the N. E. R. 771; Crofoot v. Bennett
lumber \Vas to be counted on the (1 49), 2 N. Y. 25 ; Odell v. Railroad
bank or estimated in the raft at that Co. (1871), 109 Mass. 50; Cu hman v.
44.0
21 Barb. (N. Y.)
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goods are to be delivered, as separating the specific quantity

sold from a larger mass, or identifying them when they are

mixed with others, a present right of property does not attach

in the purchaser. But when a mere operation of weight,

measurement, counting, or the like, remains to be performed

after the goods are actually delivered, and it is shown that

it was the intention of the parties to complete the sale by de-

livery, such weighing, measuring or counting afterwards will

not be regarded as a part of the contract of sale, but will be

considered as referring to adjustment on a final settlement.

The question of transfer to, and vesting title in, the purchaser

always involves an inquiry into the intention of the contract-

ing parties; and it is to be ascertained whether their negotia-

tions and acts show an intention on the part of the seller to

relinquish all further claim as owner, and on the part of the

buyer to assume such control with all liabilities."

Holyoke (1852), 34 Me. 289; Upson v.

Holmes (1883), 51 Conn. 500; Sedgwick
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v. Cottingham (1880 1, 54 Iowa, 512,

6N.W.R. 738 ; Boswell v. Green ( 1 856 ).

25 N. J. L. 390; King v. Jarman (1879),

35 Ark. 190, 37 Am. R, 11; Morrow v.

Eeed (1872), 30 Wis. 81.

Where a quantity of hemlock bark

had been sold, delivered and ac-

cepted, and the vendee had assumed

control of it as owner, it was held that

the title vested in him at once, al-

though the bark had not been meas-

ured, and that a loss of it by fire fell

upon him. Baldwin v. Doubleday

<1886), 59 Vt. 7, 8 Atl. R. 576.

So where wood had been the sub-

ject of a contract of sale, the wood

to be carried by the vendee to a cer-

tain place and there piled, measured

and paid for, and the wood after de-

livery to the vendee was lost before

measurement, it was held that the

title had passed. Gill v. Benjamin, 64

Wis. 362, 54 Ani.R. 619. 25 N.W. R.445.

Said the court: "Was such piling and

measuring a condition precedent to

the vesting of the title thereof in the

defendant? Where the manifest in-

tention of the parties is to transfer

the title the sale may be complete,

notwithstanding the property is yet

to be measured and the amount of

the price yet to be ascertained.

Sewell v. Eaton, 6 Wis. 490, 70 Am.

Dec. 471; McConnell v. Hughes, 29

Wis. 537; Morrow v. Campbell, 30

Wis. 90; Fletcher v. Ingram, 46 Wis.

191. So held where by the agree-

ment the vendee was to have the

title to saw-logs as soon as the vendor

deposited them in a certain place.

Morrow v. Reed, 30 Wis. 81. These

principles are fully recognized and

sanctioned in Pike v. Vaughn, 39

Wis. 505. relied upon by counsel for

the defendant."

441

§§ 528, 529.J
528, 529.] law of sale. [book ii.

528. What delivery sufficient in such cases.— The

delivery which will suffice to satisfy the preceding rule need

not, in all cases, be an actual, physical delivery into the man-

ual possession of the purchaser. There may here, as in other

cases, be a constructive delivery, as where goods which are so

ponderous or bulky as not to be capable of manual delivery

are put under the actual control of the buyer, or where there

is delivered to him the key of the warehouse in which they are

contained. Here, again, the intention of the parties governs,

and if, from all the circumstances, it is evident that they treated

the goods as delivered, the title may pass within the rule of

the previous section, even though something is yet to be done

to ascertain the quantity or quality which is to determine the

amount to be paid. 1

§ 529. How when the contemplated means of ascer-

taining quantity, etc., fails.— Where the whole body of the

goods is thus delivered to the purchaser, with the intention of

i Morrow v. Reed (1872), 30 Wis. 81. when intrusted to the vendee, is a
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In King v. Jarman (1879), 35 Ark. matter of confidence not affecting

190, 37 Am. R. 11, cotton contracted the sale."

to be sold was lying in a warehouse, So in Bethel St. Mill Co. v. Brown
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§ 528. - - What delivery sufficient in , uch ca e .-The
delivery which will suffice to satisfy the preceding rule n eel
not, in all cases, be an actual, physical delivery into the manual possession of the purchaser. There may here, as in other
cases, be a constructive delivery, as where goods which are so
pond erous or bulky as not to be capable of manual delivery
are put under the actual control of the buyer, or where there
is delivered to him the key of the warehou e in which they are
contained. Here, again, the intention of the parties governs,
and if, from all the circumstances, it is evident that they treated
the goods as delivered, the title may pass within the rule of
the previous section, even though something is yet to be done
to ascertain the quantity or quality which is to determine the
amount to be paid.1

and the seller gave the purchaser an (1869), 57 Me. 9, it is said: "The law

order on the warehouseman for it. regulating the delivery of property

Said the court: "Where the minds upon a sale accommodates itself to

of the parties have assented to the the necessities of the business and

present purchase and sale of a spe- the nature of the property, making a

cific chattel, which may be clearly symbolical delivery sufficient where

§ 529. - - How when the contemplated means of a certaining quantity, etc., fails.-Where the whole body of the
goods is thus delivered to the purchaser, with the intention of

identified and separated from other nothing but a constructive posses-

property, and the sale be depondent sion can ordinarily be had, and by

on no conditions or contingencies, no means overlooking the possibility

and such possession be given as the that the merchandise sold may re-

nature of the subject and the situa- main in possession of the seller for

tiou of the parties with regard thereto certain specific purposes, among

'will permit of, and the vendor has which are transportation and deliv-

done all that is required of him with ery at another place, where the prop-

respect to the property, the title will erty in it has actually passed from

pass. And this will be so notwith- him and vested in the purchaser,

standing something may be still without affecting the validity of the

necessary on the part of the vendee sale. Boynton v. Veazie, 24 Me. 286;

to ascertain the exact price. That, Terry v. Wheeler, 25 N. Y. 520."

442

11\Iorrow v. Reed (1872), 30 Wis. 81.
In King v. Jarman (1879), 35 Ark.
190, 37 Am. R. 11, cot.ton contracted
to be sold was lying in a warehouse,
and t.he seller gave the purchaser an
order on the warehouseman for it.
Said the court: "Where the minds
of the parties have assented to the
pre ent purchase and sale of a specific chattel, which may be clearly
identified and separated from other
property, and the sale be dep3ndent
on no conuitions or contingencies,
and such possession be given as the
nature of the subject and the situation of the parties with rega1·d thereto
'will permit of, and the vendor has
done all that is required of him with
respect to the property, the title will
pa . And this will be so notwithstanding something may be still
necessary on the part of the vendee
to ascertain the exact price. That,

when intrusted to the vendee, is a
matter of confidence not affecting
the sale."
So in Bethel St. Mill Co. v. Brown
(1869), 57 Me. 9, it is said: "The law
regulating the delivery of property
upon a sale accommodates itself to
the necessities of the business and
the nature of the property, making a
symbolical delivery sufficient where
nothing but a constructive possession can ordinarily be bad, and by
no means overlooking the possibility
that the merchandise sold may remain in possess10n of the seller for
certain specific purposes, among
which are transportation and delivery at another place, where the property in it has actually passed from
him and vested in the purchaser,
without affecting the validity of the
ale. Boynton v. Veazie, 24 Me. 286;
Terry v. Wheeler, 25 N. Y. 520."

442
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completing the sale, or the title is otherwise transferred, and

the quantity, etc., is to be subsequently ascertained by some par-

ticular method or at some particular place, the impossibility

afterwards of doing so by the method or at the place agreed

upon will not defeat the sale, but the quantity, etc., may be

ascertained in some other way. 1

1 Upson v. Holmes (1883), 51 Conn, agreed to sell to Benjamin one thou-

500. In this case the defendants pur-

chased of the plaintiff all the wood

standing upon a certain lot, at a cer-

tain price per cord, to be cut and

hauled by the defendants and meas-

ured in their yard, and paid for after

measurement. After all had been cut

and a part had been hauled, a large

quantity remaining on the lot was

burned. Held, (1) that there had
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been a delivery to the defendants;

and (2) that plaintiff could recover

the value of the wood burned on any

proper proof of its quantity.

So in Sedgwick v. Cottingham

(1880), 54 Iowa, 512, 6 N. W. R. 738,

wheat delivered to the purchaser to

be afterwards weighed by him was

accidentally destroyed by fire before

weighing. Held, that the title had

passed and the seller could recover

according to the weight as shown by

other evidence.

So in Cushman v. Holyoke (1852),

34 Me. 289, logs, which had been sold

and delivered to be scaled at a sub-

sequent time and particular place,

were lost before being so scaled.

Held, that the quantity could be

shown by other means.

Other illustrations are found in

Haxall v. Willis, 15 Gratt. (Va.) 434;

Cunningham v. Ashbrook, 20 Mo. 555;

Burrows v. Whitaker, 71 N. Y. 291,

27 Am. R. 42; Gill v. Benjamin (1885),

64 Wis. 362, 54 Am. R. 619; Baldwin

v. Doubleday, 59 Vt. 7, 8 Atl. R. 576.

In Gill v. Benjamin, supra, Gill

sand cords of wood, "to be deliv-

ered from Gill's pier (in Michigan)

over the rail of the vessel . . . and

to be delivered from time to time to

Benjamin's vessel as wanted during

the season of navigation: said wood

to be piled as taken from vessel, and

to be measured and paid for when

piled on Benjamin's dock in Milwau-

kee." One cargo of the wood was

thus delivered and was lost with the

vessel. Held, that the contract as to

such cargo became an executed sale

and the title vested at once in Benja-

min, and the piling and measurement

having become impossible, either by

Benjamin's fault or the act of God,

Benjamin was liable for the cargo.

In Martineau v. Kitching (1872),

L. R. 7 Q. B. 436, the goods were de-

stroyed by accidental fire before they

had been weighed, and it was urged

that this relieved the buyer, but

§§ 530-532.J
§§ 530-532.] LA.W OF SALE. [book it.

§ 530. . "Where, however, the goods have not been de-

livered, and the agreed method of determining the quantity,

etc., fails, and the parties cannot agree upon another, the sale

itself fails and the title does not pass. 1

§ 531. Effect of part performance. — Here, as in the cases

mentioned in the preceding subdivision, 2 if the weighing, meas-

L W OF

[n

.ALE.

K IT.

§ 530. - - . Where, however, the good have not h n 1 livered, and the agreed method of determining the quantity,
etc., fails, and the parties cannot agree ur on another, the al
itself fails and the title does not pa s. 1

uring or testing is necessary at all, the fact that this act has

been partly performed can usually be of no aid in passing the

title unless the performance of the residue is waived. Where

the contract is entire, the vendee may insist upon full per-

formance, and unless he waives it the seller cannot recover by

showing that he has done a part only of that which he was

to do. 3

§ 532. Effect of earnest or part payment.— For reasons

similar to those likewise mentioned in the preceding subdi-

vision, 4 the payment of earnest does not aid the passing of

the title. It merely confirms the contract; but the question

whether, under that contract, the title passes, remains to be
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determined as before. 5

i Thus, in Nesbit v. Burry (1855), no delivery, is not dispensed with by

25 Pa. St. 208, the parties had agreed an unsuccessful attempt to weigh,

§ 531. Effect of part performance.- Here, as in the cases
mentioned in the preceding subdivision, 2 if the weighing, measuring or testing is necessary at all, the fact that this act ha·
been partly performed can usually be of no aid in passing th
title unless the performance of the residue i waived. Where
the contract is entire, the vendee may insist upon full performan e, and unless he waives it the seller cannot recover by
showing that he has done a part only of that which he wa
to do. 3

upon the sale of a pair of oxen at so or by a refusal to try a better mode

much a pound, live weight, the cattle of doing it. These matters left the

to be thereafter weighed at a certain parties as they stood before, and the

place on certain scales. The buyer title remained in the vendor. Nor

at the time paid $10 as earnest. The does earnest or part payment aid in

cattle were afterwards taken to the vesting the title where the quantity

place agreed upon, but it was then is yet to be ascertained and there is

learned that the scales specified no delivery. Under such circum-

were out of repair and could not be stances the contract is essentially

used. The buyer was willing to executory, and the part payment

have them weighed in some other only shows a concluded and binding

§ 532. Effect of earnest or part pa.yment.-For rea ons
similar to those likewise mentioned in the preceding snbdivision,4 the payment of earne t does not aid the passing of
the title. It merely confirms the contract; but the question
whether, under that contract, the title passes, remains to be
determined as before. 5

place, and offered to pay the balance agreement."

of the price as so determined; but 2 See ante, § 513.

the seller refused and took the oxen 3 The Elgee Cotton Cases (1874), 89

home. The buyer then brought re- U. S. (22 Wall.) 180; Kein v. Tupper

plevin for them, but it was held that (1873), 52 N. Y. 550, quoted from in

the title had not passed. The court § 522, ante.

said: "The weighing, being neces- 4 See ante, § 514.

sary to a perfect sale where there is 5 The Elgee Cotton Cases, supra;
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1 Thu , in Nesbit v. Burry (1 55),
no delivery, is not di pensed with by
25 Pa. St. 208, the parties had agreed an un uccessful attempt to weigh,
upou the ale of a pair of oxen at so or by a refusal to try a better mode
much a pound, live weight, the cattle of doing it. The e matter left the
to be thereafter weighed at a certain parties as they stood before, and the
place on certain scales. The buyer title r emainea in the vendor. Nor
at the time paid SlO as earnest. The does earnest or part payment aid in
cattle were afterward taken to the ve ting the title where the quantity
place agreed upon, but it was then is yet to be ascertained and there is
learned that the scales specified no delivery. Under such circumwere out of repair and could not be stances the contract is essentially
used. The buyer wa willing to executory, and tile part payment
have them weighed in some other on ly shows a concluded and hinding
place, an i offered to pay the balance agreement."
of the price as so determined; but
2 See ante,
513.
the seller refused and took the oxen
3 The Elgee Cotton Cases (1874), 89
home. The buyer then brought re- U. S. (22 Wall.) 1 O; Kein v. Tupper
plevin for them, but it was held that (1873), 52 N. Y. 550, quoted from in
the title had not passed. The court ~ 522, ante.
said: 'The weighing, being neces4 ee ante, § 514.
sary to a perfect sale where there is
5 The Elgee Cotton Cases, supra;
444
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CH. III.] CONDITIONAL SALE OF SPECIFIC CHATTELS. [§§ 533, 534.

III. .

Where the Buyer is to do Something other than to Merely

Pat the Price as a Condition Precedent to the Pass-

ing of the Title.

§ 533. What here included.— The third rule as stated by Mr.

Benjamin is, as has been seen, 1 that " where the buyer is by

the contract bound to do anything as a condition, either pre-

cedent or concurrent, on which the passing of the property

depends, the property will not pass until the condition be ful-

filled, even though the goods may have been actually delivered

into the possession of the buyer." This thing which the buyer

is to do is usually, as has been already stated, to pay the price;

and this aspect of the condition will be fully dealt with in the

following subdivision.

But there may be other things than payment which the

buyer is to do as a condition precedent; and what these may

be will here be separately considered.

§ 531. Title does not pass till act is performed.— In a re-
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cent case in Maine there was a contract for the sale of a quan-

tity of wood to be delivered and piled upon the buyer's prem-

ises, there to be inspected and surveyed by an agent of the

buyer, and to be paid for at a certain rate " when said wood

shall be delivered and surveyed as aforesaid." The wood was

all delivered, but before it was all surveyed the buyer became

insolvent, and the seller sought to reclaim the wood on the

ground that the title had not passed. The court, quoting and

applying the rule of Mr. Benjamin, held that so far as the wood

had "been surveyed and accepted by the buyer, the title had

passed and the seller could not regain it, 2 but so far as that act

had not been done the title did not pass. 3

Nesbit v. Burry (1855), 25 Pa. St. 208; 2Pinkham v. Appleton (1890), 82

Jennings v. Flanagan (1837), 5 Dana Me. 574, 20 Atl. R. 237.

(Ky.), 217, 30 Am. Dec. 683. 3 Ballantyne v. Appleton (1890), 82

lAnte, § 505. Me. 570, 20 Atl. R. 235.

445

§§ 535-537.]

LAW OF SALE.

[BOOK II.

§§ 535-537.] law of sale. [book ii.

§ 535. . The same principle has to some extent been ap-

plied l where oxen were sold and delivered to the vendee, to be

slaughtered, prepared for market and weighed by him, and

to be paid for in cash at so much per hundred weight when

dressed; 2 and where a carload of wheat was delivered to the

buyer, to be weighed by him and paid for in cash at a certain

price per bushel when the number of bushels should be so de-

termined ; 3 and where a roll of carpet was sent to the buyer's

house that he might measure and cut off what he needed to

cover his room, and was to pay for it in cash when the amount

was thus ascertained ; 4 though these cases more appropriately

belong among those cited in the following subdivision.

§ 536. Unless a contrary intention appears.— But this rule,

like the others, yields to evidence of a contrary intention. Thus,

as has been seen, 5 the title may pass, if that under all of the

circumstances appears to have been the intention, although the

buyer is yet to do some act in reference to the goods; as, for

example, to weigh them that the amount of the price may be

IT.
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ascertained. 6

Where Payment of Pkice is Condition Precedent to Pass-

§ 535. - - . The same principle has to some extent been applied 1 where oxen were sold and delivered to the vendee, to be
slaughtered, prepared for market and weighed by him, and
to be paid for in cash at so much per hundred weight when
dressed; 2 and where a carload of wheat was delivered to the
buyer, to be weighed by him and paid for in cash at a certain
price per bushel when the number of bushels should be so determined; 3 and where a roll of carpet was sent to the buyer's
house that he might measure a·nd cut off what he needed to
cover his room, and was to pay for it in cash when the amount
was thus ascertained; 4 though these cases more appropriately
belong among those cited in the following subdivision.

§ 536. Unless a contrary intention appears.- But this rule,

ing of Title.

§ 537. What here included.— The question whether the pay-'

ment of the price is a condition precedent to the passing of the

title is one which presents several aspects, and involves the con-

sideration of a variety of circumstances. It must, in the first

place, be distinguished from the question whether the seller has

the right to retain possession until payment — a matter not fully

to be considered now, but dealt with hereafter under the head

1 See ante > § 524 4 Andrew v. Dieterich (1835), 14

2 Ward v. Shaw (1831), 7 Wend. Wend. (N. Y.) 31.

like the others, yields to evidence of a contrary intention. Thus,
as has been seen, 5 the title may pass, if that under all of the
circumstances appears to have been the intention, although the
buyer is yet to do some act in reference to the goods; as, for
example, to weigh them that the amount of the price may be
ascertained. 6

(N. Y.) 404. 5 See ante, § 498.

IV.

3 Hoffman v. Culver (1880), 7 111. 6 See Burke v. Shannon (Ky.), 43 S.

A PP- 45 °- W. R. 223; Kohl v. Lindley, 39 111.

195; Phillips v. Moor, 71 Me. 78.
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wHERE

p A YMENT

OF PRICE IS CONDITION PRECEDENT TO

pA

-

ING OF TITLE.

§ 537. What here included.-The question whether the pay-·
ment of the price is a condition precedent to the passing of the
t.i tle is one which pres en ts several aspects, and involves the consideration of a variety of circumstances. It must, in the first
place, be distinguished from the question whether the seller has
the right to retain possession until payment- a matter not fully
to be considered now, but dealt with hereafter under the head
See ante, § 524.
2Ward v. Shaw (1831), 7 Wend.
(N. Y.) 404.
3 Hoffman v. Culver (1880), 7 Ill.
App. 450.
1

Andrew v. Dieterich (1835), 14
Wend. (N. Y.) 31.
5 See ante,§ 498.
s See Burke v. Shannon (Ky.), 43 S.
W. R. 223; Kohl v. Lindley, 39 Ill.
195; Phillips v. Moor, 71 Me. 78.
446
4

CH. III.] CONDITIONAL SALE OF SPECIFIC CHATTELS. [§ 538.

of the vendor's lien. There it will be found that, though the

title may have passed, the seller has in many cases the right to

retain possession as a means of securing the payment of the

price. The question here is different, and involves the matter,

not of the transfer of possession, but of the passing of the title.

Is the payment of the price a condition precedent to the pass-

ing of the title?

This question divides itself into two distinct parts: (1) In gen-

eral, is the payment of the price, by implication, a condition

precedent; and (2) May the parties, by express agreement, make

it a condition precedent ?

The former of these two subdivisions will be considered, first,

and after it the second.

1. Payment of Price as Implied Condition Precedent to Passing

of Title.

§ 538. In general — Payment as condition precedent where

sale impliedly for cash. — Where a contract for the present

sale of goods has been made, and nothing is said as to the time
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of payment, the law presumes that no credit is to be given, and

that the price is to be paid concurrently with the delivery of

the goods, — or, as it is often phrased, that the sale is to be for

cash. Under such circumstances, is the payment of the price

to be deemed by implication a condition precedent to the trans-

fer of the title ?

To this question there may be given the general answer that

where the parties are negotiating concerning specific goods,

and all of the terms have been agreed upon, and nothing re-

mains to be done except to deliver the goods and pay the price,

the title, as has been seen, 1 will be deemed to pass at once, even

without delivery or payment, unless a contrary intention ap-

pears. The right to possession, however, as has also been seen,

does not necessarily pass, for the seller, who has not waived it,

has the right to retain possession of the goods by virtue of his

vendor's lien to secure the payment of the price. 2

i See ante, § 483. 2 See ante, § 493.

447

§ ') 539-5·±1.J

LA.W OF SALE.

[BOOK II.

§§ 539-541.] LAW OF SALE. [book II.

§ 539. . Notwithstanding this general answer, the spe-

§ 539. - - . Notwithstanding this general answer, the spe-

cific question may still be pressed : Where the parties evidently

contemplate that the transaction is to be closed at once — where

no term of credit is agreed upon — no stipulation for further

dealings had — where the seller, clearly expects cash in hand,

although there may have been no express agreement to that

effect, — is there not in these facts such evidence of an inten-

tion that the title shall not pass until the price is paid as to

make such payment a condition precedent, even within the gen-

eral rule above referred to ?

Before the answer to this question is given let another be

put. Thus —

§ 540. Payment of price as implied condition where sale

is expressly for cash. — Instead of remaining silent as to the

time of payment, as above supposed, the parties may expressly

stipulate that the sale is to be for " cash " or for " cash upon

delivery." In such a case, also, is the payment of the price to

be regarded as a condition precedent to the passing of the
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title ?

cific question may still be pressed: Where the parties evidently
contemplate that the transaction is to be closed at once -where
no term of credit is agreed upon- no stipulation for further
dealings had - where the seller. clearly expects cash in hand,
although there may have been no express agreement to that
effect,- is there not in these facts such evidence of an intention that the title shall not pass until the price is paid as to
make such payment a condition precedent, even within the general rule above referred to?
Before the answer to this question is given let another he
put. Thus-

The parties may, indeed, go further and expressly stipulate

in terms that the title shall not pass until the price is paid ;

but the effectiveness of such a stipulation, unless it is waived, is

so clear as to require no comment here. The difficult question

§ 540. Payment of price as implied condition where sale
is expressly for cash.- Instead of remaining silent as to the

is, whether a sale which, by implication or expressly, is to be for

"cash" or "cash upon delivery," shall be deemed conditional.

§ 541. Meaning of i( cash sale." — It will be evident,

upon reflection, that the expressions " cash," " cash down," or

" cash upon delivery," may be used in two different senses —

one where the words indicate simply that the goods must be

paid for before the buyer is to be entitled to possession; and

the other, where they indicate an intention not to part with the

title until the price is paid. 1 Whether they are to have the one

!Thus in Clark v. Greeley (1882), condition precedent to the transfer

62 N. H. 394, the court say: "A sale of the title, and in such a case the

of chattels may be conditional. The property will not pass although the

payment of the price may be made a goods are delivered. A sale for cash

448

time of payment, as above supposed, the parties may expressly
stipulate that the sale is to be for "cash" or for "cash upon
delivery." In such a case, also, is the payment of the price to
be regarded as a condition precedent to the passing of the
title?
The parties may, indeed, go further and expressly stipulate
in terms that the title shall not pass until the price is paid;
but the effectiveness of such a stipulation, unless it is waived, is
so clear as to require no comment here. The difficult question
is, whether a sale which, by implication or expressly, is to be for
"cash" or "cash upon delivery," shall be deemed conditional.

§ 541. - - Meaning of" cash sale."- It will be evident,
upon reflection, that the expressions "cash," "cash down," or
"cash upon delivery," may be used in two different senses one where the words indicate simply that the goods must be
paid for before the buyer is to be entitled to possession; and
the other, where they indicate an intention not to part with the
title until the price is paid. 1 \Vhether they are to have the one
1 Thus in Cla1·k v. Greeley (1882),
condition precedent to the transfer
62 N. H. 394, the court say: "A sale of the title, and in such a case the
f chattel · m ay be conditiona l. The property will not pas although the
pay ment of the price may be made a. goods are delivered. A sale for cash
448

CH. III.] CONDITIONAL SALE OF SPECIFIC CHATTELS.

[§ 542-

meaning or the other is a question of intention, depending

largely upon the situation of the parties, the character of the

property and the circumstances of the case. If the contract is

in writing, or the facts are not disputed, it is a question for the

court; 1 if the facts are in dispute, the question is for the jury. 2

g 542. Title may pass though possession retained —

Payment and delivery to be concurrent. — Where the words

are given the first meaning, it must be true that the title passes

at once upon the completion of the contract and by force of it,

so as to cast the risk upon the buyer and entitle the seller to

the price. 3 It is, of course, true that the buyer, even though he

has the title, is not entitled to possession until he pays the price ;

for payment and delivery, in such a case, are presumed to be

concurrent acts, 4 and until payment is made the seller may re-

tain the goods by virtue of his vendor's lien. But the seller

retains possession and not title.

is not necessarily a conditional sale.
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Scudder v. Bradbury, 106 Mass. 422.

The phrases ' terms cash ' and ' cash

down ' may or may not import that

payment of the price is made a con-

dition precedent to the transfer of

the title, according to the intent of

the parties. If by the use of these

terms the parties understand merely

that no credit is to be given, and that

the seller will insist on his right to

retain possession of the goods until

the payment of the price, the sale is

still so far completed and absolute

that the property passes; but if it is

understood that the goods are to re-

main the property of the seller until

the price is paid, the sale is condi-

tional and the title does not pass."

To same effect: Towne v. Davis

(1890), 66 N. H. 396, 22 AtL R 450.

i Davis v. Giddings, 30 Neb. 209, 46

N. W. R. 425.

2 Collins v. Houston, 138 Pa. St. 481,

21 Atl. R. 234; Paul v. Reed, 52 N. H.

136; Clark v. Greeley, 62 N. H. 394;

Towne v. Davis, 66 N. H. 396, 22 Atl.

R. 450; Scudder v. Bradbury, 106

Mass. 422; Empire State Type Found-

ing Co. v. Grant, 114 N. Y. 40, 21 N.

E. R. 49 (citing Hall v. Stevens, 40

Hun, 578; Hammett v. Linneman, 48

N. Y. 399).

3 Clark v. Greeley, supra; Phillips

v. Moor, 71 Me. 78; Rail v. Little

Falls Lumber Co., 47 Minn. 422, 50

N. W. R. 471; Hayden v. Demets, 53

N. Y. 426.

4 In Southwestern Freight Co. v.

Stanard (1869), 44 Mo. 71, 100 Am.

Dec. 255, it is said : " Where no time

is stipulated for payment, it is un-

derstood to be a cash sale, and the

payment and delivery are immediate

and concurrent acts, and the vendor

may refuse to deliver without pay-

ment: and if the payment be not

immediately made, the contract be-

comes void. Outwater v. Dodge, 7

Cow. (N. Y.) 85; Woods v. Magee, 7

29
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§ 5±3.J
543.]

LA.W OF SALE.

[book II.

§ 543. Or title may not pass until payment.— Where

the words are given the second meaning, it is clear that the

title will not pass until the price is paid or the condition

waived. Here, until payment or its tender, the seller retains

not simply the possession, but the title also. It is unquestion-

able that this is the ordinary interpretation of the words, and

that the title does not pass until the price is paid or payment

waived, not only in those cases in which the parties expressly

stipulate that the sale is to be for cash, but also in those in

which, though there was no express stipulation, the parties

evidently contemplated that the transfer of the title and the

payment of the price were to be concurrent acts. 1

Ohio (Pt. II), 128, 30 Am. Deo. 202;

Leven v. Smith, 1 Denio (N. Y.), 571;

Com. Dig., tit. Agreement, B. 3; Pal-

mer v. Hand, 13 Johns. (N. Y.) 434;
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Harris v. Smith, 3 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 20;

LA. W OF SALE.

[BOOK II.

§ 543. - - Or title may '!JOt pass until payment.-Where
the words are given the second meaning, it is clear that the
title will not pass until the price is paid or the condition
waived. Here, until payment or its tender, the seller retains
not simply the possession, but the title also. It is unquestionable that this is the ordinary interpretation of the words, and
that the title does not pass until the price i paid or payment
waived, not only in those cases in which the parties expressly
stipulate that the sale is to be for cash, but also in those in
which, though there was no cxpres tipulation, the parties
evidently contemplated that the tran fer of the title and the
payment of the price were to be concurrent acts. 1

Bainbridge v. Caldwell, 4 Dana (Ky.),

213; Ferguson v. Clifford, 37 N. H. 86;

Morris v. Rexford, 18 N. Y. 552; 2

Kent'aCom.(llthed.) 605." This state-

ment, however, as will be observed,

and as an examination of the cases

cited will more clearly indicate, con-

fuses the delivery of possession with

the transfer of the title. A much more

accurate statement is that found in

Saff ord v. McDonough (1876), 120 Mass.

290, as follows: " It should be kept in

mind that the question is not whether

. . . the title in the property would

have passed to the defendant so that

it would be at his risk. In such a case

the title would pass to the purchaser

unless there was some agreement to

the contrary, but the vendor would

have a lien for the price and could re-

tain possession until its payment. Has-

kins v. Warren, 115 Mass. 514; Morse

v. Sherman, 106 Mass. 430; Townsend

v. Hargraves, 118 Mass. 325."

1 It was laid down by the earlier

writers that a sale for cash is a con-

ditional sale. Thus, Kent says that

"Where no time is agreed on for

payment, it is understood to be a

cash sale, and the payment and de-

livery are immediate and concurrent

acts, and the vendor may refuse to

deliver without payment, and if the

payment be not immediately made,

the contract becomes void." 2 Kent's

Cora. 496, where he cites Comyn's

Digest, tit. Agreements, B. 3, and

Bell on Sales, Edin. (1844), 20, 21.

In an early case, Copland v. Bos-

quet (1826), 4 Wash. C. C. 588, 6 Fed.

Cas., p. 513, No. 3212, it was said that

" if the sale be for money to be im-

mediately paid, or to be paid upon

delivery, payment of the price is a

precedent condition of the sale,

which suspends the completion of

the contract until the condition is

performed, and prevents the right of

property from passing to the vendee,

unless the vendor chooses to trust to

Ohio (Pt. II), 128, 30 Am. Dec. 202; ditional sale. Thus, Kent says that
Leven v. Smith, 1 Denio (N. Y.), 571; " Where no time is agreed on for
Com. Dig., tit. Agreement, B. 3; Pal- payment, it is under tood to be a
mer v. Hand, 13 John . (N. Y.) 434; ca~h sale, and the ·payment and deHarris v. Smith, 3 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 20; livery are immetliate and concurrent
Bainbridge v. Caldwell, 4 Dana (Ky.), acts, and the vendor may refuse to
213; Fergu on v. Clifford, 37 . H. 6; deliver without payment, ancl if the
l\Iorris v. Rexford, 1 N. Y. 552; 2 payment be not inimediately made,
Kent's.Com.(llthed.) 665." This state- the confract becomes void." 2 Kent's
ment, however, as will be observed, Com. 496, where he cites Cornyn's
and as an examination of the cases Digest, tit. Agreements, B. 3, and
cited will more clearly indicate, con- Bell on Sales, Edin. (1844), 20, 21.
fuses the delivery of po ession with
In an early case, Copland v. Bosthe tran3er of the title. Am uch more quet (1826), 4 Wash. C. C. 5 , 6 Fed.
accurate statement i that found in Cas., p. 513, No. 3212, it was sa.id that
Safford v.McDonough(l 76),120 Mass. "if the sale be for money to be im290, as follow : "It should be kept in mediately paitl, or to be paid upon
mind that the question is not whether deli very, payment of the price is a
• • . the title in the property would precedent condition of the sale,
ha Ye pa. secl to the defendant so that which suspends the corn.pletion of
it would be at bis risk. In such a case the contract until the condition is
the title would pass to the puruhaser performed, and prevents t.he right of
unless there was some agreement to property from passing to the vendee,
the contrary, but the vendor would unless the vendor choose to tru t to
have a lien for the price and could re- the personal credit of the vendee.
tain pos es ion until its payment. Has- If credit be not given, the bargain i
kins v. Warren, 115 Mass. 514; Morse con idered nothing more than a comv. Sherman, 106 l\Iass. 430; Townsend munication." Qnoted and approved
v. Hargraves, 11 Mass. 325."
in Bergan v. Magnus (1896), 98 Ga.
1 It wa laid down by the earlier 514, 25 s. E. R. 570.
writers that a sale for cash is a conIn ~aul v. Reed (1872), 52 N. H. 136,
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The subject, nevertheless, is one concerning

which there seems to be much difference of opinion and con-

siderable cloudiness of thought. It is often said that a sale

for cash is a conditional one, and that the property will not

Williston's Cas. on Sales, 68, it ap-

peared that Reed, who was keeping

a boarding house, had arranged to

sell out to one Moody, who was to

buy Reed's hog, sugar and certain

other supplies. On the day that the

transfer was to be made Reed was to

furnish the breakfast and Moody was

to furnish the dinner, and the parties

were respectively to change posses-

sion of the house. A price was agreed

upon for the several articles which
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Moody was to buy, the hog was

changed from one pen to another at

Moody's request, the sugar was put in

with his stock, and, the amount to be

paid having been ascertained, he stood

with his pocket-book in his hand

looking over the list preparatory to

immediate payment, when he was

served with garnishment or trustee

process by. Paul, a creditor of Reed.

Reed immediately demanded back

the goods, saying: "We can call it

no sale, and I can take my stuff."

Moody said he had no objections to

giving up the goods if he could safely

do so; but he was advised not to do

so. The understanding, as testified

to by Moody, was, " 1 was to pay cash

right in his fingers; I did not ask

any time for him to wait." The ques-

tion was whether the title had passed

so that Moody owed Reed the price

at the time of the service of the writ.

The court below held that the title

had passed and that the trustee was

therefore liable; but the supreme

court reversed it, holding that the

transfer of title was conditioned upon

immediate payment. Said the court :

" The question then is whether the

goods were delivered so as to vest

the title in the trustee. The proof

tends to show that the sale was for

cash, and not on credit; so the trus-

tee testifies, and this is just what

would have been intended had no

time of payment been stipulated. 2

Kent's Com. 496, 497; Story on Con.,

sec. 796; Noy's Maxims, 87; Insurance

Co. v. De Wolf, 2 Cow. 105. The case,

then, stands before us as a contract

of sale for cash on delivery; in such

case the delivery and payment are to

be concurrent acts; and therefore, if

the goods are put into the possession

of the buyer in the expectation that

he will immediately pay the price,

and he does not do it, the seller is at

liberty to regard the delivery as con-

ditional, and may at once reclaim

the goods. In such a case the con-

§ 5±±.J
§ 544.]
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pass until the price is paid, when all that was really necessary

or intended was evidently that the buyer could not have pos-

session until he paid the price. There are, doubtless, on the
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pass until the price is paid, when all that was really nece ary
or intended was evidently that the buyer could not ba ve J ossession until be paid the price. There are, doubtless, on the
other hand, cases in which the sale was really conditional-

other hand, cases in which the sale was really conditional —

form the contract as to entitle the

seller to put an end to it and reclaim

the goods. The evidence relied upon

to prove the delivery to be absolute

and intended to pass the title at all

events is simply and solely the

changing of the hog into another

pen, and mixing the sugar with the

sugar of the buyer. Without the

mixing of the sugar, the case would

be just the ordinary one of a deliv-

ery of the goods with the expecta-
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tion that the buyer would at once

pay the price; and we think that

circumstance is not enough to show

a purpose to make the delivery abso-

lute, but rather a confident expecta-

tion that the buyer would do as he

had agreed, and pay the price at once.

. , . It is very clear that the in-

termingling of the sugar does not. as

matter of law, make the delivery ab-

solute: and I think, as matter of fact,

it is not sufficient to prove an inten-

tion to pass the title absolutely.

When the buyer declined to pay the

price, the seller at once reclaimed

the goods, and so notified the buyer,

who did not object to giving up the

sale if he could safely do so."

In Turner v. Moore (1886), 58 Vt.

455, plaintiff had bargained with de-

fendant for a tombstone. Defend-

ant claimed that the sale was to be

for cash, and plaintiff testified that

at the time of the contract nothing

was said as to the time of payment

and that she expected to pay cash

on delivery. When the stone was

completed, defendant took it on Sat-

urday afternoon to the cemetery to

place it in position, but, night com-

ing on before it was erected, he left

it there until the following Wednes-

day, when, having become concerned

about the payment, he took the stone

back to his shop. Plaintiff there-

upon brought this action, declaring

in trover and for the conversion of

the stone. The court below permit-

ted a recovery, but this judgment

was reversed by the supreme court,

where it was said: '• If the contract

was for the sale of the stone, and

there was no agreement that time

should be given the plaintiff in

which to make payment, it was a

cash sale, and no title would vest in

the plaintiff until she paid or tend-

ered the money. The court told the

jury that if the stone was delivered

to the plaintiff, the title vested in

her, and she became the owner. We

form the contract as to entitle the place it in position, but, night comseller to put an end to it and reclaim ing on before it was erected, he left
the goods. The evidence relied upon it there until the following Wednesto prove the delivery to be absolute day, when, having become concerned
and intended to pass the title at all about the payment., he took the stone
events is imply and solely the back to hi shop. Plaintiff therechanging of the hog into another upon brought this aetion, declaring
pen, and mixing the sugar with the in trover and for the con version of
sugar of the buyer. Without the the stone. The court b low permitmixing of the sugar, the case would ted a recovery, but this judgment
be ju t the ordinary one of a deliv- wa reYer eel by the supreme court,
ery of the goods with the expecta- ·where it was said: " lf the con tract
tion that the buyer would at once was for the sale of the stone, and
pay the price; and we think that there wa no agreement that time
circumstance is not enough to show should be given the plaintiff in
a purpose to make the delivery ab o- which to make payment, it was a
lute, but rather a confident expecta- ca h sale, and no title would vest in
tion that the buyer would do as he the plaintiff until he paid or tendhad agreed, and pay the price at once. ered the money. The court told the
. , . It is very clear that the in- jury that if the stone wa delivere.d
termingling of the sugar does not. as to the plaintiff, the title vested in
matter of law, make the delivery ab- her, and she became the owner. We
solute; and I think, as matter of fact, think they should have been told
it is not sufficient to prove an inten- that, if they found it a cash sale, title
tion to pass the title absolutely. would not ve t until payment or
When the buyer declined to pay the tender of payment."
price, the eller at once reclaimed
In Evansville, etc. R. Co. v. Erwin
the goods, and so notified the buyer, (1 82), 84 Ind. 457, the parties exwho did not object to giving up the pressly stipulated that the goods
sale if he could safely do so."
in question - a carload of wheat In Turner v. Moore (18 6), 58 Vt. should be delivered, weighed and
455, plaintiff had bargained with de- paid for at a certain place and that
fendant for a tombstone. Defend- payment should be made upon deant claimeJ that the sale was to be livery, and the seller gave as his reafor cash, and plaintiff testified that son for insisting upon such payment
at the time of the contract nothing that the vendee was a strang r to
wa said as to the t.ime of payment him. This was held to be a case
and that she expected to pay cash where payment \Vas a condition preon delivery. When the stoue was cedent to the passing of the title.
completed. defenilaut took it on SatPalmer v. Hand (1816), 13 Johns.
urday afternoon to the emetery to (N. Y.) 434, ·was a case where a raft
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cases in which it is clear, from, the surrounding circumstances

or the express language of the parties, that the title was not

to be transferred until the price was paid.

merit being made or demanded. Upon

the vendor attempting to assert title,

the court held that in such a sale

title would not pass before pay-

ment, unless the condition had been

waived, an apparently unrestricted

and unconditional delivery being pre-

sumptive evidence of such waiver.

In Johnson-Brinkman Co. v. Cen-

tral Bank (1893), 116 Mo. 558, 22 S.

W. R. 813, 38 Am. St. R. 615, plaint-

iffs sold a number of cars of wheat

for cash, and payment was made by

private check of the vendee. The
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check, after being duly deposited

and sent through the clearing-house,

was presented to the defendant

bank, on which it was drawn, and

payment refused, the wheat having

meantime been transferred to a

third party and the proceeds depos-

ited with defendant to the original

vendee's account. It was held that

payment by check was conditional,

and the title had not passed to the

vendee, in the absence of negligence

or laches.

Com. v. Devlin (1886), 141 Mass. 423,

6 N. E. R. 64, was a criminal case

wherein the defendant was charged

with obtaining goods under false pre-

tenses. He had agreed to purchase

certain sheep for cash, and about an

hour after delivery the parties met

and the defendant by false pretenses

induced the vendor to take a worth-

less check in payment. It was held

that the facts showed an intention

that delivery and payment should be

substantially concurrent, and the de-

lay of an hour was no waiver on the

part of the vendor. The title did

not pass until the parties met and

of lumber was sold with the evident

intention that cash should be paid

on delivery. The vendee resold it

and absconded before the delivery

was complete, and the vendor there-

upon stopped delivery and asserted

ownership as against the vendee of

the absconding purchaser. The court

used language which was somewhat

self contradictory, but the opinion

evidently was that the title had not

passed.

In Leven v. Smith (1845), 1 Denio

(N. Y.), 571, the plaintiffs were vend-

ors of boots and shoes which were

delivered to the defendant in the

expectation of immediate cash pay-

ment. Instead of tendering cash,

the defendant offered a matured

note of the plaintiffs as part pay-

ment, and cash for the balance,

which was refused and replevin

§ 544. J
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In many cases, moreover, it is practically immaterial whether

there was a reservation of the title or a reservation of posses-

sion ; because, if it were the latter only, the operation of the

vendor's lien would adequately protect the seller. That there

In many cases moreover, it is practically immaterial whether
there was a reservation of the title or a reservation of possession; because, if it were the latter only, the operation of the
vendor's lien would adequately protect the seller. That there

agreed about the check, and the

goods were therefore obtained by

said false pretenses.

In McDonough v. Sutton (1876), 35

Mich. 1, a number of farmers, who

had driven their hogs to market,

agreed to sell them to the defend-

ant, and he in turn agreed to sell

them to the plaintiff, both sales to

be for cash. The plaintiff's money

not arriving, defendant sold the hogs

to another, and while the purchaser
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was driving them off plaintiff tend-

ered the price and then brought

trover. It was held that all parties

understood that defendant was not

the owner and could not convey

title. The property remained in the

farmers until they received the pur-

chase price, and defendant was at no

time in a position to convey title to

any one.

fn Welsh v. Bell (1858), 32 Pa. St.

12, the court said : " It is a condition

precedent of a sale for cash, in order

to pass the property to the vendee,

that payment should be made. . . .

Yet, even if the contract be for a

cash sale, if the thing agreed to be

sold be delivered without payment,

the property passes to the vendee

and is liable to levy and sale as his."

In Hammett v. Linneman (1872),

48 N. Y. 399, a contract of sale was

made for a quantity of coal, for cash

on delivery. The coal was delivered

and mixed with other coal in the de-

fendant's yard. Within two or three

days payment was demanded, but

the defendant had sold the coal and

refused to pay. The court held that

defendant had no title, saying that

" it was not necessary to stand by the

coal while being delivered to the de-

fendant's carts and demand payment

for each load before it was carted

away, under penalty of waiving the

condition upon which the title was

to pass. It was sufficient that pay-

ment was the condition agreed on,

and that a request, in the case of a

bulky article like coal, was made for

payment promptly, within two or

three clays after it had been re-

ceived."

In Dows v. Kidder (1881), 81 N. Y.

121, the plaintiffs sold a cargo of

corn to Atkinson & Co., expressly for

cash on delivery. They sent a bill to

the vendee for the price and made a

conditional delivery by delivering

the official weigher's return, indorsed

by themselves, in order to allow At-

agreed about the check, and the defendant had no title, saying that
goods were therefore obtained by "it was not necessary to stand by the
said false pretenRes.
coal while being delivered to the deIn McDonough v. Sutton (1876), 35 fondant's carts and demand payment
Mich. 1, a number of farmers, who for each load before it. was carted
had driven their hogs to market, away, under penalty of waiving the
agreed to sell them to the defend- condition upon which the title was
ant, and he in turn agreed to sell to pass. It was sufficient that paythem to the plaintiff, both sales to rnent was the condition agreed on,
be for cash. The plaintiff's money and that a request, in the case of a
not arriving, defendant sold the hogs bulky article like coal, was made for
to another, and while the purcha er payment promptly, within two or
was drivrng them off plaintiff tend- three days after it hau been reered the price and then brought ceived."
trover. It was held that all parties
In Dows v. Kidder (1 1), 84 N. Y.
understood that defendant was not 121, the plaintiffs sold a cargo of
the owner and could not convey corn to Atkin on & Co., expressly for
title. The property remained in the cash on delivery. They sent a bill to
farmers until they received the pur- the vendee for the price and made a
chase price, and defendant was at no conditional delivery by delivering
time in a position to convey title to the official weigher's return, indorsed
any one.
by them elves, in order to allow AtIn Welsh v. Bell (185 ), 32 Pa. St. kinson & Co. to draw up exchange
12, the court said: ''It is a condition against the corn; but this delivery
precedent of a sale for cash, in order was only on the express condition
to pass the property to the vendee, that title should not pass till paythat payment hould be made. . . . ment was made. Atkinson & Co.
Yet, even if the contract be for a sold the corn and failed, whereupon
cash sale, if the thing agreed to be plaintiffs a serted title. The court
sold be delivered without payment, sa.id: "Upon the facts found by the
the property passes to the vendee referee it is plain that no title to the
and is liable to levy and sale as his." corn passed from the plaintiff to
In Hammett v. Linneman (1872), Atkin on or to Atkinson & Co. There
4 N. Y. 399, a contract of sale was was an agreement to sell, but paymade for a quantity of coal, for cash ment wa to be made in cash on deon delivery. The coal was delivered livery. Payment was thus made a
and mixed with other coal in the de- condition precedent, and until the
fendant 's yar l. ·within two or three condition was performed the title
days payment was demanded, but could not be affected."
the defendant had olJ. the coal and
In Adams v. O'Connor (1868), 100
refused to pay. The court held tlrn.t Ma s. 515, where a cash ale of whisky
4-4
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are cases, however, in which the question of the reservation

of the title must be determined is clear; and to these only the

present consideration is devoted : the question of the vendor's

lien is fully treated in a later chapter.

sale was completed so as to pass the

property. The general rule in such

cases is, that the price must be paid

before the property will pass, al-

though conditional delivery may

occur. If delivery takes place, where

payment is expected simultaneously

therewith, it is in law made upon

the condition precedent that the

price shall forthwith be paid."

So in Neil v. Cheves (1830), 1 Bailey

(S. C), 537, and Pickett v. Cloud

(1830), 1 id. 362, where nothing was

said about the time for payment, it
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was held that payment on delivery

was a condition precedent to the

vesting of the property.

Mathews v. Cowan (187a), 59 111.

341, was a case of trover for wheat

sold for cash and never paid for. In

such a case the court held that pay-

ment was a condition precedent to

the passing of the title, and the ap-

propriation of the flour by the de-

fendant was a conversion of the

plaintiff's property. To the same ef-

fect, Mich. Cent. R. Co. v. Phillips

(1871), 60 I1L 190.

In Lehman v. Warren (1875), 53

Ala. 535, the court had under consid-

eration a contract of sale of cotton

made by commission merchants, and

the decision was based upon a stat-

ute declaring that "no cotton sold

by commission merchants to brokers

or buyers shall be considered as de-

livered and the ownership given up

until the same is fully paid for."

Flanders v. Maynard (1877), 58 Ga. 56,

was a similar case and rested upon a

like statute.

was made, the court said: " The sale

to the defendants, having been found

by the jury to have been for cash,

was a conditional sale, and vested no

title in the purchasers until the terms

of sale had been complied with."

In Wabash Elevator Co. v. Bank

(1872), 23 Ohio St. 311, in construing

a contract for the sale of wheat, the

court said: "The title did not pass.

Under the circumstances disclosed

by the evidence, there can be no

doubt but that the transaction was

understood by the parties as a cash

sale. ... A delivery with the

expectation of receiving immediate

payment is not absolute, but condi-

tional until payment is made, and,

where there is no waiver of pay-

ment, no title vests in the purchaser

till the price is paid." Followed in

Hodgson v. Barrett (1877), 33 Ohio

St. 63.

So Fenelon v. Hogaboom (1872), 31

§§ 545-547.]
545-547.]
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§ 545. Check or draft not payment if dishonored. —

"Where the sale is thus to be for cash and payment is found to

be a condition precedent, it is clear that if the buyer obtains the

goods by giving for the price a check or draft which is subse-

quently dishonored, there is no payment (unless the check or

draft was clearly taken as such), and the title does not pass. 1

§ 546. Giving of note or other security as condition pre-

LAW OF SALE.

[B

K II.

§ 54:5 . - - Check or .draft not payment if di honored.-Where the sale is thus to be for cash and payment is found to
be a condition precedent, it is clear that if the buyer obtains the
goods by giving for the price a check or draft which is subsequently dishonored, there is no payment (unle s the check or
draft was clearly taken as such), and the title does not pass. 1

cedent. — Reasons similar to those found applicable in the pre-

ceding sections operate where it is agreed that the buyer shall

give a note, mortgage or other security for the price. The par-

ties may thus, either expressly or impliedly, make the giving of

such note or security a condition precedent to the passing of

the title ; and where they have done so the title will not pass

until the act is performed or its performance has been waived. 2

§547.

How determined. — Whether the srivino- .of the
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note or other security is to be a condition precedent is here, as

in the former case, usually a question of fact, if the parties have

i Mathews v. Cowan (1871), 59 111.

341; Hodgson v. Barrett (1877), 33

Ohio St. 63, 31 Am. E. 527; Canadian

§ 546. Giving of note or other security as condition precedent.-Reasons similar to those found applicable in the pr ceding sections operate where it is agreed that the buyer shall
give a note, mortgage or other security for the price. The parties may thus, either expres ly or impliedly make the gi in , of
such note or security a condition precedent to the pas ing of
the title; and where they have done so the title will not pass
until the act is performed or its performance has been waived. 2

Bank v. McCrea (1882), 106 111. 281;

Peoria & Pekin Un. Ry. Co. v. Buck-

ley (1885), 114 111. 337; National Bank

of Commerce v. Chicago, etc. R. Co.

(1890), 44 Minn. 224, 46 N. W. R. 342,

560, 20 Am. St. R. 566; John son-Br ink-

§ 54:7. - - How dete rmi ned.-Whetber the giving .of the
note or other security is to be a condition precedent is here, as
in the former case, u ually a question of fact, if the parties have

man Com. Co. v. Central Bank (1893),

116 Mo. 558, 22 S. W. R. 813, 38 Am.

St. R. 615.

- Whitney v. Eaton, 15 Gray (Mass.),

225; Bainbridge v. Caldwell, 4 Dana

(Ky), 211; Young v. Kansas Mfg. Co.,

23 Fla. 394; Towne v. Davis, 66 N. H.

396, 22 Atl. R. 450; Harris v. Smith

(1817), 3 S. & R. (Pa.) 20; Tyler v. Free-

man (1849), 3 Cush. (Mass.) 261 ; Hill v.

Freeman, 3 id. 257; Coggill v. Hart-

ford, etc. R. Co. (1854), 3 Gray (Mass.),

545; Hirschorn v. Canney (1867), 98

Mass. 149; Armour v. Pecker (1877),

123 Mass. 143; Salomon v. Hathaway

(1879), 126 Mass. 482; Kenney v. Ingalls,

126 id. 488; Van Duzor v. Allen (1878),

90 111. 499; Peabody v. Maguire (1887),

79 Me. 572; Russell v. Minor (1838),

22 Wend. (N. Y.) 659; Osborn v. Gantz

(1875), 60 N. Y. 540: Empire State Type

Founding Co. v. Grant, 114 N. Y. 40,

21 N. E. R. 49; Adams v. Roscoe Lum-

ber Co. (1899), 159 N. Y. 176, 53 N. E.

R. 805. In Nicholson v. Taylor (1858),

31 Pa. St. 128, an estimated amount

of lumber was sold at a certain price

per thousand, to be paid for by a note

at six months. The lumber had to

be measured before the exact price

could be determined and the note

drawn, and no time was set for the

measuring. The court held that these

facts showed that the contract was

executory.
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Mathews v. Cowan (1 71), 59 Ill. l\fass. 149; Armour v. Pecker (1877),
341; Hodgson v. Barrett (1877), 33 123 Mass. 143; Salomon v. Hathaway
Ohio St. 63, 31Am.R.527; Canadian (1879),1261\Iass.4 2;Kenneyv.Ingall,
Bank v. McCrea (1 9), 106 Ill. 2 1; 126 id. 4 ; Van Duzor v. Allen (1 7 ),
Peoria & Pekin Un. Ry. Co. v. Buck- 90 Ill. 499; Peabody v. 1aguire (1 7),
ley (1 5), 114 Ill. 837; National Bank 79 Me. 579; Russell v. Minor (183 ),
of Commerce v. Chicago, etc. R. Co. 22 Wend. (N. Y.) 659; Osborn v. Gantz
(1 90), 441\finn. 224, 46 N. W. R. 342, (1 75), 60 N. Y. 540: Empire State Type
560, 20 Am. St. R. 566; Johnson-Brink- Founding o. v. Grant, 114 N. Y. 40,
man Com. Co. v. Central Bank (1 '93), 21 N. E. R. 49; dams v. Ro ·coe Lnm116 Mo. 55 , 22 S. W. R. 13, 38 Am. ber Co. (1 '99), 159 N. Y. 176, 53 N. E.
R. 05. In Nicholson v. Taylor (1 5 ),
St. R. 615.
2vVh1tney v. Eaton, 15 Gray (Mass.), 31 Pa. St. 12 , an e timated amonnt
225; Bainbridge v. Caldwell, 4 Dana of lumber wa sold at a certain price
(Ky.), 211; Young v. Kansas Mfg. Co., per thousand, to be paid for by a note
23 Fla. 394; Towne v. Davis, 66 N. H. at six months. The lumber had to
396, 22 Atl. R. 450; Harris v. Smith be mea ured before the exact price
(1817), 3 . & R. (Pa.) 20; Tyler v. Free- could be determined and tbe note
man (1849), 3 Cush. (Mass.) 261; Hill'· drawn, and no time wa set for the
Freeman, 3 id. 2f57; Coggill v. Hart- measuring. The court held that the e
ford, etc. R. Co. (1 54), 3 Gray ( fas .), facts showed that the contract was
545; Hir chorn v. Canney (1 67), 9 executory.
456
l
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not made their intention clear; ! and, if it were a condition, the

question whether or not its performance has been waived is

likewise for the jury. 2

§ 548» Consideration for the condition. — The consideration

for the condition, whether express or implied, is ordinarily

found in the same acts or events which supply the considera-

tion for the remainder of the contract. "Where, however, the

property has once been unconditionally sold and delivered, a

subsequent agreement annexing conditions is without consid-

eration and void. 3

§ 549. Waiver of the condition of payment or secu-

rity. — But as this condition of payment or security, whether

express or implied, is, as has been seen, for the benefit of the

seller, he may waive it if he so elects. This waiver, like the

condition itself, may be either express or implied. Where it

is express, no doubt of course can arise as to its existence ; but

it need not be express, and can be inferred from acts and cir-

cumstances. Delivery of the goods without insisting upon the
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performance of the condition may be such an act. Hence it

is well settled that an absolute and unconditional delivery of

the goods without requiring payment, or the giving of the se-

curity, is to be deemed a waiver of payment as a condition

precedent or concurrent; 4 and, in any case, a voluntary de-

1 Empire State Type Founding Co. 114 N. Y. 40; Chapman v. Lathrop, 6

v. Grant, 114 N. Y. 40, 21 N. E. R. 49; Cow. (N. Y.) 110, 16 Am. Dec. 4:3:3;

Towne v. Davis, 66 N. H. 396, 22 Atl. Scudder v. Bradbury, 106 Mass. 422;

R. 450. Goodwin v. Railroad Co., Ill Mass.

2 Silsby v. Boston & Albany R. Co. 487; Freeman v. Nichols, 116 Mass.

(1900), 176 Mass. 158, 57 N. E. R. 376. 309; Haskins v. Warren. 115 Mass.

s Merrill Furniture Co. v. Hill (1894), 514; Smith v. Dennie, 6 Pick. (Mass.)

87 Me. 17, 32 Atl. R. 712; Domestic 262, 17 Am. Dec. 368; Warder v.

Sewing Mach. Co. v. Anderson (1876), Hoover, 51 Iowa, 491; Scharff v.

23 Minn. 57. See also Houser & Meyer, 133 Mo. 428, 34 S. W. R. 858;

Haines Mfg. Co. v. Hargrove (1900), Lewenberg v. Hayes, 91 Me. 104. 39

129 Cal. 90, 61 Pac. R. 660. Atl. R. 469: Freeport Stone Co. v.

'Fishback v. Van Dusen (1885), 33 Carey, 42 W. Va. 276, 26 S. E. R. 183;

Minn. Ill; Pinkham v. Appleton, 82 Neal v. Boggan, 97 Ala. 611, 11 S. R.

Me. 574; Empire State Co. v. Grant, 809; England v. Forbes, 7 Houst.
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[BOOK II.

livery without requiring such payment or security is strong

evidence of a waiver, particularly where the rights of third per-

sons have intervened based upon such delivery. Still, whether,

in fact, under all the circumstances, there has been a waiver is

a question for the jury. 1

livery without requiring such payment or security is strong
evidence of a waiYer, particularly where the rights of third per·
sons have intervened based upon such delivery. Still, whether,.
in fact, under all the circumstances, there has been a waiver is
a question for the jury. 1

(Del.) 301, 31 Atl. R 895; Merrill

Furniture Co. v. Hill, 87 Me. 17, 32

Atl. R. 712; Oester v. Sitlington, 115

Mo. 247, 21 S. W. R. 820; Wheeler &

Wilson Mfg. Co. v. Bank, 105 Ga..57,

31 S. E. R. 48.

In Fishback v. Van Dusen (1885), 33

Minn. Ill, 22 N. W. R. 244, it is said:

"The doctrine is uniform and well es-

tablished that if the vendor unquali-

fiedly and unconditionally delivers
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the goods to the vendee without in-

sisting on performance of conditions,

intending to rely solely on the per-

sonal responsibility of the vendee, the

title passes to the latter, and the

vendor cannot afterwards reclaim

the property, even if the condition is

never performed. His only remedy is

upon the contract for the purchase-

money. 2 Kent, *496; Benj. Sales,

§ 320, note d; Carlton v. Sumner, 4

Pick. 516; Smith v.Dejinie, 6 Pick. 262,

17 Am. Dec. 368; Dresser Mfg. Co. v.

Waterston, 3 Met. 9; Farlow v. Ellis,

15 Gray, 229; Goodwin v. Railroad

Co., Ill Mass. 487; Scudder v. Brad-

bury, 106 Mass. 422; Haskins v. War-

ren, 115 Mass. 514; Freeman v. Nich-

ols, 116 Mass. 309; Bowen v. Burk, 13

Pa. St. 146; Mixer v. Cook. 31 Me. 340.

The weight of authority seems to be

that a delivery, apparently unre-

stricted and unconditional, of goods

sold for cash, is presumptive evi-

dence of the waiver of the condition

that payment should be made on de-

livery in order to vest the title in the

purchaser. Scudder v. Bradbury, 106

Mass. 422; Upton v. Sturbridge Cotton

Mills, 111 Mass. 446; Hammett v. Lin-

neman, 48 N. Y. 399; Smith v. Lynes,

5 N. Y. 41; Farlow v. Ellis, supra."

1 Fishback v. Van Dusen, supra;

Young v. Kansas Mfg. Co. (1887), 23

Fla. 394 [citing Whitney v. Eaton, 15

Gray (Mass.), 225; Farlow v. Ellis,

15 Gray, 229; Armour v. Pecker, 123

Mass. 143; Salomon v. Hathaway,

126 Mass. 482]; Peabody v. Maguire

(1887), 79 Me. 572.

Asking for. and being promised, se-

curity, which is not given, is not a

waiver of the condition. Sargent v.

Metcalf, 5 Gray (Mass.), 306, 66 Am.

Dec. 368. A contract for the sale of

three hundred barrels of flour to be

delivered in lots of one hundred bar-

rels each, each lot to be paid for on

delivery, is severable, and delivery

and receipt of payment for the last

two lots do not constitute a waiver

(Del.) 301, 31 Atl. R. 895; Merrill Mills, 111Mass.446; Hammett v. Lin·
Furniture Co. v. Hill, 87 Me. 17, 32 neman, 48 N. Y. 399; Smith v. Lynes,
Atl. R. 712; Oester v. Sitlington, 115 5 N. Y. 41; Farlow v. Ellis, supra.'~
Mo. 247, 21 S. W. R. 820; Wheeler &
l Fishbac k v. Van Dusen, supra;
"Wilson Mfg. Co. v. Bank, 105 Ga .. 57, Young v. Kansas Mfg. Co. (1887), 23
31 S. E. R. 48.
Fla. 394 [citing Whitney v. Eaton, 15
In Fishback v. Van Dusen (1885), 33 Gray (Mass.), 225; Farlow v. Ellis,
Minn. 111, 22 N. W . R. 244, it is said: 15 Gray, 229; Armour v. Pecker, 123
"The doctrine is uniform and well es- Mass. 143; Salomon v. Hathaway,
tablished that if the vendor unquali- 126 Ma s. 482]; Peabody v. Maguire
fied ly and unconditionally delivers (1887), 79 Me. 572.
the goods to the vendee without inAsking for, and being promised, sesisting on performance of conditions, curity, which is not given, is not a
intending to rely solely on the per- waiver of the condition. Sargent v.
sonal responsibility of the vendee, the Metcalf, 5 Gray (Mass.), 306, 66 Am.
title passes to the latter, and the Dec. 368. A contract for the sale of
vendor cannot afterwards reclaim three hundred barrels of flour to be
the property, even if the condition is delivered in lot s of one hundred barnever performed. His only remedy is rels each, each lot to be paid for on
upon the contract for the purchase- delivery, is severable, and delivery
money. 2 Kent, *496; Benj. Sales, and receipt of payment for the last
§ 320, note d; Carlton v. Sumner, 4 two lots do not constitute a waiver
Pick. 516; Smith v.D~nnie, 6 Pick. 262, of any rights of the seller arising out
17 Am. Dec. 368 ; Dresser l\ffg. Co. v. of the unauthorized delivery of the
Wa.terston, 3 Met. 9; Farlow v. Ellis, first lot by a railroad company to the
15 Gray, 229; Goodwin v. Railroad purchaser without payment. Sawyer
Co., 111 Mass. 487; Scudder v. Brad- v. Railway Co., 22 Wis. 402, !)9 Am.
bury, 106 Mass. 422; H askins v. War- Dec. 49.
ren, 115 Mass. 514.; Freeman v. NichThe fact that the seller loaded the
ols, 116 Mass. 309; Bowen v. Burk, rn goods into cars, in pursuance of his
Pa. St. 146; Mixer v. Cook. 31 Me. 340. contract, is not a waiver. Globe MillThe weight of authority seems to be ing Co. v. Minneapolis Elevator Co.,
that a delivery, appm·ently unre- 44 Minn. 153, 46 N. W. R. 306. Nor
stricted and unconditional, of goods tbe fact that the seller helped the
sold for cash, is presumptive evi- buyer to put them into cars, where,
dence of the waiver of tbe condition under the contract, they were to be
that payment should be made on de- paid for. Meeker v. Johnson, 3 Wash.
livery in order to vest the title in the 247, 28 Pac. R. 542.
purcha er. Scudder v. Bradbury, 106
But knowingly to mark logs with
Mass.422; Upton v. Sturbridge Cotton the log-mark of the purchaser -rec•
458
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§ 550. Delivery to carrier as waiver.— An uncondi-

tional delivery of the goods to a carrier for transportation to

the buyer is just as effectual to waive the condition as a per-

sonal delivery to the buyer. Such a delivery is equivalent to

a delivery to the purchaser, subject to the right of stoppage

in transitu. If, in such a case, the seller desires to retain the

jus disponendi, 1 he must do it by taking the bill of lading in

his own name, or in some other similar manner indicating his

intention not to pass the title until payment ; otherwise the

title passes and the condition is waived. 2

§ 551. Further of waiver.— It is not necessarily to be

inferred, where a conditional bargain has been made and a de-

livery has immediately taken place upon the expectation that

the promised payment or security will shortly be given, that

the sale ipso facto becomes absolute. There is always an im-

plied understanding that the vendee is acting honestly and that

he takes the goods subject to the contract. It is not necessary,

therefore, that the vendor shall in express terms declare that he
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makes the delivery conditional; it is sufficient if the intent of

the parties that the delivery is conditional can be inferred from

their acts and the circumstances of the case. 3 Waiver is the

voluntary relinquishment of some right which, but for such

waiver, the party would have enjoyed. Voluntary choice is of

the essence of waiver, and not mere negligence, though from

ognized by the laws of the State as 'See post, ch. VI, on Reservation

the indicia of ownership — is a of Jus Disponencli.

waiver. Hance v. Boom Co. (1888), 2Scharff v. Meyer (1895), 133 Mo.

70 Mich. 227, 38 N. W. R. 228. 428, 34 S. W. R. 858, 54 Am. St. R.

Ratification.— Where there was a 672.

sale for cash, but the vendee ob- " Smith v. Dennie (1828), 6 Pick.

tained the goods without payment, (Mass.), 262, 17 Am. Dec. 368; Fish-

andthen sold them to another, and back v. Van Dusen, 33 Minn. Ill;

the first seller with full knowledge Leven v. Smith, 1 Denio (N. Y.), 571;

took a note from the last purchaser Peabody v. Maguire, 79 Me. 572; Mer-

for the price, this constitutes an rill Furn. Co. v. Hill, 87 Me. 17, 32

abandonment of the sale as for cash Atl. R. 712; Farlow v. Ellis, 15 Gray

and ratines the disposition made of (Mass.), 229: Paul v. Reed, 52 N. H.

the goods. Bullard v. Bank of Madi- 136.

son (1899), 107 Ga. 772, 33 S. E. R. 684.
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such negligence, if unexplained, an intention to waive may be

inferred.

§ 552. . The important question, therefore, is: Has the

such negligence, if unexplained, an intention to wafre ma be
inferred.

vendor manifested, by his language or conduct, an intention or

willingness to waive the condition, and make the delivery un-

conditional, and the sale absolute, without having received pay-

ment or the performance of the conditions of the sale ? This

must depend upon the intent of the parties at the time, to be

ascertained from their conduct and language, and not from the

mere fact of delivery alone. Whether there has been a waiver

is a question of fact. It may be proved by various species of

evidence : by declarations, by acts, or by forbearance to act.

But however proved, the question is: Has the vendor volun-

tarily and unconditionally delivered the goods without intend-

ing to claim the benefit of the condition? 1

| 553. . No secret or undisclosed intention of the seller

is sufficient of itself to make a delivery conditional; 2 and where

the delivery is absolute and unconditional, usage alone cannot
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operate to defeat its effect as a waiver. 3

§ 554. Goods may be retaken if condition not performed.

"Where payment of the purchase-money, or the giving of secu-

rity for it, is thus expressly or impliedly a condition precedent

to the passing of the title, and the making of the payment or

the giving of the security is omitted, evaded or refused by the

purchaser upon obtaining possession of the goods, the delivery

§ 552. - - . The important question th refore i : Has the
vendor manifested, by his lanO'UaO'e or c9ndu t an intention or
willingness to waive the condition, and mak the deliv ry unconditional, and the sale absolute, without having r ceiv d ra. ment or the performance of the con lition of the ale. This
must depend upon the intent of the partie at the time, to be
ascer.tained from their conduct and languaO' and not from the
mere fact of delivery alone. Wh th r th re has b n a wai er
is a question of fact. It may be proved by variou pecies of
evidence: by declarations by act , or by forbearance to act.
But however proved, the que tion i : llas the vendor voluntarily and unconditionally deliv r d the goods lvithout inten ing to claim the benefit of the condition? 1

is deemed to be conditional, and the seller may immediately

reclaim and recover the goods themselves or their value in

i Fishback v. Van Dusen, supra; Elevator Co., 44 Minn. 153, 46 N. W.

Carleton v. Sumner, 4 Pick. (Mass.) R. 306; Silsby v. Boston & Albany

516; Smith v. Dennie, supra; Fuller R. Co., 176 Mass. 158, 57 N. E. R. 376.

v. Bean. 34 N. H. 290; Hammett v. 2 Fishback v. Van Dusen, supra;

Linneman, 48 N. Y. 399; Peabody v. Upton v. Sturbridge Cotton Mills,

§ 553. - - . No secret or undi closed intention of the seller
is sufficient of itself to make a delivery conditional· 2 and where
the delivery is absolute and unconditional, usage alone cannot
operate to defeat its effect as a waiver. 3

Maguire, supra; Stone v. Perry, 60 111 Mass. 446: Haskins v. Warren,

Me. 48; Seed v. Lord, 66 Me. 580; 115 Mass. 514; West v. Piatt, 127 Mass.

Smith v. Lynes. 5 N. Y. 41 ; Farlow 367.

v. Ellis, supra; Globe Milling Co. v. 3 Haskins v. Warren, 115 Mass. 514.

460

§ 554. Good may be retaken if condition not performed .
Where payment of the purchase-money or the gi·\ ing of security for it, is thus expressly or impliedly a condition precedent
to the passing of the title, and the making of the payment or
the giving of the security is omitted, evaded or refu ed by the
purchaser upon obtaining pos e ion of the goo ls, the delivery
is deemed to be conditional, and the seller may immediateiy
reclaim and recover the goods themselves or their value in
l Fi hback v. Van Dusen, sitp1·a; Elevator Co., 44 l\finn. 153 46 N. W .
Carleton v. Sumner, 4 Pick. (1\Iass.) R. 306; Silsby v. Bo ton & Albany
516; Smith '· Dennie, supra; Fuller R. Co., 176 l\Ia. s. 158, 57 N. E. R. 376.
v. Bean. 3-! N. H. 290; Hammett v.
2 Fi hback v. Van Du en, supra;
Linneman, 4 N. Y. 399; Peabody v. Upton v. Sturbridge Cotton l\Iills,
Maguire, supra; Stone v. Perry, 60 111 l\Iass. 446; Haskin v. "' arren,
l\Ie. 4 ; Seed v. Lord, 66 l\Ie. 5 0; 115 1a s. 514; \Vest v. Platt, 127 lass.
Smith v. Lynes. 5 N. Y. 41; Farlow 367.
v. Ellis, sitpra; Globe Iilling Co. v.
a Haskin v. ·warren, 115 l\Iass. 514.
460
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trover, either from the original purchaser 1 or from any one

claiming title through or under him, 2 though it is said that, at

least in the case of an implied condition, a waiver of the con-

dition will be more readily inferred for the protection of the

sub-vendee. 3

§ 555. Even from bona fide purchaser. — Thus, where

goods were sold and delivered to be paid for in cash on deliv-

ery, and the purchaser gave the seller a check which was dis-

honored on presentation, it was held that the seller might re-

take the goods, 4 if he had done nothing to estop himself, even

from an innocent sub-vendee for value. 5 And the rip-ht to re-

1 Whitwell v.Vincent (1827), 4 Pick.

(Mass.) 449, 16 Am. Dec. 355; Reed v.

Upton (1830), 10 Pick. (Mass.) 522, 20

Am. Dec. 545; Barrett v. Pritchard

(1824), 2 Pick. 512, 13 Am. Dec. 449;

Fishback v. Van Dusen (1885). 33

Minn. Ill ; Peabody v. Maguire (1887),
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79 Me. 572; Ferguson v. Clifford, 37

N. H 86: Bain bridge v. Caldwell, 4

Dana (Ky.), 213; Wabash Elevator

Co. v. First Nat. Bank, 23 Ohio St.

311; Bauendahl v. Horr, 7 Blatchf.

(U. S. C. C.) 548; Harding v. Metz, 1

Tenn. Ch. 610; Thorpe v. Fowler, 57

Iowa, 541; Paul v. Reed, 52 N. H. 136;

Dows v. Kidder,84 N. Y. 121; Evans-

ville, etc. R. Co. v. Erwin, 84 Ind.

457; Harris v. Smith, 3 Serg. & R.

(Pa.) 20; Morris v. Rexford, 18 N. Y.

552.

2 In National Bank of Commerce

v. Chicago, B. & N. R. Co. (1890), 44

Minn. 224, 46 N. W. R. 342, 560, 20

Am. St. R. 566, it is said: "It is

urged that a different rule applies

where, intermediately, the property

has been purchased by an innocent

sub-vendee for value. The general

rule is that a title, like a stream,

cannot rise higher than its source,

and it is difficult to see how a person

can communicate a better title than

he himself has, unless some principle

of equitable estoppel comes into

operation against the person claim-

ing under what would otherwise be

the better title. We have found no

case holding that any different rule

obtains in cases like the present, as to

a sub-vendee, than as to the original

purchaser, except perhaps that, as to

the former, a waiver of the condi-

tion, as, for example, of payment on

delivery, will be more readily in-

ferred from the delivery, especially

when the condition is not express

but implied. See Benjamin on Sales,

Am. note 269; Coggill v. Railroad Co.,

3 Gray, 545; Hirschorn v. Canney, 98

Mass. 149; Armour v. Pecker, 123

Mass. 143."

'National Bank v. Railroad Co.,

supra.

4 National Bank v. Railroad Co.,

supra: Hodgson v. Barrett (1877), 33

Ohio St. 63, 31 Am. R. 527; Johnson-

Brinkman Com. Co. v. Central Bank

(1893), 116 Mo. 558, 22 S. W. R. 813, 38

§§ 556- 5 ~ .]

LA.W OF

LE.

[BOOK II.

§§ 556-558.] law or sale. [book ii.

cover the goods has been sustained where the purchaser was

to give an indorsed note, or a mortgage or other security for

the price, which he failed or refused to do. 1

§ 556. And clearly from attaching creditors, etc.—

cover th goods has been su tain d where the purchaser was
to give an indors d note, or a mort<Yage or other security for
the pric , which he failed or refused to lo. 1

The right to retake extends also a fortiori as against the cred-

itors of the purchaser who have seized the goods for debts due

themselves, 2 and against the purchaser's assignee in bank-

ruptcy. 3

§ 557. Usage does not defeat.— This right of the seller

to reclaim his goods is one which cannot be defeated by any

local usage. 4

2. Payment of Price as Express Condition Precedent to Pass-

ing of Title, and Herein of So-called "Conditional Sales "

§ 556. - - And clearly from attaching creflitor , etc.The right to retake xtends al o a fortiori as aga:n. t the er ditors of the purcha er who have seiz d the goods for debts du
themselves,2 and against the purchaser's a sjgnee in bankruptcy.3

or " Instalment Contracts."

§ 558. Formal contracts of so-called "conditional sales."

The contracts of sale conditioned upon payment which have

thus far been considered have been those in which, either ex-

pressly or impliedly, the payment was to be made at, or shortly
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after, the delivery of the goods, no extended period of credit

§ 557. - - Usage doe not defeat.- This right of the seller
to reclaim his goods is one which cannot be defeated by any
local usage. 4

being contemplated or agreed upon.

The exigencies of business, however, have given rise to an

entirely different class of contracts, to which the term " con-

supra. See also Andrew v. Dieter- against the vendee, but also against

ich (1835), 14 Wend. (N. Y.) 31 (but as his creditors, claiming to hold them

to this case see 3 Barb. Ch. 451); under attachments. Everett v. Hall,

Adams v. Roscoe Lumber Co. (1899), 67 Me. 498; Brown v. Haynes, 52 Me.

2. Paynient of Price as Express Condition Prececlent to Pass-

ing of TUle, an cl Herein of So-callecl "Conditional Sctles '
or "Instalnient Contracts."

159 N. Y. 176, 53 N. E. R. 805. 580." Peabody v. Maguire, 79 Me.

i Whitwell v.Vincent (1827), 4 Pick. 572.

(Mass.) 449, 16 Am. Dec. 355; Davison 3 Rogers v. Whitehouse (1880), 71

v. Davis (1887), 125 U. S. 90; Sargent Me. 222;. Ballantyne v. Appleton, 82

v. Metcalf, 5 Gray (Mass.), 306, 66 Am. Me. 570, 20 Atl. R. 235; Whitney v.

Dec. 368; Leatherbury v. Connor Eaton (1860), 15 Gray (Mass.), 225.

(1891), 54 N. J. L. 172. 4 Globe Milling Co. v. Elevator Co.,

2 Mack v. Stoiy (1889), 57 Conn. 407. 44 Minn. 153, 46 N. W. R. 306; Silsby

"The vendor has a right to repossess v. Boston & Albany R. Co. (1900), 178

himself of the goods, not only as Mass. 158, 57 N. E. R. 376.

462

§ 558. Formal contract of o-called "conditional ales."
The ontracts of sale condition d upon payment which have
thu far been considered have been those in which, either xpres ly or impliedly, the payment was to be made at, or shortly
after, the delivery of the goods, no xtended period of credit
being contemplated or agreed ur on.
The exigencies of business, however, have giv n rise to an
entirely different class of contract , to which the term "conSee al o Andrew v. Dieter- against the vendee, but also against
ich (1 35), 14 Wend. (N. Y.) 31 (but as his creditor , claiming to hold them
to this case see 3 Barb. Ch. 451); under attachment . Everett v. Hall,
A lam v. Roscoe Lumber Co. (1899), 67 1\'.Ie. 49 ; Brown v. Haynes, 52 Me.
159 N. Y. 176. 53 N. E. R. 805.
5 0." Peabody v. Maguire, 79 .Me.
l Whitw 11 v. Vincent (1 27), 4 Pick. 572.
(l\1a .) 449, 16 Am. Dec. 355; Davison
3 Rogers v. Whi t ehou e (1 0) 71
v. Davis fl 7), 125 U. S. 90; Sargent Me. 222; Ballantyne v. Appleton, 82
v. l\Iet alf, 5 Gray (Mass.), 306, 66 Am. l\fe. 570, 20 Atl. R. 235; Whitney v.
Dec. 36 ; Leatherbury v. Connor En.ton (1 60), 15 ~ray (Mass.), 225.
(1 91), 54 N. J. L. 172.
4 Globe Milling Co. v. Elevator Co.,
2 1\Iack v. Story (1889), 57 Conn. 407.
44 Minn. 153, 46 N. W. R. 306; Sil by
"The vendor ha a right to repo sess v. Bo ton & Albany R. Co. (1900), 176
himself of the good , not only as Ma s. 158, 57 N. E. R. 376.
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ditional sale" has been popularly applied, and which contem-

plate a delivery of the goods to the prospective purchaser upon

a more or less extended term of credit, subject nevertheless to

the condition that the title shall remain in the vendor until the

price is paid. The price, moreover, is frequently made payable

in instalments, and from this fact the term "instalment con-

fcract" is often applied to these agreements. Their purpose is

to facilitate sales and purchases upon credit, and especially to

avoid the publicity and statutory regulation of chattel mort-

gages.

§ 550. Confusion respecting the name. — It will be evident

to any one who has occasion to examine the cases that the term

"conditional sale" has been indiscriminately applied to a great

variety of differing transactions, and that much confusion has

resulted therefrom. It will be further evident that this con-

fusion is the legitimate result and natural consequence of the

ill-advised efforts of the framers of these agreements to make

them appear to be what they are not; and that by their very
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efforts to force a particular appearance upon such agreements

without construction, they have most effectually invited and

required the application of legal rules of construction to arrive

at their true intent. In applying these rules here, as in other

cases in which intent is to be sought after, different courts will

inevitably come to different conclusions often in respect to in-

struments substantially alike.

§ 560. What is a conditional sale. — It will be evident also

that confusion has arisen from the use of words in different

senses. What is meant by the term "conditional sale?" In

order to answer this question, it is necessary to determine first

what is meant by the word "sale." As has been seen in the

opening sections of this work, the word "sale," in actual use,

is not a word of precise Legal import. It is constantly being

used to mean either the actual transfer of the title, or the agree-

mentto transfer the title. If the first meaning be adopted, then

obviously the only conditional sale possible is the present trans-
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fer subject to be defeated by a condition subsequent. If, on

the other hand, the second definition be adopted, a conditional

sale is a conditional contract to convey, and the condition will

usually, if not always, be a condition precedent.

This is more than a mere dispute about words, because it will

be seen that substantial differences in result ensue according as

the one view or the other is adopted.

| 561. What varieties are possible.— The very nature

of the case shows that these various forms of agreement are

usually intended to be bargainings about sales to be made, and

L.A. W OF

.A.LE.

[u

K II.

fer subject to be defeated by a condition ubs qu nt. If, on
the other hand, the second definition be a lopt d, a con iti nal
sale is a conditional contract to convey, and the condition will
usually, if not al ways, be a condition pre e lent.
This is more than a mere di pute about wor ls becaus it will
be seen that substantial difference in r ult ensue according as
the one view or the other is adopted.

not perfect and completed sales in themselves. The question

then is: "What forms of agreement may there be amounting to

less than a present unconditional and perfect sale ? The an-

swer to this is plain:

1. There may be the ordinary agreement, on the one part to

sell, and on the other part to buy, a particular chattel. Here

the seller is entitled to keep the chattel until the other party

pays for it.
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2. There may be the ordinary executory agreement above

mentioned, and annexed to it a voluntary delivery of the prop-

erty to the prospective purchaser to be kept by him as the

property of the seller until he demands it, if not sooner paid

for. This is the executory agreement, plus a bailment.

3. There may be the executory agreement as before, but as

part of it an express or implied agreement that the seller shall

deliver the chattel to the prospective buyer to be kept and

used by him until he makes default in his performance of the

agreement (at which time the seller may resume possession),

the title to the chattel remaining nevertheless in the seller

until the price is paid.

4. There may be a present transfer of the title and of the pos-

session, subject to a right in the seller to rescind the transfer,

and have back the title and possession upon default in payment.

5. There may be a present transfer of title and possession,

reserving a lien upon the chattel as security for the payment

of the price.
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561. - - 1\ hat varietie are po ible.-Th very nature
of the case shows that these variou form of agr em nt are
usually intended to be bar()'ainings about sales to be made, and
not perfect and completed sales in them elv s. The que tion
then is: What form of aoTe ment may there be amountinn to
less than a pre ent unconditional and perfect sale? The answer to this is plain:
1. There may be the ordinary agr ement on the one part to
sell, and on the oth r part to buy, a particular chattel. Ilere
the seller is entitled to keep the chattel until the other party
pays for it.
2. There may be the or linary executory agreement above
mentionell, and annexed to it a voluntary delivery of the property to the pro pective purchaser to be kept by him as the
property of the seller until he demands it, if not sooner paid
for. This is the executory agreement, plus a bailment.
3. There may be the executory agreement as before, but as
part of it an express or implied agreement that the seller shall
deliver the chattel to the prospective buyer to be kept ancl
used by him until he makes default in his performance of the
agreement (at which time the seller may resume possession),
the title to the chattel remaining nevertheless in the seller
until the price is paid.
4. There may be a present transfer of the title and of the possession, subject to a right in the seller to rescind the transfer,
and have back the title and possession upon default in payment.
5. There may be a present transfer of title and possession,
reserving a lien upon the chattel as security for the payment
of the price.
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6. There may also be a present transfer of title and posses-

sion, and a formal chattel mortgage taken by the seller to

secure payment.

§ 562. . Of these, the first is clearly not within the

class now being considered.

The second and third are in many respects alike, but the third

has the additional feature that the purchaser acquires by the

contract a right to the possession of the chattel of which he

can only be deprived upon a default in pursuance of the pro-

visions of the contract.

The fourth is the true conditional sale, i. e., a present sale

subject to defeat upon a condition subsequent.

The fifth and sixth are alike in their result; the former being

an informal mortgage and the latter a formal one.

The second and third are the kinds of agreement ordinarily

meant by the popular use of the term " conditional sale," but

the cases are numerous where courts have used the same term

meaning sometimes an agreement of the second or third kind,
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and sometimes one of the fourth.

§ 563. What here meant by conditional sale. — Adopt-

ing for the present the popular signification of the term, it is

of agreements of the second and third kinds, namely, exec-

utory contracts of sale accompanied by a delivery of the chat-

tel to the purchaser to be held by him pending payment, either

at the will of the seller or Until default in performance by the

buyer of some term of the agreement, the title, however, being

reserved by the seller until payment by the purchaser — that

it is now proposed to treat.

§ 564. Validity and form of <s conditional sales." — These

contracts of " conditional sale " are entirely lawful, 1 unless pro-

hibited by statute, and they may, in general, take such form

1 See Warren v. Liddell, 110 Ala. Dewes Brewery Co. v. Merritt, 82

232, 20 S. R. 89; Rodgers v Bachman, Mich. 198, 46 N. W. R. 379; Cooley v.

109 Cal. 552, 42Pac.R448; Van Allen Gillan, 54 Conn. 80, 6 Atl. R. 180;

v. Francis, 123 Cal. 474, 56 Pac. R 339; Steele v. Aspy, 128 Ind. 367, 27 N. E.
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as the parties see fit to give them. 1 They are not required to

be in writing, 2 nor are they required to be filed or recorded,''

unless a statute, as now in many States, 4 declares otherwise.

It is, however, essential that a reservation of the title shall

appear; for the parties may intend to reserve the title in the

seller and yet so frame their agreement as not to accomplish

this purpose, 5 or such a reservation may have been originally

R. 739; Morse v. Sherman, 100 Mass.

5G±.J
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as the parties se fit to give them. 1 Th y ar not requir cl to
be in writing, 2 nor are they required to be filed or r cor l 1, 3
unless a statute, as now in many States, 4 <l clares oth rwi e.
It is, however, essential that a reservation of th title ball
appear; for the parties may int ncl to r rve the title in the
seller and yet so frame their agreement a not to accompli ·h
this purpose,5 or such a reservation may have been originally

430; Harkness v. Russell, 118 U. S.

663; Bradshaw v. Thomas, 7 Yerg.

(Tenia.) 497; Edgewood Distilling Co.

v. Shannon, 60 Ark. 133, 29 S. W. R.

147; McGinn is v. Savage, 29 W. Va.

362; Edison Gen'l Elec. Co. v. Walter,

10 Wash. 14, 38 Pac. R. 752; Hirsch

v. Steele, 10 Utah, 18, 36 Pac. R. 49,
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and the many cases cited in follow-

ing sections.

1 See Rodgers v. Bachman, supra;

Edgwood Distilling Co. v. Shannon,

supra; Edison Gen'l Electric Co. v.

Walter, supra; Page v. Edwards, 64

Vt. 124, 23 Atl. R. 917. Condition

printed upon the back of a note and

referred to in it is sufficient. Sey-

mour v. Farquhar, 93 Ala. 292.

2Benner v. Puffer, 114 Mass. 376;

Mclver v. Williams, 83 Wis. 570, 53

N. W. R. 847; Wise v. Collins, 121 Cal.

147, 53 Pac. R. 640.

3 Warren v. Liddell, 110 Ala. 232, 20

S. R. 89; Campbell Printing Press Co.

v. Walker, 22 Fla. 412. Are not chat-

tel mortgages within the acts requir-

ing such instruments to be filed or

recorded. Kimball Co. v. Mellon, 80

Wis. 133, 48 N. W. R. 1100; McConab

v. Donald, 82 Va. 903; Lima Mach.

Works v. Parsons, 10 Utah, 105, 37

Pac. R. 244. Though where the nego-

tiations amount to a chattel mort-

gage in fact, it is void if not in writ-

ing in Texas. Harrold v. Barwise, 10

Tex. Civ. App. 138, 30 S. W. R. 498;

Lazarus v. Bank, 72 Tex. 354, 10 S. W.

252.

4 These statutes are referred to

post, § 603, note.

5 Thus, as will be more fully seen in

later sections, though the parties

may have intended to make a con-

ditional sale, the true construction of

their words and conduct may show

that they have made an absolute

sale, reserving, perhaps, a lien upon

the goods but not the title to them;

as in Aultman v. Silha, 85 Wis. 359,

55 N. W. R. 711; Andrews v. Colorado

Savings Bank, 20 Colo. 313, 36 Pac. R.

902, 46 Am. St. R. 291 ; Arkansas Cattle

Co. v. Mann, 130 U. S. 69; Beardsley

v. Beardsley, 138 U. S. 262; First Nat.

Bank v. Cook Carriage Co., 70 Miss.

587; Palmer v. Howard, 72 Cal. 293,

13 Pac. R. 858, 1 Am. St. R. 60. Other

illustrations are given in later notes.

In Silver Bow Mining Co. v. Lowry,

R. 739; Morse v. Sherman, 10G l\Ia s. Lazarus v. Bank, 72 Tex. 354, 10 S. W.
430; Harkness v. Ru sell, 11 U. . 252.
4 These
663; Bradshaw v. Thoma, 7 Yerg.
tatutes are referred to
(Tenn.) 497; Edgewood Distilling Co. post, ~ 603, note.
v. Shannon, 60 Ark. 133, 29 . -w. R.
5 Thu , a will be more fully een in
147; l\fo@innis v. avage, 91) \V. Va. laL r section·, though the partie
362; Edison Gen'l Elec. Co. v. ·walter, rnn,y ha,·e intenlled to make a con10 Wash. 14, 38 Pac. R. 752; Hir ch di ti nal sale, the true con Lruction of
v. Steele, 10 Utah, 1 , 36 Pac. R. 49, their worrh; and conduct may show
and the many ca es cited in follow- that they have made an absolute
ing sections.
ale, re erving, perhaps, a lien upon
1 See Rodgers v. Bachman, siip1·a,. the goods but not the title to th em;
Edgwood Distilling Co. v. Shannon, a in Aultman v. Silha, 85 Wis. 339,
sup ta,' Edi on Gen'l Electric Co. v. 53 N. W. R. 711; Andrew v. Colorado
Walter, supra; Page v. Erl wards, 64 Savings Bank, 20 Colo. 313, 36 Pac. R.
Vt. 124, 23 Atl. R. 917. Condition 902,46Am.St.R.29l;ArkansasCattle
printed upon the back of a note and Co. v. Mann, 130 U. S. 69; Beardsley
referred to in it is ufficient. Sey- v. Beard ley, 138 U.S. 269; First Nat.
mour v. Farquhar, 93 Ala. ·292.
Bank v. Cook Carriage Co., 70 'liss.
2 Benner v. Puffer, 114 Mass. 376;
5 7; Palmer v. Howard, 72 Cal. 293,
Mclver v. Williams, 83 Wis. 570, 53 13 Pac. R. 85 , 1 Am. t. R. 60. Other
N. W.R. 847; Wise v. Collins, 121 Cal. illu tration are given in later notes.
In Silver Bow Mining Co. v. Lowry,
147, 53 Pac. R. 640.
3 ·warren v. Liddell, 110 Ala. 232, 20 6 !\font. 288, the contract was in form
S. R. 89; Campbell Printing Press Co. one of conditional sale, but a note
v. Walker, 22 Fla. 412. Are not chat- was t.aken for the price secured by
tel mortgages within the acts requir- mortgage upon other property, and
ing such instruments to be filed or this was held to render the sale absorncorded. Kimball Co. v. Mellon, 80 lute.
Wis. 133, 48 N. W. R. 1100; McComb
But the fact that a printed for m
v. Donald, 82 Va. 903; Lima l\1ach. clearly of conditional sale has at·
Works v. Parsons, 10 Utah, 105, 37 tached to it a typewritten "rider"
Pac. R. 244. Though where the nego- proviqing for a mortgage upon the
tiations amount to a chattel mort- chattels to secure the payment of
gage in fact, it is void if not in writ- the price does not defeat its charing in Texas. Harrold v. Bi1rwise, 10 acter as a conditional sale. Edi on
Tex. Civ. App. 138, 30 S. W. R. 498; Gen'l Electric Co. v. Walter, 10
466
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contemplated and yet have been subsequently waived or ig-

nored.

If the whole agreement is in writing, its construction will be

for the court, aided by such extrinsic circumstances as throw

light upon the intention; 1 but where the intention is to be

gathered from words and conduct, the question is pre-eminently

for the jury. 2

§ 565. Contract in form absolute shown to be condi-

tional. — Even though the delivery was accompanied by a bill

of sale apparently absolute, the transaction may be shown to

have been conditional; 3 and parol evidence is admissible for

this purpose as between the original parties or others having

notice, though not, of course, as against l>ona fide purchasers

for value. 4

So, though the delivery and sale were at first absolute, it

may, upon sufficient consideration, be subsequently made con-

ditional; and while the Avhole transaction still remains execu-

tory, a sale originally intended to be absolute may by agreement
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be made conditional. 5

Wash. 14, 38 Pac. R. 752. See also ing creditors who have relied upon

Page v. Edwards, 64 Vt. 124, 23 Atl. its absolute appearance in making

R. 917. their attachments. Dixon v. Blondin.

1 Palmer v. Howard, supra; An- 58 Vt. 689; Sanborn v. Chittenden, 27

drews v. Colorado Savings Bank, Vt. 171. Where seller gave an abso-

supra; Aultman v. Silha, supra. lute bill of sale he will not be per-

2 Scudder v. Bradbury, 105 Mass. niitted. say the court in Connecticut,

422; Armour v. Pecker, 123 Mass. 143; to show that, by contemporaneous

Gurney v. Collins, 64 Mich. 458; Se- parol agreement, the sale was con-

grist v. Crabtree, 13117. S. 287; Claflin ditional, to the prejudice of a bona

v. Furniture Co., 58 N. J. L. 379; fide purchaser, attaching creditor or

Rohn v. Dennis, 109 Pa. St. 504. trustee in insolvency. Ryder v.

3 Smith v. Tilton, 10 Me. 350. It Cooley, 58 Conn. 367, 20 Atl. R. 470.

being evident that part of the con- 5 Goss Printing Press Co. v. Jordan,

tract rested in parol, parol evidence 171 Pa. St. 474, 32 Atl. R. 1031. But

is properly admissible, although the the intent to change must be clear.

order and acceptance were in writ- Caraway v. Wallace, 2 Ala. 542. And

ing. Burditt v. Howe, 69 Vt. 563, 38 in Vermont a change of possession

Atl. R 240. was held necessary, as against cred-

4 Nor, in Vermont, against attach- itors. Wright v. Vaughn, 45 Vt. 369.
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§ 566. Fact that promise to pay is absolute does not

make sale absolute.— On the other hand, the fact that the
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§ 566. - - Fact that promi e to pay is ab. oln te doe not
make sale ab olute.- On the other hand, the fa t that the

vendee's promise to pay is absolute does not necessarily deprive

the contract of its conditional character and make it absolute. 1

In a doubtful case it would be suggestive, but it is not conclu-

sive; and, indeed, as will be seen, 2 the absolute character of the

vendee's obligation — at least where the vendor elects so to

treat it — is a common characteristic of these contracts.

§567, Construction of such contracts.— As has been al-

ready seen, contracts intended to fall within the class now

under consideration have been made in every variety of form,

and many different names have been applied to them. They

vendee's promise to pay ]s ab o1 ute does not neces arily cl l rive
the contract of its con litional character and make it absolute.1
In a doubtful case it would be u0 gesti ve, but it i not conclusive; and, indeed, as will be een 2 the ab o1 ute character of the
vendee's obligation - at 1ea t where the vendor elects so to
treat it-is a common characteri tic of the e contract s.

have often been purposely given the form or name of some

other contract, in order to disguise their real nature. This has

led to much difficulty in determining what is the true con-

struction to be given them. " The answer to this question,"

said the supreme court of the United States, 3 " is not to be

found in any name which the parties may have given to the

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:50 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t6xw4h56n
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

instrument, and not alone in any particular provisions it con-

tains, disconnected from all others, but in the ruling intention

of the parties gathered from all the language they have used.

It is the legal effect of the whole which is to be sought for.

The form of the instrument is of little account."

§ 568. Declaration of parties not conclusive.— The

mere fact that the parties declare that their agreement shall

not amount to a sale, or shall not be construed in any other

manner, is not conclusive. They cannot, by their agreement,

control the operation of the rules of construction. 4

i Perkins v. Mettler (1899), 126 Cal. ^Heryford v. Davis, supra; Greer

100, 58 Pac. R. 384; Van Allen v. v. Church, 13 Bush (Ky.), 430; Dede-

Francis (1897), 123 Cal. 474, 5G Pac. R. rick v. Wolfe, 68 Miss. 500, 9 S. R. 350,

339; Harkness v. Russell, 118 U. S. 24 Am. St. R 283; Gerow v. Castello,

663> 11 Colo. 560, 7 Am. St. R. 260, 19 Pac.

2 See post, % 625. But see §£ 578, 579. R. 505,

3 In Heryford v. Davis (1880), 102

U. S. 235.

4G8

§ 567. Con truction of such contract .- As has be n already seen, contracts intended to fall within the cla no'v
under consideration have been made in every variet of form,
and many different names have been applied to them. They
have often been purposely given the form or name of some
other contract, in order to di gui e their real nature. This has
led to much difficulty in determining what is the true construction to be given them. ' The an wer to th]s question,"
said the supreme court of the United States, 3 "is not to be
found in any name which the parties may have given to the
instrument~ and not alone in any particular prov]sions it contains, disconnected from all others, but in the ruling ]ntention
of the parties gathered from all the language they have used.
It is the legal effect of the whole which ]s to ·be sought for.
The form of the instrument is of little account."

§ 568. - - Decl aration of parties not conclusi Ye.- The
mere fact that the parties declare that their agreement shall
not amount to a sale, or shall not be construed in any other
manner is not conclusive. They cannot, by thei r agreemen t,
control the operation of the rules of con truction.4
1 Perkins v. Mettler (1 99), 126 Cal.
100, 5 P ac. R. 3 4; Van Allen ,v.
Franci (1 '97), 123 Cal. 474, 56 Pac. R.
339; Harkness v. Rus ell, 11 TJ. •
663.
2 ee post,§ 62-. But e
3 In H eryford v. Da vj
u. s. 235.

4 Heryford v. DaYis, supra; Greer
v. Church, 13 Bush (Ky.). 430; Dederick v. ·wolfe, 6 Mi . 500, 9 . R. 3-0,
24 Am. t. R. 2 3; Gerow v. CR tello,
11 Colo. 560, 7 Am. St. R. 260, 19 P::w.
R. 50-.

4GS
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§ 569. Instruments in form of lease held to l)e con-

ditional contracts to sell. — In very many of the cases the

instrument in question has been called a lease, and much of

the language used has been such as would be appropriate to a

lease. It is, of course, entirely competent for parties to make

leases of chattels, but the instrument will not be deemed a

lease where its contents and evident purpose show that some

other construction is demanded. Hence the cases are numer-

ous in which instruments called leases have been held to be

conditional contracts to sell, 1 that is, agreements to sell with

payment made a condition precedent to the passing of the

title, notwithstanding that the parties have expressly stipu-

lated that no such construction should be put upon their con-

tract. 2

1 Hine v. Roberts, 48 Conn. 267, 40

Am. R 170; Loomis v. Bragg. 50 Conn.

228, 47 Am. R 638; Singer Mfg. Co. v.

Cole, 4 Lea (Tenn.), 439, 40 Am. R. 20;
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Cowan v. Singer Mfg. Co., 92 Tenn.

376, 21 S. W. R 663; Singer Mfg. Co.

v. Graham, 8 Oreg. 17, 34 Am. R 572;

Gerow v. Castello, 11 Colo. 560, 19

Pac. R 505, 7 Am. St. R 260; Hays

v. Jordan, 85 Ga, 741, 11 S. E. R 833,

9 L. R A. 373; Cottrell v. Bank, 89

Ga. 508, 15 S. E. R 944; Ross v. Mo-

Duffie, 91 Ga. 120, 16 S. E. R 648;

Miller v. Steen, 30 Cal. 402, 89 Am.

Dec. 124; Lucas v. Campbell, 88 111.

447; Gerrish v. Clark, 64 N. H. 492,

13 Atl. R 870; Hill v. Townsend, 69

Ala. 286; Sumner v. Woods, 67 Ala.

139; Hegler v. Eddy, 53 Cal. 597;

Parke, etc. Co. v. Lumber Co., 101

Cal. 37, 35 Pac. R 442; Lundy Fur-

niture Co. v. White, 128 Cal. 170, 60

Pac. R. 759; Kohler v. Hayes, 41 Cal.

455; Watertown S. C. Co. v. Davis,

5 Del. 192; Forrest v. Hamilton, 98

Ind. 91: Budlong v. Cottrell, 64 Iowa,

234; Fleck v. Warner, 25 Kan. 492;

Chase v. Ingalls, 122 Mass. 381; Cole

v. Berry, 42 N. J. L. 308; Sage v.

Sleutz, 23 Ohio St. 1; Carpenter v.

Scott, 13 R. I. 477; Matthews v. Lucia,

55 Vt. 308; Fosdick v. Schall, 99 U. S.

235; Whelan v. Couch, 26 Grant Ch.74;

De St. Germain v. Wind, 3 Wash. Ter.

189; Quinn v. Parke, etc. Co., 5 Wash.

276, 31 Pac. R 866; Whitcomb v.

Wood worth, 54 Vt, 544; Collender

Co. v. Marshall, 57 Vt. 232; Gorham

v. Holden, 79 Me. 317, 9 Atl. R 894;

Gross v. Jordan, 83 Me. 380, 22 Atl.

R 250; Campbell v. Atherton, 92 Me.

66, 42 Atl. R 232; Ham v. Cerniglia,

73 Miss. 290, 18 S. R. 577; Puffer v.

Lucas, 112 N. C. 377, 17 S. E. R. 174;

Clark v. Hill, 117 N. C. 11, 23 S. E. R

91, 53 Am. St. R. 574; Singer Mfg.

Co. v. Gray, 121 N. C. 168, 28 S. E. R.

257; Wilcox v. Cherry, 123 N. C. 79,

31 S. E. R 369; Wickes v. Hill, 115

Mich. 333, 73 N. W. R 375; Farquhar

v. McAlevy, 142 Pa. St. 233. 21 Atl.

R. 811; Sanders v. Wilson, 19 D. C. (8

Mackey), 555.

2 See Gerow v. Castello, 11 Colo. 560,

7 Am. St. R. 260; Gross v. Jordan, 83

§§ 570, 571.J
§§ 570, 571.] LAW OF SALE. [ROOK II.

§ 570. . This result has been almost uniformly reached

in those cases, now so common, in which, by the terms of the

contract, one party purports to lease or rent to another per-

sonal property delivered into his possession upon his agreeing

to pay stipulated sums as rent, upon the payment of which he is

to become the owner of the property ; but further stipulating

that if such sums are not paid the other party may terminate

the lease and retake the property. Usually the instalments

of " rent " to be paid in these cases are out of any proportion

to the fair rental value of the property for the periods fixed ;

the aggregate of the instalments is always the agreed value of

the property, and when the total rent is paid the lessee be-

comes the owner. To call such contracts leases is, it is said, a

mere subterfuge which cannot deceive the court as to their

true character and purpose. l

§ 571. -. In a few cases, however, not easily distinguish-

able from those last referred to, the courts have held that the

instrument involved was really a lease with an option in the

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:50 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t6xw4h56n
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

lessee to become the owner. 2

85 Ga. 741. 9 L. R. A. 373; Hervey v. be given when the full amount is

Locomotive Works, 93 U. S. 664; paid; and the sale of the piano, and

Heryford v. Davis, 102 U. S. 235; not the renting thereof, is evidently

Dederick v. Wolfe. 68 Miss. 500. 24 the real end and basis of the con-

LAW OF SALE.

LBOOK

IT.

§ 570. - - . This result has been almost uniformly r ached
in those cases, now so common, in which, by the term of the
contract, one party purports to lease or r nt. to another per·
sonal property delivered into his possession upon his agreeing
to pay stipulated sums as rent, upon the payment of which he is
to become the owner of the property; but further stipulating
that if such sums are not paiu the other party may t rminate
the lease and retake the property. Usually the instalments
of "rent" to be paid in these cases are out of any proportion
to the fair rental value of the property for the periods fixed;
the aggregate of the in~talments is always the agreed value of
the property, and when the total rent is paid the lessee be·
comes the owner. To call such con tracts leases is, it is said, a
mere subterfuge which cannot deceive the court as to their
trne character and purpose. 1

Am. St. R. 283; Cowan v. Singer Mfg. tract."

Co., 92 Tenn. 376, 21 S. W. R. 663. 2 Thus in Southern Music House v.

*In Hays v. Jordan, supra, the Dusenbury, 27 S. C. 464, 4 S. E. R.

court say: "Although the contract 60, an agreement in form of a lease

does use the term 'rent,' and states for an organ, worth §95, for the use

that the notes are given for the ' use ' of which the lessee was to pay $10

of the piano, we do not so construe per month, and which gave him the

it, but regard it, not as a lease or right, at any time during the rental

§ 571. - - . In a few cases, however, not easily distinguish·
able from those last referred to, the courts have helu that the
instrument involved was really a lease with an option in the
lessee to become the owner. 2

renting, but as a conditional sale period, to "purchase said instrument

with title reserved in the vendor by paying the above valuation there-

until the purchase price is paid. for. and then, and in that case only,

Guilford v. McKinley, 61 Ga. 232. all amounts theretofore paid as rental

The entire $350 styled ' rent ' is made or advance deposit shall be deducted

payable within six months from the from price of instrument," was held

date of the transaction, and is the to be a lease with an option to pur-

stipulated value of the piano, and chase. Talmadge v. Oliver, 14 S. C.

the consideration for a bill of sale to 522; Straub v. Screven, 19 S. C. 445,
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85 Ga. 741, 9 L. R. A. 373; Hervey v. be given when the full amount is
Locomotive Works, 93 U. S. 664; paid; and the ale of the piano, and
Heryford v. Davis, 102 U. S. 235; not the renting thereof, i evidently
Dederick v. Wolfe, 68 Miss. 500. 24 the real end and basis of the conAm. St. R. 2 3; Cowan v.. Singer Mfg. tract."
2 Thus in Southern Music House v.
Co., 92 Tenn. 376, 21 S. W. R. 663.
1 In Hays v. Jordan, sup1·a, the Dusenbury, 27 S. C. 464, 4 S. E. R.
court say: "Although the conLract 60, an agreement in form of a lease
does use the term 'rent,' and states for an organ, worth $95, for the use
that the notes are given for the 'use' of which the les ee was to pay 10
of the piano, we do not so construe per month, and which gave him t.he
it, but regard it, not a a lease or right, at any time during the rental
renting, but as a conditional sale period, to ''purchase said in trument
with title reserved in the vendor by paying the above valuation thereuntil the purchase price is paid. for. and then, and in that ca e only,
Guilford v. McKinley, 61 Ga. 232. all amounts theretofore paid as rental
The entfre $350 styled' rent' is made or advance deposit shall be dedncted
payable within six months from the from price of in Lrument," was held
date of the transaction, and is the to be a lea e with an option to pursti ulated value of the piano, and cha e. Talmadge v. Oliver, 14 S. C.
the considerc:ttion for a bill of sale to 522; Straub v. Screven, 19 S. C. 445,
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§ 572. Instruments in form of lease construed to be

sales upon condition subsequent. — But in other cases of in-

struments denominated leases courts have held them to amount

to true conditional sales, i. e., present sales subject to be de-

feated upon a condition subsequent, namely, upon non-pay-

ment. Thus, in a leading case, 1 upon this view of the contract,

a piano had been delivered under an agreement called a lease,

the party taking it paying $50 on delivery as rent for the first

month and agreeing to pay $50 a month rent for thirteen

months thereafter. If within thirteen months he should pay

$700 the piano should become his property, in which case all

sums paid as rent were to apply as part of the $700 purchase

price. " It was a mere subterfuge," said the court, " to call

this transaction a lease; and the application of that term in

the written agreement between the parties does not change its

real character. It was a conditional sale, with a right of re-

scission on the part of the vendor in case the purchaser should

fail in payment of his instalments."
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§ 573. . This view of these agreements, differing radi-

cally, as will be seen, from that of the previous sections, has

not been generally followed in other States, 2 though it has been

followed in Colorado. 3 The same rule also prevails in Massa-

and Herring v. Cannon, 21 S. C. 212, but "one piano, equal in value to the

were distinguished. The same form above-named piano," was held, two

of instrument received the same con- judges dissenting, not to be a condi-

struction in the later case of South- tional sale.

em Music House v. Hornsby, 45 S. C. * Murch v. Wright, 4G I1L 487, 95

111, 22 S. E. R. 781, although the court Am. Dec. 455. See also Lucas v.

below had characterized it as "ex- Campbell, 88 111. 447.

treme doctrine." In Singer Mfg. Co. 2 See criticisms upon this case in

v. Smith, 40 S. C. 529, 19 S. E. R. 132, Sanders v. Heber, 28 Ohio St. 636,

an instrument similar in all respects where it is said to stand almost alone

except that it reserved no option to and to be contrary to the weight of

purchase was construed as a sale authority.

with lien reserved. In Guest v. Diack, 3 Gerow v. Castello, 11 Colo. 560, 19

29 Nova Scotia, 504, a contract sub- Pac. R. 505, 7 Am. St. R. 260. But

stantially like that of the Southern see Andrews v. Colorado Savings

Music House, supra, except that upon Bank, 20 Colo. 313, 36 Pac. R 902, 36

a payment the seller agreed to de- Am. St. R. 291.

liver, not necessarily the same piano,
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chusetts, where such contracts are regarded as conditional

sales, " liable to be defeated by non-performance of the condi-

tion," but " which could be ripened into an absolute title by

the performance of the conditions." 1

g 574. Instruments in form of leases held to be .abso-
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chusetts, where such contracts are regarded as conditional
sales, "liable to be defeated by non-performance of the condition," but "which could be ripened into an absolute title by
the performance of the conditions." 1

lute sales reserving a lien or constituting chattel mortgages.

But in yet other cases of instruments denominated leases, courts

have reached still different conclusions as to their effect, based

upon language thought to disclose a different intention. Thus,

in a leading case 2 in the supreme court of the United States,

the agreement was held to be neither a lease nor a conditional

sale, but a mortgage. In that case it appeared that a number

of cars had been delivered to a railroad company under a con-

tract which " industriously and repeatedly " spoke of the ar-

rangement as a loan for hire. Still, notes had been given for

the amount of the rent, secured by collateral, and they fell due

before the term of the lease expired, and were clearly intended

to be collected at maturity. If they were duly paid, the cars
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were to become the property of the railroad company; if they

were not paid, the cars might be sold for the payment of the

notes, and any surplus was to be returned to the railroad com-

pany.

§ 575. . " In view of these provisions," said the court,

" we can come to no other conclusion than that it was the in-

tention of the parties, manifested by the agreement, that the

ownership of the cars should pass at once to the railroad com-

pany, in consideration of their becoming debtors for the price.

Notwithstanding the efforts to cover up the real nature of the

contract, its substance was an hypothecation of the cars to

secure a debt due to the vendors for the price of a sale. The

railroad company was not accorded an option to buy or not.

They were bound to pay the price, either by paying their notes

1 Day v. Bassett, 102 Mass. 445; Cur- 2 Heryford v. Davis (1880), 102 U. S.

rier v. Knapp, 117 Mass. 324; New- 235.

hall v. Kingsbury, 131 Mass. 445; Vin-

§ 574. - - Instruments in form of leases held to be absolute sales reserring a lien or constituting chattel mortgages.
But in yet other cases of instruments denominated leases, courts
have reached still different conclusions as to their effect, based
upon language thought to disclose a different intention. Thus,
in a leading case 2 in the supreme court of the United tates,
the agreement was held to be neither a lease nor a conditional
sale, but a mortgage. In that case it appeared that a number
of cars had been delivered to a railroad company und r a contract which "industriou ly and repeatedly" spoke of the arrangement as a loan for hire. Still, notes had been given for
the amount of the rent, secured by collateral, and they fell due
before the term of the lease expired, and were clearly intended
to be collected at maturity. If they were duly paid, the cars
were to become the property of the railroad company; if they
were not paid, the cars might be sold for the payment of the
notes, and any surplus was to ~e returned to the railroad company.

cent v. Cornell, 13 Pick. 294.
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§ 575. - - . "In view of these provisions," said the court,
"we can come to no other conclusion than that it was the intention of the parties, manifested by the agreement, that the
ownership of the cars should pass at once to the railroad company, in consideration of their becoming debtors for the price.
Notwithstanding the efforts to cover up the real natuTe of the
contract, its substance was an hypothecation of the cars to
secure a debt due to the vendors for the price of a sale. The
railroad company was not accorded an option to buy or not.
They were bound to pay the price, either by paying their notes
1 Day v. Bassett, 1021\fass. 445; Cur2 Heryford v. Davis' (1880), 102 U.S.
rier v. Knapp, 117 Mass. 324; New- 235.
hall v. Kingsbury, 131Mass.445; Vincent v. Cornell, 13 Pick. 294.
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or surrendering the property to be sold in order to make pay-

ment. This was in no sense a conditional sale. This giving

the property as a security for the pa} 7 ment of a debt is the ve^

essence of a mortgage, which has no existence in a case of con-

ditional sale."

§576.

The same result has also been reached in other

cases less readily distinguishable from those in the preceding

sections than the one just referred to. 1

§ 577. Instruments in form of couditional sale held

to be absolute sales reserving a lien or mortgages. — Cases,

further, are not infrequent in which instruments denominated,

or in the form of, conditional sales have been held to consti-

tute executed and absolute sales with a lien reserved. In a

somewhat clear case 2 before the supreme court of the United

1 The same result, i. e., that the

agreement was a sale with a lien

reserved, was reached in Greer v.

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:50 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t6xw4h56n
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

Church (1877), 13 Bush (Ky.), 430,

where the court says: "In this case

the transaction shows a sale, and

that being shown, it does not matter

whether the parties intended the

title to pass or not; the sale being

completed by an agreement as to the

price and terms of payment and de-

livery of possession to the vendee,

the law, in furtherance of public

policy and to prevent fraud, will

treat the title as being where the

nature of the transaction required it

should be;" and that "at best the

effect was to give the appellees a

lien " as against the purchaser; and

in Knittel v. Cushing, 57 Tex. 354, 44

Am. R. 598, where Greer v. Church

was approved, and where the court

say of the so-called lease: " If a valid

instrument # at all, it must be held to

be a sale, and that the pretended

renting was but a device to secure

the remainder of the purchase-money

due; " and in Palmer v. Howard, 72

473

Cal. 293, 1 Am. St. R. 60, where the

court follows Heryford v. Davis, upon

the ground that, in the case at bar,

" the intention must be taken to have

been to transfer the ownership of

the property, reserving a security for

the price, and nothing more."

^Beardsley v. Beardsley (1890), 138

U. S. 262.

In Arkansas Cattle. Co. v. Mann

(1888), 130 U. S. 69, the court, in con-

struing a contract relating to the

sale of cattle, said: "That instru-

ment recites that the owners had, on

the day of its execution, 'sold' the

cattle, and that recital is followed

by clause guaranteeing the title and

providing the mode in which the

buyer was to make payment. Here

are all the elements of an actual sale,

as distinguished from an executory

agreement. The retention of posses-

sion by the sellers until, ami as secu-

rity for, the payment of the price,

was not inconsistent with an actual

§ 577.]
§ 577.] LAW OF SALE. [BOOK II.

States, the contract read: " I hold of the stock of the "Washing-

ton and Hope Railway Company . . . thirteen hundred and

fifty shares, which is sold to P. F. B., and which, though stand-

ing in my name, belongs to him, subject to a payment of eight

thousand dollars," etc. Said the court: " By the appellant it is

claimed that this is a mere executory contract, an agreement

to sell; by the appellee, that it is an executed contract, a sale

with a reservation of security. The distinction is obvious, and

the significance important. If an agreement to sell, the mov-

ing party must be the purchaser. If a sale, an executed con-

tract with reservation of security, the moving party is the

vendor, the one retaining security. If an agreement to sell,

the moving party, the purchaser, must within a reasonable

time tender performance or make excuse therefor. If an exe-

cuted contract, a completed sale, then the moving party is the

vendor, the security holder, and he assumes all the burdens

and risks of delay. What, therefore, is the significance and

import of this instrument? This, as claimed by the appellant,
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is not to be determined by any separate clause, but by the in-

strument as a whole. . . . Tested by this rule, this instru-

ment must be adjudged not a contract to sell, but a sale with

reservation of security. Note the language of the instrument:

'which is sold.' Again, ' which, though standing in my name,

belongs to him.' These words imply nothing executory, but

something executed. It is not that the vendor will sell, but has

sold. Not that the title remains in the vendor, yet to be trans-

ferred, but that it already has been transferred. The owner-

ship, equitable if not legal, is in the vendee. It is not that the

stock belongs to the vendee, upon payment, as appeared in the

case of French v. Hay} but that it is now his, subject to a lien.

Its meaning is, therefore, that of a sale, with retention of the

legal title as security for purchase-money. It is an equitable

mortgage, and the rights created and assumed by it are like

those created and assumed when the owner of real estate con-

veys by deed to a purchaser, and takes back a mortgage as se-

curity for the unpaid purchase-money."

122 Wall. (89 U. S.) 231.
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States, the contract real: "I bold of the stock of the W a hington and Hope Railway Company . . . thirteen bun lr land
fifty shares, which is sold to P. F. B., and which, though tanding in my name, belongs to him, subject to a payrrient of eight
thousand dollars," etc. Said the court: "By the appellant it is
claimed that this is a mere executory contract, an agreement
to sell; by the appellee, that it i an executed contract, a sale
with a reservation of security. The distin tion is obvious, and
the significance important. If an agreement to sell, the moving party must be the purchaser. If a sale, an executed contract with reservation of security, the moving party is the
vendor, the one retaining security. If an agreement to sell,
the moving party, the purchaser, mu t within a reasonable
time tender performance or mak excuse therefor. If an executed contract, a completed sal , then the moving party is the
vendor, the security holder, and he as umes all the bur lens
and risks of delay. What, therefore, is the significance anu
import of this instrument? This, as claimed by the appellant,
is not to be determined by any separate clause but by the in. .. Tested by this rule, this instru- strument as a whole.
ment must be adjudged not a contract to sell, but a sale with
reservation of security. Note the language of the instrument:
'which is sold.' Again, 'which, though standing in my name,
belongs to him.~ The e words imply nothing executory, but
something exeuuted. It is not that the vendor will sell, but has
sold. Not that the title remains in the vendor, yet to be transferred, but that it afready has been transferred. The ·o" nersbip, equitable if not legal, is in the vendee. It is not that the
stock belongs to the vendee, upon payment, as appeared in the
case of French v. Iiay, 1 but that it is now his, subject to a lien.
Its meaning is, therefore, that of a sale, with retention of the
legal title as security for purchase-money. It is an equitable
mortgage, and the rights created and assumed by it are like
those created and as umed when the owner of real estate conveys by deed to a purchaser, and takes back a mortgage as security for the unpaid purchase-money."
122 Wall. (8£1 U. S.) 231.
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CH. III.] CONDITIONAL SALE OF SPECIFIC CHATTELS. [§ 578.

g 578, . In a somewhat different case in Colorado, 1 it

appeared that Andrews & Co. had bargained to one Smith a

quantity of opera chairs which were put into the latter's opera

house. After the making of the contract, but before the chairs

had been delivered, Smith had mortgaged the opera house and

contents to the Colorado Savings Bank, and in an action by

the bank to foreclose its mortgage Andrews & Co. intervened,

claiming to be the owners of the chairs. The contract between

Andrews & Co. and Smith provided for payment of one-fourth

of the price in cash and of the residue by his notes; and it ex-

pressly stipulated that the title should be and remain in An-

drews & Co. until the whole was paid. This contract was duly

filed, but was not executed or acknowledged as required for

chattel mortgages. The decisive question, said the court, was

" whether the arrangement under and in pursuance of which

the seating was furnished constitutes a conditional sale, or an

absolute sale and transfer of ownership, with a reservation of

a lien to secure the payment of the purchase price. If the lat-
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ter, it must be conceded that it is in effect a chattel mortgage,

and void as to third parties, because not executed and acknowl-

edged in conformity with the chattel-mortgage act. In deter-

mining this question the entire transaction between intervenors

and Smith must be considered, and its legal effect ascertained,

not alone by any particular provisions of the written contract

itself, but from all the stipulations and agreements contained

therein, as well as in the notes given in connection therewith.

When so considered it is evident, notwithstanding the agree-

ment itself provides that the title to the seating shall remain

in Andrews & Co. until full payment in cash shall have been

made therefor, thus evidencing an intent to make the sale con-

ditional so far as the transfer of the title is concerned, that

such an intention is rebutted by the terms and stipulations in

the notes given in pursuance of the agreement, they being ab-

solute obligations, making the purchaser unconditionally liable

i Andrews v. Colorado Savings in substance is Palmer v. Howard

Bank (1894), 20 Colo. 313, 36 Pac. R. (1887), 72 CaL 293, 13 Pac. R. 858, 1

902, 36 Am. St, R. 291. Very similar Am. St. R. 60.
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for the purchase price. The optional payment of the purchase

price is as essential to constitute a transaction a conditional

sale as the conditional passing of the title; and a transaction

that in express terms imposes an unconditional liability upon

the vendee to pay the purchase price for the property deliv-

ered, however characterized by the parties, is essentially and

in legal effect an absolute, and not a conditional, sale. ' If, by

the terms of the agreement, the purchaser became liable un-

conditionally for the purchase price, although by the agree-

ment he may never get the title and ownership of the property,

then the agreement is an evasion of the registration statute,

as its purpose is simply to retain a secret lien.' 1 ... In

1 Citing Hart v. Barney, etc. Mfg.

Co., 7 Fed. R. 543.

In Aultman v. Silha (1893), 85 Wis.

359, 55 N. W. R. 711, it appeared that

;)j .]
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for the purchase price. The optional payment of the pur ha e
price is as essential to constitute a transaction a conditional
sale as the conditional passing of the title; and a transaction
that in express terms imposes an unconditional liability upon
the vendee to pay the purchase price for the property delivered, however characterized by the parties, is essentially and
in legal effect an absolute, and not a conditional, sale. 'If, by
the terms of the agreem nt, the purchaser became liable unconditionally for the purchase price, although by the agreement he may never get the title and ownership of the property,
then the agreement is an eva ion of the registration statute,
as its purpose is simply to retain a secret lien.' 1
In
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Silha had ordered from Aultman &

Co. a threshing outfit for which he

was to give his notes secured by a

mortgage upon the machineiy and

also upon certain land; and the ques-

tion arose whether there was a con-

ditional sale or a sale absolute with

a mortgage back for security. Said

the court: "Where this question is

at all doubtful the courts are in-

clined to hold the transaction a mort-

gage. The real nature of the trans-

actions, as disclosed by the written

documents and all the surrounding

circumstances, is sought to be ascer-

tained. Rockwell v. Humphrey, 57

Wis. 410. The courts do not favor a

conditional sale. In viewing this

transaction, and ascertaining its legal

effect, all the contemporaneous doc-

uments executed between the parties

are to be considered. There is, first,

the order, which plainly contem-

plates an absolute sale and expressly

provides for the execution of a first

mortgage on the machinery; second,

the notes, which contain a provision

that the title of the machinery shall

not pass until the notes are paid in

full, but which also contain a clause

authorizing sale of the property and

application of the proceeds on the

notes, which clause is inappropriate

to anything but a mortgage; third,

the chattel mortgage, which ex-

pressly recognizes and asserts and

warrants that the title of the ma-

chinery is in Silha, and contains

elaborate and full provisions for fore-

closure and sale in case of default,

and covenants that, in case the pro-

ceeds of the sale are insufficient to

pay the debt, Silha will pay the de-

ficiency; fourth, the real-estate mort-

gage. Consideration of all of these

documents forces our minds to the

conclusion that the transaction is an

absolute sale with mortgage back.

The stipulations and agreements

whicli indicate this intent are nu-

merous, while there is only one which

lCiting Hart v. Barney, etc. Mfg.
Co., 7 Fed. R. 543.
In Aultman v. Silha (1893), 85 Wis.
359, 55 N. W. R. 711, it appeared that
Silha had ordered from Aultman &
Co. a threshing outfit for which he
was to give his notes secured by a
mortgage upon the machinery and
also upon certain land; and the question arose whether there was a conditional sale or a sale absolute with
a mortgage back for security. Said
the court: "Where this question is
at all doubtful the courts are inclined to hold the transaction a martgage. The real nature of the transactions, as disclosed by the written
documents and all the surrounding
cinmm tances, is sought to be ascertained. Rockwell v. Humphrey, 57
'\Vis. 410. The courts do not favor a
conditional sale. In viewing this
transaction, and ascertaining its legal ·
effect, all the contemporaneous documents executed between the parties
are to be considered. There is, first,
the order, which plainly contemplates an absolute sale and expressly
provides for the execution of a first
mortgage on the machinery; second,
the notes, which contain a provision

that the title of the machinery ball
not pass until the notes a.re paid in
full, but which al o contain a clau e
authorizing sale of the property and
application of the proceeds on the
note , which clau e is inappropriate
to anything but a mortgage: third,
the chattel mortgage, which expressly recognizes and asserts and
warrants that the title of the machinery is in Silha, and contains
elaborate and full provisions for foreclosure and sale in ca e of default,
and covenants that, in case the proceeds of the sale are insufficient to
pay the debt, Silha will pay the dejiciency; fou1·th, the real-estate mortgage. Consideration of all of these
documents forces our mind to the
conclu ion that the transa.ction is an
ab olute sale with mortgage back.
The stipulations and agreements
which indicate this intent are numerou , while there is only one which
points to a conditional sale, and that
is coupled with a provision only uitable to a chattel mortgage. The acts
and conduct of the parties al o point
to the same conclusion. The giving
of mortgages upon the machinery
and other property to secure the pay-
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terms the notes executed by Smith to the interveners made

him an absolute debtor for the price of the furniture, and the

stipulation therein that 'A. H. Andrews & Co., or their as-

signs, shall have the right to assume possession at any time

they may deem themselves insecure, and, after maturity, to

sell said property and apply the proceeds of such sale, over

and above the expenses of taking and retaining possession

thereof, on this note, and to collect the balance,' being mani-

festly for the purpose of enabling the intervenors to enforce

such payment by subjecting the property to sale for that pur-

pose, is "an attempt to reserve a lien thereon to secure the pay-

ment of the purchase price." It was therefore held void as to

third parties, " as being in contravention of our chattel-mort-

gage act."

ment of the notes, with stipulations

to pay the balance remaining after

foreclosure, is utterly inconsistent
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with the idea of a conditional sale.

Silver Bow M. & M. Co. v. Lowry, 6

Mont. 288."

In Baldwin v. Crow (1888), 86 Ky.

679, 7 S. W. R 146, it appeared that

Baldwin & Co. had delivered to one

Dennis a piano, and received from

him three notes, each of which con-

tained the following clause: "This

note is of a series given for the pur-

chase of the instrument mentioned

below, the conditions of which pur-

chase are, that said instrument re-

mains the property of D. H. Baldwin

& Co. until all notes given for the

instrument are paid, and in default

of payment of any of said notes at

maturity, or at any time after such

default, before accepting payment of

amount thus due, or in case said in-

strument, before payment in full, is

removed from Nicholasville, Ken-

tucky, without written consent of

D. H. Baldwin & Co., they may re-

ceive possession of said instrument

4

without any liability on their part

to refund any money previously

paid on account of said purchase.

Loss in case of fire to be borne by

me, A. J. Dennis." Held to be an ab-

solute sale and mortgage back, rely-

ing on Greer v. Church, 13 Bush (Ky.),

430 (cited in preceding section), and

Barney & Smith Mfg. Co. v. Hart, 8

Ky. Law R 223, 1 S. W. R. 414. Sub-

stantially similar also is Singer Mfg.

Co. v. Smith, 40 S. C. 529, 19 S. E. R.

132.

In Damm v. Mason, 98 Mich. 237,

57 N. W. R. 123, it appeared that one

Partrick was indebted to Mason, and,

being desirous of securing him, gave

to Mason a contract describing prop-

erty already owned by Partrick, and

in his possession, but declaring, as in

a contract of conditional sale, that

the title should remain in Mason

until paid for. Damm was a subse-

quent mortgagee for Partrick. In a

contest between Damm and Mason it

~§
§§ 57^-581.] LAW OF SALE. [BOOX II.

§ 579. . It is believed, however, that the doctrines here

laid down are not in harmony with those generally prevailing

elsewhere. 1

§ 580. The rule in Pennsylvania. — The rule in Penn-

57!1-581.J

LAW OF SALE.

[DO ::I II.

§ 579. - - . It is believed, however, that the doctrines here
laid down are not in harmony with tho e generally prevailing
elsew here. 1

sylvania has been thought to be somewhat peculiar, and re-

quires mention. Distinction is there made between a bailment

with a power of purchase annexed, and a conditional sale. If

goods are delivered to be used and returned, this is a bailment,

and it continues such in Pennsylvania notwithstanding that

there may be annexed to it a stipulation that if the bailee shall

pay a designated price he shall become the owner, and other-

wise shall pay for the use. 2 If, however, notwithstanding the

form or the name of the agreement, it is not contemplated that

the article shall be returned to the bailor, but that the bailee

has bought it or is bound to buy it, though the title may be re-

served by way of security, it is a conditional sale. 3

§ 581. ■ . Of a contract of the first kind it was said:

" Properly speaking there was not a sale, but a contract to sell
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at a future clay, and the delivery in the meantime was a loan

subject to be turned into a sale by a compliance with certain

conditions." 4 In a case of the latter kind: "It is true it was

claimed to be a lease and the transaction a bailment, but it was

1 See post § 583. 53,37 Am. R. 661; Farquhar v. Mc-

2 Clark v.Jack, 7 Watts, 375; Myers Alevy, 142 Pa. St. 233; Clow v.

t. Harvey, 2 Pen. & W. 478, 23 Am. Woods, 5 S. & R. 275, 9 Am. Dec. 346;

Dec. 60; Rowe v. Sharp, 51 Pa. St, 26; Babb v. Clemson, 10 S. & R. 419, 13

§ 580. - - The rnle in Penn yhania.-Tbe rule in Pennsylvania has been thought to ·be somewhat peculiar, and requires mention. Distinction is there made between a bailment
with a power of purchase annexed, an<l a conditional sale. If
goods are delivered to be used and returned, this is a bailment,
and it continues such in Pennsylvania notwithstanding that
there may be annexed to it a stipulation that if the bailee shall
pay a de ignated price he shall become the owner and otherwise shall pay for the use. 2 If, however, notwithstanding the
form or the name of the agreement, it is not contemplated that
the article shall be returned to the bailor, but that the bailee
has bought it or is bound to buy it, though the title may be reserved by way of security, it is a conditional sale. 3

Chamberlain v. Smith, 44 Pa. St. 431; Am. Dec. 684; Martin v. Mathiot, 14

Henry v. Patterson, 57 Pa. St. 346; S. & R. 214, 16 Am. Dec. 491; Jenkins

Becker v. Smith,, 59 Pa. St. 469; En- v. Eichelberger, 4 Watts, 121,28 Am.

low v. Klein, 79 Pa. St. 488; Crist v. Dec. 691; Rose v. Story, 1 Pa. St. 190,

Kleber, 79. Pa. St. 290; Christie's Ap- 44 Am. Dec. 121; Waldron v. Hanpt,

peal, 85 Pa. St. 463; Edwards' Appeal, 2 P. F. Smith, 408; Haak v. Linder-

105 Pa. St. 103; Dando v. Foulds, 105 mann, 64 Pa. St. 499. 3 Am. R. 612;

Pa. St. 74; Brown v. Billington, 163 Dearborn v. Raysor, 132 Pa. St. 231,

Pa. St. 76, 29 Atl. R. 904; Ditman v. 20 Atl. R. 690; Ott v. Sweatman, 166

Cottrell, 125 Pa. St. 606, 17 Atl. R. 504; Pa. St. 217, 31 Atl. R. 102; Peek v.

Case v. L'Oeble, 84 Fed. R. 582. Heim, 127 Pa. St. 500, 17 Atl. R. 984.

§ 581. - - . Of a contract of the first kind it was said:
"Properly speaking there was not a sale, but a contract to sell
at a future day, and the deli very in the meantime was a loan
subject to be turned into a sale by a compliance with certain
conditions." 4 In a ca e of the latter kind: "It is true it was
claimed to be a lease and the transaction a bailment, but it was

3 Stadtfeld v. Huntsman, 92 Pa. St. 4 Clark v. Jack, supra.
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post, § 583.
Clark v. Jack, 7 Watts, 375; Myers
v. Harvey, 2 Pen. & W. 47 . 23 Am.
Dec. 60; Rowe v. Sharp, 51 Pa. St. 26;
Chamberlain v. Smith, 44 Pa. St. 431;
Henry v. Patt.erson, 57 Pa. St. 346;
Becker v. Smith,, 59 Pa. St. 46(); Enlow Y. Klein, 79 Pa. St. 4 ; Crist v.
Kleber, 79. Pa. St. 290; Chri tie's Appeal, 85 Pa. St. 463; Edwards' Appeal,
105 Pa. St. 103; Dando v. Foulds, 10Pa. St. 74; Brown v. Billington, 163
Pa. St. 76, 29 Atl. R. 904; Ditman v.
Cottrell, 125 Pa. t. 606, 17 tl. R. 504;
Ca e v. L'Oebl , 84 Fed. R. 5 2.
3 tadtfelcl v. Hunt man, 92 Pa. St.
1 See

2

47

53, 37 Am. R. 661; Farquhar v. McAlevy, 142 Pa. St. 233; Clow v.
Woods, 5 S. & R. 275, 9 Am. Dec. 3-16;
Babb v. Clemson, 10 S. & R. 419, 13
Am. Dec. 6 ±; Martin v. 1\fathiot, 14
S. & R. 214, 16 Am. Dec. 491; Jenkins
v. Eichelberger, 4 Watts, 121, 2 Am.
Dec. 691; Rose v. Story, 1 Pa. St. 190,
44 Am. Dec. 121; Waldron v. Haupt,
2 P. F. Smith. 408: Haak v. Linderrnann, 64 Pa. St. 499, 3 Am. R. G12;
D arborn v. Raysor. 132 Pa. St. 231,
20 Atl. R. 600; Ott v. Sweatman, 166
Pa. Bt. 217, 31 Atl. R. 102; P ek v.
Heim, 127 Pa. St. 500, 17 Atl. R. 984.
4 Clark v. Jack, supra.

CH. III.] CONDITIONAL SALE OF SPECIFIC CHATTELS. [§§ 582, 583.

. not even so in form. It lacked the essential feature of a bail-

ment, viz. : a stipulation for a return of the property at the end

of the term. . . . It is of the essence of a contract of bail-

ment that the article shall be returned in its own or some al-

tered form to the bailor, so that he may have his own again.

. . . The agreement was clearly a conditional sale." 1

§ 582. Bailment and conditional sale distinguished.

There is, however, nothing peculiar in principle in this partic-

ular phase of the Pennsylvania cases. It is undoubted that

there may be a mere bailment with a privilege of purchase

annexed, and it would be so held in any State; 2 but a bail-

ment coupled with an agreement to sell and purchase is held

in Pennsylvania, as in other States, to be a conditional sale.

Few of the States, however, go so far as Pennsylvania in de-

termining the results of such contracts, in which respect, as

will be seen, 3 the Pennsylvania doctrine is peculiar.

§ 583. Conditional sale and chattel mortgage distin-

guished. — Although some of the anomalous contracts which
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this kind of dealing has produced have been held to be chat-

tel mortgages in effect, 4 there is a clear distinction to be drawn

between either the conditional contract to sell or the condi-

tional sale and the chattel mortgage, and this distinction lias

usually been recognized by the courts. 5 As is said in one case, 6

iFarquhar v. McAlevy, supra. See 133, 48 N. W. R. 1100; Wadleigh v.

also Morgan-Gardner Electric Co. v. Buckingham, 80 Wis. 230, 49 N. W.

Brown, 193 Pa. St. 351, 44 Atl. R. 459. R. 745; Nichols v. Ashton, 155 M;iss.

2 See, for example, McCall v. Pow- 205, 29 N. E. R. 519; Harkness v. Rus-

ell, 64 Ala. 254. sell, 118 U. S. 663; Gilbert v. National

* See post, § 600, note. Cash Reg. Co., 176 111. 288, 52 N. E.

4 See ante, § 577 ; Hery ford v. Davis, R. 22 [citing also Plummer v. Shir-

102 U. S. 235; Greer v. Church, 13 ley, 16 Ind. 380; Sumner v. Woods,

Bush (Ky.), 430; Knittel v. Cushing, 52 Ala. 94; Bingham v. Vandergrift,

57 Tex. 354, 44 Am. R. 598; Camp- 93 Ala. 283; Jowers v. Blandy, 58 Ga.

bell v. Roddy, 44 N. J. Eq. 244, 14 Atl. 379; McComb v. Donald, 82 Va. 903;

R. 279, 6 Am. St. R. 889. McGinnis v. Savage, 29 W. Va. 362;

5 Kimball Co. v. Mellon, 80 Wis. Yasser v. Buxton, 86 N. C.335; Frick

e Kimball Co. v. Mellon, 80 Wis. 133, 48 N. W. R. 1110.
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LAW OF SALE.

[BOOK II.

" it is very difficult to see how a contract for the sale of per-

sonal property, in which it is agreed that the title of the prop-

erty shall remain in the vendor, and the possession in the

vendee, until payment of the debt, can be called a mortgage

L.A. W OF SA.LE.

[ IlOOK II.

"it is very difficult to see how a contract for the sale of per- .
sonal property, in which it is agreed that the title of the property shall remain in the vendor, and the possession in the
vendee, until payment of the debt, can be called a mortgage

v. Hilliard, 95 N. C. 117; The Ma-

rina, 19 Fed. R. 760].

In Harkness v. Russell (1886), 118

U. S. 663, it is said: "The first ques-

tion to be considered is whether

the transaction in question was a

conditional sale or a mortgage; that

is, whether it was a mere agreement

to sell upon a condition to be per-

formed, or an absolute sale with a

reservation of a lien or mortgage to

secure the purchase-money. If it
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was the latter, it is conceded that

the lien or mortgage was void as

against third persons because not

verified by affidavit and not recorded

as required by the law of Idaho. But,

so far as words and express intent of

the parties can go, it is perfectly evi-

dent that it was not an absolute sale,

but only an agreement to sell upon

condition that the purchasers should

pay their notes at maturity. The

language is: 'The express condition

of this transaction is such that the

title . . . does not pass . . .

until this note and interest shall have

been paid in full' If the vendees

should fail in this, or if the vendors

should deem themselves insecure be-

fore the maturity of the notes, the

latter were authorized to repossess

themselves of the machinery, and

credit the then value of it, or the pro-

ceeds if they should sell it, upon the

unpaid notes. If this did not pay the

notes, the balance was still to be paid

by the makers by way of ' damages

and rental for said machinery.' This

stipulation was strictly in accord-

ance with the rule of damages in

such cases. Upon an agreement to

sell, if the purchaser fails to execute

his contract, the true measure of

damages for its breach is the differ-

ence between the price of the goods

agreed on and their value at the time

of the breach or trial, which may

fairly be stipulated to be the pi'ice

they bring on a resale. It cannot be

said, therefore, that the stipulations

of the contract were inconsistent

with, or repugnant to, what the par-

ties declared to be their intention,

namely, to make an executory and

conditional contract of sale. Such

contracts are well known in the law

and often recognized ; and when free

from any fraudulent intent are not

repugnant to any principle of justice

or equity, even though possession of

the property be given to the proposed

purchaser."

v. Hilliard, 95 N. C. 117; The Marina, 19 Fed. R. 760].
In Harkness v. Russell (1886), 118
U. S. 663, it is said: "The first question to be considered is whether
the tran action in question was a
conditional sale or a mortgage; that
is, whether it was a mere agreement
to sell upon a condition to be p rformed, or an absolute sale with a
re ervation of a lien :>r mortgage to
secure the purchase-money. If it
was the latter, it is conceded that
the lien or mortgage was void as
against third persons because not
verified by affidavit and not recorded
as required by the law of Idaho. But,
so far as words and express intent of
the parties can go, it is perfectly evident that it was not an absolute sale,
but only an agreement to sell upon
condition that the purchasers should
pay their notes at maturity. The
language is: 'The express condition
of this transaction is such that the
title . • . does not pass . • .
until this note and interest shall have
been paid in full.' If the vendees
should fail in this, or if the vendors
should deem themselves insecure before the maturity of the notes, the
latter were authorized to repos ess
themselves of the machinery, and
credit the then value of it, or the proceeds if they should sell it, upon the
unpaid notes. If this did not pay the
notes, the balance wa still to be paid
by the makers by way of 'damag s
and rental for aid machinery.' This
stipulation was strictly in acconlance with the rule of damages in

such cases. Upon an agreement to
sell. if the purchaser fails to execute
his contract, the true measure of
damages for its breach is the difference between the price of the goods
agreed on and their value at the time
of the breach or trial, which may
fairly be stipulated to be the price
they bring on a resale. It cannot be
said. therefore. that the stipulations
of the contract were incon istent
with, or repugnant to, what the parties declared to be their intention,
namely, to make an executory and
conditional contract of sale. Such
contracts are well known in the law
and often recognized; and when free
from any frauuulent intent are not
repugnant to any prinuiple of justice
or equity, even though possession of
the property be given to the proposed
purchaser."
In Nichols v. Ashton (1891), 155
]\fa ·s. 205, 29 N. E. R. 519, where
goods w re delivered to one Fred L.
Stiff under a contract purporting to
be a contract of conditional sale, but
which, it was contended, amounted
to a mortgage in legal effect, it was
said: "As to whether the written
contract discloses a mortgage from
Stiff to the plaintiff, L purports, it is
true, to bind Stiff to make the paymen ts necessary to entitle him to the
goods, but it declares that he has
borrowed and received those good.,
and provides in the most explicit
way that the title shall not pa s
until the whole amount of the stipulated value shall have been paid,
and that the plaintiffs also retain

4 0

CH. III.] CONDITIONAL SALE OF SPECIFIC CHATTELS. [§ 584.

by the most liberal construction. In a mortgage the title of

the property is in the mortgagor as well as the possession.

The mortgage is a mere incumbrance, and the mortgagor may

sell and confer a good title subject to such incumbrance. The

two contracts are entirely different in form and essentially so

in substance."

§ 584. The true theory. — A satisfactory and harmoni-

ous rule in respect of these cases cannot be attained until

agreement is had as to definitions. In the writer's judgment

the term " conditional sale " is a misnomer as applied to this

class of contracts. Still, notwithstanding differences as to

names and some difference as to essential nature, the great

weight of authority is to the effect that agreements of the kind

now under consideration, by whatever name called, are con-

tracts of sale subject to a condition precedent, namely, the pay-

ment of the price. In other words, they are conditional contracts

to sell, and are most appropriately described as conditional

contracts of sale, to distinguish them from the true conditional
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sale, which is a sale subject to a condition subsequent, though

the right to the immediate posses- which has gone farthest in another

sion. It is impossible by construction direction contains nothing inconsist-

of such a contract to turn the trans- ent with our decision. Bailey v. Her-

action between the parties into a sale vey, 135 Mass. 172. See McCarthy v.

passing the title to Stiff and a mort- Henderson, 138 Mass. 310, 312."

gage or pledge back by him. Such a In Smith v. De Vaughn, 82 Ga. 574,

result can be reached only by over- 9 S. E. R. 425, De Vaughn sold Smith

turning the instrument, which de- a mule and took from him a note for

clares that the title does not pass, the price, which note contained also

and there is no warrant for overturn- the following language: " And to se-

ing it. Blanchard v. Cooke, 144 Mass. cure the payment of this note, I

207, 221. If the plain effect of the hereby mortgage and convey unto

English language needs confirmation said payee, his heirs and assigns, the

by authority, it may be mentioned following described property, to wit:

that contracts like the present are One dark mare-mule named Queen,

recognized as being what they pur- about ten years old, for which this

port to be by statutes. St. 1884, ch. 313; note is given in part. Said mule to re-

Pub. Stat., ch. 192, § 13. See also main the property of J. E. De Vaughn

Carter v. Kingman, 103 Mass. 517; until paid for." Held, that this was a

Benner v. Puffer, 114 Mass. 376; Chase conditional bill of sale with reserva-

v. Ingalls, 122 Mass. 381. The case tion of title, and not a mortgage.

31 481

~§

5- 5 7.]

LAW OF SALE.

[nooK n.

§§ 535-587.] law of sale. [cook ii.

the shorter term, " conditional sale," seems to be so firmly fixed

in our legal nomenclature that it is not likely to be abandoned.

§ 585, On conditional contract to sell, no title passes until

the shorter term, "conditional sale," seems to be so firmly fixed
in our legal nomenclature that it is not likely to be aban loned.

performance. — Such being the nature of the contracts of the

first class, namely, the conditional contracts to sell, it remains

next to consider their effect, and especially the question of their

effect upon the transfer of the title. Upon this point the con-

clusion, both in reason and authority, is clear that until full 1

payment of the price no title passes to the prospective pur-

chaser, unless this condition precedent of payment is waived. 2

In the case of the true conditional sale, however, that is, the

sale upon condition subsequent, a present title passes, subject

to be divested upon non-payment.

g 5S6 % Note not payment. — It is very common in these

cases for the buyer to give his note or notes to the seller as

part of the contract, to further evidence his agreement to pay

the price; and such notes are often afterward taken to secure

the payment of a deferred instalment of the price. Kot infre-
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quently the contract expressly provides that the title shall re-

main in the seller until all such notes are paid; but in the

absence of such an express stipulation the usual rule would

§ 585. On conditional contract to sell, no title pa es until
performance.- Such being the nature of' the contracts of the
first clas , namely, the cond,i tional contract to sell, it remains
next to consider their effect, and especially the question of their
effect upon the transfer of the title. Upon this point the conclusion, both in reason and authority is clear that unbl full 1
payment of the price no title pa ses to the pro pective purchaser, unless this condition precedent of payment is waived. 2
In the case of the true conditional sale, hO\vever, that is, the
sale upon condition subsequent, a present title pa ses, subject
to be divested upon non-payment.

apply and the note would not be regarded as payment, so as to

defeat the vendor's claim, in the absence of clear evidence of

an intention so to treat it. 3

§ 587. Nature of the interest acquired by vendee. — Al-

though it is thus true that, in the case of the conditional con-

l Entire payment is the condition Campbell Printing Co. v. Walker, 114

unless otherwise stipulated. Brown N. Y. 7, 20 N. E. R. 625; Levan v. Wil-

v. Haynes, 52 Me. 578. ten, 135 Pa. St. 61, 19 AtL R. 045:

2 Seymour v. Farquhar, 93 Ala. 292; McComb v. Donald, 82 Va. 903, 5 S. E.

Mcintosh v. Hill. 47 Ark. 363; McRea R. 558, and the many other cases

v. Merrifield, 48 Ark. 160; Simpson v. classified and arranged under § 542

Shackleford. 49 Ark. 63; Cincinnati and following.

Safe Co. v.Kelly, 54 Ark. 476; Kohler 3Triplett v. Mansur & Tebbetts

v. Hayes, 41 Cal. 455; Briggs v. Mc- Implement Co. (1900), — Ark. — , 57

Ewen, 77 Iowa, 303, 42 N. W. R. 303; S. W. R. 261: Segrist v. Crabtree

Singer Mfg. Co. v. Bullard, 62 N. H. 129 ; (1888), 131 U. S. 287.

482

§ 586. - - Note not payment.- It is 'Tery common in these
cases for the buyer to give hi note or notes to the seller as
part of the contract, to further evidence bis agreement to pay
the price; and such notes are often aftern·arcl taken to secure
the payment of a deferred instalment of the price. JS ot infrequently the con tract expressly provides that the title sha.11 remain in the seller until all such notes are paid; but in the
absence of such an express stipulation the usual rule would
apply and the note would not be regarded as payment so as to
defeat the vendor's claim, in the absence of clear evidence of
an intention so to treat it. 3

§ 587. Nature of the interest acquired by vendee.-Although it is thus true that, in the case of the conditional conIEntire payment is the condition Campbell Printing Co. v. Walker, 114
unless otherwise stipulateu. Brown N. Y. 7, 20 N. E. R. 625; Levan v. \Vilv. Hayne , 52 l\Ie. 578.
ten, 135 Pa. St. 61, 19 Atl R. 9-±5:
2 Seymour v. Farquhar, 93 Ala. 292;
IcComb v. Donald, 2 Va. !)03, 5 S. E.
Mcinto h v. Hill. 47 Ark. 363; l\fcRea R. 558, and the many other case
v. Merrifield, 48 Ark. 160; Simp on v. classified and arrangeu under§ 542
Shackleford. 49 Ark. 63; Cincinnati and following.
Safe Co. v. Kelly, 5-1 Ark. 476; Kohler
3 Triplett v. Mansur & Tebbett
v. Haye , 41 Cal. 455; Briggs v. l\Ic- Implement Co. (1900), - Ark. - , 57
Ewen, 77 Iowa, 303, 42 N. W. R. 803; S. W. R. 261: Segrist v. Crabtree
Singer l\1fg. Co. v. Bullard, 6'> N. H.129; (18 ), 131 U. S. 287.
482

CH. III.] CONDITIONAL SALE OF SPECIFIC CHATTELS. [§ 51

tract to sell, the prospective purchaser acquires no present title

to the goods, he does acquire a present interest, namely, a right

to become the owner upon the performance of the conditions,

and also such rights to possession in the interval as the contract

expressly or impliedly gives him.

In the case of the conditional sale — that is, the sale upon

condition subsequent, — as has been seen, the vendee acquires a

defeasible present title.

§ 588.

Whether assignable or leviable. — In either

case the interest or title acquired, where no restrictions are

imposed by the .con tract and no personal considerations are in-

volved, is usually deemed to be an assignable one, and the party

may sell, assign or mortgage whatever interest he has, 1 though

an attempt to transfer a greater interest would ordinarily be

regarded as a conversion, which would entitle the true owner

to recover the goods. 2 It is not, however, in cases of the lirst

i Bailey v. Colby (1856), 34 N. H.
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29, 66 Am. Dec. 752; Sargent v. Gile,

8 N. H. 325; Carpenter v. Scott, 13

R. I. 477. In this case the transac-

tion, " though in form a lease, is re-

garded in law as a conditional sale.

Goodell v. Fairbrother, 12 R. L 233;

Currier v. Knapp, 117 Mass. 324;

Greer v. Church, 13 Bush <Ky.:. 130,

433, 434. Under it the vendee ac-

quires not only the right of possession

and use, but the right to become the

absolute owner upon complying with

the terms of the contract. These are

rights of which no act of the vendor

can divest him, and which, in the ab-

sence of any stipulation in the con-

tract restraining him, he can trans-

fer by sale or mortgage. Upon per-

formance of the condition of the

sale, the title to the property vests

in the vendee, or, in the event that

he has sold or mortgaged it, in his

vendee or mortgagee, without fur-

ther bill of sale. Day v. Bassett. 102

Mass. 445, 417; Crompton v. Pratt,

105 Mass. 255: Currier v. Knapp, 117

Mass. 324, 325, 326; Chase v. Ingalls,

L22 Mass. 381, 382." Beach's Appeal,

58 Conn. 464, 20 Atl. R. 475; Ames

Iron Works v. Richardson, 55 Ark.

642, 18 S. W. R. 381; Sunny South

Lumber Co. v. Neimeyer Lumber Co.,

63 Ark. 268, 38 S. W. R. 902; Albright

v. Meredith, 58 Ohio St, 194, 50 N. K.

R. 719.

The buyer acquires a salable inter-

est, but his right to sell may be re-

stricted by the contract, and it may

be made a condition that he shall

not sell without the previous consent

of the vendor. McRea v. Merrifield,

48 Ark. 160.

It may also be made a condition

that the property shall not be re-

moved from some place specified

without the seller's consent. Johns-

ton v. Whittemore, 27 Mich 463;

Whitney v. MeConnell, 29 Mich. 12;

Smith v. Lozo, 42 Mich. 6.

2 See Bailey v. Colby, supra; Sar-

gent v. Gile, supra.

§§ 589, 590.J
§§ 589, 590.]
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class ordinarily regarded as an interest which can be taken and
sold upon execution,1 or sold for taxes. 2

class ordinarily regarded as an interest which can be taken and

sold upon execution, 1 or sold for taxes. 2

§589.

Entitled to protection. — The interest acquired

by the vendee is clearly one entitled to protection as against

wrong-doers, and he may maintain the actions necessary for

that purpose. As against a wrong-doer who has converted

them, the vendee is entitled to recover the full value of the

goods, and he may do this, it has been held, even though the

vendor may also have demanded the goods from the wrong-

doer. 3

§ 590. Performance of condition inures to benefit of

transferee. — Where a sale or transfer of the vendee's interest

is permissible, a performance of the condition after such trans-

§ 589. - - Entitled to protection.- The interest acquired
by the vendee is clearly one entitled to protection as against
wrong-doers, and he may maintain the actions necessary for
that purpose. As against a wrong-doer who has converted
them, the vendee is entitled to recover the full value of the
goods, and he may do this, it has been held, even though the
vendor may also have demanded the goods from the wrongdoer.3

fer, either by the original vendee or his transferee, is sufficient

to vest the title in such vendee or his transferee without a fur-
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ther bill of sale or other act on the part of the vendor. 4

i Sage v. Sleutz, 23 Ohio St, 1 ; Nich-

ols v. Ashton, 155 Mass. 205; Crist

v. Kleber, 79 Pa, St. 290; Enlow v.

Klein, 79 Pa. St. 488; Marquette Mfg.

Co. v. Jeffery, 49 Mich. 283; Dewes

Brewery Co. v. Merritt, 82 Mich. 198,

46 N. W. R. 379, 9 L. R. A. 270;

Thomas v. Parsons, 87 Me. 203, 32

§ 590. - - Performance of condition inures to beuefit of
transferee.-Where a sale or transfer of the venclee's int r st
is permissible, a performance of the condition after uch transfer, either by the original vendee or bis transferee, is ufficien t
to vest the title in such vendee or his tran feree without a further bill of sale or other act on the part of the vendor. 4

Atl. R. 876; Brown v. Haynes, 52 Me.

578; Everett v. Hall, 67 Me. 497;

Ilirsch v. Steele, 10 Utah, 18, 36 Pac

R. 49; Keck v. State, 12 Ind. App.

119, 39 N. E. R. 899; Reed v. Starkey,

69 Vt. 200, 37 Atl. R. 297; Dodd v.

Bowles, 3 Wash. Ter. 383, 19 Pac. R.

156; Miles v. Edsall, 7 Mont. 185, 14

Pac. R. 701; Vermont Marble Co. v.

Brow, 109 Cal. 236, 41 Pac. R. 1031,

50 Am. St. R. 37; Rodgers v. Bach-

man, 109 Cal. 552, 42 Pac. R. 448.

See contra, Fairbank v. Phelps, 22

Pick. (Mass.) 535; Newhall v. Kings-

bury, 131 Mass. 445.

May attach to extent of vendee's

payments. Hervey v. Dimond, 67

N. H. 342, 39 Atl. R 331, 68 Am. St.

R. 673; Beach's Appeal, 58 Conn. 464,

20 Atl. R. 475. After default no

leviable interest. Fields v. Williams,

91 Ala. 502, 8 S. R, 808; Jordan v.

Wells, 104 Ala. 383, 16 S. R. 23.

* Enlow v. Klein, 79 Pa. St. 488;

Hovey v. Gow, 81 Mich. 314, 45 N. W.

R. 985.

3 Harrington v. King, 121 Mass. 269.

See also French v. Osmer, 67 Vt. 427,

32 Atl. R. 254, and Lord v. Buchanan,

69 Vt. 320, 37 Atl. R. 1048, 60 Am. St.

R. 933.

* Carpenter v. Scott. 13 R. I. 477

(citing, as above, Day v. Bassett, 102

Mass. 445, 447; Crompton v. Pratt,

105 Mass. 255. 258; Currier v. Knapp,

117 Mass. 324-326; Chase v. Ingalls.

122 Mass. 381, 383); Beach's Appeal. 58

Conn. 464, 20 Atl. R. 475 (citing the

above-mentioned Rhode Island and

Massachusetts cases, and Fosdick v.
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l Sage v. Sleutz, 23 Ohio St. 1; Ni ch- pay men ts.
Hervey v. Dimond, 67
ols v. Ashton, 155 M:as . 205; Crist N. H. 342, 39 Atl. R. 331, 6 Am. t.
v. Kleber, 79 Pa. St. 290; Enlow v. R. 673; Beach's Appeal, 58 Conn. 464,
Klein, 79 Pa. St. 488; Marquette Mfg. 20 Atl. R. 475. After default no
Co. v. Jeffery, 49 Mich. 2 3; Dewes leviable interest. Fields v. William ,
Brewery Co. v. Merritt, 82 Mich. 198, 91 Ala. 502, 8 S. R. 0 ; Jordan v.
46 N. W. R. 379, 9 L. R. A. 270; Wells, 104 Ala. 383, 16 S. R. 23.
Thomas v. Parsons, 87 Me. 203, 32
2 Enlow v. Klein, 79 Pa. St. 4
;
Atl. R. 876; Brown v. Haynes, 52 Me. Hovey v. Gow, 811\lich. 314. 45 N. W.
578; Everett v. Hall, 67 1e. 497; R. 9 5.
Hirsch v. Steele, 10 Utah, 1 , 36 Pac.
3 Harrington v. King, 1211\fas . 269.
R. 49; Keck v. State, 12 Ind. App. See also French v. Osmer, 67 Vt. 427,
119, 39 N. E. R. 899; Reed v. Starkey, 32 Atl. R. 254, and Lord v. Buchanan,
69 Vt. 200, 37 Atl. R. 297; Dodd v. 69 Vt. 320, 37 Atl. R. 1048, 60 Am. St.
Bowles, 3 Wash. Ter. 3 3, 19 Pac. R. R. 933.
156; Miles v. Edsall, 7 Mont. 185, 14
4 Carpenter v. Scott, 13 R. I. 477
Pac. R. 701; Vermont Marble Co. v. (citing, as above, Day v. Bassett, 102
Brow, 109 Cal. 236, 41 Pac. R. 1031, Mass. 445, 447; Crompton v. Pratt,
50 Am. St. R. 37 · Rodgers v. Bach- 105 fass. 255. 258; Currier v. Knn.pp,
man, 109 Cal. 552, 42 Pac. R. 448. 117 Mass. 39 4-326; Chase v. I ngalls.
See contra, Fairbank v. Phelps, 22 122 Mass. 381, 3 3); Beach' Appeal, 58
Pick. (Mass.) 535; Newhall v. Kings- Conn. 404, 20 Atl. R. 475 (citing the
bury, 131 Mass. 445.
above-mentioned Rhode Island and
May attach to extent of vendee's l\Iassachusetts cases, and Fosdick v.
484

OH. III.] CONDITIONAL SALE OF SPECIFIC CHATTELS. [§§ 591, 592.

§ 591. Nature of the interest retained by the vendor. —

It is the distinguishing characteristic of these conditional con-

tracts to sell which are now under consideration that the seller

retains the title until the price is paid. Although the vendee

acquires an interest in the goods even before payment is due,

which increases, in the case of instalment contracts, as succes-

sive payments are made upon the price, and although this in-

terest, under the decisions or statutes of several States, is rapidly

augmenting in character, it is still clear, unless all distinctions

are to be lost sight of, that the legal title remains in the seller.

This legal title would draw after it the right of possession

also, unless the seller has parted with that right during the

time being, as stated in a following section. If the vendee

has not the possession, and no other notice of his right exists,

it is of course possible for the vendor who remains in posses-

sion to cut off the vendee's rights in the goods themselves by

a transfer of them to a bona y'<le purchaser; but where the

vendee has possession, or there is statutory or actual notice of
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his rights, the interest remaining in the seller must be such as

is consistent with the rights of the vendee under the contract.

§ 592. May be sold, seized, etc., subject to contract.—

Subject to the contract, therefore, the vendor may, before any

default by the vendee, sell, mortgage or assign his remaining

title, 1 or it may be seized and sold upon execution against him.

The vendor may also maintain any action which can be based

upon ownership alone. 2 After default, which usually, unless

waived, operates to restore the vendor's right of possession, he

Schall, 99 U. S. 235; note to Miller v. a horse, which was the subject of the

Steen. 89 Am. Dec. 128); Ames Iron conditional contract, had been killed

Works v. Richardson, 55 Ark. 642, 18 by a railroad company, the court

S. W. R. 381. said that either the vendor or the

^urnell v. Marvin, 44 Vt. 277; vendee might sue. " The conditional

Kimball Co. v. Mellon, 80 Wis. 133, vendee could have sued because of

48 N. W. R. 1100; Ross-Mehan his special ownership, and the vendor

Foundry Co. v. Ice Co., 72 Miss. 608. had also the right of action because

Everett v. Hall, 67 Me. 497, goes of his retained legal ownership: the

much further. recovery by one, however, being a

2 In Smith v. Gufford, 36 Fla. 481, bar to any further recovery by the

18 S. R. 717, 51 Am. St. R. 37, where other. Kent v. Buck, 45 Vt. 18; St.
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may deal with the goods, 1 or bring actions, 2 in any manner

permitted to one in whom title and the right to immediate

possession are united.

a 593. Vendor may assign his remaining interest and

may deal with the goods,1 or bring actions,2 in any manner
permitted to one in whom title and the right to immediate
possession are united.

the conditional contract of sale together. — The vendor may

also ordinarily transfer his interest in the property and in the

conditional contract of sale together, so as to invest his assignee

with all the rights and remedies which the contract confers. 3

He might not, however, without making the contract absolute,

separate it into parts, as by an absolute transfer of notes given

for the price, while he attempted to retain the title and the

remedies in his own hand. 4

Louis, etc. Ry. Co. v. Biggs, 50 Ark.

169, 6 S. W. R. 724; Harrington v.

King, 121 Mass. 269."

In Lord v. Buchanan, 69 Vt. 320,
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37 Atl. R. 1048, 60 Am. St. R. 933, a

stove sold conditionally had been

wrongfully taken from the vendee

§ 593. - - Vendor may assign his remaining interest and
the conditional contract of sale together.- The vendor may
a]so ordinarily transfer bis interest in the property and in the
conditional contract of sale together, so as to in vest his assignee
with all the rights and remedies which the contract confers. 3
He might not, however, without making the contract absolute,
separate it into parts, as by an absolute transfer of notes given
for the price, while he attempted to retain the title and the
remedies in his own bancl. 4

by a third person. The vendee sued

the wrong-doer and recovered the

f nil value and special damages. The

vendor then sued the wrong-doer in

trespass and trover, and claimed to

be entitled to at least nominal dam-

ages; but it was held that his action

Louis; etc. Ry. Co. v. Biggs, 50 Ark.
169, 6 S. W. R. 724; Harrington v.
King, 121 Mass. 269."
In Lord v. Buchanan, 69 Vt. 320,
37 Atl. R. 1048, 60 Am. St. R. 933, a

could not be maintained, as both

were for the same wrong — the un-

lawful taking. It was conceded,

however, that, for an injury to the

reversionary interest, a recovery by

one having only a possessory intei'est

for an injury to his interest would

not be a bar.

*In Hubbard v. Bliss, 12 Allen

(Mass.), 590, it is said that where per-

sonal property has been sold and

conveyed on a condition which is

afterwards broken by the purchaser,

the original owner may, by a new

sale, convey a valid title to a new

purchaser without first taking actual

manual possession of the property.

2 Where, after default, the goods

in the vendee's possession had been

levied upon by his creditors, the

court in Alabama said of an action

of trespass by the vendor: "Having

the general property, which drew to

itself the constructive possession —

the general property and right to

immediate possession at the time of

the levy, — plaintiff may maintain an

action of trespass against defend-

ants if they tortiously took the prop-

erty from the possession of the

vendee, who was in such case his

mere bailee.*' Fields v. Williams, 91

Ala. 502, 8 S. R. 808.

stove sold conditionally had been
wrongfully taken from the vendee
by a third person. The vendee sued
the wrong-doer and recovered the
full value and special damages. The
vendor then sued the wrong-doer in
trespass and trover, and claimed to
be entitled to at least nominal damages; but it was held that his action
could not be maintained, as both
were for the same wrong - the unlawful taking. It was conceded,
however, that, for an injury to the
reversionary interest, a recovery by
one ha Ying only a possessory interest
for an injury to his interest would
not be a bar.
1 In Hubbard v. Bliss, 12 Allen
(M:ass.), 590, it is said that where personal property has been sold and
conveyed on a condition which is
afterwards broken by the purchaser,
the original owner may, by a new
sale, convey a valid title to a new
purchaser without first taking actual
manual possession of the property.

2 Where. aft.er default, the goods
in the vendee's posses ion had been
levied upon by his creditor , the
court in Alabama said of an action
of trespass by the vendor: "Having
the general property, which drew to
itself the constructive posse sion the general property and right to
immediate possession at the time of
the levy,- plaintiff may maint;iin an
action of trespass against defen<lants if they tortiously took the property from the pos ession of the
vendee, who wa in such case his
mere bailee.:' Fields v. Williams, !H
Ala. 502, 8 S. R. 808.
Vendor may maintain an action
on the case, for injury to the property, against a bailee of the vendee,
after condition broken; and the fact
that the bailee had settled with the
vendee for- such injury is immaterial. Frencli v. Osmer, 67 Vt. 427,
82 Atl. R. 254. Compare Lord v. Buchanan, siipTa.
3 Landigan v. Mayer (1898), 32 Oreg.
245, 51 Pac. R. 649, 67 Am. St. R. 521.
4 Merchants' Bank v. Thomas (1887),
69 Tex. 237; Parlin, etc. Co. v. Harrell (1 94), 8 Tex. Ci v. App. 868, 27 S.

w. R. 1087.

Vendor may maintain an action

on the case, for injury to the prop-

erty, against a bailee of the vendee,

after condition broken ; and the fact

that the bailee had settled with the

vendee for- such injury is imma-

terial. French v. Osmer, 67 Vt. 427,

32 Atl. R. 254. Compare Lord v. Bu-
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CH. III.] CONDITIONAL SALE OF SPECIFIC CHATTELS. [§§ 594, 595.

§ 594. The right of possession, — A conditional contract to

sell carries with it, jproprio vigore, no right to the possession of

the property by the vendee before payment. Such a right, if

it exists, must be conferred by some express or implied term

of the agreement, and the contract will, therefore, be the source

of the right and the measure and test of its continuance. A

contract of this kind consists, consciously or unconsciously, of

two parts, of which the first may exist without the second:

1. The agreement to sell and buy. 2. The agreement as to

possession in the interval. The agreement to give the vendee

possession need not be express; it may be implied from custom

or the evident intention of the parties. 1 It may also be noth-

ing more than a mere revocable license.

§ 595. . The vendee's right of possession may, therefore,

be co-extensive with the duration of the contract, or it may

be terminable while the contract in other respects remains in

force. The continuance of the agreement to sell may, more-

over, be based upon one condition, while the continuance of
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the right of possession may be based upon another. 2 As was

said in a case 3 in California: "The person with whom such a

contract is made has only such right to the possession of the

property as the contract gives, and if the contract provides

that the right of possession shall cease upon the failure to per-

form a specified condition, the owner may, upon the failure of

the other party to perform the condition, resume the posses-

sion." Where, however, no other provision is made, the right

of possession will usually be terminated by default in pay-

ment. 4

1 Thus in Richardson v. Great "West- ment was made, but that he was not

ern Mfg. Co., 3 Kan. App. 445, 43 Pac. entitled to possession until default

R. 809, where the contract provided was made in payment,

for the conditional sale of new ma- 2 See Hegler v. Eddy. 53 Cal. 597;

chinery, and stipulated that the title Tufts v. D'Arcambal, 85 Mich. 185, 24

should remain in the seller until Am. St. R 79. 12 L. R. A 446.

fully paid for, and that upon default 3 Hegler v. Eddy, supra.

in any of the payments the seller 4 Wiggins v. Snow, 89 Mich. 476, 50

might take such machinery into his N. W. R. 991; Ryan v. Wayson, 108

possession, it was held that the title Mich. 519, 66 N. "W. R. 370.

remained in the seller until full pay-
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§§ 596, 597.] law of sale. [book ii.

g 5%. . If, on the other hand, the contract is deemed

to be one of true conditional sale, — that is, a present sale sub-

ject to a condition subsequent,— then the right of possession

until default passes as an incident to the ownership; it does

not depend alone upon the contract, and cannot be defeated

before the defeasance of the sale except by virtue of some ex-

press provision to that effect. 1

§597. Condition good against creditors of vendee. — The

condition reserving title in the seller until the goods are paid

for is, as has been already intimated, effective not only against

the original vendee, but, unless some statute intervenes, it is

§ 596. - - . If, on the other hand, the contract is deemed
to be one of true conditional sal , - that is, a present sale subject to a condition subsequent,- then the right of pos ession
until default passes as an incident to the ownership; it does
not depend alone upon the contract, and cannot be defeated
before the defeasance of the sale except by virtue of some express provision to that effect. 1

operative also to preserve the right of the conditional vendor,

if guilty of no laches, against levies and seizures by the cred-

itors of the vendee and assignments of the goods for the bene-

fit of his creditors. 2

This is, moreover, true, even though the goods were delivered

under the contract to the conditional purchaser, who obtained

them for the express purpose of resale in his business, 3 or for
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the purpose of consuming them in their use; 4 since neither of

these purposes furnishes any warrant for the appropriation of

the goods by the buyer's creditors.

iSee Newhall v. Kingsbury, 131 v. Lang, 67 N. H. 348, 31 Atl. R. 20;

Mass. 445. Hirsch v. Steele, 10 Utah, 18, 36 Pac.

2 Vermont Marble Co. v. Brow, 109 R. 49; Reed v. Starkey, 69 Vt. 200, 37

Cal. 236, 41 Pac. R. 1031, 50 Am. St. Atl. R. 297; Dodd v. Bowles, 3 Wash.

R. 37; Rodgers v. Bachman, 109 Cal. Ter. 383, 19 Pac. R. 156. Such goods

552, 42 Pac. R. 448; Perkins v. Mett- cannot be distrained for rent. Tufts

ler, 126 Cal. 100, 58 Pac. R. 384; Keck v. Stone, 70 Miss. 54, 11 S. R. 792.

v. State, 12 Ind. App. 119, 39 N. E. R. 3 Rogers v. Whitehouse, 71 Me. 222;

899; Ellis v. Holland, 98 Ga. 154, 26 Lewis v. McCabe, 49 Conn. 141, 44

S. E. R. 735; Nichols v. Ashton, 155 Am. R. 217; New Haven Wire Co.

Mass. 205; Brown v. Haynes, 52 Me. Cases, 57 Conn. 352, 18 Atl. R. 266, 5

578; Everett v. Hall, 67 Me. 497; L. R. A. 300; Bur bank v. Crooker, 7

Thomas v. Parsons, 87 Me. 203, 32 Gray (Mass.), 158, 66 Am. Dec. 470;

Atl. R. 876; Marquette Mfg. Co. v. Dewes Brewery Co. v. Merritt, supra.

§ 597. Condition good against cred itors of vend ee.-The
condition reserving title in the seller until the goo ls are paid
for is, as has been already intimated, effective not only against
the original vendee, but, unles some statute intervene , it is
operative also to pre erve the right of the conditional vendor,
if guilty of no laches, again t }evies and seizur s by the creditors of the vendee and assignm nts of the goods for the benefit of his creditors. 2
This is, moreover, true, even though the goods were leliverecl
under the contract to the conditional purchaser, who obtained
them for the express purpose of resale in his busine s, 3 or for
the purpose of consuming them in their use; 4 since neither of
these purposes furnishes any warrant for the appropriation of
the goods by the buyer's creditors.

Jeffery, 49 Mich. 283, 13 N. W. R 592; But contra, see Ludden v. Hazen, 31

Dewes Brewery Co. v. Merritt, 82 Barb. (N.Y.) 650; Bonesteel v. Flack,

Mich. 198, 46 N. W. R. 379, 9 L. R. A. 41 Barb. 435; Powell v. Preston. 1

270; Miles v. Edsall, 7 Mont. 185, 14 Hun (N. Y.), 513.

Pac. R. 701; Cleveland Mach. Works 4 Armington v. Houston, 38 Vt. 448.

483

I See New hall v. King bury, 131 v. Lang, 67 N. H. 348, 31 Atl. R. 20;
Hirsch v. Steele, 10 Utah, 18, 36 Pac.
Mass. 445.
2 Vermont Marble Co. v. Brow, 109 R. 49; Reed v. Starkey, 69 Vt. 200. 117
Cal. 236, 41 Pac. R. 1031, 50 Am. St. Atl. R. 297; Dodd v. Bowles, 3 Wash.
R. 37; Rodgers v. Bachman, 109 Cal. Ter. 3 3, 19 Pac. R. 156. Such good::;
552, 42 Pac. R. 448; Perkins v. Mett- cannot be distrained for rent. Tufts
ler, 12G Cal. 100, 58 Pac. R. 384; Keck v. Stone, 70 Miss. 54, 11 S. R. 792.
3 Rogers v. Whitehouse, 71 Me. 222;
v. State, 12 Ind. App. 119, 39 N. E. R.
899; Ellis v. Holland, 98 Ga. 154, 26 Lewis v. McCabe, 49 Conn. 141, 4±
S. E. R. 735; Nichols v. Ashton, 155 Am. R. 217; New Haven Wire Co.
Ma . 205; Brown v. Haynes, 52 Me. Case , 57 Conn. 352, 18 Atl. R. 266, 5
578; Everett v. Hall, 67 Me. 497; L. R. A. 300; Burbank v. Crooker, 7
Thomas v. Parsons, 87 Me. 203, 32 Gray (Mass.), 158, 66 Am. Dec. 470;
Atl. R. 876; Marquette Mfg. Co. v. Dewes Brewery Co. v. Merritt, supru.
Jeff ry, 49 Mich. 2 3, 13 N. W.R. 592; But contra, ee Ludden v. Hazen, 31
Dewes Brewery Co. v. Merritt, 82 Barb. (N. Y.) 630; Bonesteel v. Flack,
Mich. 198, 46 N. W. R. 379, 9 L. R. A. 41 Barb. 435; Powell v. Preston. 1
270; Mile v. Edsall, 7 Mont. 185, 14 Hun (N. Y.), 513.
Pac. R. 701; Cleveland Mach. Works
4 Armington v. Houston, 38 Vt. 448.
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CH. III.] CONDITIONAL SALE OF SPECIFIC CHATTELS. [§§ 59S, 599.

§ 598. . The liability of the goods to the claims of the

buyer's creditors has been enlarged in several States, as will be

seen, by statute, as a penalty for not filing or recording the

contract in pursuance of legislative enactment; 1 but, in the ab-

sence of such legislation, the rule is that already stated.

§ 599. Condition good even against bona fide purchasers. —

It is thus clear, as has been seen, that the conditional contract

of sale is effective to preserve the title of the vendor from the

claims of the vendee's creditors. 2 It is also effective as against

subsequent purchasers from the vendee with notice of the con-

dition. 3 Whether it is also operative against bona fide purchas-

ers from the vendee who have no notice of the condition has

been the subject of much controversy; but it is now settled by

the great weight of authority that, unless otherwise declared

by statute, such bona fide purchaser acquires no better title than

his vendor had. Such has been the holding in Alabama, 4 Ar-

kansas, 5 California, 6 Connecticut, 7 Delaware, 8 Florida, 9 Georgia, 10

1 These statutes are more fully re-
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ferred to in a later section; but see

National Cash Reg. Co. v. Broeksmit,

103 Iowa, 271, 72N.W.R.52G; Peterson

v. Tufts, 34 Neb. 8, 51 N. W. R. 297.

2 See ante, % 588.

3 First Nat. Bank v. Tufts, 53 Kan.

710, 37 Pac. R. 127; Rhode Island

Loco. Works v. Lumber Co., 91 Ga.

639, 17 S. E. R. 1012; Batchelder v.

Sanborn, 66 N. H. 192, 22 Atl. R. 535.

* Sumner v. Woods, 67 Ala. 139, 42

Am. R. 104 (overruling Sumner v.

Woods, 52 Ala. 94, and Dudley v.

Abner, 52 Ala. 572); Weinstein v.

Freyer, 93 Ala. 257, 9 S. R. 285, 12 L.

R. A. 700; Fairbanks v. Eureka Co.,

67 Ala. 109, 42 Am. R. 105, n. ; Ensley

Lumber Co. v. Lewis, 121 Ala. 94, 25

S. R. 729. See also Tanner Engine Co.

v. Hall, 89 Ala. 628, 7 S. R. 187; Sey-

mour v. Farquhar, 93 Ala. 292, 8 S. R.

466. Are now required to be recorded.

5 Mcintosh v. Hill, 47 Ark. 363, 1 S.

W. R. 680; McRae v. Merrifield, 48

Ark. 160, 2 S. W. R. 780; Simpson v.

Shackleford, 49 Ark. 63, 4 S. W. R.

165; Triplett v. Mansur, etc. Co., —

Ark. — , 57 S. W. R. 261.

6 Houser-Haines Mfg. Co. v. Har-

grove, 129 Cal. 90, 59 Pac. R. 947;

Palmer v. Howard, 72 Cal. 293, 1 Am.

St. R. 60; Putnam v. Lamphier, 36

Cal. 151; Kohler v. Hayes, 41 Cal. 455;

Rodgers v. Bachman, 109 Cal. 552, 42

Pac. R. 448.

7 See Lewis v. McCabe. 49 Conn.

141, 44 Am. R. 217; Hart v. Carpen-

ter, 24 Conn. 427; Tomlinson v. Rob-

erts, 25 Conn. 477; Cragin v. Coe, 29

Conn. 51; Hughes v. Kelly, 40 Conn.

148; Brown v. Fitch. 43 Conn. 512.

8 Mathews v. Smith, 8 Houst. 22, 31

Atl. R. 879.

» Campbell Press Co. v. Walker, 22

Fla. 412; Roof v. Pulley Co., 36 Fla.

284, 18 S. R. 597. But see Hudnall v.

Paine, 39 Fla. 67, 21 S. R. 791.

io Sims v. James, 62 Ga. 200. Now

changed by statute.
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Indiana, 1 Iowa, 2 Kansas, 3 Maine, 4 Massachusetts, 5 Michigan,"

Indiana, 1 Iowa,2 Kansas, 3 1Yiaine, 4 :J\1:assachusetts,5 Michigan,i;
Missouri,7 Mississippi, 8 Montana, 9 N ebraska, 10 ew Hampshir ,n

Missouri, 7 Mississippi, 8 Montana, 9 Nebraska, 10 New Hampshire, 11

i Baals v. Stewart. 109 Ind. 371, 9

N. E. R 403, citing many cases; Hod-

son v. Warner, 60 Ind. 214; Dunbar

v. Rawles, 28 Ind. 225, 92 Am. Dec.

311.

a Baker v. Hall, 15 Iowa, 277; Rob-

inson v. Chapline, 9 Iowa, 91; Bailey

v. Harris, 8 Iowa, 331, 74 Am. Dec.

312. Now changed by statute requir-

ing contracts to be in writing and re-

corded Code 1873, § 1922. See, as to

the construction and application of

the statute, Pash v. Weston, 52 Iowa,

675, 3 N. W. R. 713; Moseley v. Shat-
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tuck, 43 Iowa, 540; Knoulton v. Red-

en baugh, 40 Iowa, 114; Budlong v.

Cottrell, 64 Iowa, 234, 20 N. W. R. 166

(distinguishing Singer Sew. M. Co. v.

Holcomb, 40 Iowa, 33); Wright v.

Barnard, 89 Iowa, 166, 56 N. W. R.

424.

3 Sumner v. McFarlan, 15 Kan. 600.

Now changed by statute. See Mo-

line Plow Co. v. Witham, 52 Kan. 185,

34 Pac. R. 751.

4 Brown v. Haynes, 52 Me. 578;

Whipple v. Gilpatrick, 19 Me. 427.

Now changed by statute. See Hill

v. Nutter, 82 Me. 199, 19 Atl. R. 170;

Hopkins v. Maxwell, 91 Me. 247, 39

Atl. R. 573.

5 Coggill v. Hartford, etc. R. Co., 3

Gray (Mass.), 545; Sargent v. Metcalf,

5 Gray (Mass.), 306, 66 Am. Dec. 368;

Hirschorn v. Canney, 98 Mass. 149;

Blanchard v. Child, 7 Gray (Mass.),

155; Zuchtmann v. Roberts, 109

Mass. 53, 12 Am. R. 663; Benner v.

Puffer, 114 Mass. 376; Wentworth v.

Woods Mach. Co., 163 Mass. 28, 39 N.

E. R. 414; Cottrell v. Carter, 173 Mass.

155, 53 N. E. R. 375.

6 Couse v. Tregent, 11 Mich. 65;

Dunlap v. Gleason, 16 Mich. 158; Fi-

field v. Elmer, 25 Mich. 48; Thirlby

v. Rainbow, 93 Mich. 164, 53 N. W. R

159; Lansing Iron Works v. Wilbur,

111 Mich. 413, 69 N. W. R. 667; Petty-

place v. Groton Mfg. Co., 103 Mich.

155, note; Dewes Brewery Co. v.

Merritt, 82 Mich. 198, 46 N. W. R. 379,

9 L. R. A. 270; Lansing Iron' & En-

gine Works v. Walker, 91 Mich. 409,

51 N. W. R. 1061, 30 Am. St. R. 488;

Gill v. De Arniant, 90 Mich. 430, 51

N. W. R. 527; Marquette Mfg. Co.

v. Jeffery, 49 Mich. 283, 13 N. W. R.

592.

7 Ridge way v. Kennedy, 52 Mo. 24;

Little v. Page. 44 Mo. 412; Parmlee

v. Catherwood, 36 Mo. 479; Robbins

v. Phillips, 68 Mo. 100; Wangler v.

Franklin, 70 Mo. 659. But now, by

statute, the contract must be in

writing and recorded. R. S. 1879,

1 Baals v. Stewart. 109 Ind. 371, 9 field v. Elmer, 25 Mich. 48; Thirll>y
N. E. R. 403, citing many cases; Hod- v. Rainbow, 93 'lich. 164, 53 N. W.R.
son v. Warner, 60 In l 214; Dunbar 159; Lansing Iron Works v. Wilbur,
v. Rawles, 28 Ind. 225, 92 Am. Dec. 111 Mich. 413, 69 N. W.R. 667; Petty311.
place v. Groton Mfg. Co., 103 Mieh.
2 Baker v. Hall, 15 Iowa, 277; Rob155, note; Dewes Brewery Co. v.
inson v. Chapline, 9 Iowa, 91; Bailey Merritt, 82 Mich. 198, 46 N. W.R. 379,
v. Harris, 8 Iowa, 331, 74 Am. Dec. 9 L. R. A. 270; Lansing Iron' & En312. Now changed by statute requir~ gine Work v. Walker, 91 Mich. 409,
ing contracts to be in writing and re- 51 N. W. R. 1061, 30 Am. St. R. 488;
corded. Code 1873, § 1922. See, as to Gill v. De Armant, 90 Mich. 430, 51
the con truction and application of N. W. R. 527; M:uquette Mfg. Co.
the statute, Pash v. We ton, 52 Iowa, v. Jeffery, 49 Mich. 2 3, 13 N. W. R.
675, 3 N. W. R. 713; Moseley v. Shat- 592.
tuck, 43 Iowa, 540; Knoulton v. Red7 Ridgeway v. Kennedy, 52 Mo. 24;
enbaugh, 40 Iowa, 114; Budlong v. Little v. Page. 44 fo. 412; Parmlee
Cottrell, 64 Iowa, 234, 20 N. W.R. 166 v. Catherwood, 36 Mo. 479; Robbins
(distinguishing Singer Sew. M. Co. v. v. Phillips, 68 Mo. 100; Wangler v.
Holcomb, 40 Iowa, 33); Wright v. Franklin, 70 Mo. 659. But now, by
Barnard, 89 Iowa, 166, 56 N. W.R. statute, the contract must be in
424.
writing and recorded. R. S. 1879,
3 Sumner v. McFarlan, 15 Kan. 600.
~ 2507.
See Collins v. Wilhoit, 108
Now changed by statute. See Mo- Mo. 451, 18 S. W.R. 839; Redenbaugh
line Plow Co. v. Witham, 52 Kan. 185, v. Kelton, 130 Mo. 558, 32 S. W. R. 67.
34 Pac. R. 751.
B Ketchum v. Brennan, 53 Miss. 596;
4 Brown v. Haynes, 52 Me. 578; Van Range Co. v. Allen (Miss.), 7 S.
Whipple v. Gilpatrick, 19 Me. 427. R. 499; Journey v. Prie ·tley, 70 :V.riss.
Now changed by statute. See Hill 584, 12 S. R. 799. But see Paine v.
v. Nutter, 82 Me. 199, 19 Atl. R. 170; Hall Safe Co., 64 Miss. 175; Adams
Hopkins v. Maxwell, 91 Me. 247, 3!) v. Berg, 67 Miss. 234, 7 S. R. 225; JenAtl. R. 573.
nings v. Wilson, 71 Miss. 42, 14 S. R.
5 Coggill v. Hartford, etc. R. Co., 3 259.
Gray (Mass.), 545; Sargent v. Metcalf,
9 Heinbockle v. Zugbaum, 5 Mont.
5 Gray ( fass.), 306, 66 Am. Dec. 3fl8; 344, 5 Pac. R. 897, 51 Am. R. 59.
Hirschorn v. Canney, 98 lVIass. 149;
lo Aultman v. Mallory, 5 Neb. 178,
Blanchard v. Child, 7 Gray (Mass.), 25 Am. R. 478. Now changed by sta.t155; Zuchtmann v. Roberts, 109 ute. See Osborne Co. v. P lano Mfg.
Mass. 53, 12 Am. R. 663; Benner v. Co., 51 Neb. 502, 70 N. W. R. 1124;
Puffer, 1141\fass. 376; Wentworth v. Campbell Printing Press Co. v. Dyer,
Woods J\fach. Co., 163 Mass. 28, 39 N. 46 Neb. 830. 63 N. W. R. !)04.
E. R. 414; Cottrell v. Carter, 173 1ass.
11 Weeks v. Pike, 60 N. H. 447; King
155, 53 N. E. R. 375.
v. Bates, 57 N. H. 446; Kimball v.
6 Couse v. Tregen~, 11 Mich. 65;
Jackman, 42 N. H. 242. Now changed
Dunlap v. Gleason, 16 Mich. 158; Fi- by statute.
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New Jersey, 1 New Mexico, 2 New York, 3 North Carolina, 4 Ohio, 5

Oregon, 6 Rhode Island, 7 South Carolina, 8 Tennessee, 9 Texas, 10

Utah, 11 Vermont, 12 Virginia, 13 Washington, 14 and perhaps other

States; 15 in Canada, 16 and the supreme court of the United

States; 17 though since the decisions referred to, the rule in sev-

eral of the States mentioned has been changed by statute.

600.

In a few States, however, the decisions, based

largely upon the theory of a condition subsequent or of con-

i Cole v. Berry, 42 N. J. L. 308, 36

Am. E. 511; Marvin Safe Co. v. Nor-

ton, 48 N. J. L. 410, 7 Atl. R. 418, 57

Am. R. 566. Now changed by stat-

ute. See Knowles Loom Works v.

Vacher, 57 N. J. L. 490, 31 Atl. R. 306.

2Redewill v. Gillen, 4 N. Mex. 72,

12 Pac. R. 872. Such contracts are

not within chattel mortgage record-
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ing acts. Maxwell v. Tufts, 8 N. Mex.

396, 45 Pac. R. 979.

3 Ballard v. Burgett, 40 N. Y. 314;

Austin v. Dye, 46 N. Y. 500; Comer

v. Cunningham, 77 N. Y. 391, 33 Am.

R. 626. Now changed by statute.

4 Clayton v. Hester, 80 N. C. 275;

Vassar v. Buxton, 86 N. C. 335. Now

changed by statute requiring record-

ing as to bona fide purchasers, though

good as between the parties. Perry

v. Young, 105 N. C. 463, 11 S. E. R.

511; Harrell v. Godwin, 102 N. C. 330,

8 S. E. R. 925; Kornegay v. Korne-

gay, 109 N. Q. 188, 13 S. E. R. 770.

5 Sanders v. Keber, 28 Ohio St. 630;

Call v. Seymour, 40 Ohio St. 670.

Now regulated by statute. See Case

Mfg. Co. v. Garven, 45 Ohio St. 289.

6 Singer Mfg. Co. v. Graham, 8

Oreg. 17, 34 Am. R. 572.

7 Apparently. See Goodell v. Fair-

brother, 12 R. I. 233, 34 Am. R. 631.

See also Carpenter v. Scott, 13 R. I.

477.

8 Perhaps. See Herring v. Cannon,

21 S. C. 212, 53 Am. R. 661, referring

to cases. The question was settled

by statute in 1843, which rendered

void all secret reservations of title to

goods apparently sold and delivered.

9 But now see Cowan v. Singer

Mfg. Co., 92 Tenn. 376, 21 S. W. R.

663.

lOLeath v. Uttley, 66 Tex. 82, 17 S.

W. R. 401. Now changed by statute.

11 Apparently. See Lippincott v.

Rich (1900), — Utah, — , 61 Pac. R.

526.

12 Now changed by statute. See

Roberts v. Hunt, 61 Vt. 612, 17 Atl.

R. 1006; Desany v. Thorp, 70 Vt. 31,

39 Atl. R. 309.

13 McComb v. Donald, 82 Va. 903.

Now changed by statute. See Hash

v. Lore, 88 Va. 716, 14 S. E. R. 365;

Callahan v. Young, 90 Va. 574, 19 S.

E. R. 163; Arbuckle v. Gates, 95 Va.

802, 30 S. E. R. 496.

14 Now regulated by statute. John-

ston v. Wood, 19 Wash. St. 441, 53
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structive fraud, protect the claims of the bona fide purchaser,

structive fraud, protect the claims of the bona fide purchaser,
without a statute. 1

without a statute. 1

601.

Rule does not apply when goods bought to be

resold. — But the rule permitting the conditional vendor to re-

take his goods in case of default, even from a bona fide pur-

chaser from his conditional vendee, very obviously should not,

and does not, apply in those cases in which the goods have

been delivered to the conditional vendee for the very purpose

of being resold to such a purchaser, as where a retail dealer

obtains goods from a wholesale dealer upon the agreement that

the title to the goods as a bulk shall remain in the latter, but

the retail dealer is impliedly, if not expressly, permitted to sell

from the bulk in the usual course of trade. 2 A sale of the

1 In Illinois the bona fide pur-

chaser is protected. See Murch v.

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:50 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t6xw4h56n
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

Wright, 46 111. 487, 95 Am. Dec. 455;

Michigan Central R. R. Co. v. Phil-

lips, 60 I1L 190; Lucas v. Campbell, 88

111. 447; Van Duzor v. Allen, 90 111.

499.

§ 601. - - Rule does not apply when goods bought to be
re old.- But the rule permitting the conditional vendor to retake his goo<ls in case of default, even from a bona fide purchaser from his conditional vendee, very obviously should not,
and does not, apply in those cases in which the goods have
been delivered to the conditional vendee for the very p11rpo e
of being resold to such a purchaser, as where a retail dealer
obtains goods from a wholesale dealer upon the agreement that
the title to the goods as a bulk shall remain in the latter, but
the retail dealer is impliedly, if not expressly, permitted to sell
from the bulk in the usual course of trade. 2 A sale of the

In Colorado. See Jones v. Clark,

20 Colo. 353, 38 Pac. R. 371; overrul-

ing George v. Tufts, 5 Colo. 162.

In Kentucky the bona fide pur-

chaser is protected. See Vaughn v.

Hopson, 10 Bush, 337; Greer v.

Church, 13 Bush, 430. So in Mary-

land. See Hall v. Hinks, 21 Md. 406;

Butler v. Gannon, 53 Md. 333; Cen-

tral Trust Co. v. Arctic Mfg. Co., 77

Md. 202, 26 Atl. R. 493; Lincoln v.

Quynn, 68 Md. 299, 11 Atl. R. 848, 6

Am. St. R. 446.

In Pennsylvania, it is said in Ryle

v. Loom Works, 87 Fed. R. 976, it is

the established rule " that a sale and

delivery of personal property, with

an agreement that the ownership

shall remain in the vendor until the

purchase price is paid, is ineffectual

and void as respects the creditors of

the vendee and innocent purchasers;

and the rule applies whatever may

be the form of the agreement. Haak

v. Linderman, 64 Pa. St. 499; Stadt-

feld v. Huntsman, 92 Pa. St. 53, 37

Am. R. 661 ; Thompson v. Paret, 94

Pa. St. 275; Brunswick, etc. Co. v.

Hoover, 95 Pa. St. 508; Forrest v. Nel-

son, 108 Pa. St. 481; Dearborn v. Ray-

sor, 132 Pa. St. 231, 20 Atl. R. 690;

Farquhar v. McAlevy, 142 Pa. St. 233,

21 Atl. R. 811; Ott v. Sweatman, 166

Pa. St. 217, 31 Atl. R 102. But where

personal property is delivered under

a contract of bailment, accompanied

with an agreement for a future sale

to the bailee on the payment of a

certain price, the ownership of the

bailor is preserved, and the trans-

action is valid, even as against the

creditors of the bailee and pur-

chasers. Rowe v. Sharp, 51 Pa. St.

26; Enlow v. Klein, 79 Pa. St. 488;

Goss Printing Press Co. v. Jordan,

171 Pa. St. 474, 32 Atl. R. 1031."

I In Illinois the bona fide pur- the vendee and innocent purcha er ;
chaser js protected. See Murch v. and the rule applfos whatever may
Wright, 46 Ill. 487, 95 Am. Dec. 455; be the form of the agreement. Haak
Michigan Central R. R. Co. v. Phil- v. Linderman, 64 Pa. St. 499; Stadtlip , 60 IlL 190; Lucas v. Campbell, 88 feld v. Huntsman, 92 Pa. St. 53, 37
Ill. 447; Van Duzor v. Allen, 90 Ill. Am. R. 661; Thompson v. Paret, 9±
499.
Pa. St. 275; Brunswick, etc. Co. v.
In Colorado. See Jones v. Clark, Hoover, 95 Pa. St. 508; Forre t v. Nel20 Colo. 353, 38 Pac. R. 371; overrul- son, 108 Pa. St. 4 1; Dearborn v. Raying George v. Tufts, 5 Colo. 162.
sor, 132 Pa. St. 231, 20 Atl. R. 690;
In Kentucky the bona fide pur- Farquhar v. McAlevy, 142 Pa. t. 233.
chaser is protected. See Vaughn v. 21 tl. R. 811; Ott v. Sweatman, 166
Hop on, 10 Bush, 337; Greer v. Pa. t. 217, 31Atl.R.102. But where
Church, 13 Bush, 430. So in Mary· per onal property is delivered under
Jan<l. See Hall v. Hinks, 21Md.406; a contract of bailment, accompanied
Butler v. Gannon, 53 Md. 333; Cen- with an agreement for a future sale
tral Tru t Co. v. Arctic l\Ifg. Co., 77 to the bailee on the payment of a
l\Id. 202, 26 Atl. R. 493; Lincoln v. certain price. the ownership of the
Quynn, 68 l\'Id. 299, 11 Atl. R. 848, 6 bailor is preserved, aud the tran action is valid, even as against the
Am. St. R. 446.
In Pennsylvania, it is said in Ryle creditors of the bailee and purv. Loom Works, 87 Fed. R. 976, it is chasers. Rowe v. Sharp, 51 Pa. St.
thee tablisheJ rule "that a sale and 26; Enlow v. Klein, 79 Pa. St. 4 8;
delivery of personal property, with Go
Printing Press Co. v. Jordan,
an agreement that the ownership 171 Pa. St. 474, 32 Atl. R. 1031."
shall remain in the vendor until the
:.! In Weston v. Brown (1899). 158
purchase price is paid, is ineffectual N. Y. 360, 53 N. E. R. 36, the agreeand void as respects the creditors of ment expres ly declared that it
492
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goods in bulk might be deemed unauthorized and pass no title,

but the retail purchaser in the usual course of business would,

where such resales were expressly or impliedly authorized, ob-

tain a good title, though the retail dealer might fail in paying

for the goods. 1

should not be construed as restrict- a quantity of flour, mortgaged it with

ing the vendee's right to sell to bona

fide purchasers; but if so sold the

proceeds should belong to the vendor

until the purchase price was paid.

As to these proceeds, the vendor may

recover them from the vendee in an

action at law, and need not go into

equity for accounting.

i Rogers v. Whitehouse, 71 Me. 222:

"Winchester Mfg. Co. v. Carman, 109

Ind. 31, 58 Am. R. 382; Burbank v.
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Crooker, 7 Gray (Mass.), 158, 06 Am.

Dec. 470; New Haven Wire Co.'s

Cases, 57 Conn. 352, 18 Atl. R. 266;

Stone v. Waite, 88 Ala. 599; Leigh v.

Railroad Co., 58 Ala. 165; Devlin v.

O'Neill, 6 Daly (N. Y.), 305: Ludden

v. Hazen, 31 Barb. (N. Y.) 650. Au-

thority to sell at retail, as in the case

of goods consigned, does not justify

a sale at wholesale. Powell v. Wal-

lace (1890), 44 Kan. 656, 25 Pac. R.

42; Romeo v. Martucci (1900), 72

Conn. 504, 45 Atl. R, 99, 47 L. R. A.

601. There is no right to sell again,

though the conditional vendor knew

that the conditional vendee was a

dealer and had no use for the goods

except for resale, if the contract ex-

pressly provides that the latter should

not sell them till paid for, and a

bona fide sub-vendee gets no title

as against the original conditional

vendor. Sargent v. Metcalf, 5 Gray

(Mass.), 306, 66 Am. Dec. 368.

But in Poorman v. Witman, 49

Kan. 697, 31 Pac. R. 370, where a

vendee, who was authorized to resell

the rest of his stock for pre-existing

debts, and the mortgagees on fore-

closure sold the whole stock, includ-

ing this flour, to a third person, it

was held that the latter obtained a

good title.

In Columbus Buggy Co. v. Turley,

73 Miss. 529, 19 S. R. 232, 55 Am. St.

R. 550, there was authority to resell,

the proceeds to be held as agent for

the vendor. The vendee sold the

goods to one of his creditors in satis-

faction of the latter*s claim, the cred-

itor having no knowledge of the

original vendor's claim. Held, that

the creditor obtained a good title.

Where the vendor lias licensed the

vendee to sell the property and ac-

count to him for the proceeds, a

sham sale will not cut off his lien,

but the sub-vendee is not bound to

see that the proceeds are actually

paid to the original vendor (Ufford

v. Winchester, 69 Vt. 542, 38 Atl. R.

§§ 602, 603. J
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[book II.

| G02. . The same result may ensue from the operation

of estoppel where the conditional vendor has previously per-

mitted sales from the bulk under like circumstances. 1

§ 603. Statutes requiring filing or recording of contract.

Unless so declared by statute, these contracts of conditional

sale or the agreements evidencing them are not deemed to be

chattel mortgages or instruments in the nature of chattel mort-

gages, so as to come within the provisions of the familiar stat-

utes which require chattel mortgages to be filed or recorded. 2

In some States, however, they have been expressly made sub-

ject to such provisions, and in several States special statutes

have been enacted with express reference to these contracts.

These statutes usually provide that unless the contract, or some

memorandum thereof, 3 be in writing, signed by the parties, 4

and filed or recorded, 5 after the manner of chattel mortgages,

!See Spooner v. Cummings, 151

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:50 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t6xw4h56n
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

Mass. 313, 23 N. E. R. 839. See also

Ezzard v. Frick, 76 Ga. 512.

2 See McComb v. Donald, 82 Va.

903; Kimball Co. v. Mellon, 80 Wis.

133. 48 N. W. R 1100; Campbell Print.

Press Co. v. Walker, 22 Fla. 412, 1 S.

of estoppel where the conditional vendor has previou ly permitted sales from the bulk under like circumstances. 1

§ 603. Statutes requiring filing or recording of contract.
Unless so declared by statute, these contracts of conditional
sale or the agreements evidencing them are not deemeu to be
chattel mortgages or instruments in the naturn of chattel mortgages, so as to come within the provisions of the familiar statutes whiQh require chattel mortgages to be filed or recorded. 2
In some States, however, they have been expres ly made subject to such provisions, and in several States special statutes
have been enacted with express reference to these contracts.
These statutes usually provide tbat unless the contract, or some
memorandum thereof, 3 be in writing, ignecl by the partie ,4
and filed or recorded, 5 after the manner of chattel mortgages,

R. 59; Rogers Locomotive Works v.

Lewis, 4 Dill. 158; The Marina, 19 Fed.

R. 760; Maxwell v. Tufts (New Mex.),

45 Pcic. R. 979.

3 As in Minnesota, where, if the con-

tract was not in writing, a memo-

randum of it must be recorded.

4 Must be signed by both parties in

Wisconsin. Kimball Co. v. Mellon, 80

Wis. 133, 48 N. W. R. 1100; Sheldon

Co. v. Mayers, 81 Wis. 627, 51 N. W.

R. 1082. But a signing by the factor

of the vendor and also by the vendee

suffices. Kellogg v. Costello, 93 Wis.

232, 67 N. W. R. 24.

5 In Connecticut the statute of 1893

provided that such contracts should

be in writing, acknowledged and re-

corded, or they would be regarded as

absolute except as against the ven-

dor or his heirs. See Lee Bros. Furn.

Co. v. Cram, 63 Conn. 433, 28 Atl. R.

540.

In Florida, void after two years'

possession unless in writing and re-

corded. Hudnall v. Paine, 39 Fla. 67,

21 S. R. 791.

In (xeorgia, except as between the

parties, the contracts must be in writ-

ing and recorded like chattel mort-

gages. Cohen v. Candler, 79 Ga. 427,

7 S. E. R. 160; Gartrell v. Clay, 81

Ga. 327, 7 S. E. R. 161; Steen v. Har-

ris, 81 Ga. 681, 8 S. E. R. 206; Mann

v. Thompson, 86 Ga. 347, 12 S. E. R.

746, Morton v. Frick, 87 Ga. 230, 13

S. E. R. 463; Penland v. Cathey, 110

Ga.431, 35 S. E. R. 659; Central Trust

Co. v. Marietta, etc. Ry. Co., 48 Fed.

R. 868. 1 C. C. A. 140, 2 U. S. App. 95.

Statute has no application to stat-

utory "cash sales" o* cotton under

Code, § 1955a. Savannah Cotton Press

v. Maclntyre, 92 Ga. 166, 17 S. E. R.

1023.

l See Spooner v. Cummings, 151
Mass. 313, 23 N. E. R. 839. See also
Ezzard v. Frick, 76 Ga. 512.
2 See McComb v. Donald, 82 Va.
903; Kimball Co. v. Mellon, 80 Wis.
133, 48 N. W.R. 1100; Campbell Print.
Press Co. v. Walker, 22 Fla. 412, 1 S.
R. 59; Rogers Locomotive Works v.
Lewis, 4 Dill. 158; The Marina, 19 Fed.
R. 760; Maxwell v. Tufts (New Mex.),
45 P<t C. R. 979.
3 As in Minnesota, where, if the contract was not in writing, a memorandum of it must be recorded.
4 Must be signed hy both parties in
Wi cousin. Kimball Co. v. Mellon, 80
Wis. 133, 48 N. vV. R. 1100; Sheldon
Co. v. Mayers, 81 Wis. 627, 51 N. W.
R. 10 2. But a signing by the factor
of the vendor and also by the vendee
suffices. Kellogg v. Costello, 93 Wis.
232, 67 N. W. R. 24.
5 In Connecticut the statute of 1 93
provided that such contracts should
be in writing, acknowledged and recorded, or they would be regarded as
absolute except as against the ven-

dor or his heirs. See Lee Bros. Furn.
Co. v. Cram, 63 Conn. 433, 28 Atl. R.
540.
In Florida, void after two years'
po se sion unles in writing and recorded. Hudnall v. Paine, 39 Fla. 67,
21 S. R. 791.
In Georg·ia, except as between the
parties, the contracts must be in writing and recorded like chattel mort.gages. Cohen v. Candler, 79 Ga. 427,
7 S. E. R. 160; Gartrell v. Clay, 81
Ga. 327, 7 S. E. R. 161; Steen v. Harris, 81 Ga. 681, 8 S. E. R. 206; Mann
v. Thompson, 86 Ga. 347, 12 S. E. R.
746·, forton v. Frick, 87 Ga. 230. 13
S. E. R. 463; Penland v. Cathey, 110
Ga. 431, 35 S. E. R. 659; Central Trust
Co. v. Marietta., etc. Ry. Co., 48 Fed.
R. 868. 1 C. C. A. 140, 2 U. S. App. U.).
Statute bas no application to statutory "cash sales" oL cotton under
Code,§ 1955a. Savannah Cotton Pres
v. Macintyre, 92 Ga. 166, 17 S. E. R.
1023.

Contract is valid if recorded before
a<lven;e rights accrue (Holland v. Au-
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in some designated office, it shall not be valid as against sub-

sequent purchasers from the vendee, or often as against his

creditors.

While there is general likeness in form and similarit} 7- of

purpose, these statutes yet vary so greatly that no brief resume

of them can be given in the text. They are so frequently also

• affected by local conditions and coloring that local knowledge

is necessary. The substance of them, however, with a brief ref-

erence to certain of the more important cases which have con-

strued them, will be given in the notes.

ams, 103 Ga. 610, 30 S. E. R. 432), and

actual notice of it, though not re-

corded, makes it operative. Rhode

Island Locomotive Works v. Empire

Lumber Co., 91 Ga. 639, 17 S. E. R.

1012. The contract is good as against

a subsequent unrecorded mortgage
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under Code, § 1957. Cottrell v. Mer-

chants' Bank, 89 Ga. 508, 15 S. E. R.

944.

But if not entitled to record the

actual record of the contract does

not avail (Derrick v. Pierce, 94 Ga.

466, 19 S. E. R. 246), and such a con-

tract not reduced to writing, and not

recorded until after a delivery of the

property and until after rights of

creditors have attached, cannot avail.

Harp v. Guano Co., 99 Ga. 752, 27 S.

E. R 181; Wood v. Evans, 98 Ga. 454,

25 S. E. R. 559.

In Illinois the contract, though

not recorded, is good as against the

buyer's assignee for creditors, as he

takes the property subject to all equi-

ties, etc., which existed against the

goods in the hands of his assignor.

Hooven, etc. Co. v. Burdette, 153 I1L

672, 39 N. E. R. 1107.

In Ioiva such a contract is invalid

as against creditor or purchaser with-

out notice of the vendee in actual

possession, unless it be in writing,

executed by the vendor and acknowl-

edged and recorded same as chattel

mortgages. Wright v. Barnard, 89

Iowa, 166, 56 N. W. R. 424; Wilcox v.

Williamson Co.. 92 Iowa, 215, 60 N.

W. R. 618. Agreement to pay or re-

turn is within this statute. Wright

v. Barnard, supra.

Where the contract is not executed

or recorded until two months after

actual delivery, and is then the act

of seller alone, it is not enough. Pash

v. Weston, 52 Iowa, 675, 3 N. W. R.

713.

Statute does not apply where the

contract is not one of conditional

sale (Budlong v. Cottrell, 64 Iowa,

234, 20 N. W. R. 106 1, neither does it

apply before the goods come into

the actual possession of the vendee.

Warner v. Johnson, 65 Iowa. 126, 21

N. W. R. 483. As to what constitutes

actual possession, see Vorsev. Loomis,

86 Iowa, 522, 53 N. W. R 314.

Contract is operative, though not

§ 60±.J

LAW OF SALE.

[B

K II.

604.]

LAW OF SALE.

[BOOK II.

g 604. . As between the parties themselves, however, the

§ 60!. - - . As between the parties themselves, howev r, the
contract is u ually not affected by the lack of uch recor ling

contract is usually not affected by the lack of such recording

value, it was held that the last pur-

chaser was protected. National Cash

Reg. Co. v. Maloney, 95 Iowa, 573, 64

N. W. R. 618.

It is not necessary that the con-

tract shall be executed by the buyer.

National Cash 'Reg. Co. v. Schwab,

— Iowa, — , 82 N. W. R 1011.

In Kansas such a contract is void

as against purchasers without notice

and creditors, unless in writing and

recorded like chattel mortgages.

Laws 1889. ch. 255, p. 1; Moline Plow

Co. v. Witham, 52 Kan. 185, 34 Pac.
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R.751.

Actual notice is equivalent to rec-

ord. First Nat. Bank v. Tufts, 53

Kan. 710, 37 Pac. R. 127.

Statute does not apply to goods

delivered for sale on commission

merely. Renoe v. "Western Milling

Co., 53 Kan. 255, 36 Pac. R 329.

In Kentucky these contracts are

treated as mortgages and must be

recorded as such. "Welch v. National

Cash Reg. Co. (1898), — Ky. — , 44

S. "W. R 124 -

Iu Maine, " no agreement that per-

sonal property bargained and deliv-

ered to another, for which a note is

given, shall remain the property of

the payee until the note is paid is

valid, unless it is made and signed as

part of the note; and no such agree-

ment, although so made and signed,

in a note for more than thirty dol-

lars is.valid, except as between the

original parties to said agreement,

unless it is recorded like mortgages

of personal property." Rev. Stat. 1883,

cli. 111. g 5; Hill v. Nutter, 82 Me. 199,

19 Atl. R. 170; Holt v. Knowlton, 86

Me. 156, 29 Atl. R 1113; Hopkins v.

Maxwell, 91 Me. 247, 39 AtL R. 573.

Other writing containing a prom-

ise to pay may be a " note " within

the meaning of this statute. Nichols

v. Ruggles, 76 Me. 25; Cunningham

v. Trevitt, 82 Me. 145, 19 Atl. R. 110.

Statute does not apply where there

is no agreement to buy and no note

given. Thomas v. Parsons, 87 Me.

203, 32 Atl. R. 876. See also Morris

v. Lynde, 73 Ma 88.

In Minnesota the contract is void

as against the creditors of the vendee

and subsequent purchasers and mort-

gagees in good faith, unless the con-

tract, or a memorandum thereof, if

it were oral, be filed.

Statute applies to an exchange of

property where one party retains

title to the thing parted with by him

until certain conditions are satisfied.

Kinney v. Cay, 39 Minn. 210, 39 N.

value, it was held that the last purcba er wa protected. National Ca h
Reg. Co. v. :Maloney, 95 Iowa, 573, 64
N. W . R. 61 .
It is not neces ary that the contract shall be executed by the buyer.
National Ca h 'Reg. Co. v. Schwab,
Iowa, - , 9 N. W. R. 1011.
In Kan as uch a contract i void
a again t purchasers without notice
and creditors, unles in writing and
recordecl like chatte l mortgages.
Law 1 9, ch. 255, p. 1 · foline Plow
Co. v. Witham, 52 Kan. 1 5, 31 Pac.
R. 751.
Actual notice is equivalent to record. Fir t Nat. Bank v. Tuft , 53
Kan. 710, 3 P a.c. R. 127.
Statute does not apply to goods
delivered for ale on com mi ion
merely. Renoe v. Western Milling
Co., 53 Kan. 255, 36 Pac. R. 329.
In K entucky these contracts are
treated a mortgage and mu. t be
recorded as such. Welch v. National
Ca. h Reg. Co. (1898), Ky. - , 44
s. w. R. 12±. .
In Maine, " no agreement that peronal property bargained and delivered to another, for which a note is
given, hall remain the property of
the payee until the note is paid is
valid, unless it is made and igned as
part of the note; and no such agreement, although so made and signed,
in a note for more than thirty dollar i valid, except as between the
ri inal partie to said agreement,
unle sit is recorded like mortga 0 es
of per onal property." Rev. Stat. 1 3,
ch. 111. : -; Hill v. Nutter, 9 l\Ie. 199,
H> • tl. R. 110; Holt v. Knowlton, 6
1\1 . 4.56, 29
tl. R 1113; Hopkins v.
Maxwell, 91 Je. 247, 39 AtL R. 573.

Other writing containing a promise to pay may be a " note " within
the meaning of thi tatute. Nichol
v. Ruggle , 76 1\fe. 25; Cunningham
v. Trevitt, 82 le. 14.5, 19 Atl. R. 110.
Statute does not apply where there
is no agreement to buy and no note
given. Tllomas v. Par ·ons, 7 l\Ie.
203, 39 A tl. R. 76. See also ~forri
v. L ynde, 73 Me.
In i\Iiune ota the contract i void
a again t the creditors of the vendee
and ub equent purchasers and mortgagee in good faith, unle s the contract, or a memorandum thereof, if
it were oral, be filed.
Statute applies to an exchange of
property where one pa rty r etains
title to the thing parted with by him
until certain conditions are sati. fied.
Kinney v. Cay, 39 Minn. 210, 39 N.
w. R. 140.
Statute does not apply to a mere
con ignment. Cortland w·agon Co. v.
Sharvy, 52 l\Iinn. 216, 53 N. W.R. 1147.
Contract is not void as to creditor
for delay in filing unles in that interval they have attached the property (Clark v. Richards Lumber Co.,
6 l\Iinn. 2 9 , 71 N. W. R. 3 9); but
creditors who became such while
contract kept off the files are prot ected Id. And an assignee for creditors may enforce their right .
Thomas Hg. Co. v. Drew, 69 1\Iinn.
69, 71 N. W. R. 991.
In Mi i ippi such a contract is
void a to creditors or purcba ers of
one remaining in po session for three
year unle · acknowledged and recorded. Code, . 422 r; Paine '· Hall
Safe Co., 64 Mi . 175; J enning v.
"\ iLon, 71 l\1i . 49, 14 . R. 2.19.
Section 1300 does not apply except
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or filing; 1 and, in general, it is likewise valid, though not re-

corded, as against mere creditors 2 or purchasers having other-

wise actual knowledge of it. 3

where the article is in possession of

a trader with consent of owner.

Adams v. Berg, 67 Miss. 234, 7 S. R.

225.

In Missouri such a contract, un-

less in writing, acknowledged by the

vendee and recorded like a chattel

mortgage, is void against creditors

or subsequent purchasers in good

faith. R S. 1879, § 2505.

This means prior as well as subse-

quent creditors. Collins v. Wilhoit,

35 Mo. App. 585, 108 Mo. 451, 18 S. W.

R 839.
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The statute applies to instalment

contracts (Gentry v. Templeton, 47

Mo. App. 55), and to sale by one part-

ner to another. Redenbaugh v. Kel-

ton, 130 Mo. 558, 32 S. W. R 67.

Bona fide purchasers protected

where contract was not recorded.

Eidson v. Hedger, 38 Mo. App. 52;

Hauck Cloth Co. v. Brothers, 61 Mo.

App. 3S1.

In Nebraska such a contract, un-

less in writing and recorded, is not

valid as against purchasers or judg-

ment creditors of a vendee in posses-

sion without notica Com. Stat., eh.

32, § 26; Osborne Co. v. Piano Mfg.

Co., 51 Neb. 502. 70 X. W. R. 1124: Nor-

ton v. Pilger, 30 Xeb. 860, 47 X. W.

R 471; Peterson v. Tufts, 34 Xeb. 8,

51 N. W. R 297; Regier v. Craver, 54

Xeb. 507, 74 X. W. R 830.

A mortgagee of the conditional

vendee is not a purchaser within

this statute. McCormick Harvesting

Co. v. Callen, 48 Xeb. 849, 67 X. W.

R 863; Campbell Printing Press Co.

v. Dyer, 46 Xeb. 830. 65 X. W. R.904.

In New Hampshire such a con-

tract must be recorded to be valid

against attaching creditors or subse-

quent purchasers without notice.

Laws 18S5, ch. 30; Gerrish v. Clark.

64 X. H. 492. 13 Atl. R 570. See also

Sinclair v. Wheeler, 69 X. H. 538, 45

Atl. R 1085.

Actual notice is enough though

not recorded. Batchelder v. San-

born, 66 X. H. 192. 22 Atl. R. 535.

In New Mexico such contracts are

not within the chattel mortgage re-

cording acts. Maxwell v. Tufts

(X. M.), 45 Pac. R 979.

In New Jersey, unless recorded,

such contracts are void as against

subsequent purchasers and mortga-

gees in good faith. Stats. 1896. p. 891 ;

Knowles Loom Works v. Vacher, 57

X. J. L, 490, 31 Atl. R 306. But,

though not so recorded, the contract

is operative as against creditors.

1 Compare provisions of statutes in

§ 605.J

LAW OF SALE.

[no

K

1r.

605.]

LAW OF SALE.

[BOOK II.

§605. Defar.lt by purchaser — What constitutes.— The

most common purpose which the vendor has in view in retain-

ing title is usually, as has been seen, to secure thereby the pay-

ment of the purchase price. Incident to this, however, or coupled

§ 605. Defad t by purcl1aser - Wh at constitute . .- Th e
most common purpose which the vendor bas in vi w in r etaining title is usually, as has been seen, to secure t h r by the payment of the purchase price. Incident to this, ho wever, or coupled

Wooley v. Wagon Co., 59 N. J. L. 278,

35 Atl. R. 789.

In New York such contracts are

void as to subsequent purchasers and

mortgagees in good faith unless filed.

Laws 1884, ch. 315.

Creditors are not protected by this

statute (Frank v. Batten, 49 Hun,

91); nor is a mortgagee for an ante-

cedent debt (Duffus v. Furnace Co.,

15 Misc. 169); nor a pledgee. Kauff-

man v. Klang. 16 Misc. 379.
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In North Carolina the contract

must be in writing and recorded like

a chattel mortgage.

As between the parties the con-

tract is not affected by the statute.

Kornegay v. Kornegay, 109 N. C. 188,

13 S. E. R. 770. See also Henkel v.

Greene, 125 N. C. 489, 34 S. E. R. 554.

The statute does not operate re-

trospectively. Harrell v. Godwin,

102 N. C. 330, 8 S. E. R. 925; Perry v.

Young, 105 N. C. 463, 11 S. E. R. 511.

Contract once properly recorded

need not be rerecorded upon re-

moval of property to another county.

Barrington v. Skinner, 117 N. C. 47,

23 S. E. R. 90.

In Ohio the condition is void as to

subsequent purchasers, mortgagees

in good faith and creditors, unless it

is in writing, and verified and filed

as chattel mortgages are required to

be. Act of May 4, 1885, 82 Ohio L.

238. The statute is constitutional.

Weil v. State, 46 Ohio St. 450. For

construction, see Speyer v. Baker, 59

Ohio St. 11, 51 N. E. R. 442; Metro-

politan Trust Co. v. Columbus, S. R.

Co., 93 Fed. R. 702,

In South Carolina such contracts

are void as to subsequent creditors

or purchasers for valuable considera-

tion without notice unless recorded.

Herring v. Cannon, 21 S. C. 212, 53

Am. R. 661; Southern Music House

v. Dusenbury, 27 S. C. 464, 4 S. E.

R. 60.

In Texas such contracts are void

as to creditors and bona fide pur-

chasers unless registered like chattel

mortgages. Creditor here means a

lien creditor. Pari in v. Harrell, 8

Tex. Civ. App. 368, 27 S. W. R. 1084.

Valid as against assignee for cred-

itors. Mansur, etc. Co. v. Beeman,

etc. Co., — Tex. Civ. App. , 45 S.W.

R. 729. See also Bowen v. Lansing

Wagon Works, 91 Tex. 385, 43 S. W.

R. 872; Hall, etc. Co. v. Brown, 82

Tex. 469. 17 S. W. R. 715; San An-

tonio Brewing Ass'n v. Arctic Mfg.

Wooley v. Wagon Co., 59 N. J. L. 27 ,
In So uth Carolina u ch contract
35 Atl. R. 789.
are void as to sub:eque nt cr editor.
In New York such contracts are or purcha.·ers for valuable con, ideravoid as to subsequent purchasers and tion without notice un less recor ded.
mortgagees in good faith unless filed. Herring v. Cannon, 21 S. C. 212, 53
Laws 1884, ch. 315.
Am. R. 661; Southern Music Hou e
Creditors are not protected by this v. Dusenbury, 27 S. C. 464, 4 S. E.
statute (Frank v. Batten, 49 Hun, R. 60.
91); nor is a mortgagee for an anteIn Texas uch contract s a re void
cedent debt (Duffus v. Furnace Co., a to creditor and bona fide pur15 l\fisc. 169); nor a ple<lgee. Kauff- chasers unless registered like cha ttel
man v. Klang. 16 Misc. 379.
mortgages. Creditor here m eans a
In North CaroI;na the contract lien creditor. Parlin v. H a rrell, 8
must be in writing and recorded like Tex. Civ. App. 36 , 27 S. W . R. 10 4.
a chattel mortgage.
Valid as against as ignee for cr edAs between the parties the con- itors. Mansur, etc. Co. v. Be man,
tract is not affected by the statute. etc. Co., - Tex. Civ. App. -, 45 S.W .
Kornegay v. Kornegay, 109 N. C. 188, R. 729. See also Bowen v. Lansing
13 S. E. R. 770. See also Henkel v. Wagon Works, 91 Tex. 3 5, 43 S. W .
Greene, 125 N. C. 489, 34 S. E. R. 534. R. 872; Hall, etc. Co. v. Brown, 82
The statute does not operate re- Tex. 469, 17 S. Vl. R. 715; San Antro pectively. Harrell v. Godwin, tonio Brewing Ass'n v. Arctic Mfg.
102 N. C. 330, 8 S. E. R. 925; Perry v. Co., 81 Tex. 99, 16 S. W . R. 797; Hoy t
Young, 10.5 N. C. 463, 11 S. .E. R. 511. v. Weiss, 10 Tex. Civ. App. 462, 32 S.
Contract once properly recorded W . R. 86.
need not be rerecorded upon reIn Vermont contract mu t be removal of property to another county. corded wit hi n thirty days to be vali d
Barrington v. Skinner, 117 N. C. 47, against attaching cred ito rs or sub e28 S. E. R. 90.
q nent pu rc hase rs w ithout n otice.
In Ohio the condition is void as to Rev. L. 1880, § 1992 ; Desany v. Thorp,
ubsequent purcha ers, mortgagees 70 Vt. 31, 39 Atl. R. 309; Whitcom b
in good faith and creditors, unless jt v. Wood wor t h, 54 Vt. 544; Church v.
is in writing, and verified and filed McLeod, 58 V t. 541.
as chattel mortgages are required to
Attaching cr ed itors, to be probe. Act of May 4, 1885, 82 Ohio L. tected, m ust likewise be without no2:~ . The tatute is constitutional. tice. McPhail v. Gerry, 55 Vt. 174;
Weil v. tate, 46 Ohio St. 450. For Singer Mfg. Co. v. Nash, 70 Vt. 434,
construction, ·ee Speyer v. Baker, 59 41 Atl. R. 429.
Ohio St. 11, 51 N. E. R. 442; MetroLien m ust be foreclosed by public
politan Tru t Co. v. Columbus, S. R. sale by a public officer, and ven<lee
Co., 93 Fed. . 702,
has the ri g ht to redeem within a
4!)8
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with it, may be provisions that the property shall not be re-

moved from a specified place, 1 or shall be used only for a cer-

tain purpose, 2 or shall be kept insured, or be kept up to a certain

value, as in the case of a stock of goods, 3 or be preserved in

good order, and the like.

In the formal contracts now so common, these matters will

be found specifically provided for, with penalties attached for

their breach, the usual penalty being the resumption of posses-

sion by the seller, and perhaps the total termination of the con-

tract.

The default, however, which is most frequently presented is

time prescribed. Act 1884, No. 93;

Roberts v. Hunt, 61 Vt. 612, 17 Atl.

E. 1006.

In Virginia contract must be re-

corded or it will be void as to cred-

itors and bona fide purchasers. Code,

§ 2462; Hash v. Lore, 88 Va. 716, 14
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S. E. R. 365; Callahan v. Young, 90

Va. 574, 19 S. E. R. 163; Arbuckle v.

Gates, 95 Va. 802, 30 S. E. R. 496.

In Washington the sale is absolute

as to all creditors or purchasers in

good faith unless filed within ten

days. Bal. Code, § 4585. As to what

is a conditional sale hereunder, see

Eisenberg v. Nichols, 22 Wash. 70,

60 Pac. R. 124.

Purchaser in consideration of a

pre-existing debt is protected by this

statute. Johnston v. Wood, 19 Wash.

•441, 53 Pac. R. 707.

In West Virginia, unless recorded,

the contract is void as to creditors

and purchasers without notice. Bald-

win v. Van Wagner, 33 W. Va. 293,

10 S. E. R 716.

In Wisconsin contract must be

subscribed by both parties, and filed

in office of town clerk, in order to be

valid against others than the parties

and those having notice. Rawson

Mfg. Co. v. Richards, 69 Wis. 643, 35

N. W. R. 40; Kellogg v. Costello, 93

Wis. 232, 67 N. W. R. 24.

As to signing by both parties, see

Kimball Co. v. Mellon, 80 Wis. 133,

48 N. W. R. 1100; Sheldon Co. v.

Mayers, 81 Wis. 627, 51 N. W. R. 1082;

Kellogg v. Costello, supra.

Assignee for creditors has the

rights of such creditors. Sheldon

Co. v. Mayers, supra. Notice by re-

citals in other instruments through

which the party claims is sufficient.

Perkins v. Best, 94 Wis. 168, 68 N. W.

R. 762.

Contract for sale of standing tim-

ber is not within this statute. Bent

v. Hoxie, 90 Wis. 625, 64 N. W. R. 426;

Lillie v. Dunbar, 62 Wis. 198.

Statute requiring notice has no ap-

plication where the vendee surrepti-

tiously obtains possession before the

contract is completed. Owen v. Long,

97 Wis. 78, 72 N. W. R 364.

Statute does not protect a mere tres-

passer. Kimball v. Post, 44 Wis. 471.

i Johnston v. Whittemore, 27 Mich.

§ 606.J

LAW OF SALE.

[ Il

K II.

§ 606.]

LAW OF SALE. [BOOK II.

that of the failure of the vendee to pay for the goods at the

time specified, or, if no time was agreed upon, then within a

reasonable time; 1 and, whatever the condition, there will be a

default whenever the buyer, without the consent of the seller,

has failed or omitted to pay the price or do the other act at

the time or in the manner agreed upon. 2

§606. Effect of vendee's default.— It is customary and

competent for the parties to stipulate, with more or less of par-

ticularity, what shall be the effect of the default by the vendee,

that of the failure of the v ndee to pay for the goods at the
time specified, or, if no time was agreed upon, th n within a
reasonable time; 1 and, whatever the condition, there will be a
default whenever the buyer, without the con ent of the seller,
has failed or omitted to pay the price or do the other act at
the time or in the manner agreed upon. 2

and what shall be the respective rights and duties of the par-

ties thereafter. The mere omission, however, of the vendee

§ 606. Eft'ect of vendee's default.- It is cu tomary and

to pay the price, or perform the other acts agreed upon, at

maturity, while it may terminate his right to possession 3 does

not, unless by force of an express provision, ipso facto operate

as an absolute forfeiture of all his rights, in the absence of a

demand for such payment or performance, or a request for the

restoration of the goods, on the part of the vendor; 4 and upon
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such a demand, even after maturity, the vendee may, it is held,

still pay the amount or perform the other stipulated acts and

save the goods. 9

i Mathews v. McElroy, 79 Mo. 202; this reason or ask instructions, or no-

Wiggins v. Snow, $9 Mich. 476, 50 N. tify it of his readiness to deliver.

W. R. 991 ; Ryan v. Wayson, 108 Mich. Held, that Kelly was in default.

-519, 66 N. W. R. 370. 3 As to necessity of demand hefore

2 In Cincinnati Safe Co. v. Kelly, 54 retaking the goods, see post, § 628.

Ark. 476, 16 S. W. R. 263, plaintiff sold 4 Sunny South Lumber Co. v. Nei-

Kelly a new safe for a sum of money meyer Lumber Co., 63 Ark. 268,38

and his old safe, which Kelly was to S. W. R. 902; Ames Iron Works v.

deliver at the depot. Kelly paid the Rea, 56 Ark. 450, 19 S. W. R. 1063;

money, but, though " urged " to do so, Nattin v. Riley, 54 Ark. 30, 14 S. W.

did not deliver the old safe at the R. 1100; Deyoe v. Jamison, 33 Mich.

depot, though it appeared afterward 94; Taylor v. Finley, 48 Vt. 78;

competent for the parties to stipulate, with more or 1 ss of particularity, what shall be the effect of th default by the vendee,
and what shall be the respective rights and duties of the parties thereafter. The mere omis ion, however, of the vendee
to pay the price, or perform the other acts agr ed upon, at
maturity, while it may terminate his right to po e ion 3 do s
not, unless by force of an expr ss provi ion, ipso facto operate
as an absolute forfeiture of all his rights, in the absence of a
demand for such payment or performance, or a request for the
restoration of the goods, on the part of the vendor; 4 and upon
such a demand, even after maturity, the venclee may, it is held,
still pay the amount or perform the other stipulated acts and
save the goods.5

that he had requested permission of Hutchings v. Munger, 41 N. Y. 155.

the station agent to place the safe 5 Taylor v. Finley, Hutchins v.

on the depot platform, which was re- Munger, Nattin v. Riley, and other

fused unless it was placed there for cases in preceding note; O'Rourke

shipment. Kelly could give no ship- v. Hadcock, 114 N. Y. 541, 22 N. E. R.

ping instructions and therefore did 33; Vaughn v. McFadyen, 110 Mich,

not deliver the safe at the depot. He 234, 68 N. W. R. 135.

did not, however, notify plaintiff of If money is not paid at the time
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I Mathews v. McElroy 79 Mo. 202; this reason or a k instructions, or noWiggins v. Snow, ~9 Mich. 476, 50 N. tify it of his readiness to deliver.
W.R. 991; Ryan v. Wayson, 108 Mich. Held, that Kelly was in default.
·519, 66 N. W . R. 370.
3 As to necessity of demand before
2 In Cincinnati Safe Co. v. Kelly, 54 retaking the goods, see post, § 62 .
Ark. 476, 16 S. W. R. 263, plaintiff sold
4 Sunny South Lumber Co. v. NeiKelly a new ::;afe for a sum of money meyer Lumber Co., 63 Ark. 26 , 38
and his old safe, which Kelly was to S. W. R. 902; Ames Iron ·works v.
deliver at the depot. Kelly paid the Rea, 56 Ar k. 450, 19 S. W. R. 1063;
money, but, though" urged" to do so, Nattin v. Riley, 54 Ark. 30, 14 S. W.
did not deliver the old safe at the R. 1100; Deyoe v. J a mi on, 33 l'.Iich.
depot, though it appeared afterward 94; Taylor v. Finley, 48 Vt. 7 ;
that he had requested permission of Hutchings v. Munger, 41 N. Y. 155.
the station agent to place the safe
5 Taylor v. Finley, Hutchins v.
on the depot platform, which was re- Munger, Nattin v. Riley, and other
fu ed unles_ it was placed there for cases in preceding note; O'Rourke
shipment. Kelly could give no ship- v. Hadcock, 114 N. Y. 541, 22 N. E. R.
ping instructions and therefore did 33; Vaughn v. McFadyen, 110 Mich.
not deliver the safe at the depot. He 234, 68 N. W.R. 185.
diu not, however, notify plaintiff of
If money is not paid at the time
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§ 607. . The default of the vendee does, nevertheless,

work a radical change in the relations of the parties. It puts

the vendee in the position of one who, at least, has failed to

improve an opportunity,— as where he was not absolutely

bound to buy, — or who has violated his undertaking — as in

the ordinary case where he has absolutely agreed to buy and

pay for the chattel; and it gives to the vendor, unless he

waives it, the right to avail himself of the remedies which the

contract or the rules of law prescribe or offer.

§ 608. . Moreover, after the seller has exercised his right

to terminate the buyer's interest, no new transfers of the buy-

er's former title can be made in such wise as to force new par-

ties or new obligations upon the seller. 1

§ 609. Waiver of default by seller. — The law has no inter-

ests of its own to subserve in insisting upon forfeitures or the

other results of default. The remedies it gives are for the

benefit of the vendor, and he may waive them if he will. He

may do this, moreover, either expressly or by implication, and
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as the results of default more often work hardship to the buyer

than to the seller, the law looks with complacence at least

upon those acts of the vendor which may fairly be construed

as indicative of his intention not to insist upon a forfeiture of

the buyer's rights. If, therefore, the seller, notwithstanding

the default, does not avail himself of his appropriate remedy,

but so acts as to reasonably warrant the inference that he re-

gards the buyer's rights as still subsisting, he will be deemed to

have waived the default, and he will not be at liberty to de-

clare a forfeiture until he has in some way put the buyer,

whom he has thus misled, in the attitude of a fresh default.

§ 610. . Thus, if, after default, the seller permits the

buyer to retain possession of the goods and accepts part pay-

specified, and the seller resumes pos- not kept good. Summerson v. Hicks,

session, the buyer cannot maintain 134 Pa. St. 566, 19 Atl. R. 808.

replevin by virtue of a subsequent l Lippincott v. Rich, 19 Utah, 140,

tender of the price, if the tender is 56 Pac. R. 806.
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LAW OF SALE.

[nooK n.

§§ 611-61 3.] LAW OF SALE. [BOOK II.

inents on the price; 1 or if, where the price is payable in instal-

ments, the vendor permits the vendee to continue in possession

and extends the time of payment of an instalment due; 2 or

permits the vendee to make payments and retain possession

after the whole amount is due, 3 — his conduct will be deemed

to be a waiver of the default in question, and he can only in-

sist upon a default and regain possession by making a fresh

demand of payment or performance which is not complied

with. 4

§611. . It is not, however, to be understood that the

seller is, at his peril, bound to act instantly, or to proceed with

all possible dispatch or harshness: the question is whether his

conduct can reasonably be viewed as indicating that he does

not expect to insist upon a forfeiture, and thereby leading the

vendee into a position of false security. 5

men ts on the peice; 1 or if, where the price is payable in in talments, the vendor permits the vendee to continue in posse sion
and extends the time of payment of an instalment due; 2 or
permits the ven<lee to make payments and retain pos
ion
3
after the whole amount is due, - his con luct will be deemed
to be a waiver of the default in question, and he can only insist upon a default and regain possession by making a fresh
demand of payment or performance which is not complied
with. 4

§ 612. . Whether the vendor has so conducted himself

as to establish a waiver is ordinarily a question of fact for the

§ 611. - - . It is not, however, to be understoo l that the

jury, in view of all the circumstances of the case. 6
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§613. Remedies of seller upon default.— The common

and characteristic remedy of the seller, upon default, is to de-

clare the buyer's rights under the contract forfeited and re-

cover his goods. There may, however, be cases in which the

right to the possession of the property is so far at the will of

the conditional vendor, or is so far dependent upon other con-

ditions than that of payment, that the vendor may resume

seller is, at his peril, bound to act instantly, or to proceed with
all possible dispatch or harshness: the que tion is whether his
conduct can reasonably be viewed as indicating that he does
not expect to in ist upon a forfeiture, and thereby leading the
venclee into a position of false security. 5

i Hutchings v. Hunger, 41 N. Y. 155. Quinn v. Parke & Lacy Mach. Co., 5

2 Cole v. Hines, 81 Md. 476, 32 Atl. Wash. 276. 31 Pac. R. 866.

R. 196, 32 L. R. A. 455. 5 Delay of vendor is construed with

3 0'Rourke v. Haclcock, 114 N. Y. much strictness in Delaware. Math-

541, 22 N. E. R. 33; Mosby v. Goff, 21 ews v. Smith, 8 Houst, 22, 31 Atl. R.

R 1. 494, 44 Atl. R. 930 ; People's Furn. 879.

§ 612. - - . Whether the vendor has so conducted himself
as to establish a waiver is ordinarily a que tion of fact for the
jury, in view of all the circumstances of the case. 6

& Carp. Co. v. Crosby, 57 Neb. 282, 6 Goslen v. Campbell, 88 Me. 450,

77 N. W. R. 658, 73 Am. St. R. 504; 34 Atl. R. 265; Quimby v. Lowell, 89

Taylor v. Finley, 48 Vt. 78; Fairbank Me. 547, 36 Atl. R. 902; Wing v.

v. Phelps, 22 Pick. (Mass.) 535. Thompson, 78 Wis. 256, 47 N. W. R.

4 Hutchings v. Munger, Cole v. 606; Warnken v. Langdon Co., 8 N.

Hines, O'Rourke v. Hadcock, supra; Dak. 243, 77 N. W. R. 1000.
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§ 613. Remedies of seller upon default.-. The common
and characteristic remedy of the seller, upon default, is to declare the buyer's rights under the contract forfeited and recover his goods. There may, however, be cases in which the
right to the possession of the property is so far at the 'vVill of
the conditional vendor, or is so far dependent upon other conditions than that of payment, that the vendor may resume
1 Hutching

v. Munger, 41 N. Y. 155. Quinn v. Parke & Lacy Mach. Co., 5
1 Md. 476, 32 Atl. Wash. 276. 31 Pac. R. 866.
R. 196 32 L. R. A. 455.
5 Delay of vendor is construed with
3 O'Rourke v. Hadcock, 114 N. Y.
much strictnes in Delaware. Math541, 22 N. E. R. 33; l\Io ·by v. Goff, ,21 ews v. Smith, 8 Houst. 22, 31 Atl. R.
R. I. 49±, 44 Atl. R. 930; People's Furn. 879.
& Carp. Co. v. Cro by, 57 eb. 2 2,
6 Go len v. Campbell,
8 Me. 450,
77 N. \V. R. 65 , 73 Am. St. R. 50-1; 34 Atl. R. 265; Quimby v. Lowell, 89
Taylor v. Finley, 4 Vt. 78; Fairbank Me. 547, 36 At!. R. 902; Wing v.
Thompson, 7 Wis. 25(), 47 N. ·v1. R.
v. Ph Ip. , 22 Pick. (Mass.) 5~5.
4 Hutchings v. Munger, Cole v. 606; ·warn ken v. Langdon Co., 8 N.
Hine , O'Rourke v. Hadcock, su1 ra; Dak. 243, 77 N. vV. R. 1000.
50'J
2 Cole

•

v. Hines,

CH. III.] CONDITIONAL SALE OF SPECIFIC CHATTELS. [§§ 614, 615.

possession even before default in payment. There are also

cases, as will be seen, in which the vendor may, by virtue of

the peculiar provisions of the contract, resume possession of

the goods and at the same time leave the general obligations

of the contract unimpaired. When, however, by the express

or implied conditions of the contract, the vendee is entitled to

possession until default, his possession cannot, of course, be

disturbed until he has made default, 1 though upon such default,

unless waived, the seller may resume possession. 2

§ 614. . Eecovery of possession, however, is not neces-

sarily the only remedy of the seller. It may be his only rem-

edy, as where, in the not uncommon case, the other party has

not agreed to buy, but has merely the option to do so; 3 but in

the ordinary case the buyer does agree to buy and pay for the

chattel, in terms which are more or less absolute and uncondi-

tional; and where he has done so, the seller may have personal

remedies in lieu of, or in addition to, his remedy against the

goods.
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§ 615. What choice of remedies is offered. — Where, there-

fore, the vendee is, expressly or impliedly, entitled to the pos-

session until default, the vendor, who would take advantage of

a default, may often have a choice of remedies. Under vary-

ing circumstances, the following list is open to him:

1. He may treat the contract as rescinded, upon the default

iNewhall v. Kingsbury, 131 Mass. agree to buy or pay. If he did pay,

445; Hurd v. Fleming, 34 Vt. 169; he obtained the goods; if he did not

Lambert v. McCloud, 63 Cal. 162. pay, the vendor might recover them,

2 Harmon v. Goetter, 87 Ala. 325, 6 and this was held to be the extent of

S. R. 93; Richardson Drug Co. v. his loss or liability. So in Rodgers

Teasdall, 52 Neb. 698, 72 N. W. R. v. Bachman, 109 Cal. 552, 42 Pac. R

1028; Wiggins v. Snow, 89 Mich. 476, 448.

50 N. W. R. 991; Ryan v. Wayson, When the contract is in form a

108 Mich. 519, 66 N. W. R. 370. lease, and the lessee gives his notes

3 Thus, in Loomis v. Bragg, 50 for instalments of rent to fall due,

Conn. 228, 47 Am. R. 638; Hine v. the lessor who reclaims the goods

Roberts, 48 Conn. 267, 40 Am. R. 170 cannot recover on the notes falling

(as see Beach's Appeal, 58 Conn. 464, due thereafter. Campbell Print.

20 Atl. R. 475), the vendee did not Press Co. v. Henkle, 19 D. C. 95.
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§§ 616- 618.J

J.AW OF SALE.

[ BOOK IT.

§§ 616-618.] LAW OF SALE. [BOOK IT.

of the buyer, and recover his goods. If he does this, he has no

other remedy.

2. He may treat the contract as in force but broken by the

vendee ; he may retake and keep the goods as his own, and, if the

contract imposed upon the buyer an absolute obligation to buy,

he may recover of the buyer damages for the breach of his agree-

ment to buy and pay for the goods. The measure of damages

will ordinarily be the difference between the contract price and

the market value of the goods at the time and place of default.

3. He may, if the contract contains an unconditional agree-

ment on the part of the vendee to pay, waive a return of the

goods, treat the contract as executed on his own part, and re-

cover from the vendee the agreed price of the goods.

4. He may, in some cases, if the contract permits it, without

rescinding or terminating the contract, resume possession of

the goods, hold them subject to the contract, and then enforce

performance by the vendee, who, upon such performance, will

be entitled to restoration of the goods.
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§ 616. Election of remedy. — The remedies of the vendor

are usually regarded as alternative and not cumulative. He

has his choice, but, having elected to pursue one remedy, he

cannot, it is said, afterwards abandon that and try another.

§617. Rescission. — With respect of the first remedy

suggested, — that of rescission, — it is clear that such a course

defeats all further remedies under the contract. The vendor

is not required, unless by reason of some express term of the

contract, to go so far as to rescind the contract; he may ordi-

narily deem it simply broken by the vendee, 1 and may sue for

damages for its breach. If, however, he does treat it as re-

of the buyer, and recover his goods. If he does this, he has no
other remedy.
2. He may treat the contract as in force but broken by the
vendee; he may retake and keep the g oods as his own, and, if the
contract imposed upon the buyer an absolute obligation to buy,
he may recover of the buyer damages for the breach of bis ag reement to buy and pay for the goods. The measure of damages
will ordinarily be the difference bet ween the contract price and
the market value of the goods a t the t ime and place of default.
3. He may, if the contract contains an unconditional agreement on the part of the ventlee to pay, waive a r eturn of the
goods, treat the contract as executed on his own part, and recover from the vendee the agreed price of the goods.
4. He may, in some cases, if th e contract permits it, without
rescinding or terminating the contract, resume possession of
the goods, hold them subject to the contract, and th en enforce
performance by the vendee, who, upon such performance, win
be entitled to restoration of the g oods.

scinded, he.is neither entitled to the price nor to damages; for

the right to either flows from the contract, and the rescission

wipes out the contract from the beginning.

§ 618. Recaption. — If the vendor has not rescinded, he

has usually his choice of the second or the third remedies open

i See Hayes v. Nashville (1897), 47 U. S. App. 713, 26 C. C. A. 59, 80 Fed. R. 641.
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§ 616. Election of remedy .-The r emedies of the vendor
are usually regarded as alternative and not cumulative. He
bas bis choice, but, having elected to pursue one r~ medy, be
cannot, it is said, after wards abandon that and try another.

§ 617. - - Rescission.-With respect of the first remedy
suggested,- that of rescission,- it is clear that such a course
defeats all further remedies under th e con tract. The vendor
is not required, unl ess by rea on of some express term of the
con tract, to go so far as to rescind the con tract; he may ordinarily deem it simply broken by th e vendee,1 and may s~e for
damages for its breach. If, however, he does treat it as rescinded, he.is neither entitled to t he pri ce nor to damages; for
the right to either flows from t he contract, and the rescissio n
wipes out the contract from the beginning.

§ 618. - - Recaption.- If the vendor has not rescinded, be
has usually his choice of the second or the third remedies open
1 See

Hayes v. Nashville (1897), 47 U. S. A pp. 713, 26 C. C. A. 59, SO Fed. R. 641.
504

Cff. III.] CONDITIONAL SALE OF SPECIFIC CHATTELS. [§ 619.

to him. He may treat the contract as broken by the vendee

and may recover his property. If he does regain his property

and keeps it as his own, he has lost simply the benefit of the

bargain, — the profit he would have made, — and the dimin-

ished value of the goods from use or deterioration. This loss

he may recover in an action, not for the price, but for damages

for the breach of the contract.

§ 619. Personal action. — If the vendor prefers neither

to rescind nor to retake the property, but to rely on the personal

responsibility of the vendee, he may do that, and may bring

an action to recover the price as such, whenever there was an

express or implied agreement by the vendee to buy and pay

for the goods. 1 But the price is not ordinarily payable unless

the title has passed; hence if the vendor chooses this remedy

he clearly indicates his election to treat the sale as perfected,

and thereby bars either a subsequent rescission of the contract

or a reclamation of the property — unless the contract expressly

permits him this double remedy, — even though he may not suc-
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ceed in his endeavor to collect the price. 2 Having thus elected

1 Bailey v. Hervey, 135 Mass. 172; Hervey, 135 Mass. 172, it appeared

McRea v. Merrifield, 48 Ark. 160, 2 that plaintiff Bailey entered into a

S. W. R. 780; Beach's Appeal, 58 Conn, contract with defendants Hervey &

464, 20 Atl. R. 475; Crompton v. Beach, Co., which recited that plaintiff had

62 Conn. 25, 25 Atl. R. 446, 18 L. R. A. " hired and received " from them

187; Seanor v. McLaughlin, 165 Pa. St. certain goods for which he agreed to

150, 30 Atl. R. 717; Holt Mfg. Co. v. pay them certain sums of money as

Ewing, 109 Cal. 353, 42 Pac. R. 435; "rent" at stated times, and -the

Richards v. The Schreiher Co., 98 balance " at a certain rate per month

Iowa, 422, 67 N. W. R. 569; Johnson- "until paid;" that no title to the

Brinkman Co. v. Railway Co., 126 goods should vest in him until he

Mo. 344, 28 S. W. R. 870, 47 Am. St. R. had performed all the conditions of

675. the agreement, upon performance of

A formal act of delivery or tender which the title should vest. Bailey

of the goods, or specific waiver of further agreed in said contract "that

the right to reclaim them, is not a if any default be made in the pay-

condition precedent to an action for ment of the rent or any part thereof

the price. Smith v. Barber, 153 Ind. as above specified, or if any default

322, 53 N. E. R. 1014 be made in the performance of any

2 See post, as to waiver of right to of the agreements herein contained,

retake property, § 624. In Bailey v. my right to hold or retain said prop-
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to affirm the sale and pass the title, the vendor loses all claim

upon the goods, unless the contract specially provides other-

wise, and no lien will be afterwards implied to secure the pay-

ment of the price.

to affirm the ale ancl pass the titl , th ven lor 1 s s all claim
upon the good , unles the contract specially proYicl s th rwise, an<l no lien will be afterwards imr lie to secur the ayment of the pri · .

erty or any part hereof shall wholly

and determine " (62 Conn. 39).

Bailey being subsequently in default,

the sellers sued him for the price,

and then reclaimed the goods, under

the circumstances stated in the opin-

ion. Bailey then brought this ac-

tion for the conversion of the goods.

The court said: "By the terms of

the written agreement the plaintiff

was bound at all events to pay to

the defendants the full amount at
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which the goods were valued, and

upon such payment the title was to

vest in him. This payment, there-

fore, constitutes the agreed price of

the goods, and it is a misnomer to

call it rent. The defendants would

have no right to exact payment in

full of the money and also to re-

claim the goods. When the plaint-

iff discontinued his payments on

account, what was the legal position

of the defendants? If it be assumed

that they might, at their option,

either reclaim the goods as their

own property, without any obliga-

tion to account for their proceeds or

value to the plaintiff, or that they

might collect the price in full, it is

plain that they were not entitled to

do both. They could not treat the

transaction as a valid sale and an in-

valid one at the same time. If they

reclaimed their property it must be

on the ground that they elected to

treat the transaction as no sale. If

they brought an action for the price

they would thereby affirm it as a sale.

Two inconsistent courses being open

to them they must elect which they

would pursue; and, electing one, they

are debarred from the other. Re-

claiming the goods would show an

election to forego the right to re-

cover the price. But, instead of re-

claiming the goods in the first

instance, they brought an action

against Bailey for the price, made an

attachment of his property by trustee

process, entered their action in court,

and he was defaulted. They were

thereupon entitled to judgment

erty or any part hereof shall wholly
cea e ancl Jetermine " (62 Conn. 29).
Bailey being subse11uently in default,
the sellers sued him for the price,
and then reclaimed the goods, under
the circumstances , tated in the opinion. Bailey then brought this action for the conver ion of the goo<ls.
The court said: "By th term · of
the written agreem nt the plaintiff
was bound at all events to pay to
the def ndants the full amount at
which the goods were valued, and
upon such payment the title was to
vest in him. This paym nt, th r for , constitutes the agre d pric of
the goods, and it is a misnomer to
call it rent. The cl fendanti:; would
have no right to exact payment in
full of the money and also to reclaim the g ods. When the plaintiff dis ontinued his payments on
arcount, what was the l gal position
of the defendants? If it be a sumed
that they might, at th ir O}Jtion,
either r claim the goods as th ir
own property, without any obligation to ac ount for their proceeds or
value to the plaintiff, or that they
might collect the price in full, it is
plain that they were not entitled to
do hoth. They could not treat the
tram;action as a valid sale and an invalid one at the same time. If they
reclaimed their property it mu t be
on the ground that they elected to
treat the tran action as no sale. If
they brought an action for the price
th y would thereby affirm it as a sale.
Two inconsi tent cour es being open
to them they must elect which they

would pm» ue; and, electing one, th y
ar d barr d from the other. Reclai 1 ing the goods would ho w a n
el tion to f rego t he right to r •
ov r the pri . B ut, in t ad of r !aiming th
good. in the fi r. t
in tan e, th y brought an a ti n
again t Bailey for t h pric , mad an
atta hment f bi. property by t ru tee
pr . s, n t red their acti n in cour ,
an<l he wa cl fault d. They w re
ther upon
nt1tl d to juclgm nt
again t him.
nd r this state f
thing , th action was continu J t
a later term f court, and after t he
lapse of s v r 1 m nths, and aft r
the comm n m nt of the
nd
sub equent term of court, the def nclant , without di ontinuing their a ·tion, or giving any notice to Bailey
of an int ntion to abandon that r medy, to k po :e · ion of the go els ·
and, after thi had been don , th y
pro eeded in thei r action to j udgment, and t ok out execution, npon
which they coll ·t d a small snm
from the tru t e. Tb y had thus
made a d ci i ve el ction to tr at the
ing the good ; a nd, under such a n
el ction, the t itle pa ed to Bailey.
Butler v. Hildreth, 5 Met. 49; Arnold
v. Ric hmond Iron Works, 1 Gray,
434, 440; Heryford v. Davis, 102 U. S.
23.3, 246. For the e reasons a majority of t.he court is of opinion that
there m ust be judgment for the
plaintiff."
In Crompton v. Beach, 62 Conn. 25,
25 Atl. R. 446, 36 Am. St. R. 323, 18
L. R. A. 187, property was delivered

against him. Under this state of

things, the action was continued to

a later term of court, and after the

lapse of several months, and after

the commencement of the second

subsequent term of court, the defend-

ants, without discontinuing their ac-

tion, or giving any notice to Bailey

of an intention to abandon that rem-

edy, took possession of the goods;
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§ 620. Does recovery of goods bar action for the price? —

But, while it is thus generally true that an attempt to collect

the price, as such, is deemed to be such an election of remedies

as will bar a subsequent recaption of the goods, is the converse

of the proposition true, and will a recaption of the goods bar a

which was to become the property of

the vendee upon the payment of a

certain price for which he gave his

note. It was also agreed that upon

default the vendor should " have the

right at any time to resume posses-

sion of the machinery, and to enter

the premises and remove the same

as his own property; and if any por-

tion of said note, or renewals thereof,

shall remain unpaid when possession

shall be so taken, . . . then

the amount which may have been
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paid shall be for the use of said ma-

chinery while in possession of the

party of the second part, and said

note shall then be canceled and ijircn

up:' [Italics mine: F. R. M.] The

buyer became insolvent and the

seller first sued on the note and at-

tached property, and afterwards

made claim on the note against his

estate and procured a dividend of

twenty-five per cent. (See Beach's

Appeal, 58 Conn. 464, 20 Atl. R. 47.1)

The seller then sought to recover the

property, but it was held that she

had made an election of remedies by

her efforts to recover the price and

could therefore not recover the prop-

erty.

In Holt Mfg. Co. v. Ewing, 109 Cal.

353, 42 Pac. R. 435. there was a con-

tract for the sale of harvesting ma-

chinery for which the vendee gave

his notes, and also agreed that if he

made default the vendor might, at

his option, without notice and with

or without legal proceedings, take

and retain the property, and all

moneys paid by the vendee prior to

such default should be compensation

for the use of the machinery up to

that time. The buyer died, in de-

fault, and the notes, without refer-

ence to the contract, were presented

and allowed as claims against his

estate. The seller afterwards sought

to recover the machinery. It was

held that the presentation and allow-

ance of the claim was an elect In

pursue the personal remedy, and that

the property could not !»■ recovered.

To like elfecl : Richards v. S ■hreiber,

98 towa, L22.67N.W. R. 569; Smith v.

Ghlmore, 7 D. C. A pp. L92.

Prosecuting a claim for the price

to final judgment is an election.

Smith v. Barber, L53 1ml. 332, 58 N.

E. R. 1014.

An attempt, though unsuccessful,

to establish a material-man's lien for

the property is a waiver of the right

to retake it. Hickman v. Richburg

§ 620.J

L.A.W OF SA.LE.

[BOOK JI.

620.]

LAW OF SALE.

[book IT.

subsequent action for the price? The cases generally answer

this question in the affirmative, though they often proceed upon

different reasons and are not all capable of being reconciled. It

is said in some of them that this is simply another case of elec-

tion of remedies; that the vendor may either retake his goods

or proceed for the price, and, if he does one of these things, he

cannot afterwards do the other. 1 In other of the cases it is

said that when the seller reclaims the property he destroys the

consideration for which the promise to pay was given, and that

therefore the promise is thenceforward nudum pactum? In

under the contract, it was held that

the action was not a conclusive elec-

tion, citing Child v. Allen, 33 Vt. 476.

In Thomason v. Lewis, 103 Ala.

subsequent action for the price? The caRcs g nerally answer
this question in the affirmatiYe, though they often proc •d upon
different reasons and are not all capable of being recon il d. It
is said in some of them that this is simply another ca e of election of remedies; that the vendor may either retake his goods
or proceed for the price, an 1, if he <loes one of th se things, be
cannot afterwards do the otber. 1 In other of the ca es it is
said that when the seller reclaims the property he destroys the
consideration for which the promise to pay was given, and that
therefore the promise is thenceforward n/udurn pactitrn. 2 In

426, 15 S. R. 830, a suit on the notes

to judgment, but the judgment not
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being paid, was held not to be a con-

clusive election which would bar the

recovery of the property, where the

contract was that the title was not

to pass until the notes were paid in

full; and the same ruling in a like

case, where the rights of third per-

sons had not intervened, was made

in Campbell Printing Press Co. v.

Rockaway Pub. Co., 56 N. J. L. 676,

29 Atl. R. 681.

In Fuller v. Byrne, 102 Mich. 461,

60 N. W. R. 980, the agreement was

that the property should remain the

seller's until the price 4 ' and any judg-

ment rendered thereon is paid in

full." Held, that the title did not

"pass until the judgment was paid.

Kirkwood v. Hoxie, 95 Mich. 62, was

cited.

In Mississippi the seller may sue

upon the note and replevy property

at the same time, but he can have

but one satisfaction. McPherson v.

Acme Lumber Co., 70 Miss. 649, 12 S.

R. 857.

Where there was an absolute prom-

ise to pay, and the contract stipulated

that nothing should "constitute a

defense or offset or delay prompt

payment of this note in full at ma-

turity," it was held that though the

vendor had reclaimed and resold the

property and applied the proceeds on

the note, he could sue on the note

for the balance. Dederick v. Wolfe,

68 Miss. 500, 9 S. R. 350.

In Georgia a recovery of judgment

and its part payment do not bar seller

of right of action against the goods

for the balance. Jones v. Snider, 99

Ga. 276, 25 S. E. R. 668; Bowen v.

Frick, 75 Ga. 786.

A transfer to third persons, apart

from the contract itself, of the notes

given for the price, is an election to

make the sale absolute. Merchants',

etc. Bank v. Thomas, 69 Tex. 237;

Parlin v. Harrell, 8 Tex. Civ. App.

368, 27 S. W. R. 1087.

1 Thus in Dowdell v. Empire Furn.

under the contract, it was held that that nothing should "con titute a
the action was not a conclu iYe elec- defen e or off et or delay prompt
tion, citing Child v. Allen, 33 Vt. 476. payment of this note in full at maIn Thomason v. Lewis, 103 Ala. turity," it was held that though the
426, 15 S. R. 830, a suit on the notes "Vendor had reclaimed and re~ old the
to judgment, but the judgment not property and applied the proceed on
being paid, was held not to be a con- the note, he could sue on the note
clusive election which would bar the for the balance. Dederick v. Wolfe,
recovery of the property, where the 6 Mi. s. 500, 9 S. R. 330.
contract was that the title wa not
In Georgia a recoYery of judgment
to pa ·s until the notes were paid in and it part payment do not bar seller
full; and the same ruling in a like of right of action against the good
case, where the rights of thircl per- for the balance. Jones v. Snider, 99
sons had not intervened, was made Ga. 276, 25 S. E. R. 668; Bowen v.
in Campbell Printing Pres Co. v. Frick, 75 Ga. 7 6.
Rockaway Pub. Co., 56 N. J. L. 676,
A tran fer to third per ons, apart
29 Atl. R. 681.
from the contract itself. of the notes
In Fuller v. Byrne, 102 Mich. 461, given for the price, is an election to
60 N. W. R. 980, the agreement was make the sale absolute. Merchant ',
tlla,t the property should remain the etc. Bank v. Thomas, 69 Tex. 237;
seller~s until the price" and any judg- Parlin v. Harrell, 8 Tex. Civ. App.
ment rendered thereon is paid in 36 , 27 S. W. R. 10 7.
full." H eld, that the title did not
l Thus in Dowdell v. Empire Furn.
pa s until the judgment was paiu. Co., 84 Ala. 316, it is said that a cla im
Kirkwood v. Hoxie, 95 Mich. 62, was upou the purchase price after the
cited.
property ha been retaken is a n anIn Ii si ippi the seller may sue tagonistic position which cannot be
upon the note and replevy property maintained.
at the ame time, but he can have
2 So held in Minnesota.
Aultman
but one sati faction. McPherson v. v. 01. on, 43 Minn. 409, 45 N. W. R.
A me Lumber Co., 70 'liss. 649, 12 S. 852. following Minneapoli H;:irvester
R. 57.
Work v. Hally, 27 Minn. 495, 8 N. W.
·where there wa an ab olute prom- R. 597, and di tinguishin g Third Nat.
i e to pay, and the contract stipulated Bank v. A rmstrong, 25 Minn. 530. See
50
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still other cases it is held that, however it may be in name, the

reclamation of the property is, in fact, a rescission of the con-

tract, upon which thereafter no action can be maintained. 1 In

other cases still, although these proceed upon a different and

also Perkins v. Grobben, 116 Mich.

172, 74 N. W. R 469, 39 L. R. A. 815,

72 Am. St. R. 512.

^lius in Seanor v. McLaughlin,

165 Pa. St. 150, 30 Atl. R. 717, 32 L. R,

A. 467, it appeared that, under a con-

tract in form a lease, articles had

been delivered which the lessee

might buy, and, if he did, all rent

paid was to apply on the purchase

price. He covenanted to pay the

"rent'' and gave a judgment bond

as collateral. It was also stipulated
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that in case of default the property

was to be returned. The " lessee "

paid one instalment, but then de-

faulted, and the " lessors " retook the

property, refusing to surrender the

bond. They then caused judgment

to be entered against the " lessee "

on the judgment bond, and the action

was to determine the validity of that

judgment. The court said that the

lessors had two remedies or securi-

ties. They had reserved the title,

and they had the judgment bond.

" Either remedy was complete in it-

self, and the plaintiffs, on default,

could adopt either; but they were

not cumulative; they coidd not adopt

both, unless it was plainly expressed

in the contract or a necessary impli-

cation from its terms. The words of

this contract negative such a con-

struction. The defendant stipulates

that ' if default be made ... I

hereby covenant and agree to return

said machines . . . and they or

their agent may resume actual pos-

session of the same.' That was the

penalty for default on the primary

obligation, and repossession of the

machines the discharge of it. On de-

fault of payment the plaintiffs were

not bound to accept the machine or

take possession of it; the} - could have

entered judgment on the bond, levied

on the machine and any other prop-

erty of the defendant in satisfaction

of their demand. But they rescinded

the contract by retaking into their

possession the subject of it, which

they had a right to do, and then im-

mediately entered their bond and is-

sued execution to levy on other prop-

erty of defendant, which they had

no right to do, for the contract or

obligation, to which the bond was

collateral, no longer existed. It ought

to have been surrendered to defend-

ant when he demanded it at the time

plaintiffs took away the machine.

" The contract in this case is not

essentially different from those in

§ 621.J

LAW OF

ALE.

[BJ K II.

§ 621.]

LAW OF SALE.

[BOOK II.

wholly tenable theory, it has been held that the contract im-

posed upon the buyer no obligation to buy and pay, but simply

gave him an option to do so; and if he did not pay, the seller's

only remedy was to reclaim the goods. 1

wholly tenable theory, it bas been held that th contra t imposed upon the buyer no obligation to buy and pay, but impl y
gave him an option to do so; and if he did not pay, the ller
only remedy was to reclaim the good .1

§ 621. . But does it necessarily follow that a recovery of

the property destroys the consideration for the contract, or in

Hickok. sujira, was based on the stip-

ulation of the contract that the lessor

had the right, on lessee's failure to

§ 621. - - . But does it nece arily follow that a recov ry of
the property destroys the con 'i<l ration f r the cont rac t, or in

pay any instalment, to repossess

himself of the property, and, having

exercised this right, the contract was

rescinded in fact, and there was an

end of personal obligation on part of

lessee. While the word 'rescinded'

is used in that contract, the right to
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rescind and the act necessary to a

rescission are plainly expressed with-

out it, and the interpretation was

fully warranted even if the word had

not been used.

" Here the plaintiffs, in effect, in

their contract, stipulated that on de-

fault of payment of rental they

should have the right to take the

machine back to make good the de-

fault; there was default, and because

of it they took back the machine.

This was both a right to rescind and

the exercise of the right, or a rescis-

sion in fact." (But see Durr v. Rep-

logle, 167 Pa. St. 347.)

Seanor v. McLaughlin is cited and

followed in Perkins v. Grobben, 116

Mich. 172, 74 N. W. R. 469, 39 L. R. A.

815, where it is said: "The contract

provides for two way of enforcing it.

The plaintiff might sue on the note

and retain the property [title] until

the judgment was paid, or might re-

take the property, and treat the pay-

ments up to that time made as pay-

ments for the use, wear and tear of

the machineiy, but he cannot do

both. The plaintiff lias taken pos-

session of the property as the owner

thereof. What have the defendants

had as the consideration of the note ?

They acquired no title or interest in

the property, and could not until they

paid the notes. They could not call

the plaintiff to account for a disposi-

tion of the property, if he has made

any, because they had no interest

whatever in it, having made default

in the payment of the notes, the

vendor having exercised his right

under the contract to take posses-

sion. The defendants have simply

had for the notes the use of the prop-

erty, and for that use they have paid

the $800, which the contract gives

the vendor the right to so apply. The

vendor is not entitled to the title and

possession of the property, and to be

paid for it also."

Where the vendor reclaims the

Hickok. supm, was ba ed on the tipulat1on of the contract that the les or
had the right, on lessee· failure to
pay any instalment, to reposs
himself of the property, and, having
exercised this right, the contract wa
rescinded in fact, and there wa an
end of personal obligation on part of
lessee. While the word 're cindecl'
is used in that contract, the right to
rescind and the act necessary to a
rescission are plainly expressed without it, and the interpretation was
fully warranted even if the word had
not been used.
"Here the plaintiffs, in effect, in
their contract, stipulated that on de·
fault of payment of rental they
should have the right to take the
machine back to make good the default; there was default, and because
of it they took back the machine.
This was both a right to rescind and
the exercise of the right, or a· r escission in fact." (But see Durr v. Replogle, 167 Pa. St. 347.)
Seanor v. McLaughlin is cited and
followed in Perkins v. Grobben, 116
Mich. 172, 74 N. W.R. 469, 39 L. R. A.
815, where it is said: "The contract
provide for two way of enforcing it.
The plaintiff might sue on the note
and retain the property [title] until
~he judgment was paid, or might retake the property, and treat the payments up to that time made as payments for the use, wear and tear of
the machinery, but he cannot do

both. The plaintiff bas taken po ses. ion of the property as the own r
thereof. "'\Yhat have the defendant·
had as the con ideration of the note?
They acquir d no title or intere t in
the property, and could not until they
paid the note . They coul<l not call
the plaintiff to account for a di po ition of the proper ty, if he has made
any, becau e tbey had no int re t
whatever in it, having made default
in the payment of the note , the
vendor having exerci. eel his right
under tlle contract to take po session. The defendants ha>e simply
had for the notes the use of t he proper ty, and for that use they have paid
the 5800, which t he contract gives
the vendor th right to so apply. The
vendor is not entitled to t he ti t le and
pos e sion o_f the property, an d t o be
paid for it also."
Where t he vendor r eclaim s the
property a nd then sells it as his own.
or other wise appropriates t he sam e
to his own u e, he does, in effect,
res ind the contract, a n d he cannot
afterward recover the price. Tufts
v. Brace (1899), 103 Wis. 341, 79 N. W.
R. 414. See a lso Glisson v. H eggie
(189 ), 105 Ga. 30, 31 S. E. R. 118.
1 H ine v. Rol>erts, 48 Conn. 267, 40
Am. R. 170; Loomis v. Bragg, 50 Con n.
22 , 47 Am. R. 63 ; Beach's Appeal,
58 Conn. 464, 20 Atl. R. 475; Rodgers
v. Bachman, 109 Cal. 552, 42 Pac. R.
448.
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effect rescinds it? As has been seen before, these agreements

may usually be separated into two parts — an executory agree-

ment to sell, and a bailment of the property. Either of these

is a valid contract and may stand alone. May not the latter be

withdrawn without necessarily defeating the former? Clearly

it may be by express terms of the contract; but without express

provisions to that effect, may not the contract be so interpreted

as to permit of this result? This must depend upon the con-

tract. If by a fair interpretation of the contract the seller may,

upon default in payment or otherwise, have a right to resume

possession, may he not do so without rescinding, but holding

the property still subject to the contract, ready to be restored

if payment is made ?

§ 622, . In such a case 1 as this the court said : " The con-

tract provides expressly that the title to the property shall con-

tinue to remain in plaintiff until the apparatus is paid for, and

that, in case of the non-payment of either of the notes at maturity,

the plaintiff shall have the right to take possession of the prop-
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erty ; but it contains no provision that such act shall operate as

a rescission of the contract or a forfeiture of the payments

thereon. The reduction of the property to possession by the

plaintiff does not excuse performance by defendant, as defend-

ant has the right, upon payment of the amount due, to a return

of the property. Plaintiff had the right, under the express

conditions of the contract, to secure himself by taking posses-

sion, and the exercise of this right under the contract did not

entitle the defendant to rescind the contract, or to a recovery

of the amount paid, or to a delivery to him of the unpaid notes;

neither did it give him any lien upon the property for the

amount paid by him."

§ 623. . And where the contract provided that the seller,

if he should deem himself insecure, might take possession of

the property, even before the debt was due, and might sell the

1 Tufts v. D'Arcambal, 85 Mich. 185, R. A. 446. See also Latham v. Sum-

48 N. W. R. 497, 24 Am. St. R. 79, 12 L. ner, 89 111. 233, 31 Am. R. 79.
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property at public or private sale, and, after applying the net

proceeds upon the debt, recover the unpaid balance, it was held

that this was a valid and binding contract by which the parties

must abide. 1

§624.

Waiver by vendor of right to retake property.

property at public or private sale, and, after applying the net
proceeds upon the debt, recover the unpaid balance, it \\~ as held
that this was a valid and binding contract by which the parties
must abide. 1

The conditional vendor may not only elect some other remedy,

but he may also, by his conduct, waive or lose his right to re-

take the goods in case of default, both as against the condi-

tional purchaser and those who succeed to his rights, and thus

be remitted to his remedy against the person merely. 2

This question of waiver has been already touched upon, 3 and

no general rule can be laid down in reference to it, other than

that a waiver may be inferred wherever the conduct of the

conditional vendor is inconsistent with the idea that he still

expects to enforce a return of the goods if the conditions be
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not performed. 4 Whether such is the case or not is a question

of fact for the jury. 5

1 McCormick Harv. Mack Co. v.

Koch (1899), 8 Okl. 374, 58 Pac. R.

626. To tbe same effect: Dederick v.

Wolfe (1891), 68 Miss. 500, 9 S. R. 350.

2 Robbins v. Phillips, 68 Mo. 100.

3 See ante, § 609.

4 A vendor of personal property

who reserves title until the pur-

chase price is paid does not waive

his right to retake the property on

§ 624:. - - Waiver by vendor of right to retake property.
The conditional vendor may not only elect some other remedy,
but he may also, by his conduct, waive or lose his right to retake the goods in case of default, both as against the conditional purchaser and those who succeed to his rights, and thus
be remitted to his r emedy against the person merely. 2
This question of waiver has been already touched upon, 3 and
no general rule can be laid down in reference to it, other than
that a waiver may be inferred wherever the conduct of the
conditional vendor is inconsistent with the idea that he still
expects to enforce a return of the goods if the conditions be
not performed. 4 Whether such is the case or not is a question
of fact for the jury.5

default by advising a creditor of the

vendee with knowledge of the reser-

vation to take a mortgage upon the

property. Ames Iron Works v. Rich-

ardson, 55 Ark. 642, 18 S. W. R. 381.

Taking a note for an instalment due,

the note being unpaid, is not a waiver

of the right to retake. Levan v. Wil-

ten, 135 Pa. St. 61, 19 Atl. R. 945. The

fact that the vendee is permitted to

manufacture into goods materials

sold conditionally, and to sell the

goods upon the express agreement

that the proceeds shall be applied

upon the price, is not a waiver. Pren-

tiss Tool Co. v. Schirmer, 136 N. Y.

305, 32 N. E. R 849. Taking a chat-

tel mortgage upon other property is

not a waiver. Montgomery Iron

Works v. Smith, 98 Ala. 644, 13 S. R

525; Cherry v. Arthur, 5 Wash. 787,

32 Pac. R. 744; Petty place v. Manu-

facturing Co., 103 Mich. 155, 61 N. W.

R. 266.

Taking and foreclosing a mortgage

I McCormick H a rv. Mach. Co. v.
Koch (1899), 8 Okl. 374, 58 Pac. R.
626. To the same e.ff ect : Dede.rick v.
Wolfe (1891), 68 Miss. 500, 9 S. R. 350.
2 Robbins v. Phillips, 68 Mo. 100.
3 See ante, § 609.
4 A vendor of personal property
who reserves title until the purchase price is paid does not waive
his right to retake the property on
default by advising a creditor of the
vendee with knowledge of the reoervation to take a mortgage upon the
property. Ames Iron Works v. Richard on, 55 Ark. 642, 18 S. W. R. 381.
Taking a note for an in talment due,
the note being un I aid, is not a waiver
of the right to retake. Levan v. \Vilten, 11r Pa. St. 61, 19 Atl. R. 945. The

fact that the vendee is permitted to
manufacture into goods materials
sold conditionally~ and to sell the
goods upon the express agreement
that the proceeds shall be applied
upon the grice, is not a waiver. Prentiss Tool Co. v. Schirmer, 136 N. Y.
305, 32 N. E. R. 849. Taking a chattel mortgage upon other property is
not a waiver. Montgomery Iron
Works v. Smith, 98 Ala. 644, 13 S. R.
525; Cherry v. Arthur, 5 Wash. 787,
32 Pac. R. 744; Pettyplace v. Manufacturing Co., 103 Mich. 155, 61 N. W.
R. 266.
Taking and foreclosing a mortgage
on the property itself is a waiver
(Hinchma n v. Point Defiance Ry. Co.,
14 Wash. 349, 44 Pac. R. 867), but not

on the property itself is a waiver

(Hinchman v. Point Defiance Ry. Co.,

14 Wash. 349, 44 Pac. R. 8G7), but not

sGoslen v. Campbell, 88 Me. 450. 34

Atl. I;. 265; Quimby v. Lowell, 89 Me.

517. 36 Atl. R. 902; Peabody v. Ma-

guire, 79 Me. 572, 12 Atl. R 630; Wing

v. Thompson, 78 Wis. 256, 47 N. W.

R 606; Page v. Edwards, 64 Vt. 124,

23 Atl. R 917.
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5 o ·1 n v. Campbell, 8 l\fe. 450, 34 v. Thomp on, 78 Wis. 256, 47 N. W.
At!. . 26 - ; Quimby v. Lo"ell, 9 fe. R. 606; P age v. Edwards, 64 Vt. 124,
547, 6 tl. R. 902; Peabody v. l\1a- 23 Atl. R. 917.
Ie. 572, 12 At1. R. 630; Wing
512
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§625. Yendee lias usually no election. — The choice of

courses of conduct in these cases is usually the privilege of the

seller only. Contracts may undoubtedly be so framed as to

give to the conditional purchaser the option either to return

the goods and be released from his obligation to pay for them,

or to keep and pay for them, and such a construction has been

put upon contracts in a few cases, 1 although other courts upon

the same contracts would probably have reached different con-

clusions. In the great majority of cases, however, the obliga-

tion of the conditional purchaser to buy and pay for the goods

is a fixed and absolute one, from which he cannot relieve him-

self by tendering back the goods. 2 And, on the other hand,

the vendor's right of election, considered in the preceding sec-

tions, does not arise until the vendee is in default; up to that

time the obligation of the former to sell is usually as absolute

and irrevocable as that of the latter to buy.

§ 626. Vendor's right to take possession upon default —

Entry upon premises — License. — It is customary, in con-
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where the property is then redeliv- pear to be the unconditional owner

ered to the vendee under the original and to sell the goods as such (Foster

contract (Goodkind v. Gilliam, 19 v. Warner, 49 Mich. 641, 14 N. W. R.

Mont. 385, 48 Pac. R. 548), nor where 673), and where the vendor led cred-

the mortgage is taken on this and itors to believe the sale was absolute,

other property as further security, Brayton v. Harding, 56 111. App. 362.

with no intention of waiving the ] Such was claimed and tacitly ad-

condition. Page v. Edwards, 64 Vt. mitted in Beach's Appeal, 58 Conn.

124. Endeavoring, though without 464, 20 Atl. R. 475, to be the effect of

success,- to establish a material-man's Hine v. Roberts, 48 Conn. 267, 40 Am.

lien for the price, is a waiver. Hick- R. 170, and Loomis v. Bragg, 50 Conn.

man v. Richburg (1899), 122 Ala. 638, 228, 47 Am. R. 638. So also Rodgers

26 S. R. 136. v. Bachman, 109 Cal. 552, 42 Pac. R.

But where the vendor knows that 448. See also the contracts of " Sale

logs contracted to be sold condi- or Return," post, $ 675 et seq.

tionally are being removed to the 2 Appleton v. Norwalk Library As-

vendee's mill, sawed into lumber and sociation, 53 Conn. 4, 22 Atl. R. 681;

sold to third persons for removal by Beach's Appeal, supra; Geist v. Stier,

them, and does not object, there is 134 Pa. St. 216, 19 Atl. R 505; Finlay

evidence of waiver to go to the jury. v. Ludden & Bates South. Music

Wing v. Thompson, 78 Wis. 256. And House (1898), 105 Ga. 264, 31 S. E. R.

so where the vendor, through his 180.

agents, permitted the vendee to ap-
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tracts of this nature, to expressly stipulate that the vendor, in

case of the buyer's default, may resume possession of the goods,

and that for this purpose he may enter upon the buyer's prem-

ises and remove them. But even in the absence of such an ex-

press stipulation — there being no agreement to the contrary, —

the seller would have the right to resume possession ; and if the

goods had been placed by the buyer upon his premises, the

seller would, it is held, have an implied but irrevocable license

to enter upon the buyer's premises to remove the goods. 1

1 Heath v. Randall, 4 Cush. (Mass.)

195.

The right reserved by the contract

to enter upon the buyer's premises

to retake the goods is irrevocable.

tracts of this nature, to expressly stipulate that the vendor, in
case of the buyer's default, ma.y resume possession of the goods,
and that for this purpose he may enter upon the buyer's I remi es and remove them. But even in the absence of such an express stipulation - there being no agreement to the contrary,the seller would have the right to resume po session; and if the
goods had been placed by the buy r upon bis premises, the
seller would, it is held, have an implied but irrevocable license
to enter upon the buyer's premises to remove the goods. 1

Walsh v. Taylor, 39 Md. 592.

In Smith v. Hale (1893), 158 Mass. 178,
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33 N. E. R. 493, 35 Am. St. R. 485, there

had been an exchange of a buggy

for a heifer. The buggy was war-

ranted, and there was a breach of the

warranty under circumstances en-

titling the person who acquired the

buggy to rescind. She tendered back

the buggy and demanded the heifer,

which was refused. She thereupon

entered upon the other's land and

took the heifer, and this action re-

sulted. The court said: "The most

important question in the case is

whether, on these facts, the defend-

ant had a right to enter upon the

plaintiff's premises and reclaim her

heifer. We are of opinion that she

had. It is true that it lias been held

tiiat, where nothing appears except

that the goods of one person are upon

the land of another, the owner of the

goods has no implied license from the

owner of the land to enter and take

them away. Anthony v. Haneys, 8

Bing. 186. And this rule has been

applied to the case of a mortgage

of personal property before foreclos-

ure, if the goods have been left

in the mortgagor's possession. Mc-

Leod v. Jones, 105 Mass. 403, 7 Am.

R. 539. But after foreclosure the

mortgagee has an implied irrevo-

cable license to enter ami carry away

his goods. McNeal v. Emerson, 15

Gray, 384. Where a piano was hired

for an indefinite time, with no agree-

ment giving to the owner a right to

enter the hirer's premises and re-

claim the piano without demand or

notice, it was held that he had

no implied license to do so. Smith

v. Pierce, 110 Mass. 35. But where

one sells personal property which is

on his own land, the purchaser has an

implied license to enter and take it

away. Nettleton v. Sikes, 8 Mete. 34;

Giles v. Simonds, 15 Gray, 441, 77 Am.

Dec. 373. In the present case, on the

facts assumed, the defendant had a

right to the possession of her heifer

under her bargain with the plaintiff,

I Heath v. Randall, 4 Cush. (Mass.) in the m ortgagor's possession. Mc195.
Leod v. Jones, 105 Ma s. 403, 7 Am.
The right reserved by the contract R. 539. But after foreclosure the
to enter upon the buyer's premise mortgagee bas an implied irrevoto retake the goods is irrevocable. cable license to enter and carry away
Walsh v. Taylor, 39 Md. 592.
his good . McNeal v. Emerson, 15
In Smith v. Hale (1893), 158 Mass.178, Gray, 384. Where a piano was hired
33 N. E. R. 493, 35 Am. St. R. 485, there for an indefinite time, with no agreehad been an exchange of a buggy m ent giving to the owner a right to
for a heifer. The buggy was war- enter the hirer's premises and reranted. and there was a breach of the claim the piano without demand or
warranty under circumstances en- notice, it was held that he had
titling the person who acquired the no implied license to do so. Smith
buggy to resc.:ind. She tendered back v. Pierce, 110 Mas . 35. But where
the buggy and demanded the heifer, one sells personal property w hic.h is
which was refused. She thereupon on his own land, the purchaser has an
entered upon the other's land and implied license to enter and take it
took the he ifer, and this action re- away. Nettleton v. Sikes, 8 Mete. 34;
sulted. The court said: "The most Giles v. Simonds, 15 Gray, 441, 77 Arn.
important question in the case is Dec. 373. In the present case, on the
whether, on these facts, the defend- facts assumed, the defendant had a
ant had a right to enter upon the right to the possession of her heifer
plaintiff's prerni es and reclaim her under her bargain with the plaintiff,
heifer. We are of opinion that she and it ·was the plaintiff~ duty to
had. It is true that it has been held r estore it, and the defendant had
that, where nothing appears except demanded it, and the plaintiff had
that the goods of one person are upon refu eel to deliver it, and in this state
the land of another, the O\vner of the of things, un<ler the agreement bego cl · ha no implied li en e from the tween them, the law gave the defendO\Yn r of the land to nter and take ant a right to enter and tate away
th m away. Anthony v. Haney , 8 the heifer in the way in which she
ing. 1 6. And thi rul ha b en did it. Drake v. Wells, 11Allen,141;
appli d to the ca e of a rn rtgage Heath v. Ran lall, 4 Cush. 195; Cooley
f p r onal prop r ty bef r f r clos- on Tort , 50 et seq."
ure, if the good have b n 1 ft
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The seller may act in person or by his agent, and it is not

necessary that the agent should have or should exhibit any

authority in writing. 1 If the seller goes in person, he may take

with him such agents or assistants as are necessary to remove

the goods. 2

§ 627. . Acting in pursuance of such a license, and ex-

ercising his right at a reasonable time and in a reasonable man-

ner, the seller needs no legal process or other warrant, and is

not liable as a trespasser for his act. 3 If, however, he seeks to

enter at an unreasonable time or in an unreasonable manner,

he may lawfully be resisted, and will make himself liable in

damages if he persists. 4

i North v. Williams, 120 Pa. St. 109,

13 Atl. R. 723, 6 Am. St. R. 695.

2 Walsh v. Taylor, 39 Md. 592; Drury

v. Hervey, 126 Mass. 519.

3 Walsh v. Taylor, Heath v. Ran-

dall, North v. Williams, siqwa; Boyd
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v. Lofton, 34 Ga. 494; Watertown

Steam Engine Co. v. Davis, 5 Houst.

(Del.) 192.

The seller, acting in a proper man-

ner, may not only peaceably enter

the buyer's house, but he may go into

those rooms or portions of it where

he would be likely to find his goods,

without being thereby a trespasser.

Walsh v. Taylor, supra.

4 In Drury v. Hervey, 126 Mass.

519, it appeared that the purchaser

of the chattel rented a room in the

house of a third person and there

kept the chattel. The contract con-

tained the usual provision giving the

seller the right to enter and take

the chattel upon default. The buyer

being in default, the seller sent his

servants to get the chattel. They

found that the buyer was not in,

and that the owner of the house

was away, but his wife was pres-

ent. They showed her the contract,

51

stated their business, and sought ad-

mission. She asked them to wait

two hours, when the buyer would be

back, but they declined, and, push-

ing her away, went in and took the

chattel. She sued the seller for dam-

ages for the assault, and it was held

that her request to the servants to

wait was a reasonable one and that

their act was wrongful.

In Van Wren v. Flynn, 34 La. Ann.

1158, furniture had been sold under

the condition that if not paid for it

could be retaken, and was placed in

the buyer's house. Shortly before

the first payment fell due the buyer's

wife became sick, and he was obliged

temporarily to take her elsewhere.

Before going he informed the seller

of the facts, and stated that upon his

return he would pay; and to this the

seller made no objection. The buy-

er's absence was unexpectedly pro-

tracted by his wife's illness, so that

he did not return until nearly a

month after the last payment was

§ 62 .]
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The law, moreover, does not encourage a forcible assertion

of one's rights, and even though the seller may have an irrev-

ocable license, if he cannot enter without violence or a breach

of the peace, he should desist from his efforts and avail himself

of his legal remedies. 1

§ 628. Necessity of demand before recovery of goods. — Upon

The law, moreover, does not encourage a forcible assertion
of one's rights, and even though the seller may have an irrevocable license, if he cannot enter without violence or a breach
of the peace, he should desist from his efforts and avail himself
of his legal remedies.1

default by the buyer his right to the further possession of the

his family were occupying, stated

that he had come for the furniture,

and, disregarding their statement

§ 628. Necessity of demand before recovery ofgoods.-Upon
d efault by the buyer his right to the further possession of the

that the buyer was expected and

their request that he defer until the

buyer returned, took away the fur-

niture. That night the buyer re-

turned with his invalid wife and

children and found their sleeping

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:50 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t6xw4h56n
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

apartments denuded of furniture, so

that they had to seek accommoda-

tions elsewhere. The buyer sued the

seller for damages and was permitted

to recover. "The agreement estab-

lished on this record," said the court,

"cannot shield the conduct of the

defendant. It does not purport, in

terms, to confer upon the defendant

the right to enter the house of plaint-

iff in his absence without his con-

sent and without notice and carry

off its contents. An agreement con-

ferring such extraordinary power

would need to be so clearly worded

and proven as to leave nothing to

implication. The gi'ant of the simple

right to retake his furniture on non-

payment of the price cannot be con-

strued to embrace such power."

In North v. Williams, 120 Pa. St.

109. 13 Atl. R. 723, 6 Am. St. R. 695,

supra, the contract for the sale of a

piano provided that in case of default

the seller or his agent might '"enter

into and upon any premises where

said piano may be, and without let

or hindrance take away the same."

The buyer being in default, the seller

sent his agent to take away the piano.

The agent rang the bell and was ad-

mitted to or entered the entry or

vestibule (the case does not disclose

by whom he was admitted). Here

the buyer met the agent and asked

him what he wanted, and the agent

replied that he had come to tune the

piano. The buyer asked the agent

to wait wliile he went to call his wife.

While the buyer was thus gone, the

agent, having apparently admitted

other servants of the seller, went

with them into the parlor, where the

piano was, and began to remote it.

The buyer returning protested, but

they took the piano away. The

buyer sued the seller in trespass, con-

tending that his agent had obtained

permission by a subterfuge and that

his acts were a trespass. The court,

however, held that as the seller had

his fam ily were occupying, stated The buyer being in default, the seller
that he had come for the furniture, sent his agent to take away the piano.
and, disregarding their statement The agent rang the bell and was adthat the buyer was expected and mitted to or entered the entry or
their request that he defer until the vestibule (the case does not disclose
buyer r eturned, took away the fur- by whom he was admitted). Here
niture. That night the buyer re- the buyer met the agent and asked
turned w ith his invalid wife and him what he wanted, and the agent
children and fotmd their sleeping replied that he had come t.o tune the
apartments denuded of furniture, so piano. The buyer asked the agent
that tlwy had to seek accommoda· towaitwhilehe.,,venttoeallhiswife.
tions elsewh ere. The buyer sued the Whiie the buyer was thus gone, the
seller for damages and was permitted agent, having apparently admitted
to recover. " The agreement estab- other servants of the seller, went
lished on this record,'' said the court, with them into the parlor, where the
"cannot shield the conduct of the piano was, and began to remo~·e it.
defendant. It does not purport, in Tlie buyer returning protested, but
terms, to confer upon the defendant they took the piano away. Tbe
the right to enter the house of plaint- buyer sued the seller in trespass, coniff in bis absence without his con- tending that his agent had obtained
sent and without notice and carry permission by a subterfuge and that
off its contents. An agreement con- his acts were a trespass. The court,
ferring such extraordinary power however, held that as the seller had
would need to be so clearly worded a rig ht to enter and remove the piano,
and proven as to leave nothing to the fact that the agent gained aclimplication. The grant of the simple mission by a false reason did not
ri6ht to r etake his furniture on non- destroy the right. "If a citizen depayment of the price cannot be con- sired to see another upon businrss
strued to embrace such power."
which he knew to be unpleasant to
In North v. Williams, 120 Pa. St. the latter," said the court. "and
100. 13 Atl. R. 723, 6 Am. St. R. 695, cho e to assign some other than the
supra, the ontract for th ale of a r al r eason for asking admission, he
piano provid d that in case of d fault c rtainly would not become a tresth sell r or his agent might" nter pa er m er ely becau e be failed to
into and up n any pr mi. 8 where give the true reason."
said piano may b , and without 1 t
I
rury v. H ervey, 126 Ma s. 510;
or hindrance take aw y th
am ." Churchill v. Hulbert, 110 Mass. 42.
516
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goods ordinarily ceases, and the seller is again invested not only

with the title but with the right to the immediate possession

of the goods. Except, therefore, in those cases, already noticed, 1

in which the vendor has permitted the vendee to believe that

a previous default will not be insisted upon, and those in which

the contract by its terms requires a demand, 2 it is usually held,

that a demand for the goods is not necessary to entitle the

vendor to retake the goods from the vendee upon default or to

maintain replevin for their recovery. 3 Some cases, however,

deem a demand necessary. 4

i See ante, §§ 609, 634

2 In Wheeler & Wilson Mfg. Co. v.

Teetzlaff, 53 Wis. 211, the court said:

" The contract says the appellant [the

seller] may, at his option, take the

machine away if the payments are

not made according to the terms of
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the contract. A fair construction of

this contract would require the ap-

pellant to give notice to the respond-

ent that it would exercise its option

to take away the machine, on ac-

count of the non-payment of the

purchase-money, before an action

could be commenced to get posses-

sion thereof. A demand of posses-

sion, or notice to the respondent that

the company would exercise its op-

tion to take possession of the ma-

chine, was especially necessary after

the company had failed to take im-

mediate advantage of the provision

in the contract, and suffered the ma-

chine to remain in the respondent's

possession for several months after

such failure, during all that time de-

manding payment of the $5 claimed

to be due. Under such circum-

stances, if the appellant determined

to avail itself of the forfeiture of the

money paid, and assert its right to

the possession and ownership of the

machine, notwithstanding it had re-

ceived eight-ninths of the purchase-

money, it was clearly its duty to give

the respondent unequivocal notice of

such determination on its part before

exercising that right. Smith v. New-

land, 9 Hun (N. Y.), 553; Johnston v.

Whittemore, 27 Mich. 463; Giddey v.

Altaian, 27 Mich. 206; Deyoe v. Jami-

son, 33 Mich. 94; Cushman v. Jewell,

7 Hun, 525; Hutchings v. Hunger, 41

N. Y. 155.

With reference to the first portion

of this holding, its soundness may be

open to question; upon the latter

ground it is in accord with many

cases elsewhere.

3 In Hughes v. Kelly, 40 Conn. 148,

it appeared that Hughes had con-

tracted, under the form of a lease, to

sell certain property to one Spreyer.

Spreyer paid part but was in default

4 Thus in Michigan a previous de-

mand, where the buyer was in law-

ful possession of the chattel "and

had nearly paid for it," was held

§ 62 .]
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And where the goods have, without right, been transferred

by the original vendee to a third person, the vendor may also,

Arn.l where the goods have, without rjgl:t, been transferred
by the original vendee to a third person, the vendor may also,

as to several payments, when the

property was attached by Kelly, a

creditor of Spreyer, as the property

of the latter. Hughes brought re-

plevin against Kelly, having first de-

manded of him a return of the prop-

erty, which was refused. It was

contended that as Hughes had not

demanded the property of Spreyer he

had still the right of possession, and

therefore Hughes could not maintain

replevin. To this the court replied:

"By the terms of the contract

Hughes was at liberty, on the neglect
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of Spreyer to pay, to take the prop-

erty into his possession wherever

found. As the contract says noth-

ing of any demand to be made pre-

vious to taking possession on default

of payment, we find no warrant for

interpolating such a provision into

the contract."

In Proctor v. Tilton, 65 N. H. 3, 17

Atl. R. 638, Proctor was suing Tilton,

a deputy sheriff, for taking on a writ

of replevin, at the suit of one Wink-

ley, a horse from the possession of

Proctor. Tilton defended on the

ground that Winkley at the date of

the replevin writ was entitled to pos-

session. The horse had been sold

conditionally by Winkley to Proctor,

who, though often requested, had

paid no part of the price. Said the

court: " By the terms of the contract

Proctor had no title to the horse.

He had the possession with the priv-

ilege of acquiring a title by payment

within a reasonable time. Upon his

failure to make such payment in a

reasonable time his right to the pos-

session of the horse terminated, and

both the right of property and the

right of possession were in Winkley,

and he had the right to take the

horse wherever he could find it. As

Proctor had no right to the posses-

sion against Winkley no demand was'

necessary. Bailey v. Colby, 34 N. H.

29; McFarland v. Farmer, 42 N. H.

386, 390. The case differs from Davis

v. Emery, 11 N. H. 230, where it was

held that a demand and a reasonable

notice to surrender the property or

perfect the title was necessary, be-

cause by the terms of the contract

the bailee had an election whether

he would buy or not. So also in Kim-

ball v. Farnum. 61 N. H. 348, a de-

mand was held necessary because

the time of payment had been ex-

tended with an understanding that

the vendee might pay when he could,

and therefore the vendee's possession

was lawful."

as to several payments, when the and he bad the right to take the
property was attached by Kelly, a horse wherever he could find it. As
creditor of Spreyer, as the property Proctor h a d no right to the possesof the latter. Hughes brought re- sion against Winkley no demand was·
plevin against Kelly, having first de- necessary. Bailey v. Colby, 34 N. H.
manded of him a return of the prop- 29; McFarland v. Farmer, 42 N. H.
erty, which was refused. It was 386, 390. The case differs from Davis
contended that as Hughes had not v. Emery, 11 N. H. 230, where it was
demanded the property of Spreyer he held that a demand and a reasonable
had still the right of possession, and notice to surrender the property or
therefore Hughes could not maintain perfect the title was n ece sary, bereplevin . To this the court replied: cause by the terms of the contract
"By the terms of the contrac t the bailee had an elect.ion whether
Hughes was at liberty, on the n eglect he would buy or not. So a lso in Kimof Spreyer to pay, to take the prop- ball v. Farnum, 61 N. H. 348, a deerty into his posse sion whe rever mand was held n eces a r y because
found. As the contract says noth- the time of payment h ad been exing of any demand to be made pre- tended with an understa,n ding that
vious to taking posse sion on default the vendee might pay when he could,
of payment, we find no warrant for and ther efore the vendee's possession
interpolating such a provision into was lawful."
the contract."
Where goods are sold for cash or
In Proctor v. Tilton, 65 N. H. 3, 17 a note upon delivery, and delivery is
Atl. R. 63 , Proctor was suin g Tilton, obtained withou5 paying the cash or
a deputy sheriff, for taking on a writ giving the note, the vendor, who has
of replevin, at the suit of one Wink- not waived it, has the right to regain
ley, a hor e from the possession of his goods, and no previous de m2.nd is
Proctor. Tilton · defended on the necessary. Salomon v. Hathaway,
ground that Winkley at t he date of 126 Mass. 482; Stone v. P erry, 60 Me.
the replevin writ was entitled to pos- 48.
se sion. The horse had been sold
It is imma terial to a third person
conditionally by Winkley to Proctor, claiming ri g hts in the property
who, though often r quested, had whether the seller made a demand
paid n l art of the price. Said the for it before retaking it from the
court: "By the term of the contra t vendee. Moses v. Rogers, 62 Vt. 84,
Proctor had no title to the hor e. 19 Atl. R. 11 .
He had the po. se ion \Vith the privIf demand before r plevin were
il er of a quiring a titl by paym nt nece ary, the fact th at the lmyer
within r a onabl time.
r on hi ha ecr t d him elf to I revent a de·
failure to make u h pa,ym nt in a mand, or ha left th juri diction, or
r a one ble tim hi right to th po - cl ni tb ~· 11 r rig ht. , will excuse
. i n C th hor t nninat J, and th want f cl mancl Wall v. De
b h tb right f pr I rty and the litki wi z, 9 D. . .App. 109.
rigb of po.
ion wer in\ inkl y,
\ h re the van ior has taken peace51
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without demand, recover the goods or their value from such

third person, even though he is a bonaf.de purchaser for value. 1

§ 629. Return of payments if property retaken by seller. —

Whether payments already made upon the price by the pur-

chaser are to be returned to him in case, for a later default, the

goods are retaken by the seller, is a question which has given

rise to some difficulty. If the contract be entirely rescinded

and avoided from the beginning, the seller, it is held, must put

the buyer in statu quo, by restoring to him what he has parted

with upon the contract. 2 But, as has been seen, it is not usually

able possession of the property, but

the vendee retakes it with force, the

vendor need make no demand before

replevying it. Hyland v. Bohn Mfg.

Co., 92 Wis. 157, 65 N. W. R 170.

1 Gilmore v. Newton, 9 Allen (Mass.),

171, 85 Am. Dec. 749; Carter v. King-

man, 103 Mass. 517, (In this case it
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was a condition of the contract that

the goods should not be sold or re-

moved without the vendor's consent.

Having been sold to and removed by

a third person, he was held liable to

the vendor as for a con version, though

he had acted in good faith and had

parted with the goods before a de-

mand was made upon him.) Galvin

v. Bacon, 11 Me. 28; Prime v. Cobb,

63 Me. 200.

2 Thus in Ketchum v. Brennan, 53

Miss. 596. where the vendee had resold

the property and the vendor brought

replevin for it, the court said: "A

rescission of the contract by the

plaintiff was a condition precedent

to his right to sue for the property;

and, to rescind, it was his duty to re-

turn or offer to return to his vendee

what had been paid on the contract

of sale. This he did." But see Duke

v. Shackleford, 56 Miss. 552, where

this statement is explained and modi-

fied, if not overruled.

In Drew v. Pedlar, 87 Cal. 443, 25

Pac. R. 749, 22 Am. St. R. 257, a case

of sale of land with a stipulation for

forfeiture, in which the buyer, after

making a payment of §1,000, de-

faulted until after the stipulated

time, and then tendered perform-

ance, which was refused, the court

said: " From the time defendants re-

fused to accept payment and execute

a deed, the plaintiff has considered

the contract rescinded and bases this

action partly upon that ground, his

complaint stating facts from which

a rescission is a necessary inference.

Under these circumstances the

plaintiff was entitled to recover the

one thousand dollars paid by him,

less such actual damages as may

have been sustained by the defend-

ants by plaintiff's breach of the con-

tract. Grey v. Tubbs, 43 Cal. 359;

Cleary v. Folger, 84 Cal. 316, 18 Am.

St. R. 187."

In Latham v. Davis, 44 Fed. R. 862,

it is said that the better rule is " that

§ 629.J
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[BOOK II.
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LAW OF SALE.

[book ir.

necessary for the seller to go so far as to rescind the contract; !

he may retake the property, in case of a default, in pursuance

of the contract and by its authority, and where he does so it

is well settled that, unless the contract itself or some statute

Hine v. Roberts, 48 Conn. 267, 40 Am.

nece ary for the seller to go so far as to rescind the con tract; 1
he may retake the property, in case of a default, in pursuance
of the contract and by it authority, and where he does so it
is well settled that, unle s the contract itself or some statute

R. 170; Preston v. Whitney, 23 Mich.

260, — sed qucere.

In Brewster v. Wooster (1892), 131

N. Y. 473, 30 N. E. R. 489, there seems

to have been a clear case of rescis-

sion.

i In Tufts v. D'Arcambal, 85 Mich.

185, 48 N. W. R. 497, 24 Am. St. R. 79,

12 L. R. A. 446, the condition was

that the title should remain in the

seller until notes given for the price
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were paid, and that the seller should

have the right, in case of default,

"without process of law, to enter

and retake immediate possession of

said property, wherever it may be,

and remove the same." The action

was replevin to regain possession of

the property from the buyer in de-

fault, and the buyer sought to im-

press upon the property a lien for

the amount he had paid upon it.

The court said: "It will be observed

that the contract here does not pro-

vide for a rescission thereof before

plaintiff should have the right to re-

duce the property to his possession.

nor does it provide that the taking

of possession should rescind the con-

tract or work i forfeiture of the

amount paid upon the apparatus, but

the plaintiff treats the contract as

still existing and executory. The

contract provides expressly that the

title to the property shall continue

to remain in plaintiff until the ap-

paratus is paid for, and that, in case

of the non-payment of either of the

notes at maturity, the plaintiff should

have the right to take possession of

the property; but it contains no pro-

vision that such act shall operate as

a rescission of the contract or a for-

feiture of the payments thereon.

The reduction of the property to pos-

session by plaintiff does not excuse

performance by defendant, as defend-

ant has the right, upon payment of

the amount due, to a return of the

property. Plaintiff had the right,

under the express conditions of the

contract, to secure himself by taking

possession, and the exercise of this

right under the contract did not en-

title the defendant to rescind the

contract, or to a recovery of the

amount paid, or to a delivery to him

of the unpaid notes; neither did it

give him any lien upon the property

for the amount paid by him."

Declaring contract " void." — It is

a common provision in contracts of

Hine v. Robert , 48 Conn. 267, 40 Am.
R. 1 rO: Pre -ton v. Whitney, 23 lich.
260,- sed qiu:ere.
In _Brew ter v. vVooster (1 92), 131
N. Y. 473, 30 N. E. R. 4 9, there eems
to have been a clear case of re cission.
I In Tufts v. D'Arcambal, 83 Iich.
1 5, 4 N. W. R. 497, 2± Am. t. R. 79,
12 L. R. A. 446, the condition was
that the title hould remain in the
seller until note gi·rnn for the price
were paid, and tha.t the seller should
have the right, in ca e of default,
" without proce of law, to enter
and retake immediate possession of
said property, where er it may be,
and remove the same." The action
was replevin to regain posse ion of
the property from the buyer in default, and the buyer sought to impre s upon the property a lien for
the amount he had paid upon it.
The court said: "It will be ob erved
that the contract here doe not provicle for a re ci ion thereof before
plaintiff should have the right to re<luce the property to hi po ' e sion,
nor does it provide that the taking
of po e ion hould re cind the contract or work . i forfeiture of the
amount paitl upon the a1 para.tu , but
the plaintiff tr at the contra t as
still xi ting and ex cutory. The
ontrc t provid expr ly that the
title to the property hall ontiuue
to r main in plaintiff until tb apparatu i aid for, and that, in a e
of the non-pc ym nt of ither of the
note at maturity, th plaintiff hould
have th right t tak p .
n of

the property; but it contaips no provision that such act shall operate as
a rescis ion of the contract or a forfeitme of the payments thereon.
The reduction of the property to po session by plaintiff does not excu e
performance by defendant, as defend.ant has the right, upon payment of
the amount due, to a return of the
property. Plaintiff had the right,
umler the expre s conditions of the
contract, to secure himself by taking
po se sion, and the exercise of this
right under the contract did not entitle the defendant to re cind the
contract, or to a r ecovery of the
amount paid, or to a delivery t-0 him
of the unpaid notes; neither did it
give him any lien upon the property
for the amount paid by him."
Declaring contract" void."- It i
a common provision in contracts of
this nature that, in ca e of default,
the seller shall have the right to declare the contract "void," recover
the property, and retain what ha
b en paid u pon it. What do the parti mean by declaring the contract
void? A of what time doe it become void? Is thi equfralent to a
1·e ·cission or ::i, te1·mination merely?
If a contract i void it is of no effe t..
and no right can be ba ed upon it
by either party. If it is rescinded
tile parti mu tor linarily be placed
in tatu q1.o. lf it i terminated o
far a the vendee· right to further
po-. e ion and lon ger tim in which
to pay ar cone rn d, tbi would not
b incon i tent with the eller ' remeclyund r the contra t, or with rights

090

CH. III.] CONDITIONAL SALE OF SPECIFIC CHATTELS. [§ 029.

expressly requires it, he is not obliged to restore what he has

received, as a condition precedent to resuming possession. 1

Statutes, however, in some States do require it. 2

still remaining in the buyer. Ordi-

narily a provision in a contract that

it shall be " void " in a certain con-

tingency means only that it may be

treated as voidable. In Preston v.

Whitney, 23 Mich. 260, the stipula-

tion was that on default the seller

should be entitled to possession, " and

said agreement to sell . . . shall

become void." Said the court: "From

the time of the taking of possession

the agreement for the sale may be

treated as void, or more properly as

terminated." In Johnston v. Whitte-

more, 27 Mich. 463, the provision was
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that in case of default the seller

might declare the agreement void,

recover the property, and retain the

payments already made as damages

for the non-performance of the agree-

ment. See also Hayes v. Nashville,

47 U. S. App. 713.

1 Unless the contract so provides,

a return of what has been received

under it is not a conditiou prece-

dent to the vendor's right to recover

the property on the seller's default.

" Strictly speaking, his action in re-

taking the property is not a rescission

of the contract, but in pursuance of

it." Fairbanks v. Malloy, 16 111. App.

277. Retaking the property by the

seller on default is "in affirmance,

and not in avoidance, of the con-

tract, and the seller having per-

formed on his part, the purchaser

could have no right to rescind it or

to treat it as rescinded." Singer

Mfg. Co. v. Treadway. 4 III. App. 57.

To same effect: Latham v. Sumner,

89 111. 233, 31 Am. R. 79; Tufts v.

D'Arcambal. siqira; White v. Oakes,

88 Me. 367, 34 Atl. R. 175, 32 L. R. A.

592; Duke v. Shackleford, 56 Miss. 552.

" The plaintiff [seller] was entitled

to the possession of the property

without paying back anything to

the defendant; and whether the de-

fendant should ever receive any-

thing back, or should be paid any-

thing for what he had already paid

to the plaintiff, is a question for fur-

ther consideration." Fleck v. War-

ner, 25 Kan. 492.

2 Thus, in Ohio the vendor cannot

retake the property without tenclei'-

ing back to the purchaser the amount

paid by him "after deducting there-

from a reasonable compensation for

the use of such property." Acts 1885,

p. 239, § 2; Speyer v. Baker, 59 Ohio

St. 11, 51 N. E. R. 442; Albright v.

Meredith, 58 Ohio St. 194, 50 N. E. R.

719. This statute is constitutional.

Weil v. State, 46 Ohio St. 450, 21 N.

E. R. 643.

§§ 630-632.J

LA.W OF SALE,

[nooK n.

§§ 630-632.] LA.W OF SALE. [book II.

§ 630. Equities of purchaser.— Whether the buyer,

after such retaking,— not a rescission, — has any rights or

equities by reason of his payments, which maybe made effectual

by any means, is also a question of some uncertainty. It is

usual, in the contract, to expressly stipulate that payments al-

ready made shall be forfeited to the seller, either as compensa-

tion for use and depreciation or as liquidated damages for the

breach of the contract. Stipulations of this nature, when

clearly declared and reasonable in amount, are constantly en-

forced under the well settled rules governing liquidated dam-

ages; 1 but even where the stipulation is not thus reasonable,

it is difficult to see what standing the vendee, in default, can

have in a court of law to recover from the vendor the excess

after satisfying the latter's reasonable demands. 2 A court of

equity may give relief, 3 but an adjustment of equities cannot

be worked out in an action of replevin brought by the vendor

to recover the goods upon default, 4 though trover may be found

more flexible. 5
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§631. How when action against third person.— In

actions by the vendor against third persons to recover as for a

conversion of the goods by them, it is held that he may recover

the full value of the goods without any deduction for what

may have been paid by the original vendee. 6

§632. Return of notes received.— The buyer's note

for the price is often made a part of the contract of sale. Fre-

quently the stipulations showing the conditional character of

1 See, e. g.. Wheeler & Wilson Mfg. Mich. 463, where, in an action of

Co. v. Jacobs, 2 N. Y. Misc. 236. trover, the seller was permitted to

2 See Lowrie v. Gourlay, 112 Mich, recover only according to his inter-

§ 630. - - Equities of purchaser.-Whether the buyer,
after such retaking,- not a rescission,- has any rights or
equities by reason of his payments, which may be made effectual
by any means, is also a question of some uncertainty. It is
usual, in the contract, to expressly stipulate that payments alr eady made shall be forfeited to the seller, either as compensation for use and depreciation or as liquidated damages for the
breach of the contract. Stipulations of this nature, when
clearly declared and reasonable in amount, are constantly enforced under the well-settled rules governing liquidated damages; 1 but even where the stipulation is not thus reasonable,
it is difficult to see what standing the vendee, in default, can
have in a court of law to r ecover from tbe vendor the excess
after satisfying the latter's reasonable demands. 2 A court of
equity may give relief, 3 but an adjustment of equities cannot
be worked out in an action of replevin brought by the vendor
to recover the goods upon default,4 though trover may be found
m.ore fiexible.5

641, 71 N. W. R. 174; Satterlee v. est.

Cronkhite, 114 Mich. 634, 72 N. W. R. 6 Angier v. Taunton Paper Co., 1

616. Gray (Mass.), 621, 61 Am. Dec. 436;

3 See Lowrie v. Gourlay, supra. Carter v. Kingman, 103 Mass. 517;

* Ryan v. Wayson, 108 Mich. 519, Colcord v. McDonald, 128 Mass. 470;

66 N. W. R. 370; Thirlby v. Rainbow, Brown v. Haynes, 52 Me. 578; Everett

93 Mich. 164, 53 N. W. R. 159. v. Hall, 67 Me. 497.

5 See Johnston v. Whittemore, 27
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§ 631. - - How when action against thirfl person.- In
actions by the vendor against third persons to recover as for a
conversion of the goods by them, it is held that he may recover
the full value of the goods without any deduction for what
may have been paid by the original vendee. 6

§ 632. - - Return of notes received.- The buyer's note
for t he price is often made a part of the contract of sale. Frequent ly the stipulations showing the conditional character of
I See, e. g., Wheeler & Wilson Mfg.
o. v. J acobs, 2 N. Y. Misc. 236.
2, ee Lowrie v. Gour lay, 112 '.fich.
641, 71 N. vV. R. 174; att erl e v.
Cr nkbit , 114 Mic h. 634, 72 N. W.R.
616.
3 , ee Lowrie v.
our1ay supra.
4 yan v. W ayson, 10 1\Ii b. 519,
66 N. \ V. R. 370 ; Tbirl by v. Rainbow,
:3 1ich. 164, 53 N. W. R. i-9.
f> ee J h nston v. Whittemore, 27

Mich. 463, where, in an action of
trover, the seller was permitted to
recover only according to his interest.
6 Angier v. Tann ton Paper Co., 1
Gray (Mass.), 621, 61 Am. Dec. 43fi;
Carter v. Kingman, 103 Mass. 517;
Colcord v. 1cDonald 12 Ma ·s. 470;
Brown v. Hayne , 52 l\1e. 578; Everett
v. Hall, 67 Me. 497.
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the contract of sale are incorporated in or attached to the note;

on other occasions the note is physically entirely separate.

"Whether such a note is to be returned upon a recovery of the

property depends largely upon the considerations mentioned

in the preceding sections. If the note were taken as payment,

" either absolute or conditional," it was said in one case, 1 " it

might well be argued that, as the plaintiffs [the sellers] were

not entitled both to the property and to the purchase price of

the property, they would be put to their election, and, if they

insisted upon recaption of the property, they could only take

it after a surrender of the notes." So, where the note and the

contract are separate, a transfer of the note, apart from the

contract, thus putting it out of the seller's power to return it,

is evidence that he elects to treat it as payment, and this pre-

cludes recovery of the goods. 2

§ 633. . In the ordinary case, however, the note is not

payment, but simply evidence of the undertaking of the vendee ;

and while if the seller rescind he should return the note, he is
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usually, as has been seen, not obliged to rescind, nor is he bound

to surrender the evidence of the contract. 3 If a return in such

a case becomes necessary, as where the action is for damages

or a deficiency after sale, restitution upon the trial would un-

doubtedly suffice. 4

§ 634. Destruction of property before payment. — The ques-

tion of the effect of the accidental destruction of the property

before it was fully paid for has also given rise to decisions ap-

parently in conflict. The true view would seem to be that the

loss follows the title. 5 Hence in the case of the conditional

i Van Allen v. Francis (1899), 123 3 S. W. R. 363; Lippincott v. Rich

CaL 474, 56 Pac. R. 339, citing Segrist (1900), — Utah, — , 61 Pac. R. 526. See

v. Crabtree, 131 U. S. 287, 9 Sup. Ct. R. also Fleck v. Warner, 25 Kan. 492:

687. Bauendahl v. Horr, 7 Blatch. 548,

2 Merchants' Bank v. Thomas (1887), Fed. Cas. No. 1,1 13.

69 Tex. 237; Parlin, etc. Co. v. Harrell 4 See Brewer v. Ford (1889), 54 Hun

(1894), 8 Tex. Civ. Ap. 368, 27 S.W. R. (N. Y.), 116.

1084. 5 See Williams v. Allen, 10 Humph.

»Kirby v. Tompkins, 48 Ark. 273, (Tenn.) 337, 51 Am. Dec. 709; Black
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contract to sell, where no title passes until payment in full, the

loss, unless otherwise provided by the contract, would fall upon

the party agreeing to sell; while in the case of a sale upon

condition subsequent the loss would fall upon the purchaser;

and so the decisions are, when not complicated by other facts. 1

g 635. . At the same time it is possible that, even in

case of a contract of the first kind, the party undertaking to

sell may, by the terms of the agreement, be entitled to recover

contract to sell, where no title passes u~ til pay ment in full, the
loss, unless oth erwise provided by the co ntract, would fall upon
the party agreeing to sell; while in the case of a sale upon
condition subsequent the loss would fall upon the purchaser;
and so the decisions are, when not complicated by other facts.1

the sum agreed to be paid notwithstanding the destruction of

the property. In one case 2 the defendant Burnley had entered

into a contract for the purchase of a soda fountain from the

plaintiff Tufts and had given his notes for the amount payable

at different times. These notes stipulated that the title should

remain in Tufts until payment, and in case of default in pay-

ment of any one of them he might resume possession. After

part of the notes had been paid, the property while in posses-

sion of Burnley was burned without his fault, and he refused

to pay the remaining notes. Tufts sued to recover on these
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notes and succeeded. Said the court: "Burnley uncondition-

ally and absolutely promised to pay a certain sum for the prop-

v. Webb, 20 Ohio, 304, 55 Am. Dec. 2 Burnley v. Tufts, 66 Miss. 48, 5 S.

456. R. 627, 14 Am. St. R. 540. This case

!See Swallow v. Emery, 111 Mass. was approved and followed in Tufts

855: Stone v. Waite, 88 Ala. 599, 7 S. v. Griffin (1890). 107 N. C. 47, 12 S. E.

R.117; Bishop v. Minderhout, — Ala. R, 68, 22 Am. St. R. 863, 10 L. R. A.

— ,29S. R. 11; Randle v.Stone, 77 Ga. 526, where the court also take the

501. In this case it is said: "Thereser- same view of the nature of the con-

vatiou of title and ownership is with- tract, i e„ that it was "a conditional

out any modification or condition sale to be defeated upon the non-

whatever. It is absolutely reserved performance of the conditions."

up to the maturity. of the notes; not Swallow v. Emery, supra, was said

only ' title ' is so reserved, but, by to be perhaps distinguishable upon

way of emphasis, 'ownership' is the ground that in that case the

§ 635. - - . At the same time it is possible that, even in
case of a contract of tlie first kind, the party undertaking to
sell may, by the terms of the agreement, be entitled to recover
the sum agreed to be paid notwithstanding the destruction of
the property. In one case 2 the defendant Burnley had entered
into a contract for the purchase of a soda fountain from the
plaintiff Tufts and had given his notes for the amount payable
at different times. These notes stipulated that the title should
remain in Tuf.ts until payment, and in case of default in payment of any one of them he might resume possession. After
part of the notes had been paid, the property while in possession of Burnley was burned without his fault, and he refused
to pay the remaining notes. Tufts sued to recover on these
notes and succeeded. Said the court: "Burnley uncon(litionally and absolutely promised t::> pay a certain sum for the prop-

added. The owner must bear the vendor was to execute a bill of sale

loss if there be no fault in the actual to the vendee upon the payment of

possessor who is a bailee. 1 Benjamin the price. Burnley v. Tufts is also

on Sales, § 620; 1 Parsons, Contracts, approved in Tufts v. Wynne, 45 Mo.

526, 533, 537 (note), 51 Am. R. 59, 62. App. 42, and Osborn v. South Shore

63; 1 Benj.. g^ 412, 427." To same Lumber Co. (1895), 91 Wis. 526,65 N.

effect: Mountain City Mill Co. v. W. R. 184.

Butler, 109 Ga. 469, 34 S. E. R. 565.
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Y. ·vvebb, 20 Ohio, 304, 55 Am. Dec.
456.
l See s,,.·allow v. Emery, 111 Mass.
3.5.): Stone v. Waite, 88 A la. 599, 7 S.
R.117; Bishopv. l\Iinderhout,--Ala.
- , 29 S. R.11; Randle v. Stone, 77 Ga.
501. In thiscaseiti a.id: "Thereser·
vatio11 of title and owner::;hip is without any modification or condition
whate,er. It is absolutely reserved
up to the maturity.of the notes; not
only ' title' is so reserved, hut, by
"·ay of mpha is, 'owner hip' i
adLl d. The owner must bear the
lo · if there be no fault in the actual
p . . .· orwhoi a bail e. 1 Benjamin
on 'a.l , . 620; 1 Parsons, Con tra, ts,
:;<>6, . 3., 537 (note), 51 Am. R. 59. 63.
(3; • 1 B nj., L.' 412, 421." To ame
eff t: l\Iountain ity Mill o. v.
Butler, 109 Ga. 469, 34 S. E. R. 563.

Burnley v. Tufts, 66 Miss. 48, 5 S.
This case
was approved and foll owed in Tufts
v. Griffin (1890). 107 N. C. 47, 12 S. E.
R. 68, 22 Am. St. R. 863, 10 L. R. A.
526, where the court also take tbe
ame view of the nature of the contract, i. e., that it was "a conditional
sale to be defeateu upon the nonperformance of the conditions."
Swallow v. Emery, supra, was said
to he perhaps distingni hable upon
the ground that in that case the
vendor was to execute a bill of sale
to the ven rlee upon the payment of
the price. Burnley v. Tufts i abo
approved in Tufts v. Wynn e, 45 Mo.
App. 42, and Osborn v. South Shore
Lumber Co. (1 95), 01 Wis. 526, 65 N.
2

R. 627, 14 Am. St. R. 540.

w. R. 184.
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erty, the possession of which he received from Tufts. The fact

that the property has been destroyed while in his custody, and

before the time for the payment of the note last due, on pay-

ment of which only his right to the legal title of the property

would have accrued, does not relieve him of payment of the

price agreed on. He got exactly what he contracted for, viz.,

the possession of the property, and the right to acquire an ab-

solute title by payment of the agreed price. The transaction

was something more than an executory conditional sale. The

seller had done all that he was to do except to receive the pur-

chase price; the purchaser had received all that he was to re-

ceive as the consideration of his promises to pay. The inquiry

is not whether, if he had foreseen the contingency which has

occurred, he could have provided against it, nor whether he

might have made a more prudent contract, but it is whether,

by the contract he has made, his promise is absolute or condi-

tional. The contract made was a lawful one, and, as we have

said, imposed upon the buyer an absolute obligation to pay.
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To relieve him from this obligation the court must make a

new agreement for the parties, instead of enforcing the one

made, which it cannot do." The contract made in this case,

it will be observed, fell within the class of those which amount

to " something more than an executory conditional sale."

§ 636. Additions to or increase of property before pay-

ment.— As the risk of loss or destruction thus usually follows

the title, so the chance of gain or advantage from accessions

or additions to, or the increase or increment of, the chattel, is

usually held to likewise follow the title. Thus, in a number

of cases where a conditional contract for the sale of a mare

has been made, it has been held that a colt foaled before the

title has passed belonged, in case of default, to the owner of

the mare, and this whether the colt was begotten before x or

after 2 the making of the contract. In the same manner per-

i Allen v. Delano 55 Me. 113, 92 v. Fitzpatrick, 56 Ala. 400. See also

Am. Dec. 573. Desany v. Thorp, 70 Vt. 31, 39 Atl. R,

2 Buckmaster v. Smith, 22 Vt. 203; 309.

Clark v. Hayward, 51 Vt. 14; Elmore
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manent additions, improvements or repairs belong, usually,

as accessions, to the owner of the chattel to which they are

made. 1

This is in analogy to the rule prevailing in respect of chat-

tel mortgages by which additions to the property or its increase

inure to the benefit of the mortgagee. 2

§ 637. Additions to stock of goods sold. — But the doc-

trine of the preceding section has been held not to apply, in

the absence of express contract, to cases of the sale of a stock

manent additions, improvements or repairs belong, usually,
as accessions, to the owner of the chattel to which they are
made. 1
This is in analogy to the rule prevailing in respect of chattel mortgages by which additions to the property or its in crease
inure to the benefit of the mortgagee. 2

of goods from which the vendee is to be permitted to sell at

retail and which he is to replenish by purchases. Thus, in such

a case, 3 the court said: "There cannot be a transfer of title

by bringing in goods in this way without a clear agreement

to that effect. The writing contains no such agreement. It

nowhere says that the [seller] is to acquire any title under the

instrument. . . . It is silent in regard to the ownership

of the property to be bought by [the vendee] to keep up his

stock. If it was the intention of the parties that the title to
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this property should pass to the [seller] whenever it was put

with the stock of goods, they failed to express it."

iSee Eaton v. Munroe, 52 Me. 63 mortgaged, and the like, will pass

(the facts of which are stated in the by the mortgage. Harding v. Co-

note to the following section). But burn, 12 Mete. (Mass.) 833, 46 Am.

in Wiggins v. Snow (1891), 89 Mich. Dec. 680; Perry v. Pettingill, 33 N. H.

476, 50 N. W. R. 991, where the vendor 433; Crosby v. Baker, 6 Allen (Mass.),

failed to supply certain parts or ap- 295; Ames, Ex parte, 1 Low. (U. S.

purtenances of a machine sold, and C. C.) 561 ; Bryant v. Pennell, 61 Me.

the vendee was obliged to procure 108, 14 Am. R. 550. So will the young

them, it was held that these parts born of animals mortgaged. Rogers

belonged to the vendee and could v. Highland, 69 Iowa, 504, 29 N. W.

not be taken by the seller on recov- R. 429, 58 Am. R. 230; Kellogg v.

ering the machine. See also Rich- Lovely, 46 Mich. 131, 8 N. W. R. 699,

ardson Drug Co. v. Teasdall (1897), 41 Am. R. 151; Darling v. Wilson, 60

52 Neb. 698, 72 N. W. R. 1028, more N. H. 59, 49 Am. R. 305.

§ 6a7. - - Additions to stock of goods sold.-But the doctrine of the preceding section has been held not to apply, in
the absence of express contract, to cases of the sale of a stock
of goods from which the vendee is to be permitted to sell at
retail and which he is to replenish by purchases. Thus, in such
a case, a the court said : "There cannot be a trans fer of title
by bringing in goods in this way without a clear agreement
to that effect. The writin g contains no such agreement. It
nowhere says that the [seller] is to acquire any title under the
in 'trnment.
It is silent in regard to the ownership
of the property to be bought by [the vendee] to keep up his
stock. If it was the intention of the parties th at the title to
this property should pass to the [seller] whenever it was put
with the stock of goods, they failed to express it."

fully referred to in section following 3 Harding v. Lewenberg (1899), 174

on "Accession and confusion," § 642. Mass. 394, 54 N. E. R. 870. Ricliard-

2 Thus additions, repairs or im- son Drug Co. v. Teasdall (1897), 52

provements to chattels mortgaged, Neb. 698, 72 N. W. R 1028, accords,

completions of incomplete chattels
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1 See Eaton v. Munroe, 52 Me. 63 mortgaged, and the like, wiU pas
(the facts of which are stated in the by the mortgage. Hardin g v. Conote to the following section). But burn, 12 Mete. (l\'Ia s.) 333, 46 Am.
in Wiggins v. Snow (1 91), 89 l\Iich. Dec. 680; Perry v. P etting ill, 33 N. H.
476, 50 N. \V. R. 991, where the vendor 433; Crosby v. Baker, 6 Allen ( fas'.),
failed to supply certain parts or ap- 295; Ames, Ex part , 1 Low. (U. , .
purtenances of a machine sold, and C. C.) 561; Bryant v. P ennell, 61 Me.
the vendee was obliged to procure 108, 14 Am. R. 550. So w ill the young
them, it was held that tlrnse part born of anim als mortgaged. Rogers
belonged to the Yendee and could v. Highland, 69 Iowa, 504-, 29 N. W.
not be taken by the seller on recov- R. 429, 5 Arn. R. 230; K ellogg v.
ring the machine.
ee also Rich- Lovely, 46 Mich. 131, N. Vv. R. 699,
anl on rug o. v. T asdall (1 97), 41 Am. R. 151; Da rling v. Wilson, 60
59 N b. 69 , 72 N. W. R. 1028, more N. H. 59, 49 Am. R. 30:5.
3 Harding v. L ewenberg (1 99), 174
fully ref rred to in e tion following
on "
ce ."ion an cl confu ion, ' 642. l\fa s. 304, 54 N. E. R. ' 10. Ri c hard. v. Tea ]all (1897), 52
2Thus a idition., r pairs or im- on Drug
Neb.
698,
72
N.
\ V. R. 10.., , accords.
provem nt to hatt 1 mortgF1.g d,
compl li n of incompl te chattel
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§ 638. Changes in the form or nature of the property. —

"Where, after the delivery to the prospective purchaser, but

before payment, the goods are changed in form or nature or

are incorporated into other chattels, the question of the right

of the proposed seller to follow and recover them, in case of

default, presents interesting and difficult considerations. The

question has not frequently presented itself in reference to the

class of cases now under consideration, but analogy to general

principles would seem to suggest the following rules, under

which the seller's rights would be preserved, unless he has

done something to waive them or estop himself from asserting

them. 1 The question may present itself in three classes of

cases: (1) Where the change was wrongfully made; (2) where

it was not wilful but accidental, as through a mistake of fact;

and (3) where the change was rightful, or at least made with-

out wilful or intentional wrong.

§ 639. , 1. Where the prospective purchaser has made

the change wrongfully, the proposed seller may, in case of de-
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fault, recover his property in its changed form, without refer-

1 In Eaton v. Munroe, 52 Me. 63, possession of the lumber after de-

plaintiff had delivered to one Hall fault in payment by the purchaser,

about $40 worth of canvas. This In "Wing v. Thompson, 78 Wis. 256,

Hall was to make into a sail which 47 N. W. R. 606, a contract had been

was to remain the property of plaint- made for the sale of standing timber

iff until paid for. Hall had the can- which was to be cut and removed by

vas made into the sail, as agreed, at the vendees and kept in their pos-

an expense for labor and materials of session, but the title was to remain

about $18, and then, without paying in the vendor until full payment was

plaintiff, sold the sail to one Chase, made. Said the court: "It may be

and Chase sold it to defendant. The premised that a contract of this kind

plaintiff, after demand, replevied the is not favored in the law. and the

sail and was held entitled to recover, right to enforce the reservations as

not only because the sail was to be against a bona fide purchaser with-

his until paid for, but also on the out notice must be based upon evi-

ground of accession. dence which shows that the plaintiff

In Hineman v. Matthews, 138 Pa. has not done anything in regard to

St. 204, 20 Atl. E. 843, 10 L. R. A. 233, such property while in the hands of

it was held, that, where timber was his vendee which would amount to

conditionally sold, the fact that it a waiver of his right or estop him

was converted into lumber did not from asserting his title against a pur-

deprive the seller of his right to take chaser from his vendee."
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ence to the degree of the improvement or the additional value

given to it by the labor of the wrong-doer, provided that the

original chattels are still capable of identification, or, accord-

ing to some cases, provided that they can be traced into the

new form though their identity be lost. 1 " This rule," says

1 " As a general rule," says Cooley,

ence to the degree of the improvement or the additional value
given to it by the labor of the wrong-doer, provided that the
original chattels are still capable of identification, or, according to some cases, provided that they can be traced into the
new form though their identity be lost. 1 "This rule," says

J.. " one whose property has been ap-

propriated by another without au-

thority has a right to follow it, and

recover the possession from any one

who may have received it; and if, in

the meantime, it has been increased

in value by the addition of labor or

money, the owner may, nevertheless,

reclaim it, provided there has been

no destruction of substantial iden-
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tity. So far the authorities are agreed.

A man cannot generally be deprived

of his property except by his own

voluntary act or by operation of law;

and if unauthorized parties have be-

stowed expense or labor upon it, that

fact cannot constitute a bar to his

reclaiming it, so long as identifica-

tion is not impracticable. But there

must, nevertheless, in reason be some

limit to the right to follow and re-

claim materials which have under-

gone a process of manufacture. . . .

No test which satisfies the reason of

the law can be applied in the adjust-

ment of questions of title to chattels

by accession unless it keeps in view

the circumstance of relative values.

When we bear in mind the fact that

what the law aims at is the accom-

plishment of substantial equity, we

shall readily perceive that the fact

of the value of the materials having

been increased a hundred fold is of

more importance in the adjustment

than any chemical change or me-

chanical transformation, which, how-

ever radical, neither is expensive to

the party making it, nor adds mate-

rially to the value." Wetherbee v.

Green, 22 Mich. 311, 7 Am. R. 653.

"In Betts v. Lee, 5 Johns. 348, 4

Am. Dec. 368, it was decided," says

Kuggles, J., " that as against a tres-

passer the original owner of the

property may seize it in its new

shape, whatever alteration of form

it may have undergone, if he can

prove the identity of the original

materials. That was a case in which

the defendant had cut down the

I" As a general rule," says Cooley,
J .. "one wl10 el roperty has been appropriated by another without authority has a right to follow it, and
recover the pos ession from any one
who may have received it; and if, in
the meantime, it has been increased
in value by the addition of labor or
money, the owner may, n everthele s,
i·eclaim it, provided there has been
no destruct.ion of substantial identity. So far the authorities are agreed.
A man cannot generally be deprived
of his property except by his own
voluntary act or by operation of law;
and if unauthorized parties have bestowed expense or labor upon it, that
fact cannot constitute a bar to his
reclaiming it, so long as identifica ·
tion is not impracticable. But there
must, nevertheless, in reason be some
limit to the right to follow and reclaim materials which have undergone a process of manufacture. . • •
No test which satisfies the reason of
the law can be applied in the adjustment of q_uestion of title to chattels
by a ce ion unles it keeps in view
the circumstance of relative values.
When we bear in mind the fact that
what the law aims at is the accompli bment of sub tantial equity, we
hall r adily per eive that the fact
of th value of th material having
b n increa . . ed a hundred fold is of
mor importan e in the aclju tm nt
tllan any hemical ban O'e or mehani al tr n f rmation wbi h h wver racli al, n ith r i · XI n iv to
the pc rty making it, nor atltl8 mat -

plaintiff's trees and made them into

shingles. The property could neither

be identified by inspection nor re-

stored to its original form; but the

plaintiff recovered the value of the

shingles. So in Curtis v. Groat, 6

Johns. 168, 5 Am. Dec. 204, a tres-

passer cut wood on another's land

and converted it into charcoal. It

was held that the charcoal still be-

5•>

rially to the value." Wetherbee v.
Green, 22 Mich. 311, 7 Am. R 653.
''In Betts v. Lee, 5 Johns. 848, 4
Am. Dec. 368, it was decided," says
ltuggles, J., "that as against a trespasser the original owner of the
property may seize it in its new
shape, whatever alteration of form
it may have undergone, if he can
pro,·e the identity of the origiual
materials. That was a case in which
the ·defendant had cut down the
plaintiff's trees and made them into
shingles. The property could neither
be identified by inspection nor restored to its original form; but the
plainWf recovered the value of the
shingles. So in Curtis v. Groat, 6
Johns. 168, 5 Am. Dec. 204, a trespasser cut wood on another's land
and converted it into charcoal. It
was held that the charcoal still belonged to the owner of the wood.
Here was a change of the wood in to
an article of different kind and species. No part of the substance of
the wood rernainetl in its original
state; its identity could not be ascertained by the senses, nor could it be
re~ tored to what it originally wa .
That case di tinctly recognizes the
principle that a wilful tre pas er
cannot acquire a title to property
m rely by changing it from one spei s to another. And the late 'bancellor Kent, in his Commentarie
(vol. 2, p. 363), d clares that the EngIi h law will not allow one man to
gain a title to the property of anotber upon the principle of a ce sion

CH. III.] CONDITIONAL SALE OF SPECIFIC CHATTELS. [§§ 640, 641.

Ruggles, J., 1 " holds good against an innocent purchaser from

the wrong-doer, although its value be increased a hundred

fold by the labor of the purchaser. This is a necessary con-

sequence of the continuance of the original ownership." An

exception exists where the change was made by the innocent

purchaser himself, believing himself to be the owner. In this

case, if the identity be destroyed, the true owner may recover

only the value of the original chattel and not the chattel in

its improved or altered form. 2

| 640. . 2. Where the change was not wilful, but acci-

dental, and the original can still be identified, the owner may

have it in its altered form unless the additions have gone fur-

ther than the original chattel to make up its present improved

form, in which case he may have simply the value of the orig-

inal. 3

§ 641, . 3. Where the change was not wrongful, the orig-

inal owner may recover his chattel even in its improved form

if he took the other's property wil-
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fully as a trespasser; and that it was

settled as early as the time of the

Year Books that whatever alteration

of form any property had undergone,

the owner might seize it in its new

shape if he could prove the identity

of the original materials. The same

rule has been adopted in Pennsyl-

vania: Snyder v. Vaux, 2 Rawle, 427,

21 Am. Dec. 406." Silsbury v. Mc-

Coon, 3 N. Y. 379, 53 Am. Dec. 307.

In this case whisky made from corn

wrongfully taken was held to be-

long to the owner of the corn. See

also interesting illustrations and dis-

cussions in Strubbee v. Railway Co.,

78 Ky. 481, 39 Am. R. 251; Murphy v.

Railroad Co., 55 Iowa, 473, 8 N. W.

R. 320, 39 Am. R. 175; Hazelton v.

Weeks, 49 Wis. 661, 35 Am. R. 796;

Heard v. James, 49 Miss. 236.

1 In Silsbury v. McCoon, supra. To

same effect: Strubbee v. Railway

Co., supra, disapproving of Lake

Shore R. Co. v. Hutchins, 32 Ohio St.

571, 30 Am. R. 629.

2 Silsbury v. McCoon, supra; Weth-

erbee v. Green, supra.

sWetherbee v. Green, 22 Mich. 311,

7 Am. R. 653, is the leading case

upon this subject. There timber of

the value of $25 had been, in the

exercise of what was supposed to

be proper authority, converted into

hoops of the value of $700, and it

was held that while, as a general

rule, the owner may recover his prop-

erty in its increased form, yet where,

as here, the act was not wilful, and

the change in value was so great, he

could recover only the original value.

But in Isle Royal Mining Co. v. Her-

tin, 37 Mich. 332, 26 Am. R. 520, where

the disparity in values was slight,

the contrary result was reached.

See the note to this case in 26 Am.

R.525.

34
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unless its identity has been lost, or the alterations or additions

exceed it in value, in which case also he may recover simply

the value of the original. 1

§ 642. Accession and confusion of goods.— The question of

unless its identity has been lost, or the alterations or ad litions
exceed it in value, in which case also he may recover simr ly
the value of the original. 1

the confusion of goods presents substantially the same consider-

ations. Four cases may here present themselves: (1) The au-

thorized commingling. (2) The wilful or tortious comming-

ling. (3) The unintentionally mistaken commingling; and

(4) The commingling by accident or vis major. Without going

at large into the subject, it may be said that the following

rules apply:

1. Where the commingling was with the consent of the par-

ties, they become tenants in common of the mass. 2

2. Where the confusion was tortious, the parties will still be

treated as tenants in common, if the parts are of like nature

and value; or, if the goods of each can be distinguished, then

each may take his own; but where they are of different kinds

and value, or the goods of each cannot be distinguished, the
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innocent owner will take the whole. 3

i See 2 Schouler, Personal Property, R. 226; First Nat. Bank v. Schween,

37; Bishop, Non-Contract Law, § 939. 127 111. 573, 11 Am. St. R 174; First

2 Dole v. Olmstead, 36 111. 150,85 Nat. Bank of Elgin v. Kilbourne, 20

Am. Dec. 397; S. C, 41 111. 344, 89 Am. N. E. R. 681 ; Stephenson v. Little, 10

Dec. 386; Sexton v. Graham, 53 Iowa, Mich. 433.

181, 4 N. W. R. 1090; Nowlen v. Colt, In Richardson Drug Co. v. Teas-

6 Hill (N. Y.), 461, 41 Am. Dec. 756. dall (1897), 52 Neb. 698, 72 N. W. R.

3 " There is no forfeiture," says 1028, where the subject-matter of the

Shepley, C. J., "in a case of a fraud- sale was a stock of drugs, which the

ulent intermixture when the goods vendee was, by the contract, to dis-

intermixed are of equal value. This pose of at retail and not to deplete,

has not been sufficiently noticed, and it was held that, on default, the

§ 64-2. Accession and confusion of goods.-The que tion of
the confusion of oods pre ents substantially the same con iderations. Four cases may here present them elves: (1) The authorized commingling. (2) The wilful or tortious commingling. (3) The unintentionally mi taken commingling; an l
(4) The commingling by accident or vis major. Without going
at large into the subject, it may be said that the following
rules apply:
1. Where the commingling was with the con ent of the parties, they become tenants in common of the mass. 2
2. Where the confusion was tortious, the parties will still be
treated as tenants in common, if the parts are of like nature
and value; or, if the goods of each can be di tinguished, then
each may take his own; but where they are of different kinds
and value, or the goods of each cannot be distinguished, the
innocent owner will take the whole. 3

yet it is a just rule and is fully sus- vendor was entitled only to so much

tained by authority." Hesseltine v. of the original stock as remained un-

Stockwell, 30 Me. 237, 50 Am. Dec. disposed of, and not to additions

627. See also Robinson v. Holt, 39 made by the vendee; and that the

N. H. 557, 75 Am. Dec. 233; First Nat. vendee's mixing of the goods abso-

Bank v. Hummel, 14 Colo. 259, 23 lutely purchased by him with the

Pac. R. 986, 20 Am. St. R. 257; Little goods conditionally purchased was

Pittsburg Mining Co. v. Mining Co., neither wrongful nor fraudulent

11 Colo. 223, 17 Pac. R. 760, 7 Am. St. within such principles as are dis-
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l See 2 Schouler, Per on al Property,
R. 226; First Nat. Bank v. Sch ween,
37; Bishop, Non-Contract Law, 939. 127 Ill. 573, 11 Am. St. R. 174; First
2 Dole v. Olmstead, 36 Ill. 150, 85 Nat. Bank of Elgin v. Kilbourne, 20
A m. Dec. 397; s. c., 41 Ill. 344, 89 Am. N. E. R. 681; Stephenson "V. Little, 10
Dec. 3 6; ex ton v. Graham, 53 Iowa, Mich. 433.
1 1, 4 N. vV. R. 1090; Nowlen v. Colt,
In Richardson Drug Co. v. Teasdall (1897), 52 Neb. 698, 72 N. W. R.
6 Hill (N. Y. ), 461, 41 Am. Dec. 756.
3 '' There is no forfeiture,' ' says 1028, where the subject-matter of the
Shepley, . J., " in a case of a fraud- sale wa a stock of drugs, which the
ulent intermix ture when the good::; vendee wa~, by the contract, to di intermixed ar e of equa l value. This po e of at retail and nqt to deplete,
has not b Pn s ufficiently noticed, and it was held that, on default, the
ye t it i a j ust rule and is fully sus- vendor was entitled only to so much
t ained by au t hority." H esseltine v. of the original tock as remained untockw 11, 30 Me. 237, 50 Am. D c. dispo ed of, and not to additions
6':37.
al o Robin on v. H olt, 39 maJe by the vendee; and that the
N. H. 557, 75 Am. D . 23 ; Fir ·t Nat. vend e's mixing of the goods ab oBan k v. Hummel, 14 Colo. 259, 23 lutely purchased by him with the
P ac. R. 9 6, 90 m. t. R. 9 i 7; ittle gooJ conditionally purchased was
Pitt burg l\Iining o. . l\Iinin o- Co., n ith r wrongful nor fraudulent
11 ol . 2,.,3, 17 Pac. R. 760, 7 m. t. within such pi·inciples as are dis530
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3. If the confusion was caused by the unintentional mistake

of the party making it, the parties will usually be regarded as

tenants in common, if their contributions are of like kind and

value, and the share of each can be ascertained ; but, if not, the

person by whose carelessness, folly or misfortune the confusion

was caused must lose his share. 1

4. If the confusion was caused by - inevitable accident or vis

major, each may recover his share if distinguishable, otherwise

they will be held to be tenants in common of the mass. 2

§643. Substitution of goods. — If the property originally

agreed to be sold is exchanged by the prospective purchaser for

other chattels, the latter do not thereby become the property

of the vendor or subject to the contract, 3 though with the con-

sent of both parties such a substitution may be made. 4

§ 644. Effect of annexing chattels conditionally sold to the

freehold. — The annexation of the chattels contracted to be

sold to his freehold by the conditional purchaser raises all of

the vexed and difficult questions which attend the subject of
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fixtures generally.

§ 645. As between the immediate parties to the trans-

action there can ordinarily be no difficulty in preserving the

character of the chattels as personalty, even though annexed

cussed in the text. Wiggins v. Snow, S. R. 717, it is held that if a horse sold

89 Mich. 476, 50 N. W. R. 991, was conditionally be wrongfully killed

cited and relied upon. See also Hard- by a railroad company, either the

ing v. Lewenberg, 174 Mass. 394, 54 vendor or vendee may sue to recover

N. E. R. 870. the damages. If the vendee sues and

1 Ryder v. Hathaway, 21 Pick, recovers, the vendor has a claim upon

{Mass.) 298; Pratt v. Bryant, 20 Vt. the vendee for money had to his use

333; Hesseltine v. Stockwell, supra; to the extent of the original purchase

Thome v. Colton, 27 Iowa, 425. price; but if the vendee uses the

2 Spence v. Insurance Co., L. R. 3 money to buy another horse, it does

C. P. 427; Moore v. Railway Co., 7 not become the property of the orig-

Lans. (N. Y.) 39. inal vendor, nor has he any lien upon

3 Nattin v. Riley, 54 Ark. 30, 14 S. it for the purchase price of the horse

"W. R. 1100; Dedman v. Earle, 52 Ark. killed.

164, 12 S. W. R. 330. * Kelsey v. Kendall, 48 Vt. 24 ; Perry

In Smith v. Gufford, 36 Fla. 481, 18 v. Young, 105 N. C. 463, 11 S. E. R. 511.
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to the realty with the seller's assent, so long as they remain

distinguishable and severable. 1 The same rule applies also

asrainst creditors of the vendee: 2 but when the claims of mort-

gagees or purchasers of the land, to which such chattels have

been annexed, arise, questions of difficulty present themselves.

646.

to the realty with the seller's ·assent, so lonci as they remain
distingui halJle and scverable. 1 The same rule applies also
against creditors of the vendee; 2 but when the claims of mortgagees or purchas rs of the land, to which such chattels have
been annexed, ari e, questions of difficulty present themselves.

As against subsequent purchasers without no-

tice, the condition, by the weight of authority, could net oper-

ate to characterize as personalty that which appears to be, and

§ 64:6. - - As against subsequent purcha ers without no-

by its ordinary nature is, a part of the realty. 3 The same rule

also applies in respect of a subsequent mortgagee of the land

where he takes without notice, 4 but not where he took with

1 Harkey v. Cain, 69 Tex. 146, 6 S.

W. R 637; Brewing Ass'n v. Manu-

facturing Co., 81 Tex. 99. 16 S. W. R

797; Lansing Iron Works v. Walker,

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:50 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t6xw4h56n
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

91 Mich. 409, 51 N. W. R. 1061, 30 Am.

tice, the condition, by the weight of authority, could not operate to characterize as per onalty that which appears to be, and
by its ordinary nature is, a part of the realty. 3 The same rule
al o a pplies in resp ct of a subseciuent mortgagee of the land
where he takes without notice, 4 but not where he took with

St. R. 488; Tyson v. Post, 108 N. Y.

217, 15 N. E. R. 316, 2 Am. St. R. 409;

Rogers v. Cox, 96 Ind. 157, 49 Am. R.

152; Price v. Malott, 85 Ind. 266, 109

Ind. 22; Hendy v. Dinkerhoff, 57 Cal.

3, 40 Am. R. 107; Haven v. Emery, 33

N. H. 66.

2Sturgis v. Warren, 11 Vt. 433: Sis-

son v. Hibbard, 75 N. Y. 542.

s Prince v. Case, 10 Conn. 375, 27

Am. Dec. 675; Powers v. Dennison, 30

Vt. 752; Hunt v. Bay State Iron Co.,

97 Mass. 279; Tibbetts v. Home, 65

N. H. 242, 23 Atl. R. 145, 23 Am. St.

R 31; Stillman v. Flenniken, 58 Iowa,

450, 43 Am. R 120, 10 N. W. R. 842;

Hobson v. Gorringe (1897), 1 Ch. 182;

Watson v. Alberts, 120 Mich. 508, 79

N. W. R. 1048; Landigan v. Mayer

(1898 1 , 32 Oreg. 245, 51 Pac. R. 649, 67

Am. St. R 521. But see Mott v.

Palmer, 1 N. Y. 564; Ford v. Cobb,

20 N. Y. 344. where it is held that the

subsequent purchaser gets no title,

but must rely on the warranties in

3 »is deed.

4 Hopewell Mills v. Taunton Sav-

ings Bank, 150 Mass. 519, 15 Am. St.

R. 235, 6 L. R. A. 249, 23 N. E. R. 327

[citing Hunt v. Bay State Iron Co.,

supra; Thompson v. Vinton, 121 Mass.

139; Southbridge Sav. Bank v. Exeter

Mach. Wks., 127 Mass. 542; Case Mfg.

Co. v. Garven, 45 Ohio St. 289, 13 N.

E. R 493]; Tibbetts v. Home, 65 N. H.

242, 23 Atl. R. 145, 23 Am. St, R. 81;

Pierce v. George, 108 Mass. 78; Wickes

v. Hill, 115 Mich. 333, 73 N. W. R. 375.

But contra in Alabama. Warren v.

Liddell (1895), 110 Ala. 232, 20 S. R. 89,

citing many other cases from that

state.

A planer used in a saw-mill, al-

though some fastening be necessary

to its use, is not such a fixture as to

pass with a subsequent mortgage of

the realty, as against the conditional

vendor, especially as the mortgage

was merely to secure an antecedent

indebtedness. Cherry v. Arthur, 5

1 Harkey

v. Cain, 69 Tex. 146, 6 S.
4 Hopewell Mill
v. Tann ton SavW.R. 637; Brewing A ·s'n v. Manu- ings Bank, 150 Mass. 519, 15 Arn. St.
facturing Co., 81 Tex. 99. 16 S. W.R. R. 235, 6 L. R. A. 249, 23 N. E. R. 327
797; Lan ing Iron Works v. Walker, [citing Hunt v. Bay State Iron Co.,
91 Mic h. 409, 51 N. W.R. 1061, 30 Am. supra; Thomp on v. Vinton, 121 Mass.
St. R. 4 ; Tyson v. Post, 10 N. Y. 1i39; Southbridge Sav. Bank v. Exeter
217, 15 N. E. R. 316, 2 Am. St. R. 409; Mach. Wks., 127 Mass. 542; Ca e Mfg.
Roger · v. Cox, 96 Ind. 157, 49 Am. R. Co. v. Garven, 45 Ohio t. 2 9, 13 N.
152; Price v. Malott, 85 Ind. 266, 109 E. R. 4913]; Tibbetts v. Horne, 65 N. H.
Incl 22; Hendy v. Dinkerhoff, 57 Cal. 242, 23 Atl. R. 145, 23 Am. St. R. 31;
3, 40 Am. R.107; Haven v. Emery, 33 Pierce v. George, 10 Ma s. 78; Wickes
N. H. 66.
v. Hill, 115 Mich. 333, 73 N. W. R. 375.
2Sturgi v. Warren, 11 Vt. 433: Sis- But contra in Alabama. Warren v.
Liddell (1 95), 110 Ala. 232, 20 S. R. 89,
son v. Hibbard, 75 N. Y. 542.
a Prince v. Case, 10 Conn. 375, 27 citing many other ca es from that
A m. Dec. 675; P owers v. Dennison, 30 state.
V t. 759; Hunt v. Bay tate Iron Co.,
A planer used in a sa"··-mill, al97 llla . 279; Tibbetts v. Horne, 6- though ome fastening be nece ·sary
N. H . 249, 23 Atl. R. 145, 23 Am. St. to its use, is not snch a fixture as to
R. 31; t illman v. Flenniken, 5 Iowa, pas· with a ·ub equent mortgage of
4.-0, 43 Am. R. 120, 10 N. W.R. 42· the realty, as again t the conditiona l
IIob~ on v. Gorrin ge (1 97), 1 Ch. 182; v ndor, especially as the mortgage
W a t on v. Albert , 12 Iich. 50 , 79 wa merely to secure an ante eclent
N . \ . R. 10J ; La ndigan v . fay er indebtedne . Cherry v. Arthur, 5
(1 0 ', 32 reg. 945, 51 P ac. R. 649, 67 Wa. h. 7 7, 32 Pac. R. 744.
A m. t. R. 5... 1. But e
I tt v.
\Vb n battel are
ld under an
lmer 1 N. Y. 564; Ford v.
bb, ag reem nt thn.t the title shall not
20 . Y. 344. wher it i held tha t th
pa . until full paym nt and are deu equ nt pur ha r g t n o tit! , liv red t the purcha rafter he has
b ut m u t r ly n th w IT ntie in m ad a mortgage covering after·
11i cl eel.
a quired rop rty, of which mort53..,

CH. III.] CONDITIONAL SALE OF SPECIFIC CHATTELS. [§ 647.

notice that the chattels still retained their character as per-

sonalty. 1

647.

As to a prior mortgagee of the land, the rule

seems to be that a chattel not intended to become a fixture, and

so affixed as to be removable without destroying or seriously

injuring either the chattel itself or the realty to which it is

attached, may, by virtue of a reservation of title in the vendor,

retain its character as personalty and be subject to his rights. 2

gage the vendor has constructive

notice through its record, the vend-

or's lien on such chattels for their

price will prevail, as against the

mortgagee, provided such chattels

are separate and distinct personalty,

and do not become part of the real

estate mortgaged; but if, with the

consent of the vendor, implied by his

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:50 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t6xw4h56n
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

knowledge of the mortgage, such

chattels become part of the realty,

they are subject to the lien of the

mortgage. A stipulation in a con-

tract for the sale of chattels that

they shall not become or be deemed

a part of any real estate cannot alter,

as against one not a party to such

contract, the legal effect of what may

afterwards be done with such chat-

tels. New York Sec. & Tr. Co. v.

Capital Ry. Co., 77 Fed. R. 529.

1 Horn v. Indianapolis Nat. Bank,

125 Ind. 381, 21 Am. St. R. 231, 9 L. R

A. 676, 25 N. E. R. 558.

The retention of open control by a

vendor's employee over machinery

placed in the works of a company

which were being fitted up by the

vendee is notice to said company of

the existence of a vendor's lien. Holly

Mfg. Co. v. New Chester Water Co.,

48 Fed. R. 879.

Where machinery is sold and placed

in a building for the purpose of mak-

ing it available as a manufactory, but

under an agreement between the

seller and buyer that the title shall

remain in the former until it is

wholly paid for, it may properly be

deemed personal property as against

a mortgagee who with full knowl-

edge consents to the arrangement,

and may be removed by the seller

who retained the title, although it

has the character of a fixture and

has been permanently annexed. Haw-

kins v. Hersey,88 Me. 394, 30 Atl. R. 14.

Chattels were conditionally sold to

the tenant of a building, who placed

them in the building, but without af-

fixing them to such an extent that

they could not be removed without in-

jury to the building. He surrendered

the building with those chattels to his

landlord, who afterwards leased the

building and the chattels to other

tenants; but it was held that the

surrender of the building with these

chattels affixed did not affect the

title of the conditional vendor or his

§§ 648, 649.] J'AW OF SALE. [book it,

"Where, however, " the articles are of such a character that

their detachment would involve a destruction or dismantling of

an important feature of the realty, such annexation might well

be regarded as an abandonment of the lien by him who im-

pliedly assented to the annexation." l

§ 648. Conflict of laws.— Contracts of this sort, though

made in one State, and in contemplation of its laws, may, by

reason of the removal of the parties or the property into an-

other State, fall within the influence of varying if not conflict-

ing laws; and it becomes necessary to inquire by what law the

rights of the parties are to be determined.

§ 649. "The general rule," it is said in one case, 2 "is

that the validity and effect of contracts relating to personal

property are to be determined by the laws of the State or

country where they are made, and, as a matter of comity, they

will, if valid there, be enforced in another State or country,

although not executed or recorded according to the law of the

latter. And the rule has been applied, in a great number of
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cases, to chattel mortgages, where the mortgagor removes

with the property into another State, continuing in possession

of it, permissible by the law of the former, under circumstances

that, had the mortgage been executed in the latter State by

German Savings Society v. Weber, 16 Mort., §§ 260, 299-301 ; Offutt v. Flagg,

Wash. 95, 47 Pac. R. 224; Baldwin v. 10 N. H. 46; Ferguson v. Clifford, 87

Young, 47 La, Ann. 1466, 17 S. R. 883; N. H. 86; Cobb v. Buswell, 37 Vt, 337;

Walburn-Swenson Co. v. Darrell, 49 Jones v. Taylor, 30 Vt. 42; Taylor v.

La. Ann. 1044, 22 S. R. 310. Boardman, 25 Vt. 581; Ballard v.

Campbell v. Roddy, supra, was fol- Winter, 39 Conn. 179; Langworthy

lowed and applied in Palmateer v. v. Little, 12 Cush. (Mass.) 109; Bank

Robinson, 00 N. J. L. 433, 38 Atl. R. v. Danforth, 14 Gray (Mass.), 123;

957, in a case arising between a prior Martin v. Hill, 12 Barb. (N. Y.) 631;

conditional vendor of the realty and Kanaga v. Taylor, 7 Ohio St. 134, 70

a subsequent conditional vendor of Am. Dec. 62; Wilson v. Carson, 12

the chattel. It is distinguished in Md. 54; Smith v. McLean, 24 Iowa,

Warren v. Liddell, 110 Ala. 232, 20 322; Simms v. McKee, 25 Iowa, 341;

S. R 89. Feurt v. Rowell, f>2 Mo. 524]; Gross v.

1 Campbell v. Roddy, supra. Jordan, 83 Me. 380, 22 Atl. R. 250;

2Keenan v. Stimson, 32 Minn. 377, Woolley v. Geneva Wagon Co., 59 N.

20 N. W. R, 364 [citing Jones, Chat. J. L. 278, 35 Atl. R. 789.

534
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[§ 649.

one resident therein, would have made it invalid as against

creditors or purchasers." This rule has, with substantial una-

nimity, been applied to cases of conditional contracts of sale. 1

1 A contract made in New Hamp-

shire and there valid will be held

valid in Vermont, though not re-

duced to writing or recorded as there

required. Dixon v. Blond in, 58 Vt.

689, 5 Atl. R. 514. To same effect:

Barrett v. Kelley, 66 Vt. 515, 29 Atl.

R. 8Q9; Wooley v. Wagon Co., supra;

Gross v. Jordan, supra; Public Parks

Amusement Co. v. Embree-McLean

Carriage Co., 64 Ark. 29, 40 S. W. R.

582; Baldwin v. Hill, 4 Kan. App. 168,

46 Pac. R. 329; Harper v. People, 2

Colo. App. 177. 29 Pac. R. 1040; Cleve-
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land Mach. Works v. Lang, 67 N. H.

348, 31 Atl. R. 20.

By the laws of Georgia a reserva-

tion of title by the seller until the

property is paid for, though invalid

as against third persons unless the

contract is reduced to writing, ac-

knowledged and duly recorded, is

valid as between the parties; and if

the purchaser, holding possession

under such a conditional sale, brings

the property into Alabama and there

sells it to a third person, the title of

the latter cannot prevail against that

of the original vendor under the laws

of Georgia. Weinstein v. Freyer, 93

Ala. 257, 9 S. R. 285, 12 L. R. A. 700.

By the laws of New Jersey a con-

ditional contract of sale was valid

against a bona fide purchaser from

the conditional vendee. By the law

of Pennsylvania it is not good against

such a bona fide purchaser, though it

is good as between the parties. S.

made a contract for the purchase of

a safe with the Marvin Safe Co. in

Philadelphia by which the company

reserved title till the safe was paid

for. The safe was sent to New Jer-

sey, where S. resided. He there sold

it to N., a bona fide purchaser. In

trover by the safe company against

N. it was held that N.'s rights were

determined by the law of New Jersey,

but that he acquired only such title

as S. had when the property was

brought into New Jersey, and that

therefore the title was in the com-

pany. Marvin Safe Co. v. Norton, 48

N. J. L. 410, 7 Atl. R. 418, 57 Am. R.

566. (Compare the earlier case of

The Marina, 19 Fed. R. 760, in the

New Jersey district court.)

B. made a contract in Michigan

for the purchase from W. of a piano.

W. reserved title till paid for. B. re-

moved the piano to Illinois without

W.'s knowledge or consent and there

mortgaged it to C. The contract was

good in Michigan against even a bona

fide sub-vendee though not recorded.

§ 650.J

LAW OF

ALE.

[BOOK II.

650.]
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[book IT.

650.

But where, though the parties reside and the

contract is executed in one State, the property is then situated in

another State, or is brought into the latter State in pursuance

and by virtue of the contract, the law of the latter State is

usually held to control with reference to questions thereafter

involving it, and if the conditional vendor would preserve his

rights in the latter State he must comply with the provisions

of its laws. 1

tract for the sale of personal prop-

erty by which possession is at once

§ 650. - - But where, though the parties reside and the
contract is executed in one State, the property is then situated in
another State, or is brought into the latter State in pursuance
and by virtue of the contract, the law of the latter State is
usually held to control with reference to questions thereafter
involving it, and if the conditional vendor would preserve his
rights in the latter State he must comply with the provisions
of its la ws. 1

given to the vendees and the title is

to remain in the vendors until pay-

ment is valid. Where property thus

sold in Kansas was removed to Colo-

rado it was held that such contract
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was enforceable in Colorado, though

by the laws of that State compliance

with certain conditions was requi-

site to make such a contract valid.

Harper v. People, 2 Colo. App. 177, 29

Pac. R. 1040, distinguishing Wilson

v. Voight, 9 Colo. 614, 13 Pac. R. 726.

In this case the court said : " It is al-

ways essential to ascertain the domi-

cile of the parties, the lex loci con-

tractus, and the situs of the property.

Wherever these unite to sustain the

validity of the contract it may be

safely asserted that it is enforceable

in the courts of evei*y State where a

controversy arises over the title to

the property. These elements are

present in this suit. All the parties

to the contract lived in Kansas. By

the law of the place of the contract

the agreement was a valid one

against everybody. The property was

within the limits of that jurisdiction

when the contract was made. Ac-

cording to the weight of authority

the removal of the property into an-

other State, whether with or without

the consent of the contracting par-

ties, will not invalidate a contract

enforceable when and where it was

entered into. A multitude of author-

ities can be cited upon this question,

but we shall content ourselves with

the citation of a few well-considered

decisions in which the doctrine has

been announced. Mumford v. Canty,

50 111. 370, 99 Am. Dec. 526; Ferguson

v. Clifford, 37 N. H. 86; Kanaga v.

Taylor, 7 Ohio St. 134, 70 Am. Dec.

62; Cobb v. Buswell, 37 Vt. 337;

Smith v. McLean, 24 Iowa, 322; Born

v. Shaw, 29 Pa. St. 288, 72 Am. Dec.

633; Crapo v. Kelly, 16 Wall. (U. S.)

610; Thuret v. Jenkins, 7 Mart. (La.)

318, 12 Am. Dec. 508."

1 In Hervey v. Locomotive Works,

93 U. S. 664, it is said: "It was de-

cided by this court in Green v. Van

Buskirk, 5 Wall. 307: S. C, 7 id. 139,

that the liability of property to be

sold under legal process, issuing from

tract for the sale of personal property by which po. session is at once
given to the vendees and the title is
to remain in the vendors until payment is valid. Where property thus
sold in Kansas was removed to Colorado it was hehl that such contract
was enforceable in Colorado, though
by the laws of that State compliance
with certain conditions was rnquisite to make such a contract valid.
Harper v. People, 2 Colo. App. 177, 29
Pac. R. 1040, distinguishing Wilson
v. Voight, 9 Colo. 614, 13 Pac. R. 726.
In this case the court said: "It is alway essential to ascertain the domicile of the parties, the lex loci contractus, and the situs of the property.
Wherever these unite to ustain the
validity of the contract it may be
safely asserted that it is enforceable
in the courts of every tate where a
controver y ari es over the title to
the property. The e elements are
pr sent in thi suit. All the parties
to the contract lived in Kansa . By
the law of the place of the contract
the agreement was a valid. one
again t everybody. The property was
within the limits of that juri. di tion
when the contract was made. Ac~
ordina- to the w ight of authority
the r moval of th prop rty into another t t , wh th r with or without
th
on nt of the contra ting parties, will not invalidate a contract

enforceable when and where it was
entered into. A multitude of authoritie can be cited upon this question,
but we shall content our elves with
the citation of a few well-considered
deci ions in which the doctrine has
been announced. Mumford v. Canty,
50 Ill. 370, 99 Am. Dec. 526; Ferguson
v. :lifford , 37 N. H. 86; Kanaga v.
Taylor, 7 Ohio St. 134, 70 Am. Dec.
62; Cobb v. Buswell, 37 Vt. 337;
Smith v. McLean. 24 Iowa, 322; Born
v. Shaw, 29 Pa. St. 288, 72 Am. Dec.
633; Crapo v. Kelly, 16 Wall. (U.S.)
610; Thuret v. Jenkins, 7 Mart. (La.)
318. 12 Am. Dec. 508."
l In Hervey v. Locomotive Works,
93 U. S. 664, it is said: " It was decided by this court in Green v. Van
Buskirk, 5 Wall. 307; s. c., 7 id. 139,
that the liability of property to be
sold und r legal process, issuing from
the courts of the State where it is
situated, must be determined by the
law there, rather than that of the
jurisdiction where the owner lives.
These d cisions re t on the gmund
that every State has the right to regulate the transfer of property within
its limit , and that whoever sends
property to it impliedly snbmit to
the regulations concerning its transfer in force there, although a different rule of tran fer prevails in the
juri diction where he reside . He
has no ab olute right . to have the

53G
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Y.

Contracts of Sale Subject to Other Conditions.

§ 651. In general. — It is entirely competent for parties, in

making contracts of sale, to subject them to such lawful con-

ditions as they deem material, and where they have done so

transfer of property, lawful in that

jurisdiction, respected in the courts

of the State where it is found, and it

is only on a principle of comity that

it is ever allowed. But this principle

yields when the laws and policy of

the latter State conflict with those

of the former." In this case an agree-

ment, called a lease, but held by the

court to be a conditional sale, of prop-

erty to be taken into Illinois, executed

by one party in Rhode Island and by

the other in New York, was held to
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be inoperative in Illinois as against

creditors in that State because not

recorded under the chattel-mortgage

act. To like effect : In re Legg (1899),

96 Fed. Rep. 336 [citing Hart v. Man-

ufacturing Co., 7 Fed. R. 543; Pitts-

burg Locomotive Works v. Keokuk

Bank, 19 Fed. Cas. 785; Heryford v.

Davis, 102 U. S. 235; Chicago Ry.

Equipment Co. v. Merchants' Bank,

136 U. S. 268, 10 Sup. Ct. R. 999; Mo

Gourkey v. Railway Co., 146 IT. S.

536, 13 Sup. Ct. R. 170].

In Cunningham v. Cureton, 96 Ga.

489, 23 S. E. R. 420, it appeared that

the vendees, who resided in Georgia,

went into Tennessee to purchase cer-

tain chattels and there gave their

notes for them, which notes con-

tained a clause reserving title in the

vendoi-s until payment. The chattels

were then shipped to the vendees in

Georgia. The law of Georgia re-

quired such contracts to be attested

and recorded, but the law of Tennes-

see had no such requirement. The

Georgia law was not complied with.

In a conflict between the sellers and

the holders of liens acquired in Geor-

gia, it was contended that the case

was to be governed by the law of

Tennessee, but the Georgia court

said: " When the property is brought

into this State the requirements

which our law imposes for the bene-

fit of third persons, as to the attesta-

tion and recording of such contracts,

are not dispensed with by the fact

that it was purchased or is to be paid

for in another State."

Though the contract may have

been dated in Massachusetts, yet if

delivered in Maine, relating to prop-

erty in Maine, it is to be governed by

the laws of Maine. Eolt v. Knowl-

ton, 86 Me. 456, 29 Atl. R. 1113.

The law of New Jersey applies to

a contract of sale made in New York

of property to be delivered to and

held by the purchaser in New Jersey.

Knowles Loom Works v. Vacher, 57

§ 652.J
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the title will not pass until the condition is performed. 1 It is

not practicable, however, to attempt to discuss all such possi-

ble contracts. There are, on the other hand, certain kinds of

contracts, frequently entered into, which from their nature are

necessarily subject to conditions growing out of the essential

character of the contract itself, and the most important of these

Avill now be considered.

One of the most important of these is the contract for the —

1. Sale of Goods " to Arrive."

§ 652. Such contracts conditioned upon the arrival of the

goods.— " A sale to arrive," it is said in one case, 2 is "condi-

the title 'vill not pass until the condition is performed. 1 It is
not practicable, however, to attempt to discuss all such possible contracts. There are, on the other hand, certain kinds of
contract , frequently entered into, which from their nature are
necessarily subject to conditions growing out of the essential
charact r of the contract itself, and the most important of these
will now be considered.
One of the most important of these is the contract for the -

tional, and if the article contracted for does not arrive, either

cerning a chattel there situated and

valid by its laws, may be enforced in

1. Sale of Goods "to Arrive."

New Hampshire, though the statute

of that State has not been complied
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with; and the fact that the parties, at

the time the contract was made, con-

templated that the property should

§ 652. Such contracts conditioned upon the arrival of the
goods.-" A sale to arrive," it is said in one case, 2 is" conditional, and if the article contracted for does not arrive, either

be removed to New Hampshire does

not alter the rule. Cleveland Mach.

Works v. Lang (1892), 67 N. H. 348,

31 Atl. R. 20, 68 Am. St, R. 675. To

same effect: Dorntee Casket Co. v.

Gunnison (1898), 69 N. H. 297, 45 Atl.

R.318.

Where the seller in Maine sold to

a New Hampshire resident a chattel

which was removed to New Hamp-

shire, and the statute of Maine re-

quired the contract, when executed

by a non-resident, to be recorded

where the property was when the

contract was made (i. e., in Maine),

but it was not so recorded in Maine,

the contract will not be valid in New

Hampshire against a subsequent

up .it gagee of the goods in that State.

Davis v. Osgood (1898), 69 N. H. 427,

44 Atl. R 432.

1 Thus, for example, an agreement

in a contract for the sale of a saloon.

that if no license should be granted

there should be no sale, shows that

the title is not to pass until the

license is procured. Kost v. Reilly

(1892), 62 Conn. 57, 24 Atl. R. 519.

While, on the other hand, where one

agrees that he will purchase a planter

if it did not " break all to the devil "

before he got through using it, he be-

comes the purchaser and is liable to

pay if the planter does not break as

so stipulated. Norton v. Hummel

(1887), 22 111. App. 194.

A stipulation in an order for a

harvester that "if my crops are a

failure, and I do not need a ma-

chine," justifies the buyer in rescind-

ing if those crops fail for which he

would need such a harvester, though

his other crops may be good. Mc-

Cormick Co. v. Williams (1896), 99

Iowa, 601, 68 N. W. R. 907.

2 Neldon v. Smith, 36 N. J. L. 148,

To same effect: Shields v. Pettee, 2

Sandf. (N. Y.) 262; Benedict v. Field,

cerning a chattel there situated and
valid by it laws, may be enforced in
New H ampshire, though the statute
of t hat State has not been complied
with; and the fact that the parties, at
th e time the contract was made, cont emplat ed that the property should
be remo ved to New Hampshire does
n ot alter the rule. Cleveland Mach.
Works v. Lang (1892), 67 N. H. 348,
31 Atl. R. 20, 68 Am. St. R. 675. To
same effect: Dorntee Casket Co. v.
Gunni on (1 98), 69 N. H. 297, 45 Atl.
R. 31 .
·where the seller in l\Iaine sold to
a New H amp hire resident a chattel
which wa removed to New Hampshire, and t he tatute of Maine required the contract, when executed
y a non-re ·iclcnt, t o be r ecorded
·where the prop rty was wh en the
ontra t wa. rna.Je (i. e., in Maine),
but it wa not so r onl cl in Maine,
th
ntract will not be valid in New

that if no license should be granted
there should be no sale, shows that
the title is not to pass until the
license is procured. Kost v. Reilly
(1 92), 62 Conn. 57, 24 Atl. R. 519.
While, on the other hand, where one
agrees that be will purcha ·ea planter
if it did not "break all to the devil "
before he got through using it, he becomes the purchaser and is liable to
pay if the planter does not break as
so stipulated. Norton v. Hummel
(18 7), 22 Ill. App. 194.
A stipulation in an order for a
harvester that "if my crops are a
failure, and I do not need a machine," justifies the buyer in rescinding if tho e crops fail for which he
would need such a harve ter, t.hough
his other crops may be good. McCormick Co. v. Williams (1896), 99
Iowa, 601, 6 N. W. R. 907.
2 Neldon v. mith, 36 N. J. L. 148,
To same effect: Shields v. Pettee, 2
Sa ndf. (N. Y.) 262; Benedict v. Field,
4 Duer (N. Y.) 154; Dike v. Reitlinger, 23 Hun (N. Y.), 241 · Rus ell v.
Ni oll, 3 W nd. (N. Y.) 112, 20 Am.
l Thu , f r xampl , an agr em nt
. 6t0 · Lovatt v. Hamilton, 5 M.
in a contra t for the sale of a l on. & vV. 639; tockdale v. Dunlop, 6 M.
53
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from the vessel's being lost or other cause by accident, and

without any fraud or fault of the vendor, the contract is at an

end. The contract is executory and does not pass the prop-

erty in the goods to arrive. It is merely an agreement for the

sale and delivery of the articles named at a future period

when they shall arrive. It is in the nature of a condition and

not a warranty."

Stipulations in such contracts as to the time of arrival are

therefore construed as fixing a limit beyond which the contract

is not to continue, rather than as warranties that the goods

shall arrive within that time. 1 The vendor is not liable for the

non-delivery of the goods until their arrival, and unless they

arrive within the time specified the vendor is not bound to de-

liver nor the vendee to receive them. 2 So, if the contract be

entire, the vendor is not bound to deliver nor the vendee to

receive a part of the goods only which arrives within the pe-

riod fixed. 3

§ 653. Contracts limiting time of shipment.— It is entirely

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:50 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t6xw4h56n
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

competent, of course, for the parties to limit the time within

which the goods shall be shipped, and when the time is so lim-

ited it becomes a condition precedent that they shall be shipped

within the time agreed upon; and if not complied with, both

parties are released from their respective obligations to deliver

and receive. 4

& W. 224; Johnson v. Macdonald, 9 other words showing a contrary in-

M. & W. 600; Eogers v. Woodruff, 23 tent, contingent upon its arrival,"

Ohio St. 632, 13 Am. R. 276. citing many of the cases supra.

i Russell v. Nicoll, supra; Alewyn 2 Hill v. Blake (1884), 97 N. Y. 216.

v. Pryor, R. & M. 406. In Rogers v. 3 Russell v. Nicoll, supra.

Woodruff, supra, it is said: "It has 4 Alexander v. Vanderzee, L. R. 7

uniformly been held that contracts C. R 530; Shand v. Bowes, 1 Q. B.

of this description — for the sale of Div. 470; S. C, 2 Q. B. Div. 112; s. c.

goods to arrive — are conditional, the sub nom. Bowes v. Shand. 2 A pp.

words ' to arrive,' or other equivalent Cas. 455.

words, not importing a warranty Where the contract was for five

that the goods will arrive, and the hundred tons of rails to be shipped

obligation to perform the contract "from the other side, January or

by an actual transfer of the property February or March, seller's option,"

being, therefore, in the absence of the court said: " It is the settled rule

539
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In construing: agreements of this nature it seems to be dc-

termined that the expressions in the contract, " to be shipped "

or "shipment" within a certain time, have reference, in the

absence of usage to the contrary, to the time when the goods

shall be placed on board, and not to the time when the ship-

ment shall actually be completed. 1

654.

Giving notice of name of ship. — It is a common

In con truin O' agreement of thi nature it seem to be det ermined that the expre ion in the contract, "to be shipped"
or " b1pment wi bin a certain time, ha e reference, in the
ab ence of u aO'e to the contrary, to the time when the goods
shall be placed on board, and not to the time when the shipment hall actually be completed. 1

stipulation in these contracts that the vendor shall give the

vendee notice of the name of the ship on which the goods are

expected as soon as it becomes known to him, and a strict com-

pliance with this requirement is a condition precedent to his

right to enforce the contract. 2

§ 655. Classification of the cases. — Mr. Benjamin, after

reviewing the English cases in which the question has been

much more frequently considered than in the American cases,
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classifies the decisions as follows:

that in a case like the present the

date of shipment is a material ele-

§ 65-!. - - GiYing notice of name of hip.- It is a common
stipulation in these contract that the vendor shall give the
vendee notice of the name of the ship on which the goods are
expected as soon as it becomes known to him, and a strict compliance with thi requirement is a condition precedent to his
right to enforce the contract. 2

ment in the identification of the

property (Hill v. Blake, 97 N. Y. 216;

Tobias v. Lissberger, 105 id. 404). It

was not five hundred tons of rails

generally that were the subject of

the contract, but a specific quantity

shipped from the other side during

§ 655. --Cla ification of the cases.-Mr. Benjamin, after
reviewing the English ca es in which the que tion has been
much more frequently considered than in the American case ,
cla ifies the decisions as follows :

the three named months, and unless

such were tendered the contract was

not performed. The offer of other

rails would impose no obligation

upon the purchaser." Clark v. Fey

(1890), 131 N. Y. 470, 24 N. E. R. 703.

The destruction of the vessel

named before the date of shipment

terminates the contract. Nickoll v.

Ashton, 1 1900] 2 Q. B. 298.

1 Bowes v. Shand, sujyra. A con-

tract to ship goods by railroad on a

certain day is satisfied by putting

them on the car on that day. al-

though the carrier does not send the

that in a ca e like the pre ent the
date of shipment is a material element in the jdentification of the
property (Hill v. Blake, 97 N. Y . 216;
Tobia v. Li berger, 105 id. 40-1). It
wa not five hundred tons of rail
generally that were the ubj ct of
the contract, but a pecific quantity
shipped from the other ide during
the three named month , and unle
uch were tendered the contract was

car forward until the following day.

Clark v. Lindsay (1896), 19 Mont. 1.

47 Pac. R. 102.

2 Benjamin on Sales, § 588; Busk v.

Spence, 4 Camp. 329; Graves v. Legg,

9 Ex. 709. But where the seller gave

the name of the ship as the " Chris-

topher" and the goods arrived on

the "St. Christopher," it was held

that the refusal of the buyer to re-

ceive the goods on that account was

unwarranted. Smith v. Pet tee (1877),

70 N. Y. 13. So where there was a

contract for goods to be shipped from

the Philippines in a certain vessel,

provided that if she was by any ac-

cident unable to load and no other

steamer could be procured the con-

tract was to be void, it was held not

to preclude reshipment by another

vessel at an intermediate point due

to an accident to the original vessel.

Harrison v. Fortlage (1896), 161 U. S.

57.
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ar on
though the carrier d

uot

car forward until the following day.
Clark v. Lind ay (1 96), 19 Mont. 1.
4 Pac. R. 102.
2 Benjamin on Sale , § 5
; Bu k v.
pence, 4 Camp. 329; Graves v. Legg,
0 Ex. '/09. But where the eller ga e
the :name of the hip a the "Chri topher ' and the good arrived on
the " t. Chri topher,'' it wa held
that the refu a l of the buyer to recei ve the goo on that acconnt '"a
umrnrra ntecl. Smi h v. P ettee (1 77),
10 . Y. 13.
o where there wa . a
contract for good. to be hipped from
the Philippine in a certain \e. el,
provided that if he wa~ by any accident unable to lo:id and no other
teamer ould be procured the contra wa to be void, it "a held not
to I reclude re bipment b ano h 1·
'
el at an intermediate p int due
t nu ac id nt to the oriO'inal ve el.
Harri n v. For !age (1 D6), 161 U. S.
7.
5-10

CH. III.] CONDITIONAL SALE OF SPECIFIC CHATTELS. [§ 656.

First. "Where the language is that goods are sold "on arrival

per ship A or ex ship A," or " to arrive per ship A or ex ship A"

(for these two expressions mean precisely the same thing), it

imports a double condition precedent, viz., that the ship shall

arrive, and that the goods sold shall be on board on her arrival.

Secondly. "Where the language asserts the goods to be on

board of the vessel named, as " 1,170 bales now on passage, and

expected to arrive per ship A," or other terms of like import,

there is a warranty that the goods are on board, and a single

condition precedent, to wit, the arrival of the vessel.

Thirdly. The condition precedent that the goods shall ar-

rive by the vessel will not be fulfilled by the arrival of goods

answering the description of those sold, but not consigned to

the vendor and with which he did not affect to deal; but

semble, the condition will be fulfilled if the goods which arrive

are the same which the vendor intended to sell, in the expecta-

tion, which turns out to be unfounded, that they would be con-

signed to him.
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Fourthly. Where the sale describes the expected cargo to be

of a particular description, as "400 tons of Aracan Necrensie

rice," and the cargo turns out on arrival to be rice of a differ-

ent description, and neither party is bound by the bargain.

2. Sale of Goods " to le Shipped."

§656. Such contracts conditional. — Similar in many re-

spects to the contract for the sale of goods " to arrive," and

often associated with it, is the contract for the sale of goods

" to be shipped." Such contracts, already slightly touched

upon in the preceding subdivision, however, are less conditional

than the former, and the condition, like many others to be

hereafter noticed, is rather one relating to the performance of

the contract than one which goes to the discharge of both par-

ties from it. As will be seen hereafter, whatever in executory

contracts goes to the matter of the identification or description

of the goods to be supplied, or the time, place, quantity or man-

ner of supplying them, is usually to be deemed a condition

541
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precedent to the buyer's liability ; — giving the buyer the op-

tion to reject the goods, or to waive the default and accept a

substituted performance if he will. 1 It is deemed most con-

venient, therefore, to leave this question until the subject of

delivery is reached, 2 and to confine attention here to those

conditions less intimately connected with the mere matter of

performance.

3. Sale on Approval.

§ 657. Sale if goods are approved. — Contracts are not un-

common in pursuance of which goods are delivered "on trial,"

or " on approval," to be bought and paid for if the prospective

prece lent to the buyer' liability; -giving the buyer the op. tion to reject the good , or to n'aive the default and ace pt a
sub tituted performance if be will.1 It is deemed most convenient, therefor , to leave thi que tion until the subject of
tlelivery is reached, 2 anJ to confine attention here to tbo e
conditions less intimately connected with the mere matter of
performance.

purchaser approves them, and, if not, to be returned.

3. Sale on .Appro1:al.

§ 658. Title and risk pending approval. — Such a transac-

tion does not constitute a present sale, and the title does not

pass until in some manner, either expressly or by implication,

this necessary approval is manifested. 3 With the title also re-

mains the risk of loss or injury not caused by the buyer's

default. 4 Whether the sale is absolute or on approval, in a
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doubtful case, is a question for the jury. 5

§650. Within what time option exercised. — Where the

terms of the contract fix the time within which the option is

§ 657. Sale if goods are approyecl.- Cori tracts are not uncommon in pur uance of which good are delivered "on trial,"
or "on approval to be bouD'ht and pail for if the pro pecti ve
purchaser approv them, and, if not, to be returned.

to be exercised, the contract will, of course, govern; but where

no time is so fixed the law will require the determination to be

made within a reasonable time. 6

1 See post, § 1205 et seq. 4 Thus if a horse sold upon approval

2 See jjost, § 1116 et seq. dies without the fault of the buyer

3 Hunt v. Wyman (1868>, 100 Mass. before approval and before the ex-

198; Dando v. Foulds (1884), 105 Pa. piration of the time limited, the loss

St. 71; Wartman v. Breed (1875), 117 falls on the seller. Elphick v. Barnes

Mass. 18; Fairfield v. Madison Mfg. (1880), 5 C. P. Div. 301.

Co. (1875), 38 Wis. 346; Hall & Brown 5 Reber v. Schitler (1891), 141 Pa. St,

Mach. Co. v. Brown (1891\ 82 Tex. 640, 21 Atl. R. 736.

469, 17 S. W. R. 715; Mowbray v. e Washington v. Johnson (1846), 7

( lady (1^75), 40 Iowa, 604; Glasscock Humph. (Tenn.) 468; Hickman v.

658. Title and risk pending approval.- uch a tran action does not constitute a pre en t sale, and the title doe not
pa ~s until in ome manner, either expres ·ly or by implication,
this nece ary approval is manifested. 3 With the title also remains the ri k of lo s or injury not caused by the buyers
default. 4 Whether the sale is ab olute or on approval, in a
doubtful case, is a question for the jury. 5

v. Ilazell (1891). 109 N. C. 145, 13 S. Shimp (1885), 109 Pa. St. 16.

E. R. 789.

542

. 659. lfithin what time option exerci ed.-Where the
terms of the contract fix the time within which the option is
to be exercised, the con tract will, of cour e, govern; but where
no time i so fixed th law will require the determination to be
made wi bin a r a onable time. 6
post, § 1205 et seq.
e po. t, :· 1116 et seq.
3 Hnnt v. Wyman (1 6 l 100 Ma s.
1!) ; ando v. Fould (1 ±), 1 :S Pa.
t. 74· \ artman v. reed (1 75), 117
.. Ia . 1 ; airfield v. Madi on Mfg.
o. (1 75), 3 "\ i . 346; Hall & Brown
:Mach. Co. v. Brown (1 91 ), ') T x.
4G , 17 , . W. R. 71."" Mowbray v.
'ady (1 7-1), 40 Iowa, 60± · la
k
v. Ilaz 11 (1 91). 109 N. C. 14.-, 13 S.
E. R. 7 .
1 See
2

4 Thus if a hor e sold upon approval
die without the fault of the buyel'
before approval and before the expiration of the time limited, the lo
fall on the eller. Elphick v. Barne
(1 0) C. P. Div. 3')1.
5 Reber v. " chi l r (1 91), 1·11 Pa. St.
640 ')1 tl. R. 36.
Ii\ a hington v. John on (1 46), 7
Humph. (T nn.) 46 · Hickman v.
himp (1 5), 109 Pa. St. 16.

CH. III.] CONDITIONAL SALE OF SPECIFIC CHATTELS.

G60.

§ 660. Effect of failure to return within time required. —

In either case, while the. mere failure to return the goods within

the time required may not be per se an election to purchase, 1

it is still such evidence that, if unexplained, a conclusive elec-

tion may be found. 2 Of course, in these cases, there can ordi-

1 Hunt v. Wyman, supra.

2 Washington v. Johnson, supra;

Butler v. School District (1892), 149

Pa. St. 351; Hickman v. Shimp,

supra; Stutz v. Coal Co., 131 Pa. St,

267.

In Aultman v. Theirer (1872), 34

Iowa, 272, a buyer of a reaper was to

try the machine for a certain period

and give notice if it failed to work

as warranted. The buyer gave the

notice as required, but continued to
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use the machine. Held, that he lost

his right to return it, but could still

reduce the recovery by the damages

sustained by him.

In Turner v. Machine Co. (1893), 97

Mich. 166, 56 N. W. R. 356, plaintiff

sold certain machinery to defendant

on trial, trial to cover thirty days.

If satisfactory defendant was to pay

for it. He failed to give notice at

the expiration of the time, and it

was held that such failure consti-

tuted an acceptance.

In Columbia Rolling Co. v. Beckett

Foundry Co. (1893), 55 N. J. L. 391, 26

AtL R. 888, it was held that where

goods are sold subject to approval it

is necessary for the purchaser, unless

he approves, to express disapproval

within a reasonable time, in the ab-

sence of which the seller may sue

and recover, the failure constitut-

ing either an approval or a least at

waiver.

In Fairfield v. Madison Mfg. Co.

(1875), 38 Wis. 346, plaintiff agreed to

take one of defendant's machines,

give it a fair trial, and notify defend-

ant if it failed to give satisfaction.

The machine was to be settled for

after the trial, and taken back if it

could not be made to work: but if

used more than two days the war-

ranty should be considered fulfilled.

The machine did not work and de-

fendant was notified, but plaintiff

was prevailed upon to keep the ma-

chine with the promise that it would

be fixed. It was kept and used part

of two seasons, but was nearly use-

less. Held, that title had not passed

when plaintiff first notified defend-

ant that the machine did not work.

But after plaintiff kept the machine

so long it will be presumed that he

elected to keep it and sue for breach

of warranty.

In Keeler v. Jacobs (1894), 87 Wis.

545, 58 N. W. R. 1107, plaintiffs let the

defendant have a machine on trial

until satisfied with it, and if not sat-

§§ 6Gl, 662.J
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[BOOK It.

|§ 661, 062.]

LAW OF SALE.

[BOOK II.

narily be no election until an opportunity for inspection or

narily be no election until an opportunity for inspection or
examination has been aff orded. 1

examination has been afforded. 1

§661. Necessity for notice of disapproval. — Ordinarily,

and in the absence of a stipulation to the contrary, the party

receiving the goods must, in the event of his disapproval, re-

turn them or offer to return them or give notice of his disap-

proval. 2 But the parties may, by their express or implied

agreements, dispense with this requirement, and throw upon

the person delivering the duty of ascertaining whether the

goods are approved or not. 3 If the duty in this respect is not

made clear by the terms of the agreement, it becomes a ques-

tion of fact for the jury to determine whether notice was re-

quired from the receiver or not. 4

§662. How notice to be given. — In a case 5 in which the

defendants were bound by their contract to give notice of their

the horse but not the price, where-
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upon plaintiff asked him to return

the horse. But defendant kept it

ten days longer. Held, that he was at

liberty to keep the horse for a month

§ 661. Necessity for notice of disapproval.- Ordinarily,
and in the absence of a stipulation to the contrary, the party
receiving the goods must, in the event of his disapproval, return them or offer to return them or give notice of his <lisapproval.2 But the parties may, by their express or implied
agreements, dispense with this requirement, and throw upon
the person delivering the duty of ascertaining whether the
goous are approved or not. 3 If the duty in this respect is not
made clear by the terms of the agreement, it becomes a question of fact for the jury to determine whether notice "\Vas required from the receiver or not. 4

if he chose.

i Wilson v. Stratton (1860), 47 Me.

120, citing Crane v. Roberts, 5 Me.

419; McCarren v. McNulty, 7 Gray

§ 662. Row notice to be given.- In a · case 5 in which the
defendants were bound by their contract to give notice of their

(Mass.), 139; Grout v. Hill, 4 id. 331.

In Hunt v. Wyman, supra, a horse

taken upon trial had received seri-

ous injury without the fault of the

bailee before he had a chance to try

him, nor, on account of the injury,

could the horse be returned within

the time specified. Held, not a sale.

To like effect: Lyons v. Stills (1896),

97 Tenn. 514, 37 S. W. E. 280.

In Kahn v. Klabunde (1880), 50

Wis. 235, it was held that where A

takes to his own home a horse be-

longing to B, intending to purchase

it, if satisfactory, with an under-

standing that he is to use it by way

of trial until a specified time, and

then, if not satisfied, bring it back to

B, or, if too busy for that, to let it

stand unused till B comes for it, and

A continues to use the horse after

the time so fixed, but then refuses

to buy and offers to return it, this is

evidence for the jury on the question

whether A, at the time so fixed, had

determined to retain the horse, and

is therefore liable for the price, but

it is not conclusive evidence.

2 Dewey v. Erie Borough (1850), 14

Pa. St. 211, 53 Am. Dec. 533.

3 In Gibson v. Vail (1881), 53 Vt. 476,

it was found that the seller was to

come and ascertain whether the

other party was satisfied. Such was

also the fact in Smalley v. Hendrick-

son (1862), 29 N. J. L. 371.

^Wartman v. Breed (1875% 117

Mass. 18.

5 Dewey v. Erie Borough (1850), 14

Pa. St. 211, 53 Am. Dec. 533.
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the horse but not the price, whereupon pla intiff asked him to return
the horse. But defendant kept it
ten days longer. H eld, that he was at
liberty to keep the horse for a month
if he cho e.
1 Wilson v. Stratton (1860), 47 Me.
120, citing Crane v. Robert , 5 Me.
419; Mccarren v. McNulty, 7 Gray
( fass.), 139; Grout v. Hill, 4 id. 3Jl.
In Hunt v. Wyman, sup1·a, a horse
taken upon trial had received serious injury without the fault of the
bailee before he had a chance to try
him, nor, on account of the injury,
oulcl the hor e be returned w ithin
th time pecified. Held, not a sale.
To lik effect: Lyon v. till (1 96),
97 T nn. 514, 37 S. W. R. 2 0.
In K hn v. Klabunde (1 0), 50
"\Vi . 23., it wa h Id that wh re A
tak
to hi own home a hor e bel n ing to B, intending to ur ha e
it if ati fa tory, with an und rt nding th th i to use it by way

of trial until a specified time, and
then, if not satisfied, bring it back to
B, or, if too busy for that, to let it
stand unused till B comes for it, and
A continues to use the horse after
the time so fixed, but then refu es
to buy and offers to return it, this is
evidence for the ju1·y on the que tion
whether A, at the time so fixed, had
determined to retain · the horse, and
is therefore liable for the price, but
it is not conclu ive evidence.
2 Dewey v. Erie Borough (1850), 14
Pa. St. 211, 53 Am. Dec. 533.
s In Gibson v. Vail (1881), 53 Vt. 476,
it was found that the seller was to
come and ascertain w he th er the
other party was atisfied. Such was
al o the fact in Smalley v. Hendrickson (1869), 29 N. J. L. 371.
4 \Vartman v. Breed (18i3), 117
fa . 1 .
5
wey v. Erie Borough (1 50), 14
P a. t. 211, 53 m. Dec. 533.
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dissatisfaction to the plaintiff, Gibson, C. J., said : " They were

not bound to follow the plaintiff to a foreign country; but if

foreign residence had been alleged, they would have been bound

to prove it. If his residence was unknown, they were bound

to prove that they had attempted to discover it. If it was

known to be in a sister State, they were bound to prove that

they had attempted to reach him through the postoffice. But

there was not a spark of evidence to prove that any effort had

been made whatever, and the contract had become absolute."

4. Sale if Satisfactory to Buyer.

§ 663. Sales if buyer is satisfied. — Similar to the questions

involved in the last sections are those which arise where the

contract is that the buyer shall purchase if the goods are satis-

factory. It is entirely competent for the parties to agree that

the transaction shall not constitute a sale unless the goods are

satisfactory, and where such is the contract no sale takes place

until the condition is performed. 1

§ 664. Who is to be satisfied. — In many of the cases it is
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expressly stipulated that the sale shall not result unless the

buyer is satisfied; but this express stipulation is not necessary.

"Where a proposition of sale is made to a person upon the con-

1 It is of course essential that this even though it did good work. Piano

shall really be the condition. Thus, Mfg. Co. v. Ellis (1888), 68 Mich. 101,

in Clark v. Rice (1881), 46 Mich. 308, 35 N. W. R. 841.

9 N. W. R 427, where the contract So, a contract that a machine may-

was that there should be a sale " if, be returned if it does not do good

on trial of thirty days, the machine is work will not justify a return if it

satisfactory, or does what is claimed does good work, unless the return be

for it," it was held that the sale was assented to by the seller. Manny v.

absolute if the machine did what Glendinning (1862), 15 Wis. 50. But

was claimed for it whether the pur- a stipulation that a machine may be

chaser was satisfied or not. But where returned by the purchaser if it does

the stipulation was that the machine not suit him and answer his purpose

" is to do good work and give satisfao gives him the right to return it if he

tion," it was held that the require- is not suited, even though the ma-

ment to give satisfaction was an in- chine might answer his purpose,

dependent one, and that there was Goodrich v. Van Nortwick (1867), 43

no sale unless it gave satisfaction, I1L 445.

35 545
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dition that he need not purchase unless the article is satisfac-

tory, the necessary inference, even in the absence of an express

statement, is that he need not buy unless the article is satis-

factory to him. 1

§665. If vendee not satisfied there is no sale.— In such

cases, if the vendee is in fact not satisfied, there is no sale. It

is not enough that he ought to be satisfied, or that the article

dition that he need not purchase unless the article is satisfactory, the nece sary inference, eYen in the absence of an express
statement, is that be need not buy unless the article is satisfactory to him. 1

would be satisfactory to a reasonable man, or that the court or

jury deem the article satisfactory. 2 The contract is that the

665. If vcndee not sati fied there is uo ale.-In such
cases, if the vend ee is in fact not satisfied, there is no sale. It
]s not enough that be ought to be satisfied, or that the article
would be satisfactory to a rea onable man, or that the court or
jury deem the article sa tisfactory. 2 The con tract is that the
article shall be sati factory to the vendee himself, and not to
some one else.
t;

article shall be satisfactory to the vendee himself, and not to

some one else.

§ 666. Reasons for his dissatisfaction.— To assign reasons

for one's dissatisfaction is not always easy, nor, in these cases,

is it ordinarily necessary. In many cases the question is one

appealing to taste, sentiment or artistic sensibility, rather than

reason ; and in such cases, frequently, no reason can be assigned,

and none, therefore, is required. If the undertaking is, for in-

stance, to supply a portrait, a photograph, a bust, a suit of
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clothes, a musical instrument, or an article of furniture, which

shall be satisfactory to the other party, " the buyer may reject

it without assigning any reason for his dissatisfaction. In such

a case the law cannot relieve against the folly of the vendor

by inquiring whether the dissatisfaction of the vendee was

based upon reasonable grounds or not. It is even doubtful

whether it can inquire into the good faith of the vendee's de-

cision." 3

i Singerly v. Thayer (1885), 108 Pa. 312, 18 S. E. R. 591, and many other

St. 291, 2 Atl. R. 230; Adams Radiator cases cited in the following notes.

Works v. Schnader (1893), 155 Pa. St. 3 Per Brown, J., in Campbell Print-

39 l, 26 Atl. R. 745. See also McCar- ing Press Co. v. Thorp (1888), 36 Fed.

ren v. MoNulty, 7 Gray (Mass.), 139. R. 414.

2 See Singerly v. Thayer, supra; In McCarren v. McNulty (1856), 7

Brown v. Foster, 113 Mass. 136; Za- Gray (Mass.), 139, the contract was

leski v. Clark, 44 Conn. 218; Gibson for the construction of a book case,

v. Cranage, 39 Mich. 49; Palmer v. which the plaintiff agreed to finish

Banfield, 86 Wis. 441, 56 N. W. R. "in a good, strong and workmanlike

1090; Osborne v. Francis, 38 W. Va. manner, to the satisfaction of" one
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§ 666. Reasons for his dissatisfaction.-To assign reasons
for one's dissatisfaction is not al ways easy, nor, in these cases,
is it ordinarily nee ssary. In many cases the question is one
appealing to ta te, sentiment or artistic sensibility, rather than
r eason; and in such cases, frequently, no reason can be assigned,
a nd none, therefore, is required. If the undertaking is, for instance, to supply a portrait, a photograph, a bust, a suit of
clothes, a musical instrument, or an article of furniture, which
shall be satisfactory to the other party, "the buyer may reject
it without assigning any reason for his dissatisfaction. In such
a case the la w cannot relieve against the folly of the vendor
by inquiring whether the dissatisfaction of the vendee was
ba ed upon reasonable grounds or not. It is even doubtful
whether it can inquire into the good faith of the vendee s deci ion." 3
ingerly v. Thayer (1 5), 108 Pa.
dam Ra diator
·work v. cbnader (1 93), 155 P a. St.
al o l\IcCar39J, 26 t l. R. 745.
r n v. :\fo~ Tulty, 7 Gray (:\las .), 139.
I,

't. 291, 2 Atl. R. 230·

312, 18 S. E. R. 591, and many other
ca e cited in the following note .
3 P er Brown, J., in Campbell Printing Pres Co. v. Thorp (18 ), 36 Fed.
R. 414.
In I Garren v. l\IcNulty (1 -6). 7
Gray (i\Ia .) 139, the contract wa
for the con truction of a book a e,
which the plaintiff agreed to fini h
"in a go d, strong and workmanlike
manner, to the satisfaction of " one
54.6
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§ 667. Duty to test goods. — In the cases mentioned in the

preceding section, the case cannot ordinarily be made clearer

by any test. It would, of course, be the duty of the buyer to

examine the article and not to reject it unseen ; but there could

of the defendants. It was held that

unless the plaintiff showed that the

work was satisfactory to or accepted

by the defendant in question he could

not maintain the action.

Hoffman v. Gallaher (1875), 6 Daly

(N. Y.), 42, was the case of a contract

to paint the defendant's portrait, it

being agreed that the picture should

be referred to the defendant's friends,

and if thej" thought it a good likeness

he would take it, otherwise he would

not. The court held that he was not

bound to take it unless his friends
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liked it, and that it was error to in-

troduce the portrait in evidence and

show it to the jury that they might

judge of the portrait as a likeness of

the defendant.

In the case of Zaleski v. Clark

(1876), 44 Conn. 218, 26 Am. R. 446,

the plaintiff, who was a sculptor,

agreed to make for the defendant

a bust of her deceased husband,

stipulating that she was not bound

to take it unless she was satisfied

with it. The bust was completed,

.was a fine piece of workmanship and

an accurate likeness, but from the

very nature of the materials was des-

titute of lifedike expression and color.

The defendant was not satisfied with

it, and would not accept or pay for

it; but her dissatisfaction was based

upon grounds applicable to all busts.

The supreme court said: "Courts of

law must allow parties to make their

own contracts, and can enforce only

such as they actually make. Whether

the contract is wise or unwise, rea-

sonable or unreasonable, is ordinarily

an immaterial inquiry. ... In

this case the plaintiff undertook to

make a bust which should be satis-

factory to the defendant. The case

shows that she was not satisfied with

it. The plaintiff has not yet then ful-

filled his contract. It is not enough

to say that she ought to be satisfied

with it, and that her dissatisfaction

is unreasonable. She, and not the

court, is entitled to judge of that.

The contract was not to make one

that she ought to be satisfied with,

but to make one that she icoirfcl be

satisfied with. Nor is it sufficient to

say that the bust is the best thing

of the kind that could possibly be

produced. . . . A contract to pro-

duce a bust perfect in every respect,

and one with which the defendant

ought to be satisfied, is one thing; an

undertaking to make one with which

she icill be satisfied is quite another

thing. The former can only be de-

§ 667.]
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be no other test than his own convictions or sentiments. There

are, however, other cases involving questions of mechanical

fitness or adaptability where, from the nature of the case, a

test would be required. Thus, if the agreement is to supply a

able, when the contract permits the

be no other test than his own convictions or sentiments. There
are, however, other cases involvjng questions of mechanical
fitness or adaptability where, from the nature of the case, a
test would be required. Thus, if the agreement is to supply a

defendant to decide himself whether

the articles furnished are to his satis-

faction."

The rule is further illustrated in

the case of Gibson v. Cranage (1878),

39 Mich. 49, 33 Am. R. 351. Here an

artist had undertaken to make an

enlarged picture from a smaller one,

the picture when completed to be

one that the purchaser would like

and that would be satisfactory to
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him. The artist made the picture,

but the other party was not satisfied

with it and would not accept or pay

for it. The artist endeavored to as-

certain what the objections were, and

had the picture changed in some re-

spects. He than endeavored to have

the other party examine it again, but

he refused to do so, and the artist

brought suit. On the trial the de-

fendant looked at the picture and

found it still unsatisfactory to him.

The plaintiff urged that he was en-

titled to have the defects pointed out

and to be allowed a reasonable time

to remedy them. He failed to re-

cover and appealed to the supreme

court, but that court affirmed the

judgment, and said: "The plaintiff

agreed that the picture when fin-

ished should be satisfactory to the

defendant, and his own evidence

si lowed that in this important par-

ticular the contract had not been

performed. It may be that the pic-

ture was an excellent one and that

the defendant ought to have been

satisfied with it and accepted it, but

under the agreement the defendant

was the only person who had the

right to decide this question. Where

parties thus deliberately enter into

an agreement which violates no rule

of public policy and which is free

from all taint of fraud or mistake,

there is no hardship whatever in

holding them bound by it. Artists

or third parties might consider a por-

trait an excellent one and yet it

might prove very unsatisfactory to

the person who ordered it, and who

might not be able to point out with

clearness or certainty the defects or

objections. And if the party giving

the order stipulates that the portrait

when finished must be satisfactory

to him or else he will not accept or

pay for it, he may insist upon his

right as given him by the contract."

McClure v. Briggs (1886), 58 Vt. 82,

54 Am. R. 715, was a case in which

able, when t he contract permits the was the only person who had the
defendant to decide himself whether right to decide this question. Where
the articles furnished are to his satis- parties thus deliberately enter into
faction."
an agreement which violates no rule
The rule is further illustrated in of public policy and which is free
the case of Gibson v. Cranage (187 ), from all taint of fraud or mi take,
89 Mich. 49, 33 Am. R. 351. Here an there is no hard hip whatever in
artist had undertaken to make an holding them bound by it. Artists
enlarged picture from a smaller one, or third parties might consider a porthe picture w hen completed to be trait an excellent one and yet jt
one that the purcha er would like might prove very unsatisfactory to
and that would be satisfactory to the person who ordered it, and who
him. The artist made the picture, might not be able to point out with
but the other party was not satisfied clearne s or certainty the defects or
with it and would not accept or pay objection . And if the party giving
for it. The artist endeavored to as- the order stipulates that the portrait
certain what the objections were, and when finished must be sati factory
had the picture changed in some re- to him or else he will not accept or
spects. He then endeavored to have pay for it, he may insist upon his
the other party examine it again, but right as given him by the contract."
he refused to do so, and the artist
McClure v. Briggs (1886), 58 Vt. 2,
brought suit. On the trial the de- 54 Am. R. 715, was a case in which
fend~nt looked at the picture and an organ was sold under the confound it still un atisfactory to him. dition that it should he sati factory
The plaintiff urged that he was en- to the purchaser. He was distrustful
titled to have the defects pointed out of his own judgmen t anc'l. called in
and to be allowed a reasonable time an expert, who told him the tone of
to remedy them. He faileJ to re- the organ was good, but notw·itlicover and appealed to the supreme standing the expert's opinion he still
court, but that court affirmed the thought he was di satisfied with it.
juugment, and said: " The plaintiff The court said: "If he really thought
agreed that the picture when fin- so he was so. . . . He wa bound to
i hed h uld be ati factory to the act hone tly and to give the in trudefen 1ant, and hi own evidence ment a fair trial, and such as the
how cl that in thi important par· seller had a right, in the cir umticular th
ontrc ct had not b n stances, to expect he would give it,
p rformed. It may be that th pic- and therein to exercise such judgture wa an xc lieut on an that m nt and apa ity as he had, for by
the d fen ant ought to have b n the on tract he was the one to be
ati fi u with it anu a
pted it, but ati fl d, and not another for him.'
unuer the agreement the def n ant
In Moore v. Good win (18 7), 43.
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machine which will work to the vendee's satisfaction, there is

necessarily involved the duty on the part of the vendee to try

it reasonably in order to determine whether it will do the work

or not, and no arbitrary rejection, without a reasonable test,

would be consistent with the vendee's duty. 1 If, however,

upon such test, it does not work to his satisfaction, he may de-

cline to buy it; and the fact that others would deem it satis-

factory, or that it worked well before or after his test, would

be immaterial. 2

Hun, 534, the defendant contracted

to make certain crayon portraits for

the plaintiff, not to be accepted unless

in all respects satisfactory likenesses.

It was held that neither the opposite

party nor the jury could decide that

he ought to be satisfied with the por-

traits made.

i In Hartford Sorghum Mfg. Co. v.
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Brush (1871), 43 Vt. 528, the plaintiff

sold a patent sugar evaporator to the

defendant, who was to try it and

pay for it if he liked it, otherwise

the plaintiff was to take it back.

The court held that the defendant

was bound to bring to the trial of it

honesty of purpose and judgment

according to his capacity to ascer-

tain his wishes, but was not bound

to use the care and skill of ordinary

persons in making the determina-

tion.

Daggett v. Johnson (1877), 49 Vt.

345, was an action in assumpsit to

recover the price of a number of

milk pans. The pans were a patented

device for cooling the milk with run-

ning water, and the defendant was

to pay a certain price if satisfied

with them. He used them like ordi-

nary pans for a time and then notified

the plaintiffs to take them away and

refused to pay for them. The court

said: "We think the ruling of the

court, that the defendant had no

right to say, arbitrarily and without

cause, that he was dissatisfied and

would not pay for the pans, was sen-

sible and sound. ... He must

act honestly and in accordance with

the reasonable expectations of the

seller as implied from the contract,

its subject-matter and surrounding

circumstances. His dissatisfaction

must be actual, not feigned; real, not

merely pretended."

In Singerly v. Thayer (1885), 108

Pa. St. 291, 2 Atl. R 230, 56 Am. R

207, it was claimed that an elevator

was rejected as unsatisfactory before

it was finished, and the court held

that if it was so far incomplete that

the purchaser could not reasonably

determine whether it was or would

be satisfactory to him, his rejection

was premature and constituted no

bar to the action. See also Exhaust

Ventilator Co. v. Chicago, etc. R Co.

(1886), 66 Wis. 218, 28 N. W. R 343,

57 Am. R 257.

§ 66 .]
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§ 66 . Duty to act in good faith.- It clearly is the duty

[BOOK II.

§ 668. Duty to act in good faith. — It clearly is the duty

of the vendee in these cases, it is said, to act in good faith

and with honesty of purpose, and not to express a dissatisfac-

tion which is wholly feigned or simulated. 1 In ordinary cases,

of the venclee in these cases, it is said, to act in good faith
and with honesty of purpose, and not to express a dissatisfaction which is wholly feigned or simulated. 1 In ordinary cases,

material whether they ought to have

been satisfied. Brady, J., dissenting,

did " not agree with the proposition

that the defendants had a right to

declare arbitrarily that they were

not satisfied with the soundness of

the machinery, etc."

Aiken v. Hyde (1868), 99 Mass. 183,

was a case where a machine was sold

with the agreement that it should be

'• entirely satisfactory in all respects"

to the vendee, or it might be re-
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turned. It was held that the buyer

was not bound to give any notice of

its failure, and it was immaterial

that the machine worked well in the

hands of the vendor after being re-

turned to him.

In Clark v. Rice (1881), 46 Mich.

308, 9 N. W. R. 427, the contract of

sale contained the provision "if on

trial of thirty days the machine is

satisfactory, or does what is claimed

for it." The defendant claimed that

he could reject the heater if not sat-

isfactory to him, whether it met the

warranty or not. But the court held

that the contract very clearly bound

him to pay, whether satisfied or not,

if the machine did what was claimed

for it.

In Wood Reaping, etc. Mach. Co. v.

Smith (1883), 50 Mich. 565, 15 N. W.

R. 906, the defendant insisted on the

stipulation, in addition to the ordi-

nary warranty, that the contract

should be of no effect unless the ma-

chine worked to the purchaser's sat-

isfaction. The court held that while

the cases in which the right of de-

cision is completely reserved to the

promisor without liability to disclose

reasons "are generally such as in-

volve the feelings, taste or sensibility

of the promisor, and not those gross

considerations of operative fitness or

mechanical utility which are capa-

ble of being seen and appreciated

by others," yet "this is not always

so. It sometimes happens thai the

right is fully reserved where it is the

chief ground, if not the only one,

that the party is determined to pre-

serve an unqualified option, and is

not willing to leave his freedom of

choice exposed to any contention or

subject to any contingency." The

transaction was declared to belong

to this class.

Pope Iron and Metal Co. v. Best

(1883), 14 Mo. App. 502, was a case

where a furnace was sold under the

condition that it should "work sat-

material whether they ought to have
been satisfied. Brady, J., dissenting,
did '·not agree with the proposition
that the defendants had a right to
declare arbitrarily that they were
not satisfied with the soundness of
the machinery, etc."
Aiken v. Hyde (186 ), 99 Mass. 183,
was a ca ·e where a machine w::t.s sold
with the agreement that it should be
'·entirely atisfactory in all respects"
to the vendee, or it might be returned. It was held that tlle buyer
was not bound to give any notice of
its failure, and it was immaterial
that the machine worked well in the
hand of the vendor after being returned to him.
In Clark v. Rice (18 1), 46 l\'Iich.
308, 9 N. vV. R. 427, the contract of
sale contained the provision "if on
trial of thirty days the machine is
satisfactory, or does what is claimed
for it." The defendant claimed that
he could reject the heater if not sati factory to him, whether it met the
warranty or not. But the court held
that the contract very clearly bound
him to pay, whether satisfied or not,
if the machine did wliat was claimed
for it.
In "\Vood Reaping. etc. Mach. Co. v.
Smith (1 3), 50 l\lich. 565, 15 N. vV.
R. 90G, the defendant in i ted on the
tipulation, in aduiti n to the ordinary warranty, that the contract
houlJ. b of no eiiec unle : the ma·hiu work d to th l ur ha er· ati ·fa tion. The ourt h lJ that while
the ca
in which th right o( d i ·i n i compl t ly r · n d t th
promi ·or without li bility to di ·clo

reasons ''are generally such as involve the feelings, taste or sensibility
of the promisor, and not those gross
considerations of operative fitne s or
mechanical utility which are capable of being seen and appreciated
by others,'' yet "this is not always
so. It sometimes happens thai the
right is fully reserved where it is the
chief ground, if not the only one,
that the party is determined to preserve an unqualified option. and is
not willing to leave his fre edom of
choice exposed to any contention or
subject to any contingency." The
transaction was declared to helong
to this class.
Pope Iron and Metal Co. v. Best
(18 3), 14 Mo. App. 502, was a ca e
where a furnace was sold under the
condition that it should "·work satisfactorily in melting iron." It was
held that the opinions and feelings
of the managers of the plaintiff corporation were not, by the contract,
made the t e ·t, but that the contract,
fairly con trued, meant that the furnace should work sati. factorily to l't
reasonable and fair-minded man who
wa an expert in uch matter .
In Sing rly v. Thayer (1 85), 108
Pa. St. 291, 2 Atl. R. 230, 56 Am. R.
207, it wa held that where an elevator was put into a bnilding and
"warranted ati fa tory in ev ry respect," the fair inferen e was that
the elevator was to be ati factory to
the p1lrchase1" and while it ould not
be reje ted a rbitrarily, yet a bona
fide obj t10n by him to its working
wa a alid cl fen e to tlie action.
1 In Baltimore & Ohio R Co. v.
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however, there can be no means of inquiring into the good

faith of his purpose, though circumstances may exist which

would make it clear; and so far as those cases are concerned

which appeal solely to considerations of taste, sentiment or

Bryclon (1885), 65 Md. 198, 3 AtL R.

306, 57 Am. R 318, the plaintiff con-

tracted to supply the defendant with

coal "of such quality as should be

satisfactory to defendant's masters

of transportation and machinery."

It was held that this term of the

contract did not give the officers

named a capricious or arbitrary dis-

cretion to reject it. It was their

judgment which was to decide the

question of acceptance, but the law

required them to exercise a fair, just

and honest judgment on the subject.
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On the question of fraud it was held

proper to show what knowledge and

means of knowledge they had of the

quality of the coal and its fitness for

the use intended.

Silsby Mfg. Co. v. Town of Chico

(1885), 24 Fed. R. 893, involved the

sale of a steam fire engine " subject

to the approval of the fire commit-

tee," the vendor warranting " the

workmanship, finish and perform-

ance of the machine satisfactory to

them, or the same to be removed

without expense." It was held that,

in the absence of fraud, it was not

enough that the vendees ought to be

satisfied; they must be satisfied, or

they are not bound to accept it.

In Exhaust Ventilator Co. v. Chi-

cago, etc. R. Co. (1886), 66 Wis. 218,

28 N. W. R. 343, 57 Am. R 257, fans

were sold under a warranty that

" they will exhaust the smoke and

gases in a satisfactory manner." The

court held that " if the fans are not

honestly and in good faith satisfac-

tory to the defendant, and the defend-

ant notified the plaintiff of that fact

in a reasonable time, then and in

that case there had been no sale, and

the defendant is not liable for the

price."

Duplex Safety Boiler Co. v. Garden

(1886), 101 N. Y. 387, 4 N. E. R. 749,

54 Am. R. 709, was a case of rebuild-

ing boilers, which were to be paid

for as soon as the defendants " are

satisfied that the boilers as changed

are a success." As soon as the boil-

ers were changed the defendants be-

gan to use them and continued to do

so. The defendants defended an ac-

tion for the price on the ground that

the question of the success of the

boilers was for them alone. But the

court held that a simple allegation

of dissatisfaction, without some good

reason assigned for it, might be a

mere pretext, and cannot be re-

garded.

In McCormick Mach. Co. v. Coch-

§ 669.J
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artistic sensibility, it is, as has been said, doubtful whether the

artistic sensibility, it is, as has been sai<l, doubtful whether the
vendee's motives can be questioned.

vendee's motives can be questioned.

§ 669. Within what time decision to he made.— The par-

ties may, by their contract, expressly stipulate as to the time

within which the decision is to be reached; but if they have

they were made in good faith he had

a right to reject the reaper.

§ 669. Within what time decision to be made.-The parties rnay, by their contract, expressly stipulate as to the time
within which the decision is to be reached; but if they have

A similar conclusion was reached

in Piatt v. Broderick (1888), 70 Mich.

577, 38 N. W. R. 579, where a ma-

chine was sold with the understand-

ing that it would be paid for if it

suited the purchaser. The court

held that under the agreement it was

immaterial whether the machine

worked well or not. The defendant

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:50 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t6xw4h56n
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

. was to be satisfied with it, and if it

did not suit him he had a right to

return it.

In Hawkins v. Graham (1889), 149

Mass-284, 21 N. E. R. 312, the plaint-

iff agreed to put a heating plant into

defendant's buildings, to be paid for

upon satisfactory completion. If not

able to heat the buildings "in ac-

cordance with the requirements as

above set forth," the plaintiff was to

remove the machinery at his own

expense. But if the heating was sat-

isfactory and conformed to the re-

quirements, the price was to be paid

" after such acknowledgment by the

owner or the work demonstrated."

It was held that the evident intent

of these phrases was that the satis-

factoriness of the system was to be

determined by the mind of a reason-

able man and by the external meas-

ures set forth in the conti'act.

In the case of United States Fire-

Alarm Co. v. Big Rapids (1889), 78

Mich. 67, 43 N. W. R. 1030, the plaint-

iff contracted to furnish defendant

witli a fire-alarm bell, which was

to be tested by defendant and ac-

cepted if it proved satisfactory. The

common council tested it and were

not satisfied, and rejected the bell.

Held, that the common council was

not bound to accept it unless satis-

fied after the test.

In Warder v. Whitish (1890), 77

Wis. 430, 46 N. W. R. 540, the de-

fendant took a binder with the un-

derstanding that he could try it and

if not suited he could return it at

any time. A charge that he might

reject it whether it was capable of

doing good work or not was ap-

proved.

In Howard v. Smedley (1891)* 140

Pa. St. 81. 21 Atl. R. 253, the court

held that where the plaintiff con-

tracted to erect an elevator in de-

fendant's hotel, to be paid for when

" in running order satisfactory to "

the defendant, it was not error to

they were made in good faith he had to be tested by defendant and aca right to reject the reaper.
cepted if it proved satisfactory. The
A similar conclusion was reached common council tested it and were
in Platt v. Broderick (1 8), 70 Mich. not satisfied, and rejected the bell.
577, 38 N. W. R. 579, where a ma- H eld, that the common council was
chine was sold with the understand- not bound to accept it unless satising that it would be paid for if it fied after the test.
suited the purchaser. The court
In Warder v. Whitish (1890), 77
held that under the agreement it was Wis. 430, 46 N. W. R. 540, the deimmaterial whether the machine fendant took a binder with the unworked well or not. The defendan t derstanding that he could try it and
. was to be sati8fied with it, and if it if n ot suited he could' return it at
did not suit him he had a right to any time. A charge that he might
return it.
r eject it whether it was capable of
In Hawkins v. Graham (1889), 149 doing good work or not was apMass 284, 21 N. E. R. 312, the plaint- proved.
In H oward v. Smedley (1891), 140
iff agreed to put a heating plant into
defendant's buildings, to be paid for Pa. St. 1, 21 Atl. R. 253, the court
upon satisfactory completion. If not held that where the plaintiff conable to heat the buHdings "in ac- tracted to erect an elevator in decordance with the requirements as fendant's hotel, to be paid for when
above set forth," the plaintiff was to "in running order satisfactory to "
remove the machinery at his own the defendant, it was not error to
expense. But if the heating was sat- enter a peremptory nonsuit upon
isfactory and conformed ·to the re- showing by the plaintiff that the elequirements, the price was t.o be paid vator was not running to bis sati "after such acknowledgment by the faction and that his objection did
owner or the work demonstrated. ' not arise out of mere caprice.
It was h ld that the evident intent
Osborne v. Francis (1 90), 38 W.
of the e phrases was that the satis- Va. 312, 18 S. E. R. 591, 45 Am. St. R.
factorin
of the y tern was to be 159, was a case where the defendant
determined by the mind of a reason- agreed to take a binder if it worked
able man and by the external meas- to his ati faction. He was not sature set forth in the contract.
i fled wit h it and refused to accept
In the ca e of Unit d tates Fire- it. Ther e was no written contract,
Alarm o. v. Big Rapids (1 !)), 7 but the court held that the eviden e
Mi h. 67, 43 N. W. R. 103 , the plaint- suffi ed to show that the buyer exiiI contract d t furnish d fenuant pre ly r e rved the rig ht to reject
with a fire-alarm bell, which wa and send back tlie machine if on
552
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not, a reasonable time would be implied. In either event the

vendee must exercise his right within the time so fixed, and a

failure to do so, without reasonable excuse, would furnish

strong evidence of satisfaction. 1

trial it should not be satisfactory to

him positively and generally with-

out saying in what respect.

In the case of Jay v. Wilson (1895),

91 Hun, 391, the court held that where

a loan is to be made upon a title,

provided the title is satisfactory to

the attorneys of the lender, the at-

torneys have no right to refuse arbi-

trarily or capriciously to be satisfied

with the title.

In Crane Elevator Co. v. Clark

(1897), 53 U. S. App. 257, 80 Fed. R.

705, 26 C. C. A. 100, an elevator was
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to be put into a building subject to

the satisfaction of the architect. It

was held that the decision of the

architect was conclusive, but the par-

ties had a right to his independent

and honest judgment.

1 In Wood Reaping, etc. Mach. Co.

v. Smith (1883), 50 Mich. 565, 15 N. W.

R. 906, the court said of a provision

in a warranty calling for immediate

notice, in case a machine did not

work well, "This provision for im-

mediate notice does not mean the

shortest time possible in which notice

could be given. The terms must re-

ceive a sensible interpretation — an

interpretation favorable to the gen-

eral object and consistent with the

surrounding conditions. It would be

necessary to make allowance for the

engagements of the parties, the dis-

tance between them, the facility of

communication, and any other inci-

dents having a bearing. No greater

dispatch would be implied than such

as would be fairly just and reason-

able in view of all the circum-

stances."

Pierce v. Cooley (1885), 56 Mich.

552, 23 N. W. R. 310, was a case

where the defendants purchased a

machine from the plaintiffs, to be

accepted if it worked to defendants'

satisfaction, and paid for by a note

due May 1, 1884, or by cash payment

on that day. The court held that

the option to take or reject continued

until May 1, 1881, when they were

undoubtedly bound to decide. Prior

to that date title could not pass with-

out an acceptance by the purchaser.

In Stutz v. Coal & Coke Co. (1889),

131 Pa. St. 267, 18 Atl. R. 875, ma-

chinery was sold with the stipula-

tion that it was " to be first class in

all particulars, and perform in a sat-

isfactory manner," and thirty days

were allowed for trial. But the ma-

chinery, while not satisfactory, was

retained after the expiration of the

thirty days, and the plaintiffs were

§§ 610, 671.]

LAW OF
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[BOOK II.

§§ 670, 671.]
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§ 670. Duty to give notice or return. — Unless so stipulated

in the contract, the vendee is not bound to return the article;

he performs his duty when he gives reasonable notice of his

dissatisfaction. 1 The contract may, however, require him to

return the article, and if it does this provision must be complied

with.

§671. How buyer's satisfaction indicated. — The fact of

the buyer's satisfaction may be established in a variety of ways.

§ 670. Duty to give notice or return.- Unless so stipulated
in the contract, the vendee is not bound to return the article;
he performs his duty when he gives reasonable notice of his
dissati faction. 1 The contract may, however, require him to
return the article, and if it does this provision must be complied
with.

There may, of course, be express admissions of the fact; but

other forms will suffice. Retention beyond a reasonable time

has already been suggested, and a failure to return where that

was required. A sale or disposition of the article as one's own

would also be evidence, ordinarily conclusive; and so would

the fact that the buyer had kept and consumed the article in

the terms of the contract and allow-

ing defendant a reasonable time in
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which to test the machine was error.

In the case of C. & C. Electric

Motor Co. v. Frisbie (1895), 66 Conn.

67, 33 AtL R. 604, an elevator was put

in with the agreement that it should

be a satisfactory working machine

§ 671. How buyers satisfaction indicated .-The fact of
the buyer's satisfaction may be established in a variety of ways.
There may, of course, be express admissions of the fact; but
other forms will suffice. Retention beyond a reasonable time
has already been suggested, and a failure to return where that
was required. A sale or disposition of the article as one's own
would also be evidence, or linarily conclusive; and so woul 1
the fact that the buyer had kept and consumed the article in

for one year. It was claimed that

this was a condition of the sale and

by its express terms gave the plaint-

iff a year in which to reject. But

the court held that such a warranty

is not a condition at all; if it were

it would be a subsequent, not a pre-

cedent, one. Hence there was no

error of law in the finding that the

plaintiff had, by acts and conduct,

accepted the elevator prior to the

expiration of the year.

In Forsaith Mach. Co. v. Mengel

(1894), 99 Mich. 280, 58 N. W. R 305,

defendants purchased a match ma-

chine with the privilege of returning

it if not satisfactory. Four months

after they were in a position to test

the machine, and nearly a year after

shipment, the defendants for the first

time proposed to return the machine.

Held, that the delay was clearly un-

reasonable. The defendants had the

option of accepting or rejecting the

machine, but they were bound to act

promptly, and retention beyond a

reasonable time is tantamount to an

acceptance.

In Palmer v. Banfield (1893), 86

Wis. 441, 56 N. W. R 1090, the vendee

of a harvesting machine had a right

to return it either because of defects

or dissatisfaction. He was not sat-

isfied but continued to use it, not as

further test but to complete his har-

vest. Held, to constitute an accept-

ance whereby his right to return

was lost.

i Esterly v. Campbell (1891), 44 Mo.

App. 621 [citing Exhaust Vent. Co. v.

Railroad Co., 69 Wis. 454; McCormick

Harv. Machine Co. v. Chesrown, 33

Minn. 32; Gibson v. Vail, 53 Vt. 476;

Hunt v. Wyman, 100 Mass. 198].

554

the terms of the contract and allow- the machine, and nearly a year after
ing defendant area onable time in shipment, the defendants for the first
which to te t the machine was error. time propo ed to return the machine.
In the case of C. & C. Electric H eld, that the delay was clearly un·
Motor Co. v. Frisbie (1 93), 66 Conn. reasonable. The defendant had the
67, 33 Atl. R. 60-±, an elevator was put option of accepting or r ejecting the
in with the agreement that it hould machine, but they were bound to act
be a satisfactory working machine promptly, and r etention beyond a
for one year. It was claimed that reasonable time is tantamount to an
thi was a condition of the sale and acceptance.
by its expre s terms gave the plaintIn Palmer v. Banfield (1 93), 8&
iff a year in which to r ejec:t. But \ is. 441, 56 N. W.R. 1090, the vendee
the court helcl that such a warranty of a hane ting machine had a rigllt
is not a condition at all; if it were to return it either because of Jefects
it would be a subsequent, not a pre- or di ati faction. He was not at·
cedent, one. Hence there was no isfied but continued to use it, not a
error of law in the finding that the further te t but to complete his harplaintiff had, by acts and condu:ct, ve t. Held, to con titute an acceptacc pted the elevator prior to the ance whereby bis right to return
xpir tion of the year.
wa lo t.
In For aith Mach. Co. v. Iengel
1 E terly v. Campbell (1 91), 4.-4 Uo.
(1 D.J.), 99 ::.\Iich. 2 0 5 N. \V. R. 30.5, App. 691 [citing Exhaust Vent. Co. v.
def n<.lant purcha ·eJ a mat h ma- Rn.ilroad Co., 69 Wis. 454 · McCormick
chine with the privilege of returning Harv. Maehine Co. v. Che rown, 33
it if not sati factory. Four month Minn. 39; Gib on v. Vail, 53 Vt. 176;
a fter they were in a po ·ition to te t Hunt v. Wyman, 100 fa s. 198].
. 554:
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use. 1 A refusal to restore the goods to the seller would have

the same effect. 2

5. Sale if Approved oy Third Person.

§672, Sales upon approval of third person. — But the

principle of the foregoing sections, so far as they hold that the

question is one for the unlimited arbitrament of the vendee,

without inquiry into motives, does not, it is said, 3 "apply, in

its unqualified form, in a case where the contracting parties

have expressly stipulated that the article to be supplied shall

be such, in respect to the quality or otherwise, as shall be ap-

proved by or satisfactory to some third person, though that

third person may be an agent or an employee of one of the

parties to the contract. In such case, though it be made a con-

dition precedent that the article shall be approved by the party

designated, yet, if it can be shown that the approval has been

withheld from motives of selfish interest, bias, partiality or

corruption, the party prejudiced by such action may, notwith-

standing the absence of such approval, recover on the contract
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for the non-acceptance of the article furnished."

§ 673. - — Third person must act in good faith. — '• In

such contracts it is an implied condition that the person desig-

nated to approve shall act with entire good faith to both of

the contracting parties. Both parties have the right to insist

upon such good faith, and the want of it will dispense with

the condition requiring the approval. The court will not allow

a defendant to avail himself of the condition precedent to de-

feat the right of the plaintiff to recover for a violation of the

contract, where there has been fraud or mala fides on the part

of the person appointed to approve or disapprove. But in the

absence of fraud or bad faith in the conduct of such party, in

respect to the fact of his approval or the withholding of it, his

judgment or determination is to be accepted as final and con-

i Boothby v. Piaisted (1871). 51 N. H. 2 Jones v. Wright (1873), 71 III. 61.

436, 12 Am. R, 140; Delamater v. 3 Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Biy don

Chappell (1877), 48 Md. 241. (1885), 65 Md. 198, 57 Am. R. 318.

555
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elusive. No mere error or mistake of judgment will vitiate

his determination. The very object of his appointment is to

prevent and exclude contention and litigation ; and hence noth-

ing short of fraud' or mala fides in the exercise of his power to

reject or approve the article contracted for will dispense with

the strict legal effect of the condition precedent. This is now

the settled doctrine, in respect to this class of contracts, in the

courts both of this country and of England." l

i Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Brydon,

supra [citing Wilson v. Y. & Md.

Line R. Co., 11 G. & J. (Md.) 58; Lynn

elusive. No mere error or mi take of judgment will Yi ti ate
his determination. The very object of his appointment is to
prevent and exclude contention and litigation; and hence nothing short of fraud· or mala fides in the exercise of his power to
reject or approve the article contracted for will dispense with
the strict legal effect of the condition precedent. This is now
the settled doctrine, in respect to this class of contracts, in the
courts both of this country and of England." 1

v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 60 Md..

404, 45 Am. R. 741 ; Sweeney v. United

States, 109 U. S. 618; Martinsburg v.

Potomac R. Co., 114 U. S. 549; Sharpe

v. San Paulo R. Co., L. R. 8 Ch. A pp.
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"Wood was purchased, to be meas-

ured and received by the quarter-

master at Walla Walla. Held, that

title did not pass until such measure-

ment and receipt by the quarter-

master at Walla Walla. Rosenthal

v. Kahn (1890), 19 Oreg. 571, 24 Pac.

R. 989. A ship-builder agreed to alter,

fit for sea and deliver a gun-boat as a

merchant vessel, under the inspec-

tion and subject to the approval of a

third person who was experienced

in ship-building. Held, that the third

person named was made an arbitra-

tor between the parties, and his ap-

proval was binding upon them as an

award, however much he may have

erred in his judgment. Flint v. Gib-

son (1871), 106 Mass. 391.

Plaintiff was the vendor of a de-

vice to be used in boilers for the

purpose of saving fuel. Defendant

agreed to take one provided that

upon trial it made a saving of twelve

per cent, and his engineer was to be

the judge of its performance. The

test was made and the engineer's

decision rendered to the effect that

it saved more than the required

amount. Held, that this decision of

defendant's engineer "is to be con-

sidered as the award of a referee

under a submission to arbitrate. In

the absence of any suggestion of

fraud, this award cannot be im-

peached on the ground of any error

in judgment on his part." Robbins

v. Clark (1880), 129 Mass. 145. De-

fendant purchased meat from plaint-

iffs, of a stipulated kind and quality,

and appointed an inspector, with

plaintiffs' approval, to pass upon it

as satisfying the terms of the con-

tract. The meat was inspected and

approved by the inspector, and put

upon the cars for shipment, but de-

fendant refused to take it. Accord-

ingly it was sold by plaintiffs and

action brought for damages. Held,

that the substance of the agreement

I Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Brydon,
supra [citing Wilson v. Y. & l\'.Id.
Line R. Co., 11 G. & J. (Md. ) 58; Lynn
v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 60 Md .•
404, 45Am.R.741; Sweeneyv. United
States, 109 U. S. 618; Martinsburg v.
Potomac R. Co., 114 U.S. 549; Shai:pe
v. San P a ulo R. Co., L. · R. 8 Ch. App.

decision rendered to the effect that
it saved more than the required
amount. H eld, that this decision of
defendant's engineer "is to be considerecl as the award of a referee
under a submission to arbitrate. In
the absence of any suggestion of
fraud, this award cannot be imI eached on the ground of any error
in judgment on his part." Robbins
v. Clark (1880), 129 l\fass. 145. Defendant purchased meat from plaintiffs, of a stipulated kind and quality,
and appointed an inspector, with
plaintiffs' approval, to pass upon it
as satisfying the terms of the contract. The meat was inspected and
approved by the inspector, and put
upon the cars for shipment. but defenda nt refused to take it. Accordingly it was sold by plaintiffs and
a tion brought for damages. H eld,
that the substance of the agreement.
was that the defendant would a ccept
such meat, when delivered, as had
been inspected and pronounced in
conformity with the terms of the
contract. In the absence of fraud
the purchaser was as much bound to
r eceive the meat as though be had
in pected an l approved it in per on.
N f inger v. Ring (1 19), 71 Mo. 149.
But wh re a ·ontract wa made
f r the delivery of about sixty thouand blo k of granite a cordinO' to
certain direction , provided that if

597].
Wood was purchased, to be measured and r eceived by the quartermaster at Walla Walla. H eld, that
title did not pass until such measurement and r eceipt by the quartermaster at Walla Walla. Rosenthal
v. Kahn (1890), 19 Oreg. 571, 24 Pac.
R. 9 9. A ship-builder agreed to alter,
fit for sea and deliver a gun-boat as a
merchant vessel, under the inspection and subject to the approval of a
third per on who was experienced
in ship-building. H eld, that the third
person named was made an arbitrator between the parties, and his appro\"'al wa binding u pon them as an
awartl, however much h e may have
err LI. in hi judgment. Flint v. Gibson (1 71), 1 6 l\1a . 391.
Plaintiff wa the v n<lor of a devie to be u ed in boiler for the
purpo
f avino- fuel. Defendant
agr cl to take one provided that
upon trial jt macl a
ing of tw Ive
per ent., and hi n in er wa to b
the juug of it p rform n e. The
te t wa ma<.le and the engineer's
5:J6

CH. III.] CONDITIONAL SALE OF SPECIFIC CHATTELS. [§§ 674, 675.

6. Sate of Goods to ~be Appraised.

§ 674. Title does not pass ordinarily until appraisal.—

It has been seen in an earlier chapter l that it is competent for

the parties to contract for the sale of goods at a price which

shall be fixed by some third person specified or to be agreed

upon, and that, when the price is so fixed, it becomes operative

between the parties as though they had themselves deter-

mined it.

But in order that such a contract of sale shall operate to

pass the title, it is, in general, essential that the price shall be

fixed as provided in the agreement; for if the parties fail to

agree upon the valuer, or if the latter fails or refuses to act,

the contract, if executory, must lack an essential element, and

the title will not pass, 2 unless a contrary intention appears,

even though the failure to procure the appraisal was due to the

default of one of the parties. 3 Where, however, the goods

have been delivered, and the vendee has prevented the valu-

ation, as by consuming or disposing of the goods before the
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value was fixed, he will be liable for their reasonable value. 4

7. Sale or Return.

§675. Sale with option to return or pay.— To be distin-

guished from the cases in the last sections are those in which

the option is the opposite, *'. e., that the article is purchased and

shall be paid for unless it be returned.

at any time, in the judgment of the plaintiff. Connecticut Valley,

defendants' engineer, plaintiff was etc. Co. v. Trustees (1898), 32 App.

manifestly unable to furnish the Div. (N. Y.) 83.

blocks as required, then the trustees 1 See ante, §§ 202, 203.

might declare the contract null and 2 Fuller v. Bean (1857), 34 N. H.

void, the court held that the ques- 290'; Hutton v. Moore (1870), 26 Ark.

tion of the ability of the contractor 382.

to furnish the stone did not rest 3T/hurnell v. Balbirnie (1837), 2

exclusively with the engineer, but Mees. & Wels. 786; Vickers v. Vick-

that a jury might properly consider ers (1867), L. R. 4 Eq. 529; Milnes v.

whether, under the circumstances, Gery (1807), 14 Ves. 400; Wilks v.

the engineer had any sufficient justi- Davis (1817), 3 Meriv. 507.

fication for his decision adverse to 4 Clarke v. Westrope (1856), 18 Com.
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§§ 676, 677.] law of sale. [book ii.

g 676. Here there is a present sale subject to a con-

dition subsequent.— As is said in one case: 1 "An option to

purchase if he liked is essentially different from an option to

return a purchase if he should not like. In one case the title

will not pass until the option is determined ; in the other the

property passes at once, subject to the right to rescind and re-

turn."

This is directly in line with cases already considered in a

previous section when treating of deposits of grain, in which

it was found that a sale existed whenever the owner had con-

ferred upon the other party the option to determine whether to

pay for the article in money or property as he should elect. 2

§ 677. Nature of title acquired by vendee — Risk of loss.—

A contract of this nature, as has been seen, constitutes usually

a present sale subject to be defeated by a condition subsequent.

Until return, therefore, the title is in the vendee. lie may sell

the goods as his own, 3 and thus defeat the return; or they may

be seized by his creditors, 4 with like effect. The risk usually is
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"his also, as the risk follows the title, 5 excepting, perhaps, such

B. 765, 86 Eng. Com. L. 764; Humas- facture and sale of soda-water de-

§ 676. - - Here there is a present sale subject t o a condition subsequent.- As is said in one case: 1 "An option to
purchase if he liked is essentially different from an option to
return a purchase if he should not like. In one case the title
will not pass until the option is determined; in the other the
property passes at once, subj ect to the right to rescind and return."
This is directly in line with cases already consiclereu in a
previous section when treating of depo its o'f grain, in which
it was found that a sale existed whenever tbe owner had conferred upon the other party the option to determine whether to
pay for tbe article in mon ey or property as he should elect. 2

ton v. Telegraph Co. (1873), 20 Wall, livers it in bottles to a customer, and

(U. S.) 20; Kenniston v. Ham (1854), takes a deposit from him with the

29 N. H. 501. understanding that he may return

1 Hunt v. Wynian (1868), 100 Mass. the bottles and take back the deposit,

198. To same effect: McKinney v. or keep the bottles and regard the de-

Bradlee (1873), 117 Mass. 321; Foley posit as. a payment, as he may elect,

v. Felrath (1893), 98 Ala. 176, 13 S. R. such a transaction amounts to a sale

485; Wind v. Her (1895), 93 Iowa, 316, of the bottles at the election of the

61 N. W. R. 1001, 27 L. R. A. 219; purchaser. People v. Cannon (1893),

Str, uss Saf\alery Co. v. Kingman 139 N. Y. 32, 34 N. E. R. 759, 36 Am.

(1890), 4^ Mo. App. 208; Jameson v. St. R. 668, distinguishing Westcott v.

Gregory (1863), 4 Mete. (Ky.) 363; Thompson (1858), 18 N. Y. 363.

§ 677. Nature of title acquired by vendee -Risk of loss.A contrac t of this nature, as bas been seen, constitut ,S usually
a present sale subject to be defeated by a condition subsequent.
Until return, therefore, the title is in the vendee. IIe may sell
the goods as bis own, 3 and thus defeat the return; or they may
be seized by his creditors, 4 with like effect. The risk usually is
-bis also, as the risk follows the title, 5 excepting, perhap , such

Johnson v. McLane (1845), 7 Blackf. 2 See ante, § 34.

(Ind.) 501, 43 Am. Dec. 102; Walker 3 Dearborn v. Turner (1839), 16 Me.

v. Blake (1854), 37 Me. 373; Allen v. 17, 33 Am. Dec. 630; McKinney v.

Maury (1880), 66 Ala. 10; Robinson v. Bradlee (1873), 117 Mass. 321.

Fairbanks (1886), 81 Ala. 132; House 4 Martin v. Adams (1870), 104 Mass.

v. Beak (1892), 141 111. 290, 30 N. E. R. 262; Hotchkiss v. Higgins (1884), 52

1065, 33 Am. St. R. 307. Conn. 205, 52 Am. R. 582.

If a person engaged in the manu- 5 As where goods are destroyed by
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B. 765, 86 Eng. Com. L. 76~; Humas- facture and sale of soda.-water deton v. Telegraph Co. (1873), 20 Wall. livers it in bottles to a cu tomer, and
(U. S.) 20; Kenniston v. Ham (1854), takes a deposit from him with the
29 N. H. 501.
under tanding that he may r eturn
1 Hunt v. Wyman (1 6 ), 100 Mass. the bottles and take back the deposit.,
198. To sa.me effect: McKinney v. or keep the bottles and regard the deBradlee (187:3), 117 Mass. 321; Foley posit as a payment, as he may elect,
v. Felrath (1893), 98 Ala. 176, 13 S. R. such a transaction amounts to a sale
485; Wind v. Iler (1895), 93 Iowa, 316, of the bottl es at the election of the
61 N. vV. R. 1001, 27 L. R. A. 219; purcha er. P eople v. Cannon (1 93),
tr. uss Saf..:tlery Co. v. Kingman 139 N. Y. 3?, 34 r. E. R. 759, 36 Am.
(1 90), 4.., i\Io. App. 208; J ameson v. St. R. 66 , di ting ui hing We tcott v.
Gregory (1863), 4 Mete. (Ky.) 368 ; Thompson (185 ), 18 N. Y. 363.
J olm on v. Mc Lane (1845), 7 Blackf.
2 See ante, § 34.
(Ind.) 501, 43 m. Dec. 102; Walker
3 Dearborn v. Turner (1 39), Hi Me.
v. Blake (1 54), 37 Me. 373· Allen v. 17, 33 Am. Dec. 6JO; M Kinney v.
Maury (1 U), 66 Ala. 10; Robinson v. Bradlee (1 73), 117 Ma . 32L
Fairbank (18 6), 81 Ala. 132; Hou e
4 Martin v. Adam (1870), 104 Mass.
v. Beak (1 02), 141 Ill. 290, 30 N. E. R. 262; Hot hkis v. Higgins (1 4), 52
1065, 33 m . • t. R. 307.
Con n. 205, 5
m. R. 5 ?.
If a person engaged in the manu~.As where goods are destroyed by
558
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risks as inhere in the very nature of the property or are inci-

dental to the tests or other acts which the contract gives the

buyer the right to perform. 1

fire before return (Strauss Saddlery

Co. v. Kingman (1890), 42 Mo. App.

208; Foley v. Felrath (1893), 98 Ala.

176, 13 S. R. 485); or a horse dies.

Carter v. Wallace (1884), 32 Hun

<N. Y.), 384.

1 In Carter v. Wallace, supra, the

court said: "The plaintiff was the

owner of the horse, and it is admitted

that he delivered it into the posses-

sion of the defendant. While in the

possession of the defendant the horse

was taken sick, and died within one

day thereafter. The parties had ne-

gotiations concerning the sale of the
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horse, which resulted in the delivery

of the horse as stated. The plaintiff

claims that the negotiations resulted

in a complete and absolute sale of

the property at the price of $130, and

that the same was delivered in pur-

suance of the bargain, with the privi-

lege on the part of the defendant to

return the same if, on trial, she did

not drive to suit him. If such was

the agreement, then the title to the

property passed to the vendee, and,

until an election is made to return

the property, it is at the risk of the

purchaser, and in case of any loss or

injury to the property it will fall on

the purchaser." But in Head v. Tat-

tersall (1871), L. R. 7 Exch. 7, Head

bought a horse of Tattersall, war-

ranted to have hunted with the Bi-

cester hounds. By a condition of the

contract he might return the horse,

if it did not answer the description,

at any time up to the Wednesday

evening following the sale. Before

he took the horse away, Head heard

that the horse had not hunted with

the hounds, which afterwards proved

to be the fact; but he took it with

him, and while on the way to Head's

stable the horse became frightened

without Head's fault, became un-

manageable, and was seriously in-

jured. Within the time agreed upon

Head returned the horse to Tatter-

sall, who denied his obligation to re-

ceive it back in its injured condition,

and Head sued to recover back the

price paid, and he was held to be en-

titled to recover. Bramwell, B., said:

"It is said the right to return was

lost because the rule is that a buyer

cannot return a specific chattel ex-

cept it be in the same state as when

it was bought. That is quite true as

a general proposition, but in such a

case as the present the rule must, in

my opinion, be qualified thus: The

buyer must return the horse in the

same condition as when he bought

it, but subject to any of those inci-

§ 678.J

LAW OF SALE.

[BOOK II.

§ 678.] LAW OF SALE. [BOOK II.

§ 678. Option usually vendee's only — Security of seller.—

The option, moreover, is the vendee's, and the seller has no lien

or title reserved by virtue of which he can enforce a return if

the goods are not paid for. 1 As will be seen, the vendor's secu-

rity " rests in the contract."

Thus in one case 2 it appeared that the plaintiff had delivered

to one Nason a cow, taking Nason's written promise to return

the same cow within a year with a calf by her side, or to pay

$22.50. Before the year had expired Nason sold the cow and

calf to defendant, from whom plaintiff sought to recover them.

Said the court: "We are very clear that the security of the

plaintiff rested in contract, and that, Nason having the alter-

native to return or pay, the property passed to him and he was

at liberty to sell the cow." In another case 3 in the same court

it is said: " Whether the alternative is to return specifically or

in kind, or specifically or to pay a certain sum, the principle

is the same. The property in the thing delivered passes, and

the remedy of the former owner rests in contract. It is the
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option conceded to the party receiving which produces this

effect. He may do what he will with the article received. If

he pays, he fulfills his contract. If he neither pays nor returns,

clear his right of return would be could be if the horse sold were to be

gone, because the accident would left at the vendor's by his permission

be his own fault. He would not be after the sale and were to die there."

trying the horse by virtue of any The other judges expressed no opin-

right given to him under his agree- ion on what would have been the re-

men t. If, however, the injury were suit had the horse died. .

caused by reason of a trial necessary Where the horse is sold on approval

to test the warranty the horse was and dies without the fault of the

sold under, then the right would re- vendee, the loss falls on the seller,

main. The case of a horse dying was Elphick v. Barnes (1880), 5 C. P. Div.

also put to us. But there, if the death 321. Compare also Smith v. Hale

occurs through some natural disease, (1893), 158 Mass. 178, 33 N. E. R. 493,

or without the purchaser's default, 35 Am. St. R. 485.

§ 678. Option usually vendee's only- Security of seller.The option, moreover, is the vendee's, and the seller has no lien
or title reserve<l by virtue of which he can enforce a return if
the goods are not paid for. 1 As will be seen, the vendor's security "rests in the contract."
Thus in one case 2 it appeared that the plaintiff had delivered
to one Nason a cow, taking N ason's written promise to return
the same cow within a year with a calf by her side, or to pay
$22.50. Before the year had expired Nason sold the cow and
calf to <lefen<lant, from whom plaintiff sought to recover them.
Said the court: "We are very clear that the security of the
plaintiff rested in contract, and that, ason having the alternative to return or pay, the property passed to him and he was
at liberty to sell the cow." In another case 3 in the same court
it is said: "Whether the alternative is to return specifically or
in kind, or specifically or t~ pay a certain sum, the principle
is the same. The property in the thing delivered passes, and
the remed,y of the former owner rests in contract. It is the
option conceded to the party receiving whic~ produces this
effect. He may do what he will with the article received. If
he pays, he fulfills his contract. If he neither pays nor returns,

is he to be without a remedy? It iMcKinney v. Bradlee (1873\ 117

may be answered that he might have Mass. 321 ; Dearborn v. Turner (1839),

his action on the warranty. How- 16 Me. 17, 33 Am. Dec. 630.

ever that may be, I am disposed to 2 Dearborn v. Turner, supra.

think that even in such a case the 3 Buswell v. Bicknell (1840), 17 Me.

contract might still be rescinded, 344, 35 Am. Dec. 262.

just in the same way as I think it

5G0

clear his right of return would be could be if the borse sold were to be
gone, because the accident would left at the vendor's by hi permission
be his own fault. He would not be after the sale and were to die there."
tryi n.:; the horse by virtue of any The other judges expressed no opinright g iven to him under his agree- ion on what would have been the rement. If, however, the injury were sult had the horse died. .
caused by reason of a trial necessary
Where the horse is sold on approval
to test the warranty the horse was and dies without the fault of the
old under, then the right would re- vendee, the loss falls on the seller.
main. The case of a hor e dying was Elphick v. Barnes (1880), 5 C. P. Div.
al o put to us. But there, if the death 321. Compare also Smith v. Hale
occur tbrough some natural disease, (1893), 158 Mass. 178, 33 N. E. R. 493,
or without the purchaser's default, 35 Am. St. R. 485.
1 McKinney v. Bradlee (1 ';'.)), 117
i he to be without a remedy? It
may be an wered that he might ha Ye Mi . 321; Dearborn v. Turner (1839),
his action on the warranty. How- 16 Me. 17, 33 Am. Dec. 630.
ever t.hat may be, I am di posed to
2 Dearborn v. Turner, supra.
think that even in such a case the
a Bu well v. Bicknel1 (1840), 17 Me.
contract might still be rescinded, 344, 35 Am. Dec. 262.
just in the same way as I think it
q60
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he is lir.ble to an action." Numerous other cases illustrate this

rule, many of which are cited in the note. 1

1679.

Stipulations reserving title.-

Contracts in this

general form may, nevertheless, be made conditional. Thus,

the parties may stipulate that, until the buyer has determined

whether he will purchase or return, the title shall continue in

the seller, and this reservation is effectual. 2 These cases, how-

ever, are properly to be classed among the cases of sale upon

approval.

1 In Buswell v. Bicknell (1840), 17

Me. 344, 35 Am. Dec. 262, a cow had

been delivered to a person who was to

pay $16 for her by the 4th of the

following April or return the cow

and pay $4 for her use. Held, a sale.
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InHolbrook v. Armstrong, 10 Me. 31,

cows had been delivered to be re-

turned or paid for at the end of two

years. Held, a sale. In Southwick v.

Smith, 29 Me. 228, hides had been

delivered and a note given for the

amount, with an agreement that if

the note was not paid the leather

made from the hides should be re-

turned. Held, a sale. See also Per-

kins v. Douglas, 20 Me. 317. In

Crocker v. Gullifer, 44 Me. 491, 69

Am. Dec. 118, it is said: "The gen-

eral proposition that a delivery of an

article at a fixed price, to be paid for

or returned, constitutes a sale, is not

questioned. When the option is with

the party receiving, to pay for or re-

turn the goods received, the uniform

current of authorities is that such

alternative agreement is a sale."

Where goods are shipped from one

State to another under a contract

that the vendee is to pay for them

unless within thirty days he finds

they are not as represented, it is a

sale of the goods in the first State.

Schlesinger v. Stratton, 9R.L 578.

So in Wind v. Her (1895), 93 Iowa,

316, 61 N.W. R. 1001, 27 L. R. A. 219,

where plaintiffs bought liquors from

defendants, paid the freight on them

and credited defendants immediately

upon the receipt of the goods, with

the understanding that they might

return the goods if, after test, they

were not of the quality ordered, it

was held that there was a completed

sale, title passing when goods were

delivered to the carrier for trans-

portation, with an option in plaintiff

to return them if they did not meet

the required test. Called a " sale or

return " in contradistinction from a

conditional sale.

In Hotchkiss v. Higgins (1884), 52

Conn. 205, 52 Am. R. 582, an innkeeper

sent to a wholesale liquor dealer an

order for liquors named, saying that

he wanted it for a certain occasion,

and " what is used I account for and

§" G 0-682.J

LAW OF SALE.

[BOOK II.

§§ 680-682.] LAW OF SALE. [book II.

§ 680. Form of option.— The option in these cases usually

§ 680. Form of option.-The option in these cases

usu~lly

is that if the buyer does not like, or is not satisfied with, the

goods he may return them; and where this is the stipulation

the option of the buyer is absolute, and the reasons for his ac-

tion are not to be investigated. 1 But, on the other hand, the

stipulation may not give the buyer so absolute an option. Thus,

for example, if the contract is that a machine may be returned

if it will not do good work, the right to return it will depend

upon that fact. 2 But if the contract is that the machine may

be returned if it does not suit the buyer and answer his pur-

pose he may return it if he is not suited, though it might an-

swer his purpose. 3 Many other cases might be suggested, but

the question ordinarily presents itself as one aspect of a war-

ranty, and further illustrations will be deferred until that sub-

ject is considered. 4

§681. Within what time option to be exercised.— Con-

tracts of this nature are usually specific and fix the time at or

within which the option is to be exercised; but here, as in the
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former cases, where no time is fixed by the contract, a reason-

able time will be presumed by the law. 5 Hence, —

§682. Effect of not returning in time required.— The

failure of the party receiving them, without reasonable excuse,

to return the goods within the time specified, unless such re-

turn be waived or the time extended, makes the sale absolute, 6

is that if the buyer does not like, or is not satisfied with, the
goods be may return them; and where this is the stipulation
the option of the buyer is absolute, and the reasons for bjs action are not to be in vestigated. 1 But, on the other hand, the
stipulation may not give the buyer so absolute an option. Thus,
for example, if the contract is that a machine may be returned
if it will not do good work, the right to return it will depend
upon that fact. 2 But if th e contract is that the machine may
be returned if it does not suit the buyer and answer his purpose be may return it if he is not suited, though it might answer his purpose. 3 \Iany other cases mig ht be suggested, but
the question ordinarily pr sen ts itself as one a pect of a 'varranty, and further illustrations will be deferred until that subject is considered. 4

i Goodrich v. Van Nortwick (1867), 4 See post, § 1222 et seq.

43 111. 445. 5 Moss v. Sweet, 16 Q. B. 493 ; Childs

2 Manny v. Glendinning (1862), 15 v. O'Donnell (1891), 84 Mich. 533, 47

Wis. 50. Though if the seller uncon- N. W. R. 1108; Schlesinger v. Strat-

ditionally receives the goods back he ton, 9 R. I. 578; Columbia, etc. Co. v.

will acquiesce in the rescission and Beckett (1893), 55 N. J. L. 391, 26 Atl.

cannot raise the question of perform- R. 888; Gale Mfg. Co. v. Moore (1891),

ance. 46 Kan. 324, 26 Pac. R. 703; Luger

3 Goodrich v. Van Nortwick, siqwa. Furniture Co. v. Street (1897), 6 Okl.

§ 681. 1Vithin what time option to be exercised.- Contracts of this nature are usually specific and :fix the time at or
wit bin which the option is to be exercised; but here, as in the
former cases, where no time is fixed by the contract, a reasonable time will be presumed by the law. 5 Hence,-

Compare the very similar cases in 312, 50 Pac. R. 125.

Michigan: Clark v. Rice, 46 Mich. « Stevens v. Hertzler (1895), 109 Ala.

308, 9 N. W. R. 427, and Piano Mfg. 423, 19 S. R. 838.

Co. v. Ellis, 68 Mich. 101, 35 N. W. R. In House v. Beak (1892), 141 111.

841. 290, 30 N. E. R. 1065, 33 Am. St, R. 307,

562

§ 682. Effect of not returning in time reqnire<l.-The
failure of the party receiving them, without reasonable excuse,
to return the goods within the time specified, unless such return be waived or the time extended, makes the sale absolute, 6
1

Goodrich v. Van Nortwick (1 67),

43 Ill. 445.
2 i\Ianny v. Glendi~ning (1 62), 15
'Vi . 50. Though if the seller unconditionally receive the good back he
will acquie ce in the re ci sion and
cannot rai e the que tion of performanc .
a oodri h v. Van ortwick, sitpra.
Com1 are the ery imilar case in
lichigan: lark v. Ri e, 46 l'llich.
30 , 9 N. W. R. 427, and lano If .
o. v. Elli , G 1ich. 101, 35 N. W.R.

841.

4 See post, § 1222 et seq.
51\foss v. weet, 16 Q. B. 493; Childs
v. O'Donnell (1891), 4 :Iich. 533, 47
N. W .. R. 110 ; Schle inger v. Stratton, 9 R. I. 57 " ; Columbia, etc. Co. v.
Beckett (1893), 55 N. J. L. 391, 26 Atl.
R.
; Gale Mfg. Co. v. Moore (1 91),
46 Kan. 324, 26 Pac. R. 703 · Luger
Furniture Co. v. Street (1 97), 6 Oki.
319, 50 Pac. R. 125.
6 Stevens v. Hertzler (1 9-), 109 Ala.
423, 19 s. R. 83 .
In House v. Beak (1 92), 141 Ill.
290, 30 N. E. R. 1065, 33 Am. St. R. 307,

562
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and the price may be recovered as for goods sold and delivered. 1

A fortiori is the sale absolute where the party expressly refuses

to return the goods. 2

plaintiffs were wholesale merchants,

who sold goods to defendants to be

disposed of at retail, only such goods

as were sold by defendants to be paid

for, the rest to be returned. The de-

fendants kept the goods for more

than three years without offering to

return them. Held, that the property

in the goods passed at once to the

purchaser, subject to his option to

return them within a reasonable

time. The goods were not returned

within a reasonable time and defend-

ants are therefore liable as upon an
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absolute sale.

In Buckstaff v. Russell & Co. (1897),

49 U. S. App. 253, 25 C. C. A. 129, 79

Fed. R. 611, the purchasers of ma-

chines, under a contract authorizing

rescission if they were dissatisfied

after a fair and honorable trial,

sought to defend an action for the

price on the ground of rescission,

though they had used the machines

for three and one-half years after

their alleged notice to the seller.

Held, that their conduct was a

waiver of the contract right of re-

scission.

In Waters Heater Co. v. Mansfield

(1875), 48 Vt. 378, defendants bought

-a steam heater from plaintiff, agree-

ing to attach it to their works and

try it for thirty days. If it proved

satisfactory they were to pay for it

or return it. They did not attach it,

but waited to see how another of

plaintiff's heaters which they knew

about would work. Held, that such

keeping it was an election to pur-

chase.

In Spickler v. Marsh (1877), 36 Md.

222, a party agreed to take machin-

ery on trial. If it suited him he was

to pay for it; if it did not he was to

return it. He neither returned it nor

expressed any dissatisfaction. Held,

that the seller might treat the trans-

action as an absolute sale. Called by

the court "a sale or return."

In Prairie Farmer Co. v. Taylor

(1873), 69 111. 440, appellee sold a print-

ing press to appellant with the agree-

ment that he was to keep and use it

thirty days, appellee to keep it in

order, "to determine whether the

warrant [to give complete satisfac-

tion] is good, and whether you will

keep the prass or not." Held, that if

the purchaser kept the machinery

thirty days without notice of his elec-

tion not to keep the same, he was re-

sponsible for the price. "The sale

was complete unless the company de-

termined not to keep it,"

§ 6"' 3.J

LAW OF

A.LE.

[nooK n.

§ 683.]

LAW OF SALE.

[BOOK II.

§ 683. How when party puts it out of his power to return.

Where the party receiving the goods has put it out of his power

to return them within the time agreed upon, the sale becomes

absolute. 1 Thus, where a horse had been delivered to be paid

for or returned within a specified time, and the party receiving

it so abused it that it was materially injured and lessened in

value, the court said: " The sale was on a condition subsequent,

that is, on condition he did not elect to keep the horse, to re-

turn him within the time limited. Being on a condition sub-

sequent, the property vested presently in the vendee, defeasible

only on the performance of the condition. If the defendant

in the meantime disabled himself from performing the condi-

tion — and if the horse was substantially injured by the de-

fendant by such abuse he would be so disabled, — then the sale

became absolute, the obligation to pay the price became uncon-

ditional, and the plaintiff might declare as upon an indebitatus
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assumpsit without setting out the conditional contract." 2

the goods themselves," and defend-

ant's failure to set up and test the

machinery cannot defeat plaintiffs

action for the price.

In Snody v. Shier (1891), 88 Mich

304, 50 N. W. R. 252, a harvesting

machine was purchased under the

condition that it should be return-

able if defective, but the return must

§ 683. How when party pnts it out of his power to retu rn.
Where the party receiving the goods has put it out of his power
to return them within the time agreed upon, the sale becomes
absolute.1 Thus, where a horse had been delivered to be paid
for or return ed within a specified time, and the party recei-ving
it so abu ed it that it was materially injured and lessened in
value, the court said: ''The sale was on a condition subsequent,
that is, on condition he did not elect to keep the horse, to return him within the time limited. Being on a condition subsequent, the property vested presently in the vendee, defeasible
only on the performance of the condition. If the defendant
i n the meantime disabled himself from performing the condition- and if the horse was substantially injured by the defend ant by such abuse he would be so disabled,-then the sale
became absolute, the obligation to pay the price _b ecame unconditional, and the plaintiff might declare as upon an indebitatus
assumpsit without setting out the conditional contract." 2

be before the harvesting season was

over. It was kept till the next sea-

son for a further trial with the vend-

or's consent. Held, that the vendor

waived the condition as to return.

In Colles v. Swensberg (1892), 90

Mich. 223, 51 N. W. R. 275, plaintiffs

supplied defendants with a boiler

filter to be returned within one year

if unsatisfactory. Defendants noti-

fied plaintiffs that it was unsatisfac-

tory, and asked for shipping direc-

tions, but they were not sent. Held,

that plaintiff waived the condition

tor reshipment.

1 Ray v. Thompson (1853), 12 Cush.

(Mass.) 281, 59 Am. Dec. 187. A loan

attended with a continuous offer of

sale at a fixed price may be con-

verted into a sale at any time before

the offer is withdrawn. And a sale

by the borrower to a third person

signifies that the offer is accepted.

Windsor v. Cruise (1887), 79 Ga. 635,

7 S. E. R. 141.

2 Ray v. Thompson, supra. But

this rule was held not to apply where

the horse, within the time limited,

was injured without the vendee's

fault and returned in such injured

condition. Head v. Tattersall (1871),

the goods the mselves," and defenda nt's failure t o set up and test the
machinery cannot defeat plaintiff's
action for t he price.
In Snody v. Shier (1 91), 88 Mich.
304, 50 N. W. R. 252, "' harvesting
machine was purchaseJ. under the
condit ion that it should be returnable if defective. but the return must
be before the ha rvesting season was
over. I t was kept till the n ext season fo r a fu rt her trial with the vent.I.or· con ent. H eld, tha t the vendor
waived the condition as to r eturn.
In olles v. Swen berg (1 92 ), 90
Mich. 223, 51 N. W. R. 275, plaintiff
upplied defendant w it h a boiler
fi lter to be r turned within one year
if u n ati fa tory. Defendants noti·
fied plain tiffs t hat it wa unsati factory, antl a ked f r hipping direction but hey wer not en t. H elcl,
that plaintiff wai ved th 1.. : ondition
for re hipmen t.

I Ray v. Thompson (1853), 12 Cush.
(Mass.) 281, 59 Am. Dec. 187. A loan
attended with a continuous offer of
sale at a fixed price may be converted into a sale at any time before
the offer is withdrawn. And a sale
by the borrower to a third person
signifies that the offer is accepted.
Wind or v. Crnise (1887), 79 Ga. 635,
7 s. E. R. 141.
2 Ray v. Thompson, .mpra.
But
thi rule wa held not to ap ply where
the horse, within the time lunited,
was injnred without the vendee's
fault and returned in such injured
condition. Head v. Tatter all (1 71),
L. R. 7 Ex. 7. A ale of per onal
property on condition that the vend e
may r eturn it in a certain contingency becomes ah olute if the vendee
disabl
him elf from returning it
by elling or mortgaging the property. In re Ward·s E. tR.te (1 94), 57
Minn. 377, 59 N. W. R. 311.

L. R. 7 Ex. 7. A sale of personal

property on condition that the vendee

may return it in a certain contin-

gency becomes absolute if the vendee

disables himself from returning it

by selling or mortgaging the prop-

erty. In re Ward's Estate (1894), 57

Minn. 377, 59 N. W. R. 311.

564
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CH. III.] CONDITIONAL SALE OF SPECIFIC CHATTELS. [§§ 6S4, 685.

§684. How when return becomes impossible.— The same

result ensues where the return, without the fault of the seller,

has become impossible. Thus where goods sold, subject to the

rio-ht of the vendee to return certain of them if he liked, were

delivered to a common carrier for transportation to the vendee,

but were lost in transit, it was held to be a case of present sale

subject to a condition subsequent, and that the loss must fall

upon the vendee. 1

But in an English case, 2 already cited, where a horse was

sold with the right to return it if it did not conform to the de-

scription, one of the judges said: "As a general rule, damage

from the depreciation of a chattel ought to fall on the person

who is the owner of it. Now here the effect of the contract

was to vest the property in the buyer subject to a right of re-

scission in a particular event, when it would revest in the

seller. I think in such a case that the person who is eventu-

ally entitled to the property in the chattel ought to bear any

loss arising from any depreciation in its value caused by an ac-
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cident for which nobody is in fault."

§ 685. How return effected — Tender — Effect.— The right

of the vendee to return the goods, under the conditions agreed

upon, is an absolute one, and upon such return the title vests

again in the seller. 3 A stipulation for such a return, it is usu-

ally held, " does not amount in law to a contract to repurchase,

but is, upon the exercise of the option, a rescission of the con-

tract, and the title at once vests in the original vendor." 4

i Foley v. Felrath (1893), 98 Ala. months. Held, that the loss was on

176, 13 S. R. 485, 39 Am. St. R. 39. In the vendees, for there could be no

Scroggin v. Wood (1893), 87 Iowa, 497, breach of warranty before the time

54 N. W. R. 437, a stallion was sold for making the test had elapsed,

with a warranty that he was an av- 2 Head v. Tattersall (1871), L. R. 7

erage breeder, but it was expressly Ex. 7, cited supra.

agreed that the test should not be 3 Laubach v. Laubach (1873), 73 Pa.

considered complete until he had St. 387; Gay v. Dare (1894), 103 CaL

been used two years. The vendees 454, 37 Pac. R. 466.

were to bear all risk of accident and 4 Gay v. Dare, supra. In Laubach

disease while the horse was in their v. Laubach, supra, Sharswood, J.,

possession. The horse died in four said: "No one has ever supposed

565
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If the vendor refuses to receive back the goods, a tender of

them establishes the vendee's right, 1 and he may hold the

goods for the vendor. 2 But if the vendee acquiesces in the

vendor's refusal to receive them, no restoration of the title will

be effected. 3

8. Sale with Option in Vendor to Retake.

§ 686. Title in vendor until option exercised. — In previous

sections i exhaustive discussion has been had of the so-called

conditional sale in which the vendor, while parting with the

If the vendor refuses to receive back the goods, a tender of
them establishes the vendee's right,1 and he may holcl the
goods for the vendor. 2 But if the vendee acquiesces in the
vendor's refusal to receive them, no restoration of the title will
ba effected. 3

possession, has retained the title as security for the price; and

it has there been seen that no title passes to the verdee until

the condition has been performed or performance has been

8. Sale with Option in Vendor to Retake.

waived.

But it is entirely competent for the parties to make an arrange-

ment which shall reverse these conditions, namely, that the

title shall at once pass subject to an option on the part of the

seller to subsequently reclaim the goods for reasons specified.

Until this right has been exercised, the title is in the vendee,
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and he may convey an indefeasible title to a bona fide pur-

chaser, 5 or the goods may, it is said, be seized to satisfy the

vendee's creditors. 6

that this was to be construed as a Allen (Mass.), 491. Here a steam en-

contract to repurchase, or that upon gine and boiler were sold as of a cer-

the exercise by the vendee of the tain power; part payment was made,

option reserved, the title does not and it was agreed that if they did

revest in the original vendor, and not prove of the power specified the

the right to the price in the vendee, vendor was to take them back and

This is the legal effect of the rescis- repay the money, in default of which

sion of a contract, whether the re- the vendee might sell them. They

scission be by reason of an inherent proved inefficient, but the vendor

vice, such as fraud, or by virtue of refused to take them back. Later the

the terms of the contract itself, vendee rented them to the vendor,

Smethurst v. Woolston, 5 W. & S. who mortgaged them. Held, that

106." the title was in the vendee.

J Gay v. Dare, supra; Laubach v. 4 See ante, %% 358-650.

Laubacb, supra; Thorndike v. Locke 5 See ante, § 146.

(1867), 98 Mass. 340. 6 Moline Plow Co. v. Rodgers (1894),

§ 686. Title in vendor until option exercised.-In previous
sections 4 exhaustive discussion has been bad of the so-called
conditional sale in which the vendor, while parting with the
possession, has retained the title as security for the price; and
it has there been s en that no title passes to the verclee until
the condition bas been performed or performance has been
waived.
But it is entirely competent for the parties to make an arrangement which shall reverse these conditions, namely, that the
title shall at once pass subject to an option on the part of the
seller to subsequently reclaim the goods for reasons specified.
Until this right has been exercised, the title is in the vendee,
and he may convey an indefeasible title to a bona fide purchaser,5 or the goods may, it is said, be seized to satisfy the
ven<lee s creditors. 6

2 Gay v. Dare, supra. 53 Kan. 743, 37 Pac. R. 1 11.

3 Stevens v. Cunningham (1862), 3
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that this was to be con trued as a Allen (Mass.), 491. Here a steam encontract to repurchase, or that upon gine and boiler were sold as of a certhe exercise by the vendee of the tain power; part payment was made,
option reserved, the title does not and it was agreed that if they did
revest in the original vendor, and not prove of the power specified the
the right to the price in the vendee. vendor was to take them back and
Thi i. the legal effect of the re cis- repay the money, in default of which
sion of a con tract, whether the re- the vendee might sell them. They
sci sion l>e by reason of an inherent proved inefficient, but the vendor
vi e, uch as fraud, or by virtue of refu ed to take them back. Later the
the terms of the contract it elf. vendee rented them to the vendor,
methur t v. Woobton, 5 W. & S. who mortgaged them. Hild, that
106."
the title wa in the vendee.
4 ee ante, · · 55 -6-o.
1 ay v. Dare, upra; Laubach v.
0
ee ant , § 146.
Lau ba h, sitpra; Thorndike v. Lo ke
(1 67), 9 Ia~ . 340.
6 ·i \loline Plow Co. v. Rodgers (1894),
2 Gay . Dare supra.
53 Kan. 743, 37 Pac. R. 111.
3 Stev n v. Cunningham (1 62), 3
566

CH. III.] CONDITIONAL SALE OF SPECIFIC CHATTELS. [§§ 687-689.

§ 687, Waiver of option. — And where the option is reserved

for the purpose of securing the payment of the purchase price,

and as an alternative to action for its recovery, a suit for the

price will be deemed to be such an election of remedies as will

preclude the subsequent retaking of the goods. 1

9. Sale ivitli Right in Vendor to Repurchase.

§ 688. Title in vendee until right exercised — There may

also be contracts of present sale reserving to the seller the right

to repurchase the goods upon terms agreed upon. In practice

it is difficult often to determine whether a given contract hav-

ing some of these aspects constitutes a pledge, a mortgage, a

sale conditioned to be void upon the payment of a certain sura,

or a sale with the privilege of repurchase. This is a difficulty

to be dealt with in view of the terms of the contract, the cir-

cumstances of the case and the evident intention of the parties. 2

If it be found to constitute a present sale with a privilege of

repurchase, the title passes at once, subject to the right of the

seller to regain it upon complying with the conditions. 3
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§ 689. Such contracts strictly construed. — "Such defea-

sible purchases," it has been said, 4 "though narrowly watched,

are valid, and are to be taken strictly as independent dealings

between strangers; and the time limited for the repurchase

must be precisely observed, or the vendor's right to reclaim

his property will be lost." " There is good reason," it is said

again, in commenting upon this rule, 5 " why such sale should

be ' narrowly watched ' and ' precisely observed.' There is no

i Moline Plow Co. v. Rodgers, supra. 3L uc ketts v. Townsend (1848), 3

2 See Eiland v. Radford (1845), 7 Tex. 119, 49 Am. Dec. 723.

Ala. 724, 42 Am. Dec. 610; Hickman * 4 Kent's Com. 144

v. Cantrell (1836), 9 Yerg. (Tenn.) 172, 5 Beck v. Blue (1868), 42 Ala. 32, 94

30 Am. Dec. 396; Murphy v. Bare- Am. Dec. 630. See also Slowey v.

field (1855), 27 Ala. 634; Swift v. Swift McMurray (1858), 27 Mo. 113, 72 Am.

(1860), 36 Ala. 147; Com. v. Reading Dec. 251; Sewall v. Henry (1846), 9

Savings Bank (1884), 137 Mass. 431. Ala. 24.

567

§§ 690-692. J

LAW OF SALE.

[BOOK II.

§§ 690-692.] LAW OF SALE. [book II.

obligation on the part of the vendor to repurchase. Should

the property appreciate in value, he may exercise his right

and realize the profit; should it depreciate in value, or be in-

jured or destroyed, he may decline to repurchase, and permit

the loss to fall exclusively on the vendee. 1 Such being the

relative situation of the two parties to such a contract, the law

requires promptness and precision on the part of the vendor in

the assertion of his right to repurchase, especially when the

vendee pays a fair valuation for the property."

§ 690. Within what time right exercised.— Where the

terms of the contract fix the time within which the vendor

shall repurchase, that time must be observed; 2 if no time is

so fixed, a reasonable time at least will be implied. 3

§ 691. Interests in goods before repurchase.— The title

thus being in the vendee subject only to the seller's privilege

obligation on the part of the vendor to repurchase. Should
the property appreciate in value, he may exercise bis right
and realize tbe profit; should it depreciate in va lue, or be injured or destroyed, h e may decline to repurchase, and permit
the loss to fall exclusively on the venclee.1 Such being the
relative situation of the two parties to such a contract, the law
requires promptness a nd precision on the part of the vendor in
the assertion of his right to repurchase, especially when the
vendee pays a fair valuation for the property."

of repurchase, the goods are nofe liable for the seller's debt, 4

§ 690. -w ithin wl1at time right exercised.-Where the

and a bona fide purchaser from the vendee would obtain a per-

fect title. 5
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10. Sale to be Void if Vendor Pays.

§ 692. Such agreements valid.— There may also be a pres-

ent sale subject to a condition that the transfer shall be void in

case the seller pays to the buyer a sum specified, as where upon

terms of the contract fix the time within which the vendor
shall repurchase, that time mu t be observed; 2 if no time is
so fixed, a reasonable time at least will be implied. 3

1 See Com. v. Reading Savings Bank 1867, S. sold the colt; whereupon M.

§ 691. Interests in goods bef'o1·e repurchase.-The title

(1884), 137 Mass. 431, 443. Drought trover. Held, a contract of

In Moore v. Sibbald (1869), 29 Up. sale with privilege of repurchase, and

Can. Q. B. 487, there was the follow- not a mortgage; and plaintiff not

ing agreement: " I, S., give .$20 to M. having paid in time had lost his

for the colt which I have in posses- right; but plaintiff was held entitled

sion; but I, said S., promise to give to a return of the $15.

back the colt to M. if he will pay the 2 Moore v. Sibbald (1869), 29 Up.

same sum with 12$ interest, on or be- Can. Q. B. 487.

thus being in the vendee subject only to the seller's privilege
of repurchase, the goods are not liable for the seller's debt, 4
and a bona fide purchaser from the vendee would obtain a perfect title.5

fore May 1, 1866. If not paid the colt 3 Beck v. Blue (1868), 42 Ala. 32, 94

will be S.'s property, then he can do Am. Dec. 630.

10. Sale to be Void if f endor Pays.

with it as he likes or keep it for him- 4 Mahler v. Schloss (1877), 7 Daly

self." M. paid S. $15, but failed to (N. Y.), 291.

§ 692. Such agreements valid .-There may also be a pres-

pay the balance, and in September, 5 See ante, § 146.

568

ent sale subject to a condition that the transfer shall be void in
case the seller pays to the buyer a sum specified, as where upon
See Com. v. Reading Savings Bank 1867, S. sold the colt ; whereupon l\rf.
4), 137 Mass. 431, 443.
broug ht trover. H eld, a contract of
In Moore v. Sibbald (1869), 29 Up. sale with privilege of repurchase. and
Can. . B. 4 7, there wa the fallow- not a mortgage ; and plai_ntiff not
ing agreement: "I, S., give 20 to M. h av ing paicl in time had lo t his
for th c lt which I have in pos es- .right; but pla intiff was held entitled
sion; but I, aid S., promi e to g ive to a return of the $15.
back the colt to M. if he will pay the
2 Moore v. Sibbald (1 69), 29 Up.
am um ·with 19% inter t, on or be- Can. Q. B. 4 7.
fore l\1ay 1, 1 66. If not paid the c lt
3 Beck v. Blue (1 6 ), 42 Ala. 32, 94
will be '.'s pr p rty, then he can lo Am. Dec. 680.
with it a he like' r k pit for him4 Mahler v. Schloss (1 77), 7 Daly
s lf." M. paid '. 1-, but failed to (N. Y.), '>91.
pay the bal nee, and in eptemb r,
5 See ante, § 146.
568
I

(1

On. III.] CONDITIONAL SALE OF SPECIFIC CHATTELS. [§ 693.

the sale of a slave there was indorsed upon the bill of sale, ab-

solute in its terras, the following: "N. B. If the above-bound

P. pay up to the above-named M. the sum of four hundred dol-

lars within twelve months from the date hereof, the above bill

of sale to be void, and the negro boy returned." '

These are true conditional sales, i. e., sales upon condition

subsequent, and are practically equivalent to those considered

in the preceding subdivision. They are entirely valid, 2 though

there is constantly difficulty in distinguishing them from chat-

tel mortgages. " A mortgage and a conditional sale are nearly

allied to each other, and it is frequently difficult to say whether

a particular transaction is the one or the other. The differ-

ence between them is that the former is a security for a debt,

and the latter is a purchase for a price paid or to be paid, to

become absolute on a particular event; or a purchase accom-

panied by an agreement to resell upon particular terms. It is

the latter kind that runs so nearly into a mortgage. . . .

Courts lean toward considering them mortgages." 3
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11. Sale to oe Void if Vendee Does Not Pay.

§693. Such agreements valid. — And finally, there may

be, as has been already noticed, 4 cases of present sale coupled

with a condition subsequent that the sale shall be void in case

the purchaser does not pay. These cases are rare, — the usual

form being that, already fully discussed, of contracts of sale

upon the precedent condition that the title shall not pass until

the price is paid.

1 Poindexter v. McCannon (1830), 1 3 Poindexter v. McCannon, supra.

Dev. (N. C.) Eq. 373, 18 Am. Dec. 591. See also Weathersley v. Weathersley

2See Poindexter v. McCannon, (1866), 40 Miss. 462, 90 Am. Dec. 344;

supra; Eiland v. Radford (1845), 7 Morrow v. Turney (1859), 35 Ala. 131 ;

Ala. 724, 42 Am. Dec. 610; Logwood Bishop v. Rutledge (1832), 7 J. J.

v. Hussey (1877), 60 Ala. 417; Haynie Marsh. (Ky.) 217; Hart v. Burton

v. Robertson (1877), 58 Ala. 37; Pee- (1832), 7 J. J. Marsh. 322.

pies v. Stolla (1876), 57 Ala. 53; Magee 4 See ante, § 572.

v. Catching (1857), 33 Miss. 672; Pierce

v. Scott (1881), 37 Ark. 308.
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Such sales upon condition subsequent are, however, valid as

between the parties, though the seller runs the risk of losing

his claim if the goods are seized by the creditors of the vendee

or sold by him to a hona fide purchaser before condition

broken. 1

i See Murch v. Wright (1868), 46 111.

487, 95 Am. Dec. 455; Lucas v. Camp-

Such sales upon condition subsequent are, however, valid as
between the parties, though the seller runs the risk of losing
his claim if the goods are seized by the creditors of the venclee
or sold by him to a bona fide purchaser before condition
broken. 1

bell (1878), 88 111. 447; Gerow v. Cas-

tello (1888), 11 Colo. 560, 19 Pac. R.

505, 7 Am. St. R. 260 [though see

Jones v. Clark (1894), 20 Colo. 353, 38

Pac. R. 371]. See also Vincent v.

Cornell (1832), 13 Pick. (Mass.) 294;

Day v. Bassett (1869), 102 Mass. 445;

Currier v. Knapp (1875), 117 Mass.

324; Newhall v. Kingsbury (1881), 131

570
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Mass. 445.

I See Murch v. Wright (1868), 46 Ill.
Pac. R. 371]. See also Vincent v.
487, 95 Am. Dec. 455; Lucas v. Camp- Cornell (1832), 13 Pick. (Mass.) 294;
bell (1878). 88 Ill. 447; Gerow v. Cas- Day v. Bassett (1869), 102 Mass. 445;
tello (1888), 11 Colo. 560, 19 Pac. R. Currier v. Knapp (1875), 117 Mass.
505, 7 Am. St. R. 260 [though see 324; Newhall v. Kingsbury (1881), 131
Jones v. Clark (1894), 20 Colo. 353, 38 Mass. 445.
570

CHAPTER IV.

OF CONTRACTS RESPECTING EXISTING CHATTELS NOT YET

IDENTIFIED.

§ 694. Purpose of this chapter.

L Contracts for Sale of Portion

of Ascertained Mass.

695. Before title can pass the goods

must be ascertained.

696. Method of identification im-

material.

697. Contracts respecting part of

a mass of unequal constitu-

ents.

698. These cases form class by

themselves.

699-702. Essential features of

cases of this class.

703. How when whole mass

delivered to vendee.
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704. Contracts respecting part of a

mass of like constituents.

705. Intention material.

706. Usage may affect.

707-709. How question af-

fected by usage.

710. How when no usage governs.

711, 712. Kimberly v. Patehin

as a type.

713. Cases holding separation

necessary.

714, 715. Seudder v. Worster

as a type.

716, 717. The weight of au-

thority.

IL Contracts for Sale of Goods

of Certain Kind but Goods

Not Yet Identified.

718. Nature of subject.

719. Under what circumstances

question arises.

720. What to be included here.

1. Of Appropriation in General.

§ 721. General necessity for appro-

priation.

722. What meant by appropria-

tion.

723. Who interested in question.

724, 725. Who may make the ap-

propriation.

726. What constitutes appropria-

tion in general.

727. Appropriation consists of

acts, not mere intention.

728. Acts must be in fulfill-

ment of contract.

729. Assent to the appropriation.

730. Buyer's assent made nec-

essary by terms of contract.

731. Buyer's assent required

by implication — Sale by

sample.

732. How buyer's assent given

when required.

2. Of Appropriation when Seller is to

Deliver Goods.

733. How when seller is to select

and deliver the goods.

3. Of Appropriation ichere Buyer is

to Come for Goods.

734. How when buyer is to come

•
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R ~medy over against carPayment of freight as § 74 . rier mu t be preserved.
evidence.
749. Duty to insure.
742. Agreement that goods
750. What constitutes delivery to
shall not be paid for unless
the carrier.
they arrive.
743-745. Further of the inten5. Of Apprnp1·iation where Goods
tion.
Consigned on Account of Previ746. Goods must be sent in conous Advances.
formity with order.
751, 752. How when goods con747. Due care mu t be used in shipping.
signed on account of previous advances.

§ 741. -

741. Payment of freight as

evidence.

742. Agreement that goods

shall not be paid for unless

they arrive.

743-745. Further of the inten-

tion.

746. Goods must be sent in con-

formity with order.

747. Due care must be used in ship-

ping.

§ 748. R?medy over against car-

rier must be preserved.

749. Duty to insure.

750. What constitutes delivery to

§ 694. Purpose of this chapter.- Having in the preceding

the carrier.
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5. Of Appropriation where Goods

Consigned on Account of Previ-

ous Advances.

751, 752. How when goods con-

signed on account of previ-

ous advances.

§ 694. Purpose of this chapter. — Having in the preceding

chapters dealt with unconditional contracts respecting specific

chattels, and also with conditional contracts respecting specific

chattels, there remains now to be considered such contracts as

may be made for the sale of chattels which, while they are in

existence, have not yet been ascertained and identified as the

particular ones to which the contract is to apply.

Of contracts of this general kind there are two chief classes,

viz:

I. Contracts for the sale of a portion of an ascertained mass

of goods.

II. Contracts for the sale of chattels of a certain kind, which,

however, have not yet been set apart, identified, or otherwise

c; appropriated " to the contract.

Somewhat analogous to the contracts of the latter class are

contracts which contemplate the manufacture or production of

a chattel of the kind agreed upon in the contract, and which,

when manufactured or produced, is to be supplied in pursu-

ance and performance of that contract. Undertakings of this

nature will be reserved for treatment in the following chapter.

I.

Contracts for TnE Sale of a Portion of an Ascertained

Mass.

§ 605, Before title can pass the goods niust he ascertained.

chapters dealt with unconditional contracts respecting specific
chattels, and also with conditional contracts r especting specific
chattels, there remains now to be considered such contracts as
may be made for the sale of chattels which, while they are in
existence, have not yet been ascertained and identified as the
particular ones to which the contract is to apply.
Of contracts of thi'S general kind there are two chief classes,
viz:
I. Contracts for the sale of a portion of an ascertained mass
of goods.
II. Contracts for the sale of chattels of a certain kind, which,
however, have not yet been set apart, identified, or otherwise
';appropriated" to the contract.
Somewhat analogous to the contracts of the latter class are
contracts which contemplate the manufacture 01· production of
a chattel of the kind agreed upon in the contract, and which,
when manufactured or produced, is to be supE lied in pur uance and p rforrnance of that contract. Un lertakings of tbis
nature will be reserved for tr atment in the following chapter.

As has been already seen, 1 it is absolutely indispensable to a

l See ante, § 198.
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CH. IV.] EXISTING CHATTELS XOT YET IDENTIFIED. [§§ 690-7.

completed sale that the chattel which is the subject of the

sale shall be ascertained and identified. The minds of the par-

ties must meet in reference to some specific chattel, or other-

wise there will remain but a mere agreement to sell, which

has yet to be applied to some specific chattel in order to con-

summate the sale. As is said by Bigelow, C. J., " Until the par-

ties are agreed as to the specific, identical goods, the contract

can be no more than an agreement to supply goods of a cer-

tain kind or answering a particular description. The reason

of this is obvious. There can be no transfer of property until

the parties have ascertained and agreed upon the articles sold.

Before they are designated and set apart in some form, there

is nothing to which the contract of sale can attach or on which

it can operate." J

§ 6%. Method of identification immaterial. — The method

of accomplishing the identification is immaterial; the fact is

the essential thing. The contract itself may afford the neces-

sary means of identification, or that result may be left to be
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determined by subsequent acts or events; but until in some

way the chattels are identified, *no title can pass. 2

§ 697. Contracts respecting part of a mass of unequal con-

stituents. — "When the contract is for the sale of a portion to

be selected from a mass made up of constituents of different

kinds, weights, quantities or values, it is obvious that the title

cannot ordinarily pass until the particular portion which is the

subject of the contract has been distinguished from the hetero-

geneous mass, unless, perhaps, in the case of a contract for the

sale of a portion to be taken from the mass of constituents " as

1 Gardner v. Lane (1865), 9 Allen of which, the contract recited, had

(Mass.), 492, 85 Am. Dec. 779, citing been identified by the parties, but

Aldridge v. Johnson, 7 El. & B. 885; the other lots were not identified in

Scudder v. Worster, 11 Cush. (Mass.) any way. In replevin by the vendee

573. for the whole amount, it was held

2 In Joseph v. Braudy, 112 Mich, that the contract was entire, that the

579. 70 N. W. R. 1101, it appeared third and fourth lots had not been

that there was a written contract identified, and that no title to any

for the sale of four lots of iron, two part of the iron passed.

573

§§ 691.-701.J

LAW OF SALE.

[BOOK II.

§§ 698-701.] LAW OF sale. [book II.

they run," as the saying is,— a question which would be ger-

mane to that to be considered in the following section.

§ 698. These cases form a class by themselves.— It

they run," as the saying is,- a question which would be germane to that to be considered in the following section.

will be obvious, upon reflection, that cases of the kind now

under consideration form a class by themselves distinct from

those to be considered in the following section where the mass

is made up of constituents exactly alike and concerning which

there can be no choice and hence no object, other than mere

separation, to be subserved by selection. Yet the cases now

under consideration are often treated as identical with those

yet to be considered, thereby greatly increasing the conflict as

to that class, which is certainly sufficiently complicated without

them.

§ 699. ■ Essential features of cases of this kind. — The

essential features of this class are unlike constituents from

which there is not only separation but selection to be made ; of

the other class, similar constituents from which a portion is to

be separated.
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§ 700. . Thus where the contract was for the sale of

two hundred cords of hard wood out of a pile containing be-

tween three hundred and fifty and four hundred cords of hard

and soft wood mixed, it was held that there was no sale com-

§ 698. - - These cases form a class by themselves.- It
will be obvious, upon reflection, that ca es of the kind now
under consideration form a class by themselves distinct from
those to be considered in the following section where the mass
is made up of constitue nts exactly alike and concerning which
there can be no choice and hence no object, other than mere
separation, to be subserved by selection. Yet the cases now
under consideration are often treated as identical with those
yet to be considered, thereby greatly increasing the conflict as
to that class, which is certainly sufficiently complicated without
them.

pleted until the two hundred cords of hard wood had been se-

lected from the pile. " It was a bargain," said the court, " for

a parcel yet to be measured out of a larger parcel of various

qualities, and of an extent not determined." 1

§ 701. . So where one man, having in the possession of

another a large number of barrels of flour varying in value

from twenty-five to fifty cents a barrel, agreed to sell six hun-

dred barrels to a third person, and gave him an order for them

on the depositary, it was held that no title to the six hundred

§ 699. - - Essential features of cases of this kind.-The
essential features of this class are unlike constituents from
which there is not only separation but selection to be made; of
the other class~ similar constituents from which a portion is to
be separated.

barrels passed until they were selected. 2

i Hahn v. Fredericks (1874), 30 part II, 127, 30 Am. Dec. 202. The

Mich. 223, 18 Am. R. 119. court, it is true, do not place the case

2 Woods v. McGee (1836), 7 Ohio, upon the particular ground stated in
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§ 700. - - . Thus where the contract was for the sale of
two hundred cords of hard wood out of a pile containing between three hundred and fifty and four hundred cords of hard
and soft wood mixed, it was held that there was no sale completed until the two hundred cords of hard wood had been selected from the pile. " It was a bargain,'' said the court, "for
a parcel yet to be measured out of a larger parcel of various
qualities, and of an extent not determined." 1

§ 701. - - . So where one man, having in the possession of
another a large number of barrels of flour varying in value
from tw nty-five to fifty cents a barrel, agreed to sell six hun<lr cl barrels to a third person, and gave him an order for them
on the depo itary, it was held that no title to the six hundred
barr ls pas eel until they wer selected. 2
1

Hahn v. Fred ricks (1 74), 30
Mi h. 2-3, 1 Am. R. 119.
2 "\ oods v. McGee (1 36), 7
hio,
5

part II, 127, 30 Am. Dec. 202. The
court, it is true, do not I lace the ca e
upon the particular ground stated in
4

•
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§702.

Again, in a very recent case, 1 where a contract

was made for the sale of one hundred and sixty-two thousand

merchantable brick out of a kiln, it was held that no title

passed, notwithstanding payment of the price, until they had

the text, but this was evidently a is a new question in this state, and

is an exceedingly important one; and ■

in consideration of its importance,

and in consideration of the fact that

the authorities are so conflicting, we

deem it advisable not to decide it

until such decision is necessary to

the determination of the cause at

issue. We say this because, conced-

ing the force of appellants' argu-

ment, this cause, we think, must be

distinguished from the cases cited

which sustain the rule contended
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for by appellants, that it is not neces-

sary to separate or distinguish a por-

tion of personal property from the

mass which includes it, to pass title

to the portion sold. All those cases

are based on the supposition that all

the different portions of the mass are

of equal value and of uniform qual-

ity, so that there is nothing left to

be done by either party but to weigh,

measure or count, which acts in-

volve no discretion; that the inten-

tion of the parties to the contract is

the only thing to be considered, and

that, when it can be definitely deter-

mined from the terms of the con-

tract that the intention of the parties

was to pass the title, the title is held

to pass. Or, in other words, we pre-

sume they mean to say that, while

the separation from the common

mass is a circumstance going to show

the intention of the parties to pass

the title, it is not an essential cir-

cumstance. Kimberly v. Patchin, 19

N. Y. 330, 75 Am. Dec. 334, is the

leading case supporting this rule,

and has received much criticism,

feature of the case, and this ground

is ascribed to it in the later case of

Newhall v. Langdon (1883), 39 Ohio

St. 87, 48 Am. R. 426. Mr. Ralston in

his monograph, p. 32, sa} r s that Woods

v. McGee was overruled by Newhall

v. Langdon, but this is clearly an

error, for, in the latter case, the

court, referring to the former case,

say: " The distinction between that

case and the one at bar is so manifest

that, even conceding the correctness

of the principles stated by the learned

judge independent of any usage on

the subject, and it is %mnecessary to

question them, they do not control

in the case." And after stating two

other grounds of distinction, the

court says: " 3d. The flour varied in

price, and therefore in marketable

quality, and in all such cases there is

to be a selection before the title passes.''''

(The italics are mine. M.)

§ 702.]

§ 702.J

LAW OF

ALE.

[BOOK

n.

LAW OF SALE.

[book IT.

been selected, inasmuch as it was shown that the brick in

the kiln were not all merchantable, and that selection had

to be exercised in order to determine those which were of the

kind designated. The same conclusion as to the necessity

both favorable and adverse, by courts

been elected inasmuch as it was shown that the brick in
the kiln 11ere not all merchantable, and that selection had
to be exercised in order to determine those which were of the
kind designated. The same conclusion as to the nece ity

and text writers. There it was held,

upon a sale of a specific quantity of

grain, that its separation from a mass

indistinguishable in quality or value,

in which it is included, is not neces-

sary to pass the title, when the in-

tention to do so is otherwise clearly

manifested. In that case it will be

noticed that the goods were indis-

tinguishable in quality or value, and

it was upon that particular state of
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facts that the argument of the court

was based. 'It is,' said the court,

'a rule asserted in many legal au-

thorities, but which may be quite as

fitly called a rule of reason and logic

as of law, that in order to an exe-

cuted sale, so as to transfer a title

from one party to the other, the

thing sold must be ascertained. This

is a self-evident truth, when applied

to those subjects of property which

are distinguishable by their physical

attributes from all other things, and

therefore are capable of exact identi-

fication.' But the court with great

force proceeds to argue that other

character of property, such as grains,

wines, oils, etc., which are not sus-

ceptible of definite description, are

not subject to this rule, but that the

title to such property can be held to

pass by contract without separation

or manual delivery, if nothing fur-

ther remains to be done in regard to

it. But it must be admitted that if

all the property in the mass is not of

equal value something more does re-

main to be done. Thus, in the case

at bar, another element is injected

into the contract, and there is a

question of relative values to be yet

determined. The appellants did not

buy a portion of an indistinguish-

able mass, where all the component

parts were of equal value; but their

contract called for one hundred and

sixty-two thousand merchantable

brick; and the evidence was that the

brick that were deemed unmerchant-

able were thrown aside and not

counted in when they came to haul

them. So that it is impossible to de-

both favorable and ad,erse, by courts
and text \\"Titer . There it wa held,
upon a ale of a specific quantity of
grain, that it eparation from a mas
in<l1 tinguishable in quality or 'alue,
in which it is included i not nece sary to pa s the title, when the intention to dq o i otherwi e clearly
manife ted. In that ca e it will be
noticed that the good were indistinguisbable in quality or \alue, and
it was upon that particular state of
fact that the argument of the court
wa ba ed. 'It i , aid the court,
'a rule a serted in many legal authoritie , but which may be quite as
fitly called a rule of rea on and logic
a of law, that in order to an executed sale, so as to tran fer a title
from one party to the other, the
thing sold mu t be ascertained. This
is a self-evident truth, when applied
to tho e subject of property which
are di tingui ·hable by their physical
attribute from all other thing , and
therefore are capable of exact identification.' But the court with great
force proceeds to argue that other
charact er of property, uch a grains,
win es, oils, etc., which are not us·eptible of definite description, are
not ubj ct to this rule, but that the
title to uch property can be held to
pa by ontract without eparation
or manual deliv ry if nothing further r main to be done in regard to
it. But it mu t be admitted that if
all the prop rty in the ma. i not of
qual value omethino- mor does rema.in to be done. Thu , in the ca e
at bar, another element is injected

into the contract, and there is a
question of relative value to be yet
determined. The appellants did not
buy a portion of an indi t.inguishable ma , where all the component
pa.rts were of equal value; but their
contract called for one hundred and
sixty-two thou and merchantable
brick; and the evidence was that the
brick that were deemed unmerchantable were thrown aside and not
counted in when they came to haul
them.
o that it is impos ible to determine, before the segregation of
the brick, not only what particular
brick were old, but. what relative
portions of the kiln were sold. And
while, as we have aid before, it may
be conceded that the intention of
the parties will be carried into effect
if it can be a certained, yet under
this contract it i impos ible to a certain not only the particular brick
sold, but the actual relative number
of brick sold, by reason of the unsettled question of what brick were
and what were not merchantable,
creating an element of uncertainty
in the contract which does not exi t
in those cases where the ...-endor sell
a certain number of bushels of grain
or a certain number of gallons of oil
or ton of hay, in an undivided mass,
where all the different portions are
of equal value. \Ve think to bold
that. the title pa sed in this ca. e
would be carrying the principle of
liberal eon tru tion beyond the rule
)aid down in any of the cases ited
by appellant . It is true that some
of them were brick ca ·es, similar in

termine, before the segregation of

the brick, not only what particular

brick were sold, but what relative

portions of the kiln were sold. And

while, as we have said before, it may

be conceded that the intention of

the parties will be carried into effect

if it can be ascertained, yet under

this contract it is impossible to ascer-
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of selection was reached in an important case where there

was an agreement to sell a large number of hams which were

a part of a still larger mass of different weights and value, and

there was no separation, setting apart or marking so as to dis-

tinguish those in question from the residue. The court, how-

ever, put its decision upon the broad ground that separation is

required to pass the title, even when the constituents of the

mass are identical. 1 Many other cases of the same kind might

be given, but those already stated will sufficiently illustrate

the principle, and further examples will be given in the notes. 2

most respects to the case at bar, but

in none of them did it appear that

the brick in the kiln were not of

uniform and equal value; and all the

American cases were decided on the

strength of Kimberly v. Patchin,

supra, and the principles upon which

that case was based are thus stated
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by Mr. Ralston, who is an earnest

advocate of what he terms ' the new

rule:' 'When the constituent parts

which make up a mass are indis-

tinguishable from each other by any

physical difference in size,shape, text-

ure or quality, and the quantity and

general mass from which it is to be

taken are specified, the subject of

the contract is sufficiently ascer-

tained, and the title will pass, if the

sale is complete in all its other cir-

cumstances.' Plainly, the case at bar

does not fall*within those principles.

"This being our view of the law

covering this particular case, and

there being no conflict in the testi-

mony concerning the fact that it was

only merchantable brick that were

sold, the appellants could not have

been injured by the instruction com-

plained of; for they would not have

been entitled to a verdict in any

event. Reaching this conclusion ren-

ders unnecessary the investigation of

the other questions raised." Appel-

lants cited Kimberly v. Patchin, 19

N. Y. 330, 75 Am. Dec. 334; Jackson

v. Anderson, 4 Taunt. 24; Pleasants

v. Pendleton, 6 Rand. (Va.) 473, 18

Am. Dec. 72(3; Waldron v. Chase, 37

Me. 414, 59 Am. Dec. 56: Lamprey

v. Sargent, 58 N. H. 241; Chapman

v. Shepard, 39 Conn. 413; Damon v.

Osborn, 1 Pick. 476, 11 Am. Dec.

229; Gardner v. Dutch, 9 Mass.

427; Weld v. Cutler, 2 Gray, 195;

Hutchison v. Com., 82 Pa. St. 472;

Morgan v. King, 28 W. Va. 1, 57

Am. R. 633; Newhall v. Langdon, 39

Ohio St. 87, 48 Am. R. 426; Carpen-

ter v. Graham, 42 Mich. 191, 3 N. W.

R. 974; Wagar v. Railroad Co., 79

Mich. 648, 44 N. W. R. 1113; Young

v. Miles, 20 Wis. 646; Hurff v. Hires,

40 N. J. L. 581, 29 Am. R. 282; How-

ell v. Pugh, 27 Kan. 702; Davis v.

Budd, 60 Iowa, 144, 14 N. W. R. 211;

Galloway v. Week, 54 Wis. 604;

Watts v. Hendry, 13 Fla. 523; Horr

v. Barker, 11 Cal. 393, 70 Am. Dec.

§ 703.J

LA.W OF SA.LE.

[BOOK IT.

703.]

LAW OF SALE.

[book IT.

§ 703, How when whole mass delivered to vendee.—

Before leaving this branch of the subject, notice should be made

of a class of cases (analogous to others already considered in

§ 703. - - How when whole mass deliYered to Yenclee.Before leaving this branch of the subject, notice should be made
of a class of cases (analogous to others already considered in

sale of fifty hogsheads of sugar of

different weights to be taken from

the stock, no particular hogsheads

being specified and the weight not

being capable of ascertainment until

they were selected and weighed.

Held, that the title did not pass. In

White v. Wilks (1813), 5 Taunt. 176,

there was a bargain for twenty tons

of oil, to be taken from various tanks

and cisterns of the vendor not speci-

fied. Held, no title passed. In Busk

v. Davis (1814), 2 M. & S. 397, the bar-
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gain was for ten tons of hemp out of

a stock, lying in mats of unequal

quantities, of about eighteen tons.

In order to get the ten tons it was

necessary to weigh the mats and pos-

sibly to divide a mat. Held, that the

title did not pass.

In Hutchinson v. Hunter (1847), 7

Barr (Pa. St.), 140, there was a bar-

gain for one hundred barrels of mo-

lasses "of unequal contents and un-

equal value, part of a specified larger

stock." These were not separated,

marked or otherwise agreed upon.

Held, no title passed. So, in Foster

v. Mining Co. (1888),- 68 Mich. 188, 36

N. W. R. 171, where iron ore in a pile

with worthless material was bar-

gained for to be selected from the

residue; and in Cass v. Gunison (1888),

68 Mich. 147, 36 N. W. R. 45, where

$3,000 worth of lumber was con-

tracted for out of any one of three

grades, no title passed till selected.

Foot v. Marsh (1873), 51 N. Y. 288,

was also a case of this kind, and the

court distinguished it from the class

of cases considered in § 704.

In Dunkart v. Rineheart (1883), 89

N. C. 354, where a vendor agreed to

57

sell to the vendee " any of my black

walnut trees, not exceeding fifteen

in number, that will girth eight feet

six inches in circumference and

under ten feet, at $2 each; and all

trees measuring ten feet in circum-

ference and upwards, at $2.50 each,"

it was held that if there were more

than fifteen such trees on the land

the contract was ineffectual to pass

title to any.

In Warren v. Buckminster (1852),

24 N. H. 336, and Robbins v. Chipman

(18T6), 1 Utah, 335, it was held that

where a designated number of sheep

were sold from a flock, but not se-

lected, no title passed. Latter case

affirmed on rehearing, 2 Utah, 347.

So in Williams v. Feiniman (1875), 14

Kan. 288, where certain liquors were

sale of fifty hogsheads of sugar of sell to the vendee "any of my black
different weigbt5 to be taken from walnut trees, not exceeding fifteen
the stock, no particular hogsheads in number, that -n-ill g irth eig ht feet
being specified and the weight not six inches in circ umference and
being capable of ascertai nment until under ten feet, a t $2 each; and all
they were selected and weighed. trees mea uring ten feet in circumH eld, that the title did not pass. In ference and upward , at $2.50 each, "
White v. Wilks (1813), 5 Taunt. 176, it was held that if there were more
there was a bargain for twenty tons than fifteen such trees on the land
of oil, to be taken from various tanks the contract was ineffectual to pass
and cisterns of the vendor uot speci- title to any.
.fied. H eld, no t itle pas eel. In Busk
In \ Va.rren v. Buckminster (1852),
"· Da.vis (1 14), 2 lYI. & S. 397, the bar- 2-11 . H. 336, and Robbins v-. Chipman
gain was for ten tons of hemp out of (1816), 1 Utah, 333, it was held that
a stock, lying in mats of unequal wbere a designated number of heep
quantities, of about eighteen tons. ·were sold from a flock, but not seIn order to get the ten tons it was lected, no title pa sed. Latter case
necessary to "eigh the mats and po - affirmed on rehearing, 2 Utah, 347.
sibly to divide a mat. H eld, tha t the So in Williams v. Feiniman (1875), 14
title did not pass.
Kan. 2 , where certain liquors were
In Hutchinson v. Hunter (1847), 7 sold to be supplied out of the stock
Barr (Pa. St.), 140, there was a bar- of the vendor.
gain for one hundred barrels of moIn Block Bros. v. Maas (1880), 65
lasses "of unequal contents and un- Ala.211,a bill of sale purported to conequal value, part of a specified larger vey the whole of a stock of merchanstock." The e were not separated, dise, " reserving and excepting the
marked or otherwise agreed upon. amount of $1,000 worth of said merH eld, no title passed. So, in Foster chandise, personal property, which is
v. Mining Co. (1888),. 68 Mich. 188, 36 hereby selected by me, as a resident
N. W.R. 171, where iron ore in a pile of said State, as exempt to me under
with worthles material was bar- the laws of Alabama, and which pergained for to be selected from the sonal property, to the amount of
re::>idue ; and in Cass v. Gunison (1888), $1,000, is not hereby conveyed." H eld,
6 lich. 147, 36 N. W. R. 45, where to be only an executory agreement
$3,000 worth of lumber was con- until the vendor has elected tli.e portracted for out of any one of three tion reser ved as exempt.
grade , no title pa sed till selected.
Pier on v. Spaulding (188 ), 67
Foot v. Marsh (1873), 51 N. Y. 2 , Mich. 640, 35 N. W. R. 699, was a case
was al o a a e of thi kind, and the very similar to the la t, where there
court di tinguished it from the cla s was a sale of a stock of goods exceptof ca e consi ered in § 7 .
ing and r eserving from the stock
In Dunkart v. Rineheart (18 3), 9 whatever it might inventory above
N. C. 354, where a vendor agreed to $4,500, and it was held that the title
578
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another place ! ) which hold that even where selection, as dis-

tinguished from mere separation, is required before the title

can pass, the identity of the goods may be sufficiently deter-

mined to allow the passing of the title by a delivery of the

whole mass to the purchaser with authority to make the selec-

tion for himself. Thus, in a recent case, 2 all the hard brick in

a certain kiln had been bargained for, to be selected by the

purchaser from the kiln, which contained two kinds; but as the

whole mass was turned over to the purchaser to enable him to

make his selection, it was held that the title passed. 3 " In the case

of a sale of a part of an entire mass of goods," said the court,

" if the purchaser is allowed to take possession of the whole,

for the purpose of selecting his part, the title to that part passes

before selection."

§ 704. Contracts respecting a part of a mass of like con-

stituents. — The question of the necessity of the separation

could not pass until the vendor had

taken out the goods excepted and re-
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served.

In Steaubli v. Bank (1893), 11 Wash.

426, 39 Pac. R. 814, where a contract

of sale was drawn for a certain num-

ber of shingles stored with others in

a mill dry room, the court said that

the lack of proof of any uniform

character or value of all the shingles

stored together went to show that

no title had passed.

1 See ante, § 523.

2 Lamprey v. Sargent (1878), 58 N.

TL 241.

a Weld v. Cutter (1854), 2 Gray

(Mass.), 195, and Damon v. Osborn

(1823), 1 Pick. (Mass.) 476, 11 Am. Dec.

229, were cited by the court. In

Weld v. Cutter there was a mortgage

of a part of a large quantity of coal,

but the mortgagee, with the assent

of the mortgagor, took possession of

the whole pile " for the purpose of

separating and securing his part,"

and it was held that the title passed.

Crofoot v. Bennett, 2 N. Y. 258,

was like this case. There a portion

of the bricks in a specified kiln were

sold at a certain price per thousand,

and the possession of the whole kiln

was delivered to the vendee that he

might take the quantity bought.

Held, that the title had passed to the

number sold.

In Iron Cliffs Co. v. Buhl (1879), 42

Mich. 86, two thousand tons of a cer-

tain grade of iron ore were pur-

chased, to be delivered at the rail-

road docks at Erie and carried to the

purchasers by the railroad company.

More than the quantity sold was de-

livered at the docks, all of the same

grade, and nothing remained but to

take the two thousand tons from the

common mass and forward them to

the purchasers, it being understood

by the parties that the railroad com-

pany would see to that business.

Held, that the property passed to the

purchasers when the ore was deliv-

ered at the docks.
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and identification of a part bargained for out of a larger mass

made up of ingredients of the same kind, value and amount

presents serious difficulties and has involved the courts in what

has been thought to be a hopeless conflict of authority. It is

believed, however, that much aid can be derived here also from

discrimination.

§705. Intention material. — It must be constantly

kept in mind that courts are more and more inclined, and prop-

erly, to give effect to the intention of the parties; and this in-

tention, if it can be ascertained and is not inconsistent with

and identification of a part bargajned for out of a larger mass
made up of ingredients of the same kind, value and amount
presents serious difficulties and has in valved the courts in what
has been thought to be a hopeless conflict of authority. It jg
believed, however, that much aid can be derived here also from
discrimination.

the general policy of the law, will be held conclusive even

though a different result might be required under the older

rules laid down by the courts for the very purpose of aiding

in the discovery of intention. " The tendency of the modern

decisions," it is said in a leading case, 1 "is to give effect to

contracts of sale according to the intention of the parties to a

greater extent than is found in the older cases, and to engraft

upon the rule that the property passes by the contract of sale,

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:50 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t6xw4h56n
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

if such be the intention, fewer exceptions, and those only which

are founded on substantial considerations affecting the inter-

ests of the parties."

§ 706. Usage may affect. — It must also be noticed that

the demands of modern business have given rise to usages for

the speedy and convenient transaction of business which were

unknown in earlier times and which sanction methods of deal-

ing with which earlier generations were not familiar. Parties

who deal in a field or about matters in reference to which

such an usage is known to prevail, presumptively make it a

part of their contract. " In all questions involving contract

relations," says Chief Justice Johnson, of Ohio, " the conven-

ience and wants of business give rise to usages which become

part of the contract, where it is made with reference to such

usages. This is often called the expansive property of the

common law, but it is rather the application of accepted prin-

1 Hurff v. Hires (1878), 40 N. J. L. 581, 29 Am. R. 282.
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§ 705. - - Intention material.- It must be constantly
kept in mind that courts are more and more inclined, and properly, to give effect to the intention of the parties; and this intention, if it can be ascertained and is not inconsistent with
the general policy of the law, will be held conclusive even
though a different result might be required un ler the ol<ler
rules laid clown by the courts for the very purpose of aiding
in the discovery of intention. "The tendency of the modern
decisions," it is said in a leading case,1 "is to give effect to
contracts of sale according to the intention of the parties to a
greater extent than is found in the older cases, and to engraft
upon the rule that the property passes by the contract of sale,
if such be the intention, fewer exceptions, and those only which
are founded on substantial considerations affecting the interests of the parties."

§ 706. - - Usage may affect.- It must also be noticed that
the demands of modern business have given rise to usages for
the speedy and convenient transaction of business which were
unknown in earlier times and which sanction methods of dealing with which earlier generations were not familiar. Parties
who deal in a field or about matters in reference to which
such an usage is known to prevail, presumptively make it a
part of their contract. "In all questions involving contract
relation , ' says Chief Justice Job nson, of 0 hio, " the con venience and wants of business give rise to usages which become
part of the contract, where it is made with reference to such
usag . This is often called the expansive property of the
common law, but it is rather the application of accepted prin1 Hurff

v. Hires (1 78), 40 N. J. L. 581, 29 Am. R. 282.
580
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ciples of right and justice, as evidenced by common law, to

new phases and methods in the transaction of business." 1 Now,

applying these rules to the question in hand, it may first be

noticed that —

§ 707. How question affected by usage. — In reference

to many commodities presenting always substantially like char-

acteristics of form, nature and value, such as wheat, corn, oil,

flour, and the like, it has become common to mingle together

different bulks in one general mass and to draw from the bulk,

when needed, similar quantities, without regard to whether the

identical particles contributed were returned or not. It has

also become common to deal with orders, warrants or receipts

for articles so mingled as though they were the articles them-

selves.

§ 708. . Thus, in a leading case 2 it appeared that A had

one hundred barrels of flour in the custody of a warehouseman.

He sold fifty barrels to B, and twenty -five barrels each to C

and D, giving each one an order for his flour upon the ware-
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houseman. These orders were presented to the warehouseman

and accepted by him. It was held that the title passed with-

out separation. Said the court: " In view of the nature of this

particular business, in the case at bar, and the known usage

i Newhall v. Langdon (1883), 39 ing v. Breed, 14 Allen (Mass.), 376, 92

Ohio St. 87, 48 Am. R. 426. Am. Dec. 777; Kimberly v. Patchin,

2 Newhall v. Langdon (1883), 39 Ohio 19 N. Y. 330, 75 Am. Dec. 334; Wal-

St. 87, 48 Am R. 426. The court fur- dron v. Chase, 37 Me. 414, 59 Am. Dec.

ther said: "We hold that upon the 56; Chapman v. Shepard, 39 Conn,

facts found by the court, showing 413; Whitehouse v. Frost, 12 East,

the well known usage of the busi- 614. Also notes to Hurff v. Hires, 11

ness, it is manifest that upon the Vroom (40 N. J. L.), 581, 29 Am. R.

presentation and acceptance of this 282; 17 and 18 Am. Law Reg. 18, 161,

order the sale was completed, and in which the whole subject is ex-

the subsequent loss of the flour while haustively discussed and the cases

stored at the depot must fall on the reviewed." To the same effect: In-

purchaser. Steel Works v. Dewey, glebright v. Hammond (1850), 19 Ohio,

37 Ohio St. 242; Young v. Miles, 23 337, 53 Am. Dec. 430; McPherson v.

Wis. 643; Cloud v. Moorman, 18 Ind. Gale (1866), 40 111. 368; Warren v.

40; Horr v. Barker, 8 Cal. 603; Cush- Milliken (1869), 57 Me. 97.
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governing buyer and seller, we think it clear that as between

them by the delivery of the order from the seller, by the pur-

chaser to the warehouseman, and his acceptance of the same,

the right to the fifty barrels of flour was perfected in the pur-

chaser, and that thereafter it became his property. It is true

there were one hundred barrels out of which the order was to

be rilled, but it was all of the same quality, and by the known

usage the only delivery to be made by the seller was by an

order on the warehouseman, which when presented entitled

the purchaser to separate and remove the property. No selec-

tion, properly speaking, had to be made, as all the barrels were

alike, but only a counting off and separation ; and in this re-

spect it differs from those cases where it is the intention of

the parties that there is to be a selection or designation out of

the larger quantity. "

§ 709. . So it has been held that a valid pledge may be

made of a portion of a mass of wheat in a storehouse by the

delivery of the receipt, without separating the wheat pledged
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from the residue. " For the convenient transaction of the com-

merce of the country," said Cooley, J., " it has been found nec-

essary to recognize and sanction this mode of transfer, and

vast quantities of grain are daily sold by means of such re-

ceipts." l

§ 710. How when no usage governs — Cases holding sep-

aration unnecessary. — But there still remains a large class of

governing buyer and seller, we think it clear that as between
them by the deli very of the order from the seller, by the purchaser to the warehouseman, and his acceptance of the same,
the right to the fifty barrels of flour was perfected in the purchaser, and that thereafter it became his property. It is true
there were one hundred barrels out of which the order was to
be filled, but it was all of the same quality, and by the known
usage the only delivery to be made by the seller was by an
order on the warehouseman, which when presented entitled
the purchaser to separate and remove the property. No selection, properly speaking, had to be made, as all the barrels -vvere
alike, but only a counting off and separation; and in this respect it differs from those cases where it is the intention of
the parties that there is to be a selection or designation out of
the larger quantity."

cases in which no usage prevails or which have been deter-

mined without reference to usage. These are cases in which

a person, who continues in possession, undertakes to sell a

given portion of a larger mass of goods of the same kind and

quality, and the question is whether the title to such portion

can pass before the goods in question have been separated from

1 Merchants', etc. Bank v. Hibbard 77 111. 305; Gregory v. Wendell, 40

(1882), 48 Mich. 118, 11 N. W. R. 834, Mich. 432. See also Carpenter v. Gra-

42 Am. R. 465, citing Gibson v. Ste- ham, 42 Mich. 191; Watts v. Hendry,

vens, 8 How. (U. S.) 384; Gushing v. 13 Fla. 523.

Breed, supra; Broadwell v. Howard,

582

§ 709. - - . So it has been held that a valid pledge may be
made of a portion of a mass of wheat in a storehouse by the
delivery of the receipt, without separating the wheat pledged
from the residue. "For the convenient transaction of the commerce of the country," said Cooley, J., "it has been found necessary to recognize and sanction this mode of transfer, and
vast quantities of grain are daily sold by means of such receipts." 1

§ 710. How when no usage governs-Cases holding separation uuneces ary . - But there still remains a large class of
cas s in which no usage prevails or which have been determined without reference to usage. These are cases in which
a I r on, who continues in po session, undertakes to sell a
given portion of a larger mass of goods of the same kind and
quality, an 1 the qu 'tion is wh tber the title to such portion
c n a b f r th goods in qnestion have been separated from
77 Ill. ' 05; reg ry v. W nd 11, 40
l\fi h. 432.
e a.I o Carp nt r v. Graham, .. ii b. HH; \iVatts v. Hendry,
18 Fla. 523.
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[§ ttl.

the larger mass. Upon this question the authorities seem hope-

lessry in conflict.

§711.

Kimberly y. Patcliin as a type. — One line of

the larger mass. Upon this question the authorities seem hopelessly in conflict.

cases, of which Kimberly v. Patchin 1 is a leading and impor-

tant one and typical of the whole class, holds that the title may

1 Kimberly v. Patchin (1859), 19

N. Y. 330, 75 Am. Dec. 334 The court

refer with approval to Whitehouse

v. Frost (1810), 12 East, 614; Jackson

§ 711. - - Kimberly v. Patchin as a type.- One line of
cases, of which Kimberly v. Patchin 1 is a leading and im portan tone and typical of the whole class, holds that the title may

v. Anderson (1811), 4 Taunt. 24, and

Pleasants v. Pendleton (1828), 6 Rand.

(Va.) 473, 18 Am. Dec. 726. White v.

Wilks, 5 Taunt. 176, and Austen v.

Craven, 4 Taunt. 644, were distin-

guished. In Whitehouse v. Frost,

D. & B., who had forty tons of oil in
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a cistern, sold ten tons to F., who sold

it to T, giving him an order for it on

D. & B., who accepted the order by

indorsement upon it. Held, that the

property had passed, as between F.

and T. This, says Mr. Benjamin, is a

case "which, notwithstanding expla-

nations by the judges in subsequent

cases, is scarcely even mentioned

without suggestion of doubt or dis-

approval" In Jackson v. Anderson,

F. had remitted to L. & Co. four thou-

sand and seven hundred Spanish

dollars and advised plaintiffs that

one thousand nine hundred and sixty

of these were designed for them. L.

& Co. pledged the whole number

to defendant, who sold them to the

Bank of England. Held, that, though

plaintiffs' dollars had not been sepa-

rated from the others, yet as the de-

fendant had converted the whole

number, trover would lie for the

plaintiffs' share. In White v. Wilks

there was a sale of twenty tons of oil

out of the seller's stock, which was

in different warehouses and cisterns.

There was no specification of the bulk

from which the twenty tons were to

be taken. Held, that no title passed.

In Austen v. Craven the sale was of

a quantity of sugar of different kinds

at a given price per hundred-weight.

It did not appear that the seller at

the time of the contract had the sugar

on hand, or any part of it, and the

fact was assumed to be otherwise.

Held, that no title passed.

Prior in date to Kimberly v. Patchin

is Pleasants v. Pendleton, supra,

which is often cited as the leading

case upon this side of the question.

In that case there was a contract for

the sale of one hundred and nineteen

barrels of flour out of a lot of one

hundred and twenty-three of like

kind stored in the warehouse of a

third person. An order on the ware-

houseman for the flour was delivered

to the purchaser and he gave the

seller a check for the price. The flour

1 Kimberly v. Patchin (1 59), 19
N. Y. 330, 75 Am. Dec. 334. The court
r efer with approval to Whitehouse
v. Fro t (1810), 12 East, 614; Jackson
v. Anderson (1 11), 4 Taunt. 24, and
Plea ant v. Pendleton (1 2 ), 6 Rand.
(Va.) 473, 1 Am. Dec. 726. White v.
·Wilks, 5 Taunt. 176, and Au ten v.
Craven, 4 Taunt. 644, were distinguished. In Whitehouse v. Frost,
D. & B., who had forty tons of oil in
aci tern, sold ten ton to F., who old
it to T., giving him an order for it on
D. & B., who accepted the order by
intlor ement upon it. H eld, that the
property had pa ed, as between F.
and T. Thi ·, ays l\f r. Benjamin, is a
case "which, notwithstanding explanations by the judges in sub equent
ca e , is scarcely even mentioned
without suggestion of doubt or disapproval" In J ackson v. Anderson,
F. had remitted to L. & Co. four thousand and seven hunurecl Spani h
dollars and atl·d . ed plaintiffs that
one thousand nine hundred and sixty
of these were de igned for them. L.
& Co. pledged the whole number
to defendant, who sold them to the
Bank of England. H eld, that, though
plaintiffs' dollar had not been. eparateu from the others, yet as the defendant had converted the whole
number, trover would lie for the
plaintiffs' Lhare. In White v. Wilks
t.here was a sale of twenty tons of oil
out of the eller
tock, which was
in different warehou e and ci t.ern .
Therewa no pecificationof the bulk
5

from which the twenty tons were to
be taken. Held, that no title pa ed.
In Au ten v. Craven the ale wa of
a quantity of sugar of different kinds
at a given price per hundred-weight.
It did not appear that the eller at
tbe time of the con tract had the ugar
on hand, or any part of it, and the
fact was as urned to be otherwi e.
H eld, that no title pa ed.
Prior in date to Kimberly v. Patchin
is Plea ants v. Pendleton, sup1·a,
which is often cited as the leading
ca e upon this side of the que tion.
In that case there was a contract for
the ale of one hundred and nineteen
barrels of flour out of a lot of one
hundred and twenty-three of like
kind stored in the warehou e of a
third per on. An order on the warehouseman for the flour was delivered
to the purchaser and he gave t.he
seller a check for the price. The flour
would have been delivered to tue
purcha. er if called for on the day of
purcha e (though the contract was
not completed till late in the afternoon), but it was burned by accidental fire the following morning.
It was held that the title had pas erl,
though the court laid much tre s
upon the fact that there was a welldefined usage to make a con tructive
delivery by the tran fer of warehouse
receipts or order .
·where the owner of a quantity of
corn in bulk sells a certain number
of bu hels therefrom and receive his
pay, and a vendee takes away a part,
3
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pass under such circumstances if that appears to have been

the intention of the parties. In the case referred to, it ap-

peared that one D. had a quantity of wheat in his warehouse

which he and one S. estimated at six thousand bushels. D.

the property in the part sold vests in

pass under such circumstances if that appears to have been
the intention of the parties. In the case referred to, it appeared that one D. had a quantity of wheat in bis warehouse
which he and one S. estimated at six thousand bushels. D.

the vendee, although it has not all

been measured or separated from the

heap. Waldron v. Chase, 37 Me. 414.

(Compare with Morrison v. Dingley

(1874), 63 Me. 553, cited in following

note.)

In Young v. Miles (1866), 20 Wis.

646, the plaintiff was owner of a cer-

tain quantity of wheat which was

stored in mass with that of others in

a warehouse. Shipments were made
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from the mass until it was reduced

to an amount no greater than that

which plaintiff had deposited with

the warehouseman, and replevin for

this was sustained. The court based

their decision on the general prin-

ciple as laid down in Kimberly v.

Patchin. Downer, J., preferred to

allow the action on the theory of seg-

regation, as laid down in Horr v.

Barker, 6 Cal. 489, but the chief jus-

tice, speaking for the court, said he

could see no difference between the

doctrine of segregation and the right

of separation, except that the latter

was the more fundamental.

In Clark v. Griffith (1862), 24 N. Y.

595, plaintiff's assignors had pur-

chased from the defendants four bill-

iard tables of equal value, giving

in payment therefor certain notes

and a chattel mortgage upon the

tables. The agreement was that as

fast as the amounts paid on the notes

should cover the prices of the tables,

receipts in full for them were to be

given by the vendors, and such a re-

ceipt in full for one table had been

given prior to this action. Default

having been made in the payment of

subsequent notes, the defendants

foi'eclosed the mortgage, and took

all the tables under it, alleging that

since no particular table had been

appropriated by the purchasers, no

title had passed to them. But the

court held, following Kimberly v.

Patchin, that just as the plaintiff's

assignors, while they had the tables

in their possession, had the right at

any time to take distinct possession

of one of them, so the vendors, when

they came to foreclose their mort-

gage, had the same right to select out

three tables unless the purchasers

had already selected; and since the

defendants, in seizing under fore-

closure, must have taken the tables

one at a time, the first three tables

taken must be held to have been se-

lected by them, and the title to the

the property in the part sold vests in
the vendee, although it has n ot all
been measured or separated from the
heap. Waldron v. Chase, 37 Me. 414.
(Compare with l\1orri on v. Dingley
(1874), 63 Me. 553, cited in following
note.)
In Young v. Miles (1866), 20 Wis.
646, the plaintiff was owner of a certain quantity of wheat which was
storeci in mass with that of others in
a warehouse. Shipments were made
from the mass u ntil it was reduced
to an amount no great.er than that
which plaintiff had deposited with
the warehouseman, and replevin for
this was sustained. The court based
their decision on the general principle as laid down in Kimberly v.
Patchin. Downer, J., preferred to
allow the action on the theory of segregation, as laid down in Horr v.
Barker, 6 Cal. 489, but the chief justice, speaking for the court, said he
could see no difference between the
doctrine of segregation and the right
of separation, except t l!_at the latter
was the more fundamental.
In Clark v. Griffith (1862), 24 N. Y.
59.5, plaintiff's a signors had purchased from the defendants four billfa.rd tables of equal value, giving
in payment therefor certain notes
and a hattel mortgage upon the
table . 'Ihe agreement wa that as
fa ta the amounts paid on the notes
should cover the prices of the table ,
receipts in full for th m were to be
given by the vendor , and uch a receipt in full for one table bad b en
given prior to thi action. Default
5

h aving been made in the payment of
subsequ ent notes, the defendants
foreclosed the mortgage, and took
all the tables under it, alleging tha t
since no particular table had been
appropriated by the purchasers, no
title had passed to them. But the
court held, following Kimberly v.
Patchin, that just as the plaintiff's
assignors, while they had the tabl es
in their possession, hall the right at
any time to ta ke distinct possession
of one of them, so the vendors, when
they came to foreclose their mortgage, had the sa~rn right to select out
three tables unless the purchasers
had already selected; and sincr. the
uefenda.nts, in seizing under foreclosure, must have taken the tables
one at a time, tlie first three tables
t aken must be held to have been selected by them, and the title to the
last was in the purchaser.
And in Minnesota the court said
that "while there is some confusion
and conflict among the authorities
on the subject, yet it is settled in
this State that where a certain number of articles a re sold out of a greater
number of exactly the same kind
and quality, with the inte ntion that
the title should presently pass, and
wber e the vendee has the absolute
right at a ny time to take tbe amount
or n umbe r out of the whole mass or
quantity, this is sufficient to pass the
title, a lthough the speci fic articles
are not ar.tually designat.eJ. or separated from the r emainder. Under
such circum ·tances, until the separation is made, the vendoi· and vendee
4

CH. IV.] EXISTING CHATTELS NOT YET IDENTIFIED. [§ 712.

gave to S. a written instrument by which he made a present

transfer to S. of six thousand bushels of wheat. D. also gave

to S. a warehouse receipt for the wheat, declaring that he had

received in store six thousand bushels of wheat subject to the

order of S. D. afterward sold the same wheat to other par-

ties, and, upon measurement, it was found that the whole

quantity in the warehouse at the time of the dealings with S.

was six thousand two hundred and forty-nine bushels. The

defendants claimed title through S. and had obtained posses-

sion of the wheat by replevin. The plaintiffs claimed title

through the second purchaser. It was held that the title

passed to S.

§ 712. . After discriminating between chattels of unlike

kinds, "distinguishable by their physical attributes from all

other things," and masses of property made up of particles of

like kind and nature, such as oil, wheat, flour, and the like,

the court, per Comstock, J., say, referring to the latter kind :

" "Where the quantity and the general mass from which it is to
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be taken are specified, the subject of the contract is thus ascer-

tained, and it becomes a possible result for the title to pass if

the sale is complete in all its other circumstances. An actual

delivery, indeed, cannot be made unless the whole is transferred

to the possession of the purchaser, or unless the particular

quantity sold is separated from the residue. But actual deliv-

are tenants in common of the whole 633; Hires v. Hurff (1876), 39 N. J. L.

according to their respective inter- 4; Smith v. Friend (1860), 15 Cal. 124;

ests." MacKellar v. Pillsbnry, 48 Aderholt v. Embry (1884), 78 Ala.

Minn. 396, 51 N. W. R. 222; Nash v. 185; Crapo v.Seybold (1876), 35 Mich.

Brewster, 39 Minn. 530, 41 N. W. R. 169 (considered again in 36 Mich. 444):

105 [wherein Kimberly v. Patchin Kaufmann v. Schilling (1874). 58 Ma

supra; Russell v. Carrington, 42 N. Y. 218; Hoyt v. Insurance Co., 26 Hun,

118; Lobdell v. Stowell, 51 N. Y. 70; 416; Andrews v. Smith (1884), 34

Chapman v. Shepard, 39 Conn. 413; Hun, 20; Rodee v. Wade (1866), 47

Hurff v. Hires, 40 N. J. L. 581, are Barb. 53.

cited and relied uponj. In Cloke v. Shafroth (1891), 137 111.

To like effect: Watts v. Hendry, 13 393, 27 N. E. R. 702, 31 Am. St. R. 375,

Fla. 523; Piazzek v. White, 23 Kan. this rule is said to be supported by

621; Bailey v. Long (1880), 24 Kan. the weight of American decisions.

90; Phillips v. Ocmulgee Mills, 55 Ga.
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§§ 713, 714.] LAW OF SALE. [BOOK II.

ery is not indispensable in any case in order to pass a title if

the thing to be delivered is ascertained, if the price is paid or

a credit given, and nothing further remains to be done in re-

gard to it. ... It is unnecessary to refer to all the cases,

or to determine between such as may appear to be in conflict

with each other. None of them go to the extent of holding

that a man cannot, if he wishes and intends so to do, make a

perfect sale of part of a quantity without actual separation,

where the mass is ascertained by the contract, and all. parts are

of the same value and undistinguishable from each other."

§ 713. Cases holding separation necessary.— There is,

on the other hand, a line of cases holding that under such cir-

cumstances the intention is not sufficient and that no title will

pass until the particular goods agreed upon have been separated

from the mass of which they form a part. To use the language

of Chief Justice Gibson in such a case: "Without separation,

intention is nothing." Of these —

ery is not indispensable in any case in order to pass a title if
the thing to be delivered is ascertained, if the price is paid or
a credit given, and nothing further remains to be done in regard to it.
It is unnecessary to refer to all the cases,
or to determine between such as may appear to be in conflict
\Nith each other. None of them go to the extent of holding
that a man cannot, if he wishes and in tends so to do, make a
perfec t sale of part of a quantity wjthout actual separation,
where the mass is ascertained by the contract, and alLparts are
of the same value and undistinguishable from each other."

§ 714. Scudder v. Worster as a type. — Scudder v.

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:51 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t6xw4h56n
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

Worster 1 may be selected as a type. There the defendants had

entered into a contract with S. T. & Co. to sell to the latter

i Scudder v. Worster (1853), 11 Cush. had disposed of all of the dollars,

(Mass.) 573. Speaking of Pleasants the action being trover. Gardner v.

v. Pendleton, the court say: "In ref- Dutch, 9 Mass. 427, was also distin-

erence to this case, Grimke, J., in guished if not disapproved. In that

Woods v. McGee, 7 Ohio, 127, 30 Am. case plaintiff had had in his posses-

Dec. 202, says: ' It is impossible to di- sion a large number of bags of coffee,

vest ourselves of the impression that the proceeds of a voyage he had

the small difference between the ag- made for W. & R., and he had an in-

gregate mass and the quantity sold, terest in the coffee for his compensa-

§ 713. - - Cases holding separation necessary .-There is,
on t he other hand , a line of cases holding that under such circumstances the intention is not sufficient and that no title will
pass until the particular goods ag reed upon have been separated
from the mass of which they form a part. To use the language
of Chief Justice Gibson in such a case: "vVithout separation,
intention is nothing." Of these -

the former being one hundred and tion. On an accounting his interest

twenty-three barrels and the latter was determined to be seventy-six

one hundred and nineteen, may have bags, and he delivered the entire

influenced the decision. It was a quantity to W. & R, taking from

hard case, and hard cases make ship- them their receipt " for seventy-six

wreck of principles.'" Jackson v. bags of coffee, . . . which we

§ 71 4:. - - Scudder v. Worster as a type.-Scudder v.
TVorster 1 may be selected as a type. There the defendants had
entered into a contract with S. T. & Co. to sell to the latter

Anderson, 4 Taunt. 24 (mpra), was hold subject to his order at any time

cited and distinguished upon the he may please to call for the same."

grounds that the point was not raised All of the coffee was attached as the

at the trial and that the defendant property of W.'& R, and plaintiff
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1 Scudder v. Worsteq1853), 11 Cush.
(Mass.) 573. Speaking of Pleasants
v. P endleton, the court say: "In reference to t his case, Grim k e, J., in
Woods v. McGee, 7 Ohio, 127, 30 Am.
Dec. 202, says : ' It is impossible to di·
vest ourselves of the im pression that
the small <l.ifference between the aggregate mass and the quantity sold,
the for mer being one hundred and
twenty-three barrels and t he la tter
one h un lred and nineteen, may have
influenced the ded ion. It was a
hard a e, and har i cas s make shipwreck of pr inciples.'" J ackson v.
Anderson, 4 Ta unt. 24 (supru), was
cited and distinguished u pon th e
gronnd that the point was not raised
at the trial and that the defendan t
5

had disposed of all of the dollars,
the action being trover. Gardner v.
Dutch, 9 l\fass. 427, was also disting uished if not disapproved. In that
case plaintiff had had in his possession a large number of bags of coffee,
the proceeds of a voyage he had
made for W. & R., and he had an interest in the coffee for his compensation. On an accounting his interest
was determined to be seventy-six
bags, and he delivered the entire
quantity to W. & R., taking from
them their receipt "for seventy-six
bags of coffee, . . • which we
h old subject to his order at any time
he may pl ase to call for the same."
All of the coffee was attached as the
property of W. · & R., and plaintiff
6

CH. IV.] EXISTING CHATTELS NOT YET IDENTIFIED.

[§ 714.

CH. IV.]

EX! TING CHATTELS NOT YET IDENTIFIED.

c: 71±.

two hundred and fifty barrels of pork out of a large quantity

of similar kind in their cellars, but the particular barrels were

never identified. A bill of sale was made out to them and they

gave their notes to the defendants for the price. It was also

brought replevin against the officer.

He was held entitled to recover.

Speaking of this case the court (in

two hundred and fifty barrels of pork out of a large quantity
of similar kind in th eir cellars, but the particular barrels were
never identified. A bill of sale was made out to them and they
gave their notes to the defendants for the price. It wa · also

Scudder v. Worster) say: "This case,

on the face of it, seems to go far to

recognize the right of one having a

definite number of barrels of any

given articles mingled in a common

mass, to select and take, to the num-

ber he is entitled, although no pre-

vious separation had taken place. It

is, however, to be borne in mind in

reference to this case that it did not
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arise between vendor and vendee.

The interest in the seventy-six bags

of coffee did not originate by pur-

chase from W. & R. They became

the specific property of the plaintiff

in that action on an adjustment of

an adventure, the whole proceeds of

which were in his hands, and sepa-

rated with the possession only when

he took their accountable receipt for

seventy-six bags held by them on his

account. It did not raise the ques-

tion, here so fully discussed, as to

what is necessary to constitute a de-

livery, and how far it was necessary

to have a separation from a mass of

articles to constitute a transfer of

title. Perhaps the circumstances

may well have warranted that de-

cision, but we are not satisfied that

the doctrine of it can be properly

applied to a case where the party as-

serts his title claiming only as a pur-

chaser of a specific number of bar-

rels, there having been no possession

on his part, and no separation of the

same from a larger mass of articles

similar in kind and no descriptive

marks to designate them." The court

(referring still to Scudder v. Worster)

cited and approved Hutchinson v.

Hunter, 7 Barr (Pa.), 140, where, in

an action of assumpsit to recover

payment for one hundred barrels of

molasses sold to the defendant out

of a lot of one hundred and twenty-

five barrels, the whole of which had

been destroyed by fire while on stor-

age before separation or designation

of any particular barrels, it was held

that the plaintiff could not *eeover,

the sale never haviug been consum-

mated; and to Golder v. Ogden, 15

Pa. St. 528, 53 Am. Dec. 618, in which,

in a controversy between the alleged

buyer of goods and the assignee of

the vendor, as to the effect of a con-

tract for the sale of two thousand

pieces of wall paper out of a slightly

larger lot in the possession of the

vendor, the purchaser giving his note

brought replevin ag:tin t the officer.
H e wa held entitled to recover.
Speaking of thi case the court (in
Scu<lder v. Worter) say : " This ca e,
011 the face of it, seems to go far to
r ecognize the right of one having a
definite number of barrels of any
given articles mingled in a common
ma , to elect and take, to the number he i entitled, although no previou eparation had taken place. It
i , however, to be borne in mind in
reference to this ca e that it did not
ari e between vendor and vendee.
The intere tin the eventy-six bag
of coff
did not originate by purchase from W. & R. They became
the pecific property of the plaintiff
in that action on an adju tment of
an adventure, the whole proceed of
which were in his hands, and separated with the po es ion only when
he took their accountable receipt for
seventy- ix bags held by them on his
account. It did not raLe the que tion, here so fully di cu ed, as to
what is neces ary to con ·titute a deli very, and how far it was nece sary
to have a separation from a ma s of
article to con titute a tran fer of
title. Perhaps the circum tance
m ay well have warranted that deci ion, but we a re not ati fied that
the doctrine of it can be properly
applied to a case where the party a ser t his title claiming only a a pur·
cha er of a specific number of barrel , there having been no pos e 'Sion
on hi part, and no eparation of the
same from a larger mas of articles
similar in kind and no de criptive
5

marks to designate them." The court
(referring still to Scudder v. vVorster)
cited and approved Hutchin on v.
Hunter, 7 Barr (Pa.), 140, wh re. in
an action of assumpsit to reco,·er
pa ment for one hundred barrel of
mola. es sold to the defendant out
of a lot of one hundred and twentyfive barrels, the whole of which l:iaJ.
b en destroyed by fire while on to rage before eparation or de ignation
of any particular barrels. it wa held
that the plaintiff could not <l" over,
the ale never having been consummated; and to Golder v. Og len, 1.3
Pa. St. 52 , 53 Am. Dec. 61 , in which,
in a contro"Ver y between the alleged
buyer of good and the a ignee of
the vendor, a to the effect of a contract for the sale of two thou and
pieces of wall paper out of a slightly
larger lot in the posse sion of the
vendor the purcha er giving bis note
for the price and taking away one
thou. and piece. , the other to remain
until called. for, it was held that the
remaining one thousand piece , not
having been selected or separated or
set apart, but remaining mingled
with other paper of the same de·cription, diJ. not become the property of the alleged. buyer as again ·t
the assignee; and to Waldo v. Belcher,
11 Ired. (N. C.) 609, where a contract
of sale of two thousand eight hund red bushels of corn out of lot of
three thou. and one hundred bushels
in the vendor' store passed no titl e,
the whole having been destroyed by
fire before separation; and to Ierrill v. Hunnewell, 13 Pick. (l\Iass.) 213,
7

a

§ 715.J

LA. W OF SALE.
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§ 715.] LAW OF SALE. [BOOK II.

agreed that the pork should remain on storage in the cellar

of defendants, but at the risk and expense of the purchasers.

Shortly after, S. T. & Co. sold one hundred barrels of the pork

to L., giving him an order for the same upon the defendants,

who delivered that quantity to him. S. T. & Co. then sold the

remaining one hundred and fifty barrels to plaintiff, giving

him a like order upon defendants. Plaintiff notified defend-

ants of his purchase and requested them to hold the pork on

storage for him, to which they assented. While the pork was

so on storage for plaintiff, with other of the same kind, S. T.

& Co. became insolvent, not having paid the notes given by

them to defendants for the pork, and defendants thereupon re-

fused to deliver the one hundred and fifty barrels to plaintiff,

and he brought this action of replevin to recover them. The

officer selected one hundred and fifty barrels from the stock in

defendants' cellar and delivered them to the plaintiff.

§ 715. . The court held that no title to this or any other

specific one hundred and fifty barrels had passed to the plaint-
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iff, and that consequently the action could not be maintained,

approving the rule laid down by the court in Pennsylvania in

Golder v. Ogden, " that the property cannot pass until there be

a specific identification in some way of the particular goods

which the party bargains for. The law knows no such thing

as a floating right of property, which may attach itself either

to one parcel or the other, as may be found convenient after-

wards." It was intimated that the result might have been

agreed that the pork should remain on storage in the cellar
of defendants, but at the risk and expense of the purchasers.
Shortly after, S. T. & Co. sold one hundred barrels of the pork
to L., giving bi m an order for the same upon the defendants,
who delivered that quantity to him.
. T. & Co. then sold the
r emaining one hundred and fifty barrels to plaintiff, giving
bim a like order upon defendants. Plaintiff notified defendants of his purchase and requested them to hold the pork on
storage for him, to which they assented. While the pork was
so on storage for plaintiff, with other of the same kind, S. T.
& Co. became insolvent, not having paid the notes given by
them to defendants for the pork, and defendants thereupon refused to deliver the one hundred and fifty barrels to plaintiff,
and he brought this action of replevin to recover them. The
officer selected one hundred and fifty barrels from the stock in
defendants' cellar and delivered them to the plaintiff.

different if the action had been simply to recover the value of

one hundred and fifty barrels of pork.

where a contract to sell nine arches of Krautli, Ferguson & Co., pork-

of brick out of a kiln containing a packers in Louisville. To borrow

larger number passed no title, as there money from the bank, the firm at-

had been no separation or designa- tempted to pledge certain of their

tion. goods, and to do so had deposited

Ferguson v. Northern Bank of Ken- two warehouse receipts signed by

tucky (1879), 14 Bush (Ky.), 555, 29 them stating that they had received

Am. R. 418, is also an interesting and on storage at their pork house, in

important case upon this side. Fer- one receipt three thousand six hun-

guson was the assignee for creditors dred sugar-cured hams weighing

588

§ 715. - - . The court held that no title to this or any other
specific one hundred and fifty barrels had passed to the plaintiff, and that consequ ently the action could not be maintained,
appr9ving the rule laid down by the court in Pennsylvania in
Golder v. Ogden, "that the property cannot pass until there be
a specific identification in some way of the pr.rticular goods
which the party bargains for. The law knows no such thing
as a floating right of property, which may attach itself either
to one parcel or the other, as may be found convenient afterwards." It was intimated that the result might have been
differ nt if the action had been simply to recover the value of
one bun ired and fifty barrels of pork.
where a contract to ell nine ar hes
of bri k out of a kiln containing a
larg r number passed no title, as there
had b en no parati n or desigoation.
F erg u on v. Northern Bank of Kentu ky (1 19), 14 u h (Ky.), , 55, 29
Arn. R. 4.1 , i a l o an inter tinO' and
important a e up n thi side. Ferg u on was the a , ignee for er ditor
5

of Krauth, Ferguson & Co., porkpackers in Louisville. To borrow
money from the bank, the firm attempted to pledge certain of their
goods, and to do so had depo ited
two ware house receipt signed by
them stating that they had received
on storage at their pork hou , in
one re ipt three thou and ix hundred ugar-cured hams weighing

CH. IV.] EXISTING CHATTELS NOT YET IDENTIFIED.

CH. IV.]

EXI TI G CHATTELS NOT YET IDENTIFIED.

[ 716.

[§ 716.

g 716. The weight of authority. — In a late case in

Pennsylvania 1 it is said, though the point was not directly

involved and the conclusion was certainly contrary to the

earlier cases in that State, that " the weight of American au-

fifty thousand four hundred pounds,

marked "Krauth, Ferguson & Co.,

Eclipse," and in the other eight thou-

716. - - The weight of authority.- In a late case in
Pennsylvania 1 it is sai<l, though the point was not directly
involved and the conclusion was certainly contrary to the
earlier cases in that tate, that "the weight of American au-

sand two hundred and fifty sugar-

cured haras, marked " Krauth, Fergu-

son & Co.," which they would deliver

on return of the receipt properly in-

dorsed. At the time of the delivery

of these receipts the hams belonged

to the firm and were part of a larger

quantity stored in their warehouse.

They were never separated or set

apart. The firm becoming insolvent
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made an assignment to one Ferguson,

who took possession of the entire lot

and sold them without recognizing

any right in the bank, whose loan

had not been paid. The action was

in chancery to determine the title.

It was held that the bank acquired

no title or lien. Scudder v. Worster

was approved and followed, and

Kimberly v. Patchin was disap-

proved.

A contract for the sale of a quan-

tity of cotton ties, part of a larger

lot, passes no title until they are sep-

arated. Fry v. Mobile Savings Bank

(1883), 75 Ala. 473. A contract for

the sale of one hundred ban-els of

corn in a crib containing a larger

quantity, nothing being done to

separate the part sold from the

residue, does not vest a title in the

purchaser upon which he can main-

tain detinue or trover for any part of

the corn. Warten v. Strane (1886),

82 Ala. 311, 8 S. R. 231.

In Morrison v. Dingley (1874 ), 63

Me. 553, Morrison in Maine ordered

of one Wallace, in Bostol^ one hun-

dred and twenty-five g7°oss tons of

coal. Wallace sent a cargo of about

two hundred and fifty tons, and the

whole cargo was unloaded upon the

fifty thou and four hundred pound ,
marked "Krauth, Fer ·u on & Co.,
Eclip e," and in the other eight thouand two hundred and fifty sugarcured ham , marked "Krauth, Ferguson & Co., which they would detiver
on return of the receipt properly indor. ed. At the time of the delivery
of the e receipts the hams belonged
to the firm and were part of a larger
quantity stored in their warehou e.
Th ey were never separated or et
apart. The firm becoming insolvent
made an a ignment to one Fergu ·on,
who to k pos e sion of the entire lot
and sold them without recognizing
any right in the bank, who ·e loan
had not been paiu. The action wa.
in chancery to determine the title.
It wa held that the bank acquired
no title or lien. Scudder v. Wor ter
was approved and followed, and
Kimberly v. Patchin was disapproved.
A contract for the sale of a quantity of cotton ties, part of a larger
lot, pa. se no title until they are eparated. Fry v. lobile Savmgs Bank
(1· 3), 75 Ala. 473. A contract for
the ale of one hundred banels of
corn in a crib containing a larger
quantity, nothing being done to
separate the part sold from the

re idue does not ve ta title in the
purchaser upon which he can maintain detinue or trornr for any part of
the corn. vVarten v. trane (1 6),
9
la. 311,
. R. 231.
Iu _lorrison v. Dingley (1 4), 63
.l\Ie. 5.53, Iorri on in -:\1aine ordered
of one Wallace, in Bo to~ one hundred and twenty-five gross tons of
coal. Wallace sent a cargo of about
two hundred and fifty ton . and the
whole cargo wa unloaded upon the
wharf. Then ·wallace, by hi· broker,
old one hundred and twenty-five
tons to Dingley. l\Iorrison began to
remove his coal, and when he had
r emoved one hundred and twentyfi ve net ton. Dingley stopped him,
claiming that Iorri on should take
no more until Dingley bad gotten one
hundred and twenty-five tons, when
the residue should be equally divided.
The difference to Morri on between
the net and the gross ton · was fifteen
net. tons. Morri on sued Dingley in
trover for tbe fifteen ton , but it was
held that no title to the part und livered bad pa ed. The court ci t.ed
with approval Scudder v. Wor ter, 11
Cu h. ( Ia s.) 573 (ante); Houdlette v.
Tallman, 141\Ie. 400; Bailey v. mitb,
43 N. H. 141 (post); Gibbs v. Benjamin, 45 Vt. 124, and distingui hed

l Brownfield v. J ohnson (1889), 128
Pa. St. 254, 18 Atl. R. 543, 6 L. R. A.
48.
o in Cloke v. Shafroth (1 91),
13,., Ill. 393, 27 N. E. R. 709, 31 Am. St.
R. 375,iti said : "It is helu, by what
is probably the w ight of modern
American decisions, that where the
sale or exchange is of part of a ma s
of the same kind, quality and grade,

as of part of the corn or wheat in an
elevator, separation from the ma -,
or other vecification of the particular part sold, is unnecessary to its
appropriation, independent of the
tatute ve ting the ownership in the
holder of a warehouse receipt." The
statement, however, was clictwn.

wharf. Then Wallace, by his broker,

sold one hundred and twenty-five

tons to Dingley. Morrison began to

remove his coal, and when he had

removed one hunih-ed and twenty-

five net tons, Dingley stopped him,

claiming that Morrison should take

no more until Dingley had gotten one

hundred and twenty-five tons, when

the residue should be equally divided.

The difference to Morrison between

the net and the gross tons was fifteen

net tons. Morrison sued Dingley in

trover for the fifteen tons, but it was

held that no title to the part undeliv-

ered had passed. The court cited

with approval Scudder v. Worster, 11

Cush. (Mass.) 573 (ante): Houdlette v.

Tallman, 14 Me. 400; Bailey v. Smith,

!'i 9
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§ 716.]

LAW OF SALE.

[book II.

thority supports the proposition that, when property is sold to

be taken out of a specific mass of uniform quality, title will

pass at once upon the making of the contract, if such appears

to be the intent. Oil in a tank and grain in an elevator may

Kimberly v. Patchin (supra), and

thority supports the propo ition that, when property is sold to
be taken out of a specific mass of uniform quality, title will
pass at once upon the making of the contract, if such appears
to be the intent. Oil in a tank and grain in an elevator may

Waldron v. Chase, 37 Me. 414 (cited

in preceding note). Dickerson, J., de-

livered a forcible dissenting opinion.

In Reeder v. Machen (1881), 57 Md.

56, there had been a contract for the

sale of five hundred tons of coal of

three different varieties at different

prices. The coal was part of a larger

quantity lying in the coal yard, and

nothing had been done to separate

the five hundred tons from the resi-
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due. Afterwards the vendee, with-

out the knowledge or consent of the

vendors, removed tlu-ee hundred and

eighty-five tons. The vendors be-

came insolvent, and it was held that

no title to any part of the five hun-

dred tons had passed, on the ground

that not only separation but weigh-

ing or measuring was necessary.

In Keeler v. Goodwin (1873), 111

Mass. 490, there was a contract of sale

of one thousand bushels of corn, "par-

cel of a larger quantity lying in bulk."

Said the court: "Until separation in

some form no title could pass.

Young v. Austin, 6 Pick. 280; Mer-

rill v. Hunnewell, 13 Pick. 213; Scud-

der v. Worster, 11 Cush. 573; Weld

v. Cutler, 2 Gray, 195; Ropes v. Lane,

9 Allen, 503, 510; s. C, 11 Allen, 591.

That it was on storage with a third

party, as warehouseman, would make

no difference in this respect."

A sale of a quantity of oats to be

weighed out of a bin containing a

larger quantity, accompanied by

payment of the price, gives no title,

before the quantity sold is separated

from the bulk, upon which the ven-

dee can maintain trover against the

vendor for a conversion of the quan-

tity sold. Jeraulds v. Brown (1888),

64 N. H. 606, 15 Atl. R. 123. A con-

tract to sell two thousand out of a

larger lot of poles passes no title until

they have been separated. Bailey v.

Smith (1861), 43 N. H. 141.

In Commercial National Bank v.

Gillette (1883), 90 Ind. 268, a contract

for the sale of a quantity of car

wheels out of a larger lot was held to

pass no title until separation. " There

is much strife in the American cases

upon this question," said the court,

"but none in the English. The weight

of the former is, perhaps, with the

theory of appellant, but the text-

writers are, so far as we have exam-

ined, all with the English decisions.

Our owif cases are in harmony with

the long-established rule of the com-

Kimberly v. Patchin (supm), and vendor for a conversion of the quanWaldron v. Chase, 37 lVIe. 414 (cited tity sold. J eraulds v. Brown (1888),
in preceding note). Dickerson, J. , de- 64 N. H. 606, 15 Atl. R. 123. A conlivered a forcible dissenting opinion. tract to sell two thou and out of a
In Reeder v. Machen (1 1), 57 l\Icl. larger lot of poles pa ~ses no title until
56, there had been a contract for the they have bee~ separated. Bailey v.
sale of five hundreJ. tons of coal of Smith (1 61), 43 N. H. 141.
three different varieties at different
In Commercial Na tional Bank v.
prices. The coal was part of a larger Gillette (1 83), 90 Ind. 268, a con tract
quantity lying in the coal yard, and for the sale of a quantity of car
nothing had been done to separate wheels out of a larger lot was held to
the five hundred tons from the resi- pass no title until separation. " There
due. Afterwards the vendee, with- is much strife in the American caRes
out the knowledge or consent of the upon this question,'' said the court,
vendors, removed three hundred and "but none in the English. The weight
eighty-five tons. The vendors be- of the former is, perhaps, with the
came insolvent, and it was held that theory of appellant, but the textno title to any part of the five hun- writers are, so far as we have examdred tons had passed, on the ground ined, all with the English decisions.
that not only separation but weigh- Our owrt ca~es are in harmony with
ing or measuring was necessa.ry.
the long-established rule of the comIn Keeler v. Goodwin (1873), 111 mon law. In the case of Bricker v.
Mass. 490. there was a contract of ale Hughe , 4 Ind. 146, the English rule
of one thousand bushels of corn, "par- was approved and enforced. In l\1urcelofa larger quantity lying in bulk." phy v. State, 1 Ind. 366, the court
Said the court: "Until separ ation in said: 'To render a sale of goods valid,
some form no title could pass. the specific, individual goods must be
Young v. Austin, 6 Pick. 2 O; Mer- agreed on by the parties. It is not
rill v. Hunnewell, 13 Piek. 213; Scud- enough ... thattheyaretobetaken
der v. Worster, 11 Cush. 573; Weld from some specified larger stock, bev. Cutler, 2Gray,195; Ropes v. La ne, cause there still remains something
9 Allen, 502, 510; s. c., 11 Allen, 591. to be done to desig nate the portion
That it was on storage with a third sold, which portion, before the sale
party,a warehouseman, would make can be completed, mu t be separated
no difference in this respect."
from the mass.' This doctnne found
A sale of a quantity of oats to be approval in Scott v. Kin g, 12 Ind. 203,
weighed out of a bin containing a and there are other case recognizing
larger quantity, accompanied by it as the correct one, among them
payment of the pri e. giv s no title, Moffatt v. Green, 9 Ind. 19 ; Indianbefore the quantity sold is eparat d apolis, etc. Ry. Co. v. Maguire, 62 In L
fr m the bulk, upon which the ven- 140; Bertelson v. Bower, 81 Ind. i312;
dee can maintain trover again t the Lester v. Ea t., 49 Ind. 5 8. The rule
590

CH. IV.] EXISTING CHATTELS NOT TET IDENTIFIED.

CH. IV.]

EXI TIXG CH.A.TTELS NOT YET IDENTIFIED.

[§ 716.

[§ Tie.

serve as illustrations of this rule. Where, however, the prop-

erty sold is part of a mass made up of units of unequal quality

or value, such as cattle in a herd, selection is essential to the

execution of the contract, and of course the rule cannot apply.

which our court has adopted is

upheld by the American cases of

Hutchinson v. Hunter, 7 Pa. St. 140;

serve as illustrations of this rule. "\Vbere, ho 11rnver, the property sold js part of a mass made up of units of unequal quality
or value, such as cattle in a herd, selection is e sential to the
execution of the contract and of course the rule cannot apply.

Haldeman v. Duncan, 51 Pa. St. 66;

Fuller v. Bean, 34 N. H. 290; Ocking-

ton v. Richey, 41 N. H. 275; Morrison

v. Woodley, 84 111. 192; Woods v. Mc-

Gee,7 Ohio, 127; McLaughlin v. Piatti,

27 Cal. 452; Court right v. Leonard,

11 Iowa, 32; Ropes v. Lane, 9 Allen

(Mass.), 502; Ferguson v. Northern

Bank, 14 Bush (Ky.j, 555, 29 Am. R.

418. . . . The American cases
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which have departed from the long-

settled rule are built on the cases of

Kimberly v. Patchin, 19 N. Y. 330.

and Pleasants v. Pendleton, 6 Rand.

( Va.) 473,and these cases proceed upon

the theory that commercial interests

demand a modification of the rule.

In our judgment, commercial inter-

ests are best promoted by a rigid ad-

herence to the rule which the sages

of the law have so long and so

strongly approved."

In Blakely v. Patrick, Adm'r (1870),

67 N. C. 40, 12 Am. R. 600, where a

mortgage was given by a buggy

maker upon " ten new buggies," but

the particular buggies had never been

selected, and it appeared that those

actually in the mortgagor's posses-

sion when the instrument was exe-

cuted had been disposed of and others

built to take their places, it was held

that no interest in any particular

buggies passed to the mortgagee.

In New England, etc. Co. v. Wors-

ted Co. (1896), 165 Mass. 328, 43 N. E.

R. 112, the plaintiffs, manufacturers

of combed wool, agreed to sell an un-

ascertained number of pounds of such

wool to the defendants. The wool,

after being combed, was passed into

bins through a spout, and there was

nothing to distinguish that which

was made one day from that winch

was made on any other. The con-

tract covered all wool manufactured

within thirty certain days. Held,

that unless the wool manufactured

on those days had been separated

from the rest of the bulk no title

passed.

In Baldwin v. McKay (1867),41 Miss.

358, the parties supposed that the

vendor's stock of cotton, lying un-

ginned, contained ten bales, and a

contract of sale was made covering

eight bales from this stock. The

bales sold were not separated at the

time, but subsequently, when the cot-

ton came to be ginned, it was found

to have rotted in many places so that

which our court has adopted is wool to the defendants. The wool,
upheld by the American ca es of after being combed, was passed into
Hutchin on v. Hunter, 7 Pa. St. 140; bins through a pout, and there was
Halueman v. Dun an, 51 Pa. St. 66; nothing to di tinguish that whieh
Fuller v. Bean, 34 N. H. 290; Ocking- was made one day from that which
ton v. Richey, 41 N. H. 275; Iorri on was made on any other. The conv. Woodley, 4 Ill. 192; 'Vood v. Mc- tract co·rnred all wool manufactured
Gee,7 Ohio, 127; fcLaughlin v.Piatti, within thirty certain day . H eld,
27 Cal. 452; Courtright v. Leonard, that unle the wool manufactured
11 Iowa, 32; Ropes v. Lane, 9 Allen on tb.ose day had been separated
(}fa .), 50'>; Fergu ~n v. Northern from the re t of the bulk no title
Bank, 14 Bu h (Ky.), 55-, 'l9 Am. R. pa ed.
41 . . •
The American ca es
In Bald win -v. ~1cKay (1 67),41 Ii .
which have departed from the long- 33 , the partie
uppo ed that the
settled rule are built on the ca e of vendor's tock of cotton, lying uuKim berly v. Patchin, 19 N. Y. 330. ginned. contained ten bales, and a
and Plea ant v. Pendleton, 6 Rand. contract of sale wa, made covering
( a.)473,ancl the e ca e proceed upon eight bale from thi
tock. The
the theory that commercial intere ts bale old were not eparated at the
demand a modification of the rule. time, but sub equently, when the cotIn our judgment, commercial inter- ton came to be ginned, it was found
ests are best promoted by a rigid ad- to have rotted in many place so that
herence to the rule which the sages it ginned out to only ix bale . Helcl,
of the law have so long and so that no title pa ed, and the fact that
strongly approved."
there turned out to be only ix bales
In Blakely v. Patrick, Adm'r (1 70), after ginning did not alter the ca e.
67 N. C. 40, 12 Am. R. 600, where a
Sale of part of a bin of wheat pa . es
mortgage was given by a buggy no title before separation. Cook v.
maker upon ''ten new buggies," but Logan (1 5 ), 7 Iowa, 14l. So of a
the particular buggies had never been contract to sell "25 l\I brick off the
selected, and it appeared that tho e we tend of my kiln." Courtright v.
actually in the mortgagor po es- Leonard (1 60), 11 Iowa, 32.
ee also
sion when the instrument wa exe- Ro enthal v. Ri ley (1 61), 11 Iowa,
cuted had been disposed of and others 541; Snyder v. Tibbals, 32 Iowa, 447;
built to take their place , it was held Coffey v. Quebec Bank (1 69), 20 Up.
that no interest in any particular Can. C. P. 110, citing Gla s v. "hitbuggies pas ed to the mortgagee.
ney, 22 Q. B. '>90; Dunlap v. Berry
In New England, etc. Co. v. \"\ or - (1 43), 5 Ill. 3'>7, 39 Am. Dec. 413; Polted Co. (1 96), 165 fas . 32 , 43 N. E. lock v. Fisher (1 49), 6 N. B. 515;
R. 112, the plaintiff , manufacturers
teven v. Eno (1 50), 10 Barb. 95
-0f combed wool, agreed to sell an un- (overruled by Kimberly v. Patchin);
ascertainednumberofpoundsofsuch Gardiner v. Suydam (1 52), 7 N. Y.
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The storage of oil in tanks and of grain in elevators, although

not universal, is the usual and ordinary means employed by

large dealers in those commodities; and whilst no custom of

that kind, technically speaking, could be established, the usage

of the trade and general course of business in this country is

well known. In view of the necessities which grow out of such

usage, the American courts have departed from the rule ad-

hered to in England, and have recognized a rule for the deliv-

ery of this class of property more in conformity with the

commercial usages of the country. A distinction is made be-

tween those cases where the act of separation is burdensome

and expensive or involves selection, and those where the arti-

cle is uniform in bulk and the act of separation throws no ad-

ditional burden on the buyer."

§ 717. . A number of special advocates 1 of what they

call the " new rule," i. e., the rule of Kimherly v. Patcliin, have

also appeared, but it is believed that except in those cases —

standing upon distinct ground — in which a commercial usage
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prevails, the weight of reason as well as authority requires that

there shall be a separation from the mass before the title can

pass.

II.

Contracts for the Sale of Chattels of a Certain Kind,

Th e storage of oil in t anks and of grain in elevators, although
not universal, is th e usual and ordinary means employed by
large dealers in those commodities; and whilst no custom of
that kind, technically speaking , could be established, the usage
of the t raLle and general course of business in this country is
well known. In view of the necessities which grow out of such
usage, t he American courts ha ve departed from the rule adhered to in E ngland, an<l. have recognized a rule for the delivery of thi s class of property more in conformity with the
commercial usages of the country. A distinction is made between those cases wh ere the act of separation is burdensome
and expensive or involves selection, and those where the article is uniform in bulk and the act of separation throws no additional burden on the buye r."

Where the Particular Goods Have Not Yet Been

Designated.

§ 718. Nature of subject. — Akin to the subject of the last

subdivision is the question which arises where a contract has

(3 Seld.) 357 (see discussion of this case 37 Miss. 353; Lawry v. Ellis (1893), 85

in Kimberly v. Patchin, p. 339); Mc- Me. 500, 27 Atl. R. 518; Huntington

Dougall v. Elliott (1860), 20 Up. Can. v. Chisholm (1878), 61 Ga. 270; Rail-

Q. B. 299; Box v. Insurance Co. (1868), road Co. v. Burr (1874), 51 Ga. 553;

15 Grant's Ch. (Up. Can.) 337; Uphain Cleveland v. Williams (1867), 29 Tex.

v. Dodd (1866), 24 Ark. 545; Brown- 204, 94 Am. Dec. 274; Davis v. Hill

ing v. Hamilton (1868), 42 Ala. 484; (1826), 3 N. H. 382, 14 Am. Dec. 373.

Mobile Bank v. Fry (1881), 69 Ala. 348; *See particularly the monograph

Gresham v. Bryan (1893), 103 Ala. 629, of Mr. Robert Ralston. "Sale of Un-

§ 717. - - . A number of special advocates 1 of what they
call the "new rule," i . e., the rule of Ilimberly v. P atcliin, have
also a ppeared, but it is believed that except in those cases standing upon distin ct ground - in which a commercial usage
prevails, the weig ht of reason as well as authority requires that
there shall be a separation from the mass before the title can
pass.

II.

15 S. R. 849; Thomas v. State (1859), divided Interests'' (1885).
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§ 718. Natu re of subject.- Akin to the subjec~ of the last
subdivision is the question which arises where a contract has
(3 Seld.) 357 (see discussion of t his case
in Kimberly v. P a tchin, p . 339); lVIc. Dougall v. Elliott (1860), 20 Up. Can.
Q. . 9 99; Box v. Insura nce Co. (1 6 ),
15 rant'. h. (Up. Can.) 337 ; phaltl
v. D dd (1 ' 66), 24 Ark. 545; r wning v. Hamilton (1 6 ), 42 la. 484 ;
M bil
a nk v. Fry (1 1), 69 Ala. 34 ;
h m v. Bryan (1 93), 103 Ala. 6'>9,
15 . R. 49; Th mas "· Stat e (1 -91,
5

37 Miss. 353; Lawry v. Ellis (1893), 85
lVIe. 500, 27 Atl. R. 518; Huntington
v. Chisholm (1878), 61 Ga. 270; Railr oad Co. v. Burr (1874), 51 Ga. 553;
'levela nd v. Williams t1867 ), 29 Tex.
204, 94 Am. Dec. 274 ; Da vi v . Hill
(1826), 3 N. H. 382, 14 Am. Dec. 373.
1 See particula rly the monograph
of Mr. Robert Ral t on, "Sale of Undivided Interests., (18 -).
2
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been made to supply goods of an agreed kind, but no particular

goods are, at the time, designated as the ones to which the con-

tract is to apply. The most common illustration is where goods

of a particular kind are ordered of a dealer or manufacturer,

the goods themselves not being present and designated, or per-

haps not being yet in existence, and the dealer or manufact-

urer is charged with the right and duty of selecting or desig-

nating the goods which shall be supplied, — in other words, of

appropriating the goods to the contract. The question which

arises is, When does the title pass ?

§ 719. Under what circumstances question arises. — The

question arises usually, if not invariably, either where some dis-

tance of time is to intervene between the making of the contract

and the fulfillment of it, or where some distance of space inter-

venes between the place of making the contract and the place

of its fulfillment, or where both elements exist.

The question may also arise under a great variety of circum-

stances, some of which may be indicated thus:
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I. Goods ordered of dealer and to be supplied; and —

1. The vendor is to deliver the goods, or

2. The vendee is to come and get the goods, or

3. The vendor is to ship the goods, and there is —

(a) A carrier designated, or

(b) No carrier designated but some carrier intended, or

(c) No carrier named or expressly contemplated, though

the goods are to be shipped, and — -

(d) The consignor is to pay the freight, or

(e) The consignee is to pay the freight, or

(f) The title is to pass at once but the goods are not to

be paid for unless they arrive.

II. Goods to be supplied by the producer, and

1. To be manufactured, or

2. To be grown.

§ 720. What to be included here. — Of the various questions

thus suggested, those falling under the first head will be dealt

with here, while those falling under the second will be con-

38 593
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§§ 721, 722.] LAW OF SALE. [BOOK II.

sidered in the following chapter. And the specific question

will be, Where a contract is made for the sale of existing

goods of a certain kind, but the particular goods are not yet

designated, what must be done in order that the title to some

goods of this kind shall pass?

For the purposes of an orderly discussion of the question, the

following subdivisions may be suggested :

1. Of appropriation in general.

2. Of appropriation where the seller is to carry the goods.

3. Of appropriation where the buyer is to come for the goods.

4. Of appropriation where the seller is to send for the goods

by carrier.

5. Of appropriation where goods are consigned on account of

previous advances.

1. Of Appropriation in General.

§721. General necessity for appropriation. — Upon the

making of a contract for the sale of a part of a larger mass of

goods, as seen in the last subdivision, or of goods thereafter to
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be supplied, no particular goods, however, being designated,

it is clear that no present title does or can thereby pass. The

contract at this point is purely executory, and it cannot be ef-

fectual to transfer title until it has become attached to some

specific goods upon which it can operate. What is essential

sidered in the following chapter. And the specific question
will be, Where a contract is made for the sale of xi ting
goods of a certain kind, but the particular goods are not yet
designated, what mu t be done in order that the title to some
goods of this kind shall pass?
For the purpos s of an orderly discus ion of the question, the
following ubc.livision may be uggested:
1. Of appropriation in g neral.
2. Of appropriation rd1 ere th seller is to carry the goods.
3. Of appropriation w bore the buyer is to come for the goods.
4. Of appropriation where the seller is to send for the goods
by carrier.
5. f appropriation where goods are consigned on account of
previous advances.

now is the appropriation of the goods to the contract,, and

when this occurs the contract becomes executed and the title

is transferred. 1

1. Of .Approvriation in General.

§ 722. What is meant by appropriation.— "The word appro-

priation," said Baron Parke in one case, 2 " may be understood

in different senses. It may mean a selection on the part of the

vendor, where he has the right to choose the article which he

has to supply in performance of his contract; and the contract

will show when the word is used in that sense. Or the word

i See Merchants' Nat. Bank v. Van Deusen, 33 Minn. Ill, 22 N. W.

Bangs, 102 Mass. 291; Fis'.iback v. R. 244.

2 Wait v. Baker (1848), 2 Exch. 1.
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§ 721. General

necessit~r

for appropriation. - Upon the
making of a contract for the sRle of a part of a larger mass of
goods, as seen in the la t subdivision, or of goods thereafter to
be supplied, no particular good , however, being designated,
it is clear that no present title does or can thereby pass. The
contract at this point is purel.v executory, and it cannot be effectual .to tran fer title until it has beco me attached to some
specific goods upon ·which it can operate. What is essential
now is th e approp riation . of the goods to the contract,_ and
wh en this occurs the contract becomes executed and the title
I transferrecl. 1
§ 722. 1'\rhat is meant by appro1n·iation.-"The word approJJriation, " said Baron Parke in one case,2 " may be under. tootl
in different sen es. It may mean a selection on the part of the
venclor wh ere he has the right to choose the article which he
ha to ur ply in performance of his contract; and the c·o ntract
will show wh n the word is used in that sense. Or the ·word
l ee
1ercha nt '
at. Bank v.
Bang , 10'> fa . 291; Fi :1back v.

Van Deusen, 33 Minn. 111, 22 N. W.
R. 244.
2Wait v. Baker (1848), 2 Exch. 1.
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may mean that loth parties have agreed that a certain article

shall be delivered in pursuance of the contract, and yet the

property may not pass in either case. 1 . . . ' 'Appropriation''

may also be used in another sense, . . . viz.: where both

parties agree upon the specific article in which the property is

to pass, and nothing remains to be done in order to pass it."

§723. Who interested in question. — The fact of the ap-

propriation may be of interest to several parties. It is, of

course, chiefly of interest to the buyer and seller, but creditors

and subsequent purchasers may be interested as well. Until

appropriation the goods are still the seller's, and the risk is his.

If he has begun but not finally completed the appropriation,

he may change his mind and substitute other goods. If the

appropriation is complete, the goods belong to the seller and

he has the right to those particular goods.

If the appropriation is not complete the goods are still the

seller's and may be taken for his debts; if it is complete, they

are the buyer's and may be seized upon process against him.
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If the appropriation is not complete, the seller may sell the

goods to another; 2 if it is complete, the seller, at least, would

1 Continuing here the learned judge particular carriage — which, in the

further said: "For the purpose of Roman law, was called obligate certi

illustrating this position, suppose a corporis, where a person is bound

carriage is ordered to be built at a to deliver a particular chattel, but

coach- maker's; he may make any one where the property does not pass, as

he pleases and, if it agree with the it never did by the Roman law, until

order, the party is bound to accept actual delivery, although the prop-

it. Now. suppose that, at some period erty, after the contract, remain;', 1 at

subsequent to the order, a further the risk of the vendee, and, if lost

bargain is entered into between this without any fault in the vendor, the

party and the coach-builder by which vendee and not the vendor was the

it is agreed that a particular carriage sufferer. The law of England is dif-

shall be delivered. It would depend ferent: here property does not pass

upon circumstances whether the until there is a bargain with respect

property passes or whether merely to a specific article and everything

the original contract is altered, from is done which, according to the in-

one which would have been satisfied tention of the parties to the bargain,

by the delivery of any carriage an- was necessary to transfer the prop-

swering the terms of the contract, erty in it."

into another contract to supply the 2 Walker v. Collier (1865), 37 111.
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be liable if he should so dispose of them, and if the delivery

were sufficient the first purchaser could recover them. 1

§ 724. Who may make the appropriation.— The act of ap-

propriation may, by the terms of the agreement, be devolved

be liable if he should so dispose of them, and if the delivery
were sufficient the first purchaser could recover them. 1

either upon the vendor or the vendee; or it may be left to be

made by one party and assented to by the other. In the ma-

jority of cases, however, for reasons which will be obvious, the

appropriation is to be made by the vendor. Mr. Benjamin

states the rule as follows: " The rule on the subject of election

is that when, from the nature of the agreement, an election is

to be made, the party who is by the agreement to do the first

act, which, from its nature, cannot be done till the election is

determined, has authority to make the choice, in order that he

may be able to do that first act, and when once he has done

that act the election has been irrevocably determined, but till

then he may change his mind." 2

§ 725. . He quotes further the rule laid down by Lord

Blackburn, 3 and approved by the courts, 4 to the effect " that
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where, from the terms of an executory agreement to sell un-

specified goods, the vendor is to dispatch the goods or do any-

thing to them that cannot be done till the goods are appropri-

ated, he has the right to choose what the goods shall be; and

the property is transferred the moment the dispatch or other

act has commenced, for then an appropriation is made finally

and conclusively by the authority conferred in the agreement, 5

362; Cole v. Bryant (1895), 73 Miss, defendant a quantity of butter of

297, 18 S. R 655; North Pacific Lum- the same kind and quality that he

bering Co. v. Kerron (1892), 5 Wash, had previously bought of them at a

§ 724. Who may make the appropriation.-The act of appropriation may, by the terms of the agreement, be devolved
either upon the vendor or the vendee; or it may be left to be
made by one party and a ented to by the other. In the majority of cases, however, for rea ons which will be obvious, the
appropriation is to be made by the vendor. liir. Benjamin
states the rule as follows: "The rule on the subject of election
fa that when, from the nature of the agreement, an election jg
to be made, the party who is by the agreement to do the fir t
act, which, from its nature, cannot be done till the election is
determined, has authority to make the choice, in order that he
may be able to do that first act, and when once he has done
that act the election has been irrevocably determined, but till
then be may change his mind." 2

214, 31 Pac. R 595. certain price, provided he accepted

i See Hagins v. Combs (1897), 102 before twelve o'clock the following

Ky. 165, 43 S. W. R 222. day. Within that time defendant

2 Bennett's 6th Am. ed., § 359. accepted the offer by telegram. Said

3 Blackburn on Sale, 128. the court: "The plaintiffs had in

4 Aldridge v. Johnson, 7 E. & B. their store-house a large quantity of

885, 901, per Erie, J. butter. Upon receipt of the defend-

5 In Mitchell v. Le Claire (1896), 165 ant's telegram accepting their offer

Mass. 308, 43 N. E. R 117, the plaint- they were immediately authorized,

iffs had orally offered to sell to the as the defendant's agents, to set apart

596

§ 725. - - . He quotes further the rule laid down by Lord
Blackburn,3 and approved by the courts, 4 to the effect "that
where, from the terms of an executory agreement to sell unspvcified goods, the vendor is to dispatch the goods or do anything to them that cannot be done till the goods are appropriated, he has the right to choose what the g.oods shall be; and
the property is transferred the moment the dispatch or other
act has commenced, for then an appropriation is made finally
and conclusively by the authority conferred in the ngreement, 5
362; Cole v. Bryant (1893), 73 Mi ·s. defendant a quantity of butter of
297, 18 S. R. 635; North Pacific Lum- the same kind and qu:tlity that he
bering Co. v. Kerron (1892), 5 Wash. had previously bought of them at a
214, 31 Pac. R. 595.
certain price, provided he accepted
I See Hagins v. Combs (1897), 102 before twelve o'clock the following
Ky. 165, 43 S. W. R. 222.
day. Within tha.t time defendant
~ Bennett's 6th Am. ed., § 359.
accepted the offer by telegram. Said
3 Black burn on ale, 128.
the court: "The plain tiffs had in
4 ldridge v. John on, 7 E. & B. their store-house a large quantity of
8 5, 901, p r Erle, J.
butter. Upon receipt of the defend5 In ~litchell v. Le Claire (1 96), 165 ant's telegram accepting their offer
Ma . 30 , 43 N. E. R. 117, the plaint- they were immediately authorized,
iffs bad orally offered to sell to the as the defendants agents, to set apart
596

CH. IV.] EXISTIXG CHATTELS NOT YET IDENTIFIED. [§§ 726, 727.

and, in Lord Coke's language, 'the certainty, and thereby the

property, begins by election.' But however clearly the vendor

may have expressed an intention to choose particular goods,

and however expensive may have been his preparations for

performing the agreement with those particular goods, yet,

until the act has actually commenced, the appropriation is not

yet final, for it is not made by the authority of the other party

nor binding on him."

§ 726. What constitutes appropriation in general.— What

act shall be sufficient to constitute an appropriation cannot be

determined by any inflexible rule. In general, however, that

act or series of acts constitutes an appropriation which fully

and finally designates the particular chattel upon which the

contract is to operate. Appropriation, as will be seen in the

following section, is the act of one party or of both. It is

primarily the act of both parties, and can only become the act

of one alone when the other has expressly or impliedly agreed

that he may make it. Until finally and completely consum-
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mated it is revocable by either party; when finally and com-

pletely consummated, whether by the act of both parties or of

one with the consent of both, it is irrevocable except with the

consent of both.

§ 727. Appropriation consists of acts, not mere in-

tention. — Appropriation must clearly be an act and not a

mere intention. It must also be a definite and unequivocal act,

done in pursuance and contemplation of the contract, with the

intention of bringing the designated chattel and the contract

and appropriate to him the goods 4 Cush. (Mass.) 33, 37, 50 Am. Dec. 754;

called for by the contract. This they Eopes v. Lane, 9 Allen (Mass.), 502,

immediately did, weighing the but- 510; Merchants' National Bank v.

ter, setting it apart and marking Bangs, 102 Mass. 291, 295; Marble v.

each tub for the purpose of desig- Moore, 102 Mass. 443; Morse v. Sher-

nating it as the defendant's prop- man, 106 Mass. 430; Safford v. Mc-

erty. They then at once sent him a Donough, 120 Mass. 290; Gilmour v.

bill of all of it, marked 'eash on de- Supple, 11 Moore, P. C. 551, 550; Tar-

mand.' This completed the sale and ling v. Baxter, 6 B. & C. 360."

passed the title. Ax-nold v. Delano,
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§ 727.J

LA. W OF SA.LE.

[BOOK II.

!7.]

LAW OF SALE.

[BOOK II.

into mutual operation and with the purpose of thereb} 7 fulfill-

ing the contract. In a leading case * in which there had been

a contract for the sale of a quantity of barley out of a larger

and ascertained mass, to be put into the vendee's sacks by the

vendor, it was held that as soon as the vendor had filled a sack

he had appropriated that much to the contract irrevocably

(though he never filled the entire number of sacks), and that

the title had thereupon passed, so that if he emptied the con-

tents of the sack back into the mass the vendee could recover

its value. Said Erie, J. : " When he had done the outward act

which showed what part was to be the vendee's property, his

election was made and the property passed. That might be

shown by sending the goods by the railway; and in such casj

i Aldridge v. Johnson (1857), 7 El.

& Bl. 885. In this case Aldridge

made a contract with Knights to
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trade a lot of cattle towards one hun-

dred out of two hundred quarters of

barley agreed upon and to pay the

balance in cash. It was agreed that

into mutual operation and with the purpose of thereby fulfilling the contract. In a leading case 1 in which there bad been
a contract for the sale of a quantity of barley out of a larger
and ascertained mass, to be put into the venrlee's sacks by the
vendor, it was held that as soon as the vendor had filled a sack
he had appropriated that much to the contract irrevocably
(though he never filled the entire number of sacks), and that
the title bad thereupon passed, so that if he emptied the contents of the sack back into the mass the vem.l ee could recov2r
its value. Said Erle, J.: "When he bad done the outward act
which showed what part was to be the ven<lee's property, bis
election was made antl the property passed. That might be
shown by sending the goocls by the rail way; anc.l in such casJ

Aldridge should send his own sacks

to be filled witli the barley and

Knights was to fill the sacks, take

them to a railway station, put them

on cars free of charge and send them

to Aldridge. Aldridge send the sacks

and delivered the cattle to Knights.

Some of the sacks were marked with

Aldridge's name. Knights filled one

hundred and fifty-five of the two

hundred sacks sent, but could not

get the cars to send them. Aldridge

made several demands to have the

barley sent and Knights assured him

it would be sent as soon as he could

get the cars. Before it had been

sent Knights became insolvent and

emptied the contents of the one hun-

dred and fifty-five sacks back into

the pile. Johnson was the assignee

of Knights and refused to surrender

any part of the barley, and this ac-

tion was brought to recover the en-

tire quantity bargained for. Held,

that plaintiff could recover for the

one hundred and fifty-five sacks but

not for the residue which had never

been appropriated.

Campbell, C. J., said: "Looking to

all that was done, when the bank-

rupt put the barley into the sacks eo

instantithe property in each sackful

vested in the plaintiff. I consider

that here was a priorian assent by

the plaintiff. He had inspected and

approved of the barley in bulk. He

sent his sacks to be filled out of that

bulk. There can be no doubt of his

assent to the appropriation of such

bulk as should have been put into

the sacks." In speaking of this case

in the later case of Langton v. Hig-

gins (1859), 4 H. & N. 402, Pollock,

C. B., said: "I doubt whether it was

necessary to tie up the sacks, or do

anything more than put the barley

in them; as when goods are put on

1 Aldridge

v. Johnson (1857), 7 El. tire quantity bargained for. H elcl,
In this case Aldriuge that plaintiff could recover for the
made a cont.ract with Knig hts to one hundred and fifty-five sacks !Jut
trade a lot of cat.tle towards one hun· not for the residue which had never
drec'I out of two hundred quarters of been appropriated.
barley agreed upon and to pay the
Campbell, C. J., said: "Looking to
bala nce in cash. lt was agreed that all that was done, when the b1wkAldriclge should send his own sacks - rupt put the barley into the sacks eo
to be filled with the barley and instanti the property in each sackful
Knights was to fill the sacks, take vested in the plaintiff. I consider
them to a railway tation, put them that here was a priorian assent by
on cars free of charge and send them the plaintiff. He had inspecteu aml
to Aldridge. Aldridge send the sacks approved of the barley in bulk. He
and tlelivered the cattle to Knig hts. sent his sacks to be filled out of that
Some of the sacks were marked with bulk. There can be no doubt of hi.;
Aldridge's name. Knights filled one assent to the appropriation of such
hundred and fifty-five of the two bulk as should have been put into
hundred sacks sent, but could not the saeks." In speaking of this case
get the cars to send them. Aldri<lge in the later case of Langton v. Higm a de several demands to have the gins (1859), 4 H. & N. 402, Pollock,
barley sent a nd Knights a sured him C. B., said: "I doubt whether it v.ras
it would be sent as soon as he could necessary to tie up the sacks, or do
get the cars. Before it had been anything more than put the barley
sent Kni ghts became insolvent and in them; as when goods are }Jut on
emptied the contents of the one hun- board a ship it is not necessary to
drecl a nd fifty-five sa ck's back into stow dovvn the hatchway: the filling
the pile. Johnson wa the assignee the sacks with the barley was a deof Knights and refused to surrender cisive act of appropriation and deany part of the barley, and thi ac- livery."
tion was brought to recover the en598
& Bl. 885.

CH. IV.] EXISTING CHATTELS NOT YET IDENTIFIED. [§ 728.

the property would not pass till the goods were dispatched.

"But it might also be shown by other acts. Here was an ascer-

tained bulk, of which the plaintiff agreed to buy about half.

It was left to the vendor to decide what portion should be de-

livered under that contract. As soon as he does that his elec-

tion has been indicated ; the decisive act was putting the portion

into the sacks." This decision has been followed in several

other cases where the goods were to be put into the buyer's

receptacles, the title being held to pass as soon as they were so

placed. 1

§ 728. Acts must be in fulfillment of the contract.—

But in these and other cases the act done must, as has been

stated, be done in fulfillment of the contract. Acts done, there-

fore, looking toward fulfillment or in partial fulfillment only

are not enough to constitute an appropriation. If, then, for

illustration, the contract provides for a boatful of goods, there

is no appropriation until there is a boatful, and the property

does not pass as it goes into the boat so as to charge the vendee
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with the loss, or give him a right of action for conversion, if

the property be destroyed or diverted before the boat is full, 2

even though the boat be one furnished by the vendee. 3

i Thus in Langton v. Higgins (1859), recovery of the value of two cargoes

4 H. & N. 402, under a contract for of oats, one on board boat No. 604

the sale of a crop of peppermint oil and the other on board boat No. 54.

to be put into the vendee's bottles, it The facts, as stated by the court,

was held that the putting of the oil were as follows: Miles Tempany, a

into the bottles was such an appro- corn merchant at Longford, who em-

priation as passed the title as against ployed the plaintiffs as his factors at

another vendee of the vendor. Liverpool, shipped on board the boat

2 The leading case of Bryans v. Nix No. 604 a full cargo of oats and took a

(1839), 4 M. & W. 775, is of this char- bill of lading or boat receipt for them,

acter. The action was trover for the signed by the master, bearing date

3 Thus, in Rochester Oil Co. v. and was destroyed, Held, that the

Hughey (1867), 56 Pa. St. 322, there title did not pass as the oil ran in or

was a contract for four boat-loads of until there was a boat-load, and

oil, to be drawn from tanks into the hence that the loss fell on the seller.

purchaser's boats, and to be paid for To same effect: Hayes v. Pittsburg

at so much per barrel. While one Co. (1888), 33 Fed. R. 552.

boat was being filled it caught fire
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729.]
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§ 729. Assent to the appropriation.— It inheres in the very

nature of the case that appropriation can only be made with

the assent of both parties, for until they have determined upon

the chattel which is to be sold there can obviously be no com-

the 31st of January, 1837, whereby the boat receipt or bill of lading for

§ 729. Assent to the appropriation.-It inheres in the very
nature of the case that appropriation can only be made with
the assent of both parties, for until they have determined upon
the chattel which is to be sold there can obviously be no com-

he acknowledged the receipt of the

oats on board, deliverable in Dublin

to John and T. Delany, in care for

and to be shipped to the plaintiffs

in Liverpool. On the same day he

procured from the master of another

boat, No. 54, a like bill of lading or

receipt for five hundred and thirty

barrels, but no oats were then on

board that boat, although a cargo

was prepared for that purpose. On
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the 2d of February Tempany wrote

to the plaintiffs a letter inclosing

both those instruments and stating

that he had valued on the plaintiffs

for 730Z. against those oats. On the

7th the plaintiffs received this letter

and accepted the bill of exchange

and returned it to Tempany, who re-

ceived it on the 9th. In the mean-

time the defendant, who was a cred-

itor of Tempany to a considerable

amount, sent over Mr. Walker, an

agent, to Longford. Walker arrived

on the 6th and pressed him for secu-

rity. Tempany consented on that

day to give him an order, addressed

to Tempany's brother, his agent in

Dublin, requesting him to deliver to

Walker, for the defendant, the cargo

of boat 604, which had then sailed

for Dublin, and four other cargoes,

including that of boat 54 (which was

stated to be five hundred and sixty

barrels), and also all that was in

Tempany's store in Dublin. The

boat 54 was then partially loaded,

and Tempany promised to send the

boat receipt for it to Walker. The

loading was completed on the 9th,

five hundred and fifty barrels, which

were on board, signed by the master

and transmitted to Walker, to whom

the cargo was made deliverable, and

he received it the next day. The

boats were both hired by Tempany

and the men paid by him. Walker,

on the 8th, procured an agreement

from J. Tempany, in Dublin, to hold

the oats for him when they arrived,

and he afterwards got possession of

the whole by legal process. As to

boat 604, the court held that there

was a sufficient appropriation to pass

the title to the plaintiffs, "»at least

on the 7th of February, when they

complied with the condition by ac-

cepting the bill, and before the 7th

no other title to the oats intervened,

for the order to deliver them to

Walker, given on the 6th, was clearly

executory only." But the claim of

the 31st of Janua1·y, 1 37, whereby the boat receipt or bill of lading for
he acknowledged the receipt of the five hundred and fifty barrels, which
· oats on board, deliverable in Dublin were on boar i, signed by the master
to John and T. Delany, in care for and transmitted to Walker, to whom
and to be shipped to the plaintiffs the cargo was made deliverable, and
in Liverpool. On the same day he he received it the next day. The
procured from the master of another boats were both hired by Tempany
boat, No. 54, a like bill of lading or and the men paid by him. Walker,
receipt for five hundred and thirty on the 8th, procured an agreement
barrel , but no oats were then on from J. Tempany, in Dublin, to hold
board that boat, although a cargo the oats for him when they arrived,
was prepared for that. purpose. Ou and he afterwards got posse sion of
the 2d of February Tempany wrote the whole by 1ega1 process. As to
to the plaintiffs a letter inclo ing boat 604, the court held that there
both those instruments and stating was a sufficient appropriation to pass
that he had valued on the plaintiffs the title to the plaintiffs, ".at lea t
for 730Z. against those oats. On the on the 7th of February, when they
'7th the plaintiffs received this letter complied with the condition by acand accepted the bill of exchange cepting the bill, and before the 7th
and returned it to Tempany, who re- no other title to the oats intervened.
ceived it on the 9th. In the mean- for the order to deliver them to
time the defendant, who was a creel- Walker. given on the 6th, was clearly
itor of Tempany to a considerable executory only." But the claim of
amount, sent over Mr. Walker, an the plaintiffs to the cargo of boat
agent, to Longford. Walker arrived No. 54 was denied. Said the court,
on the 6th and pressed him for secu- by Parke, B.: "At the time of the
i·ity. Tempany consented on that agreement, proveu by the bill of
day to give him an order, addressed lading or boat receipt of the 31st
to Tempany's brother, bis agent in of January, to hold the five hundred
Dublin, requesting him to deliver to and th1rty lmrrels therein mentioned
Walker, for the defendant, the cargo for the plaintiff, there were no such
of boat 604, which had then sailed oats on board, and consequently no
for Dublin, and four other cargoes, specific chattels which were held for
including that of boat 54 (which was them. The undertaking of the bon.t
stated to be five hundred and sixty ma.'ter had nothing to opemte upon,
barrel ), and also all that was in and, though Miles Tempauy had preTempany's store in Dublin. The pared a quantity of oats to put on
boat 54 was then partially loaded, board, tho e oats still remained his
and Tempany promised to send the property; he might have altered
boat receipt for it to Walker. The their de t.ination and sold them to
loading was completed on the 9th, any one else; the master's receipt no
600
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pleted contract of sale. 1 The assent, however, need not be ex-

press, nor need it be made subsequent to the act. Either

party, moreover, may expressly or impliedly agree beforehand

that the other, or some third person, may make the appropria-

more attached to them than to any-

other quantity of oats belonging to

Tempany. If, indeed, after the 31st

of January, these oats so prepared, or

any other like quantity, had been

put on board to the amount of five

hundred and thirty barrels, or less,

for the purpose of fulfilling the con-

tract, and received by the master as

such, before any new title to these

oats had been acquired by a third,

person, we should have probably held

that the property in these oats passed

to the plaintiff, and that the letter
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and receipt, though it did not operate,

as it purported to do, as an appro-

priation of any existing specific chat-

tels, at least operated as an executory

agreement by Tempany and the

master and the plaintiffs that Tem-

pany should put such a quantity of

oats on board for the plaintiffs, and

that when so put the master should

hold them on their account; and

when that agreement ivas fulfilled,

then, but not otherwise, they would

become their property. But before

the complete quantity of five hun-

dred and thirty barrels was shipped,

and when a small quantity of oats

only were loaded, and before any ap-

propriation of oats to the plaintiffs

had taken place, Tempany was in-

duced to enter into a fresh engage-

ment with the defendant to put on

board for him a full cargo for No. 54,

by way of satisfaction for the debt

due him ; for such is the effect of the

delivery order of the 6th and the

agreement with Walker of the same

date to send the boat receipt for the

cargo of that vessel. Until the oats

were appropriated by some new act,

both contracts were executory; on

the 9th the appropriation took place,

by the boat receipt for the five hun-

dred and fifty barrels then on board,

which was signed by the master at

the request of Tempany, whereby

the master was constituted the agent

of the defendant to hold those goods;

and this was the first act by which

these oats were specifically appropri-

ated to any one. The maste* might

have insisted on Tempany's putting

on board oats to the amount of the

first bill of lading, on account of the

plaintiffs, but he did not do so."

1 Upon this point the language of

Lord Blackburn is instructive: "It

has been already said that the spe-

cific goods must be agreed upon;

that is, both parties must be pledged,

the one to give and the other to ac-

cept those specific goods. This is ob-

§ '729.J

LA. W OF SALE.

[BOOK II.

729.]

LAW OF SALE.

[BOOK II.

tion, and an appropriation so made is therefore with his assent.

In other words, the assent may be, and frequently is, anticipa-

tive, and may be given by one through the agency of the other.

Thus, for example, is it usually, where goods of a certain kind

are ordered to be supplied by a dealer : the buyer beforehand

impliedly assents that the seller may determine which goods

of that kind shall be furnished. 1 So is it also where the vendee

is to select the goods from a larger mass: the vendor before-

hand assents that such goods shall pass as the vendee may so

select. 2 In either case, therefore, when the party charged with

the duty of selection has finally and conclusively selected and

determined the goods of the kind agreed upon, the appropria-

tion is made and the contract is complete without the neces-

sity of any subsequent assent by the other.

to the appropriation of some specific

goods to fulfill an agreement that in
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itself does not ascertain which the

goods are to be. The effect is then the

same as if the parties had from the

first agreed upon a sale of those spe-

cific goods. In the accurate language

tion, and an appropriation so made is therefore with his assent.
In other words, tlle assent may be, anL1 frequently is, anticipative, and may be given by one through the agency of the other.
Thus, for example, is it usually, where goods of a certain kind
are ordered to be supplied by a dealer: the buyer beforehand
impliedly assents that the seller may determine which goods
of that kind shall be furni hecl.1 So is it also where the vendee
is to select the goods from a larger mass: the vendor beforehand assents that su_ch goods shall pass as the vendee may so
select. 2 In either case, therefore, when the party charged with
the duty of selection has finally and conclusively selected and
determined the goods of the kind agreed upon, the appropriation is made and the con tract is corn plete with out the necessity of any subsequent assent by the otlicr.

of Holroyd, J. (Rhode v. Thwaites, 6

B. & C. 388), 'the selection of the

goods by the one party and the adop-

tion of that act by the other converts

that which before was a mere agree-

ment to sell into an actual sale, and

the property thereby passes.'

" But the difficulty arises when the

original agreement does not ascer-

tain the specific goods, and one party

has* appropriated some particular

goods to the agreement, but the

other party has not subsequently as-

sented to such an appropriation.

Such an appropriation is revocable

by the party who made it, and not

binding on the other party, unless it

was made in pursuance of an author-

ity to make the election conferred

by agreement, or unless the act is

subsequently and before its revoca-

tion adopted by the other party. In

either case it becomes final and ir-

revocably binding on both parties.

"The question of whether there

had been a subsequent assent or not

is one fact; the other question of

whether the selection by one party

merely showed an intention in that

party to appropriate those goods to

the contract, or showed a determina-

tion of a right of election, is one of

law, and sometimes of some nicety."

Blackburn on Sale, p. 129.

!Thus, in Aldridge v. Johnson

(1857), 7 El. & Bl. 885, 901, Erie, J.,

says: "If the thing sold is not ascer-

tained, and something is to be done

before it is ascertained, it does not

pass till it is ascertained. Some-

times the right of ascertainment

rests with the vendee, sometimes

solely witli the vendor. Here it is

vested in the vendor only. When

he had done the outward act which

showed which part teas to be the

to the appropriation of some specific
goods to fulfill an agreement that in
itself do.e s not ascertain which the
goods are to be. The effect is then the
same as if the parties had from the
first agreed upon a sale of those specific goods. In the accurate language
of Holroyd, J. (Rhode v. Thwaites, 6
B. & C. 3 8), 'the selection of the
goods by the one party and the adoption of that act by the other converts
that which before was a mere agreement to ell into an actual sale, and
the prop2rty thereby passe .'
"B ut the difficulty arises when the
original agreement doe not a certain the pecific goods, and one party
ha appropriated ome particular
goods to the agreement, but the
ot.her party has not subsequently asn te<l to such an a1 propriation.
uch an appropriation is revocable
by the party who made it, and not
binding on the other pc rty, unless it
wa made in pur uance of an authority to make the ele tion conferr cl
by agr ement., or unle
the act is
ub equent.ly and before its r rncation adopted by the other party. In

either case it becomes final and irrevocably binding on both parties.
"The question of whether there
had been a subsequent assent or not
is one fact; the other question of
whether the selection by one party
merely showed an intention in that
party to appropriate those goods to
the contract, or showed a determination of a right of election, is one of
law, and sometimes of some nicety."
Blackburn on Sale, p. 129.
I Thus, in Aldridge v. Johnson
(1 57), 7 El. & Bl. 885, 901, Erle, J.,
says: "If the thing sold is not ascertained, and something is to be done
before it is ascertained, it does not
pass till it is ascertained. Sometimes the right of ascertainment
rests with the vendee, sometimes
solely with the vendor. Here it is
vested in the vendor only. When

he had done the oiitil'ard act which
showed which pm·t was to be the
vendee's property, his election was
nwde, and the pmperty pa sed."
Many other cases are cited in the
notes to the following sections.
2 ee ante, § 703, and ca es cited.
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Buyer's assent made necessary by terms of

contract. — But the parties may expressly or impliedly agree

that the appropriation shall not be deemed complete until the

vendee has assented, and in such a case the vendee's assent, if

not waived, is indispensable: until it is given, appropriation

by the vendor alone binds nobody, not even himself, and he

may therefore recall it. 1

J See Blackburn on Sale. p. 129,

supra; Andrews v. Cheney, follow-

ing. In Andrews v. Cheney (1882',

62 X. H. 404, plaintiff bought goods of

defendant by sample and paid for

them. Defendant did not then have

the goods in stock, but was to get

them by a certain time, when the

defendant was to call for them.

Within that time defendant pro-
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cured the goods, set them apart by

themselves and marked them with

the plaintiff's name. The plaintiff

did not call for them within the stip-

ulated time, and after that time had

elapsed the goods were destroyed by

the burning of defendant's store.

The plaintiff brought this action to

get back the price he had paid for

them. Said the court: "The prop-

erty in the goods did not pass to the

plaintiff by virtue of the contract,

for they were not then ascertained,

and may not have been in existence.

The agreement on the part of the

defendant was executory. He agreed

to furnish goods corresponding to

the samples selected by the plaintiff.

If the goods, subsequently procured

and set apart by the defendant, did

not conform to the samples, the

plaintiff had a right to reject them.

It does not appear that he waived

that right. The defendant was not

concluded by his selection ; he might

have sold or otherwise disposed of

the particular articles set apart by

him. and substituted others in their

place. A contract of sale is not com-

plete until the specific goods upon

which it is to operate are agreed

upon. Until that is done the con-

tract is not a sale, but an agreement

to sell goods of a particular descrip-

tion. It is performed on the part of

the vendor by furnishing goods

which answer the description. If,

as in the case of a sale by sample,

the specific goods are not ascer-

tained by the agreement, the prop-

erty does not pass until an appro-

priation of specific goods to the

contract is made with the assent of

both parties. Bog Lead Mining Co._

v. Montague. 10 C. B. (X. S.) 481;

Jenner v. Smith, L. R. 4 C. P. 270;

Heilbutt v. Hickson. L. R. 7 C. P.

438; Merchants' Xat. Bank v. Bangs,

102 Mass. 291; Blackb. Sales. 122,127;

Benj. on Sales, § 358. If plaintiff

authorized the defendant to make

§ 731.J

LAW OF St. LE.

[B OK II.

•31.]

LAW OF SALE.

[book IT.

g 731. Buyer's assent required by implication — Sales

by sample. — If the contract requiring the buyer's subsequent

assent is express there can ordinarily be no difficulty; it is only

in those cases in which it is contended that such assent is an

implied term of the contract that trouble arises. The case most

frequently presented, perhaps, is that of a sale by sample, and

concerning this there is some apparent conflict of authority.

It has been held in England that such a contract does not imply

power in the seller to make a final appropriation and that the

subsequent assent of the buyer is required. 1 But the rule sus-

expressly agreed that the vendee,

after the goods " arrived at his store,

might examine them, and, if not ac-

cording to sample, he need not ac-

cept the same.'' The court said that

§ 731. - - Iluyer's assent required by implication -Sales
b,v sample.- If the contract requiring the buyer's subsequent
assent ]s express there can ordinarily be no difficulty; it is only
in those cases in which it is con tended that such assent is an
implied term of the contract that trouble arises. The case most
frequently presented, perhaps, is that of a sale by sample, and
concerning this there is some apparent conflict of authority.
It has been held in England that such a contract does not imply
power in the seller to make a final appropriation and that the
subsequent assent of the buyer is requirecl.1 But the rule sus-

this did not differ from other sales
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by sample " except that in this case

it was agreed that the defendant

[the buyer] should decide for him-

self whether or not the goods were

according to the sample; and he cer-

tainly cannot be heard to object that

he himself was made the umpire,

and has by his own acts decided the

case in favor of the plaintiff."

i Jenner v. Smith (1869), L. R. 4 C. P.

270. is the leading case upon this sub-

ject. That was an action to recover

the price of two pockets of hops as

goods sold and delivered and goods

bargained and sold. The parties met

at a fair, and it was orally agreed that

defendant should purchase of the

plaintiff two pockets of hops then at

the fair and inspected by the defend-

ant and also two other pockets of

which a sample was shown. After

the purchase had been agreed upon,

defendant was informed that the

latter were lying in Prid & Son's

warehouse in London, and he re-

quested that they be left there until

he sent word that he was ready to

receive them. He took the other two

pockets at the fair. The plaintiff, a

day or two afterwards, sent defend-

ant an invoice stating numbers,

weight and price of the four pockets,

with an intimation that the two pock-

ets in the warehouse were subject to

his order. The plaintiff had three

pockets at the warehouse, and he had

in the meantime gone to the ware-

house and directed the warehouse-

man to put certain marks upon two

of them to indicate that they were

sold and were to wait the orders of

the purchaser. No change was made

expre ly agreed that the vendee,
after the goods "arrived at his store,
might examine them, and, if not according to sample, he need not accept the same." The court said that
this did not differ from other sales
by sample "except that in this ca e
it was agreed that the defendant
[t.he buyer] should decide for himself whether or not the goods were
according to the sample; and he certainly cannot be lrnard to object that
he himself was ma.de the u mpire,
and has by his own acts decided the
ca e in favor of the plaintiff."
I Jenner v. Smith (1869), L. R. 4 C. P.
270. is the leading case upon this subject. That was an action to recover
the price of two pockets of hops as
goods sold and delivereu and good
bargained and sol l. The parties met
at a fair, and it ·wa orally a.gr eed that
uefendant should purchase of the
plaintiff two pocket of hops then at
the fair and in pected by the defendant and also two other pockets of
whi ha sample was shown. After
the pur ha. had l.Jeen agreed upon.
def ndant was informed that th
latt r were lying in Prid & on''
war hou ·e in London, and he requ t d that they be left there until
h
nt word that he 'va rea.1y to
r ceive th m. He took the other two

pockets at the fair. The plaintiff, a
day or two afterwards, ent defendant an invoice stating numbers,
weight and price of the four pockets,
with an intimation that the twopockets in the warehouse were subject to
hi · order. 'l'he plaintiff had three
pockets at the warehouse, a nd he had
in the meantime gone to the warehouse and directed the warehouseman to put certain marks upon two
of them to indicate that they were
sold and were to wait the order of
the purchaser. No change was made
in the books of the warehouseman.
The defendant refused to accept
these two pockets: and hence this action. Plaintiff was nonsuited at the
trial and this was sustained by the
court of common pleas. Said Brett, J.:
"Here there was no previous authority given to th a plaintiff to appropriate; and, if not, what evidence
was there to show that the appropriation of the two pockets in Prid
& Son·s warehouse was ever assented
to by the defendant? The defendant's assent might have been given
in either of two ways- by him ·elf
or by a n authorized agent. By bimself, after the receipt of the lett r
containing the invoice: or by the
war ehou e keep r , if there bad been
a.ny evidence of agency or authority

in the books of the warehouseman.

The defendant refused to accept

these two pockets, and hence this ac-

tion. Plaintiff was nonsuited at the

trial and this was sustained by the

court of common pleas. Said Brett, J. :

"Here there was no previous au-

thority given to the plaintiff to ap-

propriate; and, if not, what evidence
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tained by the weight of authority in the United States is that,

if the seller in fact appropriates goods which do conform in all

respects to the sample, the title thereby passes and the buyer

cannot afterwards reject them. It is, of course, a condition

precedent to the operation of this rule that the goods shall so

conform, for the seller cannot bind the buyer to take goods of

a kind he never agreed to take; and, if the goods supplied do

not in fact conform to the sample, the buyer may reject them;

but, subject to this right of examination and rejection, the title

passes by the appropriation of the seller. 1

in them to accept, and assent by

them to hold the hops for him. I

think the defendant's letter refusing

to accept the draft was strong, if not

conclusive, to show that there had

been no such assent by the defend-

t ained b.) the weight of authority in the United State i that,
if the seller in fact appropriates goods which do conform in all
r e pects to the ample, the title thereby pa ses and t!Je buyer
cannot afterwards reject th em. It i" of cour e, a conLlition
precedent to the operation of this rule that the good hall o
conform for the seller cannot bind the bu er to take good of
a kin l he never aD'reecl to take· and, if the goods up1 li cl do
no t in fact conform to the am1 le, he buyer may reject them;
but ubject to thi right of examination and rejection the title
pa · e by the ap1 ropriation of the seller. 1

ant. And, as to Prid & Son, the evi-
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dence fails on both points. They

never agreed to hold the two pockets

on behalf of the purchaser; and, if

they did, there is no evidence of any

authority from him that they might

do so. Counsel has strongly put for-

ward a point which was not made at

the trial, viz., that there was evi-

dence that, by agreement between

the parties, the purchaser gave au-

thority to the seller to select the two

pockets for him. If he did so, he

gave up his power to object to the

weighing and to the goods not cor-

responding with the sample; for he

could not give such authority and

reserve his right so to object; and

indeed it has not been contended

that he gave up those rights. That

seems to me to be conclusive to show

that the defendant never gave the

plaintiff authority to make the choice

so as to bind him. Under the cir-

cumstances, therefore, it is impos-

sible to say that the property passed;

consequently the plaintiff cannot re-

cover as for . goods bargained and

sold."

iln Boothby v. Plaisted (1871), 51

N. H. 436, 12 Am. R. 140, there was a

sale by sample coupled with an ex-

press agreement that, alter the goods

arrived at his store, the vendee

" might examine them, and if not ac-

cording to sample he need not accept

the same." The buyer received and

used the goods, but the court said:

"If the plaintiffs [the sellers] per-

formed their part of the contract

fully by delivering at the time and

place agreed the article which they

agreed to furnish, then it became at

in them to accept, and as ent by
them to bold the hop for him. I
think the defendant' letter refu~ ing
to accept he draft wa ·trong, if not
onclu ~ ive, to ho" that there had
b e n no uch a ent b the defendant. · And, a to Pr id & on, the evideuce fail on both point
They
never agreed to hold the two pocket
on behalf of the purcba er; and if
they did, there i no evidence of any
authori from him that they mi ht
do o. Coun el ha. trongly put forward a point which wa~ not made at
the trial, 'iz., that there wa evideuce that, by agreement between
the partie , the purcba er gave aut horit to the eller to elec the two
pocket for him. If he did o, he
gaye up ill power to object to the
weighing and to the good not corr e ponding with the ample · for he
ould not girn such authority and
r e el"rn hi right o to object; and
indeed it ha not been contended
that he gave up tho e rights. That
seem to me to be conclusfre to bow
that t.be defendant never gave the
plaintiff authori y to make the choice
o a to bind him. Under the cirum tance , therefore, it is impo ible to ay that the property pa ed;
con equently the plaintiff cannot re-

cover as for good bargained and
old. '
1 In Boothby v. Plai ted (1 11), 51
N. H. 436, 12 Am. R 140, there was a
ale by sample coupled with an expres agreement that, after the goods
arri rnd at his tore, the 'en dee
''mi o-ht examine them, and if not according to ample he need not accept
the aine. The buyer received and
u ed the good , but the cour aid :
"If the plaintiff [the seller] p rformed their part of the contract
fully by delivering at the time and
place agreed the article which they
agrned to furni h, then it became at
once the property of the defendant,
and be would ordinarily have no
right to refuse to accept it.'
In "' adham v. Balfour (1 9 ), 32
Oreg. 313, 51 Pac. R 6±2, there wa
a ale by sample of a carload of
wheat. At the time of the le he
eller indor ed and delivered to the
buyer the bill of lading, which both
partie treated as a con tructive delivery of the wheat. Before the car
reached it de tination it wa detroyed by fire, and the action wa
for the price.. The court aid that
the right of in pection was a condition of the con ract, but whether
precedent or ub equent depPnde

once the property of the defendant,

and he would ordinarily have no

right to refuse to accept it."

In Wadhams v. Balfour (1898), 32

Oreg. 313, 51 Pac. R. 642, there was

a sale by sample of a carload of

wheat. At the time of the sale the

seller indorsed and delivered to the

buyer the bill of lading, which both
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| 730. How buyer's assent given when required.—

Where the buyer's assent is required, no particular method of

giving it is indispensable. The fact of giving it is, here, as in

former cases, the material thing. And, as is said by Lord

Blackburn, "the question of whether there has been a subse-

quent assent or not is one of fact; the other question of

whether the selection by one party merely showed an inten-

tion in that party to appropriate those goods to the contract,

or showed a determination of a right of election, is one of

law." 1

in great measure upon the contract.

If the title had passed it was a condi-

tion subsequent. In this case the

parties treated the title as passing

§ 732. - - How buyer's assent giren when requ ired .Where the buyer's as ent is r quire 1, no particular method of
giving it is indispensable. The fact of giving it is, here, as in
former cases, the material thing. And, as is said by Lord
Blackburn, "the qu stion of whether there has been a ubsequent assent or not is one of fact; the other question of
\V hether the selection by one party merely sliowed an intention in that party to appropriate tho e goods to the contract,
-0r showed a determination of a right of election, is one of
law." 1

by the indorsement and delivery of

the bill of lading. The opportunity
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for examination and inspection had

been removed by the destruction of

the property, but the title having

passed the risk of loss passed with

it, and the buyers must pay for it.

Boothby v. Plaisted, supra, was cited

with approval; and to the point that

the title passes by the delivery to

the carrier of such goods as are or-

dered, even though the buyer may

have a reasonable time after their

delivery to examine the goods and

to " rescind " the contract if they do

not conform, the court also cited:

Magee v. Billingsley, 3 Ala. 679 ; Mc-

Carty v. Gordon, 16 Kan. 35; Gill v.

Kaufman, 16 Kan. 571; Brigham v.

Hibbard, 28 Oreg. 387, 43 Pac. R. 383;

Johnson v. Hibbard, 29 Oreg. 184, 44

Pac. R. 287, 54 Am. St. R. 787.

The cmestion was also fully exam-

ined in Kuppenheimer v. Wert-

heimer (1895), 107 Mich. 77, 64 N. W.

R. 952, 61 Am. St. R. 317, and the

same conclusion reached. " If the

goods are not up to the sample," said

the court, "the right to refuse them

exists, which is, in effect, a rescission.

The title passes upon delivery to the

carrier, subject to this right, of which

the purchaser may avail himself or

not." Rindskopf v. De Ruyter, 39

Mich. 1, 33 Am. R. 340, was distin-

guished.

In Smith v. Edwards (1892), 156

Mass. 221, 30 N. E. R. 1017, it was also,

upon full consideration, held that on

a sale of goods to be supplied in ac-

cordance with a sample, an appro-

priation of the goods by the seller,

in full conformity to the sample,

passed the title without a subsequent

assent by the buyer.

In Colorado Springs Live Stock Co.

v. Godding (1894), 20 Colo. 249, 38

Pac. R. 58, it is said : " While it has

been held in some of the cases that

the acceptance by the purchaser of

an article appropriated by the seller

according to the terms of an execu-

tory contract of sale is necessary to

in great measure upon the contract. The title passes upon delivery to the
If the title had passed it was a condi- ca rrier, subject to thi._right, of which
tion subsequent. In this case the the purclrn,ser may a·rnil himself or
parties treated the title as pa sing not.'' Rinclskopf v. De Ruyter, 89
by the indorsement and delivery of Mich. 1, 33 Am. R. 340, was distinthe bill of lading. The opportunity guished.
for examination and in pection had
In Smith v. Eclwanls (1892), 156
been removed by the de truction of 1\'Iass. 221, 30 ~ . E. R. 1017, it wa al o,
the proverty, but the title having upon full consideration, held that on
passed the ri k of loss passed with a sale of goods to be supplied in acit, and the buyers must pay for it. cordance with a sample, an approB '.:> othby v. Plaisted, supm, was cited priation of the goods by the seller,
with approval; and to the point that in full conformity t.o the sample,
the title passes by the delivery to pa sed the title without a sub equent
the carrier of such goods as are or- assent by the buyer.
dered, even though the buyer may
In Colorado Springs Live Stock Co.
have a rea onable time after their v. Godding (1894), 20 Colo. 249, 3
delivery to examine the goods and Pac. R. 5 , it is said: "While it has
to "rescind" th.e contract if they do been held in some of the cases that
not conform, the court also cited: the acceptance by the purchaser of
l\Iagee v. Billing ley, 3 Ala. 679; l\Ic- an article appropriated by the seller
Carty v. Gordon, 16 Kan. 35; Gill v. according to the terms of an exec uKaufman, 16 Kan. 571; Brigham v. tory contract of sale iR ne<'es ary to
Hibbard, 28 Oreg. 387, 43 Pac. R. 383; pass the tit.le, the weight. of authorJohnson v. Hibbard, 29 Oreg. 184, 44 ity is that the appropriation by tbe
Pau. R. 2 7, 54 Am. St. R. 787.
seller of an arti le, ·w hen completed
The question wa also fully exam- in accordance with the terms of the
ined in Kuppenheimer v. Wert- contract, pa ses the title without the
heimer (1 in, 107 1\Ii h. 77. 64 N. W. sul>sequent assent of the purchas r,
. 9.J2 61 Am. St. R. 317, and the and an action for the agreed pri ·e
ame conclu ion reached. "If the can be maintained."
good ar not up to th ample." aid
1 Blackburn on 'ale, p. 1'>9, cited
the court, ''the right tor fuse th m supra. In Alexander v. Gardner
xi.t , whi ·hi , in eff ut, a res i. ion. (1 3-), 1 Bing. N. C. 671, there was a
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[§ 733.

2. Of Appropriation when Seller to Deliver (lie Goods.

§ 733. How when the vendor is to select and deliver the

2. Of .Appropriation 1c h n Seller to Delii: r the Goods.

g 00 d s , — Where, by the terras of the contract, the seller is to

select and deliver the goods at any particular place or in any

particular manner, the goods ordinarily remain his property

and at his risk until they are delivered in accordance with the

aoreement; even if he commits the goods to a carrier for de-

livery as agreed upon, the carrier is deemed to be his agent,

and if the goods are lost while in the charge of the carrier the

loss must fall upon the seller. 1 The same rule would, of course,

contract for a cargo of butter, f. o. b.,

to be shipped in October. The but-

ter was not shipped until Novem-

ber 6th, but defendant waived the

delay and consented to take the in-

voice and bill of lading which de-

scribed the butter, the weights and
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marks of the casks, etc. The butter

§ 733. How when the vendor is to select and delh er tlrn
good .-Where, by the terms of the contract, the seller is to
elect and deliver the good at an particular place or in any
parti ular manner: the goods or Unarily remain hi propert
and at hi ri k until they are deli\ercd in accordance with the
agreement · e en if he commits the goods to a carrier for deliv ry a agree l upon the carrier is deemm1 to be hi agent
and if the good are lo t while in the charge of the c:arrier the
lo mu t fall upon the eller. 1 The same rule woul<l, of course,

was afterwards lost by shipwreck.

Held, that the appropriation of this

cargo of butter to the contract was

complete by mutual assent; that the

title had passed, and the buyers must

stand the loss.

In Sparkes v. Marshall (1836), 2

Bing. N. C. 761, a cargo of oats was

contracted for, to be shipped, etc.

Some days later the buyer was in-

formed that the shippers had en-

gaged " room in the schooner Gibral-

tar Packet of Dartmouth to take

about six hundred barrels of black

oats on your account." The buyer on

the next day ordered insurance " on

oats per the Gibraltar Packet of

Dartmouth." In an action by the

buyer against the insurers it was

contended by them that the title

had not passed, but it was held other-

wise. Tindal, C. J., said that the

letter " was an unequivocal appro-

priation of the oats on board the

Gibraltar Packet," and that "this

appropriation is assented to and

adopted by the plaintiff, who, on the

following day," effected insurance.

etc.

i In McNeal v. Braun (1891), 53 N.

J. L. 617. 23 Atl. R. 687, 26 Am. St.

R. 441, M., who resided at X., had or-

dered of B., who was a wholesale

coal dealer at Y., a cargo of coal at

§4.10 per ton delivered at X. B. char-

tered a compartment vessel, loaded

her with coal, took a bill of lading

which promised a delivery to M., and

sent the vessel on her way. She

reached X. and tied up atM.'s wharf

for delivery to M., but before she

was unloaded one of the compart-

ments sank, through the negligence

of the carrier, and the coal was lost.

Held, in an action to recover the

price, that B. must bear the loss.

Said the court: "The plaintiff, in-

stead of being an agent to procure

transportation, had himself con-

tracted to deliver the coal, and the

contract for a cargo of butter. f. o. b.,
to be shipped in October. The butter wa not hipped until NoTember 6th, but defendant wairnd the
delay and con~ented to take the inToice and bill of lading which decribed the butter, the weights and
mark of the ca k , etc. The butter
wa _ afterwards lo t b
hipwreck.
H eld, that the appropriation of this
cargo of butter to the contract "as
complete by mutual a ent; that the
title had passed, and the buyers mu t
tand the los .
I n Sparkes v. Iarshall (1 36), 2
Bing. N. C. , 61, a cargo of oat was
contracted for, to be shipped, etc.
Sorne days later the buyer wa informed that the hipper hacl engaged "room in the chooner Gibraltar Packet of Dartmouth to take
about ix hundred barrel of bla k
oats on your account. The buyer on
the next day ordered in urnnce "on
oat per the Gibraltar Packet of
Da rtmouth." In an action by the
buyer again t the in w·er it wa
contended by them that the title
h ad not pa ed, but it wa held otherwi e. Tindal, C. J., aid that the
letter "\\'as an unequivocal appropriation of the oat on board the
Gibraltar P acket," and that "this

appropriation is as ·ented to and
adopted by the plaintiff, who, on the
following day," effected in urance.
etc.
1 In l\Ic Teal v. Braun (1 91), 53 N.
J. L. 61 , 23 Atl. R. 6 , 26 Am. t.
R. 441, I., who re ided at X., hFLd ordered of B., who wa a whole ale
coal dealer at Y. a cargo of oal at
4:.10 per ton delivered at X. B. chart ered a compartment Ye el, loaded
her with coal, took a bill of lading
which promi ·ed a deli-very to M., and
ent the ve el on her way.
he
reached X. and tied up at l\I.' wharf
for deli 'ery to 1\I., but before he
wa unloaded one of the compartment ank, through the negligence
of the carrier, and the coFLl wa lo t.
H eld, in an action to reC'over the
price, that B. mu t bear the lo '.
, 'aid the court: 'The plaintiff, intead of being an agent to procure
tran portation, had ·himself contracted to deliver the coal, and the
instructions ignore the fact that
under a contract of that ort the
undertaking to deliver i ab olute
and unqualified, and delivery of the
good is a condition precedent to
the right of the vendor to ue for
the contract price. If the good be
lo tor destroyed before delivery i
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apply where the agreement is that the seller shall deliver the

goods to a carrier at the point of shipment. 1

Cases of this class may rest also upon the ground, previously

considered, that the seller is to do something to the goods,

consummated the vendor must bear

apply where the agreemen_t is that the seller shall deliver the
goocls to a carrier at the point of shipment. 1
Cases of this class may rest also upon the ground, previously
con idered, that the seller is to do something to the goods,

the loss. Under such a contract the

carrier selected by the vendor is his

agent to perform the contract to

deliver, and the vessel in which the

goods are carried is pro hac viae the

vendor's vessel. For the negligence

of the one and the condition of the

other, and, indeed, for failure to

make delivery of the coal according

to contract, for any cause not due to

the fault of the purchaser, the re-
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sponsibility is upon the vendor."

The question whether the title had

passed was not directly passed upon,

though the court held that even if

it had, still, by the terms of the con-

tract, delivery was a condition pre-

cedent to the right to recover the

price. The case is most appropriately

to be classed among those considered

post, § 744, where the title is to pass

at once, though the goods are not to

be paid for unless they arrive. Dun-

lop v. Lambert, 6 Clark & Fin. 600,

and Calcutta Co. v. De Mattos. 32 L.

J. Q. B. 322, 33 id. 214, were cited and

relied upon.

In Magruder v. Gage, 33 Md. 344, 3

Am. R. 177, it is said: " If the vendor

undertakes to make the delivery

himself at a distant place, thus as-

suming the risk in the carriage, the

carrier becomes the agent of the

vendor, and the property will not

pass until the delivery is actually

made."

In Dunlop v. Lambert, supra, it is

said: "If a particular contract be

proved between the consignor and

consignee — as where a party under-

taking to consign undertakes to de-

liver at a particular place, — the prop-

erty, till it reaches that place and is

delivered according to the terms of

the contract, is at the risk of the

consignor."

In Ludlow v. Bowne (1806), 1 Johns.

(N. Y.) 1, 3 Am. Dec. 277, it is said

that he has the property upon whom

the loss in transportation would fall.

con summated the vendor must bear
the loss. Under such a contract the
carrier selected by the vendor is his
agent to perform the contract to
deliver, and the vessel in which the
goods are carried is pro hac 1'ice the
vendor's ve sel. For the negligence
of tbe one and the condition of the
other, and, indeed, for fail ure to
make deli very of the coal according
to contract. for any cause not due to
the fault of the purchaser, the responsibility is upon the Tendor."
The question whether the title had
pas ed was not directly passed upon,
thoug h the court held that even if
it had, still, by the terms of the contract, delivery was a condition precedent to the right to recover the
price. The case is most appropriately
to be clas ed among those considered
post, : 744, where the title is to pass
at once, though the goods a re not to
be paid for unless they a rri ve. Dunlop v. Lambert, 6 Clark & Fin. 600,
and Calcutta Co. v. De Mattos. 32 L.
J. Q. B. 322, 33 id. 214, w ere cited and
relied upon.
In Magruder v. Gage, 33 Md. 344, 3
Am. R. 177, it is said: "If the vendor
undertakes to make the deli very
him elf at a distant place. thus assuming the risk in the carriage, the
carrier becomes the agent of the
vendor, and the property will not
pa
until the delivery is actually
made.'
In Dunlop v. Lambert, siipra, it is
said: "If a, particular contract be

proved between the consignor and
consignee - a where a pa rty undertaking to consign undertakes to deliver at a particular place,- the prop·
erty, till it r eaches t hat place and is
delivered according to the terms of
the contract, is at the risk of the
consignor. "
In Ludlow v. Bowne (1806), 1 John .
(N. Y.) 1, 3 Am. Dec. 277, it is said
that be has the property upon whom
the loss in transportation would fall.
"And Sir William Scott observes
that this is the true criterion of
property. He is to be deemed the
proprietor on whom the loss would
fall in case of accident. 2 Rob. Adm.
135. This is certainly a just and rational criterion between the vendor
and vendee; the former is presumed
to get a compensation for the risk,
and the loss is therefore to be borne
by him.n
See also Neimeyer Lumber Co. v.
Burlington R. Co., 54 Neb. 321, 74 N.
W. R. 670, 40 L. R. A. 5M; Bloyd v.
Pollock, 27 W. Va. 75; Devine v. Edwards, 101 Ill. 138; Taylor v. Cole
(1 73), 111 Mass. 363; Suit v. Woodhall, 113 Mass. 391; Weil v. Golden,
141 Mass. 364, 6 N. E. R. 229: Sneathen v. Grubbs (1878), 88 Pa. St. 147;
Braddock Glass Co. v. Irwin (1893),
153 Pa. St. 440, 25 Atl. R. 490; McL au ghlin v. Marston (1891), 78 Wis.
670, 47 N. W.R. 1058.
F. 0. B.- As to the effect of a contract to deliver good ' f. o. b." at a
certain place, it is sa.id by ... orval, J. ,

"And Sir William Scott observes

that this is the true criterion of

property. He is to be deemed the

proprietor on whom the loss would

fall in case of accident. 2 Rob. Adm.

135. This is certainly a just and ra-

tional criterion between the vendor

and vendee; the former is presumed

to get a compensation for the risk,

and the loss is therefore to be borne

by him."

See also Neimeyer Lumber Co. v.

1

ee Odell v. Bo ton & l\i R. Co. (1 71), 109 l\Iass. 50; Spencer v. HaJe
(1 3 ), 30 Vt. 314.
60

OH. IV.] EXISTING CHATTELS NOT YET IDENTIFIED. [§ 734.

i. e., deliver them at a given place, before they are in the con-

dition in which, by the terms of the agreement, the purchaser

is bound to receive them.

3. Of Appropriation where the Buyer is to Come for the Goods.

§ 1M. How when the purchaser is to come and get the

goods. — Where goods were ordered of a dealer, but the con-

tract did not determine the place of delivery, it was said: 1 "If

no place be designated by the contract, the general rule is that

the articles sold are to be delivered where they are at the time

of the sale. The store of the merchant, the shop of the manu-

facturer, and the farm of the farmer, at which the commodities

sold are deposited or kept, must be the place of delivery when

the contract is silent upon the subject; at least, when there are

no circumstances showing that a different place was intended.

This is a rule of construction predicated upon the presumed in-

tention of the parties when making the contract. 2 This rule is

not changed by the fact that plaintiffs did not have the goods

on hand at their place of business at the time of the sale, but
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had to procure them elsewhere in order to fulfill their contract.

Potentially and prospectively the goods were as if then situate

in their store."

The question of appropriation in these cases must therefore

rest upon the general principles already considered, 3 i. e., that

in Neimeyer Lumber Co. v. Burling- f. o. b. at place of destination, post,

ton R. Co., supra: "The initial let- §741, note; also post, g§ 795-797.

ters ' f. o. b.' in contracts of sale, l In Janney v. Sleeper (1883), 30

when the property is to be trans- Minn. 473, 16 N. W. R. 365.

ported, mean 'free on board' the 2 The court cited Benj. on Sales,

cars at a designated place, whether §§ 1018, 1022; 2 Chitty on Cont. 1201,

that be the initial point of shipment 1202; 2 Kent, 505; Middlesex Co. v.

or place of final destination. They Osgood, 4 Gray (Mass.), 447; Smith v.

imply that the buyer shall be free Gillett, 50 111. 290; Hamilton v. Cal-

from all the expenses and risks at- houn, 2 Watts (Pa.), 139; Lobdell v.

tending the delivery of the property Hopkins, 5 Cow. (N. Y.) 516; Rice v.

at the point named in the contract Churchill, 2 Denio (N. Y.), 145; Wil-

for such purpose." See, further, as mouth v. Patton, 2 Bibb (Ky.), 280;

to the effect of a contract to deliver Sousely v. Burns, 10 Bush (Ky.), 87.

3 See ante, § 724 et seq.
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there is a sufficient appropriation when the party who, by the

contract, has authority to make it, has conclusively and finally

designated the goods which are to be sold. 1

§ 735. Effect of putting goods into buyer's convey-

ance.— Putting the goods into the buyer's receptacles, 2 as has

been seen, or into his ship or other conveyance, 3 would ordi-

there is a sufficient appropriation when the party "·ho, by the
contract, bas authority to make it, bas conclusively and finally
designated the goods which are to be sold. 1

narily be such an appropriation; but even here, as will be seen,

this result may be defeated by acts indicative of a contrary

intent, as where, though the goods are put on board a vessel

sent by the buyer, the bill of lading is taken to the seller's order

for the purpose of reserving control over them. 4

4. Of Appropriation where Seller is to Send Goods oy Carrier.

§ 736. How when the seller is to send the goods by carrier.

The most common form in which the question arises is that in

which goods are ordered to be transmitted to the purchaser by

carrier. In such cases there may be a carrier specially desig-

nated, or the contract may provide for shipment by some car-

rier without specifying any, or it may be entirely silent upon
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the subject. As to such cases it is said : 5 " The question as to

what acts are necessary to be performed by a vendor under an

§ 735. - - Effect of putting goods into b11yer's c01neyance.- Putting the goods into the buyer's receptacles, 2 as has
been seen, or into his ship or other conveyance,3 would ordi·narily be such an appropriation; but even here, as will be seen,
this result may be defeated by acts indicative of a contrary
intent, as where, though the goods are put on board a vess el
sent by the buyer, the bill of lading is taken to the seller's order
for the purpose of reserving control over them.i

executory agreement for the sale of unspecified goods in order

to transfer the title to the vendee and subject him to the risk

of the carriage, depends entirely upon the agreement, either

4. Of .Appropriation where Seller is to S encl Goods by Carrier.

express or implied, between the parties. If the vendor under-

takes to make the delivery himself at a distant place, thus as-

§ 736. How when the seller is to send the goods by carrier.

suming the risk in the carriage, the carrier becomes the agent

i See Andrews v. Cheney (1882), 62 091 ; Moakes v. Nicolson (1865), 19

N. H. 404. C. B. (N. S.) 290; Schotsraans v. Rail-

2 Ante, § 727; Langton v. Higgins way Co. (1867), 2 Ch. App. 332; Guram

(1859), 4 H. & N. 402; Aldridge v. v. Tyrie (1864), 33 L.J. Q. B. 97, 34 id.

Johnson (1857), 7 El. & Bl. 885. 124; Rochester Oil Co. v. Hughey

3 See Turner v. Liverpool Dock (1867), 56 Pa. St. 322.

Trustees (1851), 6 Ex. 543; EUershaw * See post, § 774.

v. Magniao (1843), 6 Ex. 570; Brandt 5 In Magruder v. Gage (1870), 33 Md.

v. Bowlby (1831), 2 B. & Ad. 932; 344, 3 Am. R. 177.

Van Casteel v. Booker (1848), 2 Ex.

610

The most common form in which the question arises is that in
wh ich goods are ordered to be transmitted to the purchaser by
carrier. In such cases there may be a carrier specially designated, or the contract may provide for shipment by some carrier without specifying any, or it may be entirely silent upon
the subject. As to such cases it is said: 5 "The question as to
what acts are necessary to be performed by a vendor under an
executory agreement for th e sale of unspecified goods in order
to transfer the title to the vendee and subject him to the risk
of the carriage, depends entirely upon the agreement, either
express or impli ed, between the parties. If the vendor undertakes to make the delivery himself at a distant place, thus assuming the risk in the carriage, the carrier becomes the agent
I See Andrews v. Cheney (18 2), 62
N. H. 404.
:l Ante, § 727; Langton v. Higgins
(1859), 4 H. & N. 402; AIU.ridge v.
John on (1 57), 7 EL & Bl. 885.
3 See Turner v. Liverpool Dock
Tru tee (1 -1), 6 Ex. 543; Ellershaw
v. fagniac (1 43), 6 Ex. 570; Brandt
v. Bowlby (1 31), 2 B. & Ad. 932;

691; Moakes v. Nicolson (1865), 19
C. B. (N. S.) 290; Schotsmans v. Railway Co. (1867), 2 Ch. App. 832; Gumm
v. Tyrie (1864), 33 L. J. Q. B. 97, 34 id.
124; Rochester Oil Co. v. Hugh ey
(1 67), 56 Pa. St. 322.
4 See post, § 77 4.
f> In 1agruder v. Gage (1870), 33 Md.
344, 3 Am. R. 177.

Van Caste 1 v. Booker (1 48), 2 Ex.
610
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73G.

of the vendor, and the property will not pass until the delivery

is actually made. 1 On the other hand, if the goods are de-

livered to a carrier special^ designated by the purchaser, he

becomes the agent of the latter, and the title to the property,

as a general rule, will pass the moment the goods are dis-

patched. 2 Should the contract of purchase be silent as to the

person or mode by which the goods are to be sent, a delivery

by the vendor to a common carrier in the usual and ordinary

course of business transfers the property to the vendee." 3

1 See as to this, ante, § 733.

2 " In general, a delivery of goods to

a common carrier, and, a fortiori,

to one specially designated by the

buyer, is a delivery to the buyer."

Hobart v. Littlefield (18S1), 13 R. I.

of the yendor, and the property will not pas until the delivery
is actually made. 1
n the other hand, if the goods are deliv red to a carrier pecially designated by the purcha er he
become the agent of the latter and the title to the propert_},
a a general rule will pa the moment the goods are lispatchec.l.2
hould the contrc t of purcha e be silent as to tbe
per on or mode by "bich tbe goods are to be sent a deli very
by th 'Tendor to a common carrier in the u ual and ordinary
course of bu in ss tran fers the property to the -vendee. ' 3

341. To like effect: Stanton v. Eager

(1835), 16 Pick. (Mass.) 467; Wing v.
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Clark (1844), 24 Me. 366; State v.

Peters (1897), 91 Me. 31. 39 Atl. R.

342; Scharff v. Meyer (1896), 133 Mo.

428, 34 S. W. R. 858, 54 Am. St. R. 672;

State v. Wingfield (1893), 115 Mo. 428,

22 S. W. R. 363, 37 Am. St. R. 406;

Dyer v. Great Northern Ry. Co.

(1892), 51 Minn. 345, 53 N. "W. R. 714,

38 Am. St. R. 506; Wilcox Silver Plate

Co. v. Greeu (1878), 72 N. Y. 17: Wade

v. Hamilton (1860), 30 Ga. 450. De-

livery of the goods to the servant or

agent of the purchaser is equivalent

to delivery to the purchaser. Bonner

v. Marsh (1848), 10 Sm. & M. (Miss.)

376. 48 Am. Dec. 754.

3 When the goods are left by the

seller with a common carrier to be

delivered to the purchaser without

any qualification or restriction, the

title thereupon and thereby passes to

the purchaser, and the seller cannot

afterwards stop them or change their

destination, unless under such cir-

cumstances as justify a seller in

exercising the right of stoppage in

transitu. Philadelphia, etc. R. Co. v.

Wireman (1879), 88 Pa. St. 264;

Schmertz v. Dwyer (1866), 53 Pa. St.

335; Johnson v. Stoddard (1868), 100

Mass. 306; Merchants' Nat. Bank v.

Bangs (1869), 102 Mass. 291; Prince v.

Boston & L. R. Co. (1869), 101 Mass.

542, 100 Am. Dec. 129; Krulder v.

Ellison (1871), 47 N. Y. 36, 7 Am. R.

402; Dutton v. Solomonson (1803), 3

B. & P. 582; Cork Distilleries Co. v.

Railway Co., L. R. 7 H. L. 269; John-

son v. Railway Co. (1878), 3 C. P. D.

499; Fragano v. Long (1825), 4 B. & C.

219; Bryans v. Nix (1839), 4 M. & W.

775; Bailey v. Railroad Co. (1872), 49

N. Y. 70; Torrey v. Corliss (1851), 33

Me. 333; Neimeyer Lumber Co. v.

Burlington R. Co. (1898), 54 Neb. 321,

74 X. W. R. 670, 40 L. R. A. 534; Kess-

ler v. Smith (1890), 42 Minn. 494, 44

N. W. R. 794; Leggett & Meyer To-

bacco Co. v. Collier (1893), 89 Iowa,

144, 56 N. W. R, 417, and many other

cases cited in these cases. This will

ee a to this, ante, · 733.
·wireman (1 79), 8 Pa. St. 26±;
Ing nernJ, a delivery of good to
chmertz v. Dwyer (1 66), 53 Pa. t.
a common carrier, and, a fortiori, 335; John on v. toddard (1 6l), 100
to one pecially de ignated by the 1\fa . 306; I erchants Ni:tt. Bank ""·
buyer i a deliTery to the buyer.· Bang (1 69) 109 ~Ia . '>91; Prince v.
Hobart v. Littlefield (1 '.llJ, 13 R. 1 Bo ton & L. R. Co. (1 '69), 101 ~la .
3±1. To like effect: 'tan ton v. Eager 5±2, 100 m. Dec. 129; Krulder v.
(1 35), 16 Pick. (l\Ia .) 467· Wing v. Elli on (1 il), 47 N. Y . 36, 7 Am. R.
Clark (1 -14), 24: Ie. 366; tate v. 40'); Dutton v. , olomon. on (1 03), 3
Peter (1 97), 91 Ie. 31. 39 Atl. R. B. & P. 5 9; ork Di tillerie Co. v.
349;
harff v. l\feyer (1 96) 133 l\Io. Railway Co., L. R. H. L. 269· J ohn. t. R. 67');
on v. Railway Co. (1 7 '.l), 3 C. P. D .
42 34 . ''. R. - , 54:
• tate v. ' ' ingfield (1 93), 115 !\Io. 42 , 499; Fragano v. Long (1 95), 4 B. & C.
92 . W. R. 363, 37 m. t. R. 40 ; 219; Bryan v. :rix (1 39), 4 l\'L & \V.
D yer v. Great Northern Ry.
o.
75; Bailey v. Railroad Co. (1 7'>), 49
(1 99), 511\Iinn. 34-, -3 N. W. R. 714, N. Y. 10; Torrey v. Corli (1 31), 33
3
m. t. R. 506; \V1lcox, ilver Plate
Ie. 333· Teimeyer Lumbe r o. v.
Co. v. Gr en (1 7 ), 72 N. Y. 1i; \Yade Burlin gton R. Co. (1 9 ), -4 eb. 321,
v. Hamilton (1 60), 30 a. 430. De- 14 r. W. R. 670, 40 L. R. A. 534 · Ke livery of the good to the ser-rnnt or ler v. mith (1 90), 49 :Minn. 494: 4-±
agent of the purcha er i equivalent N. vV. R. 794:; Leggett & Meyer Toto d li' ry to the pur ha er. Bonner bacco Co. v. Collier (1 93), 9 Iowa,
v. Iar h (1 -!c.;), 10 m. & ~I. (}lis .) 144, 56 N. W.R. 417, and many other
376. 4 Am. Dec. 154:.
ca e cited in he e ca e . Thi will
3 When the good are left by the be true even though the good harn
seller with a common earrier to be yet to be weighed at the point of
delivered to the purcha er without destination hi or<ler to ascertain the
any qualification or re triction, the price (Odell v. Bo ton & l\Ie. R. Co.
title ther upon and thereby pa e to (1 tl), 109 l\Ia . 50), or though the
the pur ha ·er, and the eller cannot 0on ignor guarantees the payment
aftnward top them or change their of the freight and make a pecial
de 'tination, unle under uch cir- agreement a to the carriage.
tafcum tan e as ju tify a ~e ller in ford v. \Vatter (1 73), 67 Ill. 3.
exerci ing the right of toppage in \Vh ere, by the terms of the agreetransitu. PhilaJelphia, tc. R. Co. v. ment, the good are to be placed on a
611
l
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§§ 737-739.J

LAW OF SALE.

[BOOK II.

Where no carrier is specified, and a choice is open to the ship-

per, the selection of any one, in good faith and in the usual

course of business, will suffice.

| 737. . In a later case 1 the rule was very carefully

stated thus: "When goods ordered and contracted for are not

directly delivered to the purchaser, but are to be sent to him

Where no carrier is specified, and a choice is op n to the sbi pper, the selection of any one, in good faith and in the usual
course of business, will suffice.

by the vendor, and the vendor delivers them to the carrier, to

be transported in the mode agreed on by the parties or directed

§ 737. - - . In a later case 1 the rule was very carefully

by the purchaser, or, when no agreement is made or direction

given, to be transported in the usual mode; or when the pur-

chaser, being informed of the mode of transportation, assents

to it; or when there have been previous sales of other goods, to

the transportation of which in a similar manner the purchaser

has not objected,— the goods when delivered to the carrier are

at the risk of the purchaser, and the property is deemed to be

vested in him, subject to the vendor's right of stoppage in

transitu."

§ 738. . Such a delivery, however, will not transfer the
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title if transmission by a carrier were neither expressly or im-

pliedly agreed upon, nor justified by the previous conduct of

the parties or the usage of trade. 2

§ 739. Effect of such delivery to carrier.— The effect

of the delivery to the carrier under proper circumstances is

thus not only to transfer the title, but also to fix ordinarily the

car at the seller's place of business, Am. Dec. 636 (citing Coats v. Chap-

andthe buyer is to accept the seller's lin, 3 Ad. & El. (N. S.) 483, to same

weight and grade, the title passes effect); Hague v. Porter (1842), 3 Hill

when the goods are so deposited. (N. Y.), 141; Everett v. Parks (1872),

McKee v. Bainter, 52 Neb. 604, 72 N. 62 Barb. (N. Y.) 9. But the vendee's

stated thus: "When goods ordered and contracted for are not
directly delivered to the purchaser, but are to be sent to him
by the vendor, and the vendor delivers them to the carrier, to
be transported. in the mode agreed on by the parties or directed
by the purchaser, or, when no agreement is made or direction
given, to be transported in the usual mode; or when the purchaser, being informed of the mode of transportation, assents
to it; or when there have been previous sales of other goods, to
the transportation of which in a similar manner the purchaser
has not objected,- the goods when delivered to the carrier are
at the risk of the purchaser, and the property is deemed to be
vested in him, subject to the vendor's right of stoppage in

transitu."

W. R. 1044. consent that the goods shall be sent

JWheelhouse v. Parr (1886), 141 by carrier may be implied from the

Mass. 593, 6 N. E. R. 787. usage of trade. Hague v. Porter,

2 If goods ordered are delivered to supra; Leggett & Meyer Tobacco Co.

a carrier without any express or im- v. Collier (1893), 89 Iowa, 144, 56 N. W.

plied direction so to send them, then R. 417; Watkins v. Paine (1876), 57

such delivery will not operate to pass Ga. 50: Star Glass Co. v. Longley

the title and the risk to the vendee. (1880), 64 Ga. 576.

§ 738. - - . Such a delivery, however, will not transfer the
title if transmission by a carrier were neither expressly or implieclly agreed upon, nor justified by the previous conduct of
the parties or the usage of trade. 2

Loyd v. Wight (1856), 20 Ga. 574, 65

612

§ 739. - - Ett'ect of such delivery to carrier.- The effect
of the delivery to the carrier under proper circumstances is
thus not only to transfer the title, but also to fix ordinarily the
car at the seller's place of business,
and the buyer is to accept the seller's
weight and grade, the title passes
when the goods are so deposited.
McKee v. Bainter, 52 Neb. 604, 72 N.
w. R. 1044.
1 Wheelhouse v. Parr (1886), 141
Ma s. n93, 6 N. E. R. 787.
z If goods ordered are delivered to
a carrier without any ex pres· or implied direction so to send them, then
such delivery will not operate to pass
the title and the ri k to the venclee.
Loyd v. Wight (1856), 20 Ga. 574, 65

Am. Dec. 636 (citing Coats v. Chaplin, 3 Ad. & El. (N. S.) 483, to same
effect); Hague v. Porter (1842), 3 Hill
(N. Y.), 141; Everett v. Parks (1872),
62 Barb. (N. Y.) 9. But the vendee's
consent that the goods shall be sent
by carrier may be implied from the
usage of trade. H:=tgue v. Porter,
supra; Leggett & Meyer Tobacco Co.
v. Collier (1893),89 Iowa, 144, 56 N. W.
R. 417; Watkins v. Paine (1876). 57
Ga. 50; Star Glass Co. v. Longley
(18 0), 64 Ga. 576.
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time smdj>7ace at which the title passes. 1 With the title also

go the risk and the liability, and the seller may recover the

price, though the goods never arrive, or, without his fault, are

injured on the way. 2 The goods, moreover, having become the

property of the buyer are subject to the same rights and liabil-

ities as his other goods, and are taxable or attachable, as well

as transferable, as his own. The seller, further, thus performs

on his part, and the order for the goods is no longer open to

withdrawal or revocation by the purchaser. 3

iTIius, in Sarbecker v. State (1886),

65 Wis. 171, 56 Am. R 624, it is said:

" We are constrained to hold that

where the contract is silent on the

subject, and there is nothing in the

transaction indicating a different in-

time an l place at whi'"'h the title pa es. 1 With the title al o
go the risk an l the liabilit3, and the seller may recover the
price houo-h the goods never arrive, or, without his fault are
injured on the way. 2 The good moremT r, having become the
proper y of the buyer are ubj ct to he same ri()'ht and liabilitie a hi other goods an l are taxable or attachable, a well
a tran ferabl , a his own. The seller, further, thu p rforms
on hi part, and the or ler for the good i no longer open to
with Ira wal or revo ation b the purcha er. 3

tention, and a manufacturer in one

city receives through his agent re-
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siding in another an order for goods

from a customer there, and fills the

order by delivering the goods to a

common carrier at the place of man-

ufacture, consigned to such customer

at his place of residence, or to such

agent for him, the sale is complete

and the title passes at the place of

shipment, even though the customer

on receiving the goods at his place of

residence pays to such agent there

the purchase price. . . . The same

princi pie has frequently been applied

in the sale of liquors to a purchaser

residing in a place where all such

sales, or all such sales without license,

were prohibited. Garbracht v. Com.,

96- Pa. St. 449, 42 Am. R 550; Finch

v. Mansfield. 97 Mass. 89; Abberger

v. Marrin, 102 Mass. 70; Brockway v.

Maloney. 102 Mass. 308; Dolan v.

Oreen, 110 Mass. 322; Frank v. Hoey,

128 Mass. 263; Hill v. Spear, 50 N. H.

253, 9 Am. R 205; Tegler v. Shipman,

33 Iowa, 194, 11 Am. R 118; Boothby

v. Piaisted, 51 N. H. 436, 12 Am. R.

140; Shuenfeldt v. Junkermann, 20

Fed. R. 357." See also State v. Wing-

field (1893), 115 Mo. 428, 22 S. W. R

363, 37 Am. St, R 406; Com. v. Flem-

ing (1889), 130 Pa. St. 138, 18 Atl. R.

622, 17 Am. St, R. 763; State v. O'Neil,

58 Vt. 140, 56 Am. R 557; State v.

Carl, 43 Ark. 353, 51 Am. R 565; State

v. Peters, 91 Me. 31, 39 Atl. R 342.

See also further in chapter on Illegal

Sales, post, §§1125 et seq.

2 If goods are properly delivered to

the carrier, the risk of loss, injury

or depreciation falls from that time

upon the purchaser. Diversy v. Kel-

logg (1867), 44 111. 114, 92 Am. Dec.

154; Whiting v. Farrand (1814), 1

Conn. 60; Ranney v. Higby (1855), 4

Wis. 154, 5 Wis. 62; Janney v. Sleeper

(1883), 30 Minn. 473; Magruder v. Gage

(1870), 33 Md. 344, 3 Am. R 177; Bur-

ton v. Baird (1884), 44 Ark. 556; Mo-

bile Fruit Co. v. McGuire (1900), —

Minn. — , 83 N. W. R 833; Lord v.

Edwards, 148 Mass. 476, 20 N. E. R.

1 Thu
in arbecker v. tate (1 6), field (1 93), 115 fo. 49 , 22 S. W. R.
65 Wi. 171, 56 Am. R. 62-:1-, it i aid: 368 37 w. t. R. 406; Com. v. Flem" V. e are con train d to ~10lcl that ing (1 9), 130 Pa. t. 13 , 1
ti. R.
where the contract i ilent on the 699, 17 m. t. R. 763; tate v. 0'.1. eil,
. ubject and there i no hin cr in the 5, Vt. 140, 56 Am. R. 557; tate v.
tran a tion indicatincr a different in'arl. 43 Ark. 353 51 Am. R. 56-· tate
tention and a manufacturer in one v. Peter 91 ~Ie. 31, 39 Atl. R. 342.
city receive throu h bis agent re- ... ee al o further in chapter on Illegal
siding in another an order for good
ale . po ·t,
1125 et eq.
from a u tomer here, and fill the
2 If good are properly delivered to
order by deliverin the good to a the carrier the ri k of lo , injury
common carrier at the place of man- or depreciation falls from that time
ufacture, con igned to uch cu tom r upon the purcha er. Diver y v. Kelat his place of re idence, or to uch logg (1 67), 44 Ill. 114, 92 m. Dec.
agent for him, the sale i complete 154; \ hiting v. Farrand (1 14), 1
and the title pa es at the place of
onn. 60; Ranney v. Higby (1 55), 4
·hipment, even though the cu tomer Wi ·. 154 5 ·wi . 62; Janney v. Sleeper
on recei '-ing the good at hi~ place of (1 3), 30 ~lin n. 4 3; Magruder v. Gage
re idence pays to uch agent there (1 70), 33 Icl. 344, 3 m. R. 177 · Burt he purcha e price. . . . The ame ton v. Baird (1 4), 44 Ark. 556; ::\Ioprinciple ha frequently been appli d bile Fruit Co. v. McGuire (1900), in the ale of liquor to a purcha er 1\linn. - , 3 N. vV. R. 33; Lord v.
re iding in a place where all uch Edwards, 14 l\Ia s. 4 6, 20 . E. R.
sale or all ucb ales without licen e, 16, 9 L. R. A. 519; lee v. Ic ider. 109
were prohibited. Garbrach t v. om., N. Y. 500 17 N. E. R. 424. The fact
96' Pa. t. 449, 42 Am. R. 550; Finch that the eller ha a lien upon them
v. l\fan field. 97 Ia . . 9; .A bberger for the price ( ee post, the eller's
v. 1arrin, 102 l\la . 70; Brockway v. Lien), or has re erved the jus dispoMaloney. 102 Ma . 30 · Dolan v. nendi ( ee post, ch. VI), will not necGreen, 110 1\Ia 399· Frank v. Hoe , e arily operate to prevent the ri k
12 l\Ia . 263; Hill v. pear, 50 . H. from pa ing to the buyer upon the
253, 9 m. R. 905· Te ler '· hipman,
hipment. Hob:utv. Littlefield (1 1),
33 Iowa, 19-±, 11 Arn. R. 11 ; Bo thby 13 R. I. 341. and other ca es rnferred
v. Pla.i ted, 51 N. H. 436 12 Am. R. to in the note to the following ec1-:1:0; huenfeldt v. Junkermann, 20 tion.
Fed. R. 357. ' ee al o tate v. vVing3 Leggett & Meyer Tobacco Co. v.
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§ 740. Intention governs. — The delivery to the carrier

to pass the title must be unconditional and made with the in-

tention that the title shall pass thereby. 1 Of this intention,

where the facts are in dispute, the jury is to judge. Consign-

ing the goods without restriction to the purchaser, or assigning

and transmitting to him the bill of lading, are strong evidences

of an intention to pass the title, and cannot be controlled by

secret determinations to the contrary. 2 And so though the

Collier (1893), 89 Iowa, 144, 56 N. W.

R. 417.

i Godts v. Rose (1855), 17 Cora. B.

§ 740. - - Intention governs.-The delivery to the carrier
to pass the title must be unconditional and made with the intention that the title shall pass thereby. 1 Of this intentjon,
where the facts are in dispute, the jury js to jmlge. Consigning the goods without restriction to the purchaser, or assigning
and transmitting to him the bill of lading, are strong evidences
of an intention to pass the title, and cannot be controlled by
secret determinations to the contrary. 2 And so though the

229.

2 In Wigton v. Bowley (1881), 130

Mass. 252, it is said: "In the sale of

specific chattels an unconditional

delivery to the buyer or his agent,
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or to a common carrier consigned to

him, whether a bill of lading is taken

or not, is sufficient to pass the title,

if there is nothing to conti'ol the

effect of it. If the bill of lading or

written evidence of the delivery to a

carrier be taken in the name of the

consignee, or be transferred to him

by indorsement, the strongest proof

is afforded of the intention to trans-

fer the property to the vendee. Mer-

chants' National Bank v. Bangs, 102

Mass. 291. If the vendor intends to

retain the right to dispose of the

goods while they are in course of

transportation, he must manifest that

intention at the time of their deliv-

ery to the carrier. It is not the secret

purpose, but the intention as dis-

closed by the vendor's acts and dec-

ollations at the time, which governs.

Foster v. Ropes, 111 Mass. 10; Upton

v. Sturbridge Mills, 111 Mass. 446.

Where there is conflicting evidence

as to intention the question is for

the jury. It cannot be disposed of

as matter of law unless the evidence

will justify a finding but one way.

National Bank of Cairo v. Crocker,

111 Mass. 163; National Bank of Chi-

cago v. Bailey, 115 Mass. 228; Alder-

man v. Eastern Railroad Co., 115 Mass.

233." In Merchants' National Bank

v. Bangs (1869), 102 Mass. 291 (supra),

it is said : " In all completed contracts

of sale property in the goods sold

passes to the buyer, although they

may not have come to his actual

possession. An unconditional sale of

specific chattels passes the title at

once, and the buyer takes the risk

of loss and has the right to immedi-

ate possession. When anything re-

mains to be done in the way of

specifically appropriating the goods

sold to the contract, the agreement

is executory and the property does

not pass. When, from the nature

of the agreement, the vendor is to

make the appropriation, then, as soon

as any act is done by him identify-

National Bank of Cairo v. Crocker,
111Mass.163; National Bank of Chicago v. 13ai ley, 115 Ma. . 22 ; Alder229.
man v.Ea. t ern Railroad Co.,115 M:ns3.
2 In Wigton v. Bowley (18 1), 130 203." In Merchants' National Bank
l\Ia s. 252, it is ·said: "In the sale of v. Bangs (1 69), 102 Ma s. 291 (supra),
specific chattels an unconditional it is said: " In all completed contracts
delivery to the buyer or his agent, of sale property in the goous sold
or to a common carrier consigned to passes to the buyer, although they
him, whether a bill of lading is t.aken may not have come to his actual
or not, is sufficient to pass the title, possession. An unconditional sale of
if there is nothing to control the specific chattels passes the title at
effect of it. If the bill of lading or once, and the buyer takes the risk
written evidence of the deli very to a of loss and has the right to immedicarrier be taken in the name of the ate pos ession. When anything reconsignee, or be transferred to him mains to be done in the way of
by inclorsement, the strongest proof specifically appropriating the goods
is affor led of the intention to tram;- sold to the contract, the agreement
fer the property to the vendee. Mer- is executory and the property does
chants' National Bank v. Bangs, 102 not pass. When, from the nature
Mas . 291. If the vendor intends to of the agreement, the vendor is to
retain the right to dispose of the make the appropriation, then, as soon
goods while they are in course of as any act i done by him identifytran portation,he mu tmanife t that ing the property and it is set apart
intention at the time of their deliv- with the intention unconditionally
ery to the carrier. It is not the secret to apply it in fulfillment of the conpurpo e, but the intention as dis- tract, the title vests and the sale is
closed by the vendor's acts and dee- complete. Thus the delivery to tlle
larations at the time, vvhich governs. buyer or his agent, or to a common
Foster v. Ropes, 1111\Iass. 10; Upton carrier consigned to him, whether a
v. 'turbri lge I ills, 111 Mass. 446. bill of lading is taken or not, if there
Wher there i confli ting eddence i nothing in the circumstances to
a to intention th que tion i for control the effect of the transaction,
the jury. It cannot be Ji po d of will be ufficient. If the bill of Jada matt r of law unle the eviJence ing or other writt n evidence of the
will ju tify a finding but one way. ]elivery to the carrier be taken in
614
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goods are, by the terms of the contract, to be paid for by note

the name of the consignee, or be

goods are, by the terms of the contract, to be paid for by note

transferred to him by indorsement,

the strongest proof is afforded of the

intention to transfer an absolute

title to the vendee. But the vendor

may retain his hold upon the goods

to secure payment of the price, al-

though he puts them in course of

transportation to the place of desti-

nation by delivery to a carrier. The

appropriation which he then makes

is said to be provisional or condi-

tional. He may take the bill of lad-

ing or carrier "s receipt in his own or

some agent's name, to be transferred

on payment of the price by his own
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or his agent's indorsement to the

purchaser, and in all cases when he

manifests an intention to retain this

jus disponendi the property will not

pass to the vendee. Practically the

difficulty is to ascertain, when the

evidence is meagre or equivocal, what

the real intention of the parties was

at the time. It is properly a ques-

tion of fact for the jury, under proper

instructions, and must be submitted

to them unless it is plain as matter

of law that the evidence will justify

a finding but one way. Allen v.

Williams, 12 Pick. (Mass.) 297; Stan-

ton v. Eager, 16 id. 467; Stevens v.

Boston & Wor. R. Co., 8 Gray (Mass.),

262; Coggill v. Hartford & N. H. R.

Co., 8 id. 545; Moakes v. Nicolson, 19

C. B. (N. S. ) 290; Godts v. Rose, 17 C. B.

229; Tregelles v. Sewell, 7 H. & N.

574"

In Wigton v. Bowley, supra, A

ordered a car-load of flour of B, at an

agreed price f. o. b., and authorized

him to draw for the price at ten

days' sight. B delivered the flour to

a carrier, taking a receipt in which

A was named as consignee, and sent

it, attached to a draft, to a bank, with

directions to deliver the receipt on

acceptance of the draft. The draft

was not accepted, and it and the re-

ceipt were returned to B. A sold the

flour to C, who bought in good faith

and obtained possession of it from

the carrier. Held, That these facts

justified a finding that the title to

the flour passed to A upon delivery

to the carrier and that B could not

recover it from C.

In Browne v. Hare (1858), 3 H. & N.

484, 4 H. & N. 822, defendant ordered

of plaintiffs, through their broker, a

quantity of oil, to be shipped f. o. b.

Plaintiffs shipped the oil, and wrote

their broker to so advise defendant,

which he did. The bdl of lading was

taken to plaintiffs' order or assigns.

They indorsed the bill of lading to

defendant and sent it with invoice

the name of the consignee, or be it, attached to a draft to a bank, with
tran ferred to him by indor ement, directions to deliver the receipt on
the strongest proof is afforded of the acceptance of the draft. The draft
intention to tran fer an ab olute wa not accepted, and it and the retitle to the vendee. But the vendor ceipt were returned to B. A old the
may retain his hold upon the goods flour to C, who bought in gooJ faith
to secure payment of the price, al- and obtained po es ion of it from
though he puts them in course of the carrier. Held, that these fact
tran portation to the place of desti- ju tified a finding that the title to
nation by delivery to a carrier. The the flour pa sed to A upon delivery
appropriation which he then makes to the carrier and that B could not
is said to be provisional or condi- recover it from C.
tiona1. He rnay take the bill of ladIn Browne v. Hare (1 5 ), 3 H. & N.
ing or carrier's receipt jn his own or 4 4, 4 H. & N. '>2, defendant ordered
some agent' name, to be transferred of plaintiffs, through their broker, a
on payment of the price by hi' own quantity of oil, to be hipped f. o. b.
or hi agents indor ement to the Plaintiffs shipped the oil, and wrote
purcba er, and in all ca e when he their broker to so advise defendant,
manife ts an intention to retain this which he did. The bill of lading was
fus disponendi the property will not taken to plaintiffs' order or a igns.
pa to the vendee. Practically the They indorsed the bill of lading to
difficulty is to ascertain, when the defendant and sent it with im·oice
evidence is meagre or equivocal, what tot.he broker. He ent these papers
the real intention of the parties was to defendant. Tl.le ship was actually
at the time. It is properly a que - lo t before the papers were received
tion of fact for the jury, under proper by the broker, but defendant did not
in tructions, and mu t be submitted learn of it until two hours after he
to them unless it is plain as matter had received the bill of lading from
of law that the evidence will ju tify the broker, when he at once returned
a finding but one way.
lien v. it. Held, that the title bad pa ·ed.
William , 12 Pick. (Mass.) 207; Stan- Said Erle, J.: "The contract was for
ton v. Eager, 16 id. 467; Stevens v. the purcba. e of una certained goods,
Boston & Wor. R. Co., 8 Gray (Ma s.), and the question bas been, when the
262; Coggill v. Hartford & N. H. R. property pa sed. For the answer tbe
Co. 8 id. 545; 1foakes v. Ticol on, 19 contract must be re orted to, and
C. B. (.1.. • S. ) 290; God ts v. Rose, 17 C. B. under that we think the property
229; Tregelles v. Sewell, 7 H. & N. passed when the goods were placed
574. ''
free on board in performance of the
In ·w igton v. Bowley, SUP'ra, A contract. In this cla of contracts
ordered a car-load of flour of B, at an the property may depend, according
agreed price f. o. b., and authorized to the contract, either on mutual
him to draw for the price at ten consent of both partie , or on the
day ' sight. B delivered the flour to act of the vendor communicated to
a carrier, taking a receipt in which the purchaser, or on the act of the
A. was named as consignee, and sent vendor alone. If the bill of lading
615
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or in cash on arrival, 1 or though the seller takes a bill of lading

or in cash on arrival,1 or though the seller takes a bill of lading
in his own name and retains it, the title may till pass upon the

in his own name and retains it, the title may still pass upon the

had made the goods to be delivered

' to the order of the consignee,' the

passing of the property would be

clear. The bill of lading made them

•to be delivered to the order of the

consignor,' and he indorsed it to the

order of the consignee, and sent it to

his agent for the consignee. Thus,

the real question has been on the in-

tention with which the bill of lading

was taken in this form, whether the

consignor shipped the goods in per-

formance of his contract to place

them free on board, or for the pur-
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pose of retaining control over them

and continuing owner contrary to

the contract. The question was one

of fact, and must be taken to have

been disposed of at the trial; the

only question before the court below

or before us being whether the mode

of taking the bill of lading neces-

sarily prevented the property from

passing. In our opinion it did not,

under the circumstances."

1 Thus, in Farmers' Phosphate Co.

v. Gill (1888), 69 Md. 537, 16 Atl. R.

214, 1 L. R. A. 767, 9 Am. St. R. 443,

it is said: '• We think the law is well

settled that where a buyer purchases

or orders a specific quantity of goods

to be shipped to him from a distant

place, and the seller segregates and

appropriates to the contract the

specified quantity by delivering them

to a vessel designated by the buyer,

or, in the absence of such designation,

to a common carrier, the mere fact

that the contract contains a stipula-

tion that they are to be paid for by

note or in cash on arrival does not

prevent the title from passing or

make either payment or arrival a

condition precedent thereto. In

such case the goods become the

property of the vendee, and are at

his risk from the time they are put

on board the vessel," citing Magruder

v. Gage, 33 Md. 344, 3 Am. R. 177

Appleman v. Michael, 43 Md. 2G9

Dutton v. Solomonson, 3 Bos. & Pul

582; Fragano v. Long, 4 B. & C. 219

Alexander v. Gardner, 1 Bing. N. G

671.

See also Sarbecker v. State (1886),

65 Wis. 171, 56 Am. R. 624, where it

is said that the title will pass on de-

livery to the carrier, even though the

purchaser on receiving the goods at

his place of residence pays the pur-

chase price there to the seller's agent.

To like effect: State v. Wingfield

(1893), 115 Mo. 428, 22 S. W. R. 363,

37 Am. St. R. 406, citing State v.

Hughes, 22 W. Va. 743.

had made the goods to be delivered such ca~e the goods become the
'to the order of the con ignee,' the property of the vendee, and are at
pa sing of the property would be his risk from the time they are put
clear. The bill of lading made them on board the ve el," citing l\lagruder
'to be deliYered to the order of the v. Gage, 33 Md. 344, 3 Am. R. 177;
consignor,' and he indor edit to the Appleman v. Iichael, 43 Md. 269;
order of the con igoee, and sent it to Dutton v. olomon on, 3 Bo . & Pu!.
his agent for the con ignee. Thu , 5 2; Fragano v. Long, 4 B. & C. 219;
the real 'que tion ha been on the in- Alexauder v. Gardner, 1 Bing. N. C.
tention with which the bill of ladin g 67"1.
was taken in this form. whether the
ee also Sarbecker v. tate (1 6),
consignor shipped the goods in per- 65 \' is. 171, 56 Am. R. 624-, where it
formance of his contract to vlace i said that the title will pas on dethem free on board, or for the pur- livery to the carrier, even though the
pose of retaining control over them purchaser on receiving the goons at
and continuing owner contrary to his place of residence pay the purthe contract. The que~ ti on was one cha e price there to the seller' agent.
of fact, and mu t be taken to ha'e To like effect: tate v. ' ' ingfield ·
been dispo ed of at the trial; the (1 93), 115 l\Io. 42 , 22 S. W. R. 363,
only que tion before the court below 37 Am. St. R. 406, citing State v.
or before u. being whether the mode Hughes, 22 W. Va. 743.
of taking the bill of lading necesC. O. D.-As to the effect where
sarily prevented the property from goods are sent C. 0. D., the authoripassing. In our opinion it did not, ties are in conflict.
under the circumstances.. ,
In State v. Intoxicating Liquors
1 Thus. in Farmers' Phosphate Co. (1882), 73 Me. 27 , where liquor had
v. Gill (1 8), 69 Md. 537, 16 Atl. R. been ordered in Maine from a firm in
214, 1 L. R. A. 767, 9 Am. St. R. 443, Bo. ton to be sent by express C. 0. D.,
it is said: "We think the law is well and they were so ent, the court held
settled that where a buyer purchases that the title passed on the delivery
or orders a specific quantity of goods to the carrier in Boston. The same
to be shipped to him from a distant rule was adhered to in a ca e of the
place, and the seller segregates and sale of "bu tterine." State v. Peters
appropriate to the contract the (1 97), 91 l\Ie. 31, 39 Atl. R. 342.
specified quantity by deli vering them
In Com. v. Fleming (1889), l vO Pa.
to a vessel designated by the buyer, St. 13 , 18 Atl. R. 622, 17 Am. St. R.
or, in the ab ence of such designation, 763, 5 L. R. A. 470, where the q ue tion
to a common carrier, the mere fact was as to the place of sale of intbat the contract contains a stipula· toxicating liquors shipped C. 0. D.
tion that they are to be paid for by on order from one county to another,
note 0r in cash on arrival does not it was held that the title pas ed upon
prevent the title from pa iug or delivery to the carrier, and that the
make either payment or arrirnl a only effect of the terms C. 0. D. was
condition precedent ther to. In to make the carrier the agent of the
616
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delivery to the carrier if such were the intention. 1 Notice of

the shipment is not necessary unless stipulated for. 2

seller to collect the price. Three

judges dissented. State v. Carl (1884),

delivery to the carrier if such were the intention. 1 Notice of
the hipment is not necessary unless stipulated for. 2

43 Ark. 353, 51 Am. R. 565; Pilgreen

v. State (1882), 71 Ala. 368; Brech-

wald v. People (1886), 21 111. App. 213,

are similar. Norfolk Southern R. Co.

v. Barnes (1889), 104 N. C. 25, and

Crook v. Cowan (1870), 64 N. C. 743,

are to same effect.

On the other hand, in State v.

O'Neil (1885), 58 Vt, 140, 56 Am. R.

557 (see also O'Neil v. Vermont, 144

U. S. 323, where the question is dis-

cussed, but writ of error dismissed

for want of jurisdiction); United
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States v. Shriver (1885). 23 Fed. R. 134

(S. C siib nom. People v. Shriver, 31

Alb. L. Jour. 163): State v. Wingfield

(1893), 115 Mo. 428, 22 S. W. R. 363,

37 Am. St. R. 406, where intoxicating

liquors were sent C. O. D., it was held

that the title did not pass until pay-

ment and delivery. So also United

States v. Cline (1885), 26 Fed. R. 515.

See also Wagner v. Hallack (1877), 3

Colo. 176.

A consignee to whom goods are

shipped C. O. D. has neither title nor

right of possession which will sus-

tain replevin for the goods against

the carrier, before payment and de-

livery. Lane v. Chadwick (1888), 146

Mass. 68, 15 N. E. R. 121.

1 The intention governs, and title

may pass even though consignor takes

the bill of lading in his own name

and does not send it to vendee. Straus

v. Wessel (1876), 30 Ohio St. 211 ; Joyce

v. Swann (1864), 17 C. B. (N. S.) 84. To

like effect : Hobartv. Littlefield (1881),

13 R. I. 341.

In Joyce v. Swann, siqyra, the court

said: "It is true that the bill of lad-

ing was taken in the names of the

sellers, and at the time the insurance

was declared was unindorsed. That

was a circumstance which was well

worthy the attention of the jury and

eller to collect the price. Three
judge di ented. tate v. Carl (1 4),
43 rk. 353, 51 Am. R. 565; Pilgreen
v. tate (1 l 9), 71 Ala. 36 ; Brechwald v. People (1 6), 91 Ill. App. 213,
are similar. Norfolk outhern R. Co,
v. Barne (1 9), 104: N. C. 25, and
Crook v. Cowan (l 70), 64 N. C. 43,
are to ame effect.
On the other hand, in tate v.
O'Neil (1 .-), 5 Vt. 140, 56 Am. R.
557 ( · e also 0' eil v. V rmont, 144:
U. S. 3<)3, where the que tion i discu ·ed, but writ of rror di mi ed
for want of juri diction);
nited
tate v. hrfrer (1 - ): 23 FeL1. R. 134
( . c. sub nom. Pe ple v. hriver. 31
Alb. L. Jour. 163): tate v. "\ ingfielcl
(1 93), 115 Io. 42 , C)•) • ·w. R. 363,
37 Am. t. R. 406, where intoxicating
liquor were entC. 0. D., itwa held
that the title did not pa until payment and delivery. So al o United
tates v. Cline (1 5), 26 Fed. R. 51q.
See al o Wagner v. Hallack (1 77), 3
•
Colo. 176.
A con ignee to whom good are
hipped C. 0. D. ha neither title nor
right of po ession which will su tain replevin for the goods again t
the carrier, before payment and de), 146
livery. Lane v. Chadwick (1

and doe not send it to vendee. Straus
v. Wes el (1 76), 30 Ohio t. 011; Joyce
v. Swann (1 64:), 17 C. B. (:N'. '.) 4. To
like effect: Hobartv. Littlefield (1 1),
13 R. I. 341.
InJoycev. Swann, supra. the court
said: "It is true that the bill of lading was taken in the name of the
seller , and at the time the in, urance
wa declared wa unindor ed. That
was a circum tance which was well
worthy the attention of the jury and
might have induced them to come to
a contrary con lu ion. But if they
thought that, notwith tarn.ling thi ,
there were other circum tan e , ufficien tly cogent to induce them to
ome to the conclu. ion that the property wa int nded to pas, I am of
opinion that the mere circum tance
of the form of the bill of lading and
of the invoice being tran mitted to
[an agent] in tead of to [the buyer]
direct wa not ufficien t to annihilate
the other evidence in the cau e,
though it might induce the jury to
pau e. The ca e of Wait v. B:tker,
2 Ex. 1, and Browne v. H a re, 3 H. & N.
4 4, 4 id. 2'>, appear to me clearly to
e tablish the di tinction that if, from.
all the fact , it may fairly be inferred
that the bill of lading was taken in
1\la . 6 , 15 N. E. R. 121.
the name of the eller in order to re1 The intention govern , and title tain dominion over the good. , that
maypa even thoughconsignortakes - hows that there was no intention to
the bill of lading in his own name pa s the property; but if the whole

might have induced them to come to

a contrary conclusion. But if they

thought that, notwithstanding this,

there were other circumstances suffi-

ciently cogent to induce them to

come to the conclusion that the prop-

erty was intended to pass, I am of

opinion that the mere circumstance

of the form of the bill of lading and

of the invoice being transmitted to

[an agent] instead of to [the buyer]

direct was not sufficient to annihilate

the other evidence in the cause,

though it might induce the jury to

pause. The cases of Wait v. Baker,

2 Ex. 1, and Browne v. Hare, 3 H. & N.

484, 4 id. 822, appear to me clearly to

establish the distinction that if, from

2 "The general rule with re pect to buyer, a delivery to the carrier, etc.,
con ignments to third per on , so a i a delivery to the buyer. Da"-e v.
to place the property at the risk of Peck, T. R. 330; Cooke v. Lu<l.low,
the buyer, i that notice shall be 2 Bo . & P. (N. R.) 119." Bradford v.
given. Goom v. Jack on 5 E p. 110. Marbury (1847), 12 Ala. 520, 46 Am.
But where the carrier or warehouse- Dec. 26-±..
man is named or indicated by the
617
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§ 711. Payment of freight as evidence.— It has been

thought in a few cases 1 that the fact that the seller was to pay

the freight would operate to prevent the passing of title by-

delivery to the carrier; but it is clear that this is not conclusive

and that the title will pass if such appears to be the intention,

notwithstanding such an agreement. 2

of the circumstances lead to the con- v. Woodhall, 113 Mass. 391; Havens

elusion that that was not the object,

§ 7!1. - - Payment of freight as eviclence.- It has been
thought in a few cases 1 that the fact that the seller was to pay
the freiglJ t would operate to prevent the passing of title by
delivery to the carrier; but it js clear that this is not conclusive
and that the title will pass if such ap pears to be the intention,
notwith tanding such an agreement. 2

the form of the bill of lading has no

influence on the result."

In Hobart v. Littlefield, supra,

where the bill of lading had been

issued to the sellers and, having

been indorsed in blank, had been at-

tached to a draft on the buyer, the

court said: " In the present case the
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title might pass on the completion

of the bargain, and the selection and

appropriation of the cotton to that

purpose, in such a manner that the

goods would be at the buyer's risk

and yet the seller retain possession

of them by himself or by the master,

as his bailee and agent, until paid.

If the retention of the bill of lading

was merely to retain the possession

of the cotton for this purpose, then

the title and the risk belonged to the

defendants [the buyers]."

But, as will be seen in a following

chapter, the seller may adopt this as

a method of retaining security for

the price, and in such a case the title

will not pass until payment or tender

of the price. See chapter VI, follow-

ing.

1 See, per Holroyd, J., in Fragano

v. Long, 4 B. & C. 219. See also De-

vine v. Edwards, 101 111. 138.

- Though the fact that the seller

pays the freight is some evidence,

perhaps prima facie evidence, that

the title has not passed (Berger v.

State, 50 Ark. 20, 6 S. W. R. 15; Suit

v. Grand Island L. & F. Co., 41 Neb.

153, 59 N. W. R. 681; McLaughlin v.

Marston, 78 Wis. 670, 47 N. W. R.

1058), it is not conclusive, and the title

will nevertheless pass if such appears

to have been the intention. Neimeyer

Lumber Co. v. Burlington R. Co., 54

Neb. 321, 74 N. W. R. 670, 40 L. R. A.'

534; Wagner v. Breed, 29 Neb. 720; ,

Mee v. McNider (1888), 109 N. Y. 500,

17 N. E. R. 424; Hobart v. Littlefield,

13 R. I. 341; Tregelles v. Sewell, 7

Hurl. & Nor. 574; Dun lop v. Lam-

bert, 6 CI. & Fin. 600.

F. 0. B.— This agreement that the

seller shall pay the freight often

takes the form of an agreement to

deliver f. o. b. (free on board) at a

certain place. The initials f. o. b., it

is said, have a well-defined meaning

of which the courts takes judicial

cognizance; they are not ambiguous

and admit of no parol explanation;

of the circumstances lead to the con- v. \Voodhall, 113 Mass. 391; Havens
clusion that that was not the object, v. Grand Island L. & F. Co., 41 Neb.
the form of the bill of lading has no 153, 59 N. W. R. 681; McLaughlin v.
influence on the result."
Marston, 78 Wi . 670, 47 N. W. R.
In Hobart v. Littlefield, supm, 1058), it i not conclu ive,and the title
where the bill of lading had been will nevertheles pass if such appears
issued to the sellers and, having to have been the intention. Neimeyer
been indorsed in blank, had been at- Lumber Co. v. Burlington R. Co., 54
tached to a draft on the buyer, the Neb. 321, 74 N. W. R. 670, 40 L. R. A.'
court aid : "In the pre ent case the 534· Wagner v. Breed, 29 Neb. 720;
title might pass on the completion l\1ee v. McNiJ.er (1888), 109 N. Y. 500,
of t 11e bargain, and the selection and 17 N. E. R. 424; Hobart v. Littlefield,
appropriation of the cotton to that 13 R. I. 341; Tregelles v. Sewell, 7
purpose, in such a manner that the Hurl. & Nor. 574; Dunlop v. Lamgoods would be at the buyer's risk bert, 6 Cl. & Fin. 600.
and yet the seller retain possession
F. 0. B.-This agreement that the
of them by himself or by the master, seller shall pay the freight often
a his bailee and agent, until paid. takes the form of an agreement to
If the retention of the bill of lading deliver f. o. b. (free on board) at a
was merely to retain the possession certain place. The initials f. o. b., it
of the cotton for this purpose, then is said, have a well-defined meaning
the title and the risk belonged to the of which the courts takes judicial
defendants [the buyers]."
cognizance; they are not ambiguous
But, as will be seen in a following and admit of no parol explanation;
chapter. the seller may arlopt this as they mean that the seller is to de·
a method of retaining security for liver the goods at the point named
the price, and in such a case the title free of costs or charges of transportawill not pass until payment or tender tion. Sheffield Furnace Co. v. Hull
of the price. See chapter VI, follow- Coal & Coke Co. (1893), 101 Ala. 446,
ing.
14 S. R. 672; Capehart v. Furman
1 ee, per Holroyd. J., in Fragano Farm Improvement Co. (1 !)3), 103
v. Long, 4 B. & C. 219. See also De- Ala. 671, 16 S. R. 627.
vine v. Edward , 101 Ill. 138.
Where the point at which the goods
2 Though the fa t that the seller are to be delivered f. o. b. is the place
pay the freight is some evidence, of shipment, the letters mean that
perhap prima facie evidence, that the goods are there to be put on board
the title has not pas. d (Berger v. the vehicle for transportation free
State, 50 Ark. 20, 6 . W. R. 15; Suit from carti:tge or loading charge$.
618
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On the other hand, the fact that the purchaser is to pay the

freight is evidence that the carriage is at his risk; but this like-

wise is not conclusive, for the agreement of the parties may

be such that the seller retains the title for security or other-

wise, notwithstanding a delivery to the carrier for carriage at

the expense of the purchaser. 1

g 742. Agreement that goods shall not be paid for

unless they arrive. — So notwithstanding such a delivery to

the carrier as will pass the title to the property, it may be evi-

dent from the agreement of the parties that the goods were

On the other ban] the fact that the purchaser is to pay the
freight is evidence thn.t the carriage is at bis risk; but this likewise is not conclu ive, for the agreement of the partie may
be such that the sell r retain the title for ecurity or otherwi e notwitbstan lin 0 a delivery to the carrier for carriage at
th~ expen e of the purcha er. 1

not to be paid for unless they reached their destination, and if

such was the agreement it will be given effect. 2 In dealing

Ex parte Rosevear China Clay Co.

(1879), 11 Ch. Div. 560; Silberinan v.

Clark (1884), 96 N. Y. 522.

When the point named is the point

of destination, they mean that the
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seller is to pay the freight to that

point. Knapp Electrical Works v.

N. Y. Insulated Wire Co. (1895), 157

111. 456. 42 N. E. R. 147; Miller v. Sea-

§ 7!2. - - Agreement that good slrnJI not be paid for
unle they arrive.- So notwithstanding such a delivery to
the carrier as will pa s the title to the property, it ma be evident from the agreement of the parties that the good were
not to be paid for unless they reached their le tination an<l if
such was the agreement it will be given effect. 2 In dealing

man (1896), 176 Pa. St. 291, 35 Atl. R.

134.

Where the language is, "Prices

f. o. b." at a price named, it indicates

the cost of the goods to the buyer at v

that place. Neimeyer Lumber Co. v.

Burlington, etc. R. Co. (1898), 51 Neb.

321, 74 N. W. R. 670, 40 L. R. A. 534.

Under an agreement to deliver

f. o. b. at maker's shop, the goods are

delivered and title passes when goods

placed on the cars for shipment,

though the bill of lading may not

actually be issued and dated until a

few days later. Congdon v. Kendall

(1898), 53 Neb. 282, 73 N. W. R. 659.

1 See second chapter following.

2 This is clearly shown by the fa-

mous case of The Calcutta Co. v. De

Mattos (1863), 32 L. J. Q. B. 322, 33 id.

214. In that case A contracted to

supply to B one thousand tons of

coal, delivered at Rangoon alongside

craft, etc., as might be directed by

B: the price to be 45s. per ton deliv-

ered at Rangoon; payment, onedialf

of invoice value by bill at three

months on handing bills of lading

and policy of insurance to cover the

amount, or in cash at five per cent,

discount at A's option; and the bal-

ance in cash on right delivery at

Rangoon. A chartered a ship in pur-

suance of his contract and shipped

on board one thousand one hundred

and sixty-six tons of coal, and deliv-

ered to B the bill of lading and a pol-

icy covering half the invoice price,

and B paid the half invoice price.

On the voyage the ship became dis-

abled, and the master chartered an-

other vessel and transhipped eight

hundred and fifty tons of the coal at

45s. per ton freight to Rangoon. On

arrival at Rangoon the master of

this latter vessel offered the coal to

B's agent for B on payment of the

Ex parte Ro evear China Clay Co.
urply to B one thou and ton of
(1 19), 11 h. Div. 560; ilberman v. coal, delivered at Rangoon along ·ide
Clark (1 -!), 96 N. Y. -•N.
craft, etc., as might be directed by
When the point named i the point B: the price to be 45s. per ton delivof de tination, they mean that the ered at Rangoon; payment, one-h alf
seller i to pay the freight to that of invoice value by bill at three
point. Knapp Electrical ·work v. month on handing bill of lading
N. Y. In ulated \ ire Co. (1 95), 1;-7 anu policy of in. urance to cover the
Ill. 4-G, 42 . E. R. 1-!7; l\Iiller v. ea- amount, or in a hat frrn per cent.
man (1 96), 176 Pa. t. 291, 3- Atl. R. di count at A option; and the bal134.
ance in ca h n right delivery at
Where the languao-e i , "Prices Rangoon.
chartered a ship in purf. o. b. · at a price named, it indicate
uance of hi contract and shipped
the co. t of the good to the buyer at on boarcl one thou ancl one hundred
tha t place.
eimey r Lumber Co. v. and ixty- ix: ton of coal, and delivBurlin gton etc. R. Co. (1 9 ), 54: )fob. ered to B the bill of lading and a pol391, 74 N. W. R. 670, 40 L. R. A. 534. icy covering half the invoice price,
Under an ao-reement to deliver and B paid the half invoice price.
f. o. b. at maker' ho~). the goo are On the voyage th e ship became di delivered and title pa e when good abled and the ma ter chartered anplacecl on the cars for shipment, other ve el and transhippe<l eight
thou h the bill of lading may not hundred and fifty tons of the coal at
a ctually be i8 ueJ and dated until a 45s. per ton freight to Rangoon. On
few day later. Congdon v. Kendall arrival at Rangoon the ma. ter of
(1 9 ), 53 Neb. 2 2, 73 N. W. R. 659.
tbi latter ve el offereJ the coal to
1 See econd chapter following.
B' agent for B on payment of the
2 Thi i clearly
hown by the fa- 45s. freight· thi offer wa refn eel,
mou ca e of The Calcutta Co. v. De and the coals were afterward put up
Matto (1 63), 32 L. J. Q. B. 399, 33 id. for sale by auction by direction of
214. In that ca e A contraeted to the ma ter, and were purcha ·ed bona
G19
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with cases of this nature care must be taken to discriminate

between those like the ones now under consideration, which

involve the question merely of such designation and delivery

as will suffice to change an executory into an executed con-

tract, and those previously considered, which involve the ques-

fide by B's agent for B at 25s. per

with cases of this nature care must be taken to discriminate
between those like the ones now under consideration, which
involve the question merely of such designation and delivery
as will suffice to change an executory into an executed contract, and those preYiously considered, which involve the ques-

ton, that being the best price that

could be obtained for them there. A

brought an action against B to re-

cover for the other half of the in-

voice, or at least for the eight hun-

dred and fifty tons which B had

obtained as aforesaid; and B brought

an action against A to recover back

the amount of the half invoice paid

to him. The two cases were argued
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together. In the court of Queen's

Bench it was held by Cockburn, C. J.,

and Wightman, J., that by the con-

tract, though the property in t#ie coal

passed to B on the shipment and de-

livery of the shipping documents, A

was bound to deliver the coal at Ran-

goon, and not having delivered any

(as the purchase by B's agent was no

delivery under the contract) he was

liable to refund to B the half which

he had received of the purchase-

money and for damages for the non-

delivery. By Blackburn and Mellor,

JJ., it was held that the property in

the coal passed to B, the right of A

to the second half of the price being

contingent on the right delivery at

Rangoon ; and that, therefore, under

the circumstances that had occurred,

neither party had any right of action

against the other. On appeal to the

exchequer chamber it was held by

Erie, C. J., Willes, J., and Channell, B.,

that the property in the coal passed

to B on A's shipping it on board and

delivering to B the bills of lading

and policy of insurance; and that A

having done this was entitled to re-

tain the half of the invoice price that

had been paid to him; that A was

bound to have delivered to B at Ran-

goon so much of the coal as arrived

there; that the offer of the coal at

Rangoon on condition of paying the

freight of 45s. per ton was not a de-

livery in accordance with the con-

tract, and therefore that A was not

entitled to demand from B any part

of the residue of the invoice price;

and semble, by Willes, J., that B

might sue A for the non-delivery at

Rangoon, and recover as damages

the difference between the 25s. per

ton which B paid to get the coal and

the 22s. Qd. which B was to have paid

under the contract. By Martin and

Pigott, BB., held, that the property

in the coal did not pass to B, but that,

by the special terms as to payment,

A was entitled to keep the half price

fide by B's agent for B at 25s. per tain the half of the invoice price that
ton that being the best price that had been paid to him; that A was
could be obtained for them there. A bound to have delivered to Bat Ranbrought an action against B to re- goon so much of the coal as arrived
cover for the other half of the in· there; that the offer of the coal at
voice, or at lea t for the eight bun- Rangoon on condition of paying the
dred and fifty tons which B had freight of 45s. per ton was not a deobtained as afore aid; an cl B brought livery in accordance with the conan action against A to recover back tract, and therefore that A was not
the amount of the half invoice paid entitled to demand from B any part
to him. The two cases were argued of the residue of the invoice price;
together. In the court of Queen's and senible, by Willes, J., that B
Bench it was held by Cockburn, C. J., might sue A for the non-delivery at
and Wightman, J., that by the con- Rangoon, and recover as damages
tract, though the property in t<he coal the difference between the 25s. per
passed to B on the shipment and de- ton which B paid to get the coal and
livery of the shipping documents, A the 22s. 6d. ~vhich B was to have paid
was bound to deliver the coal at Ran- under the contract. By Martin and
goon, and not having delivered any Pigott, BB., helcl, that the property
(as the purchase by B's agent wa8 no in the coal did not pass to B, but that,
delivery under the contract) he was by the special terms as to payment,
liable to refund to B the half which A was entitled to keep the half price
he had received of the purchase- paid him, but that be conld not rernoney and for damages for the non- cover more, since he had not delivdeli very. By Blackburn and l\Iellor, ered the coal at Rangoon pur uant
JJ., it was held that the property in to his contract; by Williams, J., that
the coal passed to B, the right of A the property in the coal pa eel to B
to the second half of the price being on t.he shipment and delivery of the
conting nt on the ri ght delivery at shipping documents; but that A was
Rangoon; and that, therefore, under bound to deliver the coal at Rangoon,
the circumstances that had occurred, and that, as he had not done so, B
neither party had any right of action was entitled to recover hack the half
against the other. On appeal to the price paid, and also any damages susex hequer chamber it was held by tained by A's breach of contract in
Erl , . J., Willes, J., and Channell, B., not delivering the coal. Au extract
that the property in the coal pas ed from the opinion of Blackburn, J ..
to Bon A's s hipping it on board and which was approved by a majority
delivering to B the bills of lading of the judge , will be found in the
and policy of insurance; and that A text of the following section.
having done thi was entitled to re620
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tion whether a delivery to a carrier is a good acceptance and

receipt to satify the statute of frauds. 1 In several cases of the

first kind authorities upon the latter question have erroneously

been deemed controlling though the true question was clearly

different.

§743. Further of the intention. — Upon this ques-

tion of intention the language of Lord Blackburn in the lead-

ing case 2 cited in the note has been often quoted with approval:

" There is no rule of law to prevent the parties in cases like

the present from making whatever bargain they please. If

they use words in the contract showing that they intend that

the goods shall be shipped by the person who is to supply

them, on the terms that when shipped they shall be the con-

signee's property and at his risk, so that the vendor shall be

paid for them whether delivered at the port of destination or

not, this intention is effectual. Such is the common case where

goods are ordered to be sent by a carrier to a port of destina-

tion. The vendor's duty is in such cases at an end when he
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has delivered the goods to the carrier; and if the goods per-

ish in the carrier's hands, the vendor is discharged and the

purchaser is bound to pay him the price. 3

§ 744. . " If the parties intend that the vendor shall

not merely deliver the goods to the carrier, but also under-

x Thus it is said in Wait v. Baker payment or subsequently by part ac-

(1848), 2 Exch. 1: "It may be ad- ceptance, then there is no doubt that

mitted that if goods are ordered by the property passes by such delivery

a person, although they are to be se- to the carrier." See also Cross v.

lected by the vendor and to be deliv- O'Donnell (1871), 44 N. Y. 661, 4 Am.

ered to a common carrier to be sent R. 721. The distinction between ac-

to the person by whom they have ceptance and delivery to satisfy the

been ordered, the moment the goods, statute of frauds and delivery to pass

which have been selected in pursu- the title generally is commented

ance of the contract, are delivered to upon in Hobart v. Littlefield (1881),

the carrier, the carrier becomes the 13 R. L 341.

agent of the vendee, and such a de- ^Calcutta Co. v. De Mattos, 32 L.

livery amounts to a delivery to the J. Q. B. 322, 33 id. 214, in Ex. Ch.

vendee; and if there is a binding con- 3 Citing Dunlop v. Lambert, 6 CI.

tract between the vendor and vendee, & Fin. 600.

either by note in writing or by part

621

§§ 74:5, 746.] LAW OF sale. [book n.

§§ 7-±5, 7-±G.l

LAW OF SA.LE.

[BOOK IT.

take that they shall actually be delivered at their destination,

and express such intention, this also is effectual. In such a

case, if the goods perish in the hands of the carrier, the vendor

is not only not entitled to the price, but he is liable for whatever

damage may have been sustained by the purchaser in conse-

quence of the breach of the vendor's contract to deliver at the

place of destination. 1

§745. . "But the parties may intend an intermediate

state of things; they may intend that the vendor shall de-

liver the goods to the carrier; and that when he has done so

he shall have fulfilled his undertaking, so that he shall not be

liable in damages for a breach of contract if the goods do not

take that they shall actually be delivered at their destination,
and express such jnten tion, this also is effectual. In such a
case, if the gooc1s perish in the hands of the carrier, the vendor
is not only not entitled to the price, but be js liable for whatever
damage may have been sustained by tbe purchaser in consequence of the breach of the vendor's contract to deliver at the
place of destination. 1

reach their destination, and yet they may intend that the

whole or part of the price shall not be payable unless the goods

do arrive. They may bargain that the property shall vest in the

purchaser as owner as soon as the goods are* shipped, that then

they shall be both sold and delivered, and yet that the price (in

whole or in part) shall be payable only on the contingency of
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the goods arriving, just as they might, if they pleased, contract

that the price should not be payable unless a particular tree

fall, but without any contract on the vendor's part in the one

case to procure the goods to arrive, or in the other to cause

the tree to fall."

§ 746. Goods must be sent in conformity with order-

But in order that the delivery of the goods to the carrier shall

operate to pass the title to the consignee, it is essential that

the goods so delivered shall conform in quantity and quality

with the order given for them, and be sent at the time and in

the manner agreed upon. If, therefore, the vendor sends more

or less than the quantity ordered or of a different quality, 2 or

1 Citing Dunlop v. Lambert, supra, order and imposed no* obligation on

2 In Barton v. Kane (1863), 17 Wis. the defendant without showing an ac-

37, 84 Am. Dec. 728, an order for five ceptance in fact by him after the

thousand cigars was given. The cigars were received, the burden of

vendor sent five thousand six hun- which was upon the plaintiff. Tocon-

dred and twenty-five. Said the court : stitute a delivery to the carrier, a de-

" This was no compliance with the livery to the consignee, so as to pass

G22

§ 745. - - . "But the parties may intend an intermediate
state of things; they may intend that the vendor shall deliver the goods to the carrier; and that when he bas done so
he shall have fulfilled his undertaking, so that he shall not be
liable in damages for a breach of contract if the goods do not
reach their destination, and yet they may intend that the
whole or part of the price shall not b.. , payable un less the goods
do arrive. They may bargain that the property shall vest in the
purchaser as owner as soon as the goods are shipped, that then
they shall be both sold and delivered, and yet that the price (in
whole or in part) shall be payable only on the contingency of
the goods arriving, just as they might, if they pleased, contract
that the price should not be payable unless a particular tree
fall, but without any contract on the vendor's part in the one
case to procure the goods to arrive, or in the other to cause
the tree to fall."

§ 746. Goods must be sent in conform ity with order.But in order that the delivery of the goods to the carrier sha ll
operate to pass the title to the consignee, it is essential that
the goods so delivered shall conform in quantity and quality
with the order given for them, and be sent at the time and in
the manner agreed upon. If, therefor , the vendor sends more
or 1 ss than the quantity ordered or of a different qnality, 2 or
Citing Dunlop v. Lambert, supra. order and imposed no· obligation on
Barton v. Kane (1 63), 17 Wis. the defendant without showing an ac37, 84 Arn. Dec. 72 , an order for .five ceptance in fact by him after the
thou and cigars was giv n. The cigars were rnceive l, the burden of
vendor ent five thousand six hun- which was upon the plaintiff. To condred and twenty-five. aid the ourt: stitnte ad livery to the carrier, a de" Thi ' was no compliance with the livery to the consignee, so as to pas.·
622
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at a different time, or in a different manner, 1 or otherwise ma-

terially vary from the order, 2 the title will not pass unless the

the title and make the consignee lia-

ble for goods sold and delivered, the

goods must correspond in quantity as

•well as quality with those named in

the order. Bruce v. Pearson, 3 Johns.

(N. Y.) 534, and Downer v. Thomp-

son, 2 Hill (N. Y.), 137, are clear upon

this question, and though the latter

was reversed in the court of errors

(6 Hill, 208), the main point of re-

versal cannot arise here. There can

be no pretense that the six hundred

and twenty-five extra cigars were sent

out of an abundance of caution, and

to insure a scriptural compliance with

the order. They were sent to fill up
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the case and the defendant was

charged with their price. To entitle

himself to recover under these cir-

cumstances the plaintiff should have

shown that the defendant actually

received and accepted the cigars

sent, upon the terms indicated in

the plaintiff's letter notifying him

of the consignment." To the same

effect are Larkin v. Mitchell Lum-

ber Co. (1879), 42 Mich. 296, 3 N. W.

R. 904 (In this case plaintiff had sent

more shingles than defendant had

ordered; defendant "in good faith

and for plaintiff's benefit took them

in charge as goods consigned for sale

but not purchased, and advanced

the freight charges;" while so situ-

ated the shingles were destroyed by

accidental fire. Held, that the title

to the excess did not pass and the

consignee could recover from the

consignor the amount paid for

freight); Levy v. Green (1859), 1 E.

& E. 969, 102 Eng. Com. L. 968 (where

it was held that if the consignor sent

less than were ordered of a particu-

lar kind, and also other goods not

ordered, all in an indistinguishable

mass, the consignee might reject the

whole consignment); Cunliffe v. Har-

rison (1851), 6 Ex. 903 (to same effect):

Rommel v. Win gate (1869). 103 Mass.

327; Hart v. Mills (1846), 15 M. & W.

85; Dixon v. Fletcher (1837), 3 M. &

W. 145 (though if he holds them

without objecting within a reason-

able time, he waives the defect); Ellis

v. Roche (1874), 73 IU. 280.

The same rule applies where the

vendor sends less than was ordered,

though if the purchaser assents or

accepts the goods the variance may

be waived. Richardson v. Dunn(1841),

2 Q. B. 218, 42 Eng. Com. L. 645;

Downs v. Marsh (1860), 29 Conn. 409.

So if the goods sent are of a differ-

ent kind. Gardner v. Lane (1865), 9

Allen (Mass.), 492, 85 Am. Dec. 779;

Barton v. Kane (1863), 17 Wis. 38, 84

Am. Dec. 728. The burden is on the

§§ 747, 7·1:8.J
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purchaser accepts them. A fortiori if goods are sent without

being ordered no title passes unless they are accepted.

§ 747. Due care must be used in shipping. — And not only

must the goods conform in quantity and quality with the order

purchaser accepts them. A fortiori if goods are sent without
being ordered no title pa~ses unless they ~re accepted.

and be sent in the manner, if any, designated by the buyer,

but the seller must also, if he would pass the title and cast the

risk upon the buyer, take such precautions as to packing, di-

recting and shipping the goods as are reasonably necessary to

secure their safe arrival at their place of destination. If he

neglects to do this, and the goods are thereby lost, the buyer

will not be liable for the price. 1

§ 748. Remedy over against carrier must be pre-

served. — And so, " while it is the rule that the delivery of

goods bought, to a carrier to be conveyed to the vendee, is a

complete delivery to the latter, and vests the property in the

goods in him, yet the delivery to a carrier is incomplete to

charge the vendee for the price of the goods if lost, unless the

vendor, in so delivering them, exercises due care and diligence
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so as to provide the consignee with a remedy over against the

carrier." 2

§ 74-7. Due care must be nsed in shipping.- And not only
must the goods conform in quantity and quality with the order
and be sent in the manner, if any, designated by the buyer,
but the seller must also, if he would pass the title and cast the
risk upon the buyer, take such precautions as to packing, directing and shipping the goods as are reasonably necessary to
secure their safe arrival at their place of destination. If he
neglects to clo this, and the goods are thereby lost, the buyer
will not be liable for the price. 1

But where goods are ordered to be shipped, and no other in-

structions are given, the seller has implied power to avail him-

Conn. 335, the goods were ordered iff could not recover for the goods,

shipped " to the care of F. W. Bush- but the supreme court reversed this,

nell," but they were not so shipped, holding that there was a sale and

Held, that the purchaser was not constructive delivery, and that

bound to accept them. plaintiff could recover unless it were

In Garretson v. Selby (1873), 37 shown that this transposition of the

Iowa, 529, 18 Am. R. 14, it appeared initials caused the loss,

that H. W. Selby had ordered goods 1 Finn v. Clark (1865), 10 Allen

of plaintiff. Selby was a member of (Mass.), 479, 12 Allen. 522. Goods

the firm of H. W. Selby & Co., but must be properly packed and pro-

plaintiff did not know of the exist- tected. Wilson v. Fruit Co., 11 Ind.

ence of the firm. The goods were App. 89, 38 N. E. R. 827.

shipped directed (by mistake) to 2 Clarke v. Hutchins, 14 East, 475;

W. H. Selby, but never came to the Buckman v. Levi, 3 Campb. 414;

possession of H. W. Selby or his firm. Ward v. Taylor, 56 111. 494.

The court below held that the plaint-

624

§ 74-8. - - Remedy over against carr ier must be pr eserved.-And so, "while it is tpe rule that the delivery of
goods bought, to a carrier to be conveyeJ to the vendee, is a
complete delivery to the latter, and vests the property in the
goods in him, yet the delivery to a carrier is incomplete to
charge the vendee for the price of the goods if lost, unless the
vendor, in so delivering them, exercises due care and diligence
so as to provide the consignee with a remedy over against the
ca.rrier." 2
But where goods are ordered to be shipped, and no other instructions are given, the seller has implied power to avail himConn. 335, the goods were ordered iff could not recover for the goods,
shipped "to the care of F. W. Bush- but the supreme court reversed this,
nell," but they were not so shipped. holding that there was a sale and
Held, that the purchaser was not constructive delivery, and that
bound to accept them.
plaintiff could recover unless it were
In Garretson v. Selby (1873), 37 shown that this transposition of the
Iowa, 529, 18 Am. R. 14, it appeared initials caused the loss.
1 Finn v. Clark (1865), 10 Allen
thitt H. W. Selby had ordered goods
of plaintiff. Selby was a member of (Mass.), 479, 12 Allen. 522. Goods
the firm of H. W. Selby & Co., but must be properly packed and proplaintiff dicl not know of the exist. tected. Wilson v. Fruit Co., 11 InJ.
enc of the firm. The goods were App. 89, 38 N. E. R. 827.
shipped directed (by mistake) to
2 Clarke v. Hutchins, 14 East, 475;
W. H. Selby, but never came to the Buckman v. Levi, 3 Campb. 414;
po
ion of H. W. Selby or hi firm. Ward v. Taylor, 56 Ill. 494.
The court b low hehl that the plaint624
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self of the usual and appropriate means to accomplish that re-

sult. If, therefore, for example, the carrier will not accept

goods of a certain kind for transportation without a stipulation

limiting his liability, the seller having general instructions to

ship by such a carrier has been held to have implied power to

stipulate for such a release. 1

§ 749. Duty to insure. — "In the absence of a special

contract," it is said, 2 "the seller of goods is not bound to in-

sure, nor to impart any information upon the subject of insur-

ance." But such an obligation may undoubtedly be imposed

by agreement, or instructions, or even by a course of dealing

to that effect. 3

§ 750. What constitutes delivery to the carrier. — The

question, what constitutes such a delivery to the carrier in these

cases as will amount to an appropriation of the goods to the

contract, has occasioned some difficulty. No inflexible rule

can be laid down, but, in general, it must be such an act as un-

conditionally and unreservedly places the goods in the posses-
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sion and under the control of the carrier. 4 " What amounts to

a delivery to carriers," it was said in one case, 5 " may some-

times be a question of fact for a jury; ordinarily, delivery at

their wharf, freight house or warehouse, and bringing it to the

notice of the servants of the carriers, would be so considered.

A delivery at a wharf ma}' be of itself an incomplete act, to be

explained by what has preceded it or by what takes place sub-

sequently. 6 No one would contend that if the [goods] had

i Stafford v. Walter. 67 111. 83. Co. 'v. Nettleship, L. R. 3 C. P. 499,

2 Bartlett v. Jewett, 98 lnd. 206. 502; Packard v. Getman, 6 Cow. (N.

See also Elmore v. Kearney, 23 La. Y.) 757, 16 Am. Dec. 475; Railroad

Ann. 479. Co. v. Barrett, 36 Ohio St. 448. See

3 See New York Tartar Co. v. also Schmidt v. Nunan, 63 Cal. 371.

French, 154 Pa. St. 273, 26 Atl. R. 425. Where the contract is for the sale

4 See Mechem's Hutchinson on Car- of a car-load or a boat-load, etc., the

riers, § 94 et seq. title does not pass until the car, boat,

s Hobart v. Littlefield (1881), 13 R. I. etc., is full. Rochester, etc. Oil Co.

341. v. Hughey, 56 Pa. St. 322; Hays v.

e Citing The M. K. Rawley, 2 Low. Pittsburgh Packet Co., 33 Fed. R.

Dec. 447; British Columbia Sawmill 552.
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been merely delivered on the wharf, and no information given

to the master or his servants of the purpose for which it was

delivered, he could be considered as having received it, either

so as to bind his owners or as agent of the buyer."

5. Of Appropriation where Goods Consigned on Account of

Previous Advances.

% 751. How when goods consigned on account of previous

been merely delivered on the wharf, and no information given
to the master or his servants of the purpose for which it was
delivered, he could be considered as having received it, either
so as to bind his owners or as agent of the buyer."

advances. — Analogous to the question of the last sections is

that which arises when advances have been made by one per-

son to another upon the strength of consignments thereafter

to be made. The question here is what appropriation is suffi-

5. Of Appropricttfon 'Where Goods Consigned on Account of

Previous Aclvcwces.

cient to fix the goods with a lien or charge for the advance-

ments. It most frequently arises where the advances have

§ 751. How when goods consigned on account of previous

been made by a factor, and this aspect of the question has been

considered in another work; 1 but some general statement of

the rules seems desirable here.

g 752. . Upon this question the authorities are in con-

flict, one line of cases holding that no lien or charge will attach
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until the goods are actually in the possession of the consignee, 2

while another line maintains that where advances have pre-

viously been made in reliance upon a promise to subsequently

consign goods, a delivery to a common carrier consigned to

the creditor is sufficient. 3 The true rule seems to be that laid

* Mechem on Agency, § 1033. to pay the advance or pay any in-

2 Saunders v. Bartlett. 12 Heisk. debtedness, he may or may not com-

(Tenn.) 316; Oliver v. Moore, id. 482; ply with his contract. He may ship

Woodruff v. Nashville, etc. R. Co., 2 it to C, or he may ship it to B upon

Head (Tenn.), 87. conditions. As owner he can dis-

3 Elliott v. Cox, 48 Ga. 39; Harde- pose of it as he pleases. But if he

advances.- Analogous to the question of the last sections is
that which arises when advances have been made by one person to another upon the streng th of consignm n"ts thereafter
to be made. The <)Uestion here is what appropriation is sufficient to fix the goods with a lien or charge for the advancements. It most frequently arises where the advances have
been made by a factor, and this aspect of the question has been
considered in another work; 1 but some gen eral statement of
the rules seems desirable here.

man v. De Vaughn, 49 Ga. 596 ; Wade actually ships it to B in pursuance of

v. Hamilton, 30 Ga. 450; Nelsou v. his contract, the title vests in B upon

§ 752. - - . Upon this question the authorities are in con-

Railroad Co., 2 111. App. 180. the shipment. The highest evidence

In Bailey v. Hudson R. R. Co. that he has done so is the consign-

(1872), 49 N. Y. 70, it is said: "If A ment and unconditional delivery to

has property upon which he has re- B of the bill of lading."

ceived an advance from B upon an In. Desha v. Pope (1844), 6 Ala. 690,

agreement that he will ship it to B 41 Am. Dec. 76, it is said: " The mere
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flict, one line of cases holding that no lien or charge will attach
-until the goods are actually in the possession of the consignee, 2
while another line maintains that where advances have previously been made in reliance upon a promise to subsequently
consign goods, a delivery to a common carrier consigned to
the creditor is sufficient. 3 The true rule seems to be that laid
Mechem on Agency. § 1035.
to pay the advance or pay any inv. Bartlett. 12 R ei k. debtedness, he may or may not com(Tenn.) 316; Oliver v. Moore, id. 482; ply with his contract. He may ship
Woodruff v. Nashville, etc. R. Co., 2 it to C, or he may ship it to B upon
HeaJ (Tenn.), 87.
conditions. As own~r he can dis3 Elliott v. Cox, 48 Ga. 39; Harde- pose of it as he plea es. But if he
man v. De Vaughn, 49 Ga. 596; Wade actually ships it to Bin pursuance of
v. Hamilton, 30 Ga. 4 O; Nel ou v. bis contract, the title vests in B upon
Railroad o., 2 Ill. App. 1 O.
the shipment. The highest evidence
In
ail y v. Hud n R. R. Co. that he has done so is the consign(1 72), 49 N. Y. 70, it i sai i: " If A m ent and unconditional delivery to
has prop rty upon which he ha re- B of the bill of lading."
ceiv d an advance from B uron an
In.Desha v. Pope (1844), 6 Ala. 690,
agreement that he will hip it to B 41 Am. Dec. 76, it is said: "The mere
626 .
I

2 Saunders

C.H. IV.] EXISTING CHATTELS NOT YET IDENTIFIED. [§ 752.

clown by Chief Justice Redfield in Vermont, that in order to

give to the party making the advances a charge upon the goods

consigned, but not actually received, two things must concur:

1. The consignment must be in terms to the creditor; and

agreement to ship goods in satisfac-

tion of antecedent advances will not,

in general, give the factor or con-

signee a lien upon them for his gen-

eral balance, until they come to his

actual possession; but if there is a

specific pledge or appropriation of

certain ascertained goods, accompa-

nied with the intention that they

shall be a security, or the proceeds as

a payment, and they are deposited

with a bailee, then the property is

changed, and vests in the individual

to whom they are to be delivered by
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the depositary."

In Valle v. Cerre (1865), 36 Mo. 575,

88 Am. Dec. 161, it is said: "Where

acceptances have actually been given

upon the faitli of a consignment by

bill of lading, there can be no doubt

that the consignee acquires such a

lien or property in the goods as no

subsequent act of conveyance can

divest; such an acceptance is held

to be an advance upon the particu-

lar shipment. Where there has been

no advance or acceptance expressly

made upon the particular consign-

ment, and the question is only of a

general balance of account for pre-

vious advances, the case differs not

so much in principle as in the evi-

dence required to establish the lien.

It matters not whether the lien for

a balance of account arises by oper-

ation of law from the usage of trade,

or from the positive and special

agreement and understanding of the

parties; and it may extend to all

sums for which a factor has become

liable as surety or otherwise for his

principal, whenever the suretyship

has resulted from the nature of the

agency, or the express arrangement

of the parties, or it has been under-

taken upon the footing of such a

lien. Whether or not the given con-

signment is to be considered as made

to cover a general balance of ac-

count will depend upon the special

arrangements, agi'eement and un-

derstanding of the parties: but where

such an arrangement exists, and the

consignment is made in pursuance

of it, and there is nothing else in the

case which is inconsistent with the

hypothesis, the case would be gov-

erned by the same principle, and a

delivery to the carrier will be con-

sidered as a constructive delivery to

the consignee. In such case the

shipment and delivery of the goods

to the carrier, under the bill of lad-

ing, amounts to a specific appropria-

tion of the property with an inten-

§ 752.]
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2, the advances must have been made upon the faith of this

particular consignment. 1 These cases are of course distinct from

those in which advances have been made in reliance upon a

particular shipment of which constructive delivery has been

made by the transfer of the bill of lading or other like docu-

ment. 2

lena, etc. R. Co., 40 111. 281. Same

point: Strahorn v. Union Stock

2, the advances must have been made upon the faith of this
particular consignment. 1 These cases are of course distinct from
those in which advances have been made in reliance upon a
particular shipment of which constructive delivery has been
made by the transfer of the bill of lading or other like document.2

Yard Co., 43 111. 424, 92 Am. Dec. 142.

• i In Davis v. Bradley (1855), 28 Vt.

118, 65 Am. Dec. 226, approving Hol-

brook v. Wight (1840), 24 Wend.

(N. Y) 169, 35 Am. Dec. 607. To

the same effect: Hodges v. Kimball

(1878), 49 Iowa, 577, 31 Am. R. 158;

First Nat. Bank v. McAndrews (1885),
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5 Mont. 325, 51 Am. R. 51. See also

Grosvenor v. Phillips (1841), 2 Hill

(N. Y), 147; Bonner v. Marsh (1848),

10 Sm. & M. (Miss.) 376, 48 Am. Dec.

754.

2 As in First Nat. Bank v. Dear-

born (1874), 115 Mass. 219, 15 Am. R.

92; De Wolf v. Gardner (1853), 12

Cush. (Mass.) 19, 59 Am. Dec. 165.

628

lena, etc. R. Co., 40 Ill. 281. Same 5 Mont. 325, 51 Am. R. 51. See also
point: Strahorn v. Union Stock Grosvenor v. Phillips (1841), 2 Hill
Yard Co., 43 Ill. 424, 92 Am. Dec. 142. (N. Y.), 147; Bonner v. Marsh (1848),
· l In Davis v. Bradley (1855), 28 Vt.
10 Sm. & M. (Miss.) 376, 48 Am. Dec.
118, 65 Am. Dec. 226, approving Hol- 754.
brook v. Wight (1840), 24 Wend.
2 As in First Nat. Bank v. Dear(N. Y.) 169, 35 Am. Dec. 607. To born (1874), 115 Mass. 219, 15 Am. R.
the same effect: Hoclges v. Kimball 92; De Wolf v. Gardner (1853), 12
(1878), 49 Iowa, 577, 31 Am. R. 158; Cush. (Mass.) 19, 59 Am. Dec. 165.
First Nat. Bank v. McAndrews (1885),
628

CHAPTER V.

OF CONTRACTS RESPECTING GOODS TO BE MANUFACTURED OR

GROWN.

§ 753. Purpose of this chapter.

I. Where Goods are to be Manu-

factured.

754. Title ordinarily does not pass

until goods are completed

and tendered.

755. Title does not pass dur-

ing progress of work.

756. Especially if yet to be

separated from larger mass.

757. Same rule where goods to be

manufactured and shipped.

758. Goods must correspond

with order.

§ 759. Title may pass sooner if such

appears to have been inten-
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tion.

760. Even without actual de-

livery.

761. When title passes to article

designed for, but not an-

nexed to, another.

762. Articles to be supplied

as repairs or alteration of

chattel.

II. Where Goods are to be Grown.

763-765. Title passes when chattel

grown and appropriated.

§ 753. Purpose of this chapter. — In the preceding chapter

attention has been given to the effect of contracts for the sale

of chattels then in existence, but not yet designated, set apart

or appropriated to the contract. There yet remains to be con-

sidered that class of contracts which relate to the sale of goods

not then in existence, but which are to be manufactured, grown

or otherwise produced in pursuance of the contract and which

are to be supplied in performance of it. 1 This question will Le

dealt with in the present chapter, and it will be treated under

the two heads of contracts for the manufacture of goods to be

supplied, and of contracts to grow and supply goods.

1 The question presupposes an order

for goods to be manufactured. Where

an order is given to an agent of a

manufacturing company for the pur-

chase of goods described in its cata-

logue and supposed to be in stock,

without any knowledge that they

\vould have to be manufactured, and

the order is revoked before any no-

tice of its acceptance has been given,

and without knowledge that the com-

pany was manufacturing the goods,

no contract either of manufacture or

sale is entered into between the par-

ties. Harvey v. Duffey (1893), 99 CaL

401, 33 Pac. R. 897.
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In an earlier chapter the question whether these contracts

are contracts of sale within the provisions of the statute of

frauds has been considered; but the question now involved is

obviously a different one, namely, " When does the title pass ? "

I.

"Where Goods are to be Manufactured.

§ 754. Title ordinarily does not pass until goods are com-

In an earlier chapter the question whether these contracts
are contracts of sale within the provisions of the statute of
frauds has b een considered; but the question now involved is
obviously a different on_e, namely, "When does the title pass?"

pleted and delivery tendered. — The question of the time when

the title will pass to goods which have been ordered to be

I.

manufactured is involved in some little conflict of decision,

though the decided tendency of the authorities in the United

States is clear. Under a contract for the manufacture of an

WHERE

Goons

ARE To BE MANUFACTURED.

article, as for the building of a ship or the construction of any

other chattel, not existing in specie at the time of making the

contract, it is the general rule that no title vests in the pur-

chaser during the progress of the work, nor until the chattel is

finished and delivered, or, at least, is ready for delivery, and,

by tender or other equivalent act, is appropriated to the buyer. 1
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A few cases hold that the title will not pass until there has

been, on the part of the buyer, either an acceptance of the chat-

tel or some " acts or words respecting it from which an accept-

ance can be inferred." 2 But, by the weight of authority,

acceptance by the buyer is not indispensable; if the chattel is

produced at the time, and of the kind and quality specified, and

in all other respects in compliance with the order, so that the

1 Under a contract for the sale of act on the part of the seller identify-

two hundred tons of No. 1 pig iron, ing "any particular piles as belong-

to be thereafter delivered by a man- ing to the buyer, or of any inspection

ufacturer who is engaged in the or acceptance on the part of the

manufacture of various grades and buyer." First National Bank v. Crow-

producing large quantities daily, and ley (1872), 24 Mich. 492. See also

all the iron so manufactured is piled. Tufts v. Lawrence (1890), 77 Tex. 526.

as fast as made, upon the dock in 2 Moody v. Brown (1832), 34 Me. 107,

separate piles, according as the man- 56 Am. Dec. 640; Rider v. Kelley

ufacturer sees fit to grade it, the title (1859), 32 Vt. 268, 76 Am. Dec. 176:

to any specific portion will not pass Gammage v. Alexander (1855), 14

to the buyer in the absence of any Tex. 414.
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§ 754. Title ordinarily does not pass until goods are com·
pleted and delivery tendered.- The question of the time when
the title will pass to goods which have been ordered to be
manufactured is involved in some little conflict of decision,
though the decided tendency of the authorities in the United
States is clear. Under a contract for tbe rnanufacture of an
article, as for the building of a ship or the construction of any
other chattel, not existing in specie at the time of making the
contract, it is the general rule that no title vests in the purchaser during the progress of the work, nor until the chattel is
finished and delivered, or, at least, is ready for delivery, and,
by tender or other equivalent act, is appropriated to the bnyer. 1
A few cases hold that the title will not pass until there has
been, on the part of the buyer, either an acceptance of the chattel or some "acts or words respecting it from which an acceptance can be inferred." 2 But, by the weight ~f authority,
acceptance by the buyer is not indispensable; if the chattel is
produced at the time, and of the kind and quality specified, and
in all other respects in compliance with the order, so that the
I Un ler a contract for the sale of act on the part of the seller identifytwo hundred tons of No. 1 pig iron, ing "any particular piles as belongto be thereafter clel i vered by a man- i ng to the buyer, or of any inspection
ufacturer who is engaged in the or acceptance on the part of the
manufa ture of various grad s and buyer." First National Bank v. Crowprodu ing large quantiti s daily, and ley (1 72), 24 Mich. 492.
ee also
all the iron o man ufa tured is piled, Tuft - v. La wren e (1890), 77 Tex. 526.
as fast as made, up n the dock iu
2 Moody v.
rown (1 -2), 34 Me. 107,
- parate pile , acconling as the nmn- 56 m. De·. 640; Rider v. Kelley
ufactur r
fitt grad it, th title (1 59 ), 32 Vt. 26, 76 Am. Dec.176:
to any specific portion will not pa s Gammage v. Alexander (1855), 14
to the buyer in the absence of any T x. 414.
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buyer ought to accept it, the title will pass upon a tender or

offer of delivery even though the buyer refuses to accept it. 1

§ 755. Not during progress of work. — That no title

passes, ordinarily, during the progress of the work is now clear.

This rule prevails in this country, contrary to the later but in

1 In Shawhan v. Van Nest (1874), 25 and have recovered from the defend-

Ohio St. 490, 18 Am. R. 313, Shawhan

had ordered of Van Nest, who was a

carriage maker, a two-seated wagon

to be built by Van Nest from his own

materials, in accordance with Shaw-

han's directions, for a certain price.

Van Nest in all respects complied

with his contract and tendered the

wagon at his shop to Shawhan, and

requested him to accept and pay for

it, but Shawhan refused to do so.

The action was for the price, and
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Van Nest was held to be entitled to

recover. Said the court: "When the

plaintiff below had completed and

tendered the carriage in strict per-

formance of the contract on his part,

if the defendant below had accepted

it, as he agreed to do, there is no

question but that he would have

been liable to pay the full contract

price for it, and he cannot be per-

mitted to place the plaintiff in a

worse condition by breaking than by

performing the contract according

to its terms on his part. When plaint-

iff had completed and tendered the

carriage in full performance of the

contract on his part, and the defend-

ant refused to accept it, he had the

right to keep it at the defendant's

risk, using reasonable diligence to

preserve it, and recover the contract

price, with interest, as damages for

the breach of the contract by the de-

fendant. Or, at his election, he could

have sold tbo carriage for what it

would have brought* at a fair sale,

ant the difference between the con-

tract price and what it sold for."

Bement v. Smith, 15 Wend. (N. Y.)

493, is to same effect; and so are-

Gordon v. Norris, 49 N. H. 376; Mo-

In tyre v. Kline, 30 Miss. 361, 64 Am.

Dec. 163 (in this last case it is said

that acceptance by the buyer may

be implied from the fact that notice

of the completion of the work was

given to him and that he made no

objection to it); Ballentine v. Robin-

son, 46 Pa. St. 177. See also Central

Lith. & Eng. Co. v. Moore (1889), 75

Wis. 170, 43 N. W. R. 1124, 6 L. R. A.

788, 17 Am. St. R. 186.

In Goddard v. Binney (1874), 115

Mass. 450, 15 Am. R. 112. defendant

ordered a buggy to be built for him

by the plaintiff according to certain

directions, and to be marked with

his monogram. Before the buggy

was entirely completed, defendant

called on plaintiff and asked when it

would be done. Plaintiff inquired

§ 755.J
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conformity with the early English rule, 1 notwithstanding that,

by the terms of the contract, the purchaser was to pay and has

paid a portion of the price in instalments as the work pro-

conformity with the early English rule,1 notwithstanding that,
by the terms of the contract, the purchaser was to pay and has
paid a portion of the price in instalments as the work pro-

tliat he would come and see him

right away. Soon afterwards the

buggy was burned without plaintiff's

fault. Held, that the general owner-

ship had vested in defendant, who

must bear £he loss. Followed in

Moore v. Perrott (1891), 2 Wash. 1, 25

Pac R. 906.

In Whitcomb v. Whitney (1872), 24

Mich. 486, there was a contract in

March for the sale of all the lumber

of certain grades which Whitcomb

should make during that season,
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"lumber to be delivered on rail of

vessel when lumber is ready to ship

or when vessel is ready to send for it. ; '

Whitney advanced money on the

contract at various times and re-

ceived one cargo of lumber. In Sep-

tember Whitcomb wrote to Whitney

that the lumber was all cut, ready

to ship, and the sooner a vessel was

sent the better he would like it. On

receipt of this letter Whitney sent

an inspector who inspected and ap-

proved about sixty-four thousand

feet, acting for both parties in so

doing. As fast as it was inspected

the lumber was hauled to the dock

ready for the vessel when it should

arrive. The inspection was com-

pleted on October 6th, and Wlritney

was notified of that fact on October

1 1th. On October 9th, however, the

lumber was destroyed by accidental

fire. In an action for the price it

was held that title passed when the

lumber was inspected and put on

the dock ready for delivery, and that

Whitney was liable for the price.

In Fordice v. Gibson, 129 lnd. 7, 28

N. E. R. 303, the court states the rule

to be that "ordinarily no title passes

until the thing is completely done

and notice given to the vendee, or

some act done by the vendor desig-

nating it as the article sold, either

by setting it apart, marking it, or

some other similar act," citing First

Nat. Bank v. Crowley, 24 Mich. 492;

Ballentine v. Robinson. 46 Pa. St. 177;

Moline Scale Co. v. Beed, 52 Iovwa,

307.

Where the goods were to be man-

ufactured and delivered upon the

dock in New York as the buyer

should call for them, and he refused

to take certain goods so manufact-

ured, the price may be recovered

without proof of delivery or tender.

Atkinson v. Truesdell (1891), 127 N. Y.

230, 27 N. E. R. 844.

i In Woods v. Russell (1822), 5 B. &

Aid. (Eng.) 942, a ship-builder had

that he would come and see him until the thing is completely done
right away. Soon afterwards the and notice g iven to the ven lee, or
buggy wa burned without plaintiff's some act done by the vendor desigfau lt. Held, that the general owner- nating it as the article sold, either
ship had vested in defendant, who by setting it apart, marking it, or
must bear the loss. Followed in some other similar act," citing First
Moore v. Perrott (1891), 2 Wash. 1, 25 Nat. Bank v. Crowley, 24 Mich. 492;
Ballentine v. Robinson. 46 Pa. St. 177;
Pac. R. 906.
In Whitcomb v. Whitney (1872), 2-± Moline Scale Co. v. Beed, 52 Io..,wt,
Mich. 486, there was a contract in 307.
March for the sale of all the lumber
Where the goods were to be manof certain grades which Whitcomb ufactured and delivered upon the
should mal::e during that sea -on, dock in New York as the buyer
"lumber to be delivered on rail of should call for them, and he refused
vessel when lumber is ready to ship to take certain goods so manufactor when ve sel is r eady to send for it." ured, the price may be recovered
Whitney advanced money on the without proof of delivery or tender.
contract at various times and re- Atkinson v. Truesdell (1891), 127 N. Y.
ceived one cargo of lumber. In Sep- 230, 27 N. E. R. 844.
tember Whitcomb wrote to Whitney
1 In Woods v. Russell (1822), 5 B. &
that the lumber was a ll c ut, ready Ald. (Eng.) 942, a ship-builder had
to ship, and the sooner a vessel was contracted to build a ship for the
sent the better he would like it. On defenJ.ant to be completed by a given
receipt of this letter Whitney sent date, and the defendant was to pay
an inspector who inspected and ap- for her in four instalments, two durproved about sixty-four thousand ing construction and two when the
feet, acting for both parties in so ship was launched. Before the hip
doing. As fast as it was inspected was finished, the defendant, with
the lumber was hauled to the dock the builder's privity, bad had the
ready for the vessel when it shou ld ship measured that he might get her
arrive. The inspection was com- r egi. ter d in his own name, the hippleted on October Gth, and Wlritney builder signing the nece sary certifiwas notified of that fact on October cate, and had appointed a mn ter
11th. On October 9th, however, the who s uperintended the construction.
lumber wa de troyed by accidental had adverti ed her for a charter and
fire. In an action for the price it had chartered her for a voyage. The
was held that title pas ed when the defendant had also paid the third
lurnb r wa in I e ted and put on instalment, but before completion
the dock ready for deliv ry, and that the ship-builder went into bankWhitney wa liable for the price.
ruptcy and the defendant thereupon
In Fordice v. ib on, 1.,,,9 ln<l 7, 2 took po e ion of the ship in her unN. E. R. 303, the cow·t t<Lte the rule finished condition. The as ignees of
to be that "ordinarily no title pa e the bankrupt sued in trover, but it
632

CH. V.] CONTRACTS — GOODS TO BE MANUFACTURED, ETC. [§ 755.

gressed. It also prevails notwithstanding the fact that the

purchaser has furnished a part of the materials, and, by the

weight of authority, it prevails though the purchaser not only

was held that the title had passed,

the court holding that the act of the

builder in signing the certificate to

enable defendant to register the

ship in his ow.i name was equivalent

to a consent that the property should

be in defendant from that time.

In Clarke v. Spence (1836), 4 Ad. &

El. (Eng.) 448, under a substantially

similar contract, the plaintiff had

contracted for a vessel to be paid

for in instalments and to be con-

structed under the supervision of

his agent. When the ship was par-

tially completed and after several
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instalments had been paid, the

builder became bankrupt, and the

defendants were his assignees. The

court held that the title had passed

upon the ground that the provision

for payment in instalments was

equivalent to a declaration of an in-

tention that, upon payment of the

first instalment, the title should

pass to the purchaser.

In Anglo-Egyptian Nav. Co. v.

Rennie, L. R. 10 C. P. 271, it is said:

" The case of Laidler v. Burlinson, 2

M. & W. 602, shows how strictly

confined to that simple state of

things the doctrine of Clarke v.

Spence is held to be."

In Wood v. Bell (1856), 5 El. & Bl.

(Eng.) 772; s. c, 6 id. 355, under a

like contract, the plaintiff had paid

several instalments; had had the

work superintended by his own

agent; had had his name punched

on a plate riveted to the keel of the

ship, and, in discussions concerning

the execution of an assignment of

the ship to the plaintiff, the builder

had admitted that the ship was the

property of the plaintiff, though he

objected to the execution of the as-

signment. After this, and before

the completion of the ship, the

builder became bankrupt. Held,

that the title had passed.

In the United States, Woods v.

Russell and Clarke v. Spence have not

been generally approved.

In Andrews v. Durant (1854), 11

N. Y. 35, 62 Am. Dec. 55, a contract

had been made for the building of a

ship, under the inspection of the pur-

chasers' superintendent, to be paid

for in instalments. After three in-

stalments had been paid, but before

the ship was completed, the build-

ers became insolvent and the ship

was seized on execution for theif

debts. The purchasers replevied her,

completed her and treated her as

their own. In the meantime the

builders made a general assignment

§ ·755.J
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paid the price in instalments as the work progressed, but also,

in person or by his agent, superintended the work of construc-

tion.

paid the price in instalm ents as the work progressed; but also,
in person or by his agent, superintended the work of construction.

Valiente, 43 Barb. 131; In re Non-

Magnetic Watch Co., 89 Hun, 196.

The ruling in Andrews v. Durant

was approved and followed under

substantially similar circumstances

in Hall v. Green (1858), 1 Houst. (Del.)

546, 71 Am. Dec. 96; Elliott v. Ed-

wards (1871), 35 N. J. L. 265; West

Jersey R. Co. v. Trenton Car Works

(1866), 32 N. J. L. 517; Shaw v. Smith

(1880), 48 Conn. 306, 40 Am. R. 170;

Clarkson v. Stevens (1882), 106 U. S.

505; The Poconoket, 67 Fed. R. 262.
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See also Crosby v. Delaware & Hud.

Can. Co. (1890), 119 N. Y. 334, 23 N.

E. R. 736.

In Merritt v. Johnson (1811), 7

Johns. (N. Y.) 473, 5 Am. Dec. 289, it

appeared that A contracted with B

to build a vessel for the latter, the

former to furnish the timber requi-

site to complete the frame, and the

latter to advance the money and fur-

nish materials for the joiners' work,

and the vessel while standing on

land hired by A, and in an unfin-

ished condition, was seized on an

execution against A and sold to C,

who completed the vessel and sold

her to D. In an action of trover by

B's assignee against D, it was held

that the property was in D, and that

B had no title until completion and

delivery.

In McConihe v. Railroad Co. (1859),

20 N. Y. 495, 75 Am. Dec. 420, it ap-

peared that plaintiff's assignor had

made a contract with the defendant

to build cars for it, the defendant to

furnish the iron boxes needed for

the construction. The defendant,

though frequently requested, did not

supply the boxes within the time

agreed, and the builder did all he

could without them, but before com-

pletion and delivery the cars were

burned without his fault. Held, on

the strength of Andrews v. Durant.

supra, that the title had not passed

to the defendant.

In Shaw v. Smith (1880), 48 Conn.

306, 40 Am. R. 170, the contract was

for the manufacture of certain tools

for plaintiffs for a price to be paid in

instalments. Before completion, but

Valiente, 43 Barb. 131; In re NonMagnetic Watch Co., 9 Hun, 196.
The ruling in Andrews v. Durant
was approved and followed under
substantially similar circumstances
in Hall v. Green (1858), 1 Roust. (Del.)
5-±6, 71 Am. Dec. 96; Elliott v. Edwar<'ls (1871), 35 N. J. L. 265; We t
Jersey R. Co. v. Trenton Car Works
(1866), 32 N. J. L. 517; Shaw v. Smith
(18 0), 48 Conn. 306, 40 Am. R. 170;
Clarkson v. Stevens (1 3), 106 U. S.
505; The Poconoket, 67 Fed. R. 262.
See also Crosby v. Delaware & Hud.
Can. Co. (1 90). 119 N. Y. 834, 23 N.
E. R. 736.
In Merritt v. Johnson (1811), 7
Johns. (N. Y.) 473, 5 Am. Dec. 289, it
appeared that A contracted with B
to build a vessel for the latter, the
former to furnish the timber requisite to complete the ~rame, and the
latter to ad-vance the money and furnish materials for the joi"ners' work,
and the vessel while standing on
land hired by A, and in an unfini hed condition, was seized on an
execution against A and sold to C,
who completed the vessel a nd sold
her to D. In an action of trover by
B"s assignee against D, it was held
that the property was in D, and that
B had no title until completion and
delivery.
In l\IcConihe v. Railroad Co. (1859),
20 N. Y. 495, 75 Am. Dec. 420, it appeared that plaintiff's a ignor had
made a contract with the defendant
to build car for it. the d fendant to
furni h the iron b xes needed for
the con truction. The defendant
though fr uen tly r q u ted, did n t
supply the boxes within the tim

agreed, and the builder did a11 be
could without them, but before completion and delivery the cars were
burned without his fault. H eld, on
the strength of Andrews v. Durant.
supra, that the title bad not passed
to the defendant.
In Shaw v. Smith (1880). 48 Conn.
306, 40 Am. R. 170, the contract was
for the manufacture of certain tools
for plaintiffs for a price to be paid in
instalments. Before completion, but
upon a fraudulent r epresentation of
full com pletion, the builder secured
the last instalment without delivery
of any of them, and then made an
assignment for the benefit of creditors. H eld, that as against creditors
no title had passed, and the court also
said that no title had passed as between plaintiffs and the builder.
McConihe v. Railroad Co., and Andrews v. Durant, supra, were cited
with approval, as was also Williams
v. Jackman, 16 Gray (Mass.), 514,
where Bigelow, C. J., said: ''Under
a contract for supplying labor and
materials and making a chattel. no
p roperty passes to the vendee till the
c hattel is completed and delivered,
or r eady to be delivered. This is the
general rule of law. It must prernil
in a ll case , unless a contrary intent
is expressed or clearly implied from
the terms of the contract." To like
effect, \¥right v. Tetlow, 99 Mass.
397.

In Clark on v. Steven (1882), 106
U.S. 505, the court, through Mr. Justice Mat.thews, review the cases at
some length, and decline to follow
the Engli b rule, saying: " The courts
of this country have not adopted any

upon a fraudulent representation of

full completion, the builder secured

the last instalment without delivery

of any of them, and then made an

assignment for the benefit of credit-

ors. Held, that as against creditors

no title had passed, and the court also

said that no title had passed as be-

tween plaintiffs and the builder.
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| 756, , Especially if goods yet to be separated from

larger mass. — A fortiori, will not the title pass where, after

manufacture, the goods are yet to be separated and set off

from a larger mass. 1

§ 757. Same rule where goods to be manufactured and

shipped to buyer.—" In the case of goods to be manufactured," it

is said in a late case, 2 " the seller, as he has to tender them, gener-

arbitrary rule of construction as con-

trolling such agreements, but con-

sider the question of intent open in

every case to be determined upon

the terms of the contract and the

circumstances attending the trans-

action. 1 Parsons, Shipping and

Admiralty, 63. And such seems to

us to be the true principle. Accord-

ingly we are of opinion that the fact

that advances were made out of the
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purchase-money, according to the

contract, for the cost of the work as

it progressed, and that the govern-

ment was authorized to require the

presence of an agent to join in certi-

fying to the accounts, are not con-

clusive evidence of an intent that

the property in the ship should vest

in the United States prior to final

delivery." See also Scull v. Shake-

spear (1874), 75 Pa. St. 297; In re

Derbyshire's Estate, Lang's Appeal

(1876), 81 Pa. St. 18; Chambers v.

Board of Education (1875), 60 Mo.

370 (quoted from in note to the fol-

lowing section); Wollensak v. Briggs

(1887), 119 I1L 453, 10 N. E. R. 23.

But in Sandford v. Wiggins Ferry

Co. (1867), 27 Ind. 522, the court ap-

prove the English cases as constitut-

ing the common law, and hold that

the parties must be presumed to have

dealt with them in view; and Clif-

ford, J., in his dissenting opinion in

Calais Steamboat Co. v. Van Pelt

. (1862), 2 Black (U. S.), 380, approves

them. So also Butterworth v. Mc-

Kinly, 11 Humph. (Tenn.) 206; Moody

v. Brown, 34 Me. 107, 56 Am. Dec.

6-10.

iNew England Dressed Meat &

Wool Co. v. Worsted Co. (1896), 165

Mass. 328, 43 N. E. R. 112, 52 Am. St.

R. 516.

2 Smith v. Edwards (1892), 156 Mass.

221, 30 N.-E. R. 1017. Here shoe deal-

ers in Ohio ordered of the manu-

facturers in Massachusetts a quant it y

of calf and buff shoes according to a

sample. The shoes were manufact-

ured in accordance with the sample

and shipped to the buyers by railroad.

The buyers accepted the buff shoes

but rejected the calf shoes, and

shipped them back by the same car-

rier to the makers. The latter re-

fused to accept them, sued the buyers

for the price, and garnished the rail-

road company. Held, that the title to

the shoes had passed to the buyers. To

like effect: Kelsea v. Ramsey & Gore

§ 758.J .

LA. W OF SALE.

[BOOK IT.

§ 758.] LAW OF SALE. [BOOR II.

ally has the right to appropriate the goods to the contract so far

that, if he tenders goods conformable to it, the buyer's refusal

to accept them is a breach. The buyer cannot say that he would

have accepted some other goods had they been tendered. When

goods are to be manufactured and forwarded by a carrier to a

buyer at a distance, the seller's delivery of such goods to the

carrier as bailee for the purchaser passes the title. The seller

cannot forward them until they are specified. The delivery is

an overt dealing with the goods as those to which the contract

applies, and puts them into a position adverse to the seller.

Although not strictly a delivery, it is an act having the legal

effect of a true delivery, which in common legal language it is

said to be. 1 The act is required of the seller by the terms of

the contract, and thus is assented to in advance by the buyer,

on the condition that, as supposed, the goods answer the re-

quirements of the contract. Therefore it is a binding appropria-

tion of the goods to the contract and passes the title." 2

§ 758. But goods must correspond with the order.—
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But here, as in other cases of similar appropriation, the goods

must be of the kind and in the amount ordered ; for if the seller

sends more goods than were ordered or different goods than

those specified, the title will not pass by the shipment. 3

that a contract can be made in such I Citing Orcutt v. Nelson, 1 Gray,

a way as subsequently to pass the 536, 543; Merchant v. Chapman, 4

title, as between the parties, to goods Allen, 362, 364; Kline v. Baker, 99

unascertained at the time when the Mass. 253, 234; Hallgarten v. Oldham,

contract is made, without a subse- 135 Mass. 1, 9.

quent acceptance by the buyer, if the '-'Citing Putnam v. Tillotson. 13

ally has the right to appropriate the goods to the contract so far
that, if he tenders goods conformable to it, the buyer's refusal
to accept them is a breach. The buyer cannot say that be would
have accepted some other goods had they been tendered. When
goods are to be manufactllred and forwarded by a carrier to a
buyer at a distance, the seller's deli,Tery of such goods to the
carrier as bailee for the purchaser passes the title. The seller
cannot forward them until they are specified. The delivery is
an overt dealing with the goods as those to which the contract
applies, antl puts them into a position atl verse to the seller.
Although not strictly a delivery, it is an act having the legal
effect of a true delivery, which in common legal language it is
said to be. 1 The act is required of the seller by the terms of
the contract, and thus is assented to in advance by the buyer,
on the condition that, as supposed, the goods answer the requirements of the contract. Therefore it is a binding appropriation of the goods to the contract and passes the title." 2

contract commits the buyer in ad- Mete. 517, 520; Merchant v. Chap-

vance to the acceptance of goods de- man, snpra; Odell v. Boston & Maine

termined by other marks. Middlesex R. Co., 109 Mass. 50 ; Wigton v. Bowley,

Co. v. Osgood, 4 Gray, 447, 449; Nich- 130 Mass. 252, 254; Fragano v. Long,

ols v. Morse, 100 Mass. 523; Brewer 4 B. & C. 219; Wait v. Baker, 2 Exch.

v. Housatonic R. Co., 104 Mass. 593. 1, 7.

595; Rodman v. Guilford, 112 Mass. 3 New England Dressed M. & W.

405, 407; Goddard v. Binney, 115 Mass. Co. v. Standard Worsted Co. (1896),

450: Blanchard v. Cooke, 144 Mass. 165 Mass. 328, 43 N. E. R 112, 52 Am.

207, 227; Aldridge v. Johnson, 7 El. St. R 516.

§ 758. - - But goods must correspond with t110 order.But here, as in other cases of similar appropriation, the goods
must be of the kind and in the amount ordered; for if the seller
sends more goods than were ordered or different goods than
those specified, the title will not pass by the sbipment. 3

& Bl. 885, 899."

that a contract can be made in su ch
a way as subsequently to pass the
title, as between the p:-1.rties, t q goods
unascertained at the time when the
contract is maJe. without a sub. equentaccepta.nce by the buyer, if the
contract commits the buyer in advanee to the acceptance of goods determined by ot.her mark . Middle ex
Co. v. 0 good, 4 Gray, 447, 449; Nichols v. Ior e, 100 Ma .. 523; Brewer
v. Hou ·at nic R. Co., 104 Mass. 593.
59.:;; RoJman v. Guilford, 112 fa .
40.5, 407; oc.l lar l v. Binn y 115 Ma .
450: Ian hard v. ooke, 144 fa, .
207, 227; . Udridge v. John on, 7 El.
& Bl.
5, 99."
6'

~Citing

Orcutt v. Nelson, 1 Gray,
536, 543; Merchant v. Chapman, 4
Allen, 362, 364; Kline v. Bake1:, 99
Mass. 25~, 2.54; Hallgarten v. Ol cl ham,
135 Mass. 1, 9.
:.! Citing Putnam v. Tillotson. 13
Mete. 517, 520; Merchant v. Chapman, supTa; Odell v. Boston & Maine
R. Co., 109 Mas" 50; ·w igton v. Bowley,
130 Mas . 252, 254; Fragano v. Long,
4
& C. 219; Wait v. Baker, 2 E x h.

B:

1,

~·.

s New England Dre ed f. & W.
Co. v. Standard Wor ·ted Co. (1 96),
165 Ma s. 328, 43 N. E. R. ·112, 52 Am.
t. R. 516.

G

CH. V.] CONTRACTS — GOODS TO BE MANUFACTURED, ETC. [§ 759,

§ 759. But title may pass sooner if such appears to have

been intention. — The criterion here, however, as in other

cases, is the intention of the parties, and the general rule yields

to an intention, clearly apparent from a view of the whole con-

tract, that the title should pass at some earlier period. It is,

of course, clear, as is said by the court in a leading English

case, that a man may purchase a ship or other article as it is

in progress of construction, and the title will be held to have

then passed if that clearly appears to have been the intention

of the parties. 1 But such an intention is not decisively shown

by the mere fact of payment in instalments, or of superin-

1 The general rule and the excep-

tion to it are well stated by Daly, C. J.,

in Wright v. O'Brien, 5 Daly (N. Y.),

56. as follows: " Where a party orders

a thing to be made, such as a vessel

or any other article, it does not be-

come his property until it is deliv-
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ered into his possession, even though

he may have paid for it in advance

or furnished a large portion of the

materials of which it is constructed;

but during its production it is, and

after it is finished it continues to be,

up to its delivery, the properly of

the person who produced it, and may

be levied upon and sold under ex-

ecution against bim. Mucklow v.

Mangles, 1 Taunt. 318; Merritt v.

Johnson, 7 Johns. (N. Y.) 173; John-

son v. Hunt, 11 Wend. (N. Y.) 139;

Andrews v. Durant, 11 N. Y. 35. But,

whilst this is the rule, it is equally

well settled that it is competent for

the parties to agree that the thing to

be produced from the beginning, or

at any stage of its production, is to

be the property of the person who

ordered it, and that where a mutual

assent to that effect is shown by un-

equivocal acts or declarations, the

title passes before delivery. Woods

v. Russell, 5 B. & Aid. 942; Rohde v.

Thwaites, B. & C. 388; Atkinson v.

Bell. 8 id. 277; Jackson v. Anderson,

4 Wend. (N. Y.) 474; Whitehouse

v. Frost, 12 East, 614; Kiniberly v.

Patchin, 19 N. Y. 333; Olyphant v.

Baker, 5 Denio (N. Y.), 383; Andrews

v. Durant, 11 N. Y. 35."

In the case quoted from (Wright

v. O'Brien, 5 Daly, 54), it appeared

that plaintiff had employed A, an

artist, to make a portrait from a

photograph of a deceased child,

and on making the contract had

made him a payment on account.

After the portrait was partially com-

pleted plaintiff made an arrange-

ment with A (who desired to go

abroad) by which he agreed to pay

him a certain sum for the work al-

ready done, and A agreed to deliver

the portrait to B to be finished. Held,

that the effect of this last agreement

was to vest the title to the portrait

in the plaintiff, so that it could not

thereafter be seized by the creditors

of A. Robinson, J., expressed the

§ 160.J
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tendence by the purchaser, though these facts are significant,

and in connection with other facts may be conclusive. 1

tenuence by the purchaser, though these facts are significant,
and in connection with other facts may be conclusive. 1

760.

Even without actual delivery. — So it is clear

that, if such appears to have been the intention of the parties,

the title may vest even though there has been no formal ten-

der of delivery or though the goods still remain in the maker's

possession. If that has been done which, according to the in-

tention of the parties, was to mark the transfer of the title, it

is enough. 2

1 In the case of Briggs v. A Light

Boat, 7 Allen (Mass.), 287, Bigelow,

C. J., says: "The general rule of law-

is well settled and familiar that

§ 760. - - Even witliout actnal delivery.- o it is clear
that, if such appears to have been the intention of the parties,
the title may Yest ev n though tbere has been no formal t nder of delivery or though the goods still remain in the malrnr's
pos ession. If that has been done which, according to the intention of the parties, was to mark the transfer of the title, it
is enough. 2

under a contract for building a ship

or making any other chattel, not
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subsisting in specie at the time of

making the contract, no property

vests in the purchaser during the

progress of the work, nor until the

vessel or other chattel is finished and

ready for delivery. To this rule there

are exceptions, founded for the most

part on express stipulations in con-

tracts, by which the property is held

to vest in the purchaser from time

to time as the work goes on. It is

doubtless true that a particular

agreement in a contract concerning

the mode or time of payment of the

purchase-money, or providing for the

appointment of a superintendent of

the work, may have an important

bearing in determining the question

whether the property passes to the

purchaser before the completion of

the chattel. It is, however, errone-

ous to say, as is sometimes stated by

text-writers, that an agreement to

pay the purchase-money in instal-

ments, as certain stages of the work

are completed, or a stipulation for

the employment of a superintendent

by the purchaser to overlook the

work and see that it is done accord-

ing to the tenor of the contract, will,

of itself, operate to vest the title in

the person for whom the chattel is

intended. Such stipulations may be

very significant as indicating the in-

tention of the parties, but they are

not in all cases decisive. Both of

them may co-exist in a particular

case, and yet the property may re-

main in the builder or manufacturer.

Even in England, where the cases go

the farthest in holding that property

in a chattel in the course of con-

1 In the case of Briggs v. A Light
Boat, 7 Allen (Mas .), 2 7, Bigelow,
C. J., says: "The gf'neral rule ofla w
is well settled and familiar that
under a contract for building a ship
or making any other chattel, not
subsisting in specie at the time of
making the contract, no property
Yests in the purcha er during the
progress of the work, nor until the
ves el or other chattel is finished and
ready for delivery. To this rule there
are exception , founded for the mo t
part on express stipulations in contracts, by which the property is held
to vest in the purchaser from time
to time as the work goes on. It is
doubtless true that a particular
agreement in a contract concerning
the mode or time of payment of the
purchase-money, or providing for the
appointment of a superintendent of
the work, may have an important
bearing in determining the question
whether the property passes to the
1 urcha er before the completion of
the chattel. It is, however, erroneous to say, a is sometimes stated by
t xt-writer , that an agreement to
p y the purchase-money in in talment , as certain tages of the work
are completed, or a tipulation for
the em1 loyment of a superintendent
by the purcha er to overlook the

struction passes to and vests in the

purchaser, these stipulations are not

always deemed to be conclusive of

title in him. It is a question of intent,

arising on the interpretation of the

entire contract in each case. If, tak-

ing all the stipulations together, it is

clear that the parties intended that

the property should vest in the pur-

63

w')rk and see that it is done according to the tenor of the contract. will,
of itself, operate to vest the title in
tue person for whom the chattel is
intended. Such stipulations may be
very significant as indicating the intention of the parties, but they are
not in all cases deci i ve. B th of
them may co-exi t in a particular
case, and yet the property may remain in the builder or rn~n-ufacturer.
Even in England, where the ca es go
the farthest in holding that property
in a chattel in the course of construction passes to and vest in the
purchaser, these stipulations are not
always deemed to be conclu ·ive of
title in him. It is a question of intent,
arising on the interpretation of the
entire contract in each ca e. If, taking all the stipulations together, it i ·
clear that the parties intended that
the property should vest in the pnrchaser during the progress of the
work and before its completion, effeet will be giYen to such intention
and the property will be held to pass
accordingly; but, on the other hand,
it will not be deemed to have passed
out oft.he builder unle s such intent
i clearly manife ted, but the general
rule of law will prevail."
2Thu , in Brewer v. Michigan Salt
A ociation, 47 Mich. 526, 11 N. W.

CH. V.] CONTRACTS — GOODS TO BE MANUFACTURED, ETC. [§ 761.

"What their intention was, when not made clear by the terms

of the contract, becomes a question of fact for the jury to de-

termine. 1

§ 761. When title passes to article intended for, but not

made part of, the principal article — Lumber for building.

Closely connected with the subject of the preceding sections is

R. 370, it appeared that the defend-

ant had made a contract with

Brewer, a manufacturer of salt, to

take all the salt he manufactured

and to make a specified advance on

all received. The salt was to become

the property of the defendant as

soon as inspected and branded, but

plaintiff was to furnish storage for

it and be " responsible for the same "

until it was delivered at his expense

alongside such vessel, car or lighter
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as the defendant might send for it.

A quantity of salt, after being in-

spected and branded, but while still

remaining on plaintiff's premises,

was destroyed by accidental fire.

Held, that the title had passed, and

that the clause making him "re-

sponsible " made him responsible as

bailee only. See also Jenkinson v.

Monroe, 6l"Mich. 454, 28 N. W. R. 663.

i In Weld v. Came, 98 Mass. 152. it

appeared that defendants had con-

tracted to manufacture five billiard

tables for plaintiffs which they in-

tended to ship to the East Indies.

The tables were to be finished within

a specified time, and were, by the

makers, to be delivered on the wharf,

packed in cases ready for shipment,

at such vessel as plaintiffs might

have. On a certain date plaintiffs

notified defendants that they had a

ship about to sail, and would take

the tables if they were ready. Four

w r ere delivered and paid for, but the

fifth was not completed. Subse-

quently plaintiffs were notified that

the fifth table was finished, boxed

up and ready for shipment, and

plaintiffs, without seeing or receiving

the table, paid for it. It remained

boxed up and set aside in defend-

ants' store-room, and they suggested

to plaintiffs that it could be sold to

some one else, but plaintiffs declined

to have it sold, saying that they in-

tended to ship it. "While remaining

in this condition the table was de-

stroyed by accidental fire, and this

action was brought to recover back

the price paid for it. The trial court

directed a verdict for the plaintiffs.

Said the supreme court: "The de-

fendants were to transport the .prop-

erty to the wharf, and this is a cir-

cumstance to be considered by a jury

as tending to show that the property

was not delivered [that the title had

not passed?] But it is not conclu-

sive, and the other circumstances so

far explain it that a jury would be

§ 761.J
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that of the passing of title to things intended to constitute a

part of the principal article, as the rudder of a ship or engines

for a steamship, but not yet actually made a part of it. As to

such articles, the English courts, while adopting a more liberal

rule than our courts as to the title to the main thing, hold that

these accessories do not pass to the purchaser of the main thing

until they have actually been affixed to or made a part of it,

but having been once affixed they become a part of the main

thing though temporarily removed. 1 Under the rule prevail-

ing in the United States, the same conclusion would follow

a fortiori?

to the plaintiffs should have been

left to the jury." See also Kent Iron

Co. v. Norbeck, 150 Pa. St. 559, 24 Atl.

R. 737.

i See Woods v. Russell, 5 B. & Aid.

that of the passing of title to things intended to constitute a
part of the principal article, as the rudder of a ship or engines
for a steamship, but not yet actually made a part of it. As to
such articles, the English courts, while adopting a more liberal
rule than our courts as to the title to the main thing, bold that
these accessories do not pass to the purchaser of the main thing
until they have actually been affixed to or made a part of it,
but having been once affixed they become a part of the main
thing though temporarily removed. 1 Under the rule prevailing in the U nite<l States, the same conclusion would follow
a fo'rtiori. 2
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942; Tripp v. Armitage, 4 M. & W.

687; Goss v. Quinton, 3 M. & G. 825;

Wood v. Bell, 6 E. & B. 355. In the

latter case the question was as to the

engines, plates, irons and planking

designed for a ship and in course of

preparation for her, but not yet actu-

ally put in place. Said the chief

justice: "The question is, What is

the contract? The contract is for

the purchase of a ship, not for the

purchase of everything in use for the

making of the ship. I agree that

those things which have been fitted

to and formed part of the ship would

pass, even though at the moment

they were not attached to the vessel.

But I do not think that those things

which had merely been bought for

the ship and intended for it would

pass to the plaintiff. Nothing that

has not gone through the ordeal of

being approved as part of the ship

passes, in my opinion, under the con-

tract."

2 Thus in Chambers v. Board of

Education (1875), 60 Mo. 370, a con-

tractor had undertaken to build a

schoohhouse for the defendant, under

the supervision of the latter's archi-

tect, and the work was to be paid for in

instalments. Upon the contractor's

request, the defendant had advanced

him $3,000 to buy lumber for use in

the building, upon the parol under-

standing that it was to become the

property of defendant. The lumber

was brought upon the lot, but before

becoming incorporated in the build-

ing was transferred by the con-

tractor to satisfy a debt to a third

person. The court held the parol

understanding insufficient to trans-

fer the title, and the question there-

upon arose whether the title to the

lumber had otherwise passed to the

defendant. The court below held

that it had. " This doctrine," said

the supreme court, " was based on

the ground that a superintendent

was appointed by the orderer (the

to the plain tiffs should have been tractor had undertaken to build a
left to the jury." See also Kent Iron school-house for the defendant, under
Co. v. Norbeck, 150 Pa. St. 559, 24 Atl. the supervision of the latter's archiR. 737.
tect, and the work was to be paid for in
I See Woods v. Russell, 5 B. & Ald.
instalments. Upon the contractor's
942; Tripp v. Armitage, 4 M. & W. request, the defendant had advanced
687; Goss v. Quinton, 3M. & G. 825; him $3,000 to buy lumber for use in
Wood v. Bell, 6 E. & B. 355. In the the building, upon the parol underlatter case the question was as to the standing that it was to become the
engines, plat.es, irons and planking property of defendant. The lumber
desi3ned for a ship and in course of was brought upon the lot, but Lefore
preparation for her, but not yet actu- becoming incorporated in the buildally put in place. Said the chief ing was transferred by the conju tice: "The question is, What is tractor to satisfy a debt to a third
the contract? The contract is for person. The court held the parol
the purchase of a ship, not for the understanding insufficient to transpurchase of everything in use for the fer the title, and the question theremaking of the ship. I agree that upon arose whether the title to the
those things which have been fitted lumber had otherwise pas ed to the
to and formed part of the ship would defendant. The court below held
pass, even though at the moment that it had. "This doctrine," said
they were not attached to the vessel. the supreme court, "was based on
But I do not think that those things the ground that a superintendent
which had merely been bought for was appointed by the orderer (the
the ·hip and intended for it would defendant) and that the manufactpa · to the plaintiff. Nothing that urer or builder was to be paid in inha not gone through the ordeal of stalm nts as the work progressed,
b ing approved as part of the ship and that in such ca es, where the
pa e ·,in my opinion, under th on- mat rials were inspected and altra t.'
lowed by the superintendent, the
2 Thu
in hambers v. B ard of titl to them at once pa ed to the
Education (1875), 60 Mo. 370, a con- purcha r or orderer. But the gen640

CH. V.] CONTRACTS — GOODS TO BE MANUFACTURED, ETC. [§ 762.

§ 762. Articles to be supplied by way of repairs or

alterations to another chattel. — Where articles are to be

supplied by way of repairs or alterations to a chattel, the Eng-

lish courts hold that the title does not pass until the whole of

eral law is otherwise, as the cases in

New York and Massachusetts, and

indeed in England — unless we ex-

cept the case of Woods v. Russell (5

B. & Aid. 942),— show; and there

must be a special agreement between

the contractor and his employer to

transfer the property so bought by

the contractor to his employer; and

in this case there was no such agree-

ment, except the parol one hereto-

fore considered. Or this instruction

may have been based on the assump-

tion that when the builder put the
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lumber on the ground of defendant,

with the intention to use it in the

building he was to erect on such

ground, this alone transferred the

title in the materials to the owner

of the ground. But this is not the

law. The materials belonged to the

builder and were at his risk until

actually put in the house. The fact

that the builder bought them with a

view to putting them in the defend-

ant's house did not change their

ownership, nor did the inspection of

the superintendent or architect have

this effect. Johnson v. Hunt, 11

Wend. (N. Y.) 135; Mucklow v. Man-

gles, 1 Taunt. (Eng.) 319; Merritt v.

Johnson, 7 Johns. (N. Y.) 473, 5 Am.

Dec. 289."

In Ellis v. Bonner (1891), 80 Tex.

198, 15 S. W. R. 1045, 26 Am. St. R. 731,

a building society had undertaken to

build two portable houses for Bon-

ner. The material for the houses had

been delivered upon the lot and Bon-

ner had paid the greater part of the

contract price when Ellis attached

the lumber as the property of the

building company. The court held

that the rule applicable to the man-

ufacture of chattels did not apply to

a case like the present; that it was

within the power of the parties by

their contract to determine either

that the title should vest in Bonner

when it was delivered upon the lots,

or that it should remain in the build-

ing company until the houses were

completed; that the contract in this

respect would determine whether the

lumber was subject to seizure as the

property of the building company;

that if the contract was intended to

be a sale of the material, its delivery

upon the lot would be sufficient to

pass the title to Bonner; that if the

contract was for completed houses,

then such delivery and part payment

would not be sufficient to pass the

title. " But if," continued the court,

" under a proper construction of the

§ 703._I
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the work contracted for has been completed, notwithstanding

payment has been made in instalments, and the repairs or alter-

ations have been constructed under the supervision of the pur-

chaser. 1

the work contracted for has been co mpleted, notwithstanding
payment has been made in in talmcnts, and the repairs or alterations have been constructed under the supervision of the purchaser.1

II.

II.

Where Goods are to be Grown.

§ 763. Title passes when chattel is grown and appropri-

ated to the contract. — A contract to sell and deliver a chattel

WrrERE

Goon

ARE

To BE GROWN.

not then in existence, but subsequently to be grown and pro-

duced, " comes by analogy," said the court in Vermont, 2 " within

the class of contracts for the manufacture of goods and for

their delivery at a future day. In such cases the authorities

have abundantly established the general rule that the article

must not only be made and offered to the vendee, but that he

must accept of it, or it must be set apart for him by his con-
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sent, before the title to it will vest in him; and although the

such circumstances the building as- The defendant employed other par-

sociation would not have been al- ties to make the repairs and used the

lowed to take the property from

Bonner's possession and deprive him

of it as a security for the money paid

by him." No cases or statutes are

cited by the court as authority for its

holdings, and the English and Amer-

ican cases are not referred to.

§ 763. Title passes when chattel is grown and appropriated to the contract.- A contract to sell and deliver a cnattel
not then in exi tence, but SLlbseguently to be grow n ancl produced," comes by a nalogy," aid the court in Vermont, 2 " ·withi n
the class of contracts for the manufacture of goods and for
their delivery at a future clay. In such cases the authorities
have abund antly estabiished tbe general rule that the article
mu t not only be made and offered to the vendee, but that he
must accept of it, or it must be set apart for him by his consent, before the title to it will vest in him; and although the

See also Johnson v. Hunt, 11 Wend.

(N. Y.) 135. In Abbott v. Blossom

(1873), 66 Barb. (N. Y.) 353, it appeared

that G., a carpenter, agreed with the

defendant to put certain repairs upon

the house of the latter. G. was to

furnish the lumber required and de-

fendant was to draw it. No separate

price was to be paid for the lumber,

but the work and materials were to

be paid for at a fixed price on the

completion of the job. G. selected

the lumber to be used and the de-

fendant drew it to the house. G.

failed to commence work upon the

job and abandoned the contract.

lumber in making them. Held, that

the lumber did not become the prop-

erty of the defendant, there having

been no delivery of it with intent to

pass the title. In Hood v. Manhattan

Ins. Co. (1854), 11 N. Y. 532, it is said:

" It frequently happens that one man

owns the keel and employs another,

the ship-builder, to furnish materials

and finish the ship. Such materials,

though completely finished, remain

the property of the builder until they

actually become a part of the struct-

ure of the ship."

!See Anglo-Egyptian Navigation

Co. v. Rennie (1875), L. R. 10 C. P.

271, distinguishing Clarke v. Spence,

4 Ad. & E. 448; Woods v. Russell, 5

B. & Aid. 942; Wood v. Bell, 5 E. &

B. 772; s. C, 6 id. 355.

2 Rider v. Kelley (1859), 32 Vt. 268,

76 Am. Dec. 176.
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such circumstances the building as- The defendant employed other parsociation ·would not have been al- ties to make the repairs and used the
lowed to take the property from lumber in making them. H eld, that
Bonner's po e ·sion and deprive him the lumber did not become the prop<>f it as a ecurity for the money paid erty of the defendant, there having
by him." No cases or statutes are been no delivery of it with intent to
citecl by the court a authority for it.s pa ss the title. In Hood v. Manhattan
holdings, and the English and Amer- Ins. Co. (1 54), 11 N. Y. 532, it i said:
ican cases are not r eferred to.
'' It frequently happens that one man
See also Johnson v. Hunt, 11 W end. own the keel and employ another,
(N. Y.) 135. In Abbott v. Blo som the hip-builder, to furnish materials
(1 73), 66 Barb. (N. Y.) 353, it appeared and fini sh the ship. Such materials,
that G., a carpenter, agreed with the though completely :finished, remain
defendant to put certain repair upon the property of the builder until they
the hou e of the latter. G. was to actually become a part of the tructfurni h the lumber required and de- ure of the ship."
f ntlant vrn to draw it. No separate
I See Anglo-Egyptian
ravigation
price wa to be paid for the lumber, Co. v. Rennie (1875), L. R. 10 C. P.
hut the work and materia.ls were to 271, di::;tin g uishing Clarke v. Spence,
be p id for at a ti. ' d price on the 4 Au. & E. 4.4 ; Woods v. Rus ell, 5
completion of the job. G. elected B. & Ald. 942; Wood v. Bell, 5 E. &
the lumbe1· to b us d and the cle- B. 772; s. c., 6 id. 355.
f ndant drew it to the hou .
2 Rider v. Kelley (1859), 32 Vt. 26 ,
failed t comm nc work upon the 76 Am. Dec. 176.
job and abandone i the contra t.
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CH. V.] CONTRACTS — GOODS TO BE MANUFACTURED, ETC. [§§ 704-5.

cases, to some extent, modify this general rule, as where the

parties agree to treat the article as constructively delivered

when finished, or as where the vendee finds the materials and

superintends or specially directs in the process of manufacture,

yet we find nothing to make this case an exception."

§ 764. . The contract in this case was for hops to be

grown, cured, packed and inspected in Vermont, and the ques-

tion was whether a tender of the hops would operate to pass

the title. Upon this question it was said : "It is obvious that

the parties did not intend, and could not have intended, that a

mere tender of the hops by the vendor should pass the title in

them to the vendee against his positive refusal to accept them.

The hops were to be raised thereafter, were to answer the spe-

cial description specified in the contract, and were to be of

Vermont inspection. The vendee was entitled to examine

them, and use his judgment in determining whether they came

within the contract. They would not become his property

against his consent; although if he wrongfully refused to ac-
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cept them he would be liable in damages. He was not bound

by the offer of delivery to accept them, and treat them as his

own. Where the contract so plainly points for something fur-

ther to be done by the purchaser, some further right or priv-

ilege to be exercised by him before actual delivery takes place,

and actual possession and title change, there the possession and

title must be held to remain in the seller, and he must take

charge of the property, and keep or sell the same as he sees

fit." 1

§ 765. . However sound this decision may have been

upon its own peculiar facts, it is obvious that the rule laid

down, in supposed analogy to the case of goods to be manu-

factured or supplied, is not that which has been seen to be

supported by the weight of modern authority. 2 And no reason

is apparent why cases of this description should not fall within

i Citing Hale v. Huntley, 21 Vt. man v. Hill, 86 N. H. 311; Comfort v.

147; Jones v. Marsh, 22 Vt. 144; Gil- Kiersted, 26 Barb. (N. Y.) 472.

2 See ante, § 754 et seq.

64:3

§ 765.J

LA.W OF SA.LE.

[BOOK II.

§ 765.]

LAW OF SALE.

[BOOK II.

the general rule that, unless a contrary intention is evident,

the title would pass when the goods, of the kind agreed upon,

are by tender or other equivalent act set apart and appropri-

ated to the buyer. 1

iThus, in Colorado Springs Live

the general rule that, unless a contrary intention is evident,
the title would pass when the goods, of the kind agreed npon,
are by ten<ler or other equivalent act set apart and appropriated to the buyer. 1

Stock Co. v. Godding (1894), 20 Colo.

249, 38 Pac. R. 58, where the contract

was for raising and selling certain

crops of alfalfa, and the alfalfa had

been raised, cut, stacked and meas-

ured as the contract required, it was

held that the title then passed and

the price could be recovered. Said

the court: "While it has been held

in some of the cases that the accept-

ance by the purchaser of an article
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appropriated by the seller according

to the terms of an executory con-

tract of sale is necessary to pass the

title, the weight of authority is that

the appropriation by the seller of an

article, when completed in accord-

ance with the terms of the contract,

passes the title without the subse-

quent assent of the purchaser, and

an action for the agreed price can

be maintained." See also Wood v.

Michaud (1896), 63 Minn. 478, 63 N.

W. R. 963.

1 Thus, in Colorado Springs Live to the terms of an executory conStock Co. v. Godding (1894), 20 Colo. tract of sale is necessary to pass the
249, 38 Pac. R. 58, where the contract title, the weig ht of authority is that
was for raising and selling certain the appropriation by the seller of an
crops of alfalfa, and the alfalfa had a rticle, when completed in accordbeen raised, cut, stacked and meas- ance w ith the t erms of the contract,
ured as the contract required, it was passes the title without the subsehelu that the title then passed and quent assent of the purchaser, and
the price could be recovered. Sa.id an action for the agreed price can
the court: "While it has been held be maintained." See also Wood v.
in some of the cases that the accept- l\1ichand (1896), 63 Minn. 478, 65 N.
ance by the purchaser of an article W. R. 963.
appropriated by the seller according
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OF THE RESERVATION OF THE JUS DISPONENDL
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Sending invoice, etc., to buyer

does not affect.
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Resume of English cases.

789. Bill of lading consigning

goods to buyer.

■792. Transfer of bill of lading
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retains power of disposal. 787.

770. Methods adopted. 78S,

771-773. Choice of methods.

774-776. Bill of lading taken to 790-

seller's order.

777, 778. Purpose and effect. 793,

779. Bill of lading to seller's order

attached to draft on buyer. 795-

780. Buyer obtaining posses-

sion without payment.

§ 766, Purpose of this chapter,— It has been seen in an

earlier chapter that the question when the title passes is pri-

marily one of the intention of the parties; and the rules which

§~

766, 767. Purpose of this chapter. § 7 1. Custom does not affect.
76 . Di tinction .
7 '>. Sending invoice, etc., to buyer
769. Sending good by carrier not
doe not affect.
an appropriation if eller
7 3-7 6. The rules stat.ed.

retains power of di posaL
770. Method adopted.
771-773. Choice of method .
774-776. Bill of lading taken to
seller' order.
7,
77
. Purpo e aud effect.
7
779. Bill of lading to seller's order
attached to draft on buyer.
780. Buyer obtaining po ession without payment.

7 7. R esume of English cases.
7 , 7 9. Bill of lading con igning
goods to buyer.
790-792. Tran fer of bill of lading
during tran it.
793, 794. How when goods sent
C. 0. D.
795-797. How when goods to be
delivered F. 0. B.

have been heretofore considered are rules of construction ap-

plied by the courts in their endeavors to arrive at the intention

of the parties where the latter have not made their meaning

clear by their agreement. Among other rules it has been found

that where the parties have come to an agreement for the pres-

ent sale of a specific chattel, the title to it, in the absence of

anything to indicate a contrary intent, will be deemed forth-

with to pass without the necessity of any other act of the par-

ties, such as payment or delivery. But the chattel to be sold

is not always designated at the time of the agreement, and in

the preceding chapters there has been considered what acts

will suffice, where the parties have agreed upon the terms of

the contract but not upon the chattel, to subsequently designate

the chattel which is to be transferred and to appropriate it

to the contract.
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§ 766. Purpo e of thi chapter.- It has been seen in an
earlier chapter that the que tion when the title passes is primarily one of the intention of the parties; and the rules which
have been heretofore consi lered are rules of construction applied by the courts in their endeavors to arrive at the intention
of the parties where the latter have not made their meaning
clear by their agreement. Among other rules it has been found
that where the parties have come to an agreement fot· the present sale of a specific chattel, the title to it, in the absence of
an thing to indicate a contrary intent, will be deemed forthwith to pa without the nece ity of any other R.ct of the parties, such as payment or delivery. But the chattel to be sold
is not al ways de ignated at the time of the agreement, and in
the preceding chapters there has been considered what acts
will suffice where the parties have agreed upon the terms of
the contract but not upon the chattel, to subsequently designate
tlrn chattel which is to be tran ferred and to appropriate it
to the con tract.
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§§ 767-709.] LAW OF SALE. [book II.

§§ 767-769.J

LAW OF SALE.

[noorr: n.

§ 767. . A variety of acts which have been passed upon

by the courts has been enumerated, but it is obvious that the

list is not exhaustive owing to the infinite variety of forms in

which the transactions of the parties may present themselves.

These acts, also, have been held to pass the title because that

was presumed to have been the intention of the parties. Such

may not always have been their intention, however, and it re-

mains to consider what acts will suffice to indicate an inten-

tion that the title shall not pass, notwithstanding such conduct

or events as would otherwise have operated to transfer the

title.

§ 768. Distinctions. — In considering this question care

must be taken to discriminate between those cases in which

the title has passed, though the seller has a right to retain the

goods until some act has been done by the buyer, and those in

which the act is to be done before the title is to pass even

though the goods may have left the possession of the seller, —

in other words, between a lien and a reservation of the title.
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It is to the latter question that the present chapter is devoted,

§ 767. - - . A variety of acts which have been passed upon
by the courts has been enumerated, but it is obvious that the
list is not exhaustive owing to the infinite variety of forms in
which the transactions of the parties may present thernsel v s.
These acts, also, have been held to pass the title because that
was presumed to have been the intention of the parties. Such
may not al ways have been their intention, however, and it remains to consider what acts will suffice to indicate an intention that the title shall not pass, notwithstanding such concluct
or events as would otherwise have operated to transfer the
title.

and to that branch of the latter question which has to do with

the subject of the preceding chapters.

§ 768. - - Distinctions.- In considering this question care

§ 769. Sending goods by carrier is not an appropriation

if seller reserves jus disponendi. — The question now in hand

most frequently arises where goods have been ordered from a

seller at a distance, who is to transmit them by carrier to the

buyer. It was seen in a preceding chapter that when such

goods have been unconditionally delivered to the carrier for

transportation to the purchaser, such delivery is usually deemed

to be an appropriation of t>e goods to the contract and operates

thereupon to transfer the title. Cases, however, frequently

arise in which, while he desires and expects to transmit the

goods, the seller still desires to retain some hold upon them to

secure himself against the insolvency or default of the buyer.

The seller in such cases may be content to rely upon his ordi-

nary right of stoppage in transitu, or he may desire to retain

the title in himself until the goods are paid for. He may, of
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must be taken to discriminate between those cases in which
the title has passecl, though the seller has a rigb t to retain the
goods until some act has been done by the buyer, and those in
which the act is to be done before th e title is to pass even
though the goods may have left the possession of the seller,in other words, between a lien and a reservation of tlie title.
It is to the latter question that the present chapter is devoted,
and to that branch of the latter question which has to do with
the subject of the preceding chapters.

§ 769. Sending goods by carl'ier is not an appropriation
if sell er reserves jus disponendi.-The question now in hand
most frequently arises where goods have been ordered from a
seller at a distance, who is to transmit th em by carrier to the
buyer. It was seen in a preceding chapter that when such
goods have been unconditionp,lly delivered to the carrier for
transportation to the purchaser, such delivery is usually deemed
to be an appropriation of t.i- ':'. goods to the contract and operates
thereupon to transfer the title. Oases, however, frequ ently
arise in which, ·while he desires a nd expects to transmjt the
goods, the seller still desires to retain some hold upon th em to
s cure himself against the insolvency or default of the bnyer.
The seller in such cases may be cont nt to rely upon his ordinary right of stoppag '£n transitu, or he may desire to retain
the title in himself until the goods are paid for. He may, of
646

CH. VI.] RESERVATION OF THE JUS DISPONENDI. [§§ 770-772.

course, do this, as was seen in a preceding chapter, by an ex-

press stipulation that the title shall not pass until the price is

paid ; but a simpler and more temporary reservation of con-

trol is now the purpose.

§ 770. Methods adopted. — In accomplishing this pur-

pose one of three methods is commonly employed: 1. The ship-

per takes a bill of lading providing for the delivery of the

goods at the point of destination to his own order or that of

his agent, and then transmits the bill of lading to an agent at

the place of delivery with instructions not to deliver the goods

to the vendee until paid for; 2. The shipper may take a like

bill of lading and, attaching it indorsed to a draft upon the pur-

chaser, may deliver the draft for collection to, or may dis-

count it at, some bank which will forward both to a correspond-

ent at the place of delivery, where the latter will deliver the

bill of lading to the purchaser upon his paying or accepting

the draft; or 3. The shipper may take a bill of lading reciting

the delivery of the goods by him to the carrier for transporta-
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tion to the purchaser (without making them expressly deliver-

able to the shipper or his order), and may use this in connec-

tion with a draft, as in the second method. The first two

methods are the most common, particularly in the English

cases.

§ 771. Choice of methods. — Whatever be the method

adopted, it must be one calculated to effectuate the purpose

and to rebut the presumption arising from unconditional de-

livery to the carrier. A mere mental act on the part of the

seller will not suffice if it be not accompanied by some out-

ward act indicative of a purpose and legally sufficient to re-

tain a hold upon the title other than the mere right of stoppage

in transitu.

§ 772. . The method adopted should, moreover, be an

unambiguous and unequivocal one. Thus, where the terms of

the invoice showed clearly that the seller deemed the title to

have passed, the fact that he sent a bill of lading to his agent

647

§§ 773, 774.]

LAW OF SALE.

[HOOK II.

§§ 773, 774] law of sale. [book ii.

to be used in coercing payment was held not to prevent the

passing of the title. 1

§ 773, . The seller must also act in good faith. Thus

where, after an unconditional delivery for the buyer to the

to be used in coercing payment was held not to prevent the
passing of the title. 1

captain of the buyer's own ship, the seller by misrepresenta-

tion obtained from the captain a bill of lading in blank as to

the consignee and sent that with draft attached to an agent

for collection, it was held that the title had passed and that

this dealing with the bill of lading did not affect it. 2

§ 771. Bill of lading to seller's order. — Where the seller

takes a bill of lading which expressly stipulates that the goods

are to be delivered, at the point of destination, to himself or

agent, or to his order or assigns, there is the clearest possible

evidence upon the face of the transaction that, notwithstand-

ing such an appropriation of the goods as might have been suf-

ficient to transfer the title to the buyer, the seller has deter-

§ 773. - - . The seller must also act in good faith.

Thus
where, after an unconditional delivery for the buyer to the
captain of the buyer's own ship, the seller by misrepresentation obtained from the captain a bill of lading in blank as to
the consignee and sent that with draft attached to an agent
for collection, it was held that the title bad pas eel and that
this dealing with the bill of lading did not affect it. 2

mined to prevent this resu't by keeping the goods within his

§ 77,1. Bill of lading to seller's order.-Where the seller

own control. 3
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iWalley v. Montgomery (1803), 3 Co. v. Commercial Bank (1887), 123

East, 583. U. S. 727, 8 S. Ct. 266; Libby v. In-

2 Ogle v. Atkinson (1814), 5 Taunt, galls (1878), 124 Mass. 503; Furman v.

759. Eailroad Co., 106 N. Y. 579, 13 N. E.

3 Craven v. Ryder (1816), 6 Taunt. R. 587; Joslyn v. Grand Trunk Ry.

433; Ruck v. Hatfield (1822), 5 B. & Co., 51 Vt. 92; Peoria Bank v. Rail-

Aid. 632; Wait v. Baker (1848), 2 Ex. road Co., 58 N. H. 203; Bank v. Cum-

1; Van Casteel v. Booker (1848), 2 Ex. mings, 89 Term. 609, 18 S. W. R. 115,

691; Ellershaw v. Magniac (1843), 6 24 Am. St. R 618; Security Bank v.

Ex. 570; Ward v. Taylor (1870), 56 111. Luttgen, 29 Minn. 363, 13 N. W. R.

491; Bellefontaine v. Vassaux (1896), 151.

53 Ohio St. 323, 45 N. E. R 321; Will- Where the bill of lading is taken

man Co. v. Fussy (1895), 15 Mont. 511, to the seller's order, the mere fact

39 Pac. R. 738; Dows v. National Ex- that the buyer is named as con-

takes a bill of lading which expressly stipulates that the goods
are to be delivered, at the point of destination, to himself or
agent, or to his order or assigns, there is the clearest possible
evidence upon the face of the transaction that, notwithstanding such an appropriation of the goods as might have be€n sufficient to transfer the title to the buyer, the seller has determined to prevent this resu't by keeping the goods within his
own control. 3

change Bank (1875), 91 U. S. 618: See- signee will not pass the title to him.

ligson v. Philbrick (1886), 30 Fed. R. First Nat. Bank v. Crocker (1872), 111

600; Berger v. State (1887), 50 Ark. Mass. 163.

20, 6 S. W. R. 15; Bergeman v. Rail- Wait v. Baker, 2 Ex. 1 (supra), is

road Co. (1890), 104 Mo. 77, 15 S. W. R. a leading case upon the subject of

992; Pennsylvania Ry. Co. v. Stern reserving the jus disponendi by tak-

(1888), 119 Pa. St. 24, 12 Atl. R. 756, ingthe bill of lading to the shipper's

4 Am. St. R 626; North Penn. R R. order. There the defendant, who
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Walley v. Montgomery (1803), 3
East, 583.
2 Ogle v. Atkinson (1814), 5 Taunt.
759.
3 Craven v. Ryder ·(1 16), 6 Taunt.
433; Ruck v. Hatfield (1822), 5 B. &
Ald. 632; Wait v. Baker (1 48), 2 Ex.
1; Van Ca. teel v. Booker (1 48), 2 Ex.
691; Ellershaw v. l\fagniac (1843), 6
Ex. 570; Ward v. Taylor (1 70), 56 Ill.
49±; Bellefontaine v. Va. saux (1896),
53 Ohio St. 323, 43 N. E. R. 321; Willman Co. v. Fussy (1895), 15 Mont. 511,
39 Pac. R. 73, ; Dow v. National Exchange Bank (1875), 91 U.S. 618: Seelig on v. Philbrick (1 6), 30 Fed. R.
600; Berger v. St.ate (1 7), 50 Ark.
20, 6 '. W. R. 15; Bergeman v. Railroad Co. (1 90), 104 'Io. 77, 15 S. vV. R.
992; Penn ylvania Ry. Co. v. Stern
(188 ), 119 Pa. St. 24, 12 At!. R. 756,
4 Am. St. R. 626; North Penn. R. R.
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Co. v. Commercial Bank (1887), 123
U.S. 727, 8 S. Ct. 266; Libby v. Ingalls (1878), 124 Mass. 508; Furman v.
Railroad Co., 106 N. Y. 579, 13 N. E.
R. 587; Joslyn v. Grand Trunk Ry.
Co., 51 Vt. 92; Peoria Bank v. Railroad Co., 58 N. H. 203; Bank v. Cummings, 89 Tenn. 609, 18 S. W.R. 115,
24 Am. St. R. CHS; Seeurity Bank v.
Luttgen, 29 lino. 363, 13 N. W. R.
1.)1.
Where the bill of lading is taken
to the seller's order, the mere fact
that the buyl·r is named as consignee will not pass the title to him.
First Nat. Bank v. Crocker (1872), 111
Mass. 163.
Wait v. Baker, 2 Ex. 1 (supra), is
a leading case upon the subject of
reserving the jus disponendi by taking the bill of lading to the shipper's
order. There the defendant, who

CH. VI.]

RESERVATION OF THE JUS DISPONENDI.

CH. VI.]

RESERV.A TION OF THE JUS DISPONENDI.

[§ 775.

[§ 775.

This evidence, however, is not absolutely conclusive, though,

as stated by the supreme court of the United States, " it is held

to be almost conclusive." l

§ 775. Thus, for example, it is possible, even in such a

case, that it was the intention of the parties — as where the

This evidence, however, is not absolutely conclusive, though,
as stated by the supreme court of the United States," it is held
to be almost conclusive." 1

person occupying the relation of vendor was really acting as

agent of the buyer 2 — that the title should pass upon the de-

§ 775. - - Thus, for example, it is possible, even in such a

was a corn factor at Bristol, ery to the captain of the vessel to be

made a contract by mail with one

Lethbridge, a corn factor at Ply-

mouth, to buy from him a quantity

of barley f. o. b. at Kingsbridge, for

case, that it was the intention of the parties-as where the
person occupying the relation of vendor was really acting as
agent of the buyer 2 - that the title should pass upon the de-

cash on handing bills of lading or

acceptance at two months. Leth-

bridge was directed to charter a ves-

sel and he chartered the " Emerald."
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Her captain signed a bill of lading,

making the barley deliverable at Bris-

tol to the order of Lethbridge or as-

signs. Lethbridge went to Bristol

and called at defendant's office early

in the morning, leaving there an

unindorsed bill of lading and an

invoice. He called again later in

the day, when a dispute arose, and

though the defendant finally said

that he accepted the barley and

offered to pay the cash, Lethbridge

declined it and took away the bill of

lading, which he indorsed to plaintiffs

for value. When the ship arrived,

defendant obtained possession of part

of the cargo before plaintiffs pre-

sented their bill of lading. The ac-

tion was trover for the barley so taken

and plaintiffs recovered. Parke, B.,

after pointing out that although a

delivery to a carrier is, if nothing

further takes place, a delivery to the

vendee so as to vest the property in

him, but that such was not the case,

said: "The delivery of the goods on

board the ship was not a delivery of

them to the defendant, but a deliv-

carried under a bill of lading, and

that bill of lading indicated the per-

son for whom they were to be car-

ried. By that bill of lading the goods

were to be carried by the master of

the vessel for and on account of Leth-

bridge. to be delivered to him in case

the bill of lading should not be as-

signed, and, if it should, then to the

assignee. The goods therefore still

continued in possession of the mas-

ter of the vessel, not as in the case of

a common carrier, but as a person

carrying them on behalf of Leth-

bridge."

1 Dows v. National Exch. Bank

(1875), 91 U. S. 618, supra.

2 This was the case in Van Casteel

v. Booker (1848), 2 Ex. 691, where

Parke, B., said: "Notwithstanding

the form of the bill of lading, the

contract may have been made really

on behalf of the vendee, though

was a corn factor at Bri. tol, ery to the captain of the vessel to be
made a contract by mail with one carried under a bill of lading, and
Lethbridge, a corn factor at Ply- that bill of lading indicated the permoutb, to buy from him a quantity son for whom they were to be carof barley f. o. b. at Kings bridge, for ried. By that bill oflading the goods
cash on handing bills of lading or were to be carried by the master of
acceptance at two months. Leth- the vessel for and on account of Lethbridge was directed to charter aves- bridge. to be delivered to him in case
sel and he chartered the "Emerald/' the bill of lading should not be asHer captain igned a bill of lading, signed, and, if it should, then to the
making the barley deliverable at Bris- assignee. The goods therefore still
tol to the order of Lethbridge or a - continued in po ession of the massigns. Lethbridge went to Bri tol ter of the ves el, not as in the case of
and called at defendant's office early a common carrier, but as a person
in the morning, leaving there an carrying them on behalf of Lethunindorsed bill of lading and an b1·idge."
l Dows v. National Exch. Bank
invoice. He called again later in
the day, when a di pute arose, and (1875), 91 U. S. 618, supra.
though the defendant finally said
2 This was the case in Van Ca teel
that he accepted the barley and v. Booker (1848), 2 Ex. 691, where
offered to pay the ca h, Leth bridge Parke, B., said: "Notwithstanding
declined it and took away the bill of the form of the bill of lading, the
lading, which he ind or ed to plaintiffs contract may have been made really
for value. \Vhen the ship arrived, on behalf of the vendee, though
defendant obtained pos e · ion of part p1·ima facie it is made on behalf of
of the cargo before plaintiffs pre· the vendor; and it is a question for
sented their bill of lading. The ac- the jury, to be decided on the evition was trover for the barley so taken <lence, looking at the form of the bill
and plaintiffs reco vered. Parke, B., of ladin g, particul::1.rly noticing that
after pointing out that although a it is made freight free, and the landelivery to a carrier is, if nothing guage of the invoice, and the immefurther takes place, a deli very to the diate transfer of the bill of lading
vendee so as to vest the property in to the [ vendees], and other facts,
him, but that such was not the case, whether the goods were not really
said: "The delivery of the goods on delivered on boar1l to be carried for
board the ship was not a delivery of and on account and at the risk of
them to the defendant, but a deliv- the [vendees]."
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livery to the carrier. And notwithstanding the evidence of

the bill of lading, there may be other evidence sufficient to

overthrow it indicating a contrary intention; as where, from

the invoice, it appears that the goods were shipped "for ac-

.count and at the risk " of the buyer, 1 and the like.

Whether there was such a contrary intention is usually a

question of fact for the jury, 2 and it must be shown by evi-

dence sufficiently strong to overcome the presumption arising

upon the face of the transaction. 3 In the absence of such a

iWalley v. Montgomery (1803), 3

East, 585. So where the goods marked

with the initials of the buyer have

been delivered to the carrier, and the

livery to the carrier. And notwitbstanding the evidence of
the bill of laclin ·, there may be other evid nee sufficient to
overthrow it in licating a contrary intention; as where, from
the inYoice, it appears that the goods were shipped "for account and at the risk" of the buy r, 1 and the like.
vVhetber there was such a contrary intention is usually a
question of fact for the jury,2 and it mu t be shown by eYidence sufficiently strong to overcome the pr umr tion arisingupon the face of the transaction. 3 In the absence of such a

purchaser has accepted a draft for

the price, the fact that the seller

takes the carrier's receipt in his own
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name will not overthrow the pre-

sumption that the title passed. Hall

v. Richardson (1860), 16 Md. 396, 77

Am. Dec 303. And where the con-

tract was that the goods should be

delivered over the rail of a vessel,

and they have been so delivered, the

fact that afterwards, at the master's

suggestion, a bill of lading in the

shipper's name is made out, as the

master said. " for the purpose of fix-

ing the freight," will not necessarily

defeat the effect of the delivery.

Gibbons v. Robinson (1886), 63 Mich.

146, 29 N. W. R. 533. And where

the sellers, who were indebted to the

buyers, delivered goods to the carrier

consigned to the buyers, and wrote

them saying "we deliver you this

load on our indebtedness,'' the fact

that the shippers took a bill of lad-

ing in their own names was held not

to defeat the effect of the delivery.

Straus v. Wessel (1876), 30 Ohio St.

211, Adams' Cases on Sales, 781.

2 In Gibbons v. Robinson, supra, it

is sa|d: " The question of delivery is

one of fact, and is mainly governed

by the intention of the parties. Where

the evidence is equivocal, it is prop-

erly a question of fact for the jury,

under proper instructions, and must

be submitted to them, unless it is

plain, as matter of law, that the evi-

dence will justify a finding but one

way," citing Allen v. Williams, 12

Pick. 297; Stanton v. Eager, 16 Pick.

467; Stevens v. Boston, etc. R. Co.,

8 Gray, 262; Moakes v. Nicolson, 19

Com. B. (N. S.) 290, 115 Eng. Com. L.

290; Godts v. Rose, 25 L. J. C. P. 61,

84 Eng. Com. L, 229: Tregelles v.

Walley v. Montgomery (1803 ), 3
Ea t, 5 5. So where the goods marked
with the initials of the buyer have
been delivereu to the carrier, and the
purchaser has accepte<'l a draft for
the price, the fact that the seller
take the carrier 's receipt in his own
name will not overthrow the presum pt ion that the title pas ed. Hall
v. Richard son (1860), 16 Mel. 396, 77
Am. Dec. 303. And where the contract was that the goods should be
delivered over the rail of a vessel,
and they have been o delivered, the
fact. that afterwards, at the master's
suggestion, a bill of lading in the
shipper's name is made out, as the
master said. "for the purpose of fixing the freight," will not necessarily
defeat the effect of the delivery.
Gibbons v. Robinson (1 6), 63 Iich.
146, 29 N. W. R. 533. And where
the sellers. who were inclebted to the
buye.r., delivered goous to the carrier
consigne<.l to the buyers, and wrote
them saying "we deliver you thi
load on our ind ebted ness,'~ the fact
that the shippers took a bill of lading in their own names was held not
to def at the effect of the delivery.
Straus v. W.e sel (1 76), 30 Ohio St.
211, Adams' Cases on , ales, 7 1.
2 In Gibbons v. Robinson, supra, it
i sa}d : "The question of deliYery is
one of fact, and is mainly governed
l

bytheintentionoftheparties. \Vhere
the evidence is equivocal, it i properly a question of fact for the jury,
under proper instructions, and must
be submitted to them, unless it is
plain, as matter of law, that the evid nee will ju tify a finding but one
way, " citing Allen v. vVHliams, 12
Pick. 297; Stanton v. Eager, 16 Pick.
467; Stevens v. Bo ton, etc. R. Co.,
8 Gray, 262; Moakes v. Nicolson, 19
Com. B. (N. S.) 290, 115 Eng. Com. L.
290; Godts v. Rose, 25 L. J. C. P. 61,
84 Eng. Com. L. 229: Tregelles v.
Sewell, 7 H. &.N. 574. Though where
it appears on the face of the documents, the court may decide it as a
quest ion of law. Key v. Cotes worth
(1852), 7 Exch. 59.3.
3 In Browne v. I-fare (1859), 4 H. &
N. 822, Erle, J., said: "The contract
was for the purehase of unascertained good ·, and the question has
been when the property passed. For
the answer the contract must be resorted to; and under that we think
the property pa. sell when the goods
were placed' free on board' in performance of the contract. In this
class of cases the passing of the property may depend, according to the
contract, either on mutual consent
of both parties~ or on the act of the
vendor communicated to the purchaser, or on the act of the vendor

Sewell, 7 H. & N. 574. Though where

it appears on the face of the docu-

ments, the court may decide it as a

quest ion of law. Key v. Cotesvvorth

(1852), 7 Exch. 595.

3 In Browne v. Hare (1859), 4 H. &

N. 822, Erie, J., said: "The contract

was for the purchase of unascer-

tained goods, and the question has
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showing, the transaction will have its natural effect of reserv-

ing the jus disponendi in the seller, and will prevent a trans-

fer of the title to the buyer until such time as, upon payment

or otherwise, the seller, by indorsement or its equivalent,

places the goods at the disposal of the buyer. 1 The question

is, was it the purpose of the seller, in taking the bill of lading

to his own order, to reserve the jus disponendi — to retain con-

trol of the goods,— or was he desirous that the buyer should

take the goods and simply adopted this method as matter of

precaution in case the buyer, for any reason, should not take

them. 2

alone. Here it passed by the act of

the vendor alone. If the bill of lad-

ing had made the goods ' to be de-

livered to the order of the consignee,'

the passing of the property would be
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clear. The bill of lading made them

'to be delivered to the order of the

showing, the tran action will have its natural effect of res rving the jus cli.?_J onendi in the seller, and i.vill prevent a transfer of the title to the buyer until such time as, upon payment
or oth nvise, the seller, by indorsemcnt or its equivalent,
place. the goods at the dispo al of the buyer. 1 The question
is, wa it the purpo e of the seller, in takin 0 the bill of lading
to his own order, to reserve the jus dis_ponendi- to retain control of the goods,- or wa be de irous that the bu3 er hould
take the good and simply adopted this method as matt:>r of
precaution in ca e the buyer, for any reason, should not take
th m. 2

consignor,' and he indorsed it to the

order of the consignee and sent it to

his agent for the consignee. Thus

the real question has been on the in-

tention with which the bill of lading

was taken in this form : whether the

consignor shipped the goods in per-

formance of his contract to place

them 'free on board;' or for the pur-

pose of retaining a control over them

and continuing to be owner, con-

trary to the contract, as in the case

of Wait v. Baker, 2 Ex. 1, and as

is explained in Turner v. The Trust-

ees of the Liverpool Docks, 6 Ex.

543. and Van Casteel v. Booker, 2

Ex. 691. The question was one of

fact, and must be taken to have been

disposed of at the trial; the only

question before the court below or

before us being whether the mode of

taking the bill of lading necessarily

prevented the property from pass-

ing. In our opinion it did not, under

the circumstances."

i Where the seller indorses the bill

of lading and sends it to the pur-

chaser he clearly waives the jus dis-

ponendi. Key v. Cotesworth (1852),

7 Exch. 595; Browne v. Hare (1859),

4 H. & N. 822; Wilmshurst v. Bowker

(1844), 7 Man. & Gr. 882. So, also,

where he gives the buyer an uncon-

ditional order on the carrier for the

goods. Hatch v. Bayley (1853), 12

Cash. (Mass.) 27; Hatch v. Lincoln

(1853), 12 Gush. 31.

So, though the seller retains the

bill of lading, if the goods are actu-

ally delivered to and received by the

buyer, the jus disponendi is gone.

Hope Lumber Co. v. Hardware Co.

(1890), 53 Ark. 196, 13 S. W. R. 731.

2 The distinction is clearly shown in

Joyce v. Swann (1864), 17 C. B. (N. S.)

84. There it appeared that Seagrave

& Co. of Liverpool had contracted

to sell a cargo of guano to McCarter

of Londonderry. They wrote him

l \Vhere the eller in iorse. the bill
alone. Here it pas ed by tha act of
the vendor alone. If the bill of lad· of lading and end it to the puring bad made th good ' to be d - ha. er he clearly waive the Ju · clislivered to the order of the con i o-nee,' ponencli. Key v. Cote ·worth (1 52),
Exch. 595; Browne v. Hare (l ' 39 ,
the pa ing of the property w uld b
cl ar. The bill of lading ma le th m 4 H. & N. '>9; Wilm hur t v. Bowkel'
(1 4-!),
l\Ian. & Gr.
2.
o, also,
'to bed li,ered to the order of th
on ignor, and he indor. eel it to the where he give the buyer an unconditional order on the carrier for the
or<l r of the con ignee and ent it t
ood . Ha.tch v. Bayley (1 33), 12
hi · agent for the on ignee. Thu·
u h. (:\fa . .) 21; Ha.tch v. Lincoln
the real que tion ha been on the intention with whi h the bill of lading (1 .)3), 12 Cu h. 31.
was taken in thi form: whether the
So, though the seller retains the
con ' ignor hipped the goou in per- bill of lading, if the good are actuformance of hi contract to place ally delivered to and received by the
them 'free on board;' or for the pur- buyer, the Ju cli :ponendi is gone.
po e of retaining a control OYer them Hope Lumber Co. v. Hardware Co.
and continuing to be owner, con- (1890), 53 Ark. 196, 13 S. W. R. 731.
2 The di tinction is clearly shown in
trary to the contract, a in the ca e
of Wait v. Baker,
Ex. 1 and a· Joyce v. \Yann (1 64), 17 C. B. ( :r. .)
i explained in Turner v. The Tru tt. There it appeared that eagrave
ee' of the Liverpool Doc k· 6 Ex. & Co. of Liverpool had contracted
543: and Van Ca teel v. Booker, 2 to sell a cargo of guano to McCarter
Ex. 691. The que tion wa one of of Londonderry. They wrote him
fact, and mu t be taken to have been February '>6th that they had engaged
di po ed of at the trial; the only a ve el and would have the cargo
que tion before the court below or on board in a few day and propo:sed
before u being whether the mode of to draw on him for the guano at a
taking the bill of lading nece arily certain price per ton. On l\Iarch 2<l
prevented the property from pa - l\IcCarter ordered the cargo insured
ing. In our opinion it did not, under for him. On l\Iarch 3d he wrote to
the circum tance ."
, eagraye & o. complaining that the
6.31

§ 776.J

LA. W OF SAJ .K

[r:ooK n.

776.]

LAW OF SALE.

[L'OOK II.

776.

The mere fact, however, that the consignor was

the agent of the consignee is not necessarily conclusive, for

"where a commercial correspondent, however set in motion

by a principal for whom he acts, advances his own money or

credit for the purchase of property and takes the bill of lading

in his own name, looking to such property as the reliable and

safe means of reimbursement up to the moment when the orig-

inal principal shall pay the purchase price, he becomes the

owner of the property instead of its pledgee, and his relation

to the original mover in the transaction is that of an owner

price was too high. On March 4th

Seagrave Co., fearing from this let-

ter that McCarter might not accept

the guano, took a bill of lading in

§ 776.

The mere fact, however, that the consignor was
the agent of the consignee is not necessarily conclusive, for
"where a commercial correspondent, however set in motion
by a principal for who:n he acts, advances his own money or
credit for the purchase of property and takes the bill of lading
in his own name, looking to such property as the reliable and
safe means of reimbursement up to the moment when the original principal shall pay the purchase price, he becomes the
owner of the property instead of its pledgee, and his relation
to the original mover in the transaction is that of an owner

their own names and insured the
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cargo on their own account. This

bill of lading and an invoice were

sent to a partner of the firm who

happened to be near Londonderry,

and he called on McCarter in the

evening on Saturday, March 7th. Mc-

Carter was then willing to take the

cargo and they met Monday morn-

ing, when the bill of lading was in-

dorsed to McCarter and he gave his

acceptance for it. It afterwards ap-

peared that the vessel and cargo had

been lost on the evening of March

7th. The action was upon the insur-

ance effected by Joyce, the insur-

ance broker, for McCarter, and de-

fendants, the underwriters, con-

tended that McCarter had no insur-

able interest on March 2d, but the

jury found that Seagrave & Co. had

put the cargo on board with inten-

tion of passing the property to him,

and found for the plaintiff. A mo-

tion for nonsuit or new trial was de-

nied. The court, per Williams, J.,

said: " It was a question for the jury,

and I think they were warranted in

assuming that the guano was put on

board pursuant to that contract

65

with the intention of transferring

the property from the sellers to the

buyers. It is true that the bill of

lading was taken in the names of

the sellers, and at the time the insur-

ance was declared was unindorsed.

That was a circumstance which was

well worthy the attention of the

jury, and might have induced them

to come to a contrary conclusion.

But, if they thought that, notwith-

standing this, there were other cir-

cumstances sufficiently cogent to

induce them to come to the conclu-

sion that the property was intended

to pass, I am of opinion that the

mere circumstance of the form of

the bill of lading, and of the invoice

being transmitted to the partner

then in Ireland, instead of to Mc-

Carter direct, was not sufficient to

price was too high. On March 4th with the intention of transferring
Seagrave Co., fearing from this let- the property from the sellers to the
t er that McCarter might not accept buyers. It is true that the bill of
the g uano, took a bill of lading in lading was taken in the names of
their own names and insured the the sellers, and at the time the insurcargo on their own account. This ance was declared was unindored.
bill of lauing and an invoice were That was a circumstance which was
sent to a partner of the firm who well worthy the attention of the
happened to be near Londonderry, jury, and might have induced them
and he called on McCarter in the to come to a contrary conclu ion.
evening on Saturday, March 7th. Mc- But, if they thought that, notwithCarter was then willing to take the standing this, there were other circargo and they met Monday morn- cumstances sufficiently cogent to
ing, when the bill of lading was in- induce them to come to the concludorsed to Mccarter and he gave his sion that the property was intended
acceptance for it. It afterwards ap- to pass, I am of opinion that the
peared that the vessel and cargo had mere circumstance of the form of
been lost on the evening of March the bill of lading, and of the in voice
7th. The action was upon the insur- bP-ing transmitted to the partner
ance effected by Joyce, the insur- then in Ireland, in, tead of to Mcance broker, for 1\foCarter, and de- Carter direct, was not sufficient to
fendants, the unuer•Nriters, con- annihilate the other evidence in the
tended that foCarter had no insur- cause, though it might indnce the
able interest on March 2d, but the jury to pause. The cases of Wait v.
jury found that Seagrave & Co. had Baker, 2 Ex. 1, and Browne v. Hare,
pnt the cargo on boaru with inten- 3 H. & N. 484, 4 id. 822, appear to
tion of pa ing t.he property to him, me clearly to establish the di tincand found for the plaintiff. A mo- tion that, if from all the facts it may
tion for non uit or new trial was de- fairly be inferred that the bill of
ni d. The court, per William , J., lading was taken in the name of the
aicl: "ltwa aque tionforthe jury, seller in order to retain dominion
anu I think they were warranted in over the goods, that shows that there
a urning that the guano was put on was no intention to pas the propboard pursuant to that contra t erty; but if the whole of the circum6.32

CH. VI.] KESERVATIOX OF THE JUS DISPONEXDI. [§§ 777, 778.

under a contract to sell and deliver when the purchase price is

paid." 1

§777. Purpose and effect.— This reservation of the

title by the seller may be prompted by any one of a number of

motives and it may have a variety of effects. Its ordinary pur-

pose, undoubtedly, is to coerce payment of the price by retain-

ing title until payment. In addition to this main purpose and

effect, it may have several incidental or collateral effects. It

may, for example, determine when and where the title has

passed and the sale has been completed within the purview of

local statutes forbidding or restricting sales, as in the common

case of the statutes forbidding or restricting sales of intoxicat-

ing liquors. 2 It may also determine whether or not the goods

have become taxable or leviable as the property of the vendee. 3

And in addition to these, as will be seen, 4 it may give to the

vendor a wide power of making pledges, sales or mortgages of

the goods before they become the property of the original

vendee.
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§ 778. . "With the title would also ordinarily be retained

the risk, though this must depend upon the manner in which

the bill of lading is subsequently dealt with. If, for example,

though the bill of lading were taken to the seller's order, he

at once indorses it and sends it to the buyer, or gives the lat-

ter an order on the carrier for the goods, the title, as has been

stances lead to the conclusion that Berger v. State, 50 Ark. 20, 6 S. W. R.

that was not the object, the form of 15; Sarbecker v. State, 65 Wis. 171,

the bill of lading has no influence on 56 Am. R. 624; Coin. v. Fleming, 130

the result." See also Straus v. Wes- Pa. St. 138, 18 Atl. R. 622, 17 Am. St.

sel (1876), 30 Ohio St. 211. R. 763, 5 L. R. A. 470; State v. O'Neil,

i Moors v. Kidder (1887), 106 N. Y. 56 Vt. 140, 56 Am. R. 557; State v.

32; Farmers,' etc. Bank v. Logan Peters, 91 Me. 31, 39 Atl. R. 342; State

(1878), 74 N. Y. 568. v. Wingfield, 115 Mo. 428, 22 S. W. R.

2 Thus, where the jus disponendi 363, 37 Am. St. R. 406, and many other

lias been so reserved, the title passes cases cited in these.

and the sale is completed at the time 3 For example, see Merchants' Ex-

and place of delivery rather than of change Bank v. McGraw, 59 Fed. R.

shipment. See Bellefontaine v. Vas- 972, 15 U. S. App. 332, 8 C. C. A. 420.

saux, 55 Ohio St. 323, 45 N. E. R 321 ; * See post, g§ 793, 794.-
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seen, would be vested in the buyer. 1 And if the seller retain

the bill of lading merely for the purpose of obtaining payment

of the price, but intending that the buyer should have the

goods upon payment, the buyer, by the shipment, acquires an

interest in the gooils which will entitle him to have them upon

payment. "With reference to such a case Lord Bramwell said

on one occasion: 2 "That the vendee has an interest in the

specific goods as soon as they are shipped is plain. By the

contract they are at his risk. If lost or damaged, he must

bear the loss. If specially good and above the average qual-

ity which the seller was bound to deliver, the benefit is the

vendee's. If he pays the price, and the vendor receives it, not

having transferred the property, nor created any right over it

in another, the property vests."

§ 779. Bill of lading to seller's order attached to draft on

buyer. — Equally significant of the intention is the case in

which the bill of lading, taken to the order of the seller, 3 is

indorsed by him and attached to a draft upon the purchaser
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for the price; and the draft is then delivered to a bank for col-

lection, 4 or is discounted by the bank in reliance upon the secu-

*See cases cited in the fifth note bank on acceptance of the draft, and

to section 775. passes title to the goods, and the

2 Mirabita v. Imperial Ottoman bank need not hold the bill of lading

seen, would be vested in the buyer. 1 And if the seller retc:d n
the bill of lading merely for tb e purpose of obtaining payment
of the price, but int nding that the buyer should have the
goods upon payment, the buyer, by the shipment, acquires an
interest in the good which will entitle him to have them upon
payment. \-Vi th reference to such a ca e Lord Bram well said
on one occasion: 2 "That the Yen dee has an interest in the
specific goods a oon as they are shipped is plain. By the
contract they are at his risk. If lost or damaged, he must
bear the loss. If specially good and above the average gualHy which the seller was bound to deliver, the benefit is the
vendee's. If he pays the price, and the vendor receives it, not
having transferred the property, nor created any right over it
in another, th e property ves ts."
·

Bank (1878), 3 Exch. Div. 164. until payment, the time draft being

3 The same effect has been given evidence of a term of credit given to

§ 779. Bill of lading to seller's order attaclrnd to draft on

to the transaction where the bill of the drawee. St. Paul Mill Co. v. Great

lading was a mere receipt, naming Western Despatch Co. (1886), 27 Fed.

the seller as consignor and the buyer R. 434; National Bank v. Merchants'

as consignee. Emery s Sons v. Irving Bank (1875), 91 U. S. 92: Moore v.

National Bank (1874), 25 Ohio St. 360, Louisiana Nat. Bank (1892), 44 La.

18 Am. R. 299. See also post, §$ 783- Ann. 99, 32 Am. St. R. 332, 10 S. R,

786. 407. See also Marine Bank v. Wright,

4 " Time " and " sight " drafts — A 48 N. Y. 1 ; Hall v. Richardson (1860),

buyer .-Equally significant of the in ten ti on is the case in
which the bill of lading, taken to the order of the seller, 3 is
irnlorsed by him and attached to a draft upon the purchaser
for the price; and the draft is then delivered to a bank for collection,4 or is discounted by the bank in reliance upon the secu-

bill of lading making goods deliver- 16 Md. 396, 77 Am. Dec. 303.

able to the order of the shipper and But where the draft is a sight draft,

attached to a time draft drawn on or the papers otherwise show that no

the purchaser and sent to a bank credit was given, the bill of lading

"for acceptance and collection," with should not be delivered until pay-

no other instructions, has been held ment. Second National Bank v. Cum-

to be rightfully delivered by the mings (1891), 89 Tenn. 609, 24 Am. St.

654

1 See cases cited in the fifth note
to section 775.
2 Mirabita v. Imperial Ottoman
Bank (1878), 3 Exch. Div. 164.
a The same effect has been g iven
to the transaction where the bill of
lading was a mere receipt, naming
the seller as consig nor and the buyer
as consignee. Emery's Sons v. Irving
National Bank (1874), 215 Ohio St. 3130,
1 Am. R. 299. See al o post,§§ 7837 6.
4 " Time" an cl " ig·ht" drafts.- A
bill of lading making goods deliverable to the order of the shipper and
attached to a time draft drawn on
the purchaser and sent to a bank
"for acceptance and collection," with
no other 1nstructions, has been held
to be rightfully delivered by the

bank on ac.ceptance of the draft, and
pa es title to the goods, and the
bank need not hold the bill of lading
. until payment, the time draft being
evidence of a term of credit given to
the drawee. St. Paul Mill Co. v. Great
·western Despat ch Co. (18 6), 27 Fed.
R. 434; National Bank v. Merchants'
Bank (1875), 91 U. S. 92; Moore v.
Louisiana Nat. Ba nk (1802), 44 La.
Ann. 99, 32 Am. St. R. 332, 10 S. R.
407. See also Marine Bank v. Wright,
48 N. Y. 1; Hall v. Richardson (1860),
16 Md. 396, 77 Am. Dec. 303.
But where th e draft is a sight draft.
or the papers otherwise show that no
credit was given, the bill of lading
should not be delivered until payment. Se ond National Bank v. Cummings (1891), 89 Tenn. 609, 24 Am. St.

654
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rity afforded by the bill of lading. In such a case presumptively

no title passes to the purchaser until by payment of the draft

he has duly obtained the possession of the bill of lading, 1 al-

though the goods have been sent in the buyer's own ship. 2

R. 618, 18 S. W. R. 115; Mc Arthur Co.

v. Old Second Nat. Bank (1899), —

rity afforded by the bill of lading. In such a case presurnpti-ve1y
no title passes to the purchaser until by payment of the draft
he has duly obtained the possession of the bill of lading, 1 although the goods have been sent in the buyer's own ship. 2

Mich. — ,81 N. W. R. 92; Security

Bank v. Luttgen (1882), 29 Minn. 363,

13 N. W. R. 151; Kentucky Refining

Co. v. Globe Refining Co. (1898), —

Ky. — , 47 S. W. R. 602, 42 L. R. A.

353.

Un Jenkyns v. Brown (1849), 14

Q B. 496, it appeared that one Klin-

gender, a merchant in New Orleans,

had bought a cargo of corn on the
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order of the plaintiffs, and taken a

bill of lading for it, deliverable to his

own order. He then drew bills for

the cost of the cargo on the plaint-

iffs, and sold the bills to a New Or-

leans banker, to whom he also in-

dorsed the bill of lading. He sent

invoices and a letter of advice to the

plaintiffs, showing that the cargo

was bought and shipped on their ac-

count. It was held that the prop-

erty did not pass to plaintiffs, as the

taking of a bill of lading by Klin-

gender in his own name was " nearly

conclusive evidence " that he did not

R. 618, 18 S. W.R. 115; McArthur Co.
v. Old Second Nat. Bank (1899), - Mich.-, 81 N. W. K 92; Security
Bank v. Luttgen (1 2), 29 Minn. 363,
13 N. W. R. 151; Kentucky Refining
Co. v. Globe Refining Co. (1898), - Ky.-, 47 S. Vv. R. 602, 42 L. R. A.
353.
l In Jenkyns v. Brown (1849), 14
Q. B. 496, it appeared that one Klingender, a merchant in New Orleans,
had bought a cargo of corn on the
order of the plaintiff , and taken a
bill of lading for it, deliverable to his
own order. He then drew bills for
the cost of the cargo on the plaintiff , and sold the bills to a New Orleans Lanker, to whom he also indorsed the bill of lading. He s nt

invoices and a letter of ad dee to the
plaintiff , showing that the cargo
was bought and shipped on their acuount. It was helcl that the property did not pass to plaintiffs, a the
taking of a bill of lading by Klingender in his own name was" nearly
conclu ive evidence 'that he did not
intend to pass the property to plaintiffs; that by delivering the indorsed
bill of lading to the buyer of the
bills of exchange he had conveyed to
them "a special property" in the
cargo; and by the invoice and letter
of advice to the plaintiffs he had
pas eel to them the "general property" in the cargo, 'subject to this
special property, so that the plaintiffs' rights to the goorls would not

intend to pass the property to plaint-

iffs; that by delivering the indorsed

bill of lading to the buyer of the

bills of exchange he had conveyed to

them "a special property" in the

cargo; and by the invoice and letter

of advice to the plaintiffs he had

passed to them the "general prop-

erty" in the cargo, subject to this

special property, so that the plaint-

iffs' rights to the goods would not

2 Thus, in Turner v. Trustees of Liv-

erpool Docks (1851), 6 Exch. 543, a

cargo of cotton had been purchased

by customers who sent their own ves-

sel for it and it was placed on board;

but the sellers took bills of lading

making the goods deliverable '"to

order or to our [the sellers'] assigns,

he or they paying freight . . .

nothing, being owner's property."

The sellers drew on the purchasers

for the price, and the bills were dis-

counted at a bauk with the bill of

lading as security. The question was

whether by delivery on board the

buyer's vessel, and the statement in

the bill of lading that the goods were

his property, the title had so passed

as to defeat the claim of the bank.

Said the court, per Patteson, J.:

" There is no doubt that the delivery

of goods on board the purchasers'

own ship is a delivery to him, unless

the vendor protects himself by spe-

cial terms restraining the effect of

2 Th us,

in Turner v. Tru. tees of Liv- of goods on boarJ the purcha ers'
erpool Docks (1851), 6 Exch. 543, a own ship is a delivery to him, unless
cargo of cotton had been purchased the vendor protects himself by speby customers who sent their own ves- cial terms restraining the effect of
el for it and it was placed on board; such delivery. In the present ca. e
but the ell rs took bill of lading the vendors, by the term of the bill
making the good delfrerable '·to of lading. made the cotton deliverorder or to our [the seller1;'] a ·igns, able at Liverpool to their order or
he or they paying freight
as ign , and there was not, therefore,
nothing, being owner's p1·ope1·ty." a delivery of the cotton to the purThe sellers drew on the purchasers chasers as owners, although there
for the price, and the Lills were dis- was a delivery on board their hip.. ,
-0ounted at a bank with the bill of To like effect: Eller haw v. '.lagniac
lading as security. The question was (1843), 6 Ex. 570; Brandt v. Bowlby
whether by delivery on board tbe (1 31), 2 B. & Ad. 932; Van Ca teel
buyer's vessel, and the statement in v. Booker (1848), 2 Ex. 691; lVIoakes v.
the bill of lading that the goods were Nicholson (18Q.5), 19 C. B. (N. S.) 290:
his property, the title had so pas ed Schotsmans v. Rail way Co. (1 67), 2
as to defeat the claim of the bank. Ch. Ap. 332; Dows v. National ExSaid the court, per Patteson, J.: change Bank (1875), 91 U. S. 61 .
"' There is no doubt that the delivery
655
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This presumption, however, as in the former case, is not ab-

solutely conclusive, and the title may pass if such appears to

have been the intention, notwithstanding the draft. 1

This presumption, however, as in the former case, is not absolutely conclusive, and the title may pass if such appears to
have been the intention, notwithstanding the draft. 1

780.

Buyer obtaining possession without payment.

And, in the ordinary case, even though the bill of lading in-

§ 780. - - Buyer obtaining possession without

pa~·ment.

dorsed by the seller comes into the possession of the buyer, yet

if it so comes into his possession upon condition that he will

pay the draft, no title passes to him until he has paid it. 2 But

arise till the bills of exchange were that there was evidence to go to the

paid by them.

In Merchants' Exchange Bank v.

McGraw (1894). 59 Fed. R. 972, 15 U. S.

And, in the ordinary case, even though the bill of lading indorsecl by the seller comes into the possession of the buyer, yet
if it so comes into his possession upon condition that he will
pay the draft, no title passes to him until he has paid it. 2 But

App. 332, 8 C. C. A. 420, it appeared

that L. & Co. of Milwaukee had

bought a quantity of hops from K.,
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M. & Co., in Seattle, on the under-

standing that the sellers should re-

tain title till payment. In accord-

ance with an undertaking by the

Merchants' Exchange Bank of Mil-

waukee to guaranty payment by L.

& Co., the hops were delivered to a

carrier at Seattle and K., M. & Co.

took a bill of lading in which L. &

Co. were named as consignees. This

bill of lading was attached to a draft

on L. & Co., and the draft was dis-

counted by a bank in Seattle, which

then forwarded the draft with bill of

lading attached to the Merchants'

Exchange Bank for collection. After

the delivery of the hops to the car-

rier (but whether before or after the

discount by the Seattle bank was

not clear) the hops were attached at

Seattle as the goods of L. & Co. In

an action by the Merchants' Ex-

change Bank against the attaching

parties, the lower court nonsuited

the plaintiff upon the ground that it

did not appear that the draft was

cashed by the Seattle bank before

the levy; but on appeal it was held

jury tending to prove that, up to the

time of the delivery of the bill of

lading to the Seattle bank, the title

to the hops remained in K., M. & Co.,

and that by the cashing of the draft,

and the delivery of the bill of lading

to that bank, it acted as the agent

of the Milwaukee bank, and that the

title passed to the latter.

See also that title does not pass

until payment, Freeman v. Kraemer,

63 Minn. 242, 65 N. W. R. 455; Belle-

fontaine v. Vassaux, 55 Ohio St. 323,

45 N. E. R. 321; Baker v. Chicago,

etc. R. Co., 98 Iowa, 438, 67 N. W. R.

376; Erwin v. Harris, 87 Ga. 333, 13

S. E. Rep. 513; Scharff v. Meyer, 133

Mo. 428, 34 S. W. R. 858, 54 Am. St.

R. 672; Kentucky Refining Co. v.

Globe Refining Co., — Ky. — , 47 S.

W. R. 602, 42 L. R. A. 353; Bergeman v.

Indianapolis, etc. R. Co., 104 Mo. 77, 15

S. W. R. 992; Willman Mercantile

arise till the bills of exchange were
pa.id by them.
In Iercha.nts' Exchange Bank v.
McGraw (:l 9-1). 59 Fed. R. 972, 15 U. S.
App. 332, 8 C. C. A. 420, it appeared
that L. & Co. of Milwaukee had
bought a quantity of hops from K.,
M. & Co., in Seattle, on the understanding that the sellers should retain title till payment. In accordance with an undertaking by the
Merchants' Exchange Bank of Milwaukee to guaranty payment by L.
& Co., the hops were delivered to a
carrier at Seattle and K, M. & Co.
took a bill of lading in which L. &
Co. were named as consignees. This
Lill of lading was attached to a draft
on L. & Co., and the draft was discounted by a bank in Seattle, which
tlien forwarded the draft with bill of
lading attached to the l\Ierchants'
Exchange Bank for collect.ion. After
the delivery of the hops to the cari·ier (but whether before or after the
di count by the eattle bank was
not clear) the hops were attached at
'eattle as the goods of L. & Co. In
an aetion by the Merchant ' Exhange Bank against the atta bing
parti s, the lower court nonsuited
the plaintiff upon the ground that it
<lid n t app ar that the draft was
a heel y the Seattle bank before
the l vy; but on appeal it wa hel<l

that there was evidence to go to .the
jury tern.ling to prove that, up to the
time of the deli very of the bill of
lading to the Seattle bank, the title
to the- bops remained in K., 1\1. & Co.,
and that by the cashing of the draft,
and the delivery of the bill of lading
to that bank, it acted as the agent
of the Milwaukee bank, and that the
title passed to the latter.
See also that title does not pass
until payment, Freeman v. Kraemer,
63 Minn. 242, 65 N. W. R. 455; Bellefontaine v. Vassaux, 55 Ohio St. 323,
45 N. E. R. 321; Baker v. Chicago,
etc. R. Co., 98 Iowa., 438, 67 N. W. R.
376; Erwin v. Harris, 87 Ga. 333, 13
S. E. Rep. 513; Scharff v. Meyer, 133
Mo. 428, 34 S. W. R. 858, 54 Am. St.
R. 672; Kentucky Refining Co. v.
Globe Refining Co., -- Ky.-, 47 S.
W.R. 602, 42 L. R. A. 353; Bergeman v.
Indianapolis, etc. R. Co., 10± Mo. 77, 15
S. W. R. 992; Willman Mercantile
Co. v. Fussy, 15 Mont. 511, 39 Pac. R.
738; Jones v. Brewer (1885), 79 Ala..
5±5.
I Hobart v. Littlefield (1881), 13
R. I. 341. See also Straus v. Wessel
(1876), 30 Ohio St. 211; Joyce v.
Sw·ann (1864), 17 Com. B. (N. S.) 84.
2 Farmer 'Bank v. Logan (1 7 ), 74
N. Y. 568; Shepherd v. Harri ou
(1 71), L. R. 4 Q. B. 196, 4 id. 493,-L. R.
5 H. L. 116; Bank of Roche ter v.
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where the seller has so dealt with the bill of lading for the

purpose of securing the payment of the price, the buyer, upon

paying or tendering the price, is entitled to have the goods. 1

Jones (1851), 4 N. Y. 497, 55 Am. Dec.

290; Moors v. Kidder (1887), 106 N. Y.

where the seller bas so dealt with the bill of lading for the
purpose of securing the payment of the price, the buyer, upon
paying or tendering the price, is entitled to have the goods. 1

32, 12 N. E. R. 818; The New Haven

Wire Co. Cases (1889). 57 Conn. 352,

18 Atl. R. 2GG.

In Moors v. Kidder (supra), the

facts were as follows: Kidder, Pea-

body & Co., bankers of Boston, Mass.,

issued a letter of credit to C. C. Ban-

croft & Co., of Calcutta, authorizing

the latter to draw on Baring Bros. &

Co., of London, for the cost of ship-

ments of goods, through bills of lad-
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ing" to Boston or New York, to the

extent of £3,000, for account of P. M.

Swain, guaranteeing that the bills

drawn by virtue of this credit would

be duly honored by Baring Bros. &

Co. Swain, on his part, agreed to

provide sufficient funds in London

for meeting the payment of what-

ever bills should be drawn, as they

matured. And he further expressly

agreed that all property purchased

under this arrangement, together

with the bills of lading and insur-

ance, was " hereby pledged " to Bar-

ing Bros. & Co. as collateral security

for the payment of the drafts, and

might be sold or otherwise disposed

of as Baring Bros. & Co. might deem

necessary for their own protection.

In due course C. C. Bancroft & Co.

drew their draft for account of

Swain, for the cost of one hundred

cases of shellac, and attached thereto

a bill of lading to the order of Bail-

ing Bros. & Co., deliverable in New

York. The draft was accepted and

paid by Baring Bros. & Co. After

the arrival of the goods Swain ob-

tained the papers from Kidder, Pea-

body & Co., as attorneys for Baring

Bros. & Co., in order, as he alleged,

to enter them at the custom-house

and have them warehoused in the

name of Baring Bros. & Co. But in-

stead of doing so, he entered them in

the name of his broker, and subse-

quently obtained a loan of $6,000

from the plaintiff on the security of

ninety-five of the cases of shellac, for

Jones (1851), 4 N. Y. 497, 55 Am. Dec.
290; Moors v. Kidder (1887), 106 N. Y.
32, 12 r. E. R. 18; The New Haven
·wire Co. ca· es (1889). 57 Conn. 352,
1 Atl. R. 266.
-In Moor v. Kidder (supra), the
facts were a follows: Kidder, Peabody & Co., bankers of Bo. ton, Ma s.,
is ued a letter of credit to C. C. Bancroft & Co., of Calcutta, authorizing
the latter to draw on Baring Bros. &
Co., of London, for the cost of shipments of good , through bill of lading· to Bo ·ton or New York, to the
extent of £3,000, for account of P. 1\1.
Swain, guaranteeing that the bills
drawn by virtue of thi credit would
be duly honored by Baring Bro . &
Co. Swain, on his part, agreed to
provide sufficient funds in London
for meeting the payment of whatever bills should be drawn, as they
matured. And he further expre sly
agreed that all property purcha ed
under this arrangement, together
with the bill of lading and insurance, was "hereby pledged" to Baring Bros. & Co. as collateral security
for the payment of the drafts, and
might be sold or otherwi e di. posed
of as Baring Bro . & Co. might deem
neces ary for their uwn protection.
In due course C. C. Bancroft & Co.
drew their draft for account of
Swain, for the cost of one hundred
cases of shellac, and attached thereto
a bill of lading to the order of Baring Bros. & Co., deliverable in New
York. The draft was accepted and

paid by Baring Bros. & Co. After
the arrival of the goods Swain obtained the papers from Kidder, Peabody & Co., a attorneys for Baring
Bro . & Co., in order, as he alleged.
to enter them at the cu tom-house
and have them warehou ed in the
name of Baring Bro . & Co. But instead of doing so, he entered. them in
the name of his broker, and ubsequently obtained a loan of $6.000
from the plaintiff on the ecurity of
nmety-five of the ca e of shellac, for
which he gave warehouse receipts.
The ca e turned olely upon the question whether Swain ·was general
owner of the shellac and Baring
Bro . & Co. only pledgee . The court
held that the property in the goods
wa ve ted in ~aring Bro . & Co.,
in ce their money and credit bought
the goods, the bill of lading was to
them, the good were expres ly stated
by Swain to be held by them as security, and they had the power .o f
absolute dispo al.
A similar decision, under an almost
identical state of facts, was reached
in The New Ha,en ·wire Co. Ca es
(sup1·a). In one of these, which was
typical of them all, the New Haven
Wire Co., through its agents in England, purchased iron rod from German manufacturer on the credit of
Baring Bro. . & Co. The aid agents
drew drafts, accompanied by bills of
lading, to the order of the dra-wees,
on Baring Bros. & Co., which the
latter accepted and paid at maturity,

which he gave warehouse receipts.

The case turned solely upon the ques-

tion whether Swain was general

owner of the shellac and Baring

Bros. & Co. only pledgees. The court

held that the property in the goods

was vested in Baring Bros. & Co.,

since their money and credit bought

the goods, the bill of lading was to

them, the goods were expressly stated

by Swain to be held by them as se-

curity, and they had the power of

1 Per Cotton, L. J ., in l\firabita v. Imperial Ottoman Bank (1878), 3 Exch.
Div. 164, quoterl post,§ 783.
42
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§781. Custom does not affect.— An alleged custom

that the title should pass upon delivery to the carrier notwith-

standing that a bill of lading has been taken to the order of the

seller and attached to a draft forwarded for collection has

been held invalid. 1

782.

Sending invoice, etc., to buyer does not affect

§ 781. - - Custom does not affect.-An alleged custom
that the title should pass upon delivery to the carrier notwitl1standing t!Jat a bill of lading has been taken to the order of the
seller and attached to a draft forwarded for collection has
been held in valid .1

result. — The mere fact that the seller has sent to the buj^er

an invoice of the goods in which the specific goods are de-

scribed and the buyer is named as consignee does not change

the result; 2 for, though these acts of themselves might amount

to an appropriation, they cannot pass the title in the face of

the bill of lading taken to the order of the seller. The same

is true also where an unindorsed copy 3 or duplicate 4 of the

bill of lading is sent to the buyer, although, as will be seen, 5

where the bill of lading is not taken to the seller's order, but
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the buyer is named as consignee, then a duplicate of the bill of

lading sent to the buyer is as effectual as the original. 6

under the agreement that the goods,

together with the bills of lading,

were, in consideration of the credit,

sold, assigned and transferred to

them as collateral security, subject

only to the right of the New Haven

Wire Co. to acquire title by the com-

plete and strict performance of their

contract as to payment. The court

said: "The decisions are so numer-

§ 782. - - Sending in voice, etc., to bnyer does not affect
resnlt.-The mere fact that the seller bas sent to the buyer
an invoice of the goods in which the specific goods are described and the buyer is named as consignee does not change
the result · 2 for, though these act of them elves miaht amount
to an appropriation, they cannot pass the title in the face of
the bill of lading tak n to the order of the seller. The same
is true also where an unintlorsed copy 3 or ctuplicate 4 of the
bill of lading is sent to the _b uyer, although, as will be seen,5
where the bill of lading i not taken to the seller's order, but
the buyer is named as consignee, then a duplicate of the bill of
lading sent to the buyer is as effectual as the original. 6

ous, and by so many courts, to the

effect that when a commercial cor-

respondent advances money for the

purchase of property and takes pos-

session, either actual or symbolical,

he becomes the owner thereof, even

when the advancement was made

and the property was purchased at

the request and for the ultimate use

of another, and there is an agree-

ment to transfer title to that other

upon the performance of conditions

precedent, and ownership was taken

solely for the protection of the ad-

vancement, that such may be said to

be the established rule."

J Charles v. Carter (1896), 96 Tenn.

607, 86 S. W. R. 396.

2 Jenkyns v. Brown (1850), 14 Q. B.

496; Wait v. Baker (1848), 2 Ex. 1;

Shepherd v. Harrison (1871), L. R. 4

Q. B. 194, 4 id. 493, L.R5H. L. 116.

"The invoice standing alone fur-

nishes no proof of title." Pennsyl-

vania R. Co. v. Stern, 119 Pa. St. 24,

4 Am. St. R. 626; Dows v. Milwaukee

Bank, 91 U. S. 618.

3 Wait v. Baker, supra; Brandt v.

Bowlby (1831), 2 B. & Ad. 932.

4Weyand v. Railway Co. (1888), 75

Iowa, 573, 9 Am. St. R. 504, 39 N. W.

R. 899.

5SeejX>s£, §788et seq.

6 Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Heitlen-

heimer (1891), 82 Tex. 195, 27 Am. St,

R. 861, 17 S. W. R. 608.
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under the agreement that the good ,
together with the bills of lading,
were, in con ideration of the credit,
sold, assigned and transferred to
them as collateral security. subject
only to the right of the New Haven
Wire Co. to acquire title by the complete and strict performance of thei r
contract a to payment. The court
saiJ.: "The deci ions are so numerou , and by so many courts. to the
effect that when a commercial corr e pondent advances money for the
purcha e of property and takes posse ion, either actual or symbolical,
he becomes the owner thereof, even
when the advancement was made
and the property wa. purcha eel at
th reque t and for the ultimate u e
of another, and th re i an agreement to tran fer titl to that oth r
upon the p rforman ce of condition
precedent, anu owner hip wa taken
65

solely for the protection of the advancement, that such may be said to
be the established rule."
1 Charles v. Carter (1896), 96 Tenn.
607, 36 s. w. R. 396.
2 Jenkyns v. Brown (1 50), 14 Q. B.
496; Wait v. Baker (1848), 2 Ex. 1 ·
Shepherd v. Harrison (1871), L. R. 4
Q. B. 194, 4 id. 493, L. R. 5 H. L. 116.
"The in voice standing alone furnishes no proof of title." Penn yl\ania R. Co. v. Stern, 119 Pa.. St. 24,
4 Am. St. R. 626; Dows v. Milwaukee
Rank, 91 U. S. 618.
3 Wait v. Baker, supra; Br::tndt v.
Bowlby (1 31), 2 B. & Ad. 932.
4 Weyand v. Railway Co. (1 8), 75
Iowa o 3, 9 Am. St. R. 504, 39 N. W.
R. 99.
5 See po t, § 788 et seq.
6 M:i ouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Heidenheirner (1 !)1), 82 Tex. 195, 27 Am. St.
R. 61, 17

s. w. R. 608.

€H. VI.] RESERVATION OF THE JUS DISPONENDI. [§§ 783-785.

§ 783. The rules stated. — In a leading case 1 upon this

subject decided in the English court of appeal in 1878, Cot-

ton, L. J., laid down the principles governing the cases as fol-

lows : " Under a contract for sale of chattels not specific, the

property does not pass to the purchaser unless there is after-

wards an appropriation of the specific chattels to pass under

the contract; that is, unless both parties agree as to the specific

chattels in which the property is to pass, and nothing remains

to be done in order to pass it. In the case of such a contract

the delivery by the vendor to a common carrier, or (unless the

effect of the shipment is restricted by the terms of the bill of

lading) shipment on board a ship of, or chartered for, the pur-

chaser, is an appropriation sufficient to pass the property."

§ 7S4-. . «If } however, the vendor, when shipping the

articles which he intends to deliver under the contract, takes

the bill of lading to his own order, and does so, not as agent or

on behalf of the purchaser, but on his own behalf, it is held that

he thereby reserves to himself a power of disposing of the prop-
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erty and that consequently there is no final appropriation, and

the property does not on shipment pass to the purchasers.

When the vendor on shipment takes the bill of lading to his

own order, he has the power of absolutely disposing of the

cargo, and may prevent the purchaser from ever asserting any

right of property therein; and accordingly in Wait v. BaTcer?

Ellersliaw v. Magniac 3 and Gabarron v. Kreeft* (in each of

which cases the vendors had dealt with the bills of lading for

their own benefit), the decisions were that the purchaser had

no property in the goods, though he had offered to accept bills

for or had paid the price."

§ 785. . " So, if the vendor deals with or claims to re-

tain the bill of lading in order to secure the contract price, as

when he sends forward the bill of lading with a bill of exchange

attached, with directions that the bill of lading is not to be

i Mirabita v. Imperial Ottoman 2 2Ex., 1.

Bank (1878), 3 Ex. Div. 164, 31 Eng. R. 3 6 Ex. 570.

(Moak's), 200. 4 L. R. 10 Ex. 274, 14 Eng. R. 562.
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delivered to the purchaser till acceptance or payment of the

bill of exchange, the appropriation is not absolute, but, until

acceptance of the draft, or payment or tender of the price, is

conditional only, and until such acceptance or payment or

tender the property in the goods does not pass to the purchaser;

and so it was decided in Turner v. Trustees of Liverpool Docks, 1

Shepherd v. Harrison 2 and Ogg v. Shuter." 3

§ 786. . "But if the bill of lading has been dealt with only

to secure the contract price, there is neither principle nor au-

thority for holding that in" such a case the goods shipped for

the purpose of completing the contract do not, on payment or

tender by the purchaser of the contract price, vest in him.

delivered to the purchaser till acceptance or payment of the
bill of exchange, the appropriation is not absolute, but, until
acceptance of the draft, or payment or ten<ler of the price, is
conditional only, and· until such acceptance or payment or
tender the property in the goods does not pass to the purchaser;
and so it was decided in Turner v. Trustees of L iverpool Docks, 1
Slieplierd v. Harrison 2 and Ogg v. Skuter." 3

When this occurs there is a performance of the condition sub-

ject to which the appropriation was made, and everything

which, according to the intention of the parties, is necessary to

transfer the property is done ; and, in my opinion, under such

circumstances, the property does, on payment or tender of the

price, pass to the purchaser."
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§ 787. Resume' of English cases. — The rules to be de-

duced from the English cases are stated by Mr. Benjamin 4 as

follows:

" First. Where goods are delivered by the vendor, in pursu-

ance of an order, to a common carrier for delivery to the

buyer, the delivery to the carrier passes the property, he being

the agent of the vendee to receive it, and the delivery to him

being equivalent to a delivery to the vendee. 5

"Secondly. Where goods are delivered on board of a vessel

to be carried, and a bill of lading is taken, the delivery by the

vendor is not a delivery to the buyer, but to the captain as

1 6 Ex. 543. Dutton v. Solomonson, 3 B. & P. 582;

2 L. R. 4 Q. B. 196. London & Northwestern Ry. Co. v.

§ 786. - - . "But if the bill of lading has been dealt with only
to secure the contract price, there is neither principle nor au_
thority for holding that in- such a case the goods shipped for
the purpose of completing the contract do not, on payment or
tender by the purchaser of the contract pric~, vest in him.
When this occurs there is a performance of the condition subject to which the appropriation was made, and everything
which, according to the intention of the parties, is necessary to
transfer the property is done; and, in my opinion, under such
circumstances, the property does, on payment or tender of the
price, pass to the purchaser."

3 1 C. P. Div. 47, 15 Eng. R. 231. Bartlett, 7 H. & N. 400; Dunlop v.

4 Benjamin on Sales, § 399. Lambert, 6 CI. & Fin. 600; Cork Dis-

§ 787. - - Resume' of English cases.- The rules to be de-

5 Citing "Wait v. Baker, 2 Ex. 1. tilleries Co. v. Great Southern Ry.

"See also Dawes v. Peck, 8 T. R. 330; Co., L. R. 7 H. L 269."
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duced from the English 9ases are stated by Mr. Benjamin 4 as
follows :
"First. Where goods are delivered by the vendor, in pursuance of an order, to a common carrier for delivery to the
buyer, the delivery to the carrier passes the property, he being
the agent of the vendee to receive it, and the delivery to him
beinO' equivalent to a delivery to the vendee. 5
" econdly. Where goods are delivered on board of a vessel
to be carried, and a bill of lading is taken, the deli very by the
vendor is not a delivery to the buyer, but to the captain as
16 Ex. 543.
L. R. 4 Q. B. 196.
a 1 C. P. Div. 47, 15 Eng. R. 231.
4 Benjamin on Sales,
399.
5 Citing Wait v. Baker, 2 Ex. 1.
"See al o Dawes v. P ck, 8 T. R. 330;
2

Dutton v. Solomonson, 3 B. & P. 582;
London & Northwestern Ry. Co. v.
Bartlett, 7 H. & N. 400; Dunlop v.
Lambert, 6 Cl. & Fin. 600; Cork Distill ries Co. v. Great Southern Ry.
o., L. R. 7 H. L 269."
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bailee for delivery to the person indicated by the bill of lading

as the one for whom they are to be carried. 1

"Thirdly. The fact of making the bill of lading deliverable

to the order of the vendor is, when not rebutted by evidence

to the contrary, almost decisive to show his intention to re-

serve the jus disponendi and to prevent the property from

passing to the vendee. 2

"Fourthly. The prima facie conclusion that the vendor re-

serves the jus disponendi when the bill of lading is to his order

may be rebutted by proof that in so doing he acted as agent

for the vendee and did not intend to retain control of the prop-

erty; and it is for the jury to determine as a question of fact

what the real intention was. 3

"Fifthly. That although, as a general rule, the delivery of

goods by the vendor, on board the purchaser's own ship, is a

delivery to the purchaser and passes the property, yet the

vendor may by special terms restrain the effect of such de-

livery and reserve the jus disponendi, even in cases where the
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bills of lading show that the goods are free of freight because

owner's property. 4 And on a sale of goods which are not specific,

although the goods have been delivered on board a ship of, or

i"This principle," continues the Van Casteel v. Booker, 2 Ex. 691;

text quoted, "runs through all the Jenkyns v. Brown, 14 Q. B. 496;

cases, and is clearly enunciated by Shepherd v. Harrison, supra; Gabar-

Parke, B., in Wait v. Baker, supra; ron v. Kreeft, supra; Ogg v. Shuter,

by Byles, J., in Moakes v. Nicholson, 1 C. P. Div. 47; and Ex parte Ban-

19 C. B. (N. S.) 290; by Brarnwell and ner, 2 Ch. Div. 278.

Cleasby, BB., in Gabarron v. Kreeft, 3 Citing Van Casteel v. Booker,

L. R. 10 Ex., at pp. 281 and 285; and supra; Brown v. Hare, 4 H. & N. 822;

by Cotton, L. J., in Mirabita v. lm- Joyce v. Swan, 17 C. B. (N. S.) 84;

perial Ottoman Bank, 3 Ex. D. (C. A.), Moakes v. Nicholson, supra.

at p. 172. And the above two points 4 Citing Turner v. Liverpool Dock

were approved as an accurate state- Trustees, 6 Ex. 543; Ellershaw v.

ment of the law by Lord Chelms- Magniac, supra; Brandt v. Bowlby,

ford in Shepherd v. Harrison, L. R. 2 B. & Ad. 932; Van Casteel v. Booker,

4 _ Q. B. 196. in L. R. 4 Q. B. 493, in supra; Moakes v. Nicholson, supra;

L. R. 5 H. L. 116/' Falk v. Fletcher, 18 C. B. (N S.) 403;

2 Citing Wilmshurst v. Bowker, 2 Schotsmans v. Railway Co., 2 Ch. 332;

M. & G. 792; Ellershaw v. Magniac, Gum m v. Tyrie, 33 L. J. Q. B. 97, 34

6 Ex. 570; Wait v. Baker, 2 Ex. 1; id. 124.
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chartered for, the purchaser, yet, in the absence of any appro-

priation of the goods in fulfillment of the contract previous to

shipment, the fact that the vendor has taken a bill of lading

making the goods deliverable to his own order, or that of a

third person, will prevent the property in them from passing

to the purchaser. 2

"-Sixthly. That where a bill of exchange for the price of

goods is inclosed to the buyer for acceptance, together with

the bill of lading, the buyer cannot retain the bill of lading

unless he accepts the bill of exchange; and if he refuse accept-

ance, he acquires no right to the bill of lading or the goods of

which it is the symbol. 2 And the vendor may exercise his jus

disponendi by selling or otherwise disposing of the goods, so

long at least as the buyer remains in default. 3

"Seventhly. But although the vendor may intend the trans-

fer of the property to be conditional upon the buyer's accept-

ance of the bill of exchange, yet, if he puts into the post

addressed to the buyer a bill of lading making the goods de-
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liverable to the buyer's order, he thereby abandons all control

over the goods, and the property thereupon vests uncondition-

ally in the buyer and does not revest in the vendor on the

buyer's failure or refusal to accept the bill of exchange. 4

"Eighthly. When the vendor deals with the bill of lading

only to secure the contract price, as, e. g., by depositing it with

bankers who have discounted the bill of exchange, then the

property vests in the buyer upon the payment or tender by

him of the contract price." 5

§788. Bill of lading consigning goods to buyer.— But a

question more difficult than those considered in the foregoing

sections is presented where the bill of lading, instead of mak-

ing the goods deliverable to the seller or his order, simply de-

1 Citing Gabarron v. Kreeft, supra, distinguishing Shepherd v. Harrison,

2 Citing Shepherd v. Harrison, su- supra.

pra; Ogg v. Shuter, supra; Revv v. 5 Citing Mirabita v. Imperial Otto-

Payne, 1 C. P. D. 47. man Bank, 3 Ex. Div. 1G4, determin-

ating Ogg v. Shuter, supra. ing a point left undecided by Lord

4 Citing Ex parte Banner, supra; Cairns in Ogg v. Shuter, supra.

mi

chartered for, the purchaser, yet, in the absence of any appropriation of tbe goods in fulfillment of the contract previous to
sbipment, the fact that the vendor has taken a bill of lading
making the goods deliverable to his own order, or that of a
third person, will prevent the property in them from passing
to the purchaser. 2
"Sixtlily. That where a bill of exchange for the price of
goods is inclosed to the buyer for acceptance, together with
the bill of lading, the buyer cannot retain the bill of lading
unless he accepts the bill of exchange; and if he refuse acceptance, he acquires no right to the bill of lading or the goods of
which it is the symbol. 2 And the vendor may exercise his jus
disponend~; by selling or otherwise disposing of the gootls, so
long at least as the buyer remains in default. 3
"Seventlily. But although the vendor may in tend the transfer of the property to be conditional upon the buyers acceptance of the bill of exchange, yet, if he puts into the post
addressed to the buyer a bill of lading making the goo ls deliverable to the buyer's order, he thereby abandons all control
over the goods, and the property thereupon vests unconditionally in the buyer and does not revest in the vendor on the
buyer's failure or refu al to accept the bill of exchange. 4
"Eiglit!ily. When the vendor deals with the bill of lading
only to secure the contract price, as, e. g., by depositing it with
bankers who have discounted the bill of exchange, then the
property vests in the buyer upon the payment or tender by
him of the contract price." 5
§ 788. Bill of Iauing consigning goods to buyer.- But a
que tion more difficult than those considered in the foregoing
sections is presented where the bill of lading, instead of making the goods deliverable to the seller or his or ler, simply deCiting Gabarron v. Kreeft, supra.
Citing heph rd v. Harrison, supra; Ogg v. Shuter, supra; Rew v.
Payne, 1 C. P. D. 47.
3 Citing Ogg v.
huter, supra.
4 Citing Ex parte Banner, supra;
I

di tingui bing Shepherd v. Harrison,

I!

supra.
5 Citing firabita v. Imperial Ottoman Bank, 3 Ex. Div. 1G4, determining a point left undecided by Lord
Cairns in Ogg v. Shuter, sitpra.

662

CH. VI.]

CH. VI.]

RESERV .A. TION OF THE JUS DISPONENDI.

[§ 7 8.

RESERVATION OF THE JUS DISPONENDI.

[§ 7S8.

clares that, having been received for carriage from the seller,

they are consigned to the buyer. Upon this subject it is said

in a leading case: 1 " Where goods are delivered by a vendor to

a common carrier, consigned to the vendee, the question whether

I Emery's Sons v. Irving National

Bank (1874), 25 Ohio St. 360, 18 Am.

clares that, having been received for carriage from the seller,
they are consigned to the buyer. Upon this subject it is said
in a leading case: 1 "Where goods are delivered by a ven<lor to
a common ca~rier, consigned to the vendee, the question whether

R. 299. In this case it appeared that

one Mirrielees of New York had been

in the habit of buying goods upon

the order of Thos. Emery's Sons of

Cincinnati, and shipping those goods

to them, drawing drafts upon them

with the bill of lading attached. As

the result of previous transactions

Mirrielees was indebted to Emery's

Sons. On March 24, 1869, he shipped

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 17:51 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t6xw4h56n
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

three casks of stearine to them, tak-

ing from the carrier a bill of lading

or receipt which read as follows:

" Received from G. M. Mirrielees the

following packages (contents and

value unknown) in apparent good

order, and marked as in the margin:

(3) three casks stearine. For Thos.

Emery's Sons." In the margin was

written " Cin., O." On the same day

he drew upon them as follows:

"$299 T y 5 New York,

March 24, 1869.

" On demand, pay to the order of

myself, two hundred and ninety-nine

T %V/ dollars, value received,and charge

the same to account of three casks

stearine. G. M. Mirrielees.

" To Thos. Emery's Sons, Cincinnati."

On March 26th he shipped ten

casks of stearine under a substan-

tially similar bill of lading (except

that the words " Thos. Emery's Sons "

appeared in the margin instead of in

the body), and drew upon them a draft

similar to the other for $1,098 ftfe He

wrote Emery's Sons of the shipments,

inclosing invoices and advising them

of the drafts. He attached these bills

of lading to the drafts, respectively,

and sold the drafts to the Irving Na-

tional Bank of New York. The bank

sent the drafts on to Cincinnati for

collection, but Emery's Sons refused

to accept or pay them. After the

bills of lading and drafts had been

transferred to the bank, Emery's

Sons obtained the stearine from the

carrier and sold it, refusing to ac-

count to the bank, but claiming the

right to apply the proceeds on the

indebtedness of Mirrielees to them.

The action was by the bank against

Emery's Sons to recover the proceeds.

It was held, in an opinion from which

the quotation of the text was taken,

that the bank was entitled to recover,

though a judgment in its favor was

reversed for errors in procedure.

In First National Bank v. Dearborn

(1874), 115 Mass. 219, 15 Am. R. 92, it

Emery's Sons v. Irving National of lading to the drafts, respectively,
Bank (1874), 25 Ohio St. 360, 18 Am. and sold the drafts to the Irving NaR. 299. In this case it appeared that tional Bank of New York. The bank
one Mirrielees of New York had been sent the drafts on to Cincinnati for
in the habit of buying goods upon collection, but Emery's Sons refused
the order of Thos. Emery's Sons of to accept or pay them. After the
Cincinnati, and shipping those goods bills of lading and drafts had been
to them, drawing drafts upon them transferred to the bank, Emery's
with the bill of lading attached. As Sons obtained the stearine from the
the result of previous tran actions carrier and sold it, refusing to acMirrielees was indebted to Eµiery's count to the bank, but claiming the
Sons. On March 24, 1 69, he shipped right to apply the proceeds on the
three casks of stearine to them, tak- indebtedness of Mirrielees to them.
ing from the carrier a bill of lading The action was by the bank against
or receipt which read as follows: Emery's Son to recover the proceed .
"Received from G. M. Mirrielees the It was held, in an opinion from which
following pack'ages (contents and the quotation of the text was taken,
value unknown) in apparent good that the bank was entitled to recover,
order, and marked as in the margin: though a judgment in its favor was
(3) three ca ks stearine. For Thos. reversed for errors in procedure.
Emery's Sons." In the margin was
In First National Bank v. Dearborn
written "Cin., 0." On the same day (1874), 115 1\fass. 219, 15 Am. R. 92, it
he drew upon them as follows:
appearedthatoneParksin Wi consin
"$299r2ir1-(r
NEW YORK,
had been in the habit of shipping
March 24, 1869.
flour to Harvey Scudder & Co. of
"On demand, pay to the order of Boston, drawing upon them for the
myself, two hundred and ninety-nine price. On October 17, 18i0, he delr/o dollars, value received, and charge livered to a carrier in Wisconsin one
the same to account of three casks hundred barrels of flour and received
stearine.
G. M. MIRRIELEES.
a receipt in the following terms:
"To Thos. Emery's Sons, Cincinnati." "Received from R. G. Parks & Co.
On March 26th he shipped ten one hundred barrels of flour branded
ca ks of stearine under a sub tan- W., consigned to Harvey Scudder &
tially similar bill of lading (except Co., Boston, Mass. , via Green Bay."
that the words" Thos. Emery's Sons" At the same time Parks made a draft
appeared in the margin instead of in on Scudder & Co. for $400, to the
the body),and drew upon them a draft order of the cashier of the plaintiff
similar to the other for $1,098 1~. He bank, and delivered to the bank the
wrote Emery's Sons of the shipments, said receipt. The bank thereupon
inclosing invoices and ad vising them placed the $400 to Parks' credit. The
of the drafts. He attached these bills bank sent the draft and receipt to
663
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the title thereby passes from the vendor to the vendee depends

upon the intention of the vendor, which intention is to be gath-

ered from all the circumstances of the transaction.

"If the goods be shipped in pursuance of the purchaser's

the title thereby passes from the vendor to the vendee depends
upon the intention of the vendor, which intention is to be gathered from all the circumstances of the transaction.
"If the goods be shipped in pursuance of the purchaser's

Boston, where Scudder & Co. refused

to accept the draft and disclaimed

any interest in it, and the flour on

arrival was attached by a creditor

of Parks as his property: The action

was replevin by the bank against the

officer. It was admitted that Parks

delivered the receipt to the bank for

the purpose of securing the $400, and

that it was the understanding of the

parties that the flour was transferred

as security for the money. Said the
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court, per Ames, J: "If there was a

sufficient delivery of the property to

the plaintiff there was nothing to

hinder the intention of the parties

from going into full effect. The

character and situation of the prop-

erty at the time of this transaction

were such that an actual delivery

was impossible. A constructive or

symbolical delivery was all that the

circumstances allowed; but a de-

livery of that nature, if properly

made, would have been sufficient to

give to the plaintiff corporation the

title to the property and an imme-

diate right of possession, which it

could maintain, not only against

Parks himself, but also against his

creditors. Tux worth v. Moore, 9 Pick.

(Mass.) 347, 20 Am. Dec. 479; Fetty-

place v. Dutch, 13 Pick. 388, 23 Am.

Dec. 688; Whipple v. Thayer, 16 Pick.

25, 26 Am. Dec. 626; Carter v. Wil-

lard, 19 Pick. 1. The delivery of the

evidences of title, with orders in-

dorsed upon them, would be equiv-

alent to the delivery of the property

itself. Gibson v. Stevens, 8 How.

(U. S.) 384; Nathan v. Giles, 5 Taunt.

558; National Bank of Cairo v.

Crocker, 111 Mass. 163, and cases

there cited. All that would be neces-

sary in such a case would be that

the thing actually delivered should

have been intended as a symbol of

the property sold. . , . It is true

that a receipt of this kind does not

purport on its face to have the quasi-

negotiable character which is some-

times said to belong to bills of lading

in the ordinary form; neither does it

purport in terms to be good to the

bearer. But independently of any

indorsement, or formal transfer in

writing, the possession and produc-

tion of it would be evidence indicat-

ing to the carrier that the bank was

entitled to demand the property, and

that he would be justified in deliver-

ing it to them. There are cases in

which the delivery of a receipt of

Boston, where Scudder & Co. refused 558; National Bank of Cairo v.
to accept the draft and disclaimed Crocker, 111 Mass. 163, and cases
any interest in it, and the flour ou there cited. All that would be necesarrival wa attached by a cr editor sary in s uch a case would be tha t
of Parks as his property: The action the thing actually delivered should
was replevin by the bank agai nst the have been intended as a symbol of
officer. It was admitted that Parks the property sold. . , • It is true
delivered the receipt to the bank for that a receipt of this kind does not
the purpose of securing the $400, and purport on its face to have the quasithat it wa · the underntanding of the negotiable cha racter which is someparties that the flour was transferred times said to belong to bills of lading
as security for the money. Said the in the ordinary form; neither does it
court, ver Ames, J: "If there was a purport in terms to be goqd to the
sufficient deli very of the property to bearer. But ind ependently of any
the plaintiff there was nothing to indorsement, or formal transfer in
hinder the intention of the parties w riting, the possession and producfrom going into full effect. The tion of it would .be evidence indicatcharacter and situation of the prop- ing to the carrier that the bank was
erty at the time of this transaction enti tled to demand the property, and
were such that an actual deli very that he would be justified in deliverwas impos ible. A constructive or ing it to them. There are cases in
symbolical delivery was a ll that the which the delivery of a receipt of
circumstances a llowed; but a de- this nature, thongb not indorsed or
livery of that nature, if properly formally transferred, yet intended
made, would have been sufficient to as a transfer, has been held to be a
give to the plaintiff corporation the good symbolical deli very of the proptitle to the property and an imme- erty described in it. In Haille v.
diate right of possess ion, wh ich it SmHh, 1 B. & P. 563, Eyre,,C. J., uses
could maintain, not only aga inst this lang uage: ' I see no reason why
Parks himself, but also against his we should not expound this doctrine
creditor . Tuxworth v. foore, 9 Pick. of tran ·fer very largely upon the
(l\'Iass.) 347, 20 Am. Dec. 479; Fetty- agreement of the parties and upon
place v. Dutch, 13 Pick. 388, 23 Am. their intent to carry the substance
Dec. 68 ; Whipple v. Thayer, 16 Pick. of that agreement into execution.'
25, 26 Am. Dec. 626; Carter v. Wi l- In Allen v. Williams, 12 Pick. (Mass. )
lard, 19 Pi k. 1. The delivery of the 297, 301, Shaw, C. J., in delivering the
evidence of title, w1th orders in- judgment of the court says: 'Even a
dorsed upon them, would be equiv- sale or pledge of the property withalent to the delivery of the property out a formal bill of lading, by the
it elf. Gib on v. k tev ns, 8 How. shipper, would operate as a good as(U. S.) 384; Nathan v. Giles, 5 Taunt. signment of the property; and the
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order and at bis risk, or if it otherwise appear to be the inten-

tion of the shipper to part with the title, the carrier becomes

the agent of the consignee, and the delivery to him is equiva-

lent to a delivery to the purchaser. If the vendor, however,

in making the consignment and delivering the goods to the

carrier, does not intend to part with his title to and control

over them, the carrier must be regarded as the agent of the

consignor and not of the consignee.

§ 789. " In all such transactions," continued the court, " the

bill of lading is an important item, of proof as to the intention,

delivery of an informal or unin-

dorsed bill of lading, or other docu-

order and at his risk, or if it otherwise appear to be the intention of the shipper to part with the title, the carrier becomes
the agent of the consignee, and the delivery to him is equivalent to a delivery to the purchaser. If the vendor, however,
in making the consignment and delivering the goods to the
carrier, does not intend to part with his title to and control
over them, the carrier must be regarded as the agent of the
consignor and not of the consignee.

mentary evidence of the shipper's

property, would be a good symbolical

delivery, so as to vest the property in

the plaintiff.' It is true that he adds
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that it was not necessary to place

§ 789. "In all such transactions," continued the court, "the
bill of lading is an important item. of proof as to the intention,

the case upon that ground. But this

dictum was cited with entire appro-

bation, in a case raising that exact

point, in the court of appeals of the

state of New York. Bank of Roches-

ter v. Jones, 4 N. Y. 497, 55 Am. Dec.

290. In that case, as in this, the

plaintiff had discounted a draft

drawn against a quantity of flour,

and its title, as in this case, depended

upon a carrier's receipt, delivered to

it without any written indorsement.

The court held that the plaintiff

thereby acquired a sufficient title to

the property, and could call the con-

signee to account for it, he having

converted the property to his own

use, without accepting the draft. It

is not necessary to hold that the

plaintiff was absolute owner of the

property; it is enough that it had a

right of property and of possession to

secure the payment of the particular

draft; and the right of the former

owner, Parks, in the specific prop-

erty, had become divested, leaving

him only a right in the surplus

money which might remain after a

sale of the flour and a payment of

the draft from the proceeds. De

Wolf v. Gardner, 12 Cush. (Mass.) 19,

24, 59 Am. Dec. 165." Following and

approving First National Bank v.

Dearborn; see National Bank v.

Bayley (1874), 115 Mass. 228: New-

comb v. Railroad Co. (1874), 115 Mass.

230; Alderman v. Railroad Co. (1874),

115 Mass. 233. See also Douglas v.

People's Bank (1887), 86 Ky. 176, 9

Am. St. R. 276, 5 S. W. R. 420; Mer-

chants' National Bank v.Bangs(1869),

102 Mass. 291; Hobart v. Littlefield

(1882), 13 R. I. 341; Halsey v. Warden

(1881), 25 Kan. 128; Wigton v. Bow-

ley (1881), 130 Mass. 252; Robinson v.

Pogue (1888), 86 Ala. 257, 5 S. R. 685;

The St. Joze Indiano (1816), 1 Wheat,

208.

[But in Hallgarten v. Oldham

(1883), 135 Mass. 1, 46 Am. R. 433, the

delivery of an informal or unin- him only a right in the surplus
dor ed bill of lading, or other docu- money which might remain after a
mentary evidence of the shipper's sale of the flour and a payment of
property, would be a good symbolical the draft from the proceeds. De
delivery, so as to vest the property in ·wolf v. Gardner, 12 Cush. (Ma s.) 19,
the plaintiff.' It is true that he adds 24, 59 Am. Dec. 165. ' Following and
that it was not neces ary to place approving First National Bank v.
the case upon that ground. But this Dearborn; see National Bank v.
dictum was cited with entire appro- Bayley (1874), 115 fas. 228; Ne\'bation, in a case rai. ing that exact comb v. Railroad Co. (1874), 115 'lass.
point, in the court of appeals of the 230; Alderman v. Railroad Co. (1874),
state of New York. Bank of Roches- 115 Ma . 233. See al o Douglas v.
ter v. Jone , 4 N. Y. 497, 55 .Am. Dec. People's Bank (1887), 86 Ky. 176, 9
290. In that case, as in this, the Am. St. R. 276, 5 S. W. R. 420; Merplain tiff had discounted a draft chants' National Bank v.Bangs(l869),
drawn against a quantity- of flour, 102 Mas . 291; Hobart v. Littlefield
and its title, a in this case, depended (1 82), 13 R. I. 341; Hal ·ey v. Warden
upon a carrier's receipt, delivered to (1881), 25 Kan. 128· Wigton v. Bowit without any written indor ement. ley (1881), 100 Mass. 252; Robinson v.
The court held that the plaintiff Pogue (18 ), 86 Ala. 257, 5 S. R. 685;
thereby acquired a sufficient title to The St. Joze Indiano (1 16), 1 Wheat.
the property, and could call the con- 208.
[But in Hallgarten v. Oldham
signee to account for it, he having
converted the property to bis own (1 3), 135 l\fas . 1, 46 Am. R. 433, the
u e, without accepting the draft. It court que tion First National Bank v.
is not necessary to hold that the Dearborn, sup-ra, on the ground that,
plaintiff was absolute owner of the in principle, the transfer of the docuproperty; it is enough that it had a ment can only be ufficient when the
right of property and of possession to document originally was made "to
secure the payment of the particular order " or the like, or the issuer has
draft; and the right of the former subsequently consented to become
owner, Parks, in the pecific prop- the purchaser's bailee.]
erty, had become di vested, leaving
665
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but it is not necessarity conclusive of the question. If the bill

of lading shows that the consignment was made for the benefit

of the consignor or his order, it is very strong proof of his in-

tention to reserve the jus dlsponendi. And on the other hand,

if the bill of lading shows that the shipment is made for the

benefit of the consignee, it is almost decisive of the consignor's

intention to part with the ownership of the property. If the

bill of lading does not disclose the person for whose benefit the

consignment is made, it is of less weight on the question of

the shipper's intention. We have no doubt, however, that if the

bill of lading shows a consignment by vendor to vendee, and

no other circumstance appears as to the intention, it will be

taken as prima facie evidence of an unconditional delivery to

the vendee.

" As between the consignor and consignee, the bill of lading

cannot be regarded as a contract in writing, but merely as an

admission or declaration on the part of the consignor as to his

purpose, at the time, in making the shipment, and such admis-
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sion is subject to be rebutted by other circumstances connected

with the transaction." *

§ 790. Transfer of bill of lading during transit.— Con-

tinuing in the case referred to in the last section, 1 the court

further says: "By the rules of commercial law, bills of lading

are regarded as symbols of the property therein described, and

the delivery of such bill by one having an interest in or a right

to control the property is equivalent to a delivery of the prop-

erty itself. A consignor who has reserved the^s dlsponendi

may effectuate a sale or pledge of the property consigned, by

delivery of the bill of sale to the purchaser or pledgee, as com-

pletely as if the property were, in fact, delivered. If such

transfer of the bill of lading be made after the property has

passed into the actual possession of the consignee, the trans-

but it is not necessarily conclusive of the question. If the bill
of Jading shows that the consignment was made for the benefit
of the consignor or his order, it is very strong proof of his int ention to reserve thejus disponencli. And on the other hand,
if the bill of lading shows that the shipment is made for the
benefit of the con ignee, it is almost decisive of tbe consignor's
intention to part with the ownership of the property. If the
bill of lading does not disclose the p r on for whose benefit the
consignment is made, it is of less weight on the question of
the shipper's intention. We have no doubt, however, that if the
bill of lading shows a consignment by vendor to vendee, and
no other circum tance appears as to the intention, it will be
taken as JJrimajucie evidence of an unconditional deli very to
the vendee.
·
"As bet ween the consignor and consignee, the bill of lading
cannot be regarded as a contract in writing, but merely as an
admission or declaration on the part of the consignor as to his
purpose, at the time, in making the shipment, and such admission is subject to be rebutted by other circumstances connected
with the transaction."

feree of the bill takes it subject to any right or lien which the

consignee may have acquired by reason of his possession. But

1 Emery's Sons v. Irving National Bank, 25 Ohio St. SCO, 18 Am. R. 299,

stated in preceding note.

§ 790. Transfer of bill of lading during transit .-Oontinuing in the case referred to in the last section,1 the court
further says: "By the rules of commercial law, bills of lading
are regarded as symbols of the property therein described, and
the delivery of such bill by one having an interest in or a right
to control the property is equivalent to a delivery of the property it ~ elf. A consignor who has reserved thejits clisponencli
may effectuate a sale or pledge of the property consigned, by
delivery of the bill of sale to the purchaser or pledgee, as completely as if the property were, in fact, delivered. If such
transfer of the bill of lading be made after the property has
passed into the aCt ual possession of the consignee, the transferee of the bill takes it subject to any right or lien which the
con ignee may have acquired by rea on of his possession. But
1 Emery's
ons v. Irving National Bank, 25 Ohio St. 360, 18 Am. R. 299,
stateJ. in preceding note.
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if the bill of lading be transferred by way of sale or pledge to

a third person, before the property comes into the possession

of the consignee, the consignee takes the property subject to

any right which the transferee of the bill may have acquired

by the symbolic delivery of the property to him. The principle

on which the title to the goods maybe transferred by transfer

of the bill of lading is wholly distinct from that on which the

right of stoppage in transitu rests. The right to stop goods in

transit exists only where the vendor has consigned them to the

buyer under circumstances which vest the title in the buyer.

The transfer of goods by delivering the bill of lading can be

made only in cases where the vendor has not parted with the

title."

§ 791, — . — . It is to be kept in mind that the case from which

the foregoing language is quoted was one in which the bill of

lading had not consigned the goods to the seller's order, but

was a mere receipt naming the buyer as the consignee. Where

the bill of lading is expressly taken to the seller's order, there
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can, of course, be no doubt about his power to transfer the title

by assignment; but where the seller is simply named as con-

signor and the buyer as the consignee, then the language of the

foregoing section is applicable. In another case l of this latter

sort the court said: "If a bill of lading in favor of the con-

signee, although such consignee be the agent or factor of the

consignor, may be transferred by the consignor by delivery for

a valuable consideration, we can conceive of no reason, in the

absence of statutory inhibition, why such bill in favor of a con-

signee who is a purchaser, when retained by the consignor, may

not be transferred in the same way. We can see no difference

in principle. If extraneous evidence is admissible to show the

real intent of the consignor as to the retention of the title of

the goods covered by the bill in the one case, it must be in the

other."

§ 790, . Where, therefore, the seller by either method

has reserved the jus disponendi, he may, by assignment of the

i Scharff v. Meyer (1895), 133 Mo. 428, 34 S. W. R. 858, 54 Am. St. R. 672.
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bill of lading, sell, assign or pledge his interest in the goods as

fully as by a delivery of the goods themselves, and the pledgee

or assignee for value will obtain a good title, even though such

a transfer by the seller were in violation of his contract with

the buyer. 1

Such dealings with the bill of lading — particularly in pledg-

ing it as security for discounts or advancements upon bills of

exchange drawn against the goods — are of daily occurrence,

and the rights of the assignee or pledgee are constantly

enforced.' 3

iPer Bramwell, L. J., in Mirabita

v. Imperial Ottoman Bank (1878), 3

Ex. Div. 164, citing AVait v. Baker, 2

Ex. 1; Gabarron v. Kreeft, L. R. 10

bill of la ling, ell a ign or pledge hi intere t in the goocl, as
fully a bv a delivery of the good them el ve an l the pl eel ·ee
or a ~ 1 anee for value will obtain a good title ev n though uch
a tran fer by the seller 'Yere in violation of hi contract with
the bu.rer. 1
uch dealings with the bill of lading - particularl in p edging it a ecurit for di count or advancement upon bills of
exchange drawn again t the good - are of daily occurrence,
and the right of the a ignee or pledgee are con tan tly
enfor eel.a

Ex. 274.

- When the goods are delivered to
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the carrier, but the right of disposi-

tion is retained in the seller by the

bill of lading or receipt, then the de-

livery of the bill or receipt, even with-

out indorsement, for value transfers

the property. Scharff v. Meyer (1895),

133 Mo. 428, 34 S. W. R. 858, 54 Am.

St. R. 672. To same effect: Means v.

Bank of Randall (1892), 146 U. S. 620;

Dows v. National Exchange Bank

1 875 . 91 U. S. 618; Union Pac. R. Co.

v. Johnson (1895). 45 Neb. 57. 63 X. W.

R. 144; Bank of Rochester v. Jones

(1851), 4 N Y. 497, 55 Am. Dec. 290:

In re Non-Magnetic Watch Co. (1895),

89 Hun, 196; Mich. Cent. R. Co. v.

Phillips (1871), 60 111- 190; Holmes v.

German Bank (1878), 87 Pa. St. 525:

Holmes v. Bailey (1879), 92 Pa. St. 57:

First Nat. Bank v. Pettit (1872), 9

Heisk (56 Tenn.) 447; Forbes v. Rail-

road Co. H882), 133 Mass. 154; Com-

mercial Bank v. Pfeiffer (1888), 108

N. Y. 242. 15 N. E. R. 311; First Nat.

Bank v. Kelley (1874), 57 N Y. 34;

Richardson v. Nathan (1895), 167 Pa.

St. 513, 31 Atl. R. 740; Ha haway v.

Haynes (1878), 124 Mass. 311; Cayuga

Nat, Bank v. Daniels (1872),- 47 N. Y.

631; Heiskell v. Bank (1879), 89 Pa.

St. 155.

In Mich. Cent. R. Co. v. Phillips

(1871), 60 III. ISO {siqyra), a number of

barrels of wine were shipped to one

Ames and hauled to his store, with

the evident understanding that pay-

ment was to be a condition precedent

to the vesting of the title. Upon ob-

taining possession of the goods Ames

shipped them on board a car of the

Michigan Central Railroad, consigned

to a party in New York, and drew a

draft against them, which, with bill

of lading attached, was discounted

by a Chicago bank. The bill of lad-

ing was not indorsed, and it was ob-

jected that on this account no valid

transfer of title took place, even as-

suming that Ames was in a position

to transfer title. The court held that

Ames could transfer a good title,

1 P r Bram"ell L. J. in Mira bi ta Hayne (1 7 , 12-11\Ia s. 311: Cayuga
v. Imperial Ottoman Bank (1 7 ), 3 Nat. Bank '· Daniels (1 9),. 4 X Y.
Ex. Div. 164 citing Wait v. Baker, 2 631; Hei kell v. Bank (1 19 ), 9 Pa.
Ex. 1; Gabarron v. Kreeft, L. R. 10
t. 15-,
Ex. 974.
In )Iich. ent. R Co. v. Phillip
2 ·when the croods are delfrered to
(1 il) 60 Ill. 190 ( upra), a numb r of
the carrier. but the right of di po i- barrel of "ine " ere hipped t o one
tion i retained in the ._ eller by the
me and hauled to hi
tore. "ith
bill of lading or receipt then the de- the e\ident under tanding t hat paylivery of the bill or receipt, even " ith- ment wa to be a condition precedent
out indorement, for 'alue tran fer to the ve tin<Y of the title. Upon obthe property. charff v. Meyer (1 95), tafaing po e ion of the good mes
133 Io. 42 34 . W. R. 5 , 54 Am.
hipped them on board a car of the
St. R. 6i'1 • To ame effect: 1\Ieans v.
:Iichigan CentralRailroad,co:1 igned
Bank of Randall (1 99.), Hu U.S. 620; to a party in New York, anu drew a.
Dow. v. National Exchange Bank draft against them, which, with bill
(1 75), 91 U.S. 61 ; Union P a . R. Co. of lading attached, wa discounted
'·John on (1 95) 45 Neb. 57 63 "N. \\. by a hicago bank. The blll of ladR. 1-14; Bank of Roche, ter '· J one ing "a not in r ·e , and it wa ob(1 - 1). 4 N. Y. 497 55
m. Dec. 290: jected that on thi account no vali
In re ~on-:\Iagnetic Watch o. (1 95) tran fer of title took place, e'en as9 Hun 196· :Mich. ent. R. Co. v.
urning that Ame w?t in a po ition
Phillip (1 il) 60 IIL 19 · Holme v. to tran fer title. The court helrl hat
German Bank 1 i ), i Pa. t. - ?5· _ me could tran fer a good title,
Holme v. Ba iley (1 79), 9 Pa. St. 57; ince he bad been intru ted with the
Ffr ~ t ::Sat. Bank v. Pettit (1 12), 9 indicia of owner, hip by hi ' endor,
Hei k. (.-6 T nn.) 447; Forbe v. Rail- and tha t the bank wa a bona fide
road o. 11 2), 133 )fa . 15-!; Com- p urcha. er for value. Delh-ery of he
mercial ank '· Pfeiffer (1
), 10
bill wa tantamount to delfrery of
N. Y. -42, i.- N. E. R. 811 · Fir Xat. the ood , and "a a effi caciou, t
Bank v. K lley (1 i-1
7 X Y. 34; 'e t itle· and he fac of it bein<Y
R ic:harrl. n '· 1 ~athan (1 .) . 16- Pa. unindor ed would not, a in the ca e
St. 513, 31 _ tL R. -10· a h way '· of a negotiable in trument, convey
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,5 793. How when goods sent C. 0. D. — "Whether the seller,

who has delivered goods to the carrier for transportation to

the buyer, thereby transfers the title, if he send them C. O. D.,

is a question upon which, it has been seen, the authorities are

only an equitable interest, but the

legal title itself pass

3. How when good eut . O. D .-\\be her the eller
who ha delivere good~ to the carrier for tran portation to
the buyer thereb. - tran fer~ the title, if he encl them
.,
a que ion upon \\bich it ha been een; the authoritie are
R ..

In Commercial Bank v. Pfeiffer

1888), 1 - N. Y. 242, 15 N. E. R. 311

{supra . the defendants, who were

dealers in live-stock in Buffalo, agreed

with the plaintiff, a banking corpo-

ration of Iowa, to accept and pay the

sight drafts of one Quick for cattle

and hogs purchased by him, after

notification of shipment and receipt

of bills of lading. Under this arrange-
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ment a shipment was made and a

sight draft for $5,63L*82 was drawn

by Quick to the order of plaintiff's

cashier and sent to defendants with

bill of lading attached. Defendants

obtained the live-stock without the

production of the bill of lading, sold

the same, and turned over the pro-

ceeds of the sale. s5. - 249.1T. to the

holder of the draft and bill of lading.

The difference between the face of

the draft and the amount paid on it,

§380.35, the defendants claimed the

right to retain on account of a de-

mand held by them against Quick

for a loss sustained on a previous

shipment. But the court held that

the plaintiff, who discounted the

draft for Quick and took the bill of

lading, had a special interest in the

property to the amount of the draft,

and the defendants had no right to

receive and retain the property and

dishonor the draft. The court said:

"It is settled beyond dispute in this

State that the discount of a draft

drawn by a consignor upon his con-

signee, which is accompanied by the

delivery of a bill of lading to the

party making the advance, passes to

such party not only the legal title to

such property, but, in the eye of the

law, the transfer of the bill of lading

is regarded as an actual delivery and

an actual change of possession of the

property."

The same question, under practi-

cally the same state of facts, was

^•red in Holmes v. German

Bank 1878 M Pa. St 525 [supra),

and the court held that the defend-

ants could not retain the proceeds of

a sale of the goods consigned, on ac-

count of an old debt owed by the

consignor to them; for the bank,

which had discounted a draft drawn

by the consignor against the goods

and taken the bill of lading as se-

curity, had thereby appropriated the

proceeds of the sale to the satisfac-

tion of its demand, and this was true

only an equitable intere t. ut the
leO' l title it lf pa. _ed.
In Commercial Bank v. Pf iffer
(1 n-. 1 _-. Y. 2±2, 15 _-. E. R 311
1. upra. the defen ant . who were
dealer in lfre-- ock in Buffalo.a!!"ree
\Yith the plaintiff a bankinY corporation of Iowa. to accept and pay the
. iYht ra t of one Quick for cattle
and. 1 o(J'- purcha eJ by him, after
notification of hipment an receipt
f bill of la in O',
n er thi arranO'emen t a h1pment wa ma e an a
icrht <lraft for 25.U31. 2 wa <lr wn
Ly uick to the orJer of plaintiff'
ca ~ hier and -en to defon<lant with
bill of laclinO' attache . Defen ant
obtained the li\e-vtock without the
proJuction of the bill of ladinO' vol
the
me and turned o>er the proceed of the · le. C5.2-t9.-1 T, to the
hold.er of the draft and. bill of la in O',
The difference between the face of
the draft an the amount paid on it
""'3-0.~.5. the defendant claimed the
right to retain on account of a demantl held by them aO'ain t
uick
for a lo_
tained on a prenous
hipment. But the court held that
the plaintiff who d.iscounte
the
draft for uick and took the bill of
ladinO', had. a pecial intere tin the
property to the amount of the draft
an the defendant had no ri<Yht to
r ecei'e and retain the property an
(Ii' honor the draft. The cour sai :
, It · ettleJ beyond di pute in thi
tate that the di coun of a draft
drawn by a con i<Ynor upon hi coniO'nee, which · accompanied by the
delirnry of a bill of lading to the

GG

party makino- the a rnnce pa- e- to
u h party no only the lezal title to
uch property, but, in the eye of the
law. tie tran fer of the uiil of laclinois reO'arded a an actual eli>ery an
an actual chanO'e of --e_-ion of the
property."
The
me que ion. u:i er practically the :: me _tate ·of fac , w a
c n i ere 1 in Holme- '" German
ank L..; Tv . 7 Pa. t. 525 ( upra.
an the court held that the defendant could no retain the procee of
a le of the crooc c n-:i~ne . n account of an ol debt
-e by the
con iQ"Ilor to them: for the bank
which ha u· -counte a draft drawn
by the con i<Ynor aO'ain -t the O'OO
an taken the bill of ladin(J' a
ecurity, ha thereby appropriated the
procee ~ of tl e
e to the · ti fa tion of it demand. an thi wa true
w!Jether the bill of laclin(J' wa indo1 - ed or not.
In Forb '· Railroad Co. (12 ... 2 .
133 1[a " 1.--! :~upra , a firm of !!rain
dealer in Chica<YO, in revpon-e to an
order forwarde fifty carloa
of
corn to Bo ton. c n iQ"Iled by bill of
lauinO' to their own order at Bo ton.
.A draft upon the purcha e . toether with the bill of ladinO'. wa ~
ent to a Bo ton bank, and Up0l1 payment by the pureha er of the
amount of the draft it wa deli·rnre .
with the bill of ladin<Y. to them. Immediately thereafter the draft an
bill of ladinO' were ind.or ed o>er to
the plaintiff . a
ecurity for an a \ance then made by the plaintiff to
the full amount of the draft. I
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much in conflict. 1 The practice of sending goods C. O. D. is

one quite largely confined to those cases in which the carrier

is an express company, though it is, of course, available in the

case of other carriers.

It is insisted in some cases, as has been already noticed, that

the delivery to the carrier has the usual effect to pass the title,

and that the result of the instructions to deliver only upon pay-

ment, or to collect on delivery, is simply to make the carrier

the agent of the seller to collect and return the price. 2 Ac-

cording to this view, obviously, the sale is complete at the time

and place of delivery, though the seller has a lien upon the

o-oods for the price and an action against the carrier if he de-

livers them without obtaining the price. 3

§ 794, . In other cases it is urged that the shipment

C. O. D. very clearly makes the carrier the agent of the seller,

not only to collect the price, but to carry and deliver the goods.
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defendants, and indorsed and de-

livered by Lyons to the bank, with

the bill of lading for the four cars.

much in conflict. 1 The practice of sending goods 0. 0. D. is
one quite largely confined to those cases in which the carrier
is an express company, though it is; of course, available in the
case of other carriers.
It is insisted in some cases, as has been already noticed, that
the delivery to the carrier has the usual effect to pass the title,
and that the result of the instructions to deliver only upon payment, or to collect on delivery, is simply to make the carrier
the agent of the seller to collect and return the price. 2 According to this view, obviously, the sale is complete at the time
and place of delivery, though the seller has a lien upon the
goods for the price and an action against the carrier if he delivers them without obtaining the pric"e. 3

The draft and bill of lading were

presented to the defendants, but the

draft was not accepted or paid.

Three hours afterwards the defend-

ants sold the cattle, but kept the pro-

ceeds because they claimed that

§ 794:. - - . In other cases it is urged that the shipment
C. 0. D. very clearly makes the carrier the agent of the seller,
not only to collect the price, but to carry and deliver the goods.

Lyons was indebted to them on an

old account. The court held that

the bank was entitled to recover the

proceeds from the defendants.

1 See ante, § 740, notes.

2 See State v. Peters (1897), 91 Me.

31, 39 Atl. R. 342; State v. Intoxicat-

ing Liquors (1882), 73 Me. 278; Com.

v. Fleming (1889), 130 Pa. St. 138, 18

AtL R 622, 17 Am. St. R 763, 5 L. R.

A. 470; Norfolk R Co. v. Barnes (1889),

104 N. C. 25; Pilgreen v. State (1882).

71 Ala. 368; State v. Carl (1884), 43

Ark. 353, 51 Am. R 565, more fully

stated ante, § 740, note.

8 See Com. v. Fleming, supra.

was held that, by the transfer of the

draft and bill of lading by the orig-

inal purchasers of the corn to the

plaintiffs, the title and property in

the corn passed to them.

In Means v. Bank (1892), 146 U. S.

620 (supra), one Lyons, desiring to

purchase cattle from one Patterson,

the plaintiff bank paid the purchase-

money for Lyons to Patterson, and

Patterson delivered the cattle to the

bank, and they were shipped by rail

to the defendants, in six cars, to sell,

accompanied by Patterson, Lyons

and one Guthrie. A bill of lading

for four of the cars was issued in the

name of Lyons. A bill of lading was

to be issued for the other two cars

in the name of Guthrie, as a pass

could be issued to only two persons

on one bill of lading. Guthrie had

no interest in the cattle. The cattle

in the six cars were delivered to the

defendants. A draft was drawn by

Lyons against the shipment on the
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was held that, by the transfer of the defendants, and indorsed and dedraft and bill of lading by the orig- livered by Lyons to the bank_. with
inal purchasers of the corn to the the bill of lading for the four cars.
plaintiffs, the title and property in The draft. and bill of lading were
presented to the defendants, but the
the corn passed to them.
draft
was not accepted or paid.
ln Means v. Bank (1892), 146 U.S.
620 (supra), one Lyons, desiring to Three hours afterwards the defendpurchase cattle from one Patterson, ants sold the cattle, but kept the prothe plaintiff bank paid the purcl!ase- ceeds becau e they claimed that
money for Lyons to Patterson, and Lyons was indebted to them on an
Patterson delivered the cattle to the old account. The court held that
bank, and they were shipped by rail the bank was entitled to recover the
to the defendants, in six cars, to sell, proceeds from the defendants.
accompanied by Patterson, Lyons
1 See ante, § 740, notes.
and one Guthrie. A bill of lading
2 See State v. Peters (1897), 91 Me.
for four of the cars was issued in the 31, 39 Atl. R. 342; State v. Intoxicatname of Lyons. A bill of lading was ing Liquors (1882), 73 Me. 278; Com.
to be issued for the other two cars v. Fleming (1889), 130 Pa. St. 138, 18
in the name of Guthrie, as a pass Atl R. 622, 17 Am. St. R. 763, 5 L. R.
could be issued to only two persons A. 470; Norfolk R. Co. v. Barnes(1889),
on one bill of lading. Guthrie bad 104 N. C. 25; Pilgreen v. State (1882).
no interest in the cattle. The cattle 71 Ala. 36 ; State v. Carl (1884), 43
in the six cars were delivered to the Ark. 353, 51 Am. R. 565, more fully
defendants. A draft was drawn by stated ante,§ 740, note.
Lyons against the shipment on the
a See Com. v. Fleming, supra.
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CH. VI.] RESERVATION OF THE JUS DISPONENDI. [§§ 795, 796.

" In such cases the possession of the express company is the

possession of the seller, and generally the right of property

remains in the seller until the payment of the price." 1 Accord-

ing to this view, clearly, the sale takes place at the time and

place of delivery to the buyer, and the seller retains the title

and the right of disposal until that time. 2

§ 795. How when goods were to be delivered F. 0. B.—

Some attention has been given in a previous chapter 3 to the

effect of contracts to deliver the goods " f. o. b." (free on board)

at a designated place. As has there been seen, such an agree-

ment means ordinarily, where the place specified is the place

of shipment, that the seller will put the goods on board the

ship or car for transportation without charge to the buyer for

cartage or loading; and, where the place specified is the place

of delivery, that the seller will also pay the freight to that

point.

§ 796. . This language, however, especially in the Eng-

lish cases, has often been thought to affect the question of the
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reservation of the jtis disponendi. Thus, where the agreement

was to deliver the goods f. o. b. at the point of shipment, and

the seller took a bill of lading to his own order, but imme-

diately indorsed it and sent it to the buyer, it was held that

the agreement to deliver free on board threw light upon the

intention with which the bill of lading was so taken. 4 " The

real question," said the court, "has been on the intention with

which the bill of lading was taken in this form; whether the

consignor shipped the goods in performance of his contract to

place them ' free on board,' or for the purpose of retaining a

iSee State v. O'Neil (1885), 58 Vt. (1893), 115 Mo. 428, 22 S. W. R. 363, 37

140, 56 Am. R. 557 (see also O'Neil v. Am. St. R. 406, more fully stated

Vermont, 144 U. S. 323, where this ante, § 740, note,

case was considered at much length, 2 See also Wagner v. Hallack (1877),

but the writ of error was dismissed 3 Colo. 176.

for want of jurisdiction); United 3 See ante, §§ 733 and 741, notes.

States v. Shriver (1885), 23 Fed. R. 134 * Browne v. Hare (1858), 4 Hurl. &

(s. c. sub nom. People v. Shriver, 31 Nor. 822, per Erie, J. See also Stock

Alb. L, Jour. 163); State v. Wingfield v. Inglis (1884), 12 Q. B. Div. 564
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control over them and continuing to be owner, contrary to the

contract." "The contract was for the purchase of unascer-

tained goods, and the question has been, when the property

passed. For the answer the contract must be resorted to, and

under that we think the property passed when the goods were

placed ' free on board ' in performance of the contract." l

§ 797, , But in a later case where the bill of lading, in-

stead of being sent to the buyer, was attached to a draft for

the price and sent forward for collection, it was held by the

court of appeal that the jus disponendi had been effectually

retained notwithstanding the agreement to deliver free on

control over them and continuing to be owner, contrary to the
contract." "The contract was for the purchase of unascertained goods, and the question has been, when the property
passed. For the answer the contract must be resorted to, and
under that we think the property passed when the goods were
placed 'free on board' in performance of the contract." 1

board, which the court below had deemed strong evidence of

a contrary intention. 2

Where, however, the language was "Prices f. o. b. Omaha,"

the majority of the court in Nebraska held that while this

might ordinarily " afford a presumption that the delivery was

to be made at Omaha and that title should there pass," there

was other evidence in the case sufficient to overthrow it and

3
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justify the conclusion that the title passed on shipment. 3

i " As in the case of Wait v. Baker, 2 Ogg v. Shuter (1875), L. R. 10 C. P.

2 Exch. 1, and (as is explained in 159, 1 C. P. Div. 47.

Turner v. Trustees of Liverpool 3 Neimeyer Lumber Co. v. Burling-

Docks, 6 Exch. 543) Van Casteel v. ton, etc. R. Co. (1898), 54 Neb. 321, 74

Booker, 2 Exch. 691." N. W. R. 670, 40 L R. A. 534.
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§ 797. - - . But in a later case where the bill of lading, instead of being sent to the buyer, was attached to a draft for
the price and sent forward for collection, it was held by the
court of appeal that the } its dis1Jonendi had been effectually
retained notwithstanding the agreement to deliver free on
board, which the court below had deemed strong evidence of
a contrary intention. 2
Where, however, the language was "Prices f. o. b. Omaha,"
the majority of the court in Nebraska held that while this
Jnight ordinarily ''afford a presumption that the delivery was
to be made at Omaha and that title should there pass," there
was other evidence in the case sufficient to overthrow it and
justify the conclusion that the title passed on shipment. 3
l "As in the case of Wait v. Baker,
2 Ogg v. Shuter (1875), L. R. 10 C. P.
2 Exch. 1, and (as is explained in 159, 1 C. P. Div. 47.
Turner v. Trustees of Liverpool
s Neimeyer Lumber Co. v. BurlingDocks, 6 Exch. 543) Van Casteel v. ton, etc. R. Co. (1898), 54 Neb. 321, 74
Booker, 2 Exch. 691."
N. W. R. 670, 40 L. R. A. 534.
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